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The Iraq War was an armed conflict in Iraq that began, after several years of prior unofficial aerial action, with an invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 by forces led by the United States. An insurgency soon emerged to oppose coalition forces and the newly formed Iraqi government. The U.S. completed its withdrawal of military personnel in December 2011. However, the Iraqi insurgency continues and caused thousands of fatalities in 2012.

In 1998 the Clinton administration and large bipartisan majorities in Congress made regime change official American policy citing past Iraqi behavior and non-compliance with the post-Gulf War weapon inspection process mandated in the Gulf War cease-fire resolution. The U.S. and U.K., initiated aerial hostilities against Iraq in December 1998 which continued for the next several years in the "no-fly zones" in northern and southern Iraq. In 2002 the U.S. began to threaten a ground invasion if Iraq did not readmit U.N. weapon inspectors and complete the disarmament process. Most governments and inspectors believed that Iraq had not disarmed, although there was disagreement over whether Iraq posed a serious threat. The U.S. and U.K. pointed out that Iraq had violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions and claimed it still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that posed a growing threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.

Some U.S. officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda, but no evidence of an operational connection was ever found. Other proclaimed reasons for the invasion included Iraq's financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, Iraqi government human rights abuses, and an effort to spread democracy to the country.

Under heavy pressure Iraq agreed to readmit inspectors in September 2002. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which declared Iraq in material breach of the disarmament paragraphs of Gulf War cease-fire resolution and gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to completely and immediately cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and long-range missiles, threatening "serious consequences" if these demands were not met. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no conclusive evidence of WMD, but chief inspector Hans Blix reported in January 2003 that Iraq had not accounted for missing WMD material and thus had not arrived to "genuine acceptance" of disarmament. In February and March France, Germany and Russia nevertheless argued that Iraq's disarmament could still be achieved by prioritizing disarmament tasks and setting a tight timetable. Facing opposition by France and Russia in the UN Security Council to a further resolution setting a deadline for Iraqi compliance, the United States and United Kingdom formed the nucleus of a "coalition of the willing." Many have thus regarded the use of force as illegitimate, but the coalition argued that they were justified in enforcing the Gulf War cease-fire under Resolution 678 of 1990 which authorized all necessary means in upholding prior and subsequent resolutions against Iraq.

On 17 March 2003, Bush demanded that Saddam and his sons go into exile, explaining that "We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest." An invasion began on 19 March 2003, leading to the fall of Baghdad and destruction of Saddam's regime on 9 April.

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.‑led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had missile programs that violated U.N. range restrictions, that Iraq had the capability of producing mustard gas and anthrax, and that its dual-use infrastructure was expanding despite debilitating sanctions. But Iraq had no active chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons programs and its past WMD programs had either been dismantled by prior U.N. inspections or had been secretly destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991 in an attempt to conceal WMD capabilities from the U.N. They intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted or otherwise disintegrated. Some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were also found.

The invasion led to the occupation of Iraq and the eventual capture of Saddam Hussein, who was later tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi government. A predominately Sunni-based insurgency quickly began conducting attacks on coalition and Iraqi government troops. Serious fighting with Shi'a militias also occurred in 2004 and 2008. The occupation ended in June 2004 as power was transferred to an Iraqi interim government, but American and British troops did not withdraw due to ongoing insurgent violence that threatened Iraq's stability. Elections were held in 2005, resulting in the formation of a Shi'a led government under Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. In 2006 sectarian violence steadily mounted between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and a new faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged.

In 2007 Bush ordered over 20,000 reinforcements to Iraq in an effort to tamp down the growing violence and by mid-2008 security had improved and violence dropped sharply. As public opinion in Coalition countries favoring troop withdrawals increased and as Iraqi forces began to take responsibility for security, member nations of the Coalition withdrew their forces. In late 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments approved a Status of Forces Agreement effective through 1 January 2012. The Iraqi Parliament also ratified a Strategic Framework Agreement with the U.S.,

UK forces ended combat operations on 30 April 2009. In August 2010 Barack Obama announced that the U.S. combat role in Iraq had ended. The remaining 50,000 U.S. troops were designated as "advise and assist brigades" assigned to non-combat operations while retaining the ability to revert to combat operations as necessary. Two combat aviation brigades also remain in Iraq.

On 21 October 2011, President Obama announced that all U.S. troops and trainers would leave Iraq by the end of the year, bringing the U.S. mission in Iraq to an end. On 15 December 2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta officially declared the Iraq War over, at a flag lowering ceremony in Baghdad. The last U.S. troops left Iraqi territory on 18 December 2011 at 4:27 UTC.

Background

Weapon inspections and conflicts (1991-98)

In April 1991, following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, Iraq was required by UNSCR 687, the formal Gulf War cease-fire, to dismantle within 90 days under U.N. supervision all nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare programs as well as long range missiles as a condition for lifting stringent sanctions that had been adopted by the international community after the invasion of Kuwait. In violation of this resolution Iraq initially decided to retain parts of its WMD and proceeded to submit false declarations to the U.N. An intrusive inspection in June 1991 alarmed the Iraqis, however, and they began secret unilateral destruction of their hidden WMD as part of a plan to continue to conceal WMD-related infrastructure and documents from the inspectors. Meanwhile, destruction of Iraq's declared weapons programs proceeded under U.N. inspection and would be completed in 1994. The IAEA dismantled Iraq's nuclear program, but only after Iraqi attempts to hide much of it throughout 1991. Iraq refused to accept long-term monitoring until November 1993.

Relations between the United States and Iraq remained extremely poor and George H.W. Bush continued to urge the overthrow of Saddam’s regime after the Gulf War ended. In March 1991 the U.S. shot down two Iraqi aircraft over northern Iraq in order to defend the Kurdish population. U.S. forces were sent to northern Iraq in April 1991 to participate in humanitarian relief operations. Iraqi forces did not contest this move and Iraq later withdrew its forces from Kurdistan leading to the establishment of a de facto government independent from Baghdad.

In September 1991 Iraq prevented U.N. helicopter flights and obstructed an inspection that had uncovered evidence of a nuclear weapons program, leading to American threats of airstrikes. In the fall of 1991 the U.S. authorized covert operations to organize a coup against Saddam’s government, although regime change was not yet declared an official policy. In early 1992 another crisis developed when Iraq refused to destroy ballistic missile equipment, leading to U.S. plans for airstrikes. Iraq again relented under duress.

By this time many people felt Bush’s decision to halt the Gulf War short of Baghdad was a mistake and an April 1992 poll showed that a majority of Americans favored sending American troops back to the Persian Gulf to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Although Iraq viewed a U.S. invasion as the greatest potential threat to it during the 1990s, it was always judged to be unlikely.

In July 1992 force was again threatened after Iraq refused to provide access to an Agricultural ministry. In August 1992 the U.S., Britain, and France imposed a no-fly zone over southern Iraq to halt Iraqi bombing of Shi'ite rebel areas. An Iraqi MiG was shot down in December that same year. In January 1993 Allied aircraft attacked Iraqi radar and missile sites in southern Iraq after an Iraqi missile buildup. American cruise missiles also targeted a former nuclear facility. Bill Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on Iraqi intelligence facilities in June 1993 after the discovery of an alleged Iraqi assassination plot against George H.W. Bush.

By 1994 Iraq was growing increasingly frustrated that sanctions were not being lifted despite the destruction of its declared WMD programs. In October 1994 Iraq began massing troops near the Kuwaiti border leading to the sending of U.S. reinforcements to the Middle East and a crisis that was resolved when Iraq cancelled the buildup.

In 1995 it was revealed that Iraq had been concealing from U.N. inspectors, among other things, its entire past biological warfare program and the past production of an extremely deadly nerve agent known as VX. Following these revelations Iraq claimed that it had ended its deceptive practices and that all WMD related materials and documents had been destroyed, but Iraqi obstructionism had greatly complicated the verification process and the U.N. could not confirm that Iraq had in fact disarmed. A long list of items still remained unaccounted for in 1999. A 1997 panel of experts drawn from 13 independent nations unanimously rejected Iraq's biological warfare declarations as deeply flawed and incomplete. A 1998 technical evaluation meeting on VX with experts drawn from nine countries concluded "no full disclosure on the subject of VX has yet been made by the Iraqi side" and "Iraq was capable of producing significant quantities of VX before January 1991. This may have been as much as 50 to 100 tonnes of VX, albeit of an uncertain quality. Currently, the team assesses that Iraq has the know how and process equipment, and may possess precursors to manufacture as much as 200 tonnes of VX."

In June 1996 Iraqi security services foiled a coup plot that had been supported by the U.S., executing 100 suspected plotters. In August 1996 Saddam's forces attacked Irbil in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region leading to American cruise missile strikes against various targets in southern Iraq on 3-4 September.

Iraq blocked a number of inspections of sensitive sights on the grounds that such inspections threatened their national security and sovereignty. In November 1997 Iraq obstructed aspects of the weapon inspection process and expelled American inspectors. The U.S. built up its forces in the region to prepare for airstrikes against Iraq, and Iraq backed down. In January 1998 Iraq blocked U.N. inspections of presidential palaces leading to an acute crisis with the U.S. and Britain, with widespread speculation of a conflict breaking out. Kofi Annan travelled to Baghdad to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the standoff and a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Iraq concluded on 23 February 1998 established special procedures for the inspection of eight "presidential sites", while reaffirming that full access would be provided elsewhere.

End of inspections and bombing (1998-2000)

In August 1998 Iraq broke off cooperation with UNSCOM and threatened to end routine monitoring activities unless they reported Iraq was disarmed and sanctions were lifted. This action prompted the U.S. Congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act, which was signed by Clinton and officially established bringing about regime change in Iraq as an American foreign policy objective. On 31 October Iraq halted all monitoring activities, but reversed its position on 14 November after the U.S. threatened airstrikes. The strikes were cancelled just eight minutes before they were to be launched.

Although Iraq pledged full cooperation, it obstructed several inspections and refused to hand over certain documents. The U.S. and U.K. advised inspectors to leave Iraq and launched a punitive bombing campaign known as "Operation Desert Fox" that lasted from 16 to 19 December 1998. Clinton announced the action was intended to “degrade” Iraq’s alleged WMD programs. Over 600 bombs and 400 cruise missiles were dropped on 97 targets including 32 air defense facilities, 20 “Command and Control” facilities, 18 regime security facilities, 11 WMD related facilities (mostly missile), 9 army facilities, 6 airfields, and an oil refinery near Basra. There were no reliable reports of Iraqi casualties. Announcing the end of the strikes Clinton said "So long as Saddam remains in power, he will remain a threat to his people, his region, and the world. With our allies, we must pursue a strategy to contain him and to constrain his weapons of mass destruction program, while working toward the day Iraq has a government willing to live at peace with its people and with its neighbors.... Now, over the long-term, the best way to end the threat that Saddam poses to his own people in the region is for Iraq to have a different government."

It was subsequently revealed that the U.S. had been gathering intelligence against Iraq through the weapon inspectors, which it attempted to justify by claiming it helped inspectors break through Iraqi "concealment" practices. Iraq declared it would not readmit the inspectors unless the sanctions were lifted, even if the composition of the inspection teams were changed to reduce American influence and be more acceptable to Iraq.

Iraq indicated that it no longer accepted the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq and began to attack British and American aircraft without success. The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes against Iraqi air defenses 166 times in 1999 and 78 times in 2000. By the end of 1999 1,200 bombs had been dropped on 460 targets in what was already the longest U.S. air war since Vietnam.

In December 1999 the Security Council passed Resolution 1284 which created UNMOVIC to replace UNSCOM. UNMOVIC was designed to be under greater supervision of the U.N. and new regulations forbade intelligence sharing with outside nations. 1284 provided for the suspension of economic sanctions against Iraq for renewable 120 day periods if Iraq permitted reinforced monitoring and fulfilled key disarmament tasks. Hans Blix was appointed as head of UNMOVIC in 2000, after pro-Iraq Security Council members refused to accept Rolf Ekeus who had led UNSCOM from 1991-97. Blix stated that he would defer to the U.N. in resolving confrontations during inspections. Iraq, however, rejected the resolution because it did not meet its demand for the immediate lifting of sanctions.

The Republican Party platform in 2000 called for "the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act, which should be regarded as a starting point in a comprehensive plan for the removal of Saddam Hussein and the restoration of international inspections in collaboration with his successor. Republicans recognize that peace and stability in the Persian Gulf is impossible as long as Saddam Hussein rules Iraq." Similarly, the Democratic platform said "In Iraq, we are committed to working with our international partners to keep Saddam Hussein boxed in, and we will work to see him out of power. Bill Clinton and Al Gore have stood up to Saddam Hussein time and time again. As President, Al Gore will not hesitate to use America’s military might against Iraq when and where it is necessary."

Early Bush administration (2001-02)

In February 2001 the U.S. and Britain launched the heaviest airstrikes against Iraq since 1998, targeting Iraqi air defenses and telecommunications near Baghdad. George W. Bush's Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill claimed that Bush's first two National Security Council meetings included a discussion of regime change. But no specific actions were decided upon in first months of the Bush administration, apart from efforts to rally other nations around proposals for new “smart sanctions” against Iraq.

Planning for an actual invasion began after the September 11 attacks. Although there were some suggestions within the Bush administration that the U.S. launch an immediate, unilateral attack on Iraq, it was ultimately decided to go through the U.N. and attempt to build a coalition. In his 2002 State of the Union Address Bush described Iraq, as well as North Korea and Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil”. “I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.” In August 2002 Bush approved a classified document drafted by officials entitled "Iraq: Goals, Objectives, and Strategy". It stated that the goals of the war were to eliminate the threat of WMD, prevent Saddam from breaking out of his "containment", eliminate the Iraqi threat to its neighbors, liberate the Iraqi people, and prevent Iraqi support of terrorism.

Iraq and the U.N. began talks in March 2002 to see if the inspectors could return. These talks deadlocked because the Iraqis insisted on various preconditions. In an August 2002 letter Iraq demanded that the remaining disarmament issues be resolved in a manner acceptable to Iraq, that sanctions be lifted, and the no-fly zones abolished.

Iraq disarmament crisis and pre-war intelligence

See also: Lead up to the Iraq War, Rationale for the Iraq War, Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq, Governments' pre-war positions on invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, and Iraq and weapons of mass destruction

Main articles: Iraq disarmament timeline 1990–2003 and 2002 in Iraq

Renewed weapon inspections (2002-03)

The issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in late 2002, when Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. In a speech to the U.N. on 12 September 2002 he declared: "If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."

This speech alarmed Saddam, and four days later Iraq agreed to let the inspectors back in. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed on 8 November 2002, setting out the terms of disarmament. It decided Iraq remained in material breach of relevant resolutions, that Iraq would be given a "final opportunity" to comply, that it would submit an accurate declaration of its past WMD activities, that false statements and omissions would constitute a further material breach, that the inspectors would receive total unrestricted access and conduct interviews how they saw fit, and that cooperation would be immediate and unconditional. Iraq reluctantly accepted these terms and new inspections began on 27 November.

The inspectors failed to find any WMD but did stumble upon 14 unfilled chemical rockets. The inspectors ruled that Iraq's al-Samoud II missile violated range restrictions and noted that Iraq had rebuilt casting chambers destroyed by previous inspections for their use in long-range missile programs. Three thousand pages of nuclear related documents were discovered by an inspection of a private residence.

Although praising Iraq for its cooperation in the inspection "process", chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix remarked in January 2003 that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Among other things, he noted that 1,000 short tons (910 t) of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq's VX nerve agent program was missing, and that "no convincing evidence" was presented for the destruction of 8,500 litres (1,900 imp gal; 2,200 US gal) of anthrax that had been declared. He also stated that Iraq's 12,000 page declaration left questions unanswered and that Iraq failed to cooperate on providing names for interviews.

The UNMOVIC report of 28 February 2003 concluded "Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far." The next report stated "the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation. From the end of January 2003, the Iraqi side, which until then had been cooperative in terms of process but not equally cooperative in terms of subsistence, devoted much effort to providing explanations and proposing methods of inquiry into such issues as the production and destruction of anthrax, VX and long-range missiles. Despite those efforts, little progress was made in the solution of outstanding issues during the time of UNMOVIC operations in Iraq."

It was concluded after the invasion that Iraq had submitted inaccurate details about its past biological warfare program, and that this may have hindered the verification process.

Alleged weapons of mass destruction

A UN weapons inspector in Iraq.

The U.S. intelligence community routinely assessed that Iraq had chemical and biological agents and munitions between 1996 and 2002.

The American assessment that Iraq had a nuclear program was primarily based on Iraqi imports on aluminum tubes that had been seized in early 2001. The CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire these high-strength tubes, which were prohibited under the UN monitoring program for their potential nuclear application, pointed to a clandestine effort to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. The assessments of possible nuclear end use of the tubes had first been made in early 2001. According to Larry Wilkerson French intelligence also shared the Bush administrations concerns about the tubes. German intelligence estimated Iraq could have a nuclear bomb by 2004-2007.

This analysis was opposed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and INR, which was significant because of DOE's expertise in such gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that the Iraqi tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges and that while it was technically possible with additional modification, conventional military uses were more plausible. A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported "All experts agree that after modification the tubes could be used as a rotor of a poor quality gas centrifuge. Complicating the realization of this design is that the wall of the tubes is unusually thick, and the tubes' diameter is not optimal for such a centrifuge. Many centrifuge experts believe that this design would not work as the basis of a centrifuge plant." The DOE, however, did agree with the overall assessment that Iraq had a nuclear program, citing separate evidence.

Additionally there were allegations that Iraq had attempted to import uranium, although these claims were not essential to the intelligence assessment that a nuclear program existed. In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson to investigate reports (later found to be forgeries) that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." Wilson's report did not change any analysts' assessments of a possible deal and the Bush administration alleged, most prominently in the January 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa, citing British intelligence sources. The British government has described their assessment as "well founded" because it was not based on the forgeries, but rather on reports that Iraq had "sought" rather than "purchased" uranium from Niger in 1999. However, the Niger allegations were not cited by Colin Powell in his presentation to the U.N. in February.

In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. However, it was later revealed that he had never actually seen the reports in question. After Wilson's op-ed, Wilson's wife Valerie Plame was publicly identified as an undercover CIA analyst by a columnist. This led to a Justice Department investigation into the source of the leak.

On 1 May 2005, the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002, meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". A 2004 Congressional investigation interviewed analysts and found no evidence to substantiate that analysts had been pressured in any way by the administration. "The Committee did not find any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with Administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so. When asked whether analysts were pressured in any way to alter their assessments or make their judgments conform with Administration policies on Iraq's WMD programs, not a single analyst answered "yes." Most analysts simply answered, "no" or "never," but some provided more extensive responses."

Powell, in his address to the UN Security Council just before the war, referred to the aluminum tubes, stating that while experts disagreed on whether or not the tubes were destined for a centrifuge program, the specifications of the tubes were unusually tight.

Powell presented evidence that Iraq had been sanitizing inspection sites and questioned why they would do this if they had nothing to hide. He also made of a number of presentations designed to prove Iraq had WMD programs, which were later criticized as inaccurate and based on shoddy intelligence. Powell later admitted he had presented what turned out to be an inaccurate case to the UN on Iraqi weapons, and the sourcing for the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading." The 2004 Congressional inquiry concluded that much of the information provided to Powell was "overstated, misleading, or incorrect" but that the intelligence did support his claims that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons in the event of war.

After the United States presidential election, 2008, and the election of Democratic party nominee Barack Obama, president Bush stated that "[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq".

The CIA had contacted Iraq's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was being paid by the French as an agent. Sabri informed them that Saddam had hidden poison gas among Sunni tribesmen, had ambitions for a nuclear program but that it was not active, and that no biological weapons were being produced or stockpiled, although research was underway.

Based in part on reports obtained by the German intelligence service from an Iraqi defector codenamed "Curveball," Colin Powell presented evidence to the United Nations security council that Iraq had an active biological weapons programme. The head of German intelligence at the time, August Hanning, has stated that he wrote CIA director George Tenet to warn him that Curveball's information was unreliable, and that German intelligence had failed to corroborate Curveball's statements about Iraqi weapon production. The former head of CIA operations in Europe, Tyler Drumheller, has also stated that he repeatedly warned higher-ups about Curveball's unreliability. On 15 February 2011, the defector — a scientist identified as Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janafi — admitted to journalists working for The Guardian newspaper that he lied to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in order to strengthen the case against Saddam Hussein, whom he wished to see removed from power.