Talk:Iraq War/Archive 26

Archive 20

←

Archive 24

Archive 25

Archive 26

Archive 27

Archive 28

→

Archive 30

Edit warring needs to stop

The following discussion is closed and will soon be archived.

---

The edit warring needs to stop. Blocks are likely to happen to everyone involved, irrespective of how right you think you are. If you are serious about improving the article, the only effective option is to engage in collegiate discussion. (Hohum ^@) 00:42, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Now that the page is protected, please take the time to discuss the content conflict. If you simply re-engage in edit warring once the protection expires, blocks and another page protection is likely. (Hohum ^@) 13:25, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

I have been willing to discuss all issues, but the user involved simply reverts my edits without discussion. Locking the to the version that deletes huge contributions of mine is extraordinarily unfair. CJK (talk) 20:08, 23 June 2013 (UTC)

The problem is that you have made what others view as highly POV edits. After you make major changes to an article that get deleted, you should come back to the talk page and attempt to reach consensus. There is no consensus supporting your proposed changes here. In fact, there is a lot of opposition to the language you have been introducing into the article. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:30, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

Instead of an argument about each others actions, which is never profitable, I suggest you concentrate on how to best reflect the content of reliable sources for inclusion in the article, while referring to those sources. Where you have issues with existing or proposed edits, clearly show how they don't reflect sources. (Hohum ^@) 18:45, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

Establishing consensus

I'm still waiting for a response as to specifically what is wrong with my edits. It isn't fair for this article to be held up if nobody is going to respond to anything that I say.

The article as it stands now is an incoherent mess. It acts as if two countries suddenly out of nowhere decided to make a bunch of evidence-free accusations in order to justify a war for reasons that, as far as this article is concerned, remain a mystery. Everything that happened in the 1990s is completely ignored, which is not simply an understandable oversight but downright embarrassing 10 years on considering their direct relevance.

It's perfectly understandable that this article would want to focus on the questionable intelligence. But it ignores the other side of the coin, which is that Iraq's own behavior was directly responsible for the inaccurate intelligence on chemical and biological weapons and explains, if not excuses, the inaccurate intelligence about the nuclear program. Obviously, it shouldn't be stated that bluntly, and the reader should be permitted to come to their own conclusions. Yet pretending it didn't happen is certainly unhelpful to our understanding of the Iraq War.

CJK (talk) 14:56, 25 June 2013 (UTC)

If you put the edits you want to make here, with reasoning and sources, everyone has the opportunity to have made rational arguments based on sources by the time the protection is lifted. My suggestion would be to make reasoning as brief and to the point as possible. (Hohum ^@) 16:57, 25 June 2013 (UTC)

My edits are quite massive. But I'll try to summarize the main additions that need to be in the article.

1. There were serious confrontations between Iraq and the U.S. between 1991-98.

2. "Regime change" became the publicly announced policy of the U.S. in 1998.

3. Hostilities started in 1998 and continued uninterrupted up to the invasion.

4. Iraq obstructed the inspectors in the 1990s, first by trying to hide programs, then by blocking access, then by attempting to end inspections in August and October 1998, then by saying that there weren't going to be any inspections unless sanctions were lifted first. That they changed their mind in 2002 was due to the direct threat of force that Bush made on 12 September 2002.

5. As reported by the U.N., Iraq failed to comply with its disarmament obligations right up to the invasion by not accounting for WMD and WMD related material that it acknowledged having at one point. Additionally, inaccurate information was provided regarding it's past biological warfare program.

6. The perception of WMD existing was influenced by the aforementioned facts and by the fact that Iraq imported aluminum tubes banned by the U.N. specifically due to their potential nuclear applications.

7. The perception that there was WMD was shared by most other countries and inspectors. In particular, French and German intelligence also believed Iraq had a nuclear program.

8. Evidence gathered after the invasion revealed that Iraq had missile programs that violated U.N. range restrictions.

9. Various aspects of the intelligence debate need to be elaborated on, for example the Niger story needs to note how Wilson failed to change anyone's mind and that the alleged uranium imports were not the basis in which the nuclear judgments were made. The judgments about the aluminum tubes were first made by the CIA and DIA prior to 9/11, not in September 2002.

CJK (talk) 17:37, 25 June 2013 (UTC)

I meant, paste the way you want each substantive change to look, with sources, here. The problem with 9 bullet points is that it doesn't show the content, or the references to support it. Since it seems only you supported the inclusion, and perhaps two editors opposed it, that would seem to be the way forward. (Hohum ^@) 11:47, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

Introduction

The Iraq War was an armed conflict in Iraq that began, after several years of prior unofficial aerial action, with an invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 by forces led by the United States. An insurgency soon emerged to oppose coalition forces and the newly formed Iraqi government. The U.S. completed its withdrawal of military personnel in December 2011. However, the Iraqi insurgency continues and caused thousands of fatalities in 2012.

Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies. In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence of WMD, but could not yet verify the accuracy of Iraq's declarations regarding what weapons it possessed, as their work was still unfinished. The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be "months".

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that they intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted. Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been one of the main arguments for the invasion. The United States’ most senior intelligence officers disputed the Bush administration’s claims that the motivation for war was based on pre-war intelligence regarding WMD. Paul R. Pillar, the CIA official who coordinated U.S. intelligence on the Middle East from 2000 to 2005, said the "broad view" within the intelligence community both in the United States and overseas "was that Saddam was being kept 'in his box' " by U.N. sanctions, and that the best way to deal with him was through "an aggressive inspections program to supplement sanctions already in place." Pillar states the "Official intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs was flawed, but even with its flaws, it was not what led to the war." Instead, he asserted, the administration "went to war without requesting -- and evidently without being influenced by -- any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq." Similarly, George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, stated Vice President Dick Cheney and other Bush administration officials pushed the country to war in Iraq without ever conducting a “serious debate” about whether Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States.

Some U.S. officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda, but no evidence of a meaningful connection was ever found. Other proclaimed reasons for the invasion included Iraq's financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, Iraqi government human rights abuses, and an effort to spread democracy to the country.

On 16 March 2003, the U.S. government advised the U.N. inspectors to leave their unfinished work and exit from Iraq. On 20 March the American-led coalition conducted a surprise military invasion of Iraq without declaring war. The invasion led to an occupation and the eventual capture of President Hussein, who was later tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi government. Violence against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups soon led to the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and the emergence of a new faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

In June 2008, U.S. Department of Defense officials claimed security and economic indicators began to show signs of improvement in what they hailed as significant and fragile gains. Iraq was fifth on the 2008 Failed States Index, and sixth on the 2009 list. As public opinion favoring troop withdrawals increased and as Iraqi forces began to take responsibility for security, member nations of the Coalition withdrew their forces. In late 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments approved a Status of Forces Agreement effective through 1 January 2012. The Iraqi Parliament also ratified a Strategic Framework Agreement with the U.S., aimed at ensuring cooperation in constitutional rights, threat deterrence, education, energy development, and other areas.

In late February 2009, newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama announced an 18-month withdrawal window for combat forces, with approximately 50,000 troops remaining in the country "to advise and train Iraqi security forces and to provide intelligence and surveillance". UK forces ended combat operations on 30 April 2009. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al‑Maliki said he supported the accelerated pullout of U.S. forces. In a speech at the Oval Office on 31 August 2010 Obama declared "the American combat mission in Iraq has ended. Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country." Beginning 1 September 2010, the American operational name for its involvement in Iraq changed from "Operation Iraqi Freedom" to "Operation New Dawn". The remaining 50,000 U.S. troops were designated as "advise and assist brigades" assigned to non-combat operations while retaining the ability to revert to combat operations as necessary. Two combat aviation brigades also remain in Iraq. In September 2010, the Associated Press issued an internal memo reminding its reporters that "combat in Iraq is not over", and "U.S. troops remain involved in combat operations alongside Iraqi forces, although U.S. officials say the American combat mission has formally ended".

Should be changed to:

The Iraq War was an armed conflict in Iraq that began, after several years of prior unofficial aerial action, with an invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 by forces led by the United States. An insurgency soon emerged to oppose coalition forces and the newly formed Iraqi government. The U.S. completed its withdrawal of military personnel in December 2011. However, the Iraqi insurgency continues and caused thousands of fatalities in 2012.

In 1998 following years of Iraqi obstructionism of the post-Gulf War weapon inspections the U.S. under the Clinton administration publicly announced that it supported regime change and, along with the U.K., initiated aerial hostilities against Iraq in December 1998 which continued for the next several years in the "no-fly zones" in northern and southern Iraq. In 2002 the U.S. began to threaten a ground invasion if Iraq did not readmit U.N. weapon inspectors and complete the disarmament process. Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed, and the U.S. and U.K. claimed Iraq had violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions and still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.

Some U.S. officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda, but no evidence of an operational connection was ever found. Other proclaimed reasons for the invasion included Iraq's financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, Iraqi government human rights abuses, and an effort to spread democracy to the country.

Under heavy pressure Iraq agreed to readmit inspectors in September 2002. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which declared Iraq in material breach of prior U.N. resolutions and gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to completely and immediately cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and long-range missiles, threatening "serious consequences" if these demands were not met. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no conclusive evidence of WMD, but chief inspector Hans Blix reported in January 2003 that Iraq had not adequately accounted for its missing WMD and thus had not arrived to "genuine acceptance" of disarmament. With weapons inspections ongoing, and facing opposition by France and Russia in the UN Security Council to a further resolution calling for force against Iraq, the United States and United Kingdom formed the nucleus of a "coalition of the willing," which invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003, leading to the fall of Baghdad and destruction of Saddam's regime on 9 April.

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had missile programs that violated U.N. range restrictions, that Iraq had the capability of producing mustard gas and anthrax, and that its dual-use infrastructure was expanding despite debilitating sanctions. But Iraq had no active chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons programs and its past WMD programs had either been dismantled by prior U.N. inspections or had been secretly destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991 in an attempt to conceal WMD capabilities from the U.N. They intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted or otherwise disintegrated. Some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were also found.

The invasion led to the occupation of Iraq and the eventual capture of Saddam Hussein, who was later tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi government. A predominately Sunni-based insurgency quickly began conducting attacks on coalition and Iraqi government troops. Serious fighting with Shi'a militias also occurred in 2004 and 2008. The occupation ended in June 2004 as power was transferred to an Iraqi interim government, but American and British troops did not withdraw due to ongoing insurgent violence that threatened Iraq's stability. Elections were held in 2005, resulting in the formation of a Shi'a led government under Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. In 2006 sectarian violence steadily mounted between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and a new faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged.

In 2007 Bush ordered over 20,000 reinforcements to Iraq in an effort to tamp down the growing violence and by mid-2008 security had improved and violence dropped sharply. As public opinion in Coalition countries favoring troop withdrawals increased and as Iraqi forces began to take responsibility for security, member nations of the Coalition withdrew their forces. In late 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments approved a Status of Forces Agreement effective through 1 January 2012. The Iraqi Parliament also ratified a Strategic Framework Agreement with the U.S.,

UK forces ended combat operations on 30 April 2009. In August 2010 Barack Obama announced that the U.S. combat role in Iraq had ended. The remaining 50,000 U.S. troops were designated as "advise and assist brigades" assigned to non-combat operations while retaining the ability to revert to combat operations as necessary. Two combat aviation brigades also remain in Iraq.

Background

The following needs to be inserted:

In April 1991, following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, Iraq was required by UNSCR 687 to dismantle within 90 days under U.N. supervision all nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare programs as well as long range missiles as a condition for lifting stringent sanctions that had been adopted by the international community after the invasion of Kuwait. In violation of this resolution Iraq initially decided to retain parts of its WMD and proceeded to submit false declarations to the U.N. An intrusive inspection in June 1991 alarmed the Iraqis, however, and they began secret unilateral destruction of their hidden WMD as part of a plan to continue to conceal WMD-related infrastructure and documents from the inspectors. Meanwhile, destruction of Iraq's declared weapons programs proceeded under U.N. inspection and would be completed in 1994. The IAEA dismantled Iraq's nuclear program, but only after Iraqi attempts to hide much of it throughout 1991. Iraq refused to accept long-term monitoring until November 1993.

Relations between the United States and Iraq remained extremely poor and George H.W. Bush continued to urge the overthrow of Saddam’s regime after the Gulf War ended. In March 1991 the U.S. shot down two Iraqi aircraft over northern Iraq in order to defend the Kurdish population. U.S. forces were sent to northern Iraq in April 1991 to participate in humanitarian relief operations. Iraqi forces did not contest this move and Iraq later withdrew its forces from Kurdistan leading to the establishment of a de facto government independent from Baghdad. In September 1991 Iraq prevented U.N. helicopter flights and obstructed an inspection that had uncovered evidence of a nuclear weapons program, leading to American threats of airstrikes. In the fall of 1991 the U.S. authorized covert operations to organize a coup against Saddam’s government, although regime change was not yet declared an official policy. By this time many people felt Bush’s decision to halt the Gulf War short of Baghdad was a mistake and an April 1992 poll showed that a majority of Americans favored sending American troops back to the Persian Gulf to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Although Iraq viewed a U.S. invasion as the greatest potential threat to it during the 1990s, it was always judged to be unlikely.

In August 1992 the U.S., Britain, and France imposed a no-fly zone over southern Iraq to halt Iraqi bombing of Shi'ite rebel areas. An Iraqi MiG was shot down in December that same year. In January 1993 Allied aircraft attacked Iraqi radar and missile sites in southern Iraq after an Iraqi missile buildup. American cruise missiles also targeted a former nuclear facility. Bill Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on Iraqi intelligence facilities in June 1993 after the discovery of an alleged Iraqi assassination plot against George H.W. Bush.

By 1994 Iraq was growing increasingly frustrated that sanctions were not being lifted despite the destruction of its declared WMD programs. In October 1994 Iraq began massing troops near the Kuwaiti border leading to the sending of U.S. reinforcements to the Middle East and a crisis that was resolved when Iraq cancelled the buildup.

In 1995 it was revealed that Iraq had been concealing from U.N. inspectors, among other things, its entire past biological warfare program and the past production of an extremely deadly nerve agent known as VX. Following these revelations Iraq claimed that it had ended its deceptive practices and that all WMD related materials and documents had been destroyed, but Iraqi obstructionism had greatly complicated the verification process and the U.N. could not confirm that Iraq had in fact disarmed. A long list of items still remained unaccounted for in 1999. An international panel of experts drawn from 13 independent nations unanimously rejected Iraq's biological warfare declarations as deeply flawed and incomplete. A technical evaluation meeting on VX with experts drawn from nine countries concluded "no full disclosure on the subject of VX has yet been made by the Iraqi side" and "Iraq was capable of producing significant quantities of VX before January 1991. This may have been as much as 50 to 100 tonnes of VX, albeit of an uncertain quality. Currently, the team assesses that Iraq has the know how and process equipment, and may possess precursors to manufacture as much as 200 tonnes of VX."

In June 1996 Iraqi security services foiled a coup plot that had been supported by the U.S., executing 100 suspected plotters. In August 1996 Saddam's forces attacked Irbil in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region leading to American cruise missile strikes against various targets in southern Iraq on 3-4 September.

Iraq blocked a number of inspections of sensitive sights on the grounds that such inspections threatened their national security and sovereignty. In November 1997 Iraq obstructed aspects of the weapon inspection process and expelled American inspectors. The U.S. built up its forces in the region to prepare for airstrikes against Iraq, and Iraq backed down. In January 1998 Iraq blocked U.N. inspections of presidential palaces leading to an acute crisis with the U.S. and Britain, with widespread speculation of a conflict breaking out. Kofi Annan travelled to Baghdad to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the standoff and a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Iraq concluded on 23 February 1998 established special procedures for the inspection of eight "presidential sites", while reaffirming that unrestricted access would be provided elsewhere.

In August 1998 Iraq announced it intended to suspend cooperation with the inspectors unless they reported Iraq was disarmed and sanctions were lifted. This action prompted the U.S. Congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act, which was signed by Clinton and officially established bringing about regime change in Iraq as an American foreign policy objective. On 31 October Iraq halted all monitoring activities, but reversed its position on 14 November after the U.S. threatened airstrikes. The strikes were cancelled just eight minutes before they were to be launched.

Although Iraq pledged full cooperation, it obstructed several inspections and refused to hand over certain documents. The U.S. and U.K. advised inspectors to leave Iraq and launched a punitive bombing campaign known as "Operation Desert Fox" that lasted from 16 to 19 December 1998. Clinton announced the action was intended to “degrade” Iraq’s alleged WMD programs. Over 600 bombs and 400 cruise missiles were dropped on 97 targets including 32 air defense facilities, 20 “Command and Control” facilities, 18 regime security facilities, 11 WMD related facilities (mostly missile), 9 army facilities, 6 airfields, and an oil refinery near Basra. There were no reliable reports of Iraqi casualties. Announcing the end of the strikes Clinton said "So long as Saddam remains in power, he will remain a threat to his people, his region, and the world. With our allies, we must pursue a strategy to contain him and to constrain his weapons of mass destruction program, while working toward the day Iraq has a government willing to live at peace with its people and with its neighbors.... Now, over the long-term, the best way to end the threat that Saddam poses to his own people in the region is for Iraq to have a different government."

It was subsequently revealed that the U.S. had been gathering intelligence against Iraq through the weapon inspectors, which it attempted to justify by claiming it helped inspectors break through Iraqi "concealment" practices. Iraq declared it would not readmit the inspectors unless the sanctions were lifted, even if the composition of the inspection teams were changed to reduce American influence and be more acceptable to Iraq. Iraq indicated that it no longer accepted the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq and began to attack British and American aircraft without success. The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes against Iraqi air defenses 166 times in 1999 and 78 times in 2000.

In February 2001 the U.S. and Britain launched the heaviest airstrikes against Iraq since 1998, targeting Iraqi air defenses and telecommunications near Baghdad. George W. Bush's Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill claimed that Bush's first two National Security Council meetings included a discussion of regime change. But no specific actions were decided upon in first months of the Bush administration, apart from efforts to rally other nations around proposals for new “smart sanctions” against Iraq.

Planning for an actual invasion began after the September 11 attacks. Although there were some suggestions within the Bush administration that the U.S. launch an immediate, unilateral attack on Iraq, it was ultimately decided to go through the U.N. and attempt to build a coalition. In August 2002 Bush approved a classified document drafted by officials entitled "Iraq: Goals, Objectives, and Strategy". It stated that the goals of the war were to eliminate the threat of WMD, prevent Saddam from breaking out of his "containment", eliminate the Iraqi threat to its neighbors, liberate the Iraqi people, and prevent Iraqi support of terrorism.

U.N. weapon inspections

The issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in 2002–2003, when Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. The UN had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance. During inspections in 1999, U.S. intelligence agents supplied the United States with a direct feed of conversations between Iraqi security agencies as well as other information. This was confirmed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.

During 2002, Bush repeatedly warned of military action against Iraq unless inspections were allowed to progress unfettered. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 Iraq reluctantly agreed to new inspections in late 2002. With the cooperation of the Iraqis, a third weapons inspection team in 2003 led by David Kelly (weapons expert) viewed and photographed two alleged mobile weapons laboratories which were actually facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons.

Shortly before the invasion, Hans Blix the lead weapons inspector, advised the UN Security Council that Iraq was cooperating with inspections and that the confirmation of disarmament through inspections could be achieved in a short period of time if Iraq remained cooperative.

Should be changed to:

The issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in late 2002, when Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. The UN had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance. In a speech to the U.N. on 12 September 2002 he declared: "If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."

This speech alarmed Saddam, and four days later Iraq agreed to let the inspectors back in. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed on 8 November 2002, setting out the terms of disarmament. It decided Iraq remained in material breach of relevant resolutions, that Iraq would be given a "final opportunity" to comply, that it would submit an accurate declaration of its past WMD activities, that false statements and omissions would constitute a further material breach, that the inspectors would receive total unrestricted access and conduct interviews how they saw fit, and that cooperation would be immediate and unconditional. Iraq reluctantly accepted these terms and new inspections began on 27 November.

The inspectors failed to find any WMD but did stumble upon 14 unfilled chemical rockets. The inspectors ruled that Iraq's al-Samoud II missile violated range restrictions and noted that Iraq had rebuilt casting chambers destroyed by previous inspections for their use in long-range missile programs. Three thousand pages of nuclear related documents were discovered by an inspection of a private residence.

Although praising Iraq for its cooperation in the inspection "process", chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix remarked in January 2003 that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Among other things, he noted that 1,000 short tons (910 t) of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq's VX nerve agent program was missing, and that "no convincing evidence" was presented for the destruction of 8,500 litres (1,900 imp gal; 2,200 US gal) of anthrax that had been declared. He also stated that Iraq's 12,000 page declaration left questions unanswered and that Iraq failed to cooperate on providing names for interviews.

The UNMOVIC report of 28 February 2003 concluded "Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far." The next report stated "the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation. From the end of January 2003, the Iraqi side, which until then had been cooperative in terms of process but not equally cooperative in terms of subsistence, devoted much effort to providing explanations and proposing methods of inquiry into such issues as the production and destruction of anthrax, VX and long-range missiles. Despite those efforts, little progress was made in the solution of outstanding issues during the time of UNMOVIC operations in Iraq."

It was concluded after the invasion that Iraq had submitted inaccurate details about its past biological warfare program, and that this may have hindered the verification process.

Alleged Weapons of mass destruction

Before the Gulf War, in 1990, Iraq had stockpiled 550 short tons (500 t) of yellowcake uranium at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex about 20 kilometres (12 mi) south of Baghdad. In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson to investigate reports (later found to be forgeries) that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." The Bush administration, however, continued to allege Iraq's attempts to obtain additional yellowcake were a justification for military action, most prominently in the January 2003, State of the Union address, in which President Bush declared that Iraq had sought uranium, citing British intelligence sources.

In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. After Wilson's op-ed, Wilson's wife Valerie Plame was publicly identified as an undercover CIA analyst by a columnist. This led to a Justice Department investigation into the source of the leak.

On 1 May 2005, the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002, meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy".

In September 2002, the Bush administration, the CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes that were prohibited under the UN monitoring program and which they said pointed to a clandestine effort to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. This analysis was opposed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and INR, which was significant because of DOE's expertise in such gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that the Iraqi tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges and that while it was technically possible with additional modification, conventional military uses were more plausible. A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium.

An effort by the DOE to correct this detail in comments prepared for United States Secretary of State Colin Powell's UN appearance was rebuffed by the administration and Powell, in his address to the UN Security Council just before the war, referenced the aluminum tubes, stating that while experts disagreed on whether or not the tubes were destined for a centrifuge program, the specifications of the tubes were unusually tight. Powell later admitted he had presented what turned out to be an inaccurate case to the UN on Iraqi weapons, and the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading." After the United States presidential election, 2008, and the election of Democratic party nominee Barack Obama, president Bush stated that "[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq".

The CIA had contacted Iraq's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was being paid by the French as an agent. Sabri informed them that Saddam had hidden poison gas among Sunni tribesmen, had ambitions for a nuclear program but that it was not active, and that no biological weapons were being produced or stockpiled, although research was underway. According to Sidney Blumenthal, George Tenet briefed Bush on 18 September 2002, that Sabri had informed them that Iraq did not have WMD. Bush dismissed this top-secret intelligence from Hussein's inner circle which was approved by two senior CIA officers. The information was never shared with Congress or CIA agents examining whether Saddam had such weapons.

Based on reports obtained by the German intelligence service from an Iraqi defector codenamed "Curveball", Colin Powell presented evidence to the United Nations security council that Iraq had an active biological weapons programme. On 15 February 2011, the defector—a scientist identified as Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janafi—admitted to journalists working for The Guardian newspaper that he lied to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in order to strengthen the case against Saddam Hussein, whom he wished to see removed from power.

In December 2009, former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that he "would still have thought it right to remove [Saddam Hussein]" regardless of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or not.

Should be changed to:

The American assessment that Iraq had a nuclear program was primarily based on Iraqi imports on aluminum tubes that had been seized in early 2001. The CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire these high-strength tubes, which were prohibited under the UN monitoring program for their potential nuclear application, pointed to a clandestine effort to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. The assessments of possible nuclear end use of the tubes had first been made in early 2001. According to Larry Wilkerson French intelligence also shared the Bush administrations concerns about the tubes. This analysis was opposed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and INR, which was significant because of DOE's expertise in such gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that the Iraqi tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges and that while it was technically possible with additional modification, conventional military uses were more plausible. A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported "All experts agree that after modification the tubes could be used as a rotor of a poor quality gas centrifuge. Complicating the realization of this design is that the wall of the tubes is unusually thick, and the tubes' diameter is not optimal for such a centrifuge. Many centrifuge experts believe that this design would not work as the basis of a centrifuge plant." The DOE, however, did agree with the overall assessment that Iraq had a nuclear program, citing separate evidence.

Additionally there were allegations that Iraq had attempted to import uranium, although these claims were not essential to the intelligence assessment that a nuclear program existed. In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson to investigate reports (later found to be forgeries) that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." Wilson's report did not change any analysts' assessments of a possible deal and the Bush administration alleged, most prominently in the January 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa, citing British intelligence sources. The British government has described their assessment as "well founded" because it was not based on the forgeries, but rather on reports that Iraq had "sought" rather than "purchased" uranium from Niger in 1999. However, the Niger allegations were not cited by Colin Powell in his presentation to the U.N. in February.

In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. However, it was later revealed that he had never actually seen the reports in question. After Wilson's op-ed, Wilson's wife Valerie Plame was publicly identified as an undercover CIA analyst by a columnist. This led to a Justice Department investigation into the source of the leak.

On 1 May 2005, the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002, meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". A 2004 Congressional investigation interviewed analysts and found no evidence to substantiate that analysts had been pressured in any way by the administration. "The Committee did not find any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with Administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so. When asked whether analysts were pressured in any way to alter their assessments or make their judgments conform with Administration policies on Iraq's WMD programs, not a single analyst answered "yes." Most analysts simply answered, "no" or "never," but some provided more extensive responses."

Powell, in his address to the UN Security Council just before the war, referred to the aluminum tubes, stating that while experts disagreed on whether or not the tubes were destined for a centrifuge program, the specifications of the tubes were unusually tight.

Powell presented evidence that Iraq had been sanitizing inspection sites and questioned why they would do this if they had nothing to hide. He also made of a number of presentations designed to prove Iraq had WMD programs, which were later criticized as inaccurate and based on shoddy intelligence. Powell later admitted he had presented what turned out to be an inaccurate case to the UN on Iraqi weapons, and the sourcing for the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading." The 2004 Congressional inquiry concluded that much of the information provided to Powell was "overstated, misleading, or incorrect" but that the intelligence did support his claims that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons in the event of war.

After the United States presidential election, 2008, and the election of Democratic party nominee Barack Obama, president Bush stated that "[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq".

The CIA had contacted Iraq's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was being paid by the French as an agent. Sabri informed them that Saddam had hidden poison gas among Sunni tribesmen, had ambitions for a nuclear program but that it was not active, and that no biological weapons were being produced or stockpiled, although research was underway.

Other additions might be necessary, I am still thinking of other possible changes later. CJK (talk) 15:36, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

Really? A single huge text dump? You think that's helpful, or possible for people to reasonably review? Especially when it's difficult to tell your comments from the edit. I suggest you WP:refactor that into each substantive edit. Or better, remove all but the most important substantive edit, get consensus, then do the next, earn some goodwill and the rest will be easier. Take it a bite at a time, or a likely reaction is for people to think it's all being forced down their throats at once. (Hohum ^@) 16:19, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but you were the one who said my bullet points were insufficient and that I should show exactly what changes need to be made. Showing "each substantive" change individually would be an extremely inefficient use of time given the extensive nature of the changes being proposed. If anyone feels that they are incapable of comparing the text, they probably should not be editing an article of this complexity.

With all due respect, your suggestion that I need to "earn some goodwill" is jarring when you consider the fact that the people reverting/vandalizing my edits have not shown even the slightest goodwill. It has been a number of days since this page was protected to their preferred version, which excludes every single one of my legitimate contributions while including all of theirs, but they have not made the slightest effort since then to engage in any discussion of the issues.

Perhaps I could devote even more hours than I already have in explaining in detail my edits, but first the other users would have to demonstrate their good faith by having the decency to respond in some way to what I have been posting. Otherwise, it would be far more productive for the page protection to be lifted so that mass-deletion of my contributions can be reversed.

CJK (talk) 18:11, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

CJK, I suggest that you post the first paragraph that you would like to discuss below. We can go through the paragraphs one at a time. That's more manageable, and will lead to a more focused discussion. -Thucydides411 (talk) 22:18, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

Showing "each substantive" change individually would be an extremely inefficient use of time given the extensive nature of the changes being proposed - it would be a lot more efficient than edit warring. You can take my advice or leave it, but I'm pretty sure I know what the results will be. You can also choose to take offense if you want, but none is intended. (Hohum ^@) 12:01, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

References

Proposed Change #3

Before the Gulf War, in 1990, Iraq had stockpiled 550 short tons (500 t) of yellowcake uranium at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex about 20 kilometres (12 mi) south of Baghdad. In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson to investigate reports (later found to be forgeries) that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." The Bush administration, however, continued to allege Iraq's attempts to obtain additional yellowcake were a justification for military action, most prominently in the January 2003, State of the Union address, in which President Bush declared that Iraq had sought uranium, citing British intelligence sources.

In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. After Wilson's op-ed, Wilson's wife Valerie Plame was publicly identified as an undercover CIA analyst by a columnist. This led to a Justice Department investigation into the source of the leak.

changed to

Additionally there were allegations that Iraq had attempted to import uranium, although these claims were not essential to the intelligence assessment that a nuclear program existed. In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson to investigate reports (later found to be forgeries) that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." Wilson's report did not change any analysts' assessments of a possible deal and the Bush administration alleged, most prominently in the January 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa, citing British intelligence sources. The British government has described their assessment as "well founded" because it was not based on the forgeries, but rather on reports that Iraq had "sought" rather than "purchased" uranium from Niger in 1999. However, the Niger allegations were not cited by Colin Powell in his presentation to the U.N. in February.

In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. However, it was later revealed that he had never actually seen the reports in question. After Wilson's op-ed, Wilson's wife Valerie Plame was publicly identified as an undercover CIA analyst by a columnist. This led to a Justice Department investigation into the source of the leak.

Comment: The mythical "Wilson debunked the 16 words" should not be presented as factual.

CJK (talk) 15:24, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

References

Proposed change #4

On 1 May 2005, the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002, meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy".

changed to

On 1 May 2005, the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002, meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". A 2004 Congressional investigation interviewed analysts and found no evidence to substantiate that analysts had been pressured in any way by the administration. "The Committee did not find any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with Administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so. When asked whether analysts were pressured in any way to alter their assessments or make their judgments conform with Administration policies on Iraq's WMD programs, not a single analyst answered "yes." Most analysts simply answered, "no" or "never," but some provided more extensive responses."

Comment: Some much needed context for what is otherwise a purely propaganda stunt designed to mislead the reader.

CJK (talk) 15:28, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

References

Proposed Change #5

In September 2002, the Bush administration, the CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes that were prohibited under the UN monitoring program and which they said pointed to a clandestine effort to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. This analysis was opposed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and INR, which was significant because of DOE's expertise in such gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that the Iraqi tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges and that while it was technically possible with additional modification, conventional military uses were more plausible. A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium.

Changed to

The American assessment that Iraq had a nuclear program was primarily based on Iraqi imports on aluminum tubes that had been seized in early 2001. The CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire these high-strength tubes, which were prohibited under the UN monitoring program for their potential nuclear application, pointed to a clandestine effort to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. The assessments of possible nuclear end use of the tubes had first been made in early 2001. According to Larry Wilkerson French intelligence also shared the Bush administrations concerns about the tubes. This analysis was opposed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and INR, which was significant because of DOE's expertise in such gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that the Iraqi tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges and that while it was technically possible with additional modification, conventional military uses were more plausible. A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported "All experts agree that after modification the tubes could be used as a rotor of a poor quality gas centrifuge. Complicating the realization of this design is that the wall of the tubes is unusually thick, and the tubes' diameter is not optimal for such a centrifuge. Many centrifuge experts believe that this design would not work as the basis of a centrifuge plant." The DOE, however, did agree with the overall assessment that Iraq had a nuclear program, citing separate evidence.

Comment: The aluminum tube issue was not something that the administration invented out of thin air in September 2002.

CJK (talk) 15:32, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

References

Proposed change #6

An effort by the DOE to correct this detail in comments prepared for United States Secretary of State Colin Powell's UN appearance was rebuffed by the administration and Powell, in his address to the UN Security Council just before the war, referenced the aluminum tubes, stating that while experts disagreed on whether or not the tubes were destined for a centrifuge program, the specifications of the tubes were unusually tight. Powell later admitted he had presented what turned out to be an inaccurate case to the UN on Iraqi weapons, and the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading." After the United States presidential election, 2008, and the election of Democratic party nominee Barack Obama, president Bush stated that "[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq".

changed to

Powell presented evidence that Iraq had been sanitizing inspection sites and questioned why they would do this if they had nothing to hide. He also made of a number of presentations designed to prove Iraq had WMD programs, which were later criticized as inaccurate and based on shoddy intelligence. Powell later admitted he had presented what turned out to be an inaccurate case to the UN on Iraqi weapons, and the sourcing for the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading." The 2004 Congressional inquiry concluded that much of the information provided to Powell was "overstated, misleading, or incorrect" but that the intelligence did support his claims that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons in the event of war.

Comment: More neutral version as to the contents of Powell's speech.

CJK (talk) 15:36, 27 June 2013 (UTC)

References

Proposed change #7

The issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in 2002–2003, when Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. The UN had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance. During inspections in 1999, U.S. intelligence agents supplied the United States with a direct feed of conversations between Iraqi security agencies as well as other information. This was confirmed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.

During 2002, Bush repeatedly warned of military action against Iraq unless inspections were allowed to progress unfettered. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 Iraq reluctantly agreed to new inspections in late 2002. With the cooperation of the Iraqis, a third weapons inspection team in 2003 led by David Kelly (weapons expert) viewed and photographed two alleged mobile weapons laboratories which were actually facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons.

Shortly before the invasion, Hans Blix the lead weapons inspector, advised the UN Security Council that Iraq was cooperating with inspections and that the confirmation of disarmament through inspections could be achieved in a short period of time if Iraq remained cooperative.

Should be changed to:

The issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in late 2002, when Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. The UN had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance. In a speech to the U.N. on 12 September 2002 he declared: "If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."

This speech alarmed Saddam, and four days later Iraq agreed to let the inspectors back in. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed on 8 November 2002, setting out the terms of disarmament. It decided Iraq remained in material breach of relevant resolutions, that Iraq would be given a "final opportunity" to comply, that it would submit an accurate declaration of its past WMD activities, that false statements and omissions would constitute a further material breach, that the inspectors would receive total unrestricted access and conduct interviews how they saw fit, and that cooperation would be immediate and unconditional. Iraq reluctantly accepted these terms and new inspections began on 27 November.

The inspectors failed to find any WMD but did stumble upon 14 unfilled chemical rockets. The inspectors ruled that Iraq's al-Samoud II missile violated range restrictions and noted that Iraq had rebuilt casting chambers destroyed by previous inspections for their use in long-range missile programs. Three thousand pages of nuclear related documents were discovered by an inspection of a private residence.

Although praising Iraq for its cooperation in the inspection "process", chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix remarked in January 2003 that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Among other things, he noted that 1,000 short tons (910 t) of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq's VX nerve agent program was missing, and that "no convincing evidence" was presented for the destruction of 8,500 litres (1,900 imp gal; 2,200 US gal) of anthrax that had been declared. He also stated that Iraq's 12,000 page declaration left questions unanswered and that Iraq failed to cooperate on providing names for interviews.

The UNMOVIC report of 28 February 2003 concluded "Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far." The next report stated "the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation. From the end of January 2003, the Iraqi side, which until then had been cooperative in terms of process but not equally cooperative in terms of subsistence, devoted much effort to providing explanations and proposing methods of inquiry into such issues as the production and destruction of anthrax, VX and long-range missiles. Despite those efforts, little progress was made in the solution of outstanding issues during the time of UNMOVIC operations in Iraq."

It was concluded after the invasion that Iraq had submitted inaccurate details about its past biological warfare program, and that this may have hindered the verification process.

Comment: fixes extremely biased, one sided version of the inspections by noting relevant facts. CJK (talk) 15:45, 27 June 2013 (UTC)