Talk:Iraq War/Archive 25

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Marine Embassy guards

In the interest of accuracy there is a very small force of Marine Security Guards at the embassies and consulates of the United States in Iraq. These marines are at every American diplomatic post overseas. Mrld (talk) 05:06, 5 January 2012 (UTC)

Also, contractors are not military operatives that do not fight wars. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Snootcher (talk • contribs) 07:08, 13 March 2012 (UTC)

Blackwater heading

I've made a new heading, "Blackwater private security controversy", for the previous "Private security firm controversy". It's primarily about an incident involving a single company, so it should mention that company's name. Superm401 - Talk 03:44, 10 March 2012 (UTC)

Edit request on 16 February 2012 (550 tons of yellowcake uranium found)

AP: 7/5/2008 -- I was wondering why no one had added the fact that in 2008 the last remnants of some 550 metric tons of yellow-cake uranium were removed from Baghdad by the US military. This was a historical find and yet only a select few news agencies cared to conveniently follow the story. I actually only stumbled across the story as it was posted at MSNBC.com

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25546334/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/secret-us-mission-hauls-uranium-iraq/

208.229.219.2 (talk) 14:36, 16 February 2012 (UTC)

Not done: Please be specific about what text you would like to add to the article. Toward the end, the source identifies the yellow cake as having been known to the UN inspectors prior to the first gulf war, so this isn't really historic news, but I don't know what it is you would like to add. Thanks, Celestra (talk) 15:41, 16 February 2012 (UTC)

---

I think what this person is referring to is the appearance of bias in this entire Wikipedia entry. It comes off as argumentative and seems to support the controversial notion that the Iraq War was a war of aggression, even though this was a United Nations peacekeeping effort of coalition forces. The yellow cake uranium is used in weapons of mass destruction, and the Hussein regime had "smoking gun" ties to terrorist groups who also viewed the West (i.e. the United States) as enemies. The omission of these facts and perspectives is likely what is driving this person and others to try and insert points of view that have been omitted from this apparently biased Wikipedia entry. It comes off as if the entry argues for "There were no WMD in Iraq that were relevant" and "Saddam didn't put money into Osama's hand," so "this was a war of agression by the unilaterally acting United States." This bias is quite apparent, and this person is addressing that in his own way, I believe. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Snootcher (talk • contribs) 07:18, 13 March 2012 (UTC)

Maybe, just maybe, it is because it is true that the US and UK fabricated all the alledged evidence in order to justify a war of aggression? If that offends you, then make sure to stand up and obeject in outrage the next time your politicians plan to invade and destroy a country with no reason other than self-serving interest.173.74.22.141 (talk) 21:21, 21 March 2012 (UTC)

Of course it's argumentative and opinionated. All of Wikipedia is a left-wing blog in the guise of an encyclopedia, as the previous comment should show. It doesn't even try to have an NPOV, it uses b.s. sources and doesn't give them a second thought and that's why people laugh when you say you took any information whatsoever from Wikipedia. It's 1:AM and I'm not going to waste my time shooting off the facts the previous comment ignores on purpose. I could say anything but you can't reason with people like that. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.176.57.237 (talk) 05:10, 25 March 2012 (UTC)

hi

Obama was not in command during Iraq war!! --Neogeolegend (talk) 22:29, 13 April 2012 (UTC)

No one said that he was 'in command'. But if you want to add that in the article please provide a neutral reliable source and then proceed. In the meantime, please control the number of exclamation marks. Sonarclawz (talk) 15:18, 21 April 2012 (UTC)

Should Queen Elizabeth II be in the Commanders/Leaders section?

I know she's the head of state, but since she wasn't the one who declared war, led the army, or anything else to do with the war shouldn't she be removed? It's like putting the minister for agriculture in there because he was in government while it happened. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.20.32.242 (talk) 10:41, 22 April 2012 (UTC)

Glad I wasn't the only one to think this when I saw the infobox. The section is for those who led, and those who commanded: the Queen did neither, she is only a commander-as-figurehead, but in no way a de facto sense. Ultimate authority really does lie with the Prime Minister. It flies in the face of the actual command structure of the British armed forces to have her listed. I'm going to leave a message with the person who added her to the infobox to counteract, but if no response is forthcoming we're pretty clear to then remove her. Redverton (talk) 19:48, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

Pentagon oil partition maps scrubbed from this and all related articles

Former Treasury Secretary O'Neill, "obtained one Pentagon document, dated March 5, 2001, and entitled 'Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts,' which includes a map of potential areas for exploration." -- http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-592330.html

I was suprized to see that not only has this fact been deleted from this article, that it isn't in any of the other related articles either. Reinclude? 71.215.84.127 (talk) 20:07, 9 May 2012 (UTC)

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Edit Request -- 28 May 2012

Folks this is not the 'Iraq War,' the 'Gulf War 2;' It is the 'GWOT' or 'GWOT: Iraqi.' We do not refer to all conflicts via locations only, especially when it is a misleading. The Gulf War was from 1990-1993 (arguably 1995), but the war did not last beyond that time, just our enforcement of terms. Therefore, if the proper wording was used, there would be no confusion between my and my comrades' conflict and the current war. So, as a Gulf War vet, I ask that you please start using the correct language for our wars and thereby honoring the service of all while intelligently conveying the information properly. Thanks. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mamak (talk • contribs) 02:49, 30 May 2012 (UTC)

Iranian Involvement

After reading the current piece on the Iranian involvement in the Iraq war we believed it showed bias, and only told about a specific event with the US military. We did research and wrote a more informative piece on Iran's involvement. We would appreciate if you could include the following, we have already set up a sandbox and have edited the writing a few times. Although we are not frequent Wikipedia users, with the help of our teacher and other peers we have become well acquainted and feel as though our writing could be a great addition.

The Iranian involvement in the American-Iraqi war has been a mystery. Iran has kept itself very secretive throughout the war, allowing little information known to the public. In recent years there has been more information released to the public, largely based on Iran supplying the Shiites by financing their training and military forces, drawing much attention. On top of training Iran has provided the Shiites with rockets, missiles, chemical weapons, rifles, highly advanced and deadly IEDs (improvised explosive devices). By empowering the Shiites, Iran is able to not only influence Iraq demographically but also politically. Supporting the Shiites would be beneficial because of their similar political views as well as their strategic geographical position.[1] Aside from holding political power, Iran also hopes to take control of Iraq and make it more Middle Eastern, by having the Americans leave. Iran believes they can increase their influence over the Middle East by controlling a larger portion of Iraq. Although improbable, for Iran to control Iraq, Iran has the potential of influencing Iraq on such a great scale and in doing so Iran would guarantee that Iraq and the American forces do not threaten their essential interests. The United States is the main obstacle keeping Iran from influencing Iraq greatly, and because of this, the US has begun to show great concern about the Iranian involvement. Much of the United States' attention has emphasized gathering evidence of Iran supplying tactical support and deadly explosives to the Iraqi Shiite insurgency. By giving power to the Shiites Iran is weakening the Sunni, which is their primary goal.[2] The US has blamed a large number of American deaths on Iran’s active involvement in assisting Iraq through advanced weaponry. Iran dismisses this claim and remains adamant that they have a very limited involvement in the war. Iran has openly expressed that they believe America is accusing them as an excuse for their ongoing failure in the Middle East. In July of 2011 US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta expressed his fears to troops in Baghdad "We are very concerned about Iran and weapons they are providing to extremists here in Iraq, and the reality is that we've seen the results of that." Panetta informed the troops that, "In June, we lost a hell of a lot of Americans."[3] Although The US is not ecstatic about the Iranian involvement in Iraq they are aware that it is a reality and understand it. However, The US hopes to steer the Iranian involvement in a more positive way, hoping for Iran to focus its energy on religious tourism and trade, while reducing negative involvement. Although there is no hard evidence of whether Iran is actively involved in this war, it is possible that they have underlying political goals to strengthen their position in the Middle East. The future of Iranian involvement in Iraq cannot be predicted. Many variables play a major part in the future of Iraq including: United States military involvement, nuclear weapon capabilities, and what role Iraq decides to play. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Gblack710 (talk • contribs) 21:39, 30 May 2012 (UTC)

Dead reference

Reference [330] is dead. Also, the sentence in which it is used could be better. (Obama did officially end American involvement in the war in Iraq). Highollow (talk) 17:07, 13 June 2012 (UTC)

Qaraqosh Protection Committee

I'm reluctant to make any change on such a highly edited article without flagging it on this page, but shouldn't 'Assyria' in the list of Belligerents be amended to 'Qaraqosh Protection Committee', to which indeed it is linked? ariwara (talk) 09:22, 5 July 2012 (UTC)

Edit request on 8 July 2012

In the "Alleged weapons of mass destruction" section.....

http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-07/us/iraq.uranium_1_yellowcake-uranium-cameco?_s=PM:US http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25546334/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/secret-us-mission-hauls-uranium-iraq/#.T_nNZ_Xhf78 http://wizbangblog.com/content/2011/01/06/wikileaks-memos-the-mainstream-media-doesnt-want-you-to-read.php http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/wikileaks-show-wmd-hunt-continued-in-iraq-with-surprising-results/

Please update the section to include all those WMD's were indeed found in Iraq.

Greekdish (talk) 18:21, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Not done:. You should get consensus before adding this. Also, edit requests need to state speficially what change to make. RudolfRed (talk) 01:49, 9 July 2012 (UTC)

Edit request on 17 July 2012: United States efforts to control the oil resources of Iraq and to shelve or dilute the elections

In a signing statement, President Bush declared that he will ignore Congressional legislation that interferes with the establishment of "any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq," and will also ignore any legislation that impedes White House actions "to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq."

This is no small footnote in the history of imperialism.

The Boston Globe: Bush asserts authority to bypass defense act

In the signing statement, Bush asserted that four sections of the bill unconstitutionally infringe on his powers, and so the executive branch is not bound to obey them. One section Bush targeted created a statute that forbids spending taxpayer money "to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq" or "to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq."

The New York Times: Bush Declares Exceptions to Sections of Two Bills He Signed Into Law

President Bush asserted on Tuesday that he had the executive power to bypass several parts of two bills: a military authorization act and a measure giving inspectors general greater independence from White House control. In the authorization bill, Mr. Bush challenged four sections. One forbid the money from being used “to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.”

These intentions were outlined in the "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship" released by the White House in November 2007, an agreement between Bush and the Maliki government. The Declaration permits US forces to remain indefinitely. The declaration also commits Iraq to: "facilitate and encourage the flow of foreign investments to Iraq, especially American investments."

Furthermore, as the editors of the Financial Times wrote in March 2005: "the reason (the elections) took place was the insistence of the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who vetoed three schemes by the US-led occupation authorities to shelve or dilute them."

The Washington Post - How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq

Ayatollah's Call for Vote Forced Occupation Leader to Rewrite Transition Strategy

The unraveling of the Bush administration's script for political transition in Iraq began with a fatwa. The religious edict, handed down in June by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shiite Muslim cleric, called for general elections to select the drafters of a new constitution. He dismissed U.S. plans to appoint the authors as "fundamentally unacceptable."

People familiar with the discussions among U.S. officials about the fatwa said American political officers were too isolated to grasp the power of the edict right away, assuming that secular former exiles backed by the U.S. government would push Bremer's plan. Even when Sistani's clout became clear, they said Bremer remained reluctant to rework his transition plan right away. "He didn't want a Shiite cleric dictating the terms of Iraq's political future," one U.S. official with knowledge of the process said.

Who Would Draft Constitution?

At the end of June, when Arab satellite television networks erroneously reported that Iraq's constitution would be written by American and British experts, Sistani broke his silence. In a two-page fatwa issued on June 28, he declared that he would only support a constitution written by Iraqis chosen through a general election, not by a council selected by the Americans.

In Baghdad, Sistani's pronouncement did not raise immediate alarm among U.S. officials. The Bush administration wanted an orderly process it could control . Bremer was vague about how the authors would be selected. At the time, his aides privately said Iraqi political leaders and Americans would select the writers. By early July, Bremer had shifted focus to formation of the council, a 25-member body composed of American allies and political neophytes.

Bremer's Power Challenged

Bremer refused to give up. He chafed at the idea that a cleric would be able to dictate Iraq's democratic transition. "Is the political structure of Iraq going to be in the hands of one man?" Bremer said to a group of visitors in October.

He urged the council's five traditionalist Shiites to try to persuade Sistani to support partial elections, said Rubaie, one of the five. Rubaie said he met with Sistani in October and explained the problems with general elections and the benefits of partial elections. Sistani was unmoved, Rubaie said. "He would not have it."

Shortly thereafter, Sistani delivered his first public pronouncements on partial elections. In written comments provided to The Washington Post, he said there could be "no substitute" for a general election.

Fatwas from other clerics in support of partial elections never materialized. Nobody wanted to take on Sistani.

Surely this should not be left out of the narrative of this war.--Horhey420 (talk) 17:17, 17 July 2012 (UTC)

Edit request on 17 July 2012: 'The Salvador Option' in Iraq ("Draining the Sea"...Again)

Newsweek: 'The Salvador Option'

NEWSWEEK has learned, the Pentagon is intensively debating an option that dates back to a still-secret strategy in the Reagan administration's battle against the leftist guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador in the early 1980s. Then, faced with a losing war against Salvadoran rebels, the U.S. government funded or supported "nationalist" forces that allegedly included so-called death squads directed to hunt down and kill rebel leaders and sympathizers. Eventually the insurgency was quelled, and many U.S. conservatives consider the policy to have been a success--despite the deaths of innocent civilians and the subsequent Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages scandal. (Among the current administration officials who dealt with Central America back then is John Negroponte, who is today the U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Under Reagan, he was ambassador to Honduras.

Following that model, one Pentagon proposal would send Special Forces teams to advise, support and possibly train Iraqi squads, most likely hand-picked Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and Shiite militiamen, to target Sunni insurgents and their sympathizers, even across the border into Syria, according to military insiders familiar with the discussions. It remains unclear, however, whether this would be a policy of assassination or so-called "snatch" operations, in which the targets are sent to secret facilities for interrogation. The current thinking is that while U.S. Special Forces would lead operations in, say, Syria, activities inside Iraq itself would be carried out by Iraqi paramilitaries, officials tell NEWSWEEK.

Shahwani also said that the U.S. occupation has failed to crack the problem of broad support for the insurgency. The insurgents, he said, "are mostly in the Sunni areas where the population there, almost 200,000, is sympathetic to them." He said most Iraqi people do not actively support the insurgents or provide them with material or logistical help, but at the same time they won't turn them in. One military source involved in the Pentagon debate agrees that this is the crux of the problem, and he suggests that new offensive operations are needed that would create a fear of aiding the insurgency. "The Sunni population is paying no price for the support it is giving to the terrorists," he said. "From their point of view, it is cost-free. We have to change that equation."--Horhey420 (talk) 18:09, 17 July 2012 (UTC)

Has the United States won this war?

Well… the US (together with UK and the rest of the coalition) defeated Saddam Hussein, and the post-Saddam regime and constitution were still in place when the last troops left at the end of 2011. And at the end, the United States re-established good, stable diplomatic relations with Iraq — something that wasn’t common since the fall of Iraqi monarchy more than fifty years ago.

So… it was a victory, right?--MaGioZal (talk) 23:33, 29 July 2012 (UTC)

I don't know if "victory" is the proper thing to declare or not, here. Perhaps reviewing the goals set forth in the Joint Resolution and determining if they were fulfilled or not?Batvette (talk) 22:56, 30 July 2012 (UTC)

Blackwater Baghdad shootings

Could someone with the right permission add Blackwater Baghdad shootings to this section Iraq_War#Coalition_forces_and_private_contractors. Thank you. EPTRD (talk) 12:14, 1 August 2012 (UTC)

Added it, thanks for spotting that. Sorry nobody did this for so long. Acoma Magic (talk) 02:08, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Surprise attack?

On March 20[1] the US led coalition conducted a surprise attack on Iraq without declaring war.[65]

I dun thin so, Lucy! And neither does the provided reference. "Declaration of War" is a Red Herring, it was not required though congressional authorization through the Joint Resolution was fulfilled with Bush furnishing 48 hour notice to congress AND his ultimatum for Saddam and his sons to leave the country make the idea of a "surprise attack" absurd. Batvette (talk) 17:46, 28 July 2012 (UTC)

I agree with the other users request for this sentence to be changed. A major feature of most modern conflicts is the reluctance for States to officially declare war (sorry but I don't have the time to reference this at the moment). I would recommend the sentence be changed to:

"On March 20[1] the US-led coalition launched an invasion from the South. No formal declaration of war was declared,[65] but this is not unusual or extraordinary (See [[1]])." 92.237.150.47 (talk) 13:19, 20 August 2012 (UTC)James Regan

At the time of Pearl Harbor all US politicians seemed to agree that it was a big deal that there was no declaration of war. If that standard applies to Japan, why not the US? --130.188.8.27 (talk) 08:41, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

I really don't think it was a "surprise attack" since they knew it was comming after Saddam failed to leave the country within his alloted time (the only thing they didn't know was when the attack would begin). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.98.19.20 (talk) 04:17, 10 September 2012 (UTC)

US Gov't sources, namely Gen. Tommy Franks and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, think the attack was a successful surprise, and the article should reflect this. See references. --Tungsten (talk) 16:21, 30 October 2012 (UTC)

What would you emphasize, that it was successful or that it was a surprise? To my knowledge (this could be OR but also may be supported in other context by many sources) the only surprise aspect about it might be that Saddam did not expect a full scale invasion and removal of his Ba'athist regime, as he had allies in Paris and Moscow assuring him Bush would merely carry out a half hearted aerial bombing campaign for a few days and these allies would broker a cease fire in the security council.

The mere fact that he would be attacked being a surprise is not supported to my knowledge by the historical record.

I hope no one is requiring we have broadcast the precise minute and place of the first munition being deployed lest it be a surprise attack. I'm pretty sure Franks and Rumsfeld would have meant the swift mechanized tactical nature of the campaign, which saw a thrust into Baghdad in just a few weeks- though if you have a reference clarifying this please post up, sounds interesting and useful. The way they did this was considered novel, and risky for leaving the flanks open with many Iraqi units being bypassed unsecured. Fortunately as Saddam did not command much of an organized defense (likely for reasons above) the risk did not backfire.Batvette (talk) 10:49, 6 November 2012 (UTC)

War ended after a month?

Sorry to flag this up, but how is fighting a terrorist insurgency a war? Just in technical terms, a country can only declare war on a state, and since the Iraqi regime fell after a month or so, surely the war itself ended at that point? 95.149.42.73 (talk) 00:34, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

The definition of 'war' is broader than just a conflict between sovereign states. For example, the War on Drugs. Acoma Magic (talk) 03:49, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

Well Technically it was never a "War" since War was never declared however it has come to offically be known as the "Iraq War" which lasted for 8 Years and 9 Months — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.98.19.20 (talk) 04:15, 10 September 2012 (UTC)

IIRC for several entities including congressional declaration for veteran status/VA benefits, the first Persian Gulf war never ended and continued until into the Obama administration. This was also within the language of the Joint Resolution. Batvette (talk) 10:53, 6 November 2012 (UTC)

Civilian Casualties Edit

The current civilian casualties figure (from http://www.iraqbodycount.org) is out of date. The existing figure on the page is 103,160 – 113,728 whereas the up to date Iraq Body Count figure is 109,301 – 119,421. — Preceding unsigned comment added by DamiaanVDW (talk • contribs) 05:57, 21 October 2012 (UTC)

irrelevant entries.

"Iraq awards oil contracts

On 30 June and again on 11 December, the Iraqi ministry of oil awarded contracts to international oil companies for some of Iraq's many oil fields. The winning oil companies enter joint ventures with the Iraqi ministry of oil, and the terms of the awarded contracts include extraction of oil for a fixed fee of approximately $1.40 per barrel.[278][279] The fees will only be paid once a production threshold set by the Iraqi ministry of oil is reached."

This has what to do with the article? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.187.116.238 (talk) 03:04, 19 February 2013 (UTC)

Usage

Once again I found myself replacing the pretentious "referenced" with the customary "referred to." "Reference" as a verb has an important specific application in cultural studies. Why dull and dilute its meaning by trying to make it interchangeable with "refer to?" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Orthotox (talk • contribs) 22:07, 17 March 2013 (UTC)

These two are antonyms - interchangeable. smileguy91^talk 23:52, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

Edit request on 23 April 2013

Last sentence in first paragraph has a tense conflict. "continues" is present tense and the rest of the sentence is in past tense. Crazy881 (talk) 00:46, 23 April 2013 (UTC) Crazy881 (talk) 00:46, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Not done:. It's not a conflict. "continues" refers to the insurgency, which is ongoing. RudolfRed (talk) 02:09, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Edit request from, 17 November 2011

Please correct the casualty estimates table for two incorrectly described sources:

"Associated Press 133,280 violent deaths. Health Ministry death certificates plus AP estimate of casualties for 2003–2005. April 2009 Iraq Body Count 113,494 – 122,483 violent civilian deaths. Reported in English-language media only. (including new deaths added from the Iraq War Logs) October 2010"

The correct AP number is 110,600. The figure of 133,280 is erroneous "original research" and never appears in AP. The missing early years were 2003-2004, not 2003-2005, and the AP figure of 110,600 already includes the AP estimate for those years.

The IBC number given here of 113,494-122,483 is also a weird kind of "original research" that never appears in IBC. It seems to be using some undetermined IBC figure from its database at some point in time and adding on top a separate estimate they made of likely additions that will come from the Wikileaks war logs material. The latter is a projection of what they think will ultimately added, which is separate from the database of recorded deaths (and which now already includes some Wikileaks-sourced deaths). Moreover, the statement here "reported in English-language media only" is false. The IBC website says: "Deaths in the database are derived from a comprehensive survey of commercial media and NGO-based reports, along with official records that have been released into the public sphere. Reports range from specific, incident based accounts to figures from hospitals, morgues, and other documentary data-gathering agencies."

The current Casualties of the Iraq War page has these sources listed appropriately, and it would be simple enough to just copy them from that table to this one to correct the OR and error problems here:

Associated Press 110,600 deaths March 2003 to April 2009

Iraq Body Count project 103,536 — 113,125 civilian deaths as a result of the conflict. Over 150,726 civilian and combatant deaths[1] March 2003 to October 2011

It would also be good to add the Wikileaks to the table, again this could just be copied from the table on the Casualties page (with proper formatting of course):

WikiLeaks. Classified Iraq war logs[1][2][3][4] 109,032 deaths including 66,081 civilian deaths.[5][6] January 2004 to December 2009

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Eric4223 (talk • contribs) 23:00, 17 November 2011‎ (UTC)

Lancet Survey

The Lancet survey is here under "Estimated Excess Deaths". I think you should get rid of it since it is mostly Violent deaths. We already have an "Estimated Violent Deaths" with Iraq Body Count which is more credible. Having the Lancet under "Estimated Excess Deaths" implies this it is the best "Estimated Excess Deaths" estimate. Regardless there are better, more credible estimates as an alternative to the Iraq Body Count. And the Lancet has been repeatedly debunked anyway. Just look at these links: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/Articles/11Myths.htm#1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancet_surveys_of_Iraq_War_casualties#Criticisms.2C_countercriticisms and http://markhumphrys.com/iraq.dead.html#lancet

There are more credible estimates to put alongside the Iraq Body Count. Such as http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_iraq_war#The_Associated_Press and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_iraq_war#Iraqi_Health_Ministry — Preceding

Iraq Body Count is not a scientific count of Iraqi war casualties. It only counts documented deaths, which in past wars have been only a small fraction of total deaths. The Lancet survey, by contrast, uses a technique which attempts to determine the total number of civilian deaths, rather than only the fraction which are reported in the media or by the morgues. That is why including the Lancet survey is important. -Thucydides411 (talk) 05:41, 28 November 2012 (UTC)

The Lancet Study is infamous to anyone who knows how it was conducted. They polled Baghdad and Anbar, regions responsible for 92% of all violence yet represented 21% of the population, and simply multiplied that across the rest of the country in ratio to population. Not only that, but they made no distinction between causes of death apart from it was "unnatural", from criminal activity to automobile accidents, they lumped them all in together and claimed it to be the number killed in the war and insurgency. The fact that they release a number of 1-2 million, despite the Iraqi Ministry of health saying later that year that the highest estimate had been 350,000, and their median of 235,000 was to be used only highlights the problem.

75.187.116.238 (talk) 02:55, 19 February 2013 (UTC) Jade Rat

[citation needed]. Our article on the Lancet estimate has extensive criticism, but not these. If a war knocks out traffic lights, then do you count increased crashes at intersections as war-related or not? The Lancet estimate was under a million. EllenCT (talk) 10:02, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

75.187.116.238, most of what you've said about the Lancet study is simply wrong. The Lancet study surveyed most of the provinces, and actually excluded the Fallujah cluster in order to avoid skewing the results. The survey also did not make any distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" deaths. It simply counted the mortality rate before and after the war. The authors state their methodology clearly - they want to know how much the situation worsened after the war, and how many people died because of the worsened situation. Neither of the Lancet surveys claimed 1-2 million dead. The second survey had under 1 million dead with over 97.5% confidence. Before calling the study infamous, you should have some idea of how the study was actually conducted, and what it actually said. -Thucydides411 (talk) 05:08, 6 April 2013 (UTC)

I think the Lancet survey was fairly well done under the circumstances, and probably accurate in what it actually said (it did after all use the standard methodology used in numerous other similar studies elsewhere that are not so politically controversial, and no major issues with the methodology have been raised), the problem is that it is a count of excess deaths, which includes anyone indirectly killed during the war and afterwards, even if it was due to an increase in disease due to the breakdowns and strains on the health system during that period, etc. It certainly shouldn't be listed under "violent deaths", as that is factually incorrect as to what the study was about - violent deaths are only part of what they were measuring. --81.152.59.22 (talk) 20:36, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

The Lancet study breaks down excess deaths into violent and nonviolent deaths. From the abstract of the Lancet survey:

"We estimate that as of July, 2006, there have been 654,965 (392,979 - 942,636) excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war, which corresponds to 2-5% of the population in the study area. Of post-invasion deaths, 601,027 (426,369 - 793,663) were due to violence, the most common cause being gunfire." ([2])

The number cited in the infobox is the estimated number of violent deaths, so it's under an appropriate heading. -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:53, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

Serious problems with this article

This article is about the war that began in 2003

Did it really begin in 2003? The simple fact of the matter is that the U.S. and Iraq had been engaged in armed hostilities with each other continuously since December 1998 and that these hostilities began for reasons that were virtually identical to the reasons given four years later. The 2003 invasion turned this pre-existing air conflict into a ground war, but did not in itself “begin” a war.

The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be "months”

Absurd. Inspectors had previously spent over 7 years in Iraq without success. And Blix himself admitted that Iraq was not presenting anything new.

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S. led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion.

This omits the evidence they found showing Iraq had an illegal missile program.

On 20 March the American-led coalition conducted a surprise military invasion of Iraq without declaring war

How on earth was this a “surprise”? Bush had given a two day ultimatum on March 17 for Saddam to surrender power or face war. Furthermore, although no war was declared there was relevant Congressional authorization that had been passed back in October.

The invasion led to an occupation and the eventual capture of President Hussein, who was later tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi government.

Saddam was not President of anything when he was captured. This completely ignores the transfer of sovereignty and the new elections.

The chart says U.S. forces suffered 4,500 “killed”. This is a bit misleading. In actuality 3,500 were “killed” in combat while 1,000 died of non-combat related causes.

During inspections in 1999, U.S. intelligence agents supplied the United States with a direct feed of conversations between Iraqi security agencies as well as other information.

There were no inspections in 1999, inspections had ceased in 1998. Since this section makes no further reference to the previous inspections, it serves very little purpose to mention it here since it is completely ripped out of context.

With the cooperation of the Iraqis, a third weapons inspection team in 2003 led by David Kelly (weapons expert) viewed and photographed two alleged mobile weapons laboratories which were actually facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons.

I don’t have the slightest clue what is being talked about here, as it is unreferenced.

Shortly before the invasion, Hans Blix the lead weapons inspector, advised the UN Security Council that Iraq was cooperating with inspections and that the confirmation of disarmament through inspections could be achieved in a short period of time if Iraq remained cooperative.

Here’s what Hans Blix said on January 27: [3]

Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.

He went on to say that Iraq was cooperating with regards to “process” but not with regards to “substance”.

Blix’s statement of February 14 merely confirmed that Iraq was cooperating with regards to “process”. He said that “full cooperation” could resolve the issue shortly. But that would have to include progress on “substance” , which, as he noted on January 27, Iraq was not giving. He said on February 14 that “In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm course. Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors.” [4] Construing his statement on February 14 to mean that Iraq was cooperating and that it would all be resolved shortly is a flat-out misrepresentation of history.

Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." The Bush administration, however, continued to allege Iraq's attempts to obtain additional yellowcake were a justification for military action, most prominently in the January 2003, State of the Union address, in which President Bush declared that Iraq had sought uranium, citing British intelligence sources.

Bush never claimed that any sales were made. He merely said that it had been “sought” which does not in any way contradict Wilson’s report that no sales had been made.

On 1 May 2005, the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002, meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy".

Ah, the Downing Street memo nonsense. If we’re not in the business of quoting lines out of context to push an agenda, why don’t we include all the parts in the very same memo where it references Iraq as having WMD?

Not mentioned anywhere: the findings of a bipartisan investigation in 2004 that showed there was no evidence of any administration pressure on the intelligence community.

Bush and Blair made a secret deal to carry out the invasion regardless of whether WMD were discovered by UN weapons inspectors, in direct contradiction with statements Blair made to the British House of Commons afterwards that the Iraqi regime would be given a final chance to disarm.

Completely untrue. Iraq WAS given a final chance to disarm. The failure of inspectors to find WMD was irrelevant because it was widely assumed at the time that it was carefully hidden. By January 31 the inspections had gone on for nearly three months without success in resolving the issues.

CJK (talk) 00:21, 15 March 2013 (UTC)

Remember, anyone can edit Wikipedia, even you.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 10:56, 14 March 2013 (UTC)

This is true but let me ask you, if he or I remove the contested points and insert the factually correct information, properly sourced, will it be quickly reverted by editors watching this article with no willingness to discuss it?

Seems to me this is what talk pages are for, particularly in controversial articles- throw something at the wall and see what sticks. Though frankly the revisionist historian view on this policy has become so perverted by political agenda I am somewhat loathe to waste a lot of time beating my head on that wall. Batvette (talk) 06:49, 27 April 2013 (UTC)

Casualties: peer reviewed or other?

Regarding this edit I'm concerned that reporting non-peer reviewed estimates and documented deaths only provides a very low count compared to the peer reviewed cluster analyses from the Lancet. Thoughts? EllenCT (talk) 09:46, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Here's a thought. The Lancet studies are highly controversial as a look at its wikipedia article would show. The US, British, and Iraqi governments all dismissed criticised them as did Iraqi Body Count, the Chronicle of Higher Ed, Columbia Journalism Review, and AP. The criticism is that its clusters approach was invalid and did not match up well with either hospital records or any other reporting at the time. Capitalismojo (talk) 04:18, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

It's not surprising that the US, British and Iraqi governments would dismiss any survey that showed a large number of deaths - they were parties to the conflict that had an interest in depicting the casualty figure as low. There were criticisms of the survey by others, including Iraq Body Count (this criticism seemed to amount to an argument from implausibility), but there was also significant support from statisticians - the article on the Lancet Surveys goes over these issues. I think the appropriate thing to do is to give both the Lancet Surveys and the Iraq Body Count figures, and to discuss the differences between them. We should stress that the Lancet Surveys use a statistical method used in other conflicts, while Iraq Body Count counts only verifiable individual deaths, and is an absolute lower bound on the number of dead. -Thucydides411 (talk) 00:59, 17 April 2013 (UTC)

According to [5], the "Costs of War" count is not independent - it takes its figure directly from Iraq Body Count, adding in the 12,000 extra civilian dead from the Iraq War Logs (released by Wikileaks and mentioned on the Iraq Body Count home page). The Iraq Body Count figure is already given in the infobox, so there's no need to list the "Costs of War" figure. -Thucydides411 (talk) 04:38, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

I don't think we should quote a figure for "Total Deaths." There are different estimates, which are compiled in fundamentally different ways, and they give very different answers. To put one figure above all of the others, with the title "Total Deaths" gives it an aura of authority which, given the conflicting numbers on total war deaths, it cannot possibly have. The separation of civilian casualty figures into documented cases (Iraq Body Count) and estimated number of casualties (Lancet survey, among others) is a good one. It lets readers know that there is a difference in what the different numbers are trying to measure. It also lets readers know that different groups have arrived at different casualty figures, and doesn't try to push one number above the others. -Thucydides411 (talk) 06:01, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

Then why not put the IBC's total figure under estimated violent deaths along with Associated Press, Lancet and Iraq Family Health Survey or just put the figure under a section called total documented deaths. Stumink (talk) 09:03, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

We already have the IBC's figures under "Documented civilian deaths from violence." The IBC figure puts a floor on the total number of civilian deaths due to violence - it does not attempt to estimate the total number of deaths due to violence. The statistical surveys do try to estimate total deaths, so we have them under the heading "Estimated Violent Deaths." I'm not sure which other number you want to include. -Thucydides411 (talk) 13:20, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

What about putting the IBC's total figure under "Total Documented Deaths" just above the IBC's total documented civilian deaths. Stumink (talk) 15:39, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

Could you provide a link to IBC's total documented deaths? -Thucydides411 (talk) 16:56, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

Here it is: Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011 and for the most recent report: Iraqi deaths from violence in 2012. Stumink (talk) 19:00, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

It would probably best be put next to the Iraq Body Count civilian casualty figure. That would require changing the heading to "Documented deaths from violence." There would then be two entries underneath this heading, with subheadings "Civilians" and "Civilians and Combatants." What do you think of this organization? -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:45, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

That sound's fine. Stumink (talk) 22:45, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

Looking over the link you gave above on Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011, I can't find the range in total documented deaths. Do you have a source which provides both the high and low number of documented deaths? -Thucydides411 (talk) 21:11, 10 May 2013 (UTC)

I can't find a range of total documented deaths anywhere. They seem to use central estimates for the total documented deaths. Stumink (talk) 00:53, 11 May 2013 (UTC)

That's really a shame, since they provide high and low numbers for civilian deaths. We should continue looking before we add in IBC's total death count. -Thucydides411 (talk) 02:00, 11 May 2013 (UTC)

biased search?

How much there is (in sources) reliability when search angines tailor customized results to queries? [6]. IMO, prolbem is rael. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.90.197.87 (talk) 20:32, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Just two examples of the OR POV nonsense proliferating this article.

There's a reason this article is so unreadably long- it has to be to fit in all the weasel worded OR editors have used to insert their POV. I'm sorry if this seems a little harsh but it's appalling to find when you just check a couple of references how these things were ever entered in the first place, it's a core reason why wiki is dismissed in academic circles as a reference. I'll provide 2 examples found in one passage of the lead

Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been one of the main arguments for the invasion.[52] Some U.S. officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda,[53] but no evidence of a meaningful connection was ever found.[54][55]

Starting with the first example the statement is made: they were not the weapons which had been one of the main arguments for the invasion. Going to the reference Washington Post-New Intel Report Reignites Iraq Arms Fightyou won't find this statement or anything resembling it in it. Yet the editor presents the reference, to support his entry which is intent on placing the justification for the war in doubt. The POV is the sole intent, let's find a reference to justify the entry.

Secondly, we have: Some U.S. officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda,[53] but no evidence of a meaningful connection was ever found.

The first reference actually describes that such accusations were minimal if at all and goes on to describe all the "connections" that were found. The second two references, 54 and 55, also go on to describe what legitimate intelligence would have been used to make such claims. Note the word "meaningful" is not found in any of the three references used, it's clearly a weasel word used to provide ambiguity to actually reverse the truth of the issue at hand. I.e; we have connections which we found but if we choose to allow everyone to decide for themselves what is "meaningful" they can dismiss, modify or acknowledge at will.

This article is full of these things, what's to do about this? It's tempting to go through and just delete every "referenced" passage if you check the reference and it differs like this.

To those who would argue the claims were close enough in substance, the Joint Resolution's relevant passages on these issues goes as follows:

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;

and

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction...

finally

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687

My small contribution toward editing this mess of an article will probably start and end with deleting the above passages because I can't think immediately of a way to reword it to reflect what the references actually contain. I'm just pointing these out to demonstrate what an abomination these controversial articles become. Batvette (talk) 16:54, 12 May 2013 (UTC)

I'll respond to your first example, since it's all I have time to go into now. The source for the statement, "Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been one of the main arguments for the invasion," is New Intel Report Reignites Iraq Arms Fight. The source does not say this explicitly, although it does say

"Intelligence officials said the munitions were found in ones, twos and maybe slightly larger collections over the past couple of years. One official conceded that these pre-Gulf War weapons did not pose a threat to the U.S. military before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. They were not maintained or part of any organized program run by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein."

If you recall, the accusation that Saddam Hussein had an active weapons program was the central argument for invading Iraq. If you think that it is original research to say that these were not the weapons which Iraq was alleged to have, it is easy to find numerous sources which are more explicit. Here is one, which I will include as a reference in the article: U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons. From the Washington Post,

"The 1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent U.N. inspections destroyed Iraq's illicit weapons capability and, for the most part, Saddam Hussein did not try to rebuild it, according to an extensive report by the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq that contradicts nearly every prewar assertion made by top administration officials about Iraq."

The article goes on to say,

"Duelfer's report, delivered yesterday to two congressional committees, represents the government's most definitive accounting of Hussein's weapons programs, the assumed strength of which the Bush administration presented as a central reason for the war."

This is a rather straightforward source for the sentence you're objecting to. In fact, there are many reputable sources which go much further. A recent article in the Guardian is titled, MI6 and CIA were told before invasion that Iraq had no active WMD.

If you think that the facts included in this Wikipedia article put the justification for the war in doubt, then you are drawing a conclusion that many others have drawn. The article doesn't say the war was justified or unjustified, but it does include facts that could lead one person or another to form an opinion. We shouldn't therefore remove those facts - that would be a political act. -Thucydides411 (talk) 06:46, 13 May 2013 (UTC)

" The source does not say this explicitly, "

So you concede the editor has provided his own OR or spin to a passage, embellishing a statement or steering an interpretation of a reference which the reference did not contain? Keep in mind please we are not discussing the issue but how to improve the article.

":If you think that the facts included in this Wikipedia article put the justification for the war in doubt, then you are drawing a conclusion that many others have drawn."

That was.... special. Do you mean facts as we can verify through reliable sources, or facts it was presented a reliable source stated, but an editor provided commentary which was never, (as you describe) "explicitly stated" ?

On the issue, those ARE a couple of interesting references you have. Quoting one-

The 1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent U.N. inspections destroyed Iraq's illicit weapons capability and, for the most part, Saddam Hussein did not try to rebuild it, according to an extensive report by the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq that contradicts nearly every prewar assertion made by top administration officials about Iraq.

Can you provide for me the passage of any UN resolution that demanded Saddam Hussein "for the most part" cooperate with verification of disarming? Can you explain how that report by Duelfer could have happened without Saddam's removal, not forgetting Duelfer was once on the UN inspection team?

There seems to be this misconception that the war hinged around George W. Bush's god like ability to know exactly what WMD were in Iraq and how accurate this may or may not have been. He was only repeating intelligence, which, in retrospect, has not been shown to have a single contradicting conclusive report available to him at the time. Not one.

The war was launched upon the obstruction of the process of verification of Saddam's disarming and to assume we should have to produce something after a war which the possibility of nuclear strikes was discussed to justify it is absurd. Batvette (talk) 14:20, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

Batvette, I said that the particular article you were complaining about did not explicitly say that the Bush administration's claims about WMD were wrong. I provided another source, however, which did say exactly that. I quoted from this source above. If you're unhappy with that source, I suggest you do a LexisNexis search for "Duelfer Report." Articles detailing the fact that the accusations about WMD made before the war were wrong are a dime a dozen. The real difficulty is in determining which of the many sources merit inclusion above the others.

It's not really useful for us to argue here about who was right about WMD, however, since we're supposed to base the article on secondary sources, not our own opinions. I do suggest, however, that you acquaint yourself with the issue of the administration's pre-war WMD claims more fully, however, because it will help you in editing this article. An article which I linked above is a good start, as is the BBC Panorama documentary which the article describes: MI6 and CIA were told before invasion that Iraq had no active WMD. -Thucydides411 (talk) 16:11, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

That BBC article you reference is similar to one I've seen on Slate and it would be a complete detachment from reality if one were to take that seriously (as well as ignorance of the intelligence process used by legislators). I'll put it bluntly- If it didn't make it into a finished intelligence product as conclusive judgements, it didn't exist. .

As for the passage "they were not the weapons which had been used as one of the main arguments for the war", I'll repeat that main argument was in fact the Joint Resolution, which also included the following passage-

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

since your argument included the munitions were found in ones, twos and maybe slightly larger collections can you tell me how many munitions a terrorist would be expected to detonate in a crowded public place? Wouldn't it be one or two? Batvette (talk) 18:37, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Wikipedia articles are based on reliable secondary sources. I don't see you citing any. I'm not going to engage you in an argument about whether the Bush administration and Blair government were honest in their depiction of the intelligence about Iraq, or whether the invasion was justified. But reliable secondary sources overwhelmingly state that Iraq possessed no WMD at the time of the invasion, other than a couple dozen misplaced shells with degraded remnants of chemical agents. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:33, 10 June 2013 (UTC)

As for the latter passage, I seem to remember that there was some preliminary correspondence between Saddam and al-Qaeda regarding cooperation, but never any "operational" relationship. I.e., the al-Qaeda who were training in Iraqi camps never had the support, consent, or even the awareness of the regime, as far as anyone knows. EllenCT (talk) 08:49, 13 May 2013 (UTC)

That may be the case, but was that used in the Joint Resolution or any official US government document to justify the war? Didn't Saddam prolifically and significantly support international terrorism in events which killed Americans?Batvette (talk) 14:20, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

Such as? EllenCT (talk) 11:07, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

Edit request on 17 June 2013

Simple misspelling in 4th paragraph;

CHANGE: "threatening "serious consequences" if these demands were not meant"

TO: "threatening "serious consequences" if these demands were not met"

206.174.124.79 (talk) 18:04, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Done Typo fixed with this edit. Thank you for pointing out the error. Begoon ^talk 18:23, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Background section

The sections on the background and lead-up to the war are not very well written or sourced. We should go through them with the following points in mind:

• Give each point its due weight - this is only an overview of a very large subject, about which a huge body of literature exists.
• Use only reliable secondary sources. Think Tanks and lobby groups are generally biased sources. Major newspapers and articles from history journals are the best sources. Don't cite U.N., Congressional, or intelligence agency reports directly as evidence.

The "1991-2002" section, in particular is poorly written:

• The long list of incidents that it includes is not the way to go. We need perhaps one or two solid paragraphs that describe the period from 1996 to 1998. We have to be careful not to write propaganda here too - the current list is a highly selective and partisan telling of the events.
• The background should extend farther back, to the Iran-Iraq War at least. This is when the issue of chemical weapons first came up, and it gives insight into how the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came about.

If we follow these guidelines, the background section should come out more cohesive and focused. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:25, 10 June 2013 (UTC)

I'd like you to specifically identify the language you do not agree with. As for extending further back, the only reason it extends that far back is because the disarmament process began in 1991. The events of the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War are not directly relevant. CJK (talk) 14:37, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

The description of the disarmament process which you've written is highly partisan to the claims of the Bush and Blair governments. Our description of the background should follow what major newspapers and other reliable secondary sources say. The version that I wrote goes through the basic points in neutral language. Iraq was required to destroy chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It began unilaterally. U.N. inspectors were later involved. As inspections were wrapping up, new revelations about pre-war biological weapons research came to light, putting new pressure on Iraq to hand over documents. By the end of 1996, inspectors largely believed Iraq to be disarmed. That's well known and well sourced in the version of the background section I put up. What we require beyond that, as I indicated above, is a paragraph going over the events of 1996 to 1998, up to the departure of U.N. weapons inspectors and Operation Desert Fox.

I object not only to your selective citation of facts and reliance on right-wing lobby groups as sources (Iraq Watch, for example), but also on the POV way you describe the arms inspections. You've put the phrase "Iraqi obstructionism," which is completely unacceptable in a neutral description of the inspections, into the article twice. You write about "deception" and "violation[s]" of U.N. resolutions on the part of the Iraqis. Note that when the article describes claims made by the Bush administration that are widely viewed as deceptive, it doesn't call them "deception." When the article describes the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it doesn't say that the invasion was in "violation of the U.N. Charter," even though a majority of people in the world (including Kofi Annan) probably believe this. The article keeps a neutral tone, appropriate for an encyclopedia. I'm reverting back to the more neutral version, which has much better sourcing (major newspapers versus primary documents and lobby groups). We can discuss here how to better describe the background. -Thucydides411 (talk) 19:58, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Thank for responding.

U.N. inspectors were later involved.

No, they were involved from the very beginning, 1991.

By the end of 1996, inspectors largely believed Iraq to be disarmed.

This is utterly false, inspectors never said that they believed Iraq was disarmed. See the UNSCOM compendium of 1999.

right-wing lobby groups as sources (Iraq Watch, for example)

I'm only relying on U.N. material that was posted on Iraq Watch, not any opinions expressed by Iraq Watch itself.

You've put the phrase "Iraqi obstructionism," which is completely unacceptable in a neutral description of the inspections, into the article twice.

"Obstructionism" is a strictly factual statement and not a POV. Iraq admitted that it hid WMD programs and relevant information of its WMD programs. It blocked inspections, refused to hand over documents, and at one point terminated inspections altogether. It did not permit unfettered inspections until late 2002. If that's not "obstructionism" then what is it?

Note that when the article describes claims made by the Bush administration that are widely viewed as deceptive, it doesn't call them "deception."

No, only people opposed to the invasion view it as deliberate deception. By contrast, Iraq itself admitted that it deceived the inspectors up until 1995, and there is evidence gathered after the invasion that it continued to do so in some areas until 2003. Moreover, the Bush administration was accused of making statements based on incomplete and shoddy intelligence about something it lacked direct access to, by contrast Iraq lied about its own WMD programs.

When the article describes the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it doesn't say that the invasion was in "violation of the U.N. Charter,"

The article notes that there was no U.N. approval, thus it is already implied that the war did not have a legal basis in international law. But it isn't the same thing, because every single American violation of international law was preceded by a prior Iraqi violation of international law, and was in direct response to such violations even if the methods were not approved by the U.N.

CJK (talk) 14:27, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

CJK, this isn't an opinion piece, it's an encyclopedia. Your opinion is that the Iraqis were "obstructionist." Another opinion would be that they were protecting their sovereignty against an inspections regime that was exploited to spy on Iraq and select targets for air strikes. I'm not pushing for the Iraqi view of the inspections to be stated here factually, but you are pushing for the American view to be declared true here. Likewise, you have a personal opinion on who was in violation of UN resolutions, and whether alleged Iraqi or American violations were more important. That doesn't belong in the article, unless it represents the consensus view of reliable secondary sources. If there is dispute over a view among secondary sources, that should be reflected in the article.

Don't revert back again. If you think that something is wrong with the article as written, post reliable secondary sources here. One problem is that you've been basing the text on your own interpretation of primary sources. That's not how articles are sourced in Wikipedia, because we don't know if editors are qualified to make their own analysis of primary sources. The policy is therefore that primary sources, like U.N. resolutions and Intelligence Estimates, are to be avoided. We're not re-fighting the political battles over the Iraq War here. We're documenting what reliable secondary sources say about the background to the war. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:35, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

It was described by the U.N., not the U.S., as "obstructionism". Whether or not spying occurred is irrelevant to the fact that obstructionism happened. And "spying" didn't cause them to knowingly submit false declarations before 1995 or to suspend inspections in August and October 1998, the main reason cited by Iraq for the latter was the refusal to lift sanctions, not spying.

I'm going to quote from the 1999 Compendium directly and you can tell me where I am imposing my own interpretation on the facts:

Extended content

ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT 1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen. What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of these concealment policies and practices. 2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the Commission including the initial false Iraq's declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions: -- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern. -- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible -- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials -- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles -- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines -- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities 3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components. 4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its relations with the Commission and the IAEA. 5. In 1992, the Commission examined the evidence of the unilateral destruction available at that time and to some extent found it consistent with the rest of Iraq's programmes as then declared by Iraq. What was not recognized at the time by the Commission, was that the unilateral destruction action itself was a determined measure taken to conceal evidence which would reveal retained capabilities. Only later, when the investigations by the Commission became more searching and the Commission received reliable reports of diversions from the unilateral destruction, did it become clear that thorough verification of Iraq's claims surrounding unilateral destruction was required. 6. Iraq undertook active deception measures, during the Commission's verification of the unilateral destruction, such as "seeding" warhead destruction areas with parts unrelated to special warheads to lead the Commission's team to believe it had accounted for all that was claimed to exist. At that time, Iraq also melted down weapons and components to make impossible accurate identification or quantification of them. Because of Iraq's false declarations, the Commission was not in a position in 1992 to question, fully, Iraq's accounts. It was only later, after 1995, that the Commission became aware of the concerted deception efforts and was forced to reexamine the 1991-1992 period. 7. The Commission has conducted extensive examination of Iraq's claims concerning the period, July 1991, when Iraq stated that so much of its weapons programmes were secretly eliminated. The material balance and verification of Iraq's claims concerning the disposition of weapons in all areas (missiles, biological and chemical weapons) rests on accepting Iraq's declarations at face value. The Commission has conducted extensive excavation efforts with Iraq at places Iraq declared to have been the locations of explosive demolitions of proscribed weapons and burials of destroyed remnants. Extensive interviews with Iraqi participants in the unilateral destruction have also been conducted. Analysis of overhead imagery of that period has been made. The results have been mixed with some evidence supporting Iraqi declarations. Other data raises serious concerns about the true fate of proscribed weapons and items. 8. One example concerns the destruction of launchers. Iraq claimed until August 1997 (including in its missile FFCD) that proscribed missile launchers were destroyed in July 1991. When the Commission attempted to confirm this by examining imagery, it found such claimed destruction did not take place. Only then did Iraq shift its claim and say that the destruction did not take place until October of 1991. Thus, Iraq changed the account given repeatedly to the Commission, for six years, without any credible explanation as to why it had deliberately given a false declaration in the first place. Two obvious consequences for the Commission's investigations are: the need to explore the reason for such deceptions; and, to demand more information in order to be able to verify other Iraqi claims. 9. Other elements of the unilateral destruction presentation by Iraq were also proved to be false. The precise locations of warhead destruction and the fill of warheads have been revised several times by Iraq. The movements of concealed warheads prior to unilateral destruction, claimed by Iraq, have been proven to be false. The explanations provided on concealment and movement of retained chemical weapons production equipment was likewise shown to be false. Iraq's admissions have only been made during 1997-1998. The Commission still does not know the precise meaning or significance of Iraq's failure to provide accurate data about proscribed weapons activities and it's provision of false information. 10. One incident which has now been partially investigated illustrates another example of the Commission's concern about the possibility of retained prohibited material. 11. The Commission focussed a dedicated effort into investigating Iraq's concealment policy and actions following the events of August 1995, when Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal left Iraq. This investigation proceeded through various stages and developed progressively more information on not only what had been hidden up until 1995, but what still remained concealed. One piece of this investigation involved a Major in the Special Republican Guard, Izzadine al-Majid. He was tasked by higher authorities in July 1991 to receive a shipment of production equipment and critical components related to Iraq's indigenous proscribed missile programmes which had been diverted from secret unilateral destruction. He was ordered to hide these materials on the premises of a private villa in the west Baghdad suburb of Abu Ghraib. The materials remained hidden at that location until March 1992 when the Special Republican Guard retrieved them to move them to another location. Iraq did not declare any of this information, the Commission learned it from Major Izzadine al-Majid and other participants in the operation. 12. Further investigation of this "diversion" from the unilateral destruction raised further questions, which remain unanswered. According to Iraq, some material now acknowledged to have been diverted from unilateral destruction came from a site called al Alam. Iraq stated that ten vehicles containing prohibited missile items were sent to this remote location in July 1991. The Commission examined imagery of this area during that time-frame and found not just ten vehicles, but that there had been over 100 vehicles present at this remote location. No explanation of the remaining 90 vehicles has been received from Iraq. Requests by the Commission for documents concerning this movement of vehicles either through Special Security checkpoints or vehicle movement logs have been rebuffed by Iraq with the claim that no documents are available. On the last occasion that this issue was discussed with senior Iraqi officials, in July 1998, Iraq conceded that for the preceding two years it had mislead the Commission concerning the events of the unilateral destruction of components for its indigenous missile engine programme. 13. This particular incident also showed that the Special Republican Guard had been involved. Other direct physical evidence of its involvement in the unilateral destruction activity is in the possession of the Commission. Iraq has minimized any involvement of the Special Republican Guard or security organizations. 14. With respect to the provision of documents to the Commission, Iraq has long claimed virtually all relevant documents had been destroyed. Again, following the departure from Iraq of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal and the subsequent provision of 150 crates of documents at the Haidar Chicken Farm, the Commission concluded that more exist. The Commission examined imagery of the Haidar farm and found that shortly before Iraq led the Commission to the farm to hand over the documents, several shipping containers had been removed from the site. Iraq has not provided a credible explanation of this. The documents provided from the farm have clearly defined gaps. For example, documents which would indicate WMD production techniques achieved by Iraq are not included. There are no documents related to the military or Ministry of Defense. The Commission has concluded that a segregation of documents must have taken place prior to delivery to the Commission. It has sought from Iraq further explanations of what happened to the documents and where they are located. This has never been provided. 15. One notable document received from Iraq in August 1995 should be mentioned. "The al-Atheer Center for the development of materials production: Report of achievements accomplished from 1 June 1990 to 7 June 1991" (called "the al-Atheer document"). It illustrates how this key facility for the development of nuclear weapon devices implemented the instructions of the high level committee in April 1991 on concealment action. The facility was instructed to remove evidence of the true activities at the facility, evacuate documents to hide sites, make physical alterations to the site to hide its true purpose, develop cover stories, and conduct mock inspections to prepare for UN inspectors. These types of actions are precisely what the Commission has encountered in its inspection activities throughout its work in Iraq. Iraq has claimed such deliberate concealment activities were ceased in 1995. However, Iraq has provided no documentation to substantiate these claims and the Commission continues to find evidence that the opposite is the case. Documents are found occasionally and reports from inside Iraq indicate continuing attempts to prevent the Commission from discovering documents or other materials. 16. The concealment investigation by the Commission, which has at times been contentious, has yielded a model of the decision making and organizations in Iraq which participate in actions to hide information and thwart the discovery of prohibited materials. The evidence collected included interviews with Iraqi personnel in and out of Iraq, documents found during inspection activity, imagery, analysis of vehicle movements and other Iraqi actions in reaction to Commission inspections, and overall patterns of obstructions, delays, and changing accounts, "stories", by Iraq. 17. In its first phase, the analysis of the Chicken Farm documents was carried out and the implications of the retained and sustained prohibited programmes were examined. The Commission concluded that multiple organizations in Iraq had to be involved. The concealment and deception activities had distinct technical requirements. This implied, inter alia, the continued involvement of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). Iraq acknowledged this. However, covert procurement required an overseas presence and the establishment of front companies. These activities had been conducted by the General Intelligence Service, the Mukhabarat, during the 1980's and its expertise would continue to be valuable. Analysis of how procurement was conducted in the period immediately prior to the Gulf war was conducted as a possible indicator of how Iraq would continue such efforts to the present. This simple, logical analysis bore fruit. The Commission soon had direct evidence of Mukhabarat involvement when long range missile gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment were discovered being imported into Iraq in 1995. 18. The logistics of the movement of proscribed materials required communications and transportation support of a highly reliable and sensitive nature. In examining imagery from 1991, it was found that Special Republican Guard vehicles had been used to move equipment involved in planned nuclear weapons production when it was being hidden from the IAEA. In addition, the personnel involved had Special Republican Guard affiliations - like Major Izzadine mentioned earlier. Also, imagery taken during inspections in 1996 and 1997 showed significant vehicle movement at Special Republican Guard sites in reaction to ongoing inspection activities. 19. The Commission assessed that overall direction came from a more senior entity and that this appeared to be the Special Security Organization (SSO). In late 1995, the Commission was only beginning to gain an understanding of SSO direct control over concealment actions. One example was that during interviews with the manager of the Haidar farm it was learned that the farm had been seized by officers of the SSO some ten days before the Commission was given access to it. 20. This period of interviews and analysis led the Commission to investigate further the involvement of relevant security organizations in ongoing activities of a proscribed nature. The technique of interviewing participants in known concealment events proved useful even when interviewees were heavily coached. During the spring of 1996, continued interview and investigation missions were conducted in Iraq with the goal of eliciting a true picture of concealment actions and confirmation that it had or would be ended. In addition, acting on information developed during late 1995, the Commission conducted an inspection of sites related to concealment activities. This inspection was conducted in March 1996 and resulted in several refusals by Iraq to provide access to sites in accordance with its obligations. 21. Iraq did not acknowledge concealment as a legitimate matter for discussion with the Commission. Iraq stated that all concealment had been ended and only if the Commission could prove otherwise would Iraq discuss the matter. The Commission had ample evidence of concealment up to 1995 and in addition, uncovered clandestine proscribed missile guidance acquisition by Iraq in late 1995. Iraq claimed all such actions were terminated. The Commission had no evidence to support Iraq's claims, and, continued to receive reports to the contrary. 22. Given that Iraq would not willingly discuss the matter, the Commission planned another series of inspections of sites belonging to the organizations considered to have direct involvement in concealment. Two inspections took place in June and July 1996. There were lengthy standoffs. U-2 imagery taken during standoffs in June identified vehicle and other movements at SSO and Special Republican Guard facilities adjacent to Presidential areas that the Commission assessed as being related to concealment. The Executive Chairman had discussions with the Deputy Prime Minister on access issues and agreed on 22 June 1996 on a Joint Programme of Action which included the topic of concealment as a priority for verification work. 23. The Commission sent three additional investigation missions to Iraq during the remainder of 1996. Interviews were conducted and considerable discussion about the disposition of documentation took place. Little substantive progress was made. The Commission also continued to receive information about retained prohibited material in Iraq during this period. All information continued to support SSO/Special Republican Guard involvement. 24. In early 1997, the Commission again undertook an inspection of sites related to organizations identified with concealment actions. During these inspections, sites related to the hiding of proscribed material, transportation, and the organization of movements were inspected. In addition, sites were selected which were related to the procurement of material thought to be proscribed. 25. In June 1997, the Commission experienced delays and obstructions throughout the inspections including the removal of material from sites. The friction in conducting such inspections of sites is in some ways understandable given the sensitivity of such locations and organizations to Iraq. But, given the information about concealment practices and the absence of evidence about their termination, the Commission believed it had no choice but to continue. Ultimately, it was hoped that Iraq would provide a full and verifiable presentation on concealment. Inspections, while useful, would ultimately be blocked rather than permit discovery of prohibited materials. Nevertheless, evidence of non-compliance with the inspection regime was demonstrated in the form of non-cooperation. Missing files, cleansed rooms, purged computers and other techniques were encountered on a regular basis, at sites under inspection. 26. In August and September 1997, two inspections were conducted in an effort to uncover Iraq's efforts to deceive the Commission in the CW and BW areas. This reflected a decision to broaden the scope of the investigation aimed at thwarting Iraq's concealment efforts. During these inspections the same techniques of convoy movements occurred in direct reaction to the Commission's inspection activity. This provided still more evidence that concealment was ongoing. 27. In a further effort to continue to press Iraq to fully declare its programmes, the Commission reconfigured its concealment investigation work. Another mission went into Iraq in September 1997. Limited progress was made in obtaining Iraq's acknowledgment of Special Republican Guard and Mukhabarat involvement. At that time, another inspection obtained an SSO document related to dual-use biological activities and materials. A follow-on inspection was denied access to an SSO site in a presidential area. 28. In January 1998, an inspection to conduct a concealment investigation was sent to Iraq. It was stopped by Iraq after one day. 29. The Commission continued to press Iraq to provide full and verifiable explanations of its concealment activities. Iraq insisted that it was not concealing any proscribed weapons. The Commission found: significant gaps in every weapons area; and, that Iraq's active measures to deceive the Commission were responsible for its inability to verify the disposition of prohibited weapons. Reports that prohibited material still existed in Iraq continued to be received by the Commission. The Commission, following its presentation to the Council, established its list of priority disarmament issues and discussed these with Iraq during the Summer of 1998. The concealment issue was included in that list. Iraq declined to discuss the issue at that time. 30. In July 1998, an inspection sought to uncover information related to Iraq's production, storage, and disposal of chemical and biological weapons. Iraq had long denied that any documents on these topics were available. In the course of the team's inspection of Iraqi Air Force Headquarters inspectors located a document detailing the use of "special weapons" during the Iran - Iraq war. Immediately after its discovery, the document was seized from the Chief Inspector. Iraq has not responded to the demand, expressed by the Security Council, to return the document. Information in the document, recorded by team members, shows significant discrepancies between the amount of munitions Iraq claims to have consumed between 1983 and 1988, and the actual amount presented by Iraq in its official declarations. 31. By the end of the 1998, there remained significant uncertainties in the disposition of Iraq's prohibited programmes. 32. The Commission has received information recently from multiple sources, identifying organizations that direct and implement the concealment effort in Iraq. While the information from these sources differs in some minor details, it agrees on several major points: •The highest level of concealment-related decisions are made by a small committee of high ranking officials. The Presidential Secretary, Abed Hamid Mahmoud, chairs this committee; •The Committee directs the activities of a unit which is responsible for moving, hiding, and securing the items which are being concealed from the Commission; •The Special Security Organization plays a key role in the operation of this unit and in the tracking and surveillance of Commission activities.

CJK (talk) 14:28, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Dumping text here doesn't help. You need to find reliable secondary sources. See Wikipedia:RS. It is important to use reliable secondary sources, especially for a subject like this, because otherwise we end up with a series of conflicting statements by different nations and organizations with a stake in the conflict.

What you're doing here risks flaming up into an edit war. You should not aggressively push an American pro-war view here, unless you want to see the article become a swamp of NPOV statements from all sides. Would you be comfortable with an article that stated, "On 5 February 2003, Colin Powell lied to the United Nations, claiming the United States possessed solid intelligence confirming mobile weapons laboratories in Iraq, when in reality German intelligence, which had provided the intelligence, had previously warned the CIA that Curveball's statements were unreliable and unverified, and high-level CIA officials, including Tyler Drumheller, considered Curveball a 'likely fabricator'"? I suspect you would think that POV, even though there are plenty of sources we could bring to bear to support just that statement.

So really, for the sake of this article, don't turn it into a POV piece. -Thucydides411 (talk) 18:06, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Secondary sources are not mandatory on Wikipedia. I have reported strictly what the report said without imposing any interpretation of my own. If you want to replace it with a secondary source that says the same thing, you are free to do so. You say there are conflicting statements by different nations and organizations with a stake in the conflict. I am not aware of the fact that any other country outside of Iraq, including France, Russia, and China, believed that Iraq had fulfilled it's disarmament obligations.

There is no evidence that Powell lied about Curveball. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that Curveball was credible in spite of warnings. There is no evidence that they knew he was lying based on the warnings.

You say I am imposing a pro-war view. That is simply untrue. For example, it would be entirely reasonable to argue that even if Iraq had WMDs it could be successfully deterred from using them, and thus the war was unnecessary.

CJK (talk) 17:28, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

I'm going to first show that my statement about Colin Powell and Curveball is accurate, and then make a more general proposal about how to proceed with the article.

It is actually a well-established fact that the CIA was aware of Curveball's unreliability, and that both low-level analysts, and the director of CIA operations in Europe, Tyler Drumheller, believed Curveball to be a fabricator. British intelligence believed outright that Curveball was lying, and told this to the CIA. Up to this point (early 2003), only the Germans had access to Curveball, and they had been unable to verify his claims. Satellite photography which the CIA and BND (German foreign intelligence) had obtained of the supposed biological weapons factory where Curveball claimed to have worked directly contradicted his claims about shipments by trucks to and from the factory. Warnings about Curveball's unreliability were conveyed directly to CIA director George Tenet by the head of the BND, August Hanning, by Tyler Drumheller, and by the CIA station in Berlin. Tenet denies having received either Hanning or Drumheller's warnings, but both Hanning and Drumheller recall exactly when and how they warned him - Hanning did so in a letter mailed directly to Tenet, and Drumheller did so several times over the phone, including in the lead-up to Powell's speech. Drumheller specifically asked Tenet to make sure that no material from Curveball be included in Powell's U.N. speech, to which Tenet responded with something to the effect of, "Don't worry, it's being taken care of." The U.N. speech nevertheless ended up using Curveball as its primary source of information. In his U.N. presentation on 5 Februrary, Powell said,

"My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."

Given what we now know about the warnings given to the CIA about Curveball, the CIA's own doubts about his reliability, and the inability of the Germans to verify any of Curveball's claims about biological weapons, this statement was clearly a lie. But I'm not writing that in the Wiki article, because I think people can make their own judgement if the facts are presented neutrally.

I suggest that you take the same tack. The first step would be rolling back to the less audacious opinionated version of the article which I have been trying to revert to. I would appreciate if you would do this as a gesture of good faith. We can talk about "Iraqi obstructionism" and other issues from there. I think that such a phrase could be included, if it were made clear that there were allegations of obstructionism. But we can discuss this after we are back at the other version of the article. -Thucydides411 (talk) 19:51, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

That demonstrates that Tenet either simply disagreed with them or was incompetent (I really don't dispute that) and not necessarily that he was lying. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Powell himself was aware of any of this.

Let's go over why it is "obstructionism"

• They admitted deliberate concealment of past WMD programs up until 1995 in direct violation of UNSCR 687 and 707.

• They blocked individual inspections in violation of various resolutions. Maybe they had a good reason for this, but it doesn't matter. The very reason intrusive inspections were taking place were due to prior obstructionism.

• They suspended cooperation in August and October 1998, not on the grounds of "spying" but rather because of the refusal to lift sanctions imposed due to Kuwait and the WMD programs.

obstruct verb 1.to block 2.to hinder

Do you seriously deny that that happened?

Additionally, I have made a large number of other edits that you have indiscriminately reverted without bothering to explain why.

CJK (talk) 22:34, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

I don't share your interpretation of the events. The first thing to keep in mind when considering the inspections is that Iraq destroyed its banned weapons stocks in 1991, so the weapons the inspectors were looking for just weren't there. The concealment had to do solely with weapons stocks which were long gone and research which was no longer being carried out. After 1995, very little of consequence - either hidden documentation or weapons stocks - was found. Iraq did come into conflict with the inspectors, however, who demanded access to ever more sensitive sites for the regime. The inspections were furthermore being used by the United States as a means to keep up pressure on Iraq, and it was in American interests for the inspections to essentially go on indefinitely.

In 2002-2003, the context is even more explicit. We know from internal Bush administration and Blair government memos that war was decided on before the issue of new inspections were even raised. These memos state that WMD are one means of persuading the public of the necessity of war, and that in order to provide legitimacy to the war, inspections should be pursued. At this point, there was no credible evidence of chemical or biological weapons programs in Iraq, but there was a concerted effort by Bush and Blair in the media to hype up various unconvincing shreds of information, like high-strength aluminum tubes, supposed uranium purchases in Niger, statements by Curveball and a few other defectors (including the infamous "45 minutes" statement), and GPS software on drones with American maps installed. The only find the inspectors made - Al-Samoud 2 missiles with a disputed maximum range - was actually being addressed, in that Iraq was in the process of destroying them.

Tenet certainly lied about the warnings he received regarding Curveball. So did Bush in his State of the Union when he referenced Niger. So did Colin Powell when he said that the information he was presenting was not based on conjecture but solid proof. Should the article say that?

I also notice that you've been removing a great deal of information from the lede that you don't like, such as Iraq's listing on the Failed States Index. You've also made substantial changes to the lede, even redefining when the war began. You are editing without consensus. Stop and revert. Come back here to discuss before you make more changes. -Thucydides411 (talk) 15:35, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

The first thing to keep in mind when considering the inspections is that Iraq destroyed its banned weapons stocks in 1991, so the weapons the inspectors were looking for just weren't there.

But that's not the point. The point is that they were never accounted for, as made clear by Hans Blix. They could have still existed.

The concealment had to do solely with weapons stocks which were long gone and research which was no longer being carried out.

Um, really? Then why exactly did they bother trying to hide it in the first place?

After 1995, very little of consequence - either hidden documentation or weapons stocks - was found.

In 1996 several pieces of equipment from Iraq's former chemical warfare plant was discovered.

In 1997 200 pieces of chemical equipment that had been hidden was discovered.

In 1998 an air force document was found that contradicted Iraqi declarations on the consumption of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.

In 2003 inspectors found 3,000 pages of documents related to a nuclear program.

Iraq did come into conflict with the inspectors, however, who demanded access to ever more sensitive sites for the regime.

Yes, and this was due to the fact that Iraq had attempted concealment. There were absolutely no provisions in the U.N. mandate to respect any "sensitive" sites. They were to have unrestricted access. Blocking that access was obstructionist, even if they thought they had a legitimate reason.

The inspections were furthermore being used by the United States as a means to keep up pressure on Iraq, and it was in American interests for the inspections to essentially go on indefinitely.

What difference does that make? Did they comply? No. So the inspections had to continue. Furthermore, "monitoring" inspections were supposed to go on indefinitely.

We know from internal Bush administration and Blair government memos that war was decided on before the issue of new inspections were even raised.

Yes, because nobody thought Iraq would comply, because they hadn't complied before. And they didn't.

These memos state that WMD are one means of persuading the public of the necessity of war, and that in order to provide legitimacy to the war, inspections should be pursued.

That is correct. Iraq was required to comply with WMD inspections under U.N. resolutions, so having new inspections would give the war legitimacy by offering Iraq one more chance to comply.

At this point, there was no credible evidence of chemical or biological weapons programs in Iraq

There wasn't hard evidence. But it was a forbidden program, and Iraq would have been careful to keep it a secret. But the intelligence and conventional wisdom in 2001 and 2002 was overwhelming that Iraq still had WMD.

there was a concerted effort by Bush and Blair in the media to hype up various unconvincing shreds of information, like high-strength aluminum tubes

Which the French also shared concerns over. You do not get to determine what is or isn't "unconvincing".

supposed uranium purchases in Niger

That happened in one speech, and it was deemed well-founded by a post-war investigation by the British government.

statements by Curveball and a few other defectors

Which you have no proof they were lying about, rather than simply mistaken.

including the infamous "45 minutes" statement

I've never really understood the obsession over this. Did it make any real difference at all if it was 45 minutes or not?

Tenet certainly lied about the warnings he received regarding Curveball. So did Bush in his State of the Union when he referenced Niger. So did Colin Powell when he said that the information he was presenting was not based on conjecture but solid proof. Should the article say that?

Repeating your assertions do not make them true.

I would in addition like to specifically ask you or anyone else reverting my edits to explain in detail each point you do not agree with, instead of only addressing a small amount of the edits made.

CJK (talk) 19:42, 18 June 2013 (UTC)