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Proposed change #1

Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.[1][2][3] In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence of WMD, but could not yet verify the accuracy of Iraq's declarations regarding what weapons it possessed, as their work was still unfinished. The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be "months".[4][5][6][7][8]

changed to

In 1998 following years of Iraqi obstructionism [9] of the post-Gulf War weapon inspections the U.S. under the Clinton administration publicly announced that it supported regime change and, along with the U.K., initiated aerial hostilities against Iraq in December 1998 which continued for the next several years in the "no-fly zones" in northern and southern Iraq. In 2002 the U.S. began to threaten a ground invasion if Iraq did not readmit U.N. weapon inspectors and complete the disarmament process. Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed, and the U.S. and U.K. claimed Iraq had violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions and still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.[10][2][11]

...

Under heavy pressure Iraq agreed to readmit inspectors in September 2002. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which declared Iraq in material breach of prior U.N. resolutions and gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to completely and immediately cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and long-range missiles, threatening "serious consequences" if these demands were not met. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no conclusive evidence of WMD, but chief inspector Hans Blix reported in January 2003 that Iraq had not adequately accounted for its missing WMD and thus had not arrived to "genuine acceptance" of disarmament.[12] With weapons inspections ongoing, and facing opposition by France and Russia in the UN Security Council to a further resolution calling for force against Iraq, the United States and United Kingdom formed the nucleus of a "coalition of the willing," which invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003, leading to the fall of Baghdad and destruction of Saddam's regime on 9 April.

Comment: It is a lie to say that Blix was saying that disarmament would be complete in a number of months. It is not supported by his statements. He said that it could happen in a number of months if "full cooperation" was provided, but he never said that full cooperation was occurring. He did say that some cooperation was occurring, but a he noted in his May 2003 report, little progress was made on any of the outstanding issues. I actually removed this a few months ago without any problems but the vandal deleting my edits saw fit to restore it.

Please respond promptly and quickly. CJK (talk) 14:59, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

Would you like us "vandals" to respond promptly or quickly? I'm not sure which timetable we're working on. I all seriousness though, I will respond after carefully going through the sources you've provided. You shouldn't be calling your fellow editors "vandals" if you want to reach consensus. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:12, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

I was referring to another editor, not you. I'm sorry if that wasn't clear.

Here are my comments on the first paragraph:
  • Beginning the paragraph with, "Following years of Iraqi obstructionism" is framing the issue in an opinionated manner. One could just as easily begin, "Following years of American bombing and saber-rattling, ..." Clearly, this would also be POV. The paragraph you'd like to replace begins in a much more factual and neutral manner: "Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies." This is exactly what the US and UK contended publicly, and it gives the reader a clear idea of what the debate was over leading up to the war. "Obstructionism" is a loaded word, and you don't provide sources to show that experts on the subject generally agree on that term. You provide a UN report, but you really need to present neutral, third-party sources.
  • You do not provide any source for the claim that "Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed." You provide sources that cite US and UK politicians stating this, but nothing about other countries, or even about US and UK intelligence services. I don't think that this statement is correct, or even that US and UK intelligence were convinced of the claims their governments were making.
I don't think this paragraph is better than what we already have. Based on the above points, I think it is no good at all. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:51, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

The Iraqi obstructionism, not the saber-rattling, is relevant to the regime change policy adopted in 1998. The U.S. contended both that Iraq possessed WMD and that Iraq violated U.N. resolutions. If you don't think the U.N. report, which was composed by experts directly involved, qualifies as "neutral" I need to ask you what would qualify as neutral. The statement "Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed" is not sourced because it is common knowledge. Nobody took a poll, but before the war most nations and most inspectors were not going around saying "we believe Iraq is disarmed". The whole premise of Resolution 1441 was that Iraq had not disarmed.

For what it's worth, this article by Kenneth Pollack, who was in the NSC, states that "As a former CIA analyst and National Security Council director on the Persian Gulf, I never met a foreign government official—not even from France, Russia or China—who argued that Iraq did not still have weapons of mass destruction." [1] If you have information that contradicts this, I would be glad to see it. CJK (talk) 17:04, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

You have to provide sources for the claim that "[m]ost governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed," because I disagree with what you think is common knowledge. -Thucydides411 (talk) 17:25, 27 June 2013 (UTC)
By the way, I don't put much stock in what Kenneth Pollack wrote in an Op-Ed in the lead-up to the war. You need to cite reliable sources. -Thucydides411 (talk) 17:36, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

You won't tell me what "reliable sources" would be acceptable to you. Furthermore, you are continuing an unfortunate trend of only responding to a small part of what I am saying. Please respond to the entirety of the argument. Please respond to all of the proposed changes so the process is not dragged out longer than it already has been. CJK (talk) 18:19, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

1441 says "Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991)." [2] Paragraph 8 and 13 of 687 specifically reference disarmament. CJK (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

The Joint Statement of Russia, Germany, and France of 15 March 2003 says:

The international community's common goal is to disarm Iraq in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council. UNSCR 1441, adopted unanimously, provides for this to be achieved through an unprecedented inspections process. We reaffirm that in the present circumstances nothing justifies abandoning the inspections process or resorting to force.
Messrs Blix and ElBaradei's successive reports to the Security Council have shown that these inspections are producing results. Iraq's disarmament is under way. There is every indication that it can be completed swiftly and by obeying the rules the Security Council has set. For her part, Iraq must cooperate actively and wholeheartedly. [3]

It doesn't say "Iraq has been disarmed" or that "we believe there are no WMDs in Iraq". It says the "goal" is "to disarm" Iraq, that disarmament "is under way" and that Iraq "must cooperate actively and wholeheartedly." Thus implying that Iraq had not disarmed up to that point, fully 12 years after the Gulf War.

I find it truly shocking that you claim to be unaware of this.

CJK (talk) 19:09, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

These are diplomatic statements, which are rarely worded in a truthful or straightforward manner. Germany, for example, knew that Colin Powell's presentation on Iraqi WMD on 5 February 2003 was deceitful, but they didn't protest at the time. Joschka Fischer has said as much (Joschka Fischer's knowledge of Curveball's unreliability: [4]. CIA and DIA's knowledge of Curveball's unreliability: [5]). Accusing another nation of lying publicly is not something which is done often in diplomacy, especially among major powers. Russia, Germany and France were going along with the UN inspections process that the US and UK had demanded. They hoped that by completing the inspections process to everyone's satisfaction, they could keep the US and UK from going to war. What you haven't shown is that the governments or intelligence services of Russia, Germany and France believed Iraq to have WMD. All you've shown is that they were cautious in dealing with the demands being made by the US and UK. -Thucydides411 (talk) 19:52, 27 June 2013 (UTC)
Just to make the point more clearly that diplomats think one thing and say another, here is what the German UN ambassador had to say about Colin Powell's UN presentation (Source: [6]):
"Ja, der 5. Februar 2003, als US-Außenminister Colin Powell mit einer Diashow belegen wollte, dass der Irak Massenvernichtungswaffen besaß. Es war gespenstisch. Jeder im Saal wusste, dass seine Fakten falsch waren. Jeder wusste auch, dass der Krieg bevorstand."
Translation: "Yes, the 5th of February, when US Secretary of State Colin Powell attempted to prove with a slideshow that Iraq had WMD. It was ghastly/haunting. Everyone in the room knew that his facts were false. Everyone also knew that war was imminent."
Of course, the Germans didn't say, "We don't believe anything Colin Powell has said here." What they said is something more like, "We need to give the inspections more time to work." -Thucydides411 (talk) 20:32, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

These are diplomatic statements, which are rarely worded in a truthful or straightforward manner.

Wow, you must have a lot of confidence in your mind-reading skills for you to simply declare that they were lying when they said that. My position is that it is not your position to read their minds. While you seem eager to cite German doubts about Curveball, you conveniently ignore the fact that German intelligence was actually more pessimistic than U.S. intelligence on Iraq's nuclear program.

I want to reiterate that you are dragging out this process by not providing full and complete responses to my proposed changes. If you do not provide such responses, I will simply assume you no longer dispute the particular point in question. CJK (talk) 21:25, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

Your tone is making it extremely unpleasant to engage with you. I'll give it another go, but you should know that ultimatums like "[Y]ou are dragging out this process by not providing full and complete responses to my proposed changes. If you do not provide such responses, I will simply assume you no longer dispute the particular point in question" won't get you anywhere.
You're trying to make major changes to the article - the onus is on you to source your proposed edits, and to present the subject neutrally. I've responded to your first paragraph by pointing out that its major claims aren't reliably sourced, and that it leads with the loaded word "obstructionism." You still haven't provided a convincing rationale for the statement, "Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed." You can go read interviews with former French and German intelligence chiefs, or with CIA officials like Tyler Drumheller, and they talk about how they weren't convinced, and how they knew or strongly suspected that the information being presented to the public was false. I've linked some of those interviews already in this Talk page. The article can't claim something on the basis that you think it's common knowledge, if you're unable to provide sources that state it explicitly. -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:55, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

the onus is on you to source your proposed edits

I did give you sources, and every time I gave you sources you declared that you didn't believe them. Which isn't reasonable on your part. I would say that the onus is on you to show that the French, Germans and Russians were lying about what they said on 15 March 2003.

Here's some more statements, to show it isn't a fluke.

FRENCH-GERMAN-RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM ON CONTINUING INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ 24 February 2003
Full and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions remains the imperative objective of the international community. Our priority should be to achieve this peacefully through the inspection regime. The military option should only be a last resort. So far, the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled:
...
3 - These conditions can be met, and our common objective - the verifiable disarmament of Iraq - can be reached through the implementation of the following proposals:
...
To render possible a peaceful solution inspections should be given the necessary time and resources. However, they can not continue indefinitely. Iraq must disarm. Its full and active co-operation is necessary. This must include the provision of all the additional and specific information on issues raised by the inspectors as well as compliance with their requests, as expressed in particular in Mr. Blix' letter of February 21st 2003. The combination of a clear program of action, reinforced inspections, a clear timeline and the military build-up provide a realistic means to reunite the Security Council and to exert maximum pressure on Iraq. [7]

Now, it does say that no "evidence" of WMD "has been given", but they make perfectly clear that they do not consider an absence of evidence as automatically meaning that Iraq had disarmed.

Joint statement of 5 March 2003
Our common objective remains the full and effective disarmament of Iraq, in compliance with Resolution 1441.
We consider that this objective can be achieved by the peaceful means of the inspections.
...
We firmly call for the Iraqi authorities to co-operate more actively with the inspectors to fully disarm their country. These inspections cannot continue indefinitely.
...
We are at a turning point. Since our goal is the peaceful and full disarmament of Iraq, we have today the chance to obtain through peaceful means a comprehensive settlement for the Middle-East, starting with a move forward in the peace process, [8]

Please do not tell me they are lying when they said this.

CJK (talk) 13:20, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

The joint communique doesn't make any statement of what the French, Germans and Russians believed. It is part of the diplomatic game that they and the US/UK played before the war. The US/UK demanded inspections as a means of legitimizing the war, and the French, Germans and Russians tried to get the US and UK to continue with the inspections, as a means of preventing them from going to war. Behind the scenes, we now know from interviews that French and German intelligence did not believe the claims the Americans were making, and that high-level people within the CIA believed that bad intelligence was being misused as propaganda. 60 Minutes did a segment on this, interviewing Tyler Drumheller, then head of CIA operations in Europe (transcript is here: [9]). Here's an excerpt from the interview:
BRADLEY: So in the fall of 2002, before going to war, we had it on good authority from a source within Saddam's inner circle that he didn't have an active program for weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. DRUMHELLER: Yes.
BRADLEY: There's no doubt in your mind about it?
Mr. DRUMHELLER: No doubt in my mind at all, no.
BRADLEY: It directly contradicts, though, what the president and his staff were telling us.
Mr. DRUMHELLER: The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy.
William D. Murray, the CIA station chief in Paris, has given a similar interview to the BBC program "Panorama," in which he says that intelligence that contradicted what the Bush administration wanted to hear was systematically buried, and that bad intelligence that pushed their story was exploited propagandistically. He called the process "whack-a-mole." In this light, even claiming US intelligence believed Iraq to have WMD is inaccurate. Some people may have believed it, but high-level people are saying not only that they didn't believe it, but that the administration didn't care what the evidence said. -Thucydides411 (talk) 17:11, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

The joint communique doesn't make any statement of what the French, Germans and Russians believed. It is part of the diplomatic game that they and the US/UK played before the war.

Again, it reflects an extraordinary amount of presumption on your part to make that judgment unless you can actually read their minds. They said numerous times that Iraq must disarm, and never said that it had disarmed or that they assessed there were no WMDs in Iraq. They could have just as easily said "the inspections have thus far found no evidence of WMD, the inspections should continue in order to remove all doubt." Instead, they made extremely clear that the onus was on Iraq to disarm.

Drumheller was shown to be wrong years ago. See this report pp. 143-144. [10]

Wait, you're probably going to reject that too, because you arbitrarily refuse to believe any sources that I cite. In that case, I pre-emptively declare I do not believe Drumheller and that he is not a reliable source.

CJK (talk) 18:28, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

CJK, you're relying very heavily on your interpretation of primary sources. Do reliable secondary sources, on balance, say that France, Germany and Russia believed Iraq to possess WMD? I would be surprised if secondary source did say this, since I've seen interviews with the head of both French and German intelligence in which they say they didn't believe the claims the Americans were making. The question then is why diplomatic statements by these countries would say that inspections to disarm Iraq needed to continue, when the intelligence in those countries did not believe Iraq to have WMD. You can go ponder that question, but I've already told you what I think the reason is - they wanted inspections to continue, since that would stave off the impending American and British invasion. You simply haven't provided any reliable secondary sources here that support what you would like the article to say, namely that "[M]ost governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed." You reason that a diplomatic communique implies this belief, but you don't actually know if your inference is correct, and I think it's dead wrong. You believe the Senate Intelligence Committee and George Tenet when they say August Hanning, Tyler Drumheller and William D. Murray are wrong about Sabri and Curveball, but not 60 Minutes or BBC Panorama when they present the opposite case. You have your opinion about who is correct, based on your selective reading of primary sources, but you haven't shown that journalists or historians share your view. -Thucydides411 (talk) 20:44, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

I never said that France, Germany, and Russia believed they had WMD. (Though I do have separate evidence if you would like to see it that France and Germany, though not Russia, indicated that there probably was WMD.) What I said was that Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed. That is amply demonstrated through the joint statements, where they reaffirm over and over again that Iraq needs to take proactive steps, beyond merely opening doors, to disarm as mandated by the U.N.

60 minutes was just reporting what he said, and it was subsequently investigated and shown to be wrong. That is why I do not accept it.

CJK (talk) 21:21, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

To give a more definitive answer to the seeming contradiction: while Germany, France, and Russia said that they didn't believe that affirmative evidence of WMD had been presented by the U.S. or U.K., they nonetheless acted on the presumption that such WMD existed because Iraq had not resolved important issues with the U.N. That's the meaning of the statement: Iraq must disarm. Its full and active co-operation is necessary. This must include the provision of all the additional and specific information on issues raised by the inspectors as well as compliance with their requests, as expressed in particular in Mr. Blix' letter of February 21st 2003.

CJK (talk) 22:39, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

The BBC and ZDF have enough confidence in Tyler Drumheller and August Hanning to make them the centerpiece of their recently released documentaries on pre-war intelligence, despite the Senate Intelligence Committee's claims. Given the conflict of interest that the Senate committee members have, I don't give as much weight to their views as I do to those of BBC and ZDF journalists. Beyond this, there are at least two high-level CIA officials who now say that they believed, before the war, that Iraq had disarmed - Drumheller and Murray. This makes even the claim that US intelligence believed Iraq to have WMD suspect. If you want to claim that France, Germany and Russia did not believe Iraq to have disarmed, you have to provide some sort of source which states this directly. It's not enough to try to infer from diplomatic communiqués what their intelligence services and governments believed. There is an entirely plausible reading of the communiquė you cite under which these nations did believe Iraq to be disarmed, but were determined to push for continued inspections to prove this. This is why we generally rely on secondary sources. I don't think you know enough about this issue to correctly interpret the primary source you'd like to use, and you don't accept my interpretation of the source, so we have to turn to reliable secondary sources. -Thucydides411 (talk) 23:24, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

Given the conflict of interest that the Senate committee members have. What conflicts of interests are those exactly? Even if there were conflicts of interests, the fact of the matter is that the matter was investigated by going through the documents in question, which did not support the claims he made. Are you saying they just made it all up? If so, I really don't have the patience to contest any further your conspiratorial worldview. If he really thought that there was no WMD, why didn't he leak his thoughts to the press before the invasion? I don't give as much weight to their views as I do to those of BBC and ZDF journalists. You mean the same BBC and ZDF journalists who have to pander to audiences that were already knee-jerk anti-American on the Iraq issue from day one? Yeah, no conflicts of interests there.

There is an entirely plausible reading of the communiquė you cite under which these nations did believe Iraq to be disarmed, but were determined to push for continued inspections to prove this.

Then they would have said "we are pushing for inspections to prove this". They wouldn't have used such unqualified language.

I'll give you evidence that France and Germany believed there probably were WMDs in Iraq.

French President Jacques Chirac in an interview on 16 February 2003 said:

I simply don't analyse the situation as they do. Among the negative fallout would be inevitably a strong reaction from Arab and Islamic public opinion. It may not be justified, and it may be, but it's a fact. A war of this kind cannot help giving a big lift to terrorism. It would create a large number of little bin Ladens. Muslims and Christians have a lot to say to one another, but war isn't going to facilitate that dialogue. I'm against the clash of civilizations; that plays into the hands of extremists. There is a problem: the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right to be disturbed by this situation, and it's right in having decided Iraq should be disarmed. The inspections began, and naturally it is a long and difficult job. We have to give the inspectors time to do it. And probably (and this is France's view ) we have to reinforce their capacities, especially those of aerial surveillance. For the moment, nothing allows us to say inspections don't work.
...
France is not a pacifist country. We currently have more troops in the Balkans than the Americans. France is obviously not anti-American. It's a true friend of the United States and always has been. It is not France's role to support dictatorial regimes in Iraq or anywhere else. Nor do we have any differences over the goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. For that matter, if Saddam Hussein would only vanish, it would without a doubt be the biggest favour he could do for his people and for the world. But we think this goal can be reached without starting a war.
...
I don't think so. Are there other weapons of mass destruction? That's probable. We have to find and destroy them. In its current situation, does Iraq, controlled and inspected as it is, pose a clear and present danger to the region? I don't believe so. Given that, I prefer to continue along the path laid out by the Security Council. Then we'll see.
...
That's correct, no doubt. But it's up to the inspectors to say so. I'm betting that we can get Iraq to cooperate more. If I'm wrong, there will still be time to draw other conclusions. When a regime like Saddam's finds itself caught between certain death and abandoning its arms, I think it will make the right choice. But I can't be certain. [11]

The German foreign minister in February 2001 said:

And we talked also about the situation in Iraq, and we appreciate very much what we heard, that you are looking for a political solution. And you underlined that indeed Saddam Hussein and his policy, which tries to get the capabilities for weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, is the real reason, and that the embargo policy is not directed against the Iraqi people, but directed against that policy. So, in fact, we agree that we should go ahead along these lines, but made also quite clear that there will be no possibility for Saddam Hussein to threaten peace in the region or in the international community. [12]

February 2002:

Worst of all, however, is the brutal oppression of his own people. I happen to be familiar with the facts and figures, also from talks with my former colleague Robin Cook, who stated that the possibilities afforded by the United Nations programme for importing medicines, technical equipment for hospitals, foodstuffs and similar items, for instance, have by no means been exhausted but that imports of hard liquor from Scotland have increased tremendously. There are other examples that show how he is attempting to circumvent the sanctions and once again develop the capability for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. All of this has long been common knowledge, and it was Colin Powell, it was precisely the United States of America that at the beginning of the Bush administration set out to revamp the sanctions programme, namely by reaching agreement on so-called "smart sanctions". [13]

7 March 2003:

The aim of the international community remains the complete disarmament - and only the disarmament - of Iraq to finally eliminate the international threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. This is what all the relevant Security Council Resolutions say. [14]

20 March 2003:

Looking at the situation in Iraq, one will naturally conclude that Saddam Hussein is a terrible dictator. He has twice invaded neighbouring countries. He has in the past possessed weapons of mass destruction and there are grounds to suspect that he still has weapons of mass destruction. For all these reasons, the world has maintained a policy of containment since the first Gulf War, has established no-fly zones and imposed strict sanctions, the last also with horrendous consequences for large parts of the population. [15]

I don't have any evidence that the Russian government made such statements. Given Russia's well-known relationship with Iraq, it is highly unlikely they would have said anything incriminating out loud even if they did think he had WMD. However, Russia was a party to the joint statement which reaffirmed in unqualified language that Iraq had to disarm.

CJK (talk) 14:57, 29 June 2013 (UTC)

On the basis of the public statements and private statements of the various governmental actors, I think the following wording is best:
In the months leading up to the war, France, Germany and Russia made public statements that the ongoing UN inspections were the best means of disarming Iraq.[13] Internally, French and German intelligence doubted the credibility of evidence presented by the Bush administration on alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Head of French foreign intelligence, Pierre Brochand, felt that American intelligence had a weaker "immune system" against unreliable pieces of intelligence suggesting ongoing Iraqi WMD programs, and that "intelligence was used to disguise that [war of choice] as a war of necessity."[14] German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer wrote afterwards that he felt the Bush administration desired war for ideological reasons, and that false evidence was knowingly presented in order to bolster public support for an invasion.[15]
This best reflects the documents we have here. -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:43, 29 June 2013 (UTC)

So you're just going to ignore everything that I said, and not at least admit you were mistaken?

Regarding your "proposal", it is extremely misleading to say that they didn't believe certain aspects of what the U.S. was saying while ignoring the fact that they still agreed with the general charge. In any case, since this material is dealing with the introduction, the detail you want to insert is excessive. Nevertheless, in the interests of resolving this dispute I will use your proposal as a basis for compromise.

In 1998 following years of Iraqi obstructionism [16] of the post-Gulf War weapon inspections the U.S. under the Clinton administration publicly announced that it supported regime change and, along with the U.K., initiated aerial hostilities against Iraq in December 1998 which continued for the next several years in the "no-fly zones" in northern and southern Iraq. In 2002 the U.S. began to threaten a ground invasion if Iraq did not readmit U.N. weapon inspectors and complete the disarmament process. The U.N. and most governments who were important diplomatic actors believed that Iraq had not disarmed, and the U.S. and U.K. claimed Iraq had violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions and still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.[17][2][18]
...
Under heavy pressure Iraq agreed to readmit inspectors in September 2002. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which declared Iraq in material breach of prior U.N. resolutions and gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to completely and immediately cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and long-range missiles, threatening "serious consequences" if these demands were not met. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no conclusive evidence of WMD, but chief inspector Hans Blix reported in January 2003 that Iraq had not adequately accounted for missing WMD material and thus had not arrived to "genuine acceptance" of disarmament.[19] In February and March France, Germany and Russia nevertheless argued that Iraq's disarmament could still be achieved by prioritizing disarmament tasks and setting a tight timetable. [20] With weapons inspections ongoing, and facing opposition by France and Russia in the UN Security Council to a further resolution calling for force against Iraq, the United States and United Kingdom formed the nucleus of a "coalition of the willing," which invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003, leading to the fall of Baghdad and destruction of Saddam's regime on 9 April.

CJK (talk) 22:48, 29 June 2013 (UTC)

My proposal leads with what you're insisting we include - that official statements by France, Germany and Russia said UN inspections were the best route for Iraqi disarmament - and continues by providing the internal view that France and Germany held towards Anglo-American allegations of Iraqi WMD. That should be a good compromise. I think it's good to note both what their public and private views were. Public diplomatic positions and private assessments really are a world apart, and even Joschka Fischer, whose pronouncements you have quoted several times above, says this: "But in diplomacy, there are worlds between internal discussions and public pronouncements by the head of government, especially at a campaign event."[21] This is true not only of German and French pronouncements during the lead-up to the war, but also of American and British public statements. Government officials were aware of the unreliability of their sources, but they stressed to the public how supposedly solid their evidence was. Some high-ups in the CIA were very unhappy about this, but they didn't go public until after the war. The article should note both sides of this - public statements and internal dissent. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:29, 2 July 2013 (UTC)

Your proposal amounts to original research by implying without evidence that they were lying when they said Iraq had to disarm. Being skeptical of Colin Powell's presentation to the U.N. is not the same thing as believing there were no WMDs in Iraq. CJK (talk) 12:52, 3 July 2013 (UTC)
My proposal is based on secondary sources. Yours is based on your own interpretation of primary sources. That's basically the definition of original research. I haven't accused anyone of lying; I'm just not willing to read things into their statements that they don't explicitly state, and I'm not willing to assume they believe something because one can read it into their diplomatic statements. I take their direct statements - statements like "No doubt in my mind at all, no" (that Iraq had no active WMD program), "The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy" or "intelligence was used to disguise that [war of choice] as a war of necessity" - as better indicators of internal opinion than diplomatic statements, especially when the people who made those diplomatic statements wrote afterwards that diplomatic statements do not reflect internal opinion within the government. -Thucydides411 (talk) 16:09, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

If you have actual evidence that French, German, or Russian intelligence did not believe there were WMDs before the war then you surely could find it. Otherwise, you are making up your own facts by implying that criticizing the American presentation is the same thing as believing there were no WMDs. Iraq must disarm means what 99% would have thought it meant at the time, not what you think it means 10 years after the fact. And then there are the even more explicit public statements which I cited and you ignored.

CJK (talk) 21:21, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Center for American Progress (29 January 2004) "In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat" americanprogress.org
  2. ^ a b c Senator Bill Nelson (28 January 2004) "New Information on Iraq's Possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction", Congressional Record
  3. ^ Blair, A. (5 March 2002) "PM statement on Iraq following UN Security Council resolution" Number 10 Downing Street
  4. ^ Blix, H. (7 March 2003) "Transcript of Blix's U.N. presentation" CNN
  5. ^ In his remarks to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003 Hans Blix said on cooperation that "In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains and we note that access to sites has so far been without problems." On time remaining until the confirmation of disarmament he said "the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short if immediate, active and unconditional cooperation with UNMOVIC and IAEA were to be forthcoming." United Nations Security Council: 4707th meeting. Friday, 14 February 2003, 10 a.m., New York, New York, USA.
  6. ^ Hersh, Seymour M. (5 May 2003). Selective Intelligence, New Yorker.
  7. ^ "Official's Key Report On Iraq Is Faulted". The Washington Post. 8 February 2007. Retrieved 4 November 2008.
  8. ^ U.S. Senate Intelligence Community (June 2008): "Two Bipartisan Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office".

    There is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate.

    - Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV
  9. ^ UNSCOM Compendium Report submitted on 25 January 1999 See section Actions by Iraq to obstruct disarmament
  10. ^ Center for American Progress (29 January 2004) "In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat" americanprogress.org
  11. ^ Blair, A. (5 March 2002) "PM statement on Iraq following UN Security Council resolution" Number 10 Downing Street
  12. ^ Blix's Report to the U.N. 27 January 2003
  13. ^ "Joint Statement by Russia, Germany, and France". French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 March 2003. Retrieved 29 June 2013.
  14. ^ Whitehead, Tom; Gardham, Duncan (17 March 2013). "Iraq anniversary: war intelligence 'was a lie', BBC Panorama documentary to say". The Telegraph. Retrieved 29 June 2013.
  15. ^ Fischer, Joschka (23 March 2013). "Der Balkan des 21. Jahrhunderts". Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved 29 June 2013.
  16. ^ UNSCOM Compendium Report submitted on 25 January 1999 See section Actions by Iraq to obstruct disarmament
  17. ^ Center for American Progress (29 January 2004) "In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat" americanprogress.org
  18. ^ Blair, A. (5 March 2002) "PM statement on Iraq following UN Security Council resolution" Number 10 Downing Street
  19. ^ Blix's Report to the U.N. 27 January 2003
  20. ^ "Joint Statement by Russia, Germany, and France". French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 March 2003. Retrieved 29 June 2013.
  21. ^ Fischer, Joschka (17 February 2011). "'I Am Not Convinced': Joschka Fischer on Germany's 'No' to the Iraq War". Retrieved 2 July 2013.

Proposed addition

In April 1991, following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, Iraq was required by UNSCR 687 to dismantle within 90 days under U.N. supervision all nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare programs as well as long range missiles as a condition for lifting stringent sanctions that had been adopted by the international community after the invasion of Kuwait. In violation of this resolution Iraq initially decided to retain parts of its WMD and proceeded to submit false declarations to the U.N. An intrusive inspection in June 1991 alarmed the Iraqis, however, and they began secret unilateral destruction of their hidden WMD as part of a plan to continue to conceal WMD-related infrastructure and documents from the inspectors. [1] [2][3] Meanwhile, destruction of Iraq's declared weapons programs proceeded under U.N. inspection and would be completed in 1994. [2] The IAEA dismantled Iraq's nuclear program, but only after Iraqi attempts to hide much of it throughout 1991. [4] Iraq refused to accept long-term monitoring until November 1993.

Relations between the United States and Iraq remained extremely poor and George H.W. Bush continued to urge the overthrow of Saddam’s regime after the Gulf War ended. In March 1991 the U.S. shot down two Iraqi aircraft over northern Iraq in order to defend the Kurdish population. U.S. forces were sent to northern Iraq in April 1991 to participate in humanitarian relief operations. Iraqi forces did not contest this move and Iraq later withdrew its forces from Kurdistan leading to the establishment of a de facto government independent from Baghdad. In September 1991 Iraq prevented U.N. helicopter flights and obstructed an inspection that had uncovered evidence of a nuclear weapons program, leading to American threats of airstrikes. In the fall of 1991 the U.S. authorized covert operations to organize a coup against Saddam’s government, [5] although regime change was not yet declared an official policy. By this time many people felt Bush’s decision to halt the Gulf War short of Baghdad was a mistake and an April 1992 poll showed that a majority of Americans favored sending American troops back to the Persian Gulf to remove Saddam Hussein from power. [6] Although Iraq viewed a U.S. invasion as the greatest potential threat to it during the 1990s, it was always judged to be unlikely. [7]

In August 1992 the U.S., Britain, and France imposed a no-fly zone over southern Iraq to halt Iraqi bombing of Shi'ite rebel areas. An Iraqi MiG was shot down in December that same year. [8] In January 1993 Allied aircraft attacked Iraqi radar and missile sites in southern Iraq after an Iraqi missile buildup. [9] American cruise missiles also targeted a former nuclear facility. [10] Bill Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on Iraqi intelligence facilities in June 1993 after the discovery of an alleged Iraqi assassination plot against George H.W. Bush. [11]

By 1994 Iraq was growing increasingly frustrated that sanctions were not being lifted despite the destruction of its declared WMD programs. In October 1994 Iraq began massing troops near the Kuwaiti border leading to the sending of U.S. reinforcements to the Middle East and a crisis that was resolved when Iraq cancelled the buildup. [12]

In 1995 it was revealed that Iraq had been concealing from U.N. inspectors, among other things, its entire past biological warfare program and the past production of an extremely deadly nerve agent known as VX. [2] Following these revelations Iraq claimed that it had ended its deceptive practices and that all WMD related materials and documents had been destroyed, but Iraqi obstructionism had greatly complicated the verification process and the U.N. could not confirm that Iraq had in fact disarmed. A long list of items still remained unaccounted for in 1999. [13] An international panel of experts drawn from 13 independent nations unanimously rejected Iraq's biological warfare declarations as deeply flawed and incomplete. [14] A technical evaluation meeting on VX with experts drawn from nine countries concluded "no full disclosure on the subject of VX has yet been made by the Iraqi side" and "Iraq was capable of producing significant quantities of VX before January 1991. This may have been as much as 50 to 100 tonnes of VX, albeit of an uncertain quality. Currently, the team assesses that Iraq has the know how and process equipment, and may possess precursors to manufacture as much as 200 tonnes of VX." [15]

In June 1996 Iraqi security services foiled a coup plot that had been supported by the U.S., executing 100 suspected plotters. [16] In August 1996 Saddam's forces attacked Irbil in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region leading to American cruise missile strikes against various targets in southern Iraq on 3-4 September. [17]

Iraq blocked a number of inspections of sensitive sights on the grounds that such inspections threatened their national security and sovereignty. In November 1997 Iraq obstructed aspects of the weapon inspection process and expelled American inspectors. The U.S. built up its forces in the region to prepare for airstrikes against Iraq, and Iraq backed down. [18] In January 1998 Iraq blocked U.N. inspections of presidential palaces leading to an acute crisis with the U.S. and Britain, with widespread speculation of a conflict breaking out. [19] Kofi Annan travelled to Baghdad to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the standoff and a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Iraq concluded on 23 February 1998 established special procedures for the inspection of eight "presidential sites", while reaffirming that unrestricted access would be provided elsewhere.

In August 1998 Iraq announced it intended to suspend cooperation with the inspectors unless they reported Iraq was disarmed and sanctions were lifted. This action prompted the U.S. Congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act, which was signed by Clinton and officially established bringing about regime change in Iraq as an American foreign policy objective. On 31 October Iraq halted all monitoring activities, but reversed its position on 14 November after the U.S. threatened airstrikes. The strikes were cancelled just eight minutes before they were to be launched. [20]

Although Iraq pledged full cooperation, it obstructed several inspections and refused to hand over certain documents. The U.S. and U.K. advised inspectors to leave Iraq and launched a punitive bombing campaign known as "Operation Desert Fox" that lasted from 16 to 19 December 1998. Clinton announced the action was intended to “degrade” Iraq’s alleged WMD programs. Over 600 bombs and 400 cruise missiles were dropped on 97 targets including 32 air defense facilities, 20 “Command and Control” facilities, 18 regime security facilities, 11 WMD related facilities (mostly missile), 9 army facilities, 6 airfields, and an oil refinery near Basra. [21] There were no reliable reports of Iraqi casualties. Announcing the end of the strikes Clinton said "So long as Saddam remains in power, he will remain a threat to his people, his region, and the world. With our allies, we must pursue a strategy to contain him and to constrain his weapons of mass destruction program, while working toward the day Iraq has a government willing to live at peace with its people and with its neighbors.... Now, over the long-term, the best way to end the threat that Saddam poses to his own people in the region is for Iraq to have a different government." [22]

It was subsequently revealed that the U.S. had been gathering intelligence against Iraq through the weapon inspectors, which it attempted to justify by claiming it helped inspectors break through Iraqi "concealment" practices. [23] Iraq declared it would not readmit the inspectors unless the sanctions were lifted, even if the composition of the inspection teams were changed to reduce American influence and be more acceptable to Iraq. [24]

Iraq indicated that it no longer accepted the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq and began to attack British and American aircraft without success. The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes against Iraqi air defenses 166 times in 1999 and 78 times in 2000. [25] [26]

In February 2001 the U.S. and Britain launched the heaviest airstrikes against Iraq since 1998, targeting Iraqi air defenses and telecommunications near Baghdad. [27] George W. Bush's Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill claimed that Bush's first two National Security Council meetings included a discussion of regime change. [28] But no specific actions were decided upon in first months of the Bush administration, apart from efforts to rally other nations around proposals for new “smart sanctions” against Iraq.

Planning for an actual invasion began after the September 11 attacks. Although there were some suggestions within the Bush administration that the U.S. launch an immediate, unilateral attack on Iraq, it was ultimately decided to go through the U.N. and attempt to build a coalition. [29] In August 2002 Bush approved a classified document drafted by officials entitled "Iraq: Goals, Objectives, and Strategy". It stated that the goals of the war were to eliminate the threat of WMD, prevent Saddam from breaking out of his "containment", eliminate the Iraqi threat to its neighbors, liberate the Iraqi people, and prevent Iraqi support of terrorism. [30]

Comment: This is an addition, not a change. I provides badly needed context as to what happened prior to 2002.

CJK (talk) 15:39, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

  • This appears to be a justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which is POV. If we add it, we also need to explain that much of the evidence was distorted or fabricated, and was found to be insufficient for most other countries. TFD (talk) 20:28, 3 July 2013 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Realizing Saddam’s Veiled WMD Intent Iraq Survey Group
  2. ^ a b c . NPR. 25 November 2005 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218. Retrieved 8 June 2013. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  3. ^ . CNN. 7 October 2004 http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/. Retrieved 8 June 2013. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  4. ^ [http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/IAEA/s-1997-779.htm IAEA Report 8 October 1997
  5. ^ CONGRESS NOTIFIED OF IRAQ COUP PLAN New York Times 9 February 1992
  6. ^ Gallup Poll
  7. ^ Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD Iraq Survey Group
  8. ^ Operation Southern Watch Globalsecurity.org
  9. ^ Air Strike 13 January 1993 Globalsecurity.org
  10. ^ Cruise Missile Strike - 17 January 1993 Globalsecurity.org
  11. ^ Cruise Missile Strike - 26 June 1993 Globalsecurity.org
  12. ^ Operation Vigilant Warrior Globalsecurity.org
  13. ^ UNSCOM Compendium Report submitted on 25 January 1999
  14. ^ UNSCOM report 6 October 1997
  15. ^ REPORT ON THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION MEETING ON CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT VX 12 February 1998
  16. ^ Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime Congressional Research Service 22 March 2002
  17. ^ Operation Desert Strike
  18. ^ Operation Phoenix Scorpion I, II, III and IV Globalsecurity.org
  19. ^ Operation Desert Thunder / Desert Viper Globalsecurity.org
  20. ^ Operation Desert Thunder / Desert Viper Globalsecurity.org
  21. ^ [http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/conversino.html Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness With Unintended Effects] Conversino, Mark J. 13 July 2005
  22. ^ Address to the Nation on Completion of Military Strikes in Iraq 19 December 1998
  23. ^ U.S. SPIED ON IRAQ UNDER U.N. COVER, OFFICIALS NOW SAY New York Times 7 January 1999
  24. ^ Iraq Rebuffs France on Plan for Compromise on U.N. Weapons Inspections New York Times 22 December 1998.
  25. ^ Operation Southern Watch Globalsecurity.org
  26. ^ Operation Northern Watch Globalsecurity.org
  27. ^ Iraq: Former and Recent Military Confrontations With the United States Congressional Research Service 6 September 2002
  28. ^ Rebecca, Leung (February 11, 2009). "Bush Sought 'Way' To Invade Iraq?". 60 Minutes. Retrieved 22 March 2013.
  29. ^ Gordon, Michael and Trainor, Bernard Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (2006) pp. 16-17, 71-72
  30. ^ Gordon, Michael and Trainor, Bernard Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (2006) p. 72

On CJK's edits

CJK, You are editing without consensus. Your proposals have not gathered any support so far - only the opposite. Nevertheless, you have reinstated your previous edits with the insulting edit summary, "restoring my vandalized contributions." Who exactly are you accusing of being a vandal?

The way that you want to change this article removes any objectivity the article currently has. It is a complete travesty. In short, your edits make this article read like apologia for the Bush administration. I've compiled a few examples of blatantly partisan edits below.

Changing neutral descriptions of what happened to Op-Ed-style commentaries:

  • "In 1998 following years of Iraqi obstructionism of the post-Gulf War weapon inspections the U.S. under the Clinton administration publicly announced that it supported regime change and, along with the U.K., initiated aerial hostilities against Iraq in December 1998 which continued for the next several years in the "no-fly zones" in northern and southern Iraq."

Before, the subject was introduced with the paragraph

"Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies. In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence of WMD, but could not yet verify the accuracy of Iraq's declarations regarding what weapons it possessed, as their work was still unfinished. The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be 'months'."

This is a quick, neutral overview of the UN inspections. You replaced it with a paragraph that immediately launches into "years of Iraqi obstructionism." Present the facts, and people might agree with you, but don't force your opinion down peoples' throats right in the lede.

Placing the most insiginificant post-war findings about alleged Iraqi WMD first, and trying to play up the parts which you think justify the invasion:

  • "After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had missile programs that violated U.N. range restrictions, that Iraq had the capability of producing mustard gas and anthrax, and that its dual-use infrastructure was expanding despite debilitating sanctions. But Iraq had no active chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons programs and its past WMD programs had either been dismantled by prior U.N. inspections or had been secretly destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991 in an attempt to conceal WMD capabilities from the U.N. They intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted or otherwise disintegrated."

The first sentence is not even correct. The missiles violating the U.N. range restrictions were known about before the war, and were in the process of being destroyed. They had previously been considered within the range restrictions, and had been tested under U.N. supervision in 1996. You play down the most important aspect of the post-war findings, that Iraq's alleged WMD did not exist, burying this finding deep in the paragraph. You play up the accusations the U.S. led group that Iraq intended to build WMD in the future, and missiles that everyone new about and which were being destroyed before the war.

Playing down the importance of the deceitful Niger claims:

  • "Additionally there were allegations that Iraq had attempted to import uranium, although these claims were not essential to the intelligence assessment that a nuclear program existed."

Adding in your own attack against Wilson, who publicly revealed that the administration knew the Niger claim to be false. This one comes complete with the weasel word "however":

  • "In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. However, it was later revealed that he had never actually seen the reports in question."

You hedge every fact that is unpleasant for supporters of the war with some contrived tidbit. After the discussion of the Downing Street memo, for example, you insert,

  • "A 2004 Congressional investigation interviewed analysts and found no evidence to substantiate that analysts had been pressured in any way by the administration. 'The Committee did not find any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with Administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so. When asked whether analysts were pressured in any way to alter their assessments or make their judgments conform with Administration policies on Iraq's WMD programs, not a single analyst answered "yes." Most analysts simply answered, "no" or "never," but some provided more extensive responses.'"

An inconvenient fact for you has to be followed by a lengthy, self-serving quotation from the very same people who authored the war, justifying their own actions.

Your edits don't help the article. If you want to substantially change the article, present your edits point-by-point and convince people on the talk page. We've been discussing the first two proposals, and I don't think either of them is any good. The fact that others are disagreeing with you doesn't give you license to go and change the article wholesale. That's a sign of bad faith. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:55, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

I agree. Some of the edits are constructive, a small proportion, but I object to the edit waring and to a lesser extent making all the edits at once. For an article this size and this contentious, there needs to be more compromise. I'm also a little upset that my well-sourced edits are constantly reverted without any discussion on the talk page, so I object to the further attempts at basing the article. I'm not even sure the regular Wikipedia editing model can work well at all under these conditions. Finally, I'm upset that my suggestion to keep both opposing points of view instead of replacing the old one wholesale has apparently been ignored, even though some of the edits in question actually do that pretty well. Why not do it for all of the changes instead of just a few? EllenCT (talk) 18:12, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

The user reverting my edits was indeed acting as a vandal considering that he refused to engage in discussion. The reason that I restored my edits was because Thucydides411 had failed to respond to me in over three days, and I assumed he had lost interest.

This is a quick, neutral overview of the UN inspections. You replaced it with a paragraph that immediately launches into "years of Iraqi obstructionism." Present the facts, and people might agree with you, but don't force your opinion down peoples' throats right in the lede.

I did not remove the information that you accused me of removing, rather I added information on the Clinton administration's regime change policy that would be implemented by the Bush administration.

The first sentence is not even correct. The missiles violating the U.N. range restrictions were known about before the war, and were in the process of being destroyed. They had previously been considered within the range restrictions, and had been tested under U.N. supervision in 1996.

The Al-Samoud II missile was modified in 2001 to have specifications that had been specifically banned by the U.N.

But I'm not just talking about the al-Samoud II. There was research and development into other missiles that exceeded the 150 km restrictions, research that was deliberately hidden from the U.N. This was discovered by ISG after the war. There was a UAV that went 500 km, UAVs weren't specifically mentioned in the 687 resolution, but they were named in 1441 because they have similar capabilities as missiles.

You play down the most important aspect of the post-war findings, that Iraq's alleged WMD did not exist, burying this finding deep in the paragraph. You play up the accusations the U.S. led group that Iraq intended to build WMD in the future, and missiles that everyone new about and which were being destroyed before the war.

I reported both the facts that are favorable and unfavorable to the Bush administration. You seem to only want to talk about unfavorable facts. I am not the one who inserted the ISG accusation, it was already there.

Playing down the importance of the deceitful Niger claims:

That is a simple fact. The intelligence assessment of the nuclear program was based on the aluminum tubes, not the uranium from Africa. Iraq has natural uranium.

Adding in your own attack against Wilson, who publicly revealed that the administration knew the Niger claim to be false. This one comes complete with the weasel word "however":

Wilson claimed that he personally saw information about the forged documents, and this was shown to be false in the post-war investigation.

You hedge every fact that is unpleasant for supporters of the war with some contrived tidbit.

How is an actual investigation, as opposed to quoting two sentences in a memo out of context to support a conspiracy theory, a "contrived tidbit"?

CJK (talk) 20:00, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

Your contributions make the article a POV justification of the US War in Iraq. Most informed people never believed that Iraq posed the threat that the U.S. government presented, even when presented with the confidential intelligence. TFD (talk) 23:51, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

Are you following me around? That's a little creepy. Please don't intervene here unless you want to give a detailed explanation of your objections.

CJK (talk) 00:37, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

It is clear consensus exists between many editors (including Thucydides411, EllenCT, Darouet, TFD, and myself) that the large (10K+ characters) CJK edit moves the overall article to a less NPOV. I have heard no editor speak out in favor of the CJK edit other than CJK. It would make sense to stop reverting the version of the article that is supported by wide consensus to the version that only CJK supports. -- Truthwillneverdie (talk) 16:34, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

You need to actually respond to the substance of what I am saying.
CJK (talk) 13:50, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
I feel exactly the same way about you. I've repeatedly asked why you can't balance the article by adding alternative text with your favored POV instead of replacing well-sourced text you don't like with text biased in the opposite direction, and you've ignored me. I think your proposals numbered #3, #4, and #7 are actually pretty good because they do that. What's keeping you from doing that with all your edis? Why do you feel like you have to replace the old text entirely in the other proposals instead of augmenting it to achieve a neutral point of view? EllenCT (talk) 17:28, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

You need to be a bit more specific on what you don't like.

CJK (talk) 17:38, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Please review WP:NPOV. I don't like removing longstanding well-sourced text and replacing it with the opposing point of view. Adding opposing points of view to existing text is much better. Since you have done so in the three of your numbered proposals I referred to, why not do it in all of them? EllenCT (talk) 17:50, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

I guess you need to spell out for me what you believe is not NPOV. I find my proposal to be fair to all sides.

CJK (talk) 18:08, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Ellen is 100% correct, you need to review WP:NPOV, and attempt to propose more NPOV edits. I do think the list of facts you are providing is well referenced. Unfortunately, it is just a list of facts that solely shows one extreme POV, and deletes all reference to a NPOV. The current version of the article, while far from perfect, is a somewhat balanced approach that shows a NPOV. You have the same problem on other WP articles you edit. Here is what is being said about you on the Alger Hiss talk page:

Ok, I'm going to propose another compromise. Since, as WP:Consensus(!) makes clear, any agreements regarding article content do not have to to unanimous, and since CJK is clearly going to continue with his endless repetitive tendentious behaviour until the cows come home, I propose that the rest of the contributors to this talk page just ignore him, and try to reach a compromise between us. It seems to me that Collect for one is willing to make moves in this direction, and I suspect that others may well see this as the best way to break the impasse too. I'll leave this proposal for others to think about for now, and return to the topic tomorrow. AndyTheGrump (talk) 01:05, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
Speaking to the larger question, Yes as a matter of fact I have been thinking of writing up a possible compromise. Good suggestion and thank you for making it. I have limited Internet access this week and can't give this full attention. Peace. Joegoodfriend (talk) 01:11, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
I'd say that's a good idea Andy.Capitalismojo (talk) 01:55, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
Excellent suggestion Andy! As a wise man once said, “Never wrestle with a pig -- You'll both get dirty, but the pig will like it. Never try to teach a pig to sing -- It wastes your time and it annoys the pig” 76.182.40.135 (talk) 02:41, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

As you have the same problem with many of your Wikipedia edits, I think you should consider the possibility that the problem is with you and not with all the many editors who disagree with you. As Andy on the Alger Hiss page correctly observes, WP:Consensus(!) does not need to be unanimous, and is free to ignore one editor that fails to provide a NPOV. Truthwillneverdie (talk) 18:26, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

How am I supposed to make it more NPOV, when none of you attempt to identify what specifically you think is not NPOV?
CJK (talk) 19:28, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
In your proposal #2, for example, you want to replace the well-sourced conclusion from multiple sources that Iraq didn't have biological warfare capabilities and replace it with cherry-picked language which can be construed to say they did, but in a sense no more meaningful than the sense in which someone with a bottle of agar and a way to steal dangerous cultures from a laboratory "is capable" of producing biological weapons. Maybe the source you found is worthy of inclusion (although in that case I doubt it) but there is absolutely no basis for removing the contrary sources or the statements they support. EllenCT (talk) 21:01, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

There was no biological warfare program, and my version plainly states that. What sources say that there were no biological warfare "capabilities"?

The UNMOVIC assessment just before the invasion stated:

Iraq currently possesses the technology and materials, including fermenters, bacterial growth media and seed stock, to enable it to produce anthrax. Many of the skilled personnel familiar with anthrax production have been transferred to civilian industries. There does not appear to be any choke points, which would prevent Iraq from producing anthrax on at least the scale of its pre-1991 level. [16] See p. 98

CJK (talk) 21:37, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Okay, so why the deletions? Why can't the proposal be to add text instead of replacing it? EllenCT (talk) 01:13, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

I removed Pillar's opinion because it was just that: his opinion after the fact. It has no business being in the lead. Also, there was false information on what Blix had stated.

CJK (talk) 14:47, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Pillar was the CIA expert in the region at the time, and what you're calling opinion was published as a fact piece in the Washington Post. We don't say his word is gospel, but we say who he is and what he said. Can you see why other people might think that deleting his statements instead of adding to them could be seen as an attempt to replace your disfavored point of view with one you prefer? EllenCT (talk) 18:15, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

No, I am inserting strictly factual material, not the opinions of individuals who happen to share my views.

CJK (talk) 18:22, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

It is strictly a fact that Pillar, the expert in charge of the CIA district including Iraq in 2000-5 made the assessment we state and you want to delete. Do you think "Iraq ... had the capability of producing ... anthrax" is a strictly factual summary of the UNMOVIC quote from page 98 you posted above? I think it is a gross misrepresentation. What makes stating Pillar's assessment less factual than your summary of the survey group? EllenCT (talk) 19:10, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Please explain why it is a "gross misrepresentation" to say Iraq had the capability to produce anthrax. Pillar is expressing his personal opinion with regards to what happened.

It doesn't help matters that it happens to be completely wrong. For example, he says the "broad view" of the intelligence community was that sanctions were working. The 2002 NIE said:

Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. Baghdad diverts some of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs instead. Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance its WMD programs. Over the last four years Baghdad's earnings from illicit oil sales have more than quadrupled to about $3 billion this year.

•UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargo—worth hundreds of millions of dollars—that enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food Program; some of these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to support the Iraqi military.

•Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of international inspections—in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Even within the UN-authorized Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq does not hide that it wants to purchase military and WMD-related goods. For example, Baghdad diverted UN-approved trucks for military purposes and construction equipment to rehabilitate WMD-affiliated facilities, even though these items were approved only to help the civilian population.

•Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it may use to reconstitute Baghdad's unconventional weapons arsenal.

•On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goods—such as neutron generators and servo valves—that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for prohibited Iraqi programs; alternative, non-dual-use items would serve the civilian purpose purportedly intended for this equipment. [17]

I'm not sure how he got "containment is working" out of that. If we're going to cherry-pick an assessment, we should at least report what was actually said.

CJK (talk) 21:01, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

I think Ellen is right. I agree the Pillar quotes from the Washington Post are relevant to creating a NPOV. I also think digging into “mustard gas and anthrax” in the introduction is a revisionist way of describing the lead up to the war. The primary focus of the Bush administration was on the nuclear WMD threat, with some variation of the “don’t want a mushroom cloud to be the smoking gun” argument being cited by Bush administration officials over 100 times the weeks leading up to the war. The current version of the article offers a more NPOV as it talks about the WDM threat in total, without cherry-picking the “mustard gas and anthrax” WDM evidence that looks most reasonable 10 years in hindsight. Truthwillneverdie (talk) 21:50, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Actually, a few days before the Senate voted to go to war, Cheney told them in closed session that Iraq had UAV drones filled with anthrax on ships, ready to attack the east coast of the US. Claiming that the CIA official whose responsibility it was to know all the details at the time and who had access to all pertinent classified information is expressing a personal opinion instead of his professional assessment is absurd. Proposing replacing that professional judgement with innuendo based on the possibility that fiber optics or servo valves had anything to do with WMD just ads insult to injury.
CJK, maybe you should ask uninvolved editors why you've only picked up opposition to your proposals. Maybe at WP:VPM or somewhere like that. I think you are trying to edit in good faith and there is some good in what you're trying to accomplish. Uninvolved editors may be able to help you work on compromises better than editors here can. EllenCT (talk) 22:34, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

That "innuendo" you referenced came from the exact same intelligence community that Pillar claimed said "sanctions are working". There is absolutely no evidence for Pillar's second guessing three years after the fact. In fact, it was widely believed at the time that sanctions were not working very well, as shown in the NIE. The post-invasion ISG investigation produced an abundance of evidence to show that sanctions were eroding.

I presume he had no direct access to Bush administration policymaking, whose policy regarding regime change was the exact same policy as the Clinton administration's, which had been publicly announced two years before Pillar obtained his position. It is solely his personal opinion that you are trying to insert in the lead. That is simply unacceptable in an encyclopedia article.

CJK (talk) 00:38, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

That the facts were being fixed around policy instead of the other way around is part of the problem. Iraq had not reconstituted its WMD programs under the sanctions, so they clearly were working regardless of what Pillar, UNMOVIC, or the Bush administration said before or after the invasion. I do not agree that concerns about fiber optic cables, trucks, neutron sources (for inspecting pipelines) or servo valves had anything to do with WMDs because those all have civilian infrastructure uses. EllenCT (talk) 01:29, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Most WMD infrastructure also has legitimate civilian uses. Pillar's opinion that the intelligence community was saying that sanctions were "keeping Saddam in his box" is radically contradicted by what the NIE said. We shouldn't just take his word for it at face value.

CJK (talk) 15:06, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Pillar was corroborated by Tenet and Ritter, and as far as I know never had any reason to misrepresent the situation. The administration, on the other hand, was actively stating blatant falsehoods about biowarfare drones on ships off the east coast, stovepiping CIA reports, burning a CIA officer's cover because they didn't like her husband's opinions, and just generally lying with impunity in the most blatant, damaging and frankly ridiculous ways imaginable. Why should the politicians' discredited point of view be included at all, let alone to the exclusion of the intelligence professionals'? EllenCT (talk) 15:27, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
The U.S. showed their intelligence to other governments, and the majority of them found it unconvincing. The only governments that accepted it were very close allies on Middle East policy, such as the UK, or very small countries heavily dependent on US support, such as Palau. Most Democratic congressmen mistrusted the evidence, as did some Republicans. Even the president said (to his advisers) that the evidence was weak. TFD (talk) 15:55, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

I don't know how to respond because you both provide zero evidence to substantiate anything you say.

Pillar was corroborated by Tenet and Ritter

Tenet didn't say that. Ritter was not a member of the intelligence community.

The administration, on the other hand, was actively stating blatant falsehoods about biowarfare drones on ships off the east coast

He was pointing out that they were developing a capability in that direction. This was all confirmed after the war, given that there were UAVs in development that had an inherent capability of dispersing biological warfare agent.

stovepiping CIA reports

Please explain.

burning a CIA officer's cover because they didn't like her husband's opinions

That happened after the invasion, and was done by a moderate official. Her husbands opinion had no impact on the intelligence community's judgments.

and just generally lying with impunity in the most blatant, damaging and frankly ridiculous ways imaginable.

Actually, the administrations statements were judged by a Democrat-controlled committee as being generally consistent with the intelligence.

Why should the politicians' discredited point of view be included at all, let alone to the exclusion of the intelligence professionals'?

If you don't want to believe the NIE, you can look at the post-invasion ISG investigation, which basically said the same thing with regards to sanctions.

The U.S. showed their intelligence to other governments, and the majority of them found it unconvincing.

If you have evidence that the intelligence agencies of any country judged that there were no WMDs in Iraq, please present it.

Most Democratic congressmen mistrusted the evidence, as did some Republicans.

Untrue, all the Democrats commenting on the intelligence believed there were WMDs.

Even the president said (to his advisers) that the evidence was weak.

Evidence, please.

CJK (talk) 16:42, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Tenet corroborating Pillar. Saying that Iraq has ships with drones armed with biological weapons ready to attack the eastern seaboard was "pointing out that they were developing a capability in that direction"? No way. That assertion has convinced me that you are not editing in good faith. There was never any evidence of drones with inherent bioweapons capability, just recon cameras. Stovepiping. More stovepiping. Zero evidence? I'm finished being insulted for trying to help you. If you wish to discuss this with me further, please find a suitable intermediary via a dispute resolution procedure. EllenCT (talk) 17:46, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

I don't see any information from Tenet that corroborates Pillar's claim that sanctions were "keeping Saddam in his box". I see no evidence that anyone claimed Iraq was "ready to attack the eastern seaboard". When I said "inherent" capability I meant inherently adaptable. Whether or not stovepiping existed, the non-stovepiped intelligence supported the WMD claims.

CJK (talk) 18:32, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Okay, I think I found the drone thing you are talking about. The full quote reads:

I, along with nearly every Senator in this Chamber, in that secure room of this Capitol complex, was not only told there were weapons of mass destruction--specifically chemical and biological--but I was looked at straight in the face and told that Saddam Hussein had the means of delivering those biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction by unmanned drones, called UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles. Further, I was looked at straight in the face and told that UAVs could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to attack eastern seaboard cities of the United States.

This is true. There were drones that had an inherent capability to deliver biological weapons. They "could" be launched from ships, but nobody said that there was evidence that they were planning to do so.

CJK (talk) 18:39, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Only 30 countries joined the "Coalition of the willing". 82 Democratic congressmen voted in favor of the Iraq Resolution, while 126 voted against. That intelligence agencies and Democrats did not question their were WMDs is irrelevant. They did not know whether any existed but did not believe they did they posed any threat. Canada's PM at the time recently said he had not believed the intelligence that Iraq had WMDs.[18] Basically, one people who wanted to believe the evidence believed it. Incidentally, much of what was presented was obviously bogus, and probably only believed by a gullible public. TFD (talk) 21:36, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

I'll reply when you post actual information on what people had to say about WMD at the time rather than their self-serving nonsense years after the fact. All your other points are completely irrelevant.

Basically, one people who wanted to believe the evidence believed it. Incidentally, much of what was presented was obviously bogus, and probably only believed by a gullible public.

That reflects a remarkable level of impudence on your part. Please do not make such insulting statements unless you can back them up in detail.

CJK (talk) 22:41, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

I'm going to quote the Canadian representative to the U.N. just before the war. Apparently, he was quite gullible as well:

PAUL HEINBECKER (Canada) said throughout the world people were making their voices heard: no one wanted a war. People were also aware of Iraqi mass violations of human rights and the fact that, equipped with weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein was a threat to the region and to the world. There was no proof Iraq had rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary, there were still weapons of mass destruction unaccounted for. Resolution 1441 (2002) had given Iraq one last chance to answer remaining questions convincingly and to disarm itself. [19]

CJK (talk) 23:07, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

You are reading it out of context. The link says, "many speakers urged the Council to exhaust all peaceful means before resorting to war...." The complete Feb 19 2003 speech is here. He does not say that Saddam Hussein had WMDs. In his book (p. 145), he says of Powell's Feb. 5, 2003 speech, "Reactions in the room, including mine, ranged from incredulity to anger to intense disappointment. For many among the US public, the speech sealed the deal and Americans, for the most part, supported the war in good faith."[20] Heimbecker was speaking against the war and his and other speeches persuaded the US that the UN would never authorize it. When the US invaded, the majority of countries refused to join the Coalition.
It is ironic to use a speech opposing the war as a justification for the war.
TFD (talk) 15:52, 14 July 2013 (UTC)

Since the UNSCOM inspectors withdrew in 1998, we have no evidence that Iraq has disposed of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, we have reason to fear the opposite.

As Chief Inspector Blix told this Council January 27, Saddam Hussein clearly has still not fully accepted his obligation to disarm.

The Council should also establish an early deadline for Iraqi compliance.

Everyone understands what disarmament looks like. The case study of South Africa is often cited because that country took the decision to get out of the business of weapons of mass destruction and did so with determination, transparency and purpose. Iraq can do the same if it so decides.

Yeah, what I said was totally out of context.

CJK (talk) 16:52, 14 July 2013 (UTC)

Compare these two statements:
1. "...we have no evidence that Iraq has disposed of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, we have reason to fear the opposite"
2. Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.
Or these:
1. "...we believe that a peaceful solution remains possible."
2. War is the only option.
If you remember, the US had decided to ask for authorization for war. The Canadian ambassador and others opposed that and the US dropped their pursuit of authorization for the war after on March 10, 2003 France said they would veto it. The point is that no informed observers thought the evidence justified the war and it is POV to pretend they did.
TFD (talk) 17:59, 14 July 2013 (UTC)

The point is that no informed observers thought the evidence justified the war and it is POV to pretend they did.

That might have been a great point, if it wasn't for the fact that I never said that they did. All I said was that they believed Iraq had not disarmed.

CJK (talk) 18:26, 14 July 2013 (UTC)

Your suggested edit pushes that POV, which is why I and others oppose it. POV may be shown by presenting facts in a way that pushes one POV. For example, your selective quoting of the Canadian ambassador, and by extension other ambassadors of Western nations, presents a false view that he supported Colin Powell. TFD (talk) 05:25, 15 July 2013 (UTC)

The debate at the U.N. centered around the disarmament of Iraq, not whether Colin Powell's presentation was sufficient. I am merely noting that most governments believed that Iraq had not disarmed.

CJK (talk) 14:33, 15 July 2013 (UTC)

Real Time Regional Gateway

Real Time Regional Gateway was a data collection program used in Iraq by NSA during the war. It followed the recent model exposed by Snowden's revelations of gathering all electronic communication, storing it, then searching and otherwise analyzing it. It is not included in the current article. There is a Washington Post story today, "For NSA chief, terrorist threat drives passion to ‘collect it all,’ observers say" I don't think including a brief note in the article about it would be controversial, but, as required, here it is on the talk page for comment. User:Fred Bauder Talk 12:15, 15 July 2013 (UTC)

In the top box ('Iraq War') there is a sub-section titled 'Commanders and leaders'; in that section there is a broken link to Gen. Tommy Franks. This should be changed to either Gen. Tommy Franks or General Tommy Franks. Thanks! Highspeed (talk) 15:10, 17 July 2013 (UTC)

 Done Bearian (talk) 16:07, 17 July 2013 (UTC)

WP:Consensus – CJK’s edits contain original research and move article to a less NPOV

We need to summarize all the information on the talk page above (and recently archived) regarding the CJK proposed changes. It is clear consensus exists between many editors (including Thucydides411, EllenCT, Darouet, TFD and myself) that the CJK edits move the overall article to a less NPOV and contain original research. I have heard no editor speak out in favor of the CJK edits other than CJK. WP:Consensus does not need to be unanimous. The more NPOV article supported by WP:Consensus has been reverted to the less NPOV version which is only supported by CJK at least seven times to date by CJK. Continued CJK reverts of the WP:Consensus version to the version that only CJK supports should be handled as vandalism.

The reason that the CJK edit move the overall article to a less NPOV have been explained exhaustively on the talk page above. He frequently deletes expert secondary sources from the article and replaces it with original research citing primary sources that do not clearly support his conclusions. CJK’s responses have failed to address any of the POV issues or any of the original research issues. As WP:Consensus has been established, it is time to reject CJK’s proposed edits and move on.

CJK frequently engages in personal attacks that have reduced the willingness of NPOV editors to participate in the article. Truthwillneverdie (talk) 15:33, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

I generally support this view, although I think this is far more of a WP:NPOV problem and not really a WP:OR issue. While I believe that several of CJK's proposals are good-intentioned and have the potential to improve the article if they were re-worked to supplement their points of view instead of replacing existing mainstream points of view (as some already do) I have lost the ability to assume that CJK is editing entirely in good faith and am exhausted by CJK's implications that those who do not approve of his proposals lack supporting evidence. I note that CJK has garnered no support while several people oppose CJK's proposals. So I have requested that CJK seek dispute resolution. EllenCT (talk) 18:11, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

First of all, the primary reason I am reverting is that nobody responded to me in the last five days. You can't expect me to just give up because users fail to provide timely responses. User Truthwillneverdie is apparently obsessed with mass reverting my contributions yet he has made little to no effort in explaining what he does not like in any detail. User EllenCT chose to give up because she did not like the content of one of my responses. I expect that serious discussion of the issues at hand, rather than vague generalities, is needed before my edits can be reverted in good faith. CJK (talk) 18:43, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

You haven't been able to gain any support for your proposed changes, let alone a consensus to make the vast changes to longstanding text you've been attempting. Multiple editors oppose your proposals. Please use dispute resolution instead of continuing to edit war against consensus. EllenCT (talk) 19:05, 20 July 2013 (UTC)
CJK, it has already been explained to you that your edits are POV. You have assembled facts to create a narrative that justifies the U.S. decision to launch the war and totally ignores any other opinions. You cannot take the fact that people have tired of responding to your highly opinionated and aggressive postings as evidence that they agree with you. TFD (talk) 19:19, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

If you believe that there is a bias you are free to build upon my edits rather than completely deleting them. The vast majority of my edits consists of new material, all of which is well sourced. If you won't get into any specifics, I don't see how I can engage with you to improve the text. Neither of you have contested the vast majority of my changes. CJK (talk) 23:17, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

TFDs statement is particularly bizarre. He admits I assembled "facts" but criticizes me for ignoring "opinions". One of the purposes of an encyclopedia is to convey facts over opinions. CJK (talk) 23:22, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

I said "ignored any other opinions". Many of your facts are "facts about opinions", i.e., true statements about opinions - you accurately reported the opinions with which you agreed and ignored others. However I do not believe that your level of comprehension is such that you do not understand you have assembled and ordered information (including facts about opinions) that the U.S. was correct in its decision to invade Iraq which is what you and a tiny minority of people continue to believe. That is a clear violation of the policy of neutrality, every other editor has explained it to you, yet you continue to insult other editors and pretend you do not understand why anyone would question your extremely tendentious edit.
TFD (talk) 23:33, 20 July 2013 (UTC)

The only opinions I reported were from people directly relevant to the events leading up to the war, Bush, Clinton, Blix, etc. These people were heads of nations and organizations who played key roles in the dispute. If you have opposing opinions from similarly notable individuals, you are free to add them at any time. CJK (talk) 00:38, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

The current version of the article is just fine. TFD (talk) 00:58, 21 July 2013 (UTC)