Talk:Erwin Rommel/Archive 4

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

Archive 6

→

Archive 9

Crossing of Meuse and Mersa Matruh

It is not clear to me why are we interested in mentioning Guderian when speaking of 7th Panzer's crossing of the Meuse. 7th Panzer was on the right shoulder of the drive. Guderian was south at Sedan. Between the two was Reinhardt's XXXXI Army Corps, which also crossed. It seems to me we would be better off describing 7th Panzer's role in the plan and how Rommel handled it, and leave Guderian to the main article on the Battle of France.

Also, the notes on the Battle of Mersa Matruh mentioned in the article are factually in error. Butler should not be used as a source here because his brief description on pp 343-344 is not correct. For example, though Butler states the 2nd New Zealand and 50th British Infantry were nearly cut off, in fact both were, in different locals. 2nd New Zealand was on the upper escarpment and its retreat was blocked when 21st Panzer got to the east of them. 50th British Infantry was cut off when 90th Light reached the coast road. Also Butler asserts the wounded killed by 2nd New Zealand were in an aide station that happened to be in their path. 2nd New Zealnd went right through 21st Panzer's line, and did not go through an aide station. Clifton's explanation to Rommel, as retold by Desmond Young who knew him and asked him about it, does not ascribe the killing to an unrecognized aide station. The wounded killed were grenadiers of 21st Panzer who were unable to get up and show their hands, so they were killed where they lay. Rommel did except the explanation, and no like order was issued to DAK regarding the Kiwis, which would have been the result if Clifton's explanation did not answer. Also the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was not cut off and destroyed in Matruh, but was destroyed at Fuka, the town where the British were to regroup at 47 miles to the east. Read Jackson pp. 238-244, Mellenthin pp. 122-129, or Playfair pp. 284-295. All three are in agreement on the facts, and go into quite a bit greater detail than Butler does. My preference would be that the events would be presented correctly. Rommel's own writings are interesting, but Liddell Hart's notes are needed to straighten out the story, as Rommel's intel was not correct and thus his description was off. I don't want to go back and forth in editing the article. Please look into the other sources listed above. Playfair will not steer you wrong here. Thanks. Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:44, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

One problem is that the material that I removed with this diff is sourced entirely to von Mellenthin, which has been challenged by K.e.coffman as not being a reliable source. There's no book by Jackson in the bibliography so I am not sure which book you are referring to. I don't have Playfair and it's not available for inter-library loan, no Alberta libraries possess a copy. Your edit changed the wording from "The 2nd New Zealand Division and 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division were almost caught, with 50th Division fleeing on the 27th and 2nd Division escaping after a short engagement during the pre-dawn hours of 28 June" to "the Afrika Korps was able to get behind both of the two British Corps fighting there and blocked their retreat eastward, however it was too weak following hte Gazala battles to prevent them from braking out". I don't agree that your version is better, as it is in my opinion not any more correct that saying they were "almost caught" (my version) or "temporarily cut off" (Butler's wording). They weren't corps, they were divisions, and there's no reason not to name them. Butler does not give a precise location for the loss of 29th Indian. — Diannaa (talk) 20:39, 10 February 2016 (UTC)

I sourced it to Rommel and von Mellenthin, but the point is the description von Mellenthin writes in 1956 matches Jackson and Playfair very well. Multiple sources, all researched and edited, written from different sides of the conflict and stating the same thing: seems reliable. Playfair by himelf is considered a reliable source. In that case I think one would ask for further sourcing rather than delete it. As to corps and divisions, Rommel was attempting to destroy the infantry formations of the Eighth Army, thus he wanted to encircle, destroy or capture as much as he could. He was thinking he was trapping four infantry divisions in Mersa Matruh. In fact X Corps was in Mersa Matruh (10th Indian Infantry Division and 50th Northumbrian Infantry Division). XIII Corps was to the south of Mersa Matruh above the upper escarpement (5th Indian Infantry Division (29th Brigade), 1st Armoured Division and 2nd New Zealand Division). Gott became uneasy when 21st Panzer got to the east of 2nd New Zealand and scattered it's transport. Thus he elected to withdraw. 1st Armoured moved south into the desert, but 2nd New Zealand was missing much of its transport and the division commander elected to fight their way through. Meanwhile, X Corps's commander (Holmes) did not get notification of XIII Corps' withdrawal until early the next morning, thus X Corps was left on its own in the Mersa Matruh garrison. This was a near disaster for 8th Army, and looked to be a repeat of Tobruk ten days before. In the end more than half of X Corps did get out (Holmes estimated 60% of his corps made it back), but they lost a division's worth of equipment, a great deal of supplies, and some 8,000 men. In my view, "almost caught" doesn't quite catch what happened.

As to Butler's comments on the 29th Indian Brigade, he states "the Germans were now sitting astride the coast road and blocking the retreat of X Corps, composed now of brigade groups from four different divisions.(that is a false statement, btw) Auchenlick ordered the corps to follow 2nd New Zealand Division's example and force a way through the Germans, but the brigade movements were poorly coordinated, leading to the 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade being nearly destroyed, losing more than 6,000 troops and 40 tanks." The 6,000 troops captured at Mersa Matruh were from the 10th Indian Division which was in Mersa Matruh. 29th Brigade was a part of XIII Corps and was on the upper escarpment until they withdrew on the night of the 27th/28th, reaching Fuka on the afternoon of the 28th. 21st Panzer showed up shortly thereafter. Despite measures taken to keep the transport close, 29th Indian Brigade was unable to get away and the brigade was lost there in Fuka on the 28th. X Corps left Mersa Matruh on the night of July 28/29. Thus when X Corps attempted to break out of Mersa Matruh the 29th Brigade had already been lost, some 50 miles to the east of Mersa Matruh.

It is not clear to me what K.e.coffman was looking at this article for, but if you have to ask if it can be sourced that Rommel argued to forgo the invasion of Malta and press on to Egypt you are not familiar with the subject. That is the key decision that most historians focus on to question whether or not Rommel had a good handle on overall strategy, and those arguing against concede that he was a great tactician but a poor strategist. Thus, everyone writing on Rommel comes to this decision point, mark Rommel's role in it and make a defense or attack, depending on their opinion. If then you are that unfamiliar with the subject as to not know this it makes me wonder what interest one has in editing the article. Reading about the subject is something I believe one should consider doing prior to offering edits on a page.

Playfair wrote the Official British History of the war through the end of the campaigns in the Mediterranean, and is a primary source for many of the articles on the Western Desert Campaign. I could write the same paragraph and source it entirely to Playfair, or Jackson, if need be. We should describe it correctly though. As to von Mellenthin, he did not write an autobiography, but a study in the use of armour in WWII. He used works written by Commonwealth authors to source his statements on the Allies, in addition to using notes from the German officers and units involved. It is a clear read, and is reliable, as much as Jackson or Playfair are, and it is more accurate than Butler and many others that I have read.Gunbirddriver (talk) 05:14, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

I am confused as to why Playfair is such a definitive source on Rommel that you have not seen fit to use it as a source for this article in your over five years and 400 edits to the page, until you added it as a citation in January 2016. I still don't know who Jackson is or what book you might be talking about, as there's no such source used in the article at present either. Posting a bunch of unsourced material on the talk page and saying in effect "Go read Playfair if you don't believe me" is not a very helpful approach when I have already said I don't have access to that book. I haven't found anything in Butler that is contradicted by the other sources I have on hand, so I respectfully disagree that it's not a reliable source. — Diannaa (talk) 21:24, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

I did not use Playfair five years ago because at that time I had not yet read it. Playfair is not a definitive source on Rommel. He does, however, give a detailed presentation of British efforts and what the British command were thinking during the battles for North Africa. I purchased a copy maybe a year ago because another editor was using it and I wanted to check out what they were reading. It is not my cup of tea, but it is very detailed on the British efforts to win the war.

If the argument is that we cannot rely on sources such as Rommel's writings or the writings of other German officers because of a tendency to write a narrative favorable to themselves and a tendency to white-wash the Nazi party, then the easy counter is to include British sources such as Playfair's contributions to the Official British History, or other sources such as Sir William Jackson's The Battle for North Africa, 1940–43 (1975) or Ronald Lewin's Rommel As Military Commander (1968). These are British officers, not German, are reliable sources, and they give a consistent and clear presentation of the events.

You do not have to have the same sources as I do, editors will have different sources, but if I have access to reliable sources that contradict a cited source, then we should attempt to resolve the issue. If multiple sources report events one way and a number of others are vague on the issue or are found to be in error elsewhere, then we should use the best sources available.

Butler writes an interesting narrative, but from time to time he makes some significant errors, errors which in my mind place other things from his work into question. For example, on page 241 he tells us that Halder was the Chief of Staff of OKW. He was not. He was Chief of Staff of OKH. OKH was the command section of the German Army and had a long tradition, while OKW was a new organization brought into existence by Hitler to help secure his power by undermining the general staff at OKH. OKW was made up of men who would agree with Hitler without question. OKH was not. A struggle went on between OKH and OKW to exert influence on the conduct of the war. The distinction is significant. Say what you will about Mellenthin, but he would never make that error. Another example is on page 402, where Butler tells us Rommel wanted to defend at the Mareth Line, apparently confusing the Gabes position and the Mareth Line, but the Gabes position was 43 kilometers up the coast road toward Tunis. On p. 406 Butler goes to some length to tell us what an excellent defensive position the Mareth Line was. His comments are at odds with Rommel. Lewin states on page 192 Rommel wanted to set up his defense at the Gabes position, 43 kilometers up the coast road from the Mareth Line. Jackson says the same on page 329. But the best for this question is to look at Rommel's papers themselves. On page 360 he lays out that he wants to defend at the Gabes position. On page 392 he goes through a thorough explanation of the shortcomings of the Mareth Line, and why he did not want to defend there (the construction was not up to modern standards, the bunkers could protect infantry from an artillery barrage but little else, high ground was in front of the position, making it subject to artillery fire and necessitating the holding of the ground in front of the line, and though the southern flank was protected by "impassable mountains", Rommel was of the opinion that they were not impassable, and that the position could be outflanked to the southwest). In the course of events the position was in fact outflanked by 2nd New Zealand Division to the southwest. Those are just two, but there are other examples. All that being so I think we should take what Butler says with a grain of salt, and if other sources contradict him we should consider looking into the matter to discover where the truth lies. Gunbirddriver (talk) 08:10, 15 February 2016 (UTC)

About the revert of my 1 Feb 2016 correction

Hello, Rklawton, could you please explain why you reverted my edit? You wrote, "Let's not provide readers with bad translations," and I went back and double checked what I wrote, and I was correct as far as I can see. If I misunderstood something, could you please explain what it is? Thanks. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 02:57, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

You mistranslated the german ranks. Furthermore, with linked ranks, it's not necessary to provide a translation. Rklawton (talk) 03:30, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Rklawton I'm sorry, but you're still being vague. Could you please be specific, with something like, "When you translated 'xxxxxx' as 'yyyyyy' it was incorrect, because of 'zzzzzz'". That would probably clear up the confusion. Thanks. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 04:53, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Just check out the article's edit history and compare revisions. Level up! Rklawton (talk) 12:54, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Oh, for Pete's sake. Are you deliberately being obstinate? Can't you answer a simple question with a simple answer? And since this may be an extended round of 20 Questions, are you in fact competent to question another person's edit on this subject? I'm beginning to think you aren't. (By the way, what does "Level Up!" mean?) __209.179.86.123 (talk) 17:25, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

I realize I'm being less helpful than you would like. However, you are putting less effort into this than I would like, so it's a wash. Go see what changed via the article's edit history, read my comments and edit summaries, and figure it out. If you aren't willing to put that much effort into this, then you should probably find something else to do with your time. Rklawton (talk) 17:48, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Well all right then. I guess a better use of my time will be to seek Dispute Resolution since you clearly are not willing to cooperate in a meaningful way. Is that what you want? By the way, this is not a wash, as YOU, as the person challenging the veracity of another person's edit, are responsible for justifying YOUR action by providing an explanation of YOUR actions. (It funny you didn't know that already. Maybe you just forgot?) I honestly don't understand your behavior on this matter. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 19:15, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

I did explain it, and my explanation was quite clear. Rklawton (talk) 19:19, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Your "explanation" was anything but. It's like a teacher who gives an essay back to a student and simply says, "you put a comma in the wrong place," without any explanation as to where. The way we keep going around in circles reminds me of that movie Groundhog Day, where everything seems to keep happening again and again. Say, when is Groundhog Day? Whatever. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 21:15, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

My interpretation of the revert is that the German and American/English(?) ranks added are not exactly equivalent and it is better to have the reader click the link to the German rank to understand the subtleties. But that's just me. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 22:50, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

- - - -

Hello, Rklawton, I thought I'd try one more time to get you to explain specifically what you believe was wrong about my corrections. Thanks in advance. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 21:47, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I agree that there should not be translations, so the revert is OK. The reason why the ranks should not be translated is obvious from the edit you made, you changed one rank to "General der Panzertruppe", which is obviously not translated. It's simply so that not all ranks can be translated, so it's better not to translate them. --OpenFuture (talk) 08:19, 19 February 2016 (UTC)

Secondary sources

As I went through the portions of the article, I noticed that passages attributed to Lewin could be somewhat biased, bordering on wp:peacock, as in:

• Rommel is regarded as having been a humane and professional officer.
• Rommel led by example. In 1933 when he became commander of a Hanoverian. He felt a commander should be physically more robust than the troops he led, and should always show them an example.
• Rommel understood and accepted that with war would come casualties, but he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life. "Germany will need men after the war as well" was a comment he frequently made.
• In terms of making tactical decisions quickly, he believed the commander needed to be at the crucial place at the crucial time.
• To succeed he had to accept risks that commanders like Montgomery were never forced to take.

Etc.

I came across this chapter by Alaric Searle in Rommel: A Reappraisal (Ian F. Beckett. ed.), where he refers to "effusive and often uncritical biographies, extolling the virtues of Rommel as commander and master of maneuver" (p. 7), but missing the larger point of Rommel's service to the regime and his myopic views of Germany's strategic situation. Searle offers example of such biographies (p. 26, note 1):

• Ronald Lewin: Rommel as Military Commander
• David Irving: On the Tail of the Fox (I believe it's already been purged from the article)
• David Fraser: Knight's Cross : A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Further, passages attributed to Liddell Hart sound quite effusive as well. I don't have a critique of his work as related to Rommel, but Smelser & Davies in The Myth of the Eastern Front discuss him offering a '"lauditory foreword'" to Mainstein's memoirs Lost Victories. This sounds similar to what he is offering here:

• Quote from Liddell Hart in his intro: Awe for his dynamic generalship developed into an almost affectionate admiration for him as a man...
• He is regarded as one of the most skilled commanders of desert warfare in the conflict.
• Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.|group=N}}
• A major aspect of his success was his grasp of the psychological shock such attacks had upon the morale and fighting spirit of the enemy forces.

Etc.

References

I would suggest that these sources be minimized if possible, especially as they related to Rommel's character, leadership abilities and "humanitarianism". Hope this is helpful! K.e.coffman (talk) 02:45, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I have to say I do not find this helpful. "The Myth of the Eastern Front" by Smelser & Davies should not drive the editing of an article. I have not been impressed by what I have read. It strikes me as highly biased in its own right. It gets 2 1/2 stars at Amazon. Some of the review comments:

While the first five chapters of "The Myth of the Eastern Front" are in general soundly and fairly dispassionately presented, the next three chapters are far from dispassionate or unvested. The authors lose much if not all of their objectiveness and in their presentation of this portion of the book so overstate issues as to make a parody of their own thesis.

And now you propose we dispense with secondary sources? Because they are "effusive and often uncritical"? Have you read Desmond Young? Jackson? They look at the war from a British point of view. Would Lewin's works on Ciphers, Wavell or Montgomery also be suspect of the same sort of distortions? People like Brigadier Desmond Young, Ronald Lewin and William Jackson were officers of the British Army that fought against the Germans in North Africa and elsewhere. They did not come under some sort of spell. What's more, Erwin Rommel was not a Nazi. Thus he is an absurd target for the opinions of Smelser & Davies. It's nonsense. Gunbirddriver (talk) 10:56, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

The section "Rommel's style as military commander" is far too long (1988 words) and needs to be trimmed substantially. I think most of the POV stuff is in that section? This is the sort of content that will have to be removed. Many of the notes need to be removed as well. I have Fraser here and it seems okay as far as basic facts - there's nothing in it so far that's contradicted in the other three books I have on hand for the re-write. My plan was to nominate for Good Article, at which point I need to be able to vouch for and defend every statement in the article, so I am not keen to leave material in unless I can confirm it using books I have on hand. Everything I've updated so far has been checked in this manner, from early life through El Alamein, so any content cited to Lewin up to that point also appears in at least one of the other sources I have here (Butler, Fraser, Douglas-Home, and Hoffmann). — Diannaa (talk) 05:37, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Thank you both for your comments. Yes, most of the "effusive" language comes from Lewin and Liddell Hart, and primarily in the Leadership/Character sections, as well as in the lead. Fraser did not raise any issues for me as I was scanning the article. In Lewin's case, he's citing Mellenthin in one instance ("Said staff officer Friedrich von Mellenthin: "The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them...") and Liddell Hart in another ("Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.") -- I think these tertiary references should go.

On The Myth of the Eastern Front, I personally enjoyed reading this book. It was the first source I came across that answered the question for me "why do I feel like I've entered a parallel universe when I'm reading WWII wikipedia, specifically the Waffen-SS/Wehrmacht personnel and unit articles?" For example, such language as a Wehrmacht general being praised for his humanitarianism; "the consummate SS man"; and Manstein disobeying the Commissar order, along with a Waffen-SS general who disapproves of it. The examples are too numerous to list here; I've been keeping a tally on my user page, if you are interested: Dubious unsourced claims and non-NPOV language and Alternate History Department.

I was so overwhelmed by the volume of these examples, that I felt compelled to research post-war Waffen-SS revisionism and rewrite the article on HIAG, the Waffen-SS lobby group in the 1950-1990s.

After The Myth of the Eastern Front, I've read other sources that support Smelser and Davies's findings:

• Citino, Robert M. (2012). The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1826-2.
• Wette, Wolfram (2007). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674025776. (see my discussion with another editor on Mellenthin's talk page re Citino & Wette)
• Alaric Searle in Rommel: A Reappraisal (the language on "effusive" and "uncritical" in ref to Lewin & al. comes from Searle, not from Smelser & Davies)
• MacKenzie, S.P. (1997). Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era: A Revisionist Approach. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-09690-4.
• Kienle, Polly (2005). "Still Fighting for the Myth: German Wehrmacht Officers' Reports for the U.S. Historical Division". H-net.com. {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)

The latter article references a German-language work by Bernd Wegner that defines the post-war efforts by former generals as "erschriebene Siege"--"victories through writing". The works by Citino, Wette, MacKenzie and Wegner highlight how such writing impacted the post-war Western historiography to create a "mystification" of the German officer corps.

So yes, my BS antennas come up when I see a section named "Humanitarianism". Definition of a humanitarian is "a person promoting human welfare and social reform"; I don't think that applies to a general whether he's American, British or German.

In any case, Diannaa appears to be taking care of that, so I just wanted to raise my concerns. I do believe that a critical attitude to WWII sources written in the first couple of decades after the war may be in order, as much of the WWI historiography has been reevaluated in the recent decades. K.e.coffman (talk) 20:29, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Well, we are not speaking of all German officers. We are speaking here of Rommel. Everyone loves a revisionist. You seem very uncritical of the critics. In the passage of Searle you link to he argues Rommel does not deserve credit because he was not at his headquarters when the D-Day invasion occurred, thus he could not move his forces forward when the invasion occurred. Does he know why Rommel was not there? He went to argue with Hitler over the necessity to move the mobile formations forward into the Normandy area. He could not move them forward without Hitler's permission. Why does Searle not make that point clear in his criticism? Seems pertinent. It's a rather dishonest criticism, and answering these is a bit like chasing your tail.

Still you have not answered the question. Why did British officers who fought in the war or led the war write about Rommel in a favorable light? This would include Wavell, Auchenlick, Alexander and Winston Churchill, for heaven's sake. According to the theory we are to accept from Smelser and Davies it is because they feared the Soviet Union, unnecessarily apparently, and had their heads turned by German officers who were dishonest in their recollections. They go on to argue that all German soldiers should be looked at critically because Hitler ran an evil regime. They are all to be held accountable. A communal guilt. It's a rather presumptive view which I do not agree with. As to the British officers mentioned above, the comments from them all came either during the war or immediately after. No time to befriend the defeated Germans. How does that work in terms of the Smelser and Davies theory, exactly? Gunbirddriver (talk) 01:12, 8 February 2016 (UTC)

I got the Rommel Reconsidered by Searle & al. (that's how it was issued in the U.S.); it provide interesting insights regarding the "Rommel myth", as "the necessary image manufactured to serve the German rearmament" (Searle, p. 9) and driven by "different agencies [that] adopted Rommel for their own ends". (Connelly, p. 157) The question "why the British had such a positive attitude towards Rommel" is addressed as follows:

• Rommel had already achieved fame in the U.S. and Britain even during the war, with "the press repeatedly pointing out [Rommel's] great, quasi-mythical strength", so turning him into an icon was not difficult. (Connelly, p. 158)

• The 1950s German rearmament was highly dependent on the image boosting that the former Wehrmacht generals needed. Journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart was one of the first proponents of these two interconnected initiatives. In his 1948 book on Hitler's generals, he devoted a chapter to Rommel, portraying him as an outsider to the Nazi regime. Additions published in 1951 show that Liddell Hard played his role in the creation of the Rommel myth, concluding by: "... his gifts and performance ... qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history" (Searle, pp. 8, 27)

• "The Rommel myth came to be cemented through the mutual self-interest and cooperation between former German generals and the British," writes Searle. One of the results of this was the 1950 biography by Desmond Young, who collaborated with Hans Speidel among others, with Liddell Hart also supporting the project. Speidel had already written in 1946 that he planned to turn Rommel into "the hero of the German people", for which Rommel was a suitable candidate since his forced suicide lead to the assumption that he had not been a supporter of Nazism. Young subscribed to this "generous view", subtly conveying that Rommel served the regime, but was not part of it. (Searle, p. 9)

• However, even the "Rommel apologists" were faced with a challenge of explaining away Rommel's duties as a liaison between the Wehrmacht and the 'Hitler Youth in 1937. Young described Rommel's involvement in strictly military terms and alluded to a falling out between Baldur von Schirach and Rommel, with the former supposedly referring to Rommel as "not ideologically sound enough" (per Young). The reality was different, however, with Rommel proposing a plan that would have subordinated HJ to the Wehrmacht, removing it from the NSDAP control. Schirach was outraged; he appealed to Hitler, and Rommel was quietly removed from the project. (Searle, pp. 19-20)

• Searle points out that Young's claim that Rommel was brought into close proximity to Hitler in October 1938 "for the first time" is "patently untrue", as Rommel had been seconded to Hitler's personal protection during the March 1938 Anschluss. Young simply omits this fact casting doubts on the veracity of his other accounts. (p. 21)

• Searle provides further discussion on Rommel's relationship with Hitler and the regime, noting that Rommel had not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but also ... was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving". He wholly subscribed to the Nazi view of reality, writing to his wife in Oct 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them." (p. 24)

• Connelly discusses Liddell Hart's Rommel Papers (first published in German under a "revealing title" War Without Hate) as one of the two "crucial texst" that lead to the "Anglophone rehabilitation" and a "Rommel renaissance" (the other being Young). Both Young and Liddell Hart "set the stage for all post-war interpretations of Rommel", which consisted of three themes (1) Rommel's ambivalence about Nazism; (2) his military genius; and (3) the chivalrous nature of fighting in North Africa. This tradition included uncritical works by Sir John Squire, Ronal Lewin, David Irving, and General Sir John Hackett. For example, David Fraser described Rommel as a "Soldier without Politics" (chapter title). In contrast, German biographies, such as by Wolf Heckmann, are far less sympathetic. (p. 163-164)

• Fraser gets the nod from Connelly as the writer who "pushed furthest" "romanticising of Rommel", in "dramatic, swirling prose that encapsulates the post-1945 hagiographic approach". From Fraser: "great master of manoeuvre in war", whose personality "transcends time" and "cuts like [a] sabre through the curtains of history", etc. (almost half a page of Fraser is quoted on p. 169).

This is from a quick glance. I would recommend this book for a contemporary view on Rommel from British historians. Besides Searle and Connelly, the volume includes chapters by Niall Barr, Peter Lieb, Claus Telp and Russel A. Hart, covering campaigns in 1941 and 1942 in Africa and in 1944 in Normandy.

On the topic of The Myth of the Eastern Front, since there were concerns about its veracity, here are two reviews: one by a professional historian, and another one, surprisingly nuanced, from feldgrau.net of all places. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:49, 21 February 2016 (UTC)

Rommel's style as military commander section

This section is entirely about Rommel's performance in France during 1940 and North Africa during the successful period of German operations there. His subsequent performance is not discussed, and it gives a misleading impression to readers (for instance, he didn't lead from the front in Normandy). Nick-D (talk) 05:41, 5 March 2016 (UTC)

Normandy was a defensive battle, so it was handled differently. Same could be said at El Alamein. In each case the attacker is coming towards you, so the decisive point is in your defensive line at the point of the attacker's choosing. He was frequently at the front during the battle for Normandy, and traveled back and forth quite often. It was Rommel that set up the defense in depth south of Caen that resulted in the check of Montgomery's Operation Goodwood. His contributions in Normandy were all blunted by the stifling restrictions put upon all commanders from Hitler and OKW. Forward control was a concept of the panzerwaffe that was largely put in place by Guderian, and was made possible by the communication arrangements Guderian made which allowed the commander to control the division from any unit in the division. Rommel took it farther than most, and in some cases too far. Could be expanded, certainly. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:36, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Attitude to casualties

I've just changed the first sentence of the "Views on the conduct of war" section again. My rationale is that the claim that "he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life" is essentially WP:PEACOCK language as 1) no competent and non-criminal military leader of any rank accepts the unnecessary loss of life among the personnel under their command or defeated enemy forces, so the implication that he was somehow unusual in this regard is entirely false 2) as is also normal for all military leaders he sought to maximise thee losses of the enemy forces he fought through casualties or prisoners: he may not have wanted to kill or injure more Allied troops than he had to, but this doesn't make him unusual - it just means he obeyed the laws of warfare by encouraging and honouring surrenders. Nick-D (talk) 00:19, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

actually, fair point. Tweaked. The notion that Rommel was "not one" do do what all competent military officers do is WP:PEACOCK

Of course it was a fair point. That is why I changed it back. It would have been better for you to come to the talk page and discuss rather than to keep reverting. What you have been doing generates edit warring, and for an administrator it is a strange behavior to exhibit. I can accept your final version, but I do not think it is any improvement over what was there before, and am disappointed it took you so long to realize you were changing the wording contrary to the wording in the source citated.

As to the facts, Rommel did take a tremendous number of prisoners in both wars. He treated them as fellow soldiers. Prisoners were not mistreated if Rommel had anything to say over it. His behavior in this regard was different than what I have read of any other officer, either side of the conflict. Granted, his efforts to encourage opponents to surrender worked towards achieving his goals, and if they would not surrender he would do what was necessary to achieve his goal, but that is different than just doing what any competent officer would do. When the Italians started shipping oil across the Mediterranean in the hulls of hospital ships Rommel was extremely angry with them. Why was that, do you suppose? Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:12, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Well, we all make mistakes, admins included: at least I ended up semi-reverting myself. If you'd also like some feedback, blanket reverting problematic text back in without considering alternate wording also isn't best practice. Western Allied commanders routinely also regularly treated prisoners well. Nick-D (talk) 04:32, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

It did not need to be reworded, and the changes you were making were contradicted by the text that was used as the citation, so your edits needed to be reverted. Once reverted you should have gone to the talk page to discuss. It is bold edit-revert-discuss. You failed to do that, and now seem to think by characterizing your edits being reversed as blanket reverting is some sort of equivalence. It is not. I was attempting to bring to your attention the fact that the sentence was supported as it stood, and added the citation as a necessary proof. That would not be blanket reverting. Regardless, you should not change the text to remove something the citation supports, and my including the direct quotation in the citation should not have been necessary. You should have looked at the citation yourself (i.e. looked it up and found out what it said) rather than reverting two more times. It appears you finally read the quote I included, and finally decided to "tweak" your wording. That is nothing to ballyhoo. Administrators should be held to a higher standard. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:26, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Please see Foundational works above for the contemporary assessment of Young's 1950 work on Rommel. It's a WP:Biased source, and potentially unreliable, as discussed by Searle. The other source (Luck) is WP:Primary as the participant in the events, and biased at that (as described in The Myth of the Eastern Front). I will add citations to this effect to Hans von Luck; that's another problematic article in the WWII mythology genre, with 24 citations to Luck's memoirs, more than all other sources combined. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:52, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

I've tweaked my wording a bit per the quoted source. The notion that Rommel was unusual in doing this is clearly false. Nick-D (talk) 03:56, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

From looking further at this section, it says that " The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes". This may or may not be true (and the Holocaust was going on behind the German front line), but it certainly isn't the case for the German forces in Normandy which Rommel also led. Nick-D (talk) 04:03, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

No, that is true, and I believe it is mentioned. 2nd SS Panzer Division's killing of civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane. Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division. Officers of the Herr had operational control of SS units in their area of command, but they had no authority over them in regards to their behavior. Anyway, Rommel protested and requested permission to discipline the division. He was told by Hitler it was none of his concern. I believe his efforts here show a certain degree of moral courage, as certainly officers challenging Hitler's decisions and those of the SS were often arrested or shot. It is easy for us in a quiet study to say what one should or should not do. It was a lot harder to do so in Nazi Germany. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:47, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

The Rommel myth

I plan to add the below content to the article in the next few days. Since it would be a large addition, I'm posting it here first, in case there are critiques or commentary. Content starts below:

The Rommel myth

The larger-than-life persona of Rommel continues to intrigue both scholars and the general public. The military historian Peter Caddick-Adams in his 2012 work Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives writes that Rommel's "image, carefully cultivated during his lifetime, was also carefully reworked after his death". He notes three stages that led to the firm establishment of the Rommel myth, starting with the inter-war period that saw Rommel in a self-promotion mode. During the early war campaigns, Rommel's successes made him indispensable to Nazi propaganda. Finally, following a forced suicide, Rommel emerged as the "acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime".

Origins

The origins of the myth can be first found in Rommel's drive for success as a young World War I German officer who won the prestigious Pour le Mérite award despite initial setbacks. His popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks was a "determined effort" in self-promotion, contrary to the established tradition of the German military studies. Rommel's military successes were then played up by the Nazi propagandists Karl Hanke in France in 1940 and Alfred Berndt during the Desert Campaign of 1941. In November 1941 Goebbels wrote about his intention to have Rommel "elevated to a kind of popular hero", even though his success was achieved in the least strategically important theatre of World War II. Rommel, with his innate abilities as a military commander and love of spotlight, was a perfect fit for the Nazi "sandcastle illusion built on propaganda".

Rommel image was splashed across mass media throughout the Reich and reached as far as the U.S. and Britain. During the war, Rommel already achieved fame in the West, with its press describing his "great, quasi-mythical strength". The ground was fertile for the myth to be reborn after the war, resulting in a "renaissance of Rommel's name and reputation".

In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, it became clear to the Americans and the British that a German army would have to be revived to help face off against the Soviet Union. Many former German officers were convinced, however, that no future German army would be possible without the rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht. To this end, in October 1950, a group of former senior officers produced a document, which became known as the Himmerod memorandum, for West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Intended as both a planning and a negotiating document, the memorandum included the foundational principles for the future German army and a key demand for "measures to transform domestic and foreign public opinion" with regards to the German military.

Thus, in the atmosphere of the Cold War, Rommel's former enemies, especially the British, played a key role in the manufacture and propagation of the myth. The German rearmament was highly dependent on the image boosting that the Wehrmacht needed. The journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart, an early proponent of these two interconnected initiatives, provided the first widely available source on Rommel in his 1948 book on Hitler's generals. He devoted a chapter to Rommel, portraying him as an outsider to the Nazi regime. Additions to the chapter published in 1951 concluded with laudatory comments about Rommel's "gifts and performance" that "qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history".

Foundational works

File:Desertfoxdvd.jpg "The Rommel myth came to be cemented through the mutual self-interest and cooperation between former German generals and the British," notes the British historian Alaric Searle.

This is a common meme that is false on its face. The high regard Rommel was held in by the West predates any interaction between former German generals and “the British.” British soldiers in the Western desert held Rommel in high regard from late 1941. This idea about Rommel persisted after the war. Thus there was an idea of the man in the mind of the common British soldier long before anyone could make a valid claim that individuals were “creating” a story about Rommel out of mutual self-interest.

One of the results of this was the 1950 "influential, laudatory" biography Rommel: The Desert Fox by Brigadier Desmond Young. Young had served in North Africa in the Indian Army in a public relations capacity, and was once taken prisoner by Rommel's troops.

How does a public relations person manage to become taken prisoner by Rommel’s troops? Young was an officer in the British Indian Army, and was captured along with his troops when they were overrun by 15th Panzer Division in June 1942 during the Battle of Gazala. He escaped briefly but was recaptured. Then he relates when the area through which he and the other prisoners came under fire he was ordered by a German officer to go under a flag of truce to tell the firing battery to hold their fire, as they were injuring and killing British prisoners. Young declined to do so. He was then told that he had to order a junior officer of his to do so. He again declined. That was when another German officer arrived and inquired what was going on. After a short discussion the first officer returned to Young and informed him “The general rules that if you do not choose to obey the order I have given you, you cannot be compelled to do so”. This, such as it was, was the first and only meeting between Young and Rommel. Young spent the next sixteen months in captivity. In December 1944 after he was returned to the British Indian Army he was made Director of Public Relations for Army HQ, India.

Young collaborated with former Wehrmacht general Hans Speidel, among others, with Liddell Hart also supporting the project.

Collaborated with Speidel? Young wrote a biography of Rommel, and of course researched it. This included speaking with a number of former commanders involved in the war. One would not say Young collaborated with Claude Auchinleck or G.H. Clifton, though he spoke with both about the desert war and their impressions of Rommel. With Speidel he was most interested in the events surrounding the German resistance and Rommel’s death. Speidel had been arrested before Rommel was forced to take his own life, and Rommel had protested the arrest to Hitler. For the events immediately before and after Rommel’s death Young spoke through an interpreter with Rommel’s long-time friends Hermann Aldinger and Karl Strolin, and family members Manfred and Lucie Rommel. This would be called “research.”

The manner in which you have phrased the above presumes a conspiracy which never existed. It projects clearly what your frame of mind is, but it tells us nothing of the frame of mind of Desmond Young. I have to wonder if you have actually troubled to read any of Desmond Young’s biography of Rommel. Based on your comments here and elsewhere I would surmise you have not. If you had you would know Young certainly does have a bias, but it is not pro-Nazi, or pro-German for that matter. It is strikingly pro-British, and presumes a British superiority of arms, which Young grudgingly admits Rommel frustrated for a time. To his credit he is not as partisan as Playfair, and his frequent antidotes of life during the desert war are a great pleasure. There is a connection to time and place that is utterly lacking in Fraser or worse, Butler.

Speidel had already written in 1946 that he planned to turn Rommel into "the hero of the German people", to give them a positive role model.

Speidel is likely speaking here of Speidel’s involvement with the German resistance. Speidel and other leaders in the resistance viewed Rommel as a possible leader the German nation could look to in the period immediately following the assassination of Hitler. He felt Rommel’s fame and reputation among the German population would add legitimacy to a new German leadership. Others in the resistance did not want an officer, any officer, involved.

Rommel was a suitable candidate since the manner of his death had lead to the assumption that he had not been a supporter of Nazism.

Rommel was not a supporter of Nazism. After Rommel’s death he was no longer in the discussion for the leadership of a post-war Germany.

Young subscribed to this "generous view", subtly conveying that Rommel served the regime, but was not part of it. Young's biography "assisted in developing a new version of the truth" – with Rommel now an active, in not a leading, plotter. Speidel contributed as well, starting, from the early 1950s, to "talk up the Rommel legend" and his own "anti-Nazi credentials", thus boosting his suitability for a future command role in NATO.

Young’s biography of Rommel probably overstates Rommel’s ideas regarding a regime change in Germany, but it does not portray him as an active or leading plotter. As to Speidel, he had a doctorate in philosophy and was teaching at a German university in 1950. He did not need a job in NATO, and re-militarizing Germany following the war was an idea that had a fair amount of opposition in Germany. Speidel was aware of this. Impugning his motives here is a reach.

The 1951 movie "The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel", based on Young's biography, portrayed Rommel in a sympathetic way, as a loyal, humane soldier and a firm opponent Hitler's policies. The movie played up Rommel's disputed role in the conspiracy against Hitler, while omitting Rommel's early association with the dictator.

A movie?! The only thing of interest here was von Mellenthin’s reaction. When asked what he thought of James Mason’s portrayal of Rommel, he responded “Altogether too polite”

Critics and the public were hostile in the U.S., but the movie was a success in Britain, along with a less known 1953 movie "The Desert Rats", where Mason resumed his portrayal of Rommel.

Apparently 20th Century Fox thought a sequel would be a profitable course of action. This is just silliness. I don’t think we can include Hollywood in the conspiracy theory. Quentin Tarantino’s Inglorious Bastards showed Hitler murdered in a theater. I don’t believe it happened that way, nor am I concerned about the apparent assault on history.

1953 saw the publication of Rommel's writings of the war period as The Rommel Papers, edited by Liddell Hart. Romme's widow and son, and the former Wehrmacht officer Fritz Bayerlein first published them in German in 1950 under a "revealing title" War Without Hate. With a glowing introduction by Liddel Hart, The Rommel Papers was one of the two "crucial texts" that lead to the "Anglophone rehabilitation" and a "Rommel renaissance", the other being Young's biography.

Meanwhile, Liddel Hart had a personal interest in the work: he had coaxed Rommel's widow into admitting that his theories on mechanised warfare had influenced Rommel.

In all that I have read on the Second World War and Rommel I have never come across Frau Rommel making any comment whatsoever on military tactics, nor have I ever read her asserting anything about those military texts that had been an influence on Rommel, other than her noting that Rommel always carried a copy of Wavell’s *** Lectures with him. This was confiscated by US Forces. A second copy was sent to her years later by Wavell himself shortly before his death. In it he wrote a short inscription for her.

Thus, Rommel emerged as his "pupil", giving Liddel Hart credit for Rommel's dramatic successes in 1940. (The controversy around Liddell Hart's actions is covered by the political scientist John Mearsheimer in Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. A review of Mearsheimer's work, published by Strategic Studies Institute, points out that Mearsheimer "correctly takes 'The Captain' [Liddel Hart] to task for [...] manipulating history".)

Mearsheimer gives an opinion, the accuracy of which is debatable. Liddle Hart always presumed he had more influence then he probably did, but he believed what he asserted was true, which is a different thing than knowing something is false and then trying to pass it off as truth.

Anyway, none of this is new, and not particularly helpful. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:13, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Uncritical accounts

Young and Liddell Hart "set the stage for all post-war interpretations of Rommel", which consisted of three themes: Rommel's ambivalence towards Nazism; his military genius; and the chivalrous nature of the fighting in North Africa. Their works lent support to the image of the "clean" Wehrmacht and were generally not questioned, since they came from British authors, rather than German revisionists. The trend continued with the "effusive and often uncritical biographies, extolling the [military] virtues of Rommel", such as Rommel as Military Commander by the military historian Ronald Lewin and Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel by the high-ranking British officer David Fraser.

Fraser's account "pushed furthest" the "romanticising of Rommel", in "dramatic, swirling prose that encapsulates the post-1945 hagiographic approach". For example, he includes Rommel among the "great masters of manoeuvre in war", whose personalities "transcend time" and "cut like [a] sabre through the curtains of history". This tradition also included uncritical works by Sir John Squire and General Sir John Hackett. In contrast, German biographies, such as by Wolf Heckmann, were far less sympathetic.

Even the "Rommel apologists" were faced with a challenge of explaining away Rommel's duties as a liaison between the Wehrmacht and the Hitler Youth in 1937–38. Young's 1950 biography described Rommel's involvement in strictly military terms and alluded to a falling out between the Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach and Rommel, with the former supposedly referring to Rommel as "not ideologically sound enough". In fact, Rommel had proposed a plan (twice) that would have subordinated Hitler Youth to the Wehrmacht, removing it from the NSDAP control. Schirach was outraged; he appealed directly to Hitler, and Rommel was quietly dismissed from the project in 1938.

Searle points out Young's claim that Rommel was brought into close proximity to Hitler in October 1938 "for the first time" as "patently untrue". Rommel had previously been seconded to command the unit in charge of Hitler's personal protection during the March 1938 Anschluss. Young omits this fact, casting doubts on the veracity of his other statements. In contrast to the apologist accounts, Searle notes that Rommel had not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but [...] was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving", as evidenced by Rommel's letters to his wife. Rommel fully subscribed to the Nazi worldview, writing to his wife in October 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them."

Reevaluation

The myth of Rommel came about as "the necessary image manufactured to serve the German rearmament", driven by "different agencies [that] adopted Rommel for their own ends". Recent historiography called for a reevaluation of the Rommel myth. In 2002, Philip Remy produced a three-part documentary for the German TV called Mythos Rommel ("The Rommel Myth"). The documentary, along with a book of the same name, "chipped away at the Rommel legend dramatically".

Contemporary military practitioners have been critical of Rommel as an operational level commander. While an accomplished tactician, Rommel was a "poor operational leader", according to a paper published by Naval War College. Rommel's "personal relationship with Hitler put him in a position of authority he was not qualified to fulfill"; he lacked "the proper personality, military education, and military experience" of a successful operational leader, concludes the author, United States Navy Commander Charles M. Gibson. Gibson credits Rommel with the German defeat in North Africa due to his failure to appreciate the strategic dimensions of the conflict.

The picture that emerges is much more complex than the post-war myth of a "noble" man and a "military genius who, but for bad fortune and the faults of others, might have changed the course of World War II". Caddick-Adams notes that, over the years, Rommel "has been portrayed variously as a model officer, folk hero, dashing combat leader, strong-willed Swabian, remarkable tactician, chivalrous knight, enthusiastic Hitler supporter, war criminal, resistance fighter, representative of a clean Wehrmacht and, finally, sacrifial victim of the Third Reich". Instead, Rommel was a "complicated man of many contradictions."

In a 2012 interview with Reuters, the German historian Sönke Neitzel noted: "On the one hand he didn't commit war crimes that we know of and ordered a retreat at El Alamein despite Hitler's order. But he took huge German casualties elsewhere and he was a servant of the regime. He was not exactly a shining liberal or Social Democrat. Mostly, he was interested in his career".

References

Sources

• Caddick-Adams, Peter (2012). Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New York, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN 9781590207253. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Chambers, Madeline (2012). "The Devil's General? German film seeks to debunk Rommel myth". Reuters. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
• Connelly, Mark (2014). "Rommel as icon". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gibson, Charles M., Commander, USN (2001). "Operational Leadership as Practiced by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel During the German Campaign in North Africa 1941–1942: Success of Failure?" (PDF). Naval War College. Retrieved 8 February 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Luvaas, Jay (1990). "Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A "Pupil's" Retrospective" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
• Mearsheimer, John (1988). Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801420894. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Robinson, James R. (1997). "The Rommel Myth". Military Review Journal. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
• Searle, Alaric (2014). "Rommel and the rise of the Nazis". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)

References

K.e.coffman (talk) 03:06, 28 February 2016 (UTC)

You have neglected to include any contrary opinion from the revisionist view. Do contrary opinions exist, and what are they? What work have you done to look into this further? If you have not yet done so then proceed now. Needs more work. Regardless, this material is large enough to be broken off as its own article. However, as it is it is WP:Biased. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:54, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

I agree that the above is too lengthy for this article, though a two or so para summary would be relevant. It's certainly the case from what I've seen that modern historians take a more sceptical view of Rommel (for instance, I've seen scathing analysis of his mismanagement of supplies in North Africa, as well as his leadership in Normandy). Nick-D (talk) 04:43, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

When I searched for "Rommel legend" or "Rommel myth", the above sources are what I found. I have not found sources that state that the "Rommel myth" is the invention of contemporary historians that are trying to take Rommel down a notch. If you have such sources, please share them so that I can include them.

Regarding WP:Biased, this content is built on multiple WP:RS sources (books, articles, studies, etc). This is what the sources said. If you have contemporary sources that state the opposite, I would be glad to review them.

I will condense as suggested, and create a separate article for the in-depth discussion. BTW, I'm reading a new book on the topic (The Rommel Legend) and it is in agreement with the findings of the above scholars. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:53, 4 March 2016 (UTC)