Talk:Iraq War/Archive 28

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Secret detention and torture centers

Currently, this article has no coverage of the secret detention and torture centers summarized in this news investigation. Since the article's coverage of human rights abuses on all sides is covered in brief phrases organized in bulleted lists, contrary to WP:PROSE, I wonder how other editors think these detention centers should be covered. EllenCT (talk) 10:51, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

SPC detention centres bought video cameras, funded by the US military, which they used to film detainees for the show. When the show began to outrage the Iraqi public, Samari remembers being in the home of General Adnan Thabit – head of the special commandos – when a call came from Petraeus's office demanding that they stop showing tortured men on TV.

It was a real "secret" alright. CJK (talk) 12:36, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

That's all you have to say about this? -Darouet (talk) 13:42, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

There is already information in the article about militia infiltration of the police and acts of torture. We do not need to supplement that with sensationalist propaganda about so-called "secret" facilities. CJK (talk) 15:11, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

The human rights abuses section should be rewritten in line with WP:PROSE, if any NPOV editor wants to take that on. This information should be included. Short of doing all that, it could be referenced on the list for now. Truthwillneverdie (talk) 18:42, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Proposed Change #2

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that they intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted. Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been one of the main arguments for the invasion. The United States’ most senior intelligence officers disputed the Bush administration’s claims that the motivation for war was based on pre-war intelligence regarding WMD. Paul R. Pillar, the CIA official who coordinated U.S. intelligence on the Middle East from 2000 to 2005, said the "broad view" within the intelligence community both in the United States and overseas "was that Saddam was being kept 'in his box' " by U.N. sanctions, and that the best way to deal with him was through "an aggressive inspections program to supplement sanctions already in place." Pillar states the "Official intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs was flawed, but even with its flaws, it was not what led to the war." Instead, he asserted, the administration "went to war without requesting -- and evidently without being influenced by -- any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq." Similarly, George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, stated Vice President Dick Cheney and other Bush administration officials pushed the country to war in Iraq without ever conducting a “serious debate” about whether Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States.

changed to

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had missile programs that violated U.N. range restrictions, that Iraq had the capability of producing mustard gas and anthrax, and that its dual-use infrastructure was expanding despite debilitating sanctions. But Iraq had no active chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons programs and its past WMD programs had either been dismantled by prior U.N. inspections or had been secretly destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991 in an attempt to conceal WMD capabilities from the U.N. They intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted or otherwise disintegrated. Some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were also found.

Comment: The personal view (read: after the fact second guessing) of one individual has no business being in this article, let alone the lead section.

CJK (talk) 15:17, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

That is completely misleading in so many ways, and just plain false in others. [1] doesn't even mention anthrax. To claim it says Iraq could produce anthrax is about as far from the truth as it is possible to get. What is the point of this, anyway? To the extent that some of your other points below may have found legitimate bias issues, instead of tempering them by adding alternative views, you want to entirely replace them with the opposite bias. Have you read WP:NPOV? EllenCT (talk) 18:30, 1 July 2013 (UTC)

Really? I guess you missed this. [2]

ISG judges that a break-out production capability existed at one site, the State Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances, SDI, at Samarra. Since Iraq could relocate production assets such as fermentors, other sites with basic utilities could also be converted for break-out. A full program to include R&D and production or even just large scale production would require months rather than weeks to re-initiate in a break-out context.

A break-out of large-scale proportion would require all three key production elements; fermentor capacity, media capacity, and technical expertise. A break-out capability must also take into consideration the scale and scope of the program being considered. Modest or small-scale break-outs would be easier and require less time after a decision to do so was made. For a larger scale and scope such as Iraq possessed in 1990 would require more equipment, larger supply source, more personnel and a longer time period for effective start-up. Iraq, having had achieved a maturing program, had a core group of experienced personnel; a better start than existed in 1985. Personnel are movable assets as is growth media. While sanctions and inspections may be a hindrance to an ample supply of media, it would not have been a show stopper. Iraq developed a milk and corn byproduct media that is judged to be adequate for the production of anthrax spores, albeit of a reduced production efficiency. Thus, the equipment for the scale and scope of a program becomes the critical factor to evaluate a breakout capability.

ISG assesses the SDI to have the fixed assets that could be converted for BW agent production within four to five weeks after the decision to do so, including utilities, personnel with know-how, and the equipment (with slight modifications) required. Media and additional less-skilled personnel could be obtained (see Figure 10).

ISG judges the movable assets at the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant could provide the core of an alternative break-out capability at any other suitable site in Iraq, perhaps within 2 to 3 weeks after the decision to do so. The 1 cubic meter tanks or fermentors presently unaccounted for are other important assets that, if indeed still exist, could, when combined with the Al Dawrah FMDV assets, exceed the capacity Iraq possessed in 1990. In this case media and personnel are also movable assets.

◾Iraq had shown the ability to move fermentor assets pre-1990 era. Iraq had also shown its ability to utilize small cadres of skilled personnel to lead clusters of less skilled personnel in the production process.

◾Iraq gained additional production and development know-how during the post-1991 era.

◾Iraq has developed the capacity to produce indigenously, substitute media for the production of some agents, such as corn and milk byproduct media for anthrax spores.

ISG judges that Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) would likely be the agent of choice for breakout production.

◾It represented the single strategic BW agent that Iraq had in its historical arsenal.

◾Iraq has a previous track record in large-scale growth, processing, testing and weaponization of anthrax spores.

◾Corn byproduct medium, indigenously manufactured for Bt production, would also be suitable for the growth of B. anthracis.

CJK (talk) 20:49, 1 July 2013 (UTC)

That isn't the source you cited in the proposed text, and it doesn't say they had the capability, but that they could reconstruct it over time if the unaccounted-for fermenters were hidden. How about a proposal with wording that matches the source? How about contrasting with the "imminent threat" statements from the Bush administration? How about augmenting the original POV instead of wholesale substitution with your preferred POV? EllenCT (talk) 22:48, 2 July 2013 (UTC)

it doesn't say they had the capability, but that they could reconstruct it over time if the unaccounted-for fermenters were hidden

No, it said that they could exceed their 1990 capability if the unaccounted for material was still hidden. But they had some capability already.

"imminent threat" statements from the Bush administration

Here is what Bush actually said before the war: We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities. [3]

So, far from saying the threat was "imminent", he actually said it was 1-5 years away.

CJK (talk) 13:18, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK, let me quote from the source that you yourself used above ([4]):

• "This is about imminent threat" - White House spokesman Scott McClellan, 2/10/03
• "I would look you in the eye and I would say, go back before September 11 and ask yourself this question: Was the attack that took place on September 11 an imminent threat the month before or two months before or three months before or six months before? When did the attack on September 11 become an imminent threat? Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years or a week or a month ... So the question is, when is it such an immediate threat that you must do something?" - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 11/14/02
• "Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent – that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain. And we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 9/18/02
• "Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons. Iraq poses a threat to the security of our people and to the stability of the world that is distinct from any other. It’s a danger to its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East and to the international peace and stability. It’s a danger we cannot ignore. Iraq and North Korea are both repressive dictatorships to be sure and both pose threats. But Iraq is unique. In both word and deed, Iraq has demonstrated that it is seeking the means to strike the United States and our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 1/20/03

Here's an even more menacing statement, which I recalled and found in another source ([5]):

• "Rice acknowledged that 'there will always be some uncertainty' in determining how close Iraq may be to obtaining a nuclear weapon but said, 'We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.'"

The Bush administration used words like "imminent" and "urgent" on many occasions, as the source you provided notes. The Bush administration didn't say that Iraq's ability to produce biological and chemical weapons was 1-5 years away. It said those weapons already existed, and that they might be used in a surprise first strike on the United States at any time. -Thucydides411 (talk) 16:28, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

The only person on your list who said "imminent threat" was the White House spokesman, not an actual official.

I'm more interested in what Bush himself, the President of the United States, explicitly said at the time, rather than the vague statements of his subordinates. What he said just before the war was: We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.

In the 2003 State of the Union he said:

Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option. [6]

So it seems that, far from asserting that there was an "imminent threat" what they said was that the entire question of Iraq being an "imminent threat" or not was totally irrelevant.

CJK (talk) 21:36, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK, your bolding of Bush's comments is very misleading. You bolded "1 year, or 5 years." Bush says that in this time, "the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over." He doesn't say that the threat from Iraq wasn't imminent, nor that the threat from Iraq will only become imminent in 1 to 5 years. He says that Iraq will be more dangerous in 1 to 5 years than it already is. That's an important distinction. His administration did its best to paint Iraq as an imminent threat, as the article you cited earlier (titled, funnily enough, "In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat") demonstrates at length.

In his 2003 State of the Union, we get yet more fear mongering. You bolded, "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent." This is again misleading, as it suggests Bush did not depict the threat as imminent. Bush then goes on to argue that we won't know when the threat from Iraq is imminent, but that at any point, we could be attacked, and it would be too late to respond. In other words, he says that we may argue over whether the threat is imminent, but Saddam might attack the US at any point.

The quotes I pulled from your source do indeed demonstrate that the Bush administration painted Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat. Scott McClellan was the White House spokesman - his job was to represent the administration's official position. He wasn't some loose cannon. His job was to put out the message that Bush wanted to get out. When he says that Iraq is an imminent threat, he is representing the administration's official stance. Then we have Donald Rumsfeld twice using the word "imminent." He makes the same argument as Bush in your above quotation. He says that some people don't regard the threat as imminent, but that Iraq might attack at any moment, and that it will then be too late to discuss the imminence of the threat. In other words, he's arguing against those who say there's no imminent threat, and arguing that an attack by Iraq might indeed occur imminently. Rice goes even further, suggesting that Iraq might pre-emptively launch a nuclear attack on the United States if we wait around looking for evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program. Rice and Rumsfeld weren't nobodies. They were some of the highest officials in the Bush administration, and their pronouncements certainly can be viewed as coming from the administration.

You can't rewrite history. Your own source documents it too well. These quotes aren't going down the memory hole. -Thucydides411 (talk) 05:16, 4 July 2013 (UTC)

Are we really going to have another linguistic debate? The point that they were all making is that nobody would know exactly when the threat would become "imminent" so there was no reason to argue if the threat was imminent. Bush, by explicitly identifying a 1-5 year timeline, was strongly implying that the threat was not necessarily imminent.

CJK (talk) 12:51, 4 July 2013 (UTC)

The Bush administration used the term "imminent" all the time, as the article you cited earlier, "In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat", demonstrates. When Bush mentioned 1-5 years, it was only to say that the US could not wait 1-5 years, precisely because Iraq was an imminent threat. There's no point arguing this any further. I think this question is a litmus test of your good faith. -Thucydides411 (talk) 14:55, 22 July 2013 (UTC)

Here's a further selection of quotations from your source:

• "Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent – that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain. And we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 9/18/02
• "Absolutely." - White House spokesman Ari Fleischer answering whether Iraq was an "imminent threat," 5/7/03
• "Well, of course he is." - White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett responding to the question "is Saddam an imminent threat to U.S. interests, either in that part of the world or to Americans right here at home?", 1/26/03
• "The Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency." - President Bush, 10/2/02
• "There are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." - President Bush, 10/7/02
• "The world is also uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq whose dictator has already used weapons of mass destruction to kill thousands." - President Bush, 11/23/02
• "Saddam Hussein is no longer a threat to the United States because we removed him, but he was a threat ... He was a threat. He’s not a threat now." - President Bush, 7/2/03
• "No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 9/19/02

It's easy to find many more such statements. There is an LA Times article from 2003 titled "Bush Calls Iraq Imminent Threat". In September 2002, Bush gave a speech in which he said,

"The danger to our country is grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons. And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order were given."

If that isn't a claim of imminence, I don't know what could be. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:17, 22 July 2013 (UTC)

As you said, this was a good "litmus test" of CJK's good faith. He has continued his 16000+ character reverts without even responding. CJK clearly deserves an "F" on this test. -- Truthwillneverdie (talk) 18:06, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

References

POV tag

Since only one editor considers the article POV and his concerns have been addressed, although he continues to argue his case, I will remove it. TFD (talk) 00:58, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Actually, you simply declared that the article was fine because... you said so. Although I was already aware of your arrogance, I didn't realize that you consider yourself dictator of Wikipedia as well. CJK (talk) 02:06, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

No, I said it was fine because five editors including myself think it is while only you do not. The definition of dictatorship btw is where one person makes the decisions and has no obligation to follow rules. That my friend is a perfect description of your position. And dictators oft lambaste the citizens for becoming uppity when they dare challenge their self-appointed superiors. TFD (talk) 02:30, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Is this another one of your made up policies? CJK (talk) 12:30, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

The policy I "made up" is called "Consensus". (Actually I was not one of the editors who made it up.) If you want to unmake it up, I suggest you post a recommendation on its talk page. TFD (talk) 17:04, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

From that page: Decision-making involves an effort to incorporate all editors' legitimate concerns, while respecting Wikipedia's norms.

You (and others) have made zero effort to incorporate my legitimate concerns, instead insisting that all edits be deleted.

CJK (talk) 17:40, 22 July 2013 (UTC)

The key word is "legitimate." TFD (talk) 23:04, 22 July 2013 (UTC)

I main a 16,000 character contribution. According to you, not a single character was legitimate?

In any event, I am willing to compromise with you even though you show no sign of reciprocating. You said you didn't like that I failed to mention that other countries disagreed that Iraq was a serious threat. So I'm willing to say Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed, although there was disagreement over whether Iraq posed a serious threat. The U.S. and U.K. claimed Iraq had violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions and still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and posed a growing threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies. That should satisfy your concerns.

CJK (talk) 00:28, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

I notice that your approach has been to use contemporaneous reports and newspaper articles. i.e., from the time, the 1990s to 2003, although you use modern writing for Alger Hiss. The main difference I see in the two cases is that subsequent evidence has strengthened the case against Hiss, while it has weakened the case against Iraq. Is there any reason why you would use different approaches in the two articles? TFD (talk) 00:56, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Um, maybe because Hiss's trial was over 60 years ago, while this is relatively recent history? What does this have to do with my proposed compromise?

CJK (talk) 02:33, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

UK releasing report on intelligence fabrication soon

Retired British spy threatens to release evidence if he sees it as inaccurate. EllenCT (talk) 21:40, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Moving toward a productive discussion

This article is a total disgrace (in fact nothing more than anti-American propaganda) for reasons I have already outlined repeatedly. What should be happening is that users should examine my proposed changes here. They should then indicate which parts of the edits they view as acceptable and those edits should be added without being held up by other issues. This would be a far more productive use of time than certain editors vetoing 100% of my edits based on trivialities.

CJK (talk) 13:30, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

See Wikipedia:Template messages/Disputes#For inline article placement. The correct tag would be "failed verfication. But it is more helpful to just change or delete such text, and if you are reverted, the add the template and discuss the issue.

It is a bit much to call an article "anti-American propaganda," just because it does not have a section defending the interpretation of the evidence made by the U.S. and U.K. governments. There is a difference between the United States and its government.

TFD (talk) 15:37, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

What is being asked for is merely a factual account of what happened. That account would include at bare minimum:

1. In 1991 the U.N. cease-fire resolution demanded Iraq surrender its WMD programs. By it's own admission Iraq violated this resolution.

2. The U.N. never at any point claimed Iraq was cooperating with the disarmament. To the contrary, there were huge unresolved disarmament issues.

3. A bipartisan Congressional investigation concluded that there was no evidence that the intelligence analysts had been pressured over WMD. The WMD assessment was seen through the prism of points 1 and 2.

4. The U.S. was concerned over future capacity just as much as the present alleged WMD.

5. The full conclusions of the post-war investigation should be stated, rather than just the parts that favor one side. It should note that Iraq had missile programs that violated U.N. range restrictions, that Iraq had the capability to produce mustard gas and anthrax, and that it was expanding its legal and illegal procurement activities.

CJK (talk) 17:41, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

Now you seem to just be making stuff up. "The U.N. never at any point claimed Iraq was cooperating with the disarmament." Really? "Inspectors say Iraq cooperating -- U.S. policy rebuked at UN council" ... "Blix welcomes accelerated cooperation by Iraq, but says unresolved issues remain" etc. EllenCT (talk) 22:27, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

What I meant was that they never said that Iraq had cooperated to the extent where it could be declared disarmed. Resolution 1441 clearly stated Iraq was in material breach of its disarmament obligations because of this. Blix's report of May 2003 stated:

Inspections and declarations and documents submitted by Iraq, not least during the period under review, contributed to a better understanding of previous weapons programmes. However, the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation. From the end of January 2003, the Iraqi side, which until then had been cooperative in terms of process but not equally cooperative in terms of subsistence, devoted much effort to providing explanations and proposing methods of inquiry into such issues as the production and destruction of anthrax, VX and long-range missiles. Despite those efforts, little progress was made in the solution of outstanding issues during the time of UNMOVIC operations in Iraq. [7]

CJK (talk) 02:11, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

Compromise version

I put in a compromise version of my edits that address the specific concerns that other users raised.

• The word "obstructionism" is replaced

• I made clear that countries disagreed over whether Iraq was a serious threat.

• I retained Pillar's comments but moved them to the criticism section.

CJK (talk) 16:44, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

This IN NO WAY addresses ANY of the original research and less NPOV problems discussed above. -- Truthwillneverdie (talk) 18:17, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Agree with Truthwillneverdie. TFD (talk) 18:18, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

You need to actually tell me what those alleged problems are in good faith so I can attempt to address them. The edit addressed the specific complaints of you and others.

CJK (talk) 18:26, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Given the contention over the background section to the war, major proposed changes need to come to the talk page first. CJK, if you post something here, other editors can evaluate it. That's the way to avoid an edit war. Please don't post 10 paragraphs at one though - one at a time leads to a more focused discussion. -Thucydides411 (talk) 19:33, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

You continue to completely remove the statements of career CIA civil servants Paul R. Pillar and George Tenet from the chronologically appropriate section, relegating them to the back of this very long article, without any evidence that they are unreliable in any way. We discussed this at length, and only your own opinion, no reliable sources, have suggested that Pillar's statements are not noteworthy. The idea of relegating them to a criticism section when they were about specific events at a specific point in the chronology is misleading. I applaud that you came up with a compromise version and I hope you will make one which supplements your point of view in-line instead of replacing with it and relegating the point of view you don't like to the end of a very long article. EllenCT (talk) 21:40, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Thucydides, I did just that all last month. You nitpicked minor details which I fixed to satisfy you. Evidently, that wasn't good enough, so you need to specify what your issue is.

Ellen, their opinions are more appropriate in the criticism section. We should stick to verifiable facts with regards to the main body.

I posted the relevant section with my proposed edit here for convenience. You can comment on what you do not like about it or create another page that builds upon, rather than demolishes, what I contributed.

CJK (talk) 19:54, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

I had very substantial disagreements with your proposed edits. On edit #1, I commented in detail. I disagreed with the way you framed the entire paragraph. Beyond that, the statement that most governments believed Iraq to have WMD is factually unsupported, and there is good evidence that several involved governments, including that of the United States, were aware that Iraq did not possess WMD. The head of CIA operations in Europe has stated that he was convinced before the war that Iraq did not have such weapons, and that the best intelligence available to the US corroborated this. High-level government and intelligence figures from France, Germany and England are on the record documenting their awareness at the time that the US was supporting its WMD claims with known forgeries, intelligence known to be unreliable at best, and discredited intelligence pushed for political purposes. I proposed that we note these internal assessments of Iraq's alleged WMD programs and the US case for war, while also noting the official positions that the various governments publicly took. You didn't think this was an acceptable compromise. I still think it's the right thing to do, however. -Thucydides411 (talk) 22:44, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK, Pillar's and Tenet's opinions are their professional assessments consistent with other reliable sources e.g. [8] and [9] (which should be incorporated into the chronology, by the way.) Your insistence that their specific complaints about pre-war intelligence be relegated to the section on general criticisms is absurd, not only because you want to replace the existing chronology with your very fringe interpretation of cherry-picked passages which you construe as saying that being able to reconstitute a program is equivalent to having a biological weapons capability. Again, the fact that you have no support for your changes and several editors opposing them, and you continue to edit war saying that you think a lack of replies in a few days time means agreement suggests to me that a Request for Comment should be opened regarding your conduct. EllenCT (talk) 23:52, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

Beyond that, the statement that most governments believed Iraq to have WMD is factually unsupported

I gave you evidence that the French and German governments believed that there were probably WMD. [10] [11] You have given no evidence to suggest that any country in the world besides Iraq believed there were no WMDs.

The head of CIA operations in Europe has stated that he was convinced before the war that Iraq did not have such weapons

No, that is not what he said. He said that was what Sabri said. But Sabri said that they had chemical weapons. I gave you evidence regarding that.

High-level government and intelligence figures from France, Germany and England are on the record documenting their awareness at the time that the US was supporting its WMD claims with known forgeries, intelligence known to be unreliable at best, and discredited intelligence pushed for political purposes.

Even if that was true, it does not affect the statement in question. The belief that Iraq had WMDs was not merely based on affirmative evidence that the U.S. presented, it was based on Iraq's 12 year failure to satisfy the U.N. that it had disarmed. Furthermore, I note in the new version that there was a disagreement over the nature of the threat.

Your insistence that their specific complaints about pre-war intelligence be relegated to the section on general criticisms is absurd

They expressed their opinions, which is fine. We need to stick to facts, not personal views.

Fact: U.S. intelligence assessed that Iraq's illicit income and imports were rising.

Opinion: Pillar claims after the fact that there was a "broad view" in the intelligence community that Saddam was being kept in his box by the sanctions.

Now, I'm not saying Pillar is a liar. However, what he is saying years after the fact is ambiguous an open to interpretation. For example, the Iraq of 2003 was arguably not a threat but the U.S. repeatedly made clear that it was equally concerned with future capacity as well as sanctions gradually eroded. Absent evidence of an actual intelligence assessment stating what Pillar said it should be relegated to the criticism section.

Furthermore, If you want to stick strictly to "chronology" you would have to acknowledge that Pillar's opinion is chronologically irrelevant. In 1998 the U.S. Congress and the Clinton administration with near unanimity endorsed overthrowing Iraq's government based on past behavior and non-cooperation. If Saddam allegedly being contained was discounted by them it makes no sense to criticize Bush over it.

you want to replace the existing chronology with your very fringe interpretation of cherry-picked passages which you construe as saying that being able to reconstitute a program is equivalent to having a biological weapons capability.

I said that there was a capability with regards to producing anthrax. What is wrong with that?

CJK (talk) 01:10, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

Just restating your original position without giving any real consideration to the comments of other editors is unlikely to move the ball forward. If no compromise is reached that has the support of multiple editors, the appropriate thing to do is leave the article as it is and not make changes. -Thebuscamebyandigoton (talk) 10:44, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

I am more than willing to compromise. The idea that I am restating your original position without giving any real consideration to the comments of other editors is absurd given the lengths I have gone in the last month to respond to each and every point that has been raised.

CJK (talk) 15:32, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK, we've gone over all of this before. It's a waste of everyone's time to have to respond to the same points over and over again, when they've been made very clear. Here are some of the things you got wrong above, even though we discussed them above:

• You assert that Tyler Drumheller did not say that he was convinced Iraq had no WMD. He did, in fact, say this, and I quoted it above.
• You assert that European governments believed Iraq to be in possession of WMD. They made public pronouncements of the form, "We must continue to disarm Iraq through UN inspections," which is a far cry from believing that Iraq had WMD. The political context of these statements is clear - desire to continue the UN process rather than go to war - and as I've pointed out, diplomatic statements are not very good barometers of the internal assessments of governments. I quoted Joschka Fischer, one of the officials you've quoted several times on Iraq WMD, stating that "in diplomacy, there are worlds between internal discussions and public pronouncements by the head of government, especially at a campaign event." Meanwhile, high-level figures in the major European intelligence services are on record as saying they didn't believe the key pieces of intelligence being presented, and that the US was intentionally misleading the public on Iraqi WMD. This is echoed by high-level American intelligence officials, whom I also quoted earlier. This is why I proposed mentioning both official European pronouncements and internal governmental views on Iraqi WMD.
• You treat the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) as a reliable document. This document comes together under strong political and organizational pressure. Especially in the run-up to the Iraq War, there was intense pressure from the Bush administration for the intelligence agencies to turn up information suggesting Iraqi WMD. When important people within the intelligence agencies say that the intelligence community believed one thing, and the NIE says that the intelligence community believed another thing, we can't automatically decide that the NIE is right.

-Thucydides411 (talk) 17:26, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

we've gone over all of this before

Indeed, we have.

He did, in fact, say this, and I quoted it above.

No, he just said (wrongly) that that was what the source claimed, and that he did not believe Curveball. That is not the same thing as believing that there were no WMDs.

They made public pronouncements of the form, "We must continue to disarm Iraq through UN inspections," which is a far cry from believing that Iraq had WMD.

First of all, if they didn't believe there was anything to disarm, they would not have said Iraq needed to disarm, regardless of your personal interpretation. You have no evidence that there was any internal assessment that said Iraq had no WMDs.

Second, I gave you very explicit statements such as There is a problem: the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right to be disturbed by this situation, and it's right in having decided Iraq should be disarmed... Are there other weapons of mass destruction? That's probable. We have to find and destroy them. [12] and Looking at the situation in Iraq, one will naturally conclude that Saddam Hussein is a terrible dictator. He has twice invaded neighbouring countries. He has in the past possessed weapons of mass destruction and there are grounds to suspect that he still has weapons of mass destruction. [13]

This document comes together under strong political and organizational pressure.

False, this was investigated by a bipartisan committee, and not one analyst said they had been pressured. Nobody has come forward and said they were pressured into making an alarmist WMD assessment.

CJK (talk) 18:32, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

Rephrasing the article in new ways that fail to address the concerns of other editors doesn't move the ball forward. One editor saying they feel their rephrasing addresses the concerns of other editors, while the other editors continue to disagree, is still a rephrasing that fails to address the concerns of other editors. If no compromise is reached that has the support of a majority editors, the appropriate thing to do is leave the article as it is and not make changes. -Thebuscamebyandigoton (talk) 21:05, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

The problem is that the vast majority of my proposed changes have not been disputed. The specific objections are relatively minor and can be dealt with if we come to an understanding of the basic facts.

CJK (talk) 21:28, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK, Tyler Drumheller said directly that he believed Sabri's statement that Iraq had no WMD programs. You should read the interview again if you disagree, because it appears you've misunderstood it. -Thucydides411 (talk) 11:22, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

Provide quotes and please respond to the entirety of what I said.

CJK (talk) 13:00, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

I shouldn't have to repeat myself, since you're just as capable of looking through the talk page archives as I am myself. This one time, however, I'll humor you. In fact, I'll just repost what I said before, since this is essentially what you are demanding. -Thucydides411 (talk) 16:21, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

The joint communique doesn't make any statement of what the French, Germans and Russians believed. It is part of the diplomatic game that they and the US/UK played before the war. The US/UK demanded inspections as a means of legitimizing the war, and the French, Germans and Russians tried to get the US and UK to continue with the inspections, as a means of preventing them from going to war. Behind the scenes, we now know from interviews that French and German intelligence did not believe the claims the Americans were making, and that high-level people within the CIA believed that bad intelligence was being misused as propaganda. 60 Minutes did a segment on this, interviewing Tyler Drumheller, then head of CIA operations in Europe (transcript is here: [14]). Here's an excerpt from the interview:

BRADLEY: So in the fall of 2002, before going to war, we had it on good authority from a source within Saddam's inner circle that he didn't have an active program for weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. DRUMHELLER: Yes.

BRADLEY: There's no doubt in your mind about it?

Mr. DRUMHELLER: No doubt in my mind at all, no.

BRADLEY: It directly contradicts, though, what the president and his staff were telling us.

Mr. DRUMHELLER: The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy.

William D. Murray, the CIA station chief in Paris, has given a similar interview to the BBC program "Panorama," in which he says that intelligence that contradicted what the Bush administration wanted to hear was systematically buried, and that bad intelligence that pushed their story was exploited propagandistically. He called the process "whack-a-mole." In this light, even claiming US intelligence believed Iraq to have WMD is inaccurate. Some people may have believed it, but high-level people are saying not only that they didn't believe it, but that the administration didn't care what the evidence said. -Thucydides411 (talk) 16:21, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

1. Your quote does not substantiate the idea that Tyler Drumheller said directly that he believed Sabri's statement that Iraq had no WMD programs.

2. You continue to ignore [[15] and [[16]].

CJK (talk) 17:25, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

This is the same Fischer who said that diplomatic statements are completely different from the internal opinions of governments, and who said that everyone at the UN knew the case presented by the US about Iraqi WMD was a pack of lies meant to justify war to the public. About Drumheller, I can only believe at this point that you're willfully misunderstanding the words that are in front of your eyes. Watch or read the BBC interview with him if you want to know what his views are on Iraqi WMD and the Bush administration's case. What I've presented here is only a small snippet - although already a very damning one - of what Drumheller has to say. -Thucydides411 (talk) 22:41, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

What nonsense. Your position is utterly un-falsifiable--if the statement supports the war you deem it a lie, when it is against the war it is the unvarnished truth. So let's accept your nonsensical argument and say that the German and French governments were in fact lying (even though it makes absolutely zero sense). It was still their official position, and that it what counts in terms of the diplomatic background.

You have zero repeat ZERO evidence that any government on the planet believed that Iraq had disarmed before the war. Meaning believed IRAQ'S OWN CLAIM that it had complied with the U.N. resolutions and had disarmed, which was the subject of the international debate. It had nothing to do with what Powell said except for that one day. To pretend that they all secretly believed that Iraq was disarmed but simply failed to say it out loud is to advance a real "pack of lies" of truly epic proportions.

CJK (talk) 22:59, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

I have very good evidence that high-level people within western governments, including that of the United States, believed that Iraq did not have WMD. What the government as a whole believed, if one can define the beliefs of an institution, is not really accessible. Government figures in the US and UK made very vocal claims about WMD which their intelligence services did not agree with. Does that mean the US and UK governments believed Iraq had WMD, or does it mean they didn't believe it? Similarly, we have German and French statements that may be interpreted (and you make this interpretation) as implying that Iraq has WMD, because they say the disarmament process must continue. On the other hand, we have statements from the heads of German and French intelligence that they did not believe the evidence the US and UK were presenting. We also have a statement by the very same German figure you cite as implying Iraq had WMD, in which he says that he and everyone else at the UN were aware that the Americans were lying to the public about Iraqi WMD, and that their case was based on the desire to invade Iraq, rather than evidence of WMD. That's the state of things. Given these facts, we cannot claim that western governments believed Iraq to be in possession of WMD. At most, we can quote American and UK accusations, cite German and French requests that inspections continue, and intelligence officials' displeasure at the public case made by the Americans and British. -Thucydides411 (talk) 22:27, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

I took 18 minutes to respond, and it took you two days?

Government figures in the US and UK made very vocal claims about WMD which their intelligence services did not agree with.

Utterly false. You cited exactly one person, not directly involved in Iraqi issues or the drafting of the NIE, who complained about Curveball's credibility and the administration ignoring what he (wrongly) thought Sabri said. You have cited ZERO persons who have claimed that they personally did not believe Iraq had WMD before the war. All of the analysts who were involved in the NIE stated that they firmly believed what they wrote and not one claimed that they were pressured into making false assessment. All of this is ignored by you.

Similarly, we have German and French statements that may be interpreted (and you make this interpretation) as implying that Iraq has WMD, because they say the disarmament process must continue.

Actually, I gave you a statement from the French President where, in February 2003, he twice said Iraq probably had WMD. [17] Incidentally, French intelligence also had access to Sabri, which demonstrates what an utter farce Drumheller's claims are.

On the other hand, we have statements from the heads of German and French intelligence that they did not believe the evidence the US and UK were presenting.

You have no business equating lack of belief in the American evidence with a belief that WMDs did not exist. Other nations could have assessed Iraq had not disarmed based on either their own intelligence or the large number of Unresolved Disarmament Issues. This is why the French, German, and Russian governments said Iraq must disarm. Its full and active co-operation is necessary. This must include the provision of all the additional and specific information on issues raised by the inspectors as well as compliance with their requests, as expressed in particular in Mr. Blix' letter of February 21st 2003. [18]

To reiterate to you what I said earlier but you ignored: the issue of disarmament was not about whether the American intelligence was accurate. It was about whether or not Iraq was telling the truth regarding it having disarmed. No government in the world stated that they believed the claim made by Iraq, that it had gotten rid of all of its WMD.

CJK (talk) 00:00, 29 July 2013 (UTC)

It's no use beating a dead horse. We've exhausted this issue. If you have reliable secondary sources which claim that the French and German governments believed Iraq to have WMD, then cite them. Your own reading of the sources is not sufficient - you need to show that this is the majority view of secondary sources.

On an unrelated topic, I don't see why you expect me to reply here on a similarly short timescale as yourself. I have things to do, which means that I don't always respond within minutes of your post. Two days is a pretty normal delay, but sometimes it will be two weeks, and sometimes it will be two hours. -Thucydides411 (talk) 00:08, 29 July 2013 (UTC)

Q. – (...) Firstly, given that this is your first interview since the beginning of this crisis, let's go back a bit to the start. Can you explain to us why, from the outset, France has so firmly opposed war? (...)

...

In this context, we have from the outset found ourselves up against a problem, an Iraq which obviously possessed weapons of mass destruction, which were in the hands of an indisputably dangerous regime and consequently posed a definite threat to the world. So it was essential to disarm that regime, that country, to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction.

...

Q. – Weapons are still being found today...

There are some certainly. Missiles with a longer than permitted range are being destroyed. There are probably other weapons. [19]

Other nations' intelligence services were similarly aligned with U.S. views. Somewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France's President Jacques Chirac told Time magazine last February, "There is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right ... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed." In sum, no one doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. [20]

CJK (talk) 00:34, 29 July 2013 (UTC)

POV concerns

Refactored from an article tag by CJK:

"The article misrepresents the position of Hans Blix and by extension the U.N. It also ignores everything that happened in the 1990s, thus stripping the article of vital context. The controversy over the pre-war intelligence is stated in a selective and biased manner to support exclusively one point of view.."

You might want to consider taking this to the NPOV Noticeboard

Also, it may be better to use "POV-section" tags in the sections affected to concentrate attention where you feel it is needed. (Hohum ^@) 18:12, 25 July 2013 (UTC)

I remove the POV tag because other editors do not think the article and also "dubious" tags. "Dubious" tags should not used for sourced text. Either the text misrepresents the source or the source is wrong. In either case evidence is required. "Dubious" is more for unsourced material that other editors insist on keeping. TFD (talk) 05:57, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

The text does indeed misrepresent the source. It falsely claims that Blix said he would verify everything in a few months. In fact, he said that Iraq had not come to genuine acceptance of disarmament. If they provided full cooperation it would take a matter of months to confirm, but he never said that they were fully cooperating.

It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. [21]

CJK (talk) 13:03, 26 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK, I find your reading of Blix's statement to be off: he says that the initiatives now taken by the Iraqi side are active or even proactive, and are meant to resolve disarmament issues. While Blix says that the initiatives don't constitute immediate or universal cooperation, he says they are nevertheless welcome and is clearly optimistic, expecting that verification may take months in the current context. Your highlighting of every one of Blix's qualifiers can't change the basic message: Iraq is somehow cooperating, and he believes they can have answers within a matter of months. Do you truly believe that Blix was arguing, here, that Iraq was not complying, and that verification of disarmament should not be expected to take months? -Darouet (talk) 21:49, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

Looking at news reports from the period, I see that Blix was asking for more time - months - to conduct weapons inspections before any precipitous move to war on the part of the United States and Britain. And following his speech, international news reports interpret Blix's speech in this way: "inspections will require a few more months:"

• The Evening Standard (London), 7 March 2003: "However, new problems loomed for America, Britain and their allies as the UN chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, prepared this afternoon to announce fresh evidence that the Iraqi regime is co-operating. The latest report from Dr Blix, widely trailed in advance, will point to the recent moves, including the destruction of a number of long range Al-Samoud missiles and a private interview with scientists as evidence of Iraqi co-operation." Blix is quoted in the article: "I have said, however, that if we were to be given more months, I would welcome it. There were eight years of inspections and there were four years of non-inspections. Now we have had four months of inspections and it seems to be a rather short time to just close the door and say 'this is it'."
• The Globe and Mail (Canada), 7 March 2003: "Hans Blix, the chief UN arms inspector, made matters worse for Britain and the United States when he said on Wednesday that Iraq was showing "a great deal more" co-operation."
• The Irish Times, 7 March 2003, "An extra edge has been given to today's showdown by the underlying personal animus that has developed between Colin Powell and Hans Blix. The White House was furious last month when the mild-mannered Swede cast doubt on some of the assertions about Iraqi dirty tricks Mr Powell made in his famous slide presentation to the council on February 5th. Dr Blix further irritated the White House on Wednesday when he held a press conference to say that Iraq is now providing 'a great deal more' co-operation and their destruction of the al-Samoud 2 rockets was 'real disarmament'."
• PTV World, Islamabad, via the BBC, 8 March 2003: "Yesterday's reports by Hans Blix and the atomic energy commission officials are very much optimistic that the process of inspections is progressing well and there is increase in cooperation by Iraq . Blix has said it is only a matter of a few months that the target could be achieved. In a sense, he opposed war and hoped that the crisis could be resolved through inspections."
• Diena, Riga, via the BBC, 8 March 2003: "On Thursday 6 March , American President George Bush called on the leader of the UN's inspection team, Hans Blix, to answer 'just one question: Has the Iraq regime disarmed completely and without any conditions, as is demanded in resolution 1441, or has it not done so?' On Friday, Blix told the Security Council that, as far as he is concerned, the disarmament of Iraq will take months."
• Television Nacional de Chile, Santiago, via the BBC, 8 March 2003: "Today, the UN Security Council heard another report from the arms inspectors, who requested more time, claiming that they were making progress, citing the destruction of Iraqi missiles and other acts of Iraqi cooperation. Chief Inspector Hans Blix highlighted that even with active cooperation, disarming would take months. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain will propose a resolution to authorize military force within ten days."
• Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, via the BBC, 8 March 2003: "Blix told council members that Iraq's cooperation with arms inspectors looking for weapons of mass destruction in the country is inadequate and that the inspectors need 'months' to complete their mandate in Iraq."
• The Courrier Mail, Queensland, 8 March 2003: "IRAQ had failed to provide documents verifying it had got rid of weapons of mass destruction, UN chief arms inspector Hans Blix said today. More documents "have come to light", but the Iraqi government needed to be more forthcoming, Dr Blix said during his key report to the UN Security Council early today, Brisbane time. But he said the inspectors needed more time, "not weeks, not years, but months" to decide whether Iraq had complied fully with the order to disarm. Contrary to claims by the US, Dr Blix said his team had found no evidence of mobile labs to evade inspections while producing chemical and biological weapons. He said the Iraqis had made significant efforts in destroying outlawed missiles and revealing sites where bombs that could hold chemical or biological weapons were destroyed. The inspection team also said there were no indications Iraq had reactivated its nuclear program."

Anyway I can't keep this up forever, but I don't think you're reading Blix's statement the way most people did, and still do now. -Darouet (talk) 22:19, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

Many of those news reports also distort what Blix was saying. He was outlining a purely hypothetical scenario where Iraq provided full cooperation. On 19 March Blix said:

May I add that in my last report I commented on information provided by Iraq on a number of unresolved issues. Since then, Iraq has sent several more letters on such issues. These efforts by Iraq should be acknowledged, but, as I noted in this Council on 7 March the value of the information thus provided must be soberly judged. Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions. [22]

In his May 2003 report it said:

Inspections and declarations and documents submitted by Iraq, not least during the period under review, contributed to a better understanding of previous weapons programmes. However, the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation. From the end of January 2003, the Iraqi side, which until then had been cooperative in terms of process but not equally cooperative in terms of subsistence, devoted much effort to providing explanations and proposing methods of inquiry into such issues as the production and destruction of anthrax, VX and long-range missiles. Despite those efforts, little progress was made in the solution of outstanding issues during the time of UNMOVIC operations in Iraq. [23]

CJK (talk) 23:49, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

CJK I understand that you feel that the press accounts "distort" what Blix was saying. Given the way they cite him ("if we were to be given more months, I would welcome it... real disarmament... more cooperation"), you might as well argue that Blix was distorting his own words as well. However, if all other editors here, and Hans Blix himself, and contemporary press accounts interpret his words one way, and you interpret them another way, how can we justify maintaining the failed verification tag? -Darouet (talk) 20:56, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

This is from p.161 of Lloyd C. Gardner's "Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present," published in 2010:

“ Rice's prediction about what Blix would say was way off the mark. When he began his report to the UN on March 7 2003, it was at once clear that she had misread the auguries. "Some practical matters," he said, "have been resolved in meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance."

"Blix's report was indeed mixed, portraying an Iraqi regime that was not always immediately forthcoming, but which eventually yielded to the inspector's demands. Blix said he needed more time - but not an indefinite period.

(Gardner then provides the quote we've been discussing: "... It will not take years, nor weeks, but months..."

"Blix would later admit that while he, like many others, had actually believed at one time that Saddam Hussein had WMD, in the middle of the inspection process he became convinced that they did not exist, and that the momentum whipped up by the United States produced a 'witch hunt'. Iraqi 'prickliness' about some questions from the inspectors, Blix wrote in his memoir of the failed search, was reasonable, given the past connections between some members of UNSCOM and and American intelligence agencies.

”

Again CJK, given Blix's own commentary on his speech, the speech itself that you interpret differently from all other editors and reliable sources, and the commentary of those sources, Blix's meaning is clear. If these things don't convince you, I can't see how anything or anyone ever would. -Darouet (talk) 21:15, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

Um, Hans Blix himself confirmed my interpretation. On 19 March he said May I add that in my last report I commented on information provided by Iraq on a number of unresolved issues. Since then, Iraq has sent several more letters on such issues. These efforts by Iraq should be acknowledged, but, as I noted in this Council on 7 March the value of the information thus provided must be soberly judged. Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions.

How on earth can you argue that he was saying that it would all be resolved in a few months, when he did not say this at all on 19 March and in fact flatly stated Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions?

CJK (talk) 21:20, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

I see nothing in Blix's 19 March 2003 statement suggesting belief in a justified war, or the presence of WMD in Iraq, or a contradiction to his 7 March determination that months would be required for verification. Most of his speech laments the cessation of inspections, which he reiterates needed more time, and the approach of war. I have no interest in further trying to convince you that your personal reading should follow reliable, published sources. They can speak for themselves. -Darouet (talk) 21:35, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

I see nothing in Blix's 19 March 2003 statement suggesting belief in a justified war, or the presence of WMD in Iraq, or a contradiction to his 7 March determination that months would be required for verification.

Great, but that has nothing to do with the falsehood in question which is The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be "months". As explained to you, that was conditioned on the possibility of full cooperation. As Blix reported on 19 March, such cooperation was not being provided. Please do not re-write history.

CJK (talk) 21:48, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

Regarding the Office of Special Plans

The Office of Special Plans was primarily concerned with possible Iraqi links to al-Qaeda. It did not affect the intelligence assessment regarding either that issue or the WMD issue. "The U.S. intelligence community routinely assessed that Iraq had chemical and biological agents and munitions between 1996 and 2002" is a more accurate, straightforward statement regarding the history of the intelligence community assessment.

CJK (talk) 18:41, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

No, it is cherry picking the single source which agrees with your views among the vastly many more that do not. "The Office of Special Plans was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, wanted to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons...."[24]

CJK, I gather that by continuing to mislead and edit war, you will help all of us who oppose you when this finally gets to dispute resolution. EllenCT (talk) 22:26, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

I never disputed that. But the intelligence community assessment was separate from the OSP. Inserting information about the OSP into a WMD-related section is misleading because the WMD accusations were in fact consistent with what the legitimate intelligence said. Assessments between 1996 and 2002 stated that Iraq had WMD material.

CJK (talk) 02:17, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

Blanking of contributions has to stop

There is no, zero, justification for the continual blanking of my edits. It is outrageous behavior that needs to cease. There were a few stated objections to past edits (which were overwhelmingly trivial) that have been noted and taken into account. In fact, I am not even reverting. I carefully edited the page slowly in order to make sure that there was no problem with the individual facts. But the goalposts keep shifting. I am in essence being told that simple dislike of my tone is adequate grounds for the mass deletion of everything I do. There is no policy to justify this.

I probably have introduced more sourced material into the article than the vast majority of users, but am nonetheless told I am engaged in "original research". This comes from someone defending the lie about Blix saying it would have just taken a few months to disarm Iraq. It is indeed a lie because he had a list [25] of unresolved disarmament issues that Iraq needed to provide information about. These were essentially the same issues that UNSCOM spent over seven years trying to resolve without success. [26]

On 7 March he said Iraq was taking some proactive steps but they did not "necessarily cover all areas of relevance." Hypothetically, they could be resolved in months in the event of proactive cooperation. But on 19 March he made clear that "Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions." So how on earth was it going to be resolved in "months" when, in the last four months, only limited new information had been provided about issues that were supposed to have been resolved within 90 days 12 years ago?

Obviously, any solution should involve adding to, not demolishing, my contributions. But apparently, some people feel that relevant facts cannot be included under any circumstances.

CJK (talk) 00:43, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

The first source used for Blix' comments is a transcript from CNN of his address to the UN which quotes him as saying, "How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks?... It will not take years, nor weeks, but months."[27] If you think he said something else, then please provide another source. Otherwise your recommendations have been faulted by other editors for lacking neutrality. I find they rely too much on primary rather than secondary sources.

TFD (talk) 10:26, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

You omitted the qualifier "Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude". On 19 March he said "Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions." Suggesting that that meant things would definitely be resolved within months is simply a lie.

My recommendations have not been faulted by other editors, in fact they have been pretty much ignored. That you are unhappy with primary sources has no relevance. Primary sources are permitted to be used.

CJK (talk) 15:16, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

How Saddam Hussein would have acted is speculation. Incidentally, Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction. TFD (talk) 01:01, 3 August 2013 (UTC)

How Saddam Hussein acted is actually well known because Blix on 19 March, nearly four months after new inspections began and 12 years after the first inspections began, said:

These efforts by Iraq should be acknowledged, but, as I noted in this Council on 7 March the value of the information thus provided must be soberly judged. Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions. [28]

CJK (talk) 01:47, 3 August 2013 (UTC)

CJK, many editors here have the perception that your edits constitute original research because they tend to cite original documents and include your interpretation of them. In instances where other editors disagree with your interpretation, and cite reliable sources also disagreeing with your interpretation, you nevertheless insist that your own view be written as fact into the article (as in here following our disagreement at this entry on this talk page).

Regarding our disagreement over Blix's statement of 7 March 2003, I showed you a host of sources demonstrating that Blix:

• personally believed there were no weapons,
• publicly stated before 7 March, and after 7 March, that more time for inspections would be necessary and that he wanted this time,
• according to newspaper accounts, said that verification would "not take years, nor weeks, but months," and really meant that verification would take months.

Despite these sources, you persisted in your own view of his statement, changed the article accordingly, and cited another one of Blix's statements made on the eve of the war to justify yourself. In that statement, "a work programme which sets out the key remaining disarmament tasks for Iraq" (R. Holloway, AFP 2003/03/19), Blix says "the value of the [recent] information thus provided must be soberly judged. Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions." He also states, "I naturally feel sadness that three and a half months of work carried out in Iraq have not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq, that no more time is available for our inspections and that armed action now seems imminent." AFP's reports on Blix's statement all include this description: "Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix voiced regret Wednesday that his teams in Iraq had not been allowed more time to complete their work."

The very same day that Blix delivered his program, Michael Gordan of Melbourne's The Age wrote in the news section of the paper that "Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, insists substantial progress has been made recently and the disarmament task could be complete in months, not days or years. Most members of the Security Council agree."

Here's what Hans Blix wrote himself, in 2004, about the inspections just prior to the invasion:

I felt the armed action taken was not in line with what the Security Council had decided five months earlier. The Council had not set a three-and-a-half-month deadline for inspections. Had there been any denials of access? Any cat-and-mouse play? No. Had the inspections been going well? Yes. True, they had not resolved any of the open disarmament issues, but in my view, they had gone much too well to be abandoned to justify war.

I know you responded to my points above, and the sources I cited, by writing that the sources "distort what Blix was saying." All you have done in response, however, is search around for more of Blix's statements which you again interpret yourself. Your interpretations are at odds with the views of reliable sources, and Blix's own commentary in other statements, or even in the very same statements from which you've selectively quoted. I don't see a need to repeat myself and answer you with a new list of reliable sources when you haven't even addressed the first list.

In this entire discussion, you have not, so far as I can tell, convinced a single editor on this talk page that the bulk of your edits are justified, or neutral. Overall, your contributions tend to selectively mine declarations of Iraqi intransigence or issues regarding WMD, out of a vast literature on the prelude to the war and weapons inspections that is, currently, fairly represented in this article. This selective mining is, essentially, a repetition of the Bush administration's case for war. It doesn't strengthen the article. And in effect distracts from these overarching, unavoidable facts: that a policy of war was secretly decided upon despite serious doubts about WMD, and WMD, used as a justification of war, weren't there.

At this point, consensus appears to be against these edits. If possible however I think we should bring back the discussion that was archived, as it is still ongoing. -Darouet (talk) 04:08, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

personally believed there were no weapons,

If he personally believed it he did a good job hiding it. Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said Tuesday it is a "theoretical possibility" Iraq could use chemical or biological weapons in the event of a U.S.-led war, but he believes such a scenario is "unlikely."... "We have not seen delivery means, but they are capable of producing delivery means, of building their own warheads, so it is a theoretical possibility," he told reporters. "I think personally it is unlikely they will do that because I think the world public opinion, which they study quite a lot, is in a large measure feeling that going to war is too early."... He said he could not comment on whether the Iraqis cooperated fully. "You don't know what you don't know," he said. "You don't know what might have been held back." [29]

according to newspaper accounts, said that verification would "not take years, nor weeks, but months," and really meant that verification would take months.

Once again, you just ignore the qualifiers.

Here's what Hans Blix, in 2004, about the inspections just prior to the invasion:

You actually gave evidence that bolsters what I am saying. Blix said "they had not resolved any of the open disarmament issues". That is exactly the point I am trying to make. Acting as if he was saying it would all be resolved in months is just nonsense.

Overall, your contributions tend to selectively mine declarations of Iraqi intransigence or issues regarding WMD, out of a vast literature on the prelude to the war and weapons inspections that is, currently, fairly represented in this article.

What a joke. In your version, there is no discussion of Iraqi intransigence at all, despite massive evidence of it.

It doesn't strengthen the article. And in effect distracts from these overarching, unavoidable facts: that a policy of war was secretly decided upon

Secretly decided upon? The U.S. House in 1998 voted 360-38 to make overthrowing the Iraqi government an official policy.

despite serious doubts about WMD, and WMD, used as a justification of war, weren't there.

What "doubts" were those? The only reason people though there were WMD was because of Iraq's own behavior. First they lied about the WMD they had and then they failed to give any evidence of what happened to it. This is made perfectly clear in the post-war investigations. The actions of both sides contributed to the inaccurate WMD assessment, so why only talk about one side?

At this point, consensus appears to be against these edits.

Actually, it is just you and Truthwillneverdie (who refuses to discuss) that is opposing these edits.

CJK (talk) 16:25, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

I also oppose your edits, CJK, on much the same grounds that Darouet laid out above. Your edits are, for the most part, original research, based on your interpretation of primary documents. If you disagree with reliable secondary sources on what Blix meant, there's little that can be done. Wikipedia policies are meant to avoid open-ended debates in the talk pages, by having editors rely on the opinions of reliable secondary sources. If you think all the sources distort Blix' views, you can personally believe that, but the Wikipedia article can't put your views above those of the sources. -Thucydides411 (talk) 18:33, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

When I meant "distort" I meant distorted by how it is presented in Wikipedia without the qualifiers he clearly enunciated. It is certainly not my opinion, but a fact which I very carefully explained.

Even if you did have a good reason for claiming that was what he meant, that hardly justifies the blanking of all of my edits. Quoting selectively the one sentence which agrees with a certain POV, while ignoring all the other things the inspectors had to say about Iraq's failure to comply, makes clear the driving interest is crude anti-American propaganda rather than sound analysis.

CJK (talk) 18:56, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

CJK, if you think that you are accurately representing Blix' statements, then show that the secondary sources agree with you. It's one thing to come up with an original interpretation of Blix' statements. It's quite another thing to show that reliable sources agree with your interpretation. This is a general problem with your proposed edits, and why I and other editors consider your proposals "original research." -Thucydides411 (talk) 20:15, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

It is simply what he said. The qualifier was "with a proactive Iraqi attitude". "Interpretation" has nothing to do with it. On 19 March 2003 Blix himself clarified what he meant on 7 March: These efforts by Iraq should be acknowledged, but, as I noted in this Council on 7 March the value of the information thus provided must be soberly judged. Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions. [30]

So Blix himself said on 19 March that what he said on 7 March indicated that Iraq was not cooperating sufficiently to help resolve remaining questions. That throws out the idea of anything being resolved within "months". Moreover, it is highly illogical to assume that the issues would have been resolved in months given that UNSCOM failed to resolved these same issues in over seven years.

Also, as you are well aware, there are more edits than this one and you and others have no business blanking them also.

CJK (talk) 20:38, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

You can read Blix explaining his position this year here. I don't think that any current histories cast Blix as a supporting the U.S. and UK position. TFD (talk) 20:45, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

I suspect that you are aware that your comment has nothing at all to do with the point I am making.

CJK (talk) 20:52, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

You said "Blix himself clarified what he meant" and I provided a link to "Blix explaining his position." No I am not aware how Blix explaining his position has nothing at all to do with Blix clarifying what he meant. It is however an example of your argumentative style. TFD (talk) 21:03, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

I think this problem can be solved easily by simply using the full quote in the article Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. along with what he said on 27 January and 19 March, and his 30 May report.

CJK (talk) 21:10, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

No, I think this problem can be solved by basing the article on what reliable secondary sources say. How did major newspapers interpret Blix' statements? That is the question, not how you interpret Blix' statements. -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:27, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

Primary sources are not forbidden in Wikipedia. The reader should just read the quoted statements of 27 January, 19 March and 30 May and come to their own conclusions. That would be better than imposing any controversial interpretation.

CJK (talk) 21:34, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

CJK, I would write that it is your interpretation that is controversial, being at odds with those of secondary sources. It would be absurd - in the lead of all places, which is a summary of the article - to insert this full quote. It would be reasonable however to place the full passage in the "quote" parameter of the reference.

Since CJK has written here that the article's background section really shouldn't just begin with the Bush Administration, and I very much agree with him, I'd like to propose that we add two paragraphs to the background that contain information on:

• U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1979 through the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait and First Gulf War
• The Clinton Administration policies regarding Iraq including bombing, sanctions, the policy of regime change, and
• U.N. positions during this period.

I also think that information from the Downing Street memo should be in the lead.

Am curious what all of you - including CJK - think. I know that CJK you already have collected information on some of this.

-Darouet (talk) 21:57, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

In response:

• The quote has no business being in the lead in the first place. This is just selective POV pushing.

• Events prior to the adoption of Resolution 687, the Gulf War ceasefire, in April 1991 are of little direct relevance and would only serve to lengthen further an extremely lengthy article. Those events are already discussed in the Gulf War article. It would be like covering diplomatic relations prior to World War I in the World War II article.

• The events of 1991-2002 should be covered, but by more than two paragraphs.

• Nothing in the Downing Street memo warrants lead status.

CJK (talk) 22:21, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

A line by line refutation of the propaganda in the introduction alone

The Iraq War[nb 1] was an armed conflict in Iraq that consisted of two phases.

I disagree that you can simply limit it to two phases. There was a pre-war phase from 1998-2003 that involved bombing, there was an invasion phase, there was an insurgency phase, there was a civil war phase, and there was a low-level terrorism phase from mid 2008 onward.

Moreover, there is no evidence that the war is over so the use of "was" is inappropriate.

It was followed by a longer phase of fighting, in which an insurgency emerged to oppose the occupying forces and the newly formed Iraqi government.

The insurgency didn't care about the "occupying forces" or a new government, they cared about preserving Sunni control. A more neutral formulation would be "It was followed by a longer phase of fighting, in which a Sunni-led insurgency emerged to oppose first the occupation and later the Shi'ite majority government elected in 2005."

Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.

Bush said:

Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger

...

Events can turn in one of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors

...

We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. [[31]]

Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today -- and we do -- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?

...

Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.

Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. [32]

With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region.

...

Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. [33]

We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities. [34]

Blair said:

Why now? People ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, that he will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community having made the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening will, always draw. That the international community will talk but not act; will use diplomacy but not force; and we know, again from our history, that diplomacy, not backed by the threat of force, has never worked with dictators and never will work. If we take this course, he will carry on, his efforts will intensify, his confidence grow and at some point, in a future not too distant, the threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Saddam and WMD is not American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real. [35]

To fall back into the lassitude of the last 12 years, to talk, to discuss, to debate but never act; to declare our will but not enforce it; to combine strong language with weak intentions, a worse outcome than never speaking at all.

And then, when the threat returns from Iraq or elsewhere, who will believe us? What price our credibility with the next tyrant? No wonder Japan and South Korea, next to North Korea, has issued such strong statements of support. [36]

In short: their statements make perfectly clear that the threat they were talking about was based on what would happen in the future if Iraq built on its existing programs, not that their current WMD posed an immediate threat.

In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles.

Long-range missiles over 150 km, not "cruise missiles". Fails to mention that the resolution found Iraq in material breach of the disarmament paragraphs of Resolution 687 and threatened serious consequences.

Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence of WMD

That isn't entirely true. UNMOVIC found 14 empty chemical weapons.

but could not yet verify the accuracy of Iraq's declarations regarding what weapons it possessed, as their work was still unfinished.

False. They could not verify the accuracy of the declarations because Iraq had not provided sufficient information. This was reported by Blix on 27 January and 19 March. The 30 May report made clear they made no progress resolving outstanding issues.

The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be "months".

Ignoring his qualifier "Even with proactive cooperation" and every single other statement the inspectors made about none of the issues being resolved is an act of rank propaganda.

(From one of the footnotes) U.S. Senate Intelligence Community (June 2008): "Two Bipartisan Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office". There is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate. - Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV

That actually describes the authors of this article quite well. The fact the note is inserted next to the Blix quote proves that whoever inserted it is only interested in propaganda.

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that they intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted.

Ignores the illegal missile program and ignores Iraq's production capabilities which should be just as relevant if you are interested in making a threat assessment. Of course, the authors are only interested in propaganda.

Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been one of the main arguments for the invasion.

Not justified by its own source. More made-up propaganda.

George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, stated Vice President Dick Cheney and other Bush administration officials pushed the country to war in Iraq without ever conducting a “serious debate” about whether Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States.

Given that Bush, as demonstrated above, never said there was a imminent threat the relevance is non-existent.

Some U.S. officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda,[60] but no evidence of a meaningful connection was ever found.

What is a "meaningful" relationship and who exactly gets to determine that?

On 16 March 2003, the U.S. government advised the U.N. inspectors to leave their unfinished work and exit from Iraq.

Their work was never supposed to be "finished" because they were supposed to institute long-term monitoring even after disarmament was verified.

On 20 March the American-led coalition conducted a surprise military invasion of Iraq without declaring war.

The idea that it was a "surprise" when Bush gave a 48-hour ultimatum two days earlier is utterly laughable. Moreover, why on earth does it matter if they declared war or not? The U.S. has not declared war since World War II.

The invasion led to an occupation and the eventual capture of President Hussein, who was later tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi government.

He was not "President" when he was captured. Elections are ignored.

Violence against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups soon led to the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and the emergence of a new faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

No, a Sunni insurgency began shortly after the invasion, which later led to violence between sectarian groups. The violence didn't "lead" to the insurgency, it was the insurgency.

In June 2008, U.S. Department of Defense officials claimed security and economic indicators began to show signs of improvement in what they hailed as significant and fragile gains.

Weasel-worded nonsense. The drop in violence has been confirmed by pretty much everyone.

Iraq was fifth on the 2008 Failed States Index, and sixth on the 2009 list.

A subjective assessment that has no business being in the lead.

CJK (talk) 19:37, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

You are cherry-picking details to present your personal opinion about the lead-up to the war. However we are supposed to base our presentation on what reliable secondary sources say. If you think the mainstream interpretation of the war was wrong, then write an article and get it published somewhere that you can change expert opinion. This article is not the place to begin. TFD (talk) 20:02, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

This isn't a place to argue our opinions on the war. It is a place to discuss how best to make the article follow what reliable sources say. I'll give you an example of how trying to base the article on your reading of the primary documents is problematic. You argue, on the basis of Bush and Blair's statements, that they did not claim Iraq to be an immediate threat, but rather that they believed Iraq would become a threat in the future. In order to make this argument, you selectively bold phrases from a few of Bush and Blair's statements. But you completely skip over passages that don't agree with your thesis. For example, in one of your quotes, Blair says, "The history and the present threat are real." Yet you don't bold this statement. He's calling Iraq a "present threat," as opposed to a historical or future threat, i.e. a threat that exists right now. The quotations you give are littered with such statements, but you skip over them, bolding a word here, two words there, and stringing them together to say what you'd like them to say. Here's another example, this time from Bush. You bold the word "gathering," but not the word "grave." Indeed, Bush is clearly saying that Iraq is already a grave danger, and that it's only going to get worse in the future. Later on, you bold, "grows worse with time," but not "The danger is already significant." Then here's the kicker:

• "If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today -- and we do -- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" - Your bolding
• "If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today -- and we do -- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" - My bolding

See what I did there? I bolded a different set of words, and now it looks like Bush said something completely different. For what it's worth, I think my bolding gives a much better sense of what Bush meant than yours does.

This is why relying on your interpretation of the primary sources is not a good idea. You have many views on the Iraq War which conflict with the views of the secondary sources cited in the article. We have to go with the secondary sources over your research into the primary documents. If the article misrepresents the available literature on the Iraq War, that is an issue which you can address on the talk page. The way you're arguing now, however, doesn't get us anywhere. -Thucydides411 (talk) 20:07, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

As TFD should be well aware, primary sources are perfectly usable in Wikipedia. In fact, they are already used in this article multiple times. It isn't reasonable to demand secondary sources be used all the time for such recent events.

The point I am making is that while they did claim that Iraq had dangerous weapons, at the same time they indicated that the danger of them being used would only happen at a future date after they had been built upon further. Remember, 12 years had passed without Iraq using the secret stash of WMDs that it was believed to have had by the U.S. and U.K. The alleged secret stash was not the problem, the problem was what would happen down the road later (Bush claimed 1-5 years) if they built up a "full arsenal" (again in Bush's words) and got nuclear weapons as well.

Paul Pillar, who is quotes in the introduction opposing Bush, said "If prewar intelligence assessments had said the same things as the Duelfer report, the administration would have had to change a few lines in its rhetoric and maybe would have lost a few member's votes in Congress, but otherwise the sales campaign—which was much more about Saddam's intentions and what he “could” do than about extant weapons systems—would have been unchanged. The administration still would have gotten its war. Even Dick Cheney later cited the actual Duelfer report as support for the administration's pro-war case." [37]

CJK (talk) 20:30, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

Primary sources are permissible, but are discouraged as a basis for making factual claims. When an editor's interpretation of the primary sources conflicts with the views of reliable secondary sources, the secondary sources take precedence. This is part of a broader point about editing: Wikipedia is not a place for original essays or research. If you pull together a bunch of primary documents in order to argue some thesis about the Iraq War, that is an impermissible use of primary sources. The interpretation in the article should come from reliable secondary sources, but primary sources may be useful in illustrating a point. For example, secondary sources discuss Rumsfeld's memo on "how to start" a war with Iraq, and the article includes a picture of an excerpt from that memo. That's an appropriate use of primary sources. It would be inappropriate to use that memo to argue that Rumsfeld wanted to instigate a war with Iraq, unless reliable secondary sources made this argument, even though this might be a fair interpretation of the memo. -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:04, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

See WP:PRIMARY: "Wikipedia articles should be based on reliable, published secondary sources and, to a lesser extent, on tertiary sources and primary sources. Secondary or tertiary sources are needed...to avoid novel interpretations of primary sources. All interpretive claims, analyses, or synthetic claims about primary sources must be referenced to a secondary source, rather than to an original analysis of the primary-source material by Wikipedia editors." TFD (talk) 21:10, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

There is no novel interpretation being advanced by me, rather it is being advanced by you. You both ignored the quote I provided from Paul Pillar, in particular "the sales campaign—which was much more about Saddam's intentions and what he “could” do than about extant weapons systems—would have been unchanged." Earlier you suggested was some sort of sage about this matter. Is he only relevant when you want him to be?

This TIME article from September 2002 says: "A flurry of white papers will be brandished as evidence of what weapons Saddam has. But the Bush Administration's determination to topple him is based less on the weapons of mass destruction he has now than on what he might get later--and what he might one day do with them." [38]

The book Cobra II says: "For the Bush administration, Iraq was an inviting target for pre-emption not because it was an immediate threat but because it was thought to be a prospective menace that was incapable of defending successfully itself against a U.S. invasion." (P. 64)

CJK (talk) 22:10, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

CJK. TFD has quoted part of WP:PRIMARY verbatim, so that is hardly a novel interpretation, while Thucydides411 has paraphrased it very well. It is you that is odds with policy almost every editor who has commented on your edits. Perhaps you could take this on board instead of continuing with WP:IDIDNTHEARTHAT and making enormously long tirades which are WP:TLDR. (Hohum ^@) 23:16, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

Also, do other users the courtesy of following WP:INDENT. (Hohum ^@) 23:18, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

Oh, you didn't read it? That must explain why you ignored the three secondary sources I just cited.

CJK (talk) 00:01, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

As usual, there has been no timely response. This follows the well-established pattern: I propose a slew of changes, you guys address one or two of them, I rebut, you fail to respond, then later you blank 100% of my edits on the grounds that they are against "consensus".

CJK (talk) 23:41, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

The point I made was clear: Needlessly lengthy posts are not the best way to engage people and form consensus. I have made this point before. Also, you may need to alter your expectations of what timely is; assuming there will never be responses if there aren't any only a day later is generally unreasonable. (Hohum ^@) 13:17, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

CJK, are you old enough to have remembered the media coverage from 2001-2003? While the Bush administration may have invaded Iraq because they thought it would pose a threat in the future does not mean that is the reason they provided to the U.N. and the American public. They also btw said that Saddam Hussein had links to al Qaeda. TFD (talk) 14:42, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

As already explained to you in detail that is exactly what was said literally over and over again and reported as such in TIME magazine in September 2002. They did emphasize to the U.N. that Iraq was in material breech regarding WMDs, that was a simple fact confirmed as recently as November 2002 by Resolution 1441. They never accounted for their missing WMDs.

CJK (talk) 16:00, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

Blair said Iraq was "a current and serious threat to the UK national interest"."[39] Do you have any recollection of the media coverage from 2001-2003? TFD (talk) 16:11, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

You provided only a snipped of what Blair said. The full quote is "The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more not less worrying. It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of containment has not worked sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from developing these weapons. I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped." [40]

So the threat was the development of WMD and not the WMD on hand.

That same day he said: "Why now? People ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, that he will use his weapons." [41]

CJK (talk) 19:03, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

So you want to say, "Even though Bush and Blair knew that Iraq posed no immediate danger, they forced an end to the search for WMDs and invaded anyway." TFD (talk) 19:39, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

Bush and Blair made perfectly clear there was little immediate danger of the WMD being used, and that the threat would come from future development. They did complain about the WMD as a legal matter because of the U.N. Resolutions which Iraq was in material breech of as confirmed by Resolution 1441.

CJK (talk) 23:13, 8 August 2013 (UTC)