Talk:Erwin Rommel/Archive 3

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Inconsistencies

In the section "The Battle of Arras", the second paragraph seems to say Rommel was directing the Allied fire at the Germans. Someone needs to fix that. Noghiri (talk) 18:58, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I didn't see how that inferred that he was firing on the Germans, but if its confusing, what do you think it should say?--Jojhutton (talk) 19:09, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I'm a bit concerned by the "a British sniper could have killed Rommel" section that was inserted in the middle of the description of D-Day fighting. The only source cited for this claim doesn't seem that reliable, there aren't any corroborating sources that I could find, and in fact the article on Operation Gaff, would seem to directly contradict many aspects of the claim. Sorry if this has already been addressed or if this isn't the proper place to discuss it. 96.240.160.221 (talk) 02:01, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

I have taken it out. Thank you, well spotted. -- Dianna (talk) 03:21, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

Erwin Rommel, John Boyd and the OODA loop

It strikes me that Rommel's thinking on combat and maneuver is similar to the ideas developed by John Boyd for fighter aircraft (Energy-Maneuverability Theory), which Boyd subsequently broadened to all combat in his OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). His influence upon the combat doctrine of the US Marine Corps is remarkable, not the least of which because Boyd was retired Air Force. The general idea that Boyd advanced was that to be successful you need to be ahead of your opponent. You are acting and the opponent is placed in the position of reacting. The psychology of warfare was a big part of what Boyd was advancing (understanding your enemy, influencing the way he thinks, his perception of the battlefield, placing the enemy under psychological pressure). The implementation of these same ideas are clearly seen in Rommel's use of force in France and North Africa. To be ahead of the enemy, arrive before he expects you to be there, where he does not expect you to be, to put him under pressure, and defeat him mentally. This is all very non-traditional, and so it is not surprising that there would be critics within the German military, or expressed by opponents that were unable to keep up with the pace of combat that he was creating. Rommel was often in a Storch and would fly forward and land near an advancing column to be close to the point of contact. This dangerous practice nearly got him captured once when he landed alongside a retreating 8th Army column, but the point was to be in a position to make decisions faster than his opponent, and keep the opponent in turmoil. This he did very successfully for a number of years. The first and second battles of El Alamian did not allow for maneuver and surprise, and so were not fought in the manner Rommel desired. Supply issues were central to the outcome of the desert campaign as well, but I do not believe Rommel was unthinking in respect to this so much as frustrated by what the allies were able to do. Ultra intercepts and increasing allied air strength played a big role in this regard. I do not believe there are any sources that tie these threads together, but if I can find some time I may try locate what might be available. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:13, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

The Rommel Papers

One of the references the article lists and cites many times is The Rommel Papers. I do believe this is a diary Rommel kept, supplemented by letters he wrote home to his wife. Rommel had thoughts of writing a book about command and his experiences after the war, but he did not survive to do so. BH Liddell-Hart took up the project, acting as editor with the assistance of Rommel's family members (wife and son) and Fritz Bayerlein, who for a time acted as Rommel's Chief of Staff in North Africa. Thus the author of The Rommel Papers is Erwin Rommel, and it should be noted as such in the reference section and in those citations refering to this work. If there are no objections, I will make the changes necessary. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:37, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

Rommel's involvement in the 20 July Plot

It's put forth in the article that, based on the writings of Hans Speidel, Rommel was aware of the plan to assassinate Hitler and wanted to instead arrest him and put him on trial. In Rommel: The End of a Legend Ralf Georg Reuth claims that Speidel's claims were fabricated in order to portray Rommel as a member of the resistance so that his image could be used as a role model for the newly-formed Bundeswehr. Reuth claims that Rommel remained loyal to Hitler and the extent of his involvement in the resistance was that he wanted to negotiate a peace in the West so that Germany could more effectively fight against Russia, which Rommel had made known to Hitler several times after the Allied invasion of Normandy. Elpolloverde (talk) 07:27, 19 February 2013 (UTC)

Josef Goebbels made every effort to protray Rommel as a loyal Nazi, which he clearly was not. He had had multiple interactions with Hitler and was not afraid to challenge him or confront him, which in Nazi Germany took a great deal of courage to do. It is difficult to know the truth of the members of a secret society plotting to kill the ruthless tyrant of a police state, especially when some five thousand people were tortured and executed following that attempt. That there was unrest in Germany and that people looked to Rommel as a possible leader in a post Hitler Germany is well established. He would receive a great deal of mail from common citizens "bearing witness to their trust in the Field Marshall as their potential savior." (Wheeler-Bennet, The Nemisis of Power, p. 607) Lewin in "Rommel as Military Commander" states "In a closed circle he was prepared to say things like 'Hitler's orders are nonsense. The man must be mad.' or "Every day is costing lives unnecessarily. We must make peace at once." but in all his thinking about Hitler and what was happening to Germany he never - publically or privately - went beyond the notion that Hitler should be arrested by the army and brought to trial. He was obsessed with the idea that if only the Germans could have the truth about Hitler revealed to them they would understand and reject him." (pp. 231-232) After the attempt was made he complained bitterly to Hitler over the arrest of his chief of staff, the aforementioned Hans Speidel. Strangely enough, though Speidel was a member of the plot, he survived the event, whereas Rommel, whose involvement was peripheral, did not. It is going to be challenging to try to represent the events accurately and honestly, and source them all reliably. Gunbirddriver (talk) 20:23, 19 February 2013 (UTC)

Very informative; you're a lot more knowledgeable on this than I am. I know it's difficult to relate history with complete accuracy, but I figured I would point out something I noticed just in case it had been overlooked. Elpolloverde (talk) 03:08, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

Oh, well, I've just been trying to improve the article, adding detail when possible, clarifying, adding images. Everything you said above was true, as far as I can tell. Speidel certainly was instrumental in involving Rommel, speaking to him about the need to preserve Germany, bringing him into contact with members of the plot. Those involved wanted Rommel to play a part of the post-Hitler Germany, but as far as I have been able to find Rommel had no idea they were planning on leaving a bomb in Hitler's bunker. Rommel's loyalties were with Germany. He was never a Nazi, or a sycophantic follower of Adolf Hitler. Speidel clearly lied and got away with it to the Gestapo (that's not easy to do). Did he point the finger at Rommel? Did he give them the prize they were looking for? He ended up Supreme Commander of NATO Forces Central Europe, Germany. Did he after the war expand Rommel's involvement, to deflect attention from himself? It's hard to know. If you can improve what we have and feel confident in the source, go for it. Gunbirddriver (talk) 05:47, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

Gen. Spiedel was a loyal friend to Rommel. He and Rommel discussed the need to end Hitler's leadership but Rommel was opposed to murdering him. A Patriotic German, Rommel knew the war was lost and had seen the damage being done to his country, which was all the more horrific to him. His son, in a flak battery, was now in the line of fire in the pointless struggle. Spiedel did not want to press Rommel too hard because he was focusing on the mess of the Atlantic Wall and after D-Day trying to contain it with limited resources and Hitler's idiotic orders. (I witnessed this conversation between Gen. Spiedel and my father in 1957 at Kelly Barracks, SE of Stuttgart) Hesweeney (talk) 06:23, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Reports of such conversations should be recorded somewhere and I am glad to hear of them, but (unfortunately, I believe, in this case) we can't use it directly here as it amounts to a WP:Primary Source and some WP:Original Research is required to incorporate the details into the bigger picture. I am not questioning your honesty, but the problem is if someone did, there wouldn't be anything to back you up. Hopefully there is something more "on the record" about this? --John (User:Jwy/talk) 15:46, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Yes, well, there seems to be a large degree of agreement, with multiple supporting sources on the rough details of what happened and why. Ralf Georg Reuth's claims in Rommel: The End of a Legend that Rommel was "loyal to Hitler" are not supported. What happened between Spiedel and the Gestopo, and how did he escape them is not known. Speidel has an explanation, and it may very well be the truth. Spiedel was a loyal friend of Rommel's, but he was the conduit that allowed the conspirators to contact Rommel, and when the attempt failed, an attempt that Rommel does not appear to have been aware of, it ended up resulting in Rommel's death. I know that a movie was made that alleged Speidel was responsible, and that Speidel sued for libel and won his case, but how it all goes together I do not believe we can actually know for certain.Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:28, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

The British government just recently released tapes from the wiretapped cells of German generals who were captured in France talking to each other. The National Geographic Channel did a special on it as part of their Nazi Underground series. These tapes show Rommel was telling other generals that Hitler and his associates needed to be killed for Germany's survival.

Here is a short You Tube clip I made of the special showing that the British knew a month before Rommel died that he wanted and was openly building support for the other throw and death of Hitler and the Nazi leadership.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9SFwVMlMIc

and a photo below from later in the hour long program.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/IMG_0791.jpg

I looked in the news achieves and the BBC in early 1945 announced that Rommel was one of the July Plotters and planned to attempt to negotiate an armistice with the allies once Hitler was dead.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/23da.png

Rommel's relationship with the July plotters is often poorly understood. But, to simplify it the July Plotters had to be the ones to kill Hitler and Rommel was the only one who the Western Allied generals might be willing to sit down with and negotiate a decent surrender that ends the war early with the Western Allies occupying all of Western Europe before the Soviets and prevents the worst months of the Final Solution. But, the rank and file of the German Army in the West would only follow Rommel's orders to surrender if both Hitler was dead and they didn't think Rommel killed him.

As for Rommel's Chief of Staff Hans Speidel according to Manfred Rommel's transcribed and signed document he did for the English a few days before Hitler killed himself. Rommel was told that his Chief of Staff Speidel had informed the SS that he was part of the July 20th plot and he was only prevented from taking a bigger role by his injuries. He wasn't the only one according to Manfred.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/manfred1_zps815655bf.jpg http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/manfred2_zps9ad82332.jpg

Given the amount of information the SS had on Speidel and the skullduggery he was up to against the regime and the fact he wasn't executed leaves little doubt in my mind that Speidel did talk to save himself and potentially his family as well which the SS had the legal right to send to a concentration camp. I don't hold it too much against him as the vast majority of men would in his situation. I don't think Rommel would have, but the reason we talk about Rommel to this day is in large part because he was a unique military commander who viewed his sense of honor and protecting his country above his own life. His family life was the hard thing for Rommel in my view as he had a large family he loved very much and how does one weigh their survival against doing what you know is treason, but think is right for your country?

Anyway I have some interesting quotes from different books over years if anyone is interested in using them.

Rommel's stance on the SS's massacre of civilians in France.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/desk.png

From the book to the side page 241 http://books.google.com/books?id=0TrWrxxDkf8C&pg=PA241&dq=Rommel+the+massacre+of+oradour&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ohovUeXBLZKe8QS5k4DgDQ&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Rommel&f=false

Rommel told Guderian he opposed the attack on Kursk and supported a defensive strategy from the book the Devil's Virtuosos by David Downing p 177. http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/g3.png

Rommel disobeying OKWs orders to kill the Jews of the Jewish battalion captured by his forces. Rommel's Desert Commanders: The Men Who Served the Desert Fox, North Africa By Samuel W. Mitcham p 73.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/jews2.jpg

or a direct link to the book page. http://books.google.com/books?id=MN6ZMOdrcKcC&pg=PA73&dq=Hecker+Rommel+Jewish&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ax0vUdKmHJDQ9ASz9oHoBw&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Hecker%20Rommel%20Jewish&f=false

Finally Rommel in early 1943 at a meeting with Hitler urging him to appoint a Jewish Gauleiter.

From: Jews by George E. Berkley p 209 http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/rom1-1.jpg

http://books.google.com/books?id=BeFC9bAG2B0C&pg=PA209&dq=rommel,+jews&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hLL1UMLxBuLN0AHY_oG4Dg&sqi=2&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=rommel%2C%20jews&f=false

If anyone wants any other particular quotes about Rommel's views on a matter at any given time or his discussions with any other generals... I find his 1943 discussion with Von Manstein quite interesting if one reads between the lines of what Rommel is saying its pretty clear what he is trying to convince him of.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Amn_pandW3MC&pg=PA405&dq=von+manstein,+Rommel&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ACMvUYOyH6Tz0gGDjYC4DQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=von%20manstein%2C%20Rommel&f=false

But, I have done my research quite well and have looked up sources both old and new and have been able to come up with a pretty good grasp of what Rommel knew when about what the Nazi Party was doing in the East and how his views and his willingness to act against the regime evolved. If anyone wants help on Rommel related sources or info just ask. I hope I was helpful.

User:ech1969|ech1969]] (talk) 4:36, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

That is helpful and I look forward to going through those when time allows, but I would prefer you would refrain from deleting my comments from the Talk page discussion. I have added them back. From what you say Rommel had a larger role then previously thought, but he was fighting a war in June and July, so I am not sure how much time he could have allowed himself to plan an assassination, nor do I think he would have failed in his purpose if he had. A letter he wrote to his wife while in hospital expressed shock at hearing of the attempt to assassinate Hitler, but was this real surprise or a ruse? What happened between Speidel and the Gestapo, how is that ever to be known? Those were very dark days for all parties involved. We know that Speidel says he did not implicate Rommel, and I do not believe it can be proved otherwise. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:51, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

My personal history with this cannot be considered in any way definitive and is provided as background to the the two men's personalities. Since we will never be able to show what actually happened we get to be tantalized by this bit of history. The Allies failure to do a proper De-nazification allowed these sort of events to fall by the wayside, the history was kept close and not frequently talked of. Rommel's entire life as a soldier was honorable, nothing but a hard driving officer working toward national goals in the most thorough but decent manner.Hesweeney (talk) 23:01, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

Thanks for your comments, Hesweeney. John is right, if we cannot source something we cannot put it into the article, but it helps to hear from people who have had actual contact with the people involved, and it is appreciated. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:44, 1 March 2013 (UTC)

Sorry if I deleated anything you wrote I am new at using some of these features. One thing one its important to understand about him sending letters to his wife, he knew it would always be a party line meaning the SS will be reading them. Given the SS was sending whole families to concentration camps at that point over the July Plot if I were in his shoes I would certainly do that much at that point.

Oh and the few survivng members of the July Plot testified at the Nuremberg trials that Rommel told them to kill not just Hitler, but Goering and Himmler as well.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/1b.png

So how and why did Rommel's support for killing Hitler and the Nazi leadership all the sudden start to change a few years later to he didn't want Hitler killed, but instead put on trial or other ideas that he wasn't involved at all. It was pushed at virtually the same time the Cold War went into high gear and the WAllies decided to allow West Germany to rearm. In the early Cold War there wasn't a great deal of support for the actual attempt to kill Hitler at that time in Germany even among those who felt something needed to happen. A nice middle option NATO and West Germany promoted was that he wanted Hitler tried not killed.

At this point they were fully using Rommel as an apolitical unifying symbol to support German rearmament. And, at the time the July Plot was still very divisive among Germans so they wanted him connected to it and not fully connected to it. Thus, I think the Western Allies and West Germany went about tweaking history for Cold War reasons. That has sort of left the history of Rommel and his connection to the July Plot a bit of a mess to this day and I have found the only way to clear up the mess is go back to what was said an written before the Cold War started. The funny thing is alot of people today think his links to the July Plotters were overplayed for Cold War reasons when my studies of the primary sources show pretty much the exact opposite.

Also from what I hear there are still a ton of files on Rommel and several other german generals locked away In England and might not all be released until Churchill's 100 year cassification stamp on the documents is up. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ech1969 (talk • contribs) 03:52, 1 March 2013 (UTC)

Well then we should consider changing the lead from "was linked to the conspiracy" to "was a part of the conspiracy", and do a re-write of the section on the July 20 Plot. But let us see if we can source things well. That last clip states essentially:

Gisevius said that Rommel participated in the July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, "but it is incorrect to picture Rommel as a fighter against Hitler. It left a bad taste when this Johnny-come-lately came along with his suggestion that we kill not only Hitler, but Himmler and Goering too." And when Goering heard this testimony, he laughed broadly.

Hmmm. The quoted sentences seem to be in conflict, plus the testimony was most certainly in German, so the phrase Johnny-come-lately seems unlikely. By the way, the suggestion to kill Himmler and Goering at the same time makes sense. Those are the heads of the Nazi Party, and if the Army is to take over you've got to take all of them out. If that was Rommel's thought it was a good one. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:34, 1 March 2013 (UTC)

I still haven't seen anything that goes toward "proof" that Rommel wanted to "kill" anyone. It is hear-say and any comments by ex-nazi/Wehrmacht officers about what Rommel might have said or not begs the question of their veracity and/or CYA. Remember Rommel was a man to keep his own council. No I don't think there is any evidence Rommel was in fact part of the conspiracy other than having knowledge of it's existence. So making him "part of the conspiracy" is going too far. Beyond the obvious political leaders like Himmler and Goering, I would have thought that the entire staff of OKW were on a list for arrest, toadies like Keitel and Jodl couldn't be left out. It would have to be a huge list, you can't kill everyone!

Despite it being a "popular" biography, don't forget about Desmond Young's book. He actually TALKED to all the people involved, he held documents in his hand which is more than irving, et al could say.Hesweeney (talk) 03:53, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

Alright then. No change for now. We can look into it further as time allows. As to Young's biography, that looks to be a very good source. I have been reading Rommel As Military Commander by Ronald Lewin, and he refers to Young's biography of Rommel frequently. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:33, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

Hesweeney of course the German military sources after the war had reasons to lie, especially during the Cold War. But, its interesting how the two sources with the least reason to lie were stricken from the history books on him during the Cold War. That was of course the transcript from the Nuremberg trial (and yes the English version of the transcript was turned into Americanized words for the American readers at the time I couldn't find the words in German). But, even he had some potental reason to lie... ie the Allies put him up to it as they liked Rommel. But, General Heinrich Eberbach who was close to Rommel in France quotes on the subject are the only quotes on Rommel's view on killing Hitler in 1944 that I see zero possible reason for him to lie about as he was talking from one German general to another in a house in England that he had no idea was bugged.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9SFwVMlMIc

And, this was a month before Rommel was offically implicated by the Nazis in the July Plot and suicided. Why did these tapes take so many decades to come out? My personal view is nations as the Cold War got started decided that Rommel would be a non-political unifying symbol to support German rearmament Rommel doing more then support overthrowing and putting him on trial once the Cold War started. Is there an objective truth? Sure there is and while I view the German general in the link above talking to another German general secretly being wiretapped a month before Rommel's death the closest we may come (unless the British documents Churchill had classified for 100 years revel alot more), then really we are stuck in a loop and there will be no 'truth' just people citing different sources who say vastly different things about the subject.

Will there ever be an agreed upon objective truth that the vast majority of historians and the public agrees upon with Rommel in relation to the July 20th Plot? Not really unless as I said before deep in the British or American archives there exist further files on the subject which there may be. Its shocking it took so many decades for the audio tapes above to come out and I can dissect every source on Rommel's involvement in the July Plot for tons of reasons to lie except that one where I have nothing. Rommel was still very much alive and it was one German general known to be close to Rommel in France talking to another about what he was directly told by Rommel quite a bit before anyone knew he would be implicated and suicided for involvement in the July Plot.

For me I have looked at all the different sources and seen what their views, opinions, and statements are on each and I can tear apart the credibility of all of them even the July Plotter brought to the Nuremberg trials, but not the audio tape made at a time when it was impossible for the General in question to know Rommel would be personally implicated in the plot and he wasn't trying to push anything or any view on the public and he wasn't speaking to the public. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ech1969 (talk • contribs) 11:06, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

Grave location?

Should the picture that shows his grave add the caption of where his grave is? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Vulix14 (talk • contribs) 05:00, 16 August 2013 (UTC)

Rommel's grave is in Herrlingen as already noted in the paragraph adjacent to the picture. Mediatech492 (talk) 05:28, 16 August 2013 (UTC)

Absent on D-Day

Worth mentioning that he was absent from his post on D-Day because he'd promised to go to Paris to buy new shoes for his wife for her birthday? 86.181.153.97 (talk) 00:57, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Sounds dubious, but even if verified I doubt it is in any way essential for the article.Mediatech492 (talk) 08:27, 19 April 2012 (UTC)

He left for the purpose of meeting with Hitler in an attempt to convince him to move 12th SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division up to the Normandy coast, which he felt was imperative. From his notes: "The most urgent need was to speak personally with the Fuhrer on the Obersalzberg, convey to him the extent of the manpower and materiel inferiority we would suffer in the event of a landing, and request the dispatch of two panzer divisions, an anti-aircraft corps, and a Nebelwerfer Brigade to Normandy..." (The Rommel Papers, p. 470) Though he believed an invasion would occur at any time, he had been assured that the tides and heavy weather would preclude a landing in the next few days. As it was his wife's birthday, he planned on stopping to see her first, before attempting to get a meeting with Hitler. The proponent for the plan of early counterattack in the first 24 hours while the invaders were still on the beach, his absence was a significant aid to the Allies, and just one of many command problems the German defenders operated under. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:42, 27 September 2013 (UTC)

Missing Information

I have a biography at home which I can't remember the exact title of offhand which in the conclusion mentions that there is evidence that Rommel's intelligence at the time had cracked Allied codes and likely was a huge contributor to his military success. I think this is a major point that should be referenced, and I'd be happy to write about it and cite the book, but where should this write up be placed in the article? 98.118.97.122 (talk) 19:46, 7 March 2011 (UTC)LRobertson

This is perhaps covered in this section already:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rommel#Role_of_Signals_Intelligence_.28SIGINT.29_in_North_Africa--Nwinther (talk) 20:27, 8 March 2011 (UTC)

See Bonner Fellers in wikipedia. I THINK THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO EXPLAIN ROMMEL'S SUCCESS IN THE NORTH AFRICA CAMPAIGN. SUCH INFO GIVES THE PLANNER THE HUGE ADVANTAGE OF BEING ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ALL HIS FORCES AT THE ENEMY'S WEAKEST POINT, LEAVING NONE IN RESERVE OR FOR FLANK PROTECTION, ETC. Churchill withheld the info until something like 25 yrs after WWII. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.150.215.88 (talk) 16:39, 1 October 2013 (UTC)

The statement about intervening on behalf of a Polish priest is unclear (contained in the "Poland 1939" section). It says that the Gestapo had no knowledge of the man. This is left hanging. Does this mean he was released, since he did not "exist" in the Gestapo's eyes, or does it mean the priest had already been killed. Being asked to intervene is hardly a unique perspective on Rommel that would merit inclusion in an encyclopedia, but if he had been successful it might offer insight into his nature. 65.32.49.77 (talk) 17:24, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

Recent edit additions

These edits had a number of problems, including being placed inside a citation that does not support them, lacking neutral pov and being of questionable encyclopedic value to the article. When adding information you need to be careful that the addition is not placed before the citation in the text, as it would appear that the citation listed supports the addition when in fact it does not. New information should have its own citations that support the addition. Lastly, an editorial decision needs to be made as to whether or not the addition helps the article. More is not necessarily better, even if it were true and could be citated. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:03, 19 November 2013 (UTC)

This Bio

Although some editing has been done to this bio, it's sources still include a totally discredited work by D. Irving. Any use of this source, either by direct attribution or as a source of quotes is a FUNDAMENTAL flaw that cannot be overcome. Also the general tenor appears positive but a careful examination shows a bias against the subject which goes beyond the sourcing failures and misuse of sources. ie. Repeated negative commentary on Rommel's command style flies in the face of success and that it became the norm for accomplished panzer leaders be "at the front" after the 1940 French Campaign. Criticism from Halder, von Rundstedt and especially Guderian could only be charitably considered as being in the category of professional "sour grapes". The onerous task of using the lame editing mechanisms of Wikipedia discourage both the layman and serious historian and until that is changed it's unlikely anyone will want to take on the task of fixing this mess of a bio. Hesweeney (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 10:38, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

Is there expert opinion you could cite that would support removal of the work by Irving? Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:25, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

Well, to answer my own question, there is this on David Irving from the Wiki page on him:

Irving's reputation as an historian was widely discredited after he brought an unsuccessful libel case against the American historian Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books.[4] The English court found that Irving was an active Holocaust denier, antisemite, and racist, who "associates with right-wing extremists who promote neo-Nazism",[5] and that he had "for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence".

Alright, I would recommend we remove him as a source from the article. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:23, 31 January 2013 (UTC)

I'm with you on that. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 03:07, 1 February 2013 (UTC)

David Irving's The Trail of the Fox has been removed as a source from the Bibliography. If there are additional comments about this please make them here. We will still need to go through and take down those statements in the article that were supported by Irving's work if no other source can be found to support them. That's a big job. I am beginning to look at sourcing materials to see what is available. Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:36, 9 February 2013 (UTC)

Since I was the main complainer I will try to help find sources. I do have a personal source in Germany (former aide to Gen. Spiedel) that I will try to get on board but he is quite old and not well. Hesweeney (talk) 06:08, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

I do believe that the sentence appearing after citation marker 36 is not only incorrect but a complete opposite of what is true, also it may have been derived from the work of D. Irving who appears to be the citation at no 36. 'With Rommel's campaign in North Africa to view in retrospect, Hoth's reservations can be seen as unfounded.' There is little doubt that Rommel was an excellent tactician, but his campaign in Africa proved that he had plenty of strategic failings.141.138.54.228 (talk) 20:42, 16 January 2014 (UTC)

Photo correction

Under 'Summer Standoff' referring to events of 1942, is in fact a photo from 1941 showing Rommel with Wilhelm Bach (centre in white shirt), the defender of the Halfaya Pass garrison (which fell in January 1942 after Rommel's retreat in November 1941), and his then-ADC Heinz Werner Schmidt who used this photo to illustrate his post-war memoir, 'With Rommel In The Desert'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.101.71.153 (talk) 21:43, 22 January 2014 (UTC)

Photo correction

The photo used in subheading Summer Standoff detailing events of 1942, File:Rommel at a staff conference in the Western Desert.jpg, is in fact from 1941 and shows Rommel (L) with Wilhelm Bach (Centre in white shirt) with Rommel's then-ADC Heinz Werner Schmidt (R, mapcase under arm). Bach was caprtured with the surrender of the Halfaya Pass garrison in January 1942, left stranded by Rommel's retreat in November 1941 following Operation Crusader. Schmidt used the photo as an illustration for his book, 'With Rommel In The Desert'. 77.101.71.153 (talk) 21:47, 22 January 2014 (UTC)

Member of the NSDAP?

The last paragraph of the 'Career between the world wars' section says that Rommel was never a party member. However, the statement doesn't appear to be referenced and I can't, in my admittedly brief look, find a reputable source. Is there one? For the avoidance of doubt, I'm not trying to make a point or provoke a debate. It's simply a question about a reference for a factual statement. Dalliance (talk) 22:47, 28 November 2013 (UTC)

He was never a member of any political party that I am aware. Lewin states unequivocally that he was not a member of the Nazi party, and I have provided the citation. I also took the liberty of removing his name from the wiki list of Nazi Party members. I was surprised that he would have been found there, as his interests were in soldiering and Germany, not party politics, and his views and actions repeatedly placed him at odds with Nazi party officials. He exposed himself to significant risks on multiple occasions. In 1942 he concluded that the war could not be won for Germany, and on multiple occasions he endeavored to present the facts that would make that case clear to Hitler in the belief that he would draw the only conclusion possible and attempt to sue for terms to stop the conflict. Clearly he did not understand Hitler's mind on these matters. Politically naive is the term used in conjunction with Rommel by both Lewin and Liddell-Hart. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:52, 29 November 2013 (UTC)

Yes, I came here via that list for the same reasons you removed his entry. Thanks for adding the reference. Dalliance (talk) 08:43, 29 November 2013 (UTC)

Allied to this question is that of contemporary perception of Rommel's association with the Nazis. The London Times published an obituary (which may have been written with the aim of maintaining public morale against Germany) that, as far as I recall, stated Rommel was allied to the rise of the Nazi party and that he put down a demonstration (or was it a strike?) in Coburg in the early 1930s. At the time of publication, it was not known to the British public or government that Rommel had committed suicide under pressure from the regime, nor was he then publicly associated with the 20 July plot that had recently occurred. A look at the obituary may provide material for the Assessment section.Cloptonson (talk) 21:11, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

Neutrality dispute

I have found a lot of non-neutral language regarding the article subject, and after a cursory skim I've removed or edited statements like "Rommel possessed tremendous energy and drive," "Rommel was clearly the possessor of a great deal of physical courage" and "Rommel was manifestly a soldier's general." The article itself should be written in a dispassionate tone, and avoid stating opinions as fact. Non-neutral statements should be attributed to the appropriate sources instead of being made in Wikipedia's voice. Breadblade (talk) 20:35, 14 May 2014 (UTC)

Rommel clearly did possess "tremendous energy and drive", and there is a lot of evidence that he was a "soldier's general", if by that it is meant that he inspired admiration and loyalty in other soldiers. Of course uncited statements may be removed, but much of what you removed was clearly cited, for example the physical courage" comment, which is clearly supported by the citation [1]. You are also misrepresenting what is meant by non-neutral language. There is no policy which says the article should not include evaluate material, including assessments of such matters as skill, courage or whatever else may be relevant. Indeed we should have content. We are not just listing facts. In any case the distinction between a fact and an evaluation is never clear or straightforward - you seem to be wanting to remove what you consider to be positive comments, even though some of the (like his energy) have no moral dimension (Hitler had energy and drive too). Paul B (talk) 20:27, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

I am saying that such details should be attributed appropriately as per WP:SUBSTANTIATE, by making factual statements about these opinions. A phrase like "Rommel's leadership skills have been praised by military historians such as ___ and ___" is written from a neutral point of view, but "Rommel was a strong and effect leader" is not. Breadblade (talk) 21:30, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

I agree with Paul B: there is nothing wrong with evaluating the subject and presenting judgements which are properly cited and uncontroversial. If there were cited contrary opinions, saying that Rommel was a lazy coward, for instance, then WP:NPOV would be engaged. The tone used should be encyclopaedic, however, and of the words Breadblade objected to, i think "soldier's general" deserves looking at as more laudatory than descriptive. Cyclopaedic (talk) 08:37, 17 May 2014 (UTC)

The article should have a dispassionate voice, certainly. Some of the apparent problems are statements that are broadly commented on by military historians and are also found in the commentarys of those he commanded. For instance, Rommel's physical courage is mentioned by Young (p.116) and Lewin (p. 242). Said Hoffman: "Rommel earned his reputation by the bravura nature of his fighting." (p. 119) In Liddell Hart's "The German Generals Talk" Runstedt is quoted commenting on Rommel, saying: Quote: "He was a brave man, and a very capable commander..."(p. 234)

Others that had direct knowledge of Rommel in the war include von Mellenthin and von Luck. In their case they remark on the impression Rommel's physical courage had on his men, and they are speaking as those very men he commanded. Said von Luck on the Meuse crossing: Quote: "Rommel was slightly wounded but hurried forward on foot - in the midst of enemy fire. 'Is Rommel immune?' we asked ourselves. It made a strong impression on all the officers and men; his courage spurned us on." (p.38) Said von Mellenthin: Quote: "What I admired most were his courage and resourcefulness."(p.48) Thus, it would seem to me inappropriate for wikipedia to make a statement such as "Rommel has been praised by military historians such as ___ and ___ as being the possessor of a great deal of physical courage" as the qualifier is too limiting and argues against the record.

Nevertheless, the article is improved if we go through and cite things better, and endeavor to present a neutral voice. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:49, 18 May 2014 (UTC)

Agreed, my "military historians" example wasn't great considering that there is so much commentary from his contemporaries to draw from. I don't doubt the veracity of these accounts at all, but it would do a lot to fix the POV issues to move from statements like "Rommel was clearly brave [relevant citation]" to "Accounts from soldiers under his command made note of his bravery under fire. [relevant citation]" Breadblade (talk) 14:46, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

Sounds good. Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:31, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

Sometimes an overly "neutral" voice guts the reality of a subject. Clearly Rommel was well beyond the ordinary officer on either side in both World Wars and this Bio should reflect that amalgam of skill, bravery, dash, commonsense and "leadership." Removing comments by his contemporaries that have citations is wrong.

Hesweeney (talk) 19:35, 19 August 2014 (UTC)

ideology/humanitarianism

"During Rommel's time in France, Hitler ordered him to deport the country's Jewish population; Rommel disobeyed. Several times he wrote letters protesting against the treatment of the Jews."

I can't believe that this is the sum total of the available knowledge in this area. I think it needs expanding, certainly with citations, but in any case it goes directly to what motivated him, & we're left with a chasm in our understanding of the man if this area is not properly dealt with.

duncanrmi (talk) 10:39, 14 October 2014 (UTC)

Rommel killed on Bormann's orders?

In "With Hitler to the End: The Memoir of Hitler's Valet" Heinz Linge (Hitler's valet) claims that Rommel was killed on orders from Bormann because of a personal grudge the latter held towards Rommel from an incident in 1939 in Poland (Rommel, as head of Hitler's security detail, had refused to allow Bormann to accompany Hitler at one point), and that Hitler had made inquiries about having Rommel's body exhumed and an autopsy performed (because Hitler didn't believe the version of Rommel's death Bormann told him). Historian932 (talk) 15:55, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

Did all of this come from the one source? Thanks! Hesweeney (talk) 04:12, 27 September 2013 (UTC)

I work with a man who said that Rommel was his great-grandfather and that Rommel changed his and his family name first to Wagner and then later to (?) and came to the USA. This man looks exactly like his great-grandfather Rommel. Could this be true? I'll gather more info. 99.110.70.82 (talk) 23:07, 9 January 2015 (UTC) 1/9/2015

Sounds unlikely. His son did NOT change his name and (as the article says) did not disappear from Germany - he was long-time mayor of Stuttgart. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 03:01, 10 January 2015 (UTC)

88 Flak Gun

"This was the first time the 88 mm Flak gun was used in an anti-tank role.[33]"

I thought the properties of this gun became evident in the Spanish Revolution? Jokem (talk) 18:11, 30 November 2013 (UTC)

Could be. The wiki page on the 88 indicates so, but the statement there is not supported with a reference. Lewin is the author in the cite quoted above, and he could be in error here. If you could find a citation supporting that the first use of the 88 in an anti-tank role was in Spain then we could support the statement made on the 88 page and it would justify our removing the citated statement here. Thanks. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:12, 30 November 2013 (UTC)

There's no citation on the 88 page for the statement it was used in a ground combat role.

Hesweeney (talk) 01:39, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

I think Guderian said the 88 was discovered in Spain to be a great AT gun in Panzer Leader. Good luck finding that as my copy of the book is buried somewhere. Maybe someone else is vigorous enough to research? Jokem (talk) 09:28, 26 January 2015 (UTC)

I found this

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/88mm-flak-series-flugabwehrkanone.htm

German 88mm gun is probably the best known artillery piece of World War II. First time 88mm saw combat was in Spain during the Civil War in 1936, where it proved itself to be not only excellent anti-aircraft gun but also ideal tank killer due to its high muzzle velocity and efficient heavy projectile. Jokem (talk) 08:19, 31 January 2015 (UTC)

Yes. The information appears good, but I am not sure the source qualifies for wikipedia. Is the source getting its information from wikipedia, or does it have it's own sources, and if so what are they? I believe we are still looking for our reliable source. Gunbirddriver (talk) 06:25, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I know I read this somewhere stated by people with military 'gravitas', maybe it is Von Mellenthin's book. I will try to dig it up, but I am not sure how to cite a reference here that is not electronic media. Also, a statement by someone with Von Mellenthin's credentials would have enough weight to merit a citation here, right? Jokem (talk) 13:08, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I'm not sure it would. His book is a memoir of his experiences as an officer in the German army, so it is valid for his experience but less so for details on equipment used, when and how. I will see if I can find something. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:24, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I found the book, it starts with the Polish campaign, so that is a loss. If there is a German Officer memoir stating it was discovered to be useful in Spain, that would at least show it was noted as an effective AT gun at that point (but maybe not the first time). If you find something, OK. Jokem (talk) 00:37, 3 February 2015 (UTC)

Here is a US Military Intelligence Report from 1943: US Military Intelligence Report: German Anti-Aircraft Artillery; February 8th 1943 (page 37)

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 88-mm Dual-Purpose Gun

(1) Development

The German 8.8-cm gun was introduced in 1934 as the standard mobile AA gun. It was then known as the 8.8-cm Flak 18. In 1936, during the Spanish War, it proved a very effective weapon against tanks, which were at that time relatively lightly armored. In order to develop still further this dual-purpose employment, the Germans produced armor-piercing ammunition for the weapon, a telescopic sight suitable for the engagement of ground targets, and a more mobile carriage; an HE shell with a percussion fuse was also produced so that the weapon could, when necessary, be employed in a field-artillery role.

Gunbirddriver (talk) 09:14, 3 February 2015 (UTC)

Early life and career

Manfred Rommel

Details about the late life of son Manfred being well outside the scope of Erwin Rommel's "Early Life", I moved that text into a parenthetical paragraph at the end of this section. As this information is already provided, and more relevant, on Manfred's own Wikipedia page, I suggest that it simply be deleted from here.

Zulu Kane (talk) 00:37, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

North Africa Campaign - Rommel's last meeting with Hitler - ambiguity

The article states that:

On 9 March he returned to Germany in an effort to get Hitler to comprehend the reality of the changing situation.

It is not clear to me as a "naive reader" whether Rommel was once again trying to inform Hitler that an overall victory was impossible, or was there to argue for evacuation of the remaining German (and Italian) forces, or to try to get significant reiforcement. I suspect it is for one of the first two options, or something like them, but to someone who is unfamiliar with the North Afrrica campaign or WWII, it is not clear what is meant by "the reality of the changing situation" other than Rommel was loosing battles and in retreat. Ileanadu (talk) 00:55, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

The position was untenable, and Rommel knew it. Since his victory at the Battle of Gazala the Afrika Korps had been deprived of supplies, outnumbered, constantly harrassed from the air, and had lost the mobility and strength to contend with the British, let alone the Americans now advancing from French Morroco toward Tunisia. Rommel thought the best thing to do was extract as much of the Afrika Korps as possible, thereby saving experienced personnel for the next battle, which would be for the South of France or perhaps Italy. The idea of just letting them all be lost there seemed inconceivable to him, and he thought that Hitler would realize this if Hitler could be separated from the sway of the officers advising him from the security of the Wolf's Lair, who were not fighting the war at the front and did not understand what was happening. In truth it was Hitler that thought the Afrika Korps should fight and die where it was, and who could not understand the advantages of preserving the strength to fight another day. Hitler had the same attitude to his forces threatened with encirclement and destruction in the East, and later in Northern France. Rommel felt it was his duty as a soldier to tell Hitler the bald truth of the situation. To his surprise and disgust Hitler was completely unwilling to listen to him, and shouted that it was cowardice speaking, and defeatism. The OKW felt that they could tie up significant Allied resources in a prolonged operation against the Axis defenders in Tunisia, which is what Hitler intended. The course of events proved that the forces there could not be supplied, could not maneuver and could do nothing but surrender, which the survivors ultimately did, as Rommel well knew would be their only option. Gunbirddriver (talk) 22:53, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

The Myth of Rommel - a reevaluation may be in order?

I think it's about time we dented the "myth" of the great Rommel, a myth largely created by his adversaries, the British themselves in order that they wouldn't have to own up to defeats by the Italians. I know how deeply entrenched the Myth of Rommel is in the historiography of the North African campaign and the popular psyche, but we do a disservice to our readers if some aspects of the great "Rommel Myth" remains unchallenged. I'd like to cite Dr Sadkovich and a couple of others, who have a somewhat divergent view of the man and his abilities as a commander. 86.26.26.107 (talk) 20:23, 29 June 2015 (UTC)

People have been critical of Rommel since the 1930s. He was a very energetic, aggressive, insightful commander who fought on the wrong side of the war. The Italian command disapproved of him, his subordinates at times disapproved of him, the German General Staff disapproved of him. I believe it is already in the article. And yet he is taught today at the Army`s Command and General Staff College in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, among others. Things can be added, of course, but wikipedia would want the additions to be useful in gaining an insight into the subject. Gunbirddriver (talk) 02:31, 30 June 2015 (UTC)

The Glider Didn't Fly?

"Rommel, Patton, Montgomery", by Terry Brighton, contradicts the statement that "At the age of 14, Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider and were able to fly it short distances", saying the glider never flew, but young Rommel embellished the story and a reference to the embellished story was found later and made it into several biographies. That's all I've found on it so far, no verification for sure either way. Statalyzer (talk) 22:12, 8 July 2015 (UTC)

The source you cite affirms that Rommel and his friend Kietel built the glider when Rommel was age 14. It states Rommel told people that it flew for short distances. It asserts that Rommel had "no way to get it off the ground", but does not provide any evidence as to why that would be so. It states that Rommel's later biographers, who never spoke directly with Rommel, believed that Rommel had flown the glider. The source does not say directly that Rommel didn't fly the glider. It says he did not have a way to get it airborne. One would think if Rommel had the wherewithal to build a glider at age 14 he could figure out a way to get a little air under its wings (roll it down a hill, have it towed by a car, etc). Rommel did not posses a pilots licence, and yet he was an amateur pilot who flew his own Stork. He tended to be forthright, and he tended to succeed with what he put his mind to. With multple biographers stating Rommel did in fact fly the glider (Lewin for one is cited after the following sentence) and without clear evidence to the contrary I believe we should leave it as it is for now. Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:48, 8 July 2015 (UTC)

Rommel's view of the SS

Rommel had very strong views on correct behavior on the part of soldiers in war. Among these were sparing the lives of men when possible, both his and the enemies, and the decent treatment of prisoners taken in combat. He felt both sides should abide by a soldier's code. He could appreciate the willingness of the SS to fight stubbornly, but felt they accepted casualties too readily. More importantly, he was aware that they often shot captured soldiers and did other acts to civilians that infuriated Rommel. He believed such actions were vile and far from the professional actions that he believed was the tradition of German arms. An example of his belief in a German soldier following a soldier's code was his burning of Hitler's "Commando Order", which he felt was against the laws of war. This type of action very well could have resulted in his being court-martialed, or shot. It was a chance he took, and he might not have escaped punishment for disregarding it if his command had not been away in Africa. The clearest example of his willingness to challenge the SS was his protest of the 2nd SS Panzer division Das Reich, which in an act of retribution had massacred the citizens of the French town of Oradour-sur-Glane. At his meeting with Hitler at Margival 17 June 1944 Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division. Wehrmacht officers did not have authority over SS units, and asking to be allowed to punish the SS was a dangerous action for him to take. Hitler told Rommel the actions of Das Reich were none of his business, but Hitler took no further action against him.(Lewin p=225) Rommel's refusal to allow his son to join the SS was over his fear that Manfred would be forced to partake in atrocities, and he did not want his son placed in a position where refusing to do so would cost him his life, as the reference and quote provided indicate. Gunbirddriver (talk) 00:08, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

I will watch for more content on this as I work my way through the sources. (not all books are well indexed) -- Diannaa (talk) 02:26, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Very good. I will be interested in what you might find. As a German general who had a personal relationship with Hitler, many assume he was a Nazi, but this was not the case. However, what survives of his writings is unlikely to state clearly and unequivocally what he thought of the SS. Germany had become a police state, and though politically naïve he was not an imperceptive man. Though a capable and prolific writer, large sections of his writings he destroyed, such as those that recorded the events around the Battles of El Alamein. Here he had been critical of the German leadership, and he later perceived that what he had wrote down was a risk to himself and his family, so he destroyed them. In "The Rommel Papers" these sections are filled in by Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's Chief of Staff at the time. Still, his conflict with the Hitler Youth leadership, his row with Goebbels and "Das Reich" over the phony history the propaganda ministry wrote of him portraying him as a Nazi poster-child published in the newspaper "Das Reich", his well known standards of behavior he imposed upon the Afrika Korps in contrast to the well known actions of the SS, his willingness to punish 2nd SS Panzer and most significantly his curt refusal to allow Manfred to join the Waffen-SS I believe allow us to know his mind on the matter. I will look around a bit more as well. Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:11, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Rommel did not seem to want to spare lives when attacking Tobruk. A TV documentary states that he scolded an officer for not continuing attacking after losing half the force (officer replied "over my dead body"). That documentary also shows Manfred saying that Erwin opposed Hitler due to Nazi concentration camps (knowledge from Strölin), but I could not find sources for that. TGCP (talk) 15:36, 2 November 2015 (UTC)

Role of intelligence intercepts in North Africa

I copied the erased content to Role of intelligence intercepts in North Africa, as it seems quite notable as an element in Rommel's success. TGCP (talk) 15:36, 2 November 2015 (UTC) deleting; text is better at North_African_Campaign#Axis TGCP (talk) 15:49, 2 November 2015 (UTC)

Primary sources

Books by Friedrich von Mellenthin, von Luck and Rommel himself are being used extensively in the article. These are WP:Primary sources and should be used with caution. Further, Mellenthin's works have been described as "uncritical studies" by the historian Wolfram Wette. The historians Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies classify Luck's and Mellenthin's works belonging to the "exculpatory memoir" genre in The Myth of the Eastern Front (see in the Google preview). I've found them potentially unreliable for the following statements:

• Once the bridge was functional, [Rommel] was in the second tank across.

  Across early, certainly. The point is forward control of the attacking force. A number of secondary sources do state this. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• [Rommel] was not open to objections to his plans, and he did not tolerate incompetence. -- This is cited to Rommel himself?

• General Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's chief of staff through much of the campaign, noted that risks taken were made only after carefully weighing the potential dangers and rewards. -- Also cited to Rommel. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  The citation is not formated correctly. I believe it is from a note made by Liddell Hart who edited the work. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• Aggressive subordinate commanders, such as Hans von Luck, praised his leadership from the front. -- Luck describes himself as "aggressive commander", besides heaping praise on Rommel.

• The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes; indeed, during the desert campaign, interactions between German and British troops encountering each other between battles were sometimes openly friendly. -- "openly friendly" is dubious, unless can be confirmed by reliable secondary sources. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  I believe that is Young's statement. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• The German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks remaining,

• Although [the British] were almost as exhausted and disorganised as Rommel's force, -- how would Mellenthin know that the British were disorganized? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  How would anyone know? In his book he cites a number of works on the battles of North Africa written by British officers. He also lived in South Africa after the war, and personally knew a number of Eighth Army veterans from South Africa. The fact that Eighth Army was badly disorganized following the Gazala battles is widely acknowledged (Jackson, Playfair), if that is what this comment is referring to.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• [Rommel] strongly argued that the Panzerarmee should advance into Egypt and drive on Alexandria and the Suez. -- Can this be independently confirmed? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  Yes.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• When asked what he thought of James Mason's portrayal in the film The Desert Fox, von Mellenthin smiled before replying "Altogether too polite". Here, Mellenthin is reporting on himself. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  He is commenting on his impression of Rommel, and contrasting it with the manner in which James Mason portrayed him.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• Friedrich von Mellenthin, who was a key aide on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that Rommel was willing to take chances, sometimes gambling an entire battle on a decision made at the point of contact. Rommel first displayed this type of initiative during the First World War as a junior officer in Belgium and later in the mountains of northern Italy. There he found a sudden, bold, decisive move could reap large dividends. This was reinforced by Rommel's experiences at the head of the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France in 1940, where it was clear that his presence at the forefront of the battle was instrumental in creating successful outcomes. But at times in North Africa his absence from a position of communication made command of the battles of the Afrika Korps very difficult. Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader is one such instance. -- The discussion should include a few "According to Mellenthin,..." throughout the para to make clear that this is Mellenthin's opinion, rather than a statement of fact. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  Agree.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• Long absences from contact with headquarters meant that at times subordinate commanders had to make decisions without first consulting Rommel. Even when Rommel was present at headquarters, his impatient personality made it difficult for his subordinates—and sometimes his superiors—to work with him. -- Should be presented as Mellenthin's opinion.K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  Agree.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

References

Any thoughts on this? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

I am answering off the top of my head, but these things can be looked into and fixed. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

It appears there are no objections, so I will proceed with the edit where applicable this weekend. Per WP:MILMOS, it's recommended that articles on military history be cited to secondary WP:RS sources by reputable historians. Rommel, Mellenthin and Luck fail the test. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:35, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Primary sources can and are used, they are just not preferred. Secondary sources are subject to bias as well, as I pointed out elsewhere. Butler is fine, but there are a number of factual errors in his work (for example, he mistakes the Mareth position, which Rommel did not want to defend, with the Gabes position, which he did). Still can be useful though. We'll get it right. It's a process. I am happy to work on it with you.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

I have been working my way slowly through the article replacing the citations and updating the content using the new book by Butler along with a couple of other books, and intend to get more done on the long weekend (February 12 to 15). I got to El Alamein, will be resuming somewhere around "End of Africa campaign". I agree totally that primary sources should be used sparingly if at all. Your proposed edits look good, no objections from me. — Diannaa (talk) 20:23, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Excellent, thank you both. I was not aware that Diannaa was working on a rewrite -- this is good to hear. It will be welcome. I went ahead and did my edits, so any improvements / revisions to that are welcome. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:35, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Wüstenfuchs

Rommel was never known in English speaking countries as the "Wüstenfuchs", so there's zero point in including it in an article written for English speaking people. Desert Fox, yes. It would be different, of course, if we had a section in this article dedicated to Rommel's reputation in his own country. In that case, it would be appropriate to note that they called him the Wüstenfuchs at home. The bottom line is - readers are here for information about Rommel and not for a lesson in German vocabulary. Rklawton (talk) 01:31, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I have removed it. — Diannaa (talk) 06:09, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

potential bias

This article seems to be weighted to show Rommel in a positive light. Potential rewrite? 76.169.132.142 (talk) 21:17, 18 July 2011 (UTC)dom

Not sure a "rewrite" is necessary, but I would encourage changes supported by reliable sources and challenges (perhaps by tagging the article phrases with {{fact}}) where you believe the information is incorrect/unduly "positive." --John (User:Jwy/talk) 21:41, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

A re-write isn't necessary, but there are some mainstream historians which do not portray Rommel in as positive a light as depicted here (Antony Beevor, for example). 069952497a (U-T-C-E) 22:01, 15 September 2013 (UTC)

It does seem to portray Rommel in a positive light - especially if you come into the article thinking he deserves a negative portrayal, because he's a Nazi and thus "one of the bad guys." Agree with John, attack specific innaccuracies or over-the-top glorifications, but there's no call for a re-write. Most of this article just tells it how it is (or was). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.177.14.151 (talk) 21:11, 24 August 2011 (UTC)

    Not a Nazi, according to this article: While Rommel developed an admiration for Hitler, he never joined the Nazi Party. Moioci (talk) 06:45, 12 February 2016 (UTC)

Bengasi

User Kirrages edited the phrase "Rommel won many battles in Africa in 1941 and 1942 against British forces that always outnumbered him and generally had better supply lines" by deleting the "better supply line" part. I beg to respectfully disagree with Kirrages comment "Not true. For most of the time he had had Benghazi and a short sea route to Italy. 8th Army had a line to Cairo and then a sea route to either India or round the African cape to UK or US - much longer. ". Besides the fact that the original text didn't contain any statement about the *lenght* of the supply lines, but about their quality ("better", not "shorter"), Bengasi was not-operational for most of the time during the campaign, and even when it was it couldn't usually handle more than two ships (hand-unloaded!) at the same time. it's usual best turn-around time from late 1940 was two half-loaded ships per week, *when open*. Neither it was used (execpt in extreme emergency) for direct convoys from Italy, as it was more exposed to CW interceptions and interdiction than Tripoli. Most of the traffic to Bengasi - when available - were barges and costal lighters coming from Tripoli, and - in a few cases - from Greece, so it was the end of a trans-shipment or staged route, much longer in transit time and distance space than the usual direct route to Tripoli, that was the only reasonably effective supplyhead for the Axis during the whole campaign but hundreds of kms away from the frontline. So the availability of Bengasi wasn't absolutely a critical or even barely a substantial factor in the NA logistical balance. I would therefore advise to return to the original text or - probably better - to amend the last phrase in "and generally was in a better logistical situation" that - while still quite generic - is an accurate statement all the same. But before starting to cancel or correct another contibutor work I would like very much to hear Kirrages' and other contributors' opinion. Best regards --Arturolorioli (talk) 15:51, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

I second that. Axis supply routes were under constant attack on the sea by aircraft/ships and on the land at coastline, while the Allied supply flow was nearly unhindered for most of the time, and only determined by its lenght. I reinserted an altered version about the supply situation. StoneProphet (talk) 17:26, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

It's about maintaining supply lines, not about how long they are. Teh Germans had a shorter Supply lines which also was better, but they did not manage to maintain it because of teh Ally navy. In that case the British had the better supply line, because they could maintain it. --Arsaces (talk) 13:58, 7 November 2011 (UTC)

How about "unreliable supply lines"? Rklawton (talk) 11:10, 12 February 2016 (UTC)