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Norwegian ferry flight

A recent (June 2019) ferry flight by Norwegian crossed German borders and was forced into a holding pattern and diverted to France. Is this notable or poor flight planning on Norwegian airlines? (Section: grounding impact) [[1]] @DonFB: @Aron Manning: @Marc Lacoste: Shencypeter (talk) 05:01, 16 June 2019 (UTC)

I would support inclusion. Something like: "A ferry flight of a 737 MAX by the airline Norwegian that departed from Spain, destination Sweden, was denied entry into German airspace enroute and landed in France. [It later completed the flight to Sweden."] Presumptive conclusion, to be added when it happens, in brackets. Not terribly important, but I see the event as quirky and interesting enough to be part of encyclopedic coverage of the groundings. DonFB (talk) 05:35, 16 June 2019 (UTC)
Imo it shows the "political climate", so I support inclusion. If it turns out this was just a major flight-planning mistake, unrelated to the aircraft type, then we can remove it. —Aron M🍂 (🛄📤)   05:55, 16 June 2019 (UTC)
As you said, not very notable: "poor flight planning on Norwegian airlines", it won't change anything for the grounding. It would need a more RS, with a less self-published ring.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 06:04, 16 June 2019 (UTC)
Thanks to all. "Poor planning" is just my observation so I've sourced a second opinion saying "someone didn't do their homework." The aircraft in question is stuck in France as of today, June 17. We'll see further activity on that FlightRadar24 citation in the future, it's a rolling record of the aircraft's last 7-days. Shencypeter (talk) 03:41, 17 June 2019 (UTC)
Bit of a non-story as MAXs are being moved around all the time so I dont see why this needs to be mentioned. MilborneOne (talk) 14:08, 17 June 2019 (UTC)

ADs

I stand corrected (by myself). In a recent edit summary I said FAA airworthiness directives are "not for grounding, but for required repairs/fixes during cnt'd ops." In fact, the FAA grounded the 787 with an AD in 2013, due to the lithium battery fires, though most ADs (probably the vast majority) do not result in grounding. For the 737 MAX, though, the FAA issued an "Emergency Order of Prohibition," not an AD. DonFB (talk) 07:48, 18 June 2019 (UTC)

Groundings are rare, quirky and unusual. :-) The 787 AD grounded the world fleet and the scope of the US Emergency prohibition order applied to the US only. Maybe they thought an emergency airworthiness directive was redundant by that time, as the Taiwan authority had said. Cheers Shencypeter (talk) 08:13, 18 June 2019 (UTC)
And despite the article title the 737 MAX wasnt actually grounded just not allowed to fly commercially. MilborneOne (talk) 13:07, 18 June 2019 (UTC)

Is this something new, or are the BBC over cooking a tweet?

Hi all, please see this report https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48752932. Is this something new, or are the BBC over cooking a tweet? Regards, Springnuts (talk) 06:50, 27 June 2019 (UTC)

It's real, and it's already in the article under Certification progress. Rosbif73 (talk) 07:12, 27 June 2019 (UTC)

Thanks - I see it now, moved into “corrective work”. Thank you. Springnuts (talk) 21:33, 27 June 2019 (UTC)

Is the following really that important?

"Warren accused the Trump administration of protecting Boeing, saying:

"The Boeing 737 MAX 8 is a major driver of Boeing profits. In the coming weeks and months, Congress should hold hearings on whether an administration that famously refused to stand up to Saudi Arabia to protect Boeing arms sales has once again put lives at risk for the same reason.""

This deviates away from the subject. Is bringing up Boeing's political relationship really that important? Tigerdude9 (talk) 15:02, 27 June 2019 (UTC)

The grounding was technical not political so not relevant here. MilborneOne (talk) 15:18, 27 June 2019 (UTC)
I think it deserves inclusion. The "subject" encompasses not only the technical aspects, but also the financial and political repercussions. One may disagree with Sen. Warren's criticism, but her comments, like those of other influential people, such as safety and consumer advocates Sully and Ralph Nader, are part of this story. More comments like Warren's may be voiced in the continuing Congressional hearings. This grounding and the issues that led to it is a major chapter in the history of U.S. aviation, regulation and business ethics. We should expect the story to have an impact on, and be impacted by politics, and be ready to cover those developments neutrally and encyclopedically. DonFB (talk) 15:37, 27 June 2019 (UTC)
Claims of political interference in what are supposed to be technical decisions cannot be ignored. But as of today, the political aspects don't appear to be a major factor in the story, nor does the article appear to be giving them undue weight. For the specific quote above, my assessment of due weight would be to keep the mention of the accusation but reduce the quote to a brief paraphrase. Rosbif73 (talk) 15:47, 27 June 2019 (UTC)
It depends on perspective. Not relevant today, but there were lots of political events in the 72 hours before US grounded the planes that remains relevant in history. The Trump call was removed, but it happened. In my view, China did not suddenly say I'm grounding the plane, they pressed Boeing for answers for four months. People are still fascinated by the Titanic sinking. Shencypeter (talk) 08:59, 28 June 2019 (UTC)

Root cause

(Self copy from main article Talk)

Excellent analysis: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers

-》 Let us add it to a couple of articles, including this one, BPO and software design Zezen (talk) 07:53, 30 June 2019 (UTC)

A source of problems appears to be in the system requirements for the software, written by system engineers, not in the software itself. There was no report of software not performing to its specifications. Boeing has modified the activation logic for example. This logic is typicaly stated in "system requirements allocated to software" handed over to suppliers responsible for implementing software.Pierre5018 (talk) 11:47, 30 June 2019 (UTC)
The Bloomberg article mentioned just above is a general description of how Boeing outsourced work, including software coding. Bloomberg does not specifically say in the article that the software outsourcing was specifically for MCAS, although that is possible. Accordingly, in my opinion, there is not much, if any, information in the Bloomberg article that can or should be added to the WP 'Grounding' article. However, if anyone thinks information from the Bloomberg piece should be added, I recommend making a specific proposal here in Talk, so we can see if consensus exists for adding something. DonFB (talk) 12:55, 30 June 2019 (UTC)
MCAS was implemented by Collins Aerospace. This article does not appear to be relevant Pierre5018 (talk) 13:03, 30 June 2019 (UTC)
I think the salary of the engineers who wrote the software is about as relevant (Read: not) as the pilot's age or hours flown on the MAX. Shencypeter (talk) 14:10, 30 June 2019 (UTC)

I cannot Visual Edit here, so short. The salaries are not important. The software design, quality control, business process outsourcing (BPO), "lean management" or whatever it is called now these days - are. Zezen (talk)

Software development practices

I added the following section as a new subheading under § Analysis: In June 2019, Boeing's software development practices came under criticism from current and former engineers. Software development work for the MAX was reportedly complicated by Boeing's decision to outsource work to lower-paid contractors, including Indian companies HCL Technologies and Cyient, though these contractors did not work on MCAS or the AoA disagree alert. Management pressure to limit changes that might introduce extra time or cost was also highlighted.[1][2]

Pierre5018 has moved this to a subsection of a new § Boeing employees subheading under § Reactions, saying in his edit summary that this is not official analysis. While I had to think hard about where best to put this issue, I'm not convinced that it really belongs where Pierre has put it. Thoughts? Rosbif73 (talk) 10:52, 1 July 2019 (UTC)

If official analysis suspects that outsourcing is a factor, it could then belong under analysis. As of now, there is no indication that outsourcing software contributed to the accidents.Pierre5018 (talk) 11:02, 1 July 2019 (UTC)
[Playing devil's advocate here, because I'm not really sure where this belongs] Who said that the Analysis section was for official analysis? Rosbif73 (talk) 11:16, 1 July 2019 (UTC)
Hmm, the new section might be a new home for Peter Lemme's cutout switch comments. @Marc Lacoste: Shencypeter (talk) 03:02, 2 July 2019 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Robison, Peter (June 30, 2019). "Boeing's 737 Max Software Outsourced to $9-an-Hour Engineers". Bloomberg.
  2. ^ Loh, Chris (June 30, 2019). "Boeing Outsourced 737 MAX Software Development". Simple Flying.

About "paywalls"

Regarding Special:Diff/906002142, a paywall is not a reason to remove a source from an article, per WP:PAYWALL. ~ ToBeFree (talk) 23:01, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

Retirement of program manager

The 737 program manager decided to retire. His name is not mentioned in either the 737 or MAX articles, and indeed program managers are rarely if ever mentioned by name in aircraft articles. And he made his decision some time last year – before the first crash, and thus for reasons entirely unrelated to the subject of this article. So how is the announcement of his retirement, and the nomination of a successor, relevant to this article? Rosbif73 (talk) 14:06, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

Management changes is half about a guy celebrating retirement in the midst of airliner troubles and half about the new guy's credentials and his future actions that could shape this airliner's return to service. I'm interested in more citations that could explain the frequent management turnovers; the first one departed due to engine supply problems against pressing schedules. (financial times). For example there is significant concern over Jony Ive leaving Apple. Please give it some time. :-) Shencypeter (talk) 14:50, 12 July 2019 (UTC)
Nope cant see it is relevant to the groundings so does not need to be included. MilborneOne (talk) 14:53, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

If this article were about the groundings, it would have needed no edits after March 13; this has been about scandals, cut corners, coverups, software fixes, public relations..... and we are still monitoring its return to service. Boeing has yet to push out the MAX 10. If the program manager departed with no replacement, that's significant. Shencypeter (talk) 15:06, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

Perhaps it should be re-scoped and renamed so every criticism or negative comment about Boeing can be piled on here, relevant or not. MilborneOne (talk) 15:09, 12 July 2019 (UTC)
Sure, we are needing a third move request at this point..... Shencypeter (talk) 15:26, 12 July 2019 (UTC)
If it were to come to light that the program manager's retirement was in some way related to the scandals, cut corners, coverups, software fixes, public relations... that led to or stem from the groundings, then of course it would become relevant to this article. But as things stand, I see no suggestion of anything other than the normal, scheduled departure of a person reaching retirement age, i.e. not in any way a notable event Rosbif73 (talk) 18:08, 12 July 2019 (UTC)
Don't include, unless source says it's related to MAX probs/grounding. Otherwise, it's Wikipedia opinion/OR they're related. DonFB (talk) 20:16, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

I included it initially, because media reports are joining Lindblad's retirement and the MAX troubles: "Boeing 737 program manager to retire amid crisis over jet's grounding" (CNBC), "Boeing 737 program manager to retire amid crisis over jet's grounding" (Reuters republished by NY Times, Euronews, the Globe and Mail...), or Flight's comment: The leadership change comes at a critical juncture for the airframer’s narrowbody programme, which has been mired in crisis following two fatal crashes. ... I'm not judging if we should make the connection here in wikipedia, I think we should neutrally report the media coverage.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 13:56, 14 July 2019 (UTC)

As I see it, words like "amid" in the press coverage are being used to make a temporal link as an excuse for the story without actually claiming a causal link. The trouble is, wiki is WP:NOTNEWS and if we include the information in this article, however neutrally we word it, we are inevitably implying that there is a real, causal, link. Rosbif73 (talk) 14:49, 14 July 2019 (UTC)
I agree news reports does not establish an unambiguous link, but it's not our responsibility to research if there is or not a connection. In an opposite view, removing a link to the report could be seen as stating there is no connection at all, but we don't know. As a tertiary source, we report the reports. WP:NOTNEWS is about avoiding creating a WP article for every news ever (like for every WP:aircrash), not to ban using news as sources.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 17:16, 14 July 2019 (UTC)

Consider merging analysis and corrective work

Would anyone object to combining analysis and corrective work for the same five sections (systems) covered under both headings? e.g. AoA sensors: "...had a single point of failure... will compare both computers....." Shencypeter (talk) 01:38, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

I've implemented the content merge. One of the benefits is that it makes duplicate points easier to spot, rather than introduced in both sections. Shencypeter (talk) 05:20, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Please implement subheadings under each section to clearly separate analysis from corrective work--Pierre5018 (talk) 10:15, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Please unmerge probes, disagree alert and indicator display, keep issues separate--Pierre5018 (talk) 14:25, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Okay, I see where you're coming from, to separate probe data from system failures. I've moved some content into Certification inquiry, but still don't see a need to further divide airplane subsystems analysis and corrections. Shencypeter (talk) 08:23, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

Pre-existing procedure?

Can anyone provide sources supporting User:CaptSeely737's view, tht "Ethiopia’s crew went against procedures" and tht Boeing did not originally need to disclose MCAS?

He made an edit (25-Aug), summarising it thus: 

 I am editing out misinformation that Boeing needed to disclose MCAS. They did not have to disclose anything. I am a 737 pilot. Any uncommanded nose pitch down results in the same procedure

which said 

 Pilots were not informed about MCAS until after the Lion Air accident, although Boeing didn’t have to inform pilots, in the 737, any uncommanded nose pitch down. The procedure for stopping unwanted trim has been known since 1967. Ethiopia’s crew went against procedures, when they re-engaged the stab trim system despite Boeing highlighting the caution against doing that.

The edit has quite correctly been reverted out since (as opinion / OR) - and if I’m reading the trend of the news story right, informed opinion will ultimately be firmly critical of Boeing rather than of aircrew who couldn’t save their lives.

If that’s right, reactions at the time from other pilots expressing doubts about how their fellow fliers handled the emergency will then, in hindsight, make a very interesting aspect (highlighting the complexity, for a start). If anyone can find reliable sourcing, showing this as an established (? though minority) view, we would then need to write up their content - we couldn’t simply reintroduce what CaptSeely737 wrote - and that would be notable and encyclopaedic coverage.

- SquisherDa (talk) 20:49, 27 August 2019 (UTC)

Somewhere in the article (which is a bit of a sprawling mess now, I fear) there is sourced text about Boeing subtly casting doubt on the pilots' actions, and Ethiopian officials rebuting such insinuations. Eventually, when the final accident reports are published and covered by RS, the article can be modified to summarize the findings, including any assignment of blame/culpability for action or inaction by pilots, Boeing, FAA, the airlines or other parties. DonFB (talk) 22:56, 27 August 2019 (UTC)

#Reactions #Aircrew

This looks helpful - important, maybe? 

 https://qz.com/1584233/boeing-737-max-what-happened-when-one-us-pilot-asked-for-more-training/

(It doesn’t seem to be cited already, in the article.) I think we regard Quartz as Reliable? It seems to cast light on the (original) training, aircrew reaction to it and to the aircraft itself and industry pressures on aircrew with doubts. Corporate denial too, possibly!

Better if someone familiar with the industry writes this up? rather than me?

- SquisherDa (talk) 10:54, 5 September 2019 (UTC)

Thanks. Did you read the article, notably Crew manuals, pilot training and simulators? Is there any additional material?--Marc Lacoste (talk) 11:28, 5 September 2019 (UTC)

I referenced this article before but an editor thought the pilot being fined for missed flight was trivial. Shencypeter (talk) 23:14, 7 September 2019 (UTC)

JATR mandate

Per Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee Hearing on [http://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW05/20190619/109642/HHRG-116-PW05-20190619-SD001.pdf “Status of the Boeing 737 MAX: Stakeholder Perspectives”], June 14 :

On April 2, 2019, the FAA established a Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR)24 to

conduct a comprehensive review of the certification of the automated flight control system (MCAS) on the Boeing 737 Max, including evaluating aspects of its design and pilots’ interaction with the system, determining its compliance with all applicable regulations and identifying future

enhancements that might be needed

Per FAA update, 5/3/2019 3:00pm Update:

This week, the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) team held its first meeting to review the FAA’s certification of the Boeing 737 MAX’s automated flight control system. Chaired by former NTSB Chairman Christopher A. Hart, the JATR is comprised of technical safety experts from 9 civil aviation authorities worldwide, including the FAA, as well as from NASA. The team received extensive overviews and engaged in subsequent discussions about the design, certification, regulations, compliance, training, and Organization Designation Authorization program associated with the 737 MAX. Over the next few months, JATR participants will take a comprehensive look at the FAA’s certification of the aircraft’s automated flight control system. Each participant will individually provide the FAA with findings regarding the adequacy of the certification process and any recommendations to improve the process.

Per Reuters :

The team will evaluate aspects of the 737 MAX automated flight control system, including design and pilots’ interaction with the system, “to determine its compliance with all applicable regulations and to identify future enhancements that might be needed,” the FAA said.

Pierre5018 (talk) 13:07, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

infobox cause field -- pilots did not know about MCAS

Seems to me that the deletion of the words that the pilots could not control the pitch angle (which I mistakenly thought was synonymous with angle of attack) leaves the reader wondering what does the fact that the pilots were oblivious to the MCAS have anything to do with the cause of the grounding. I think the sentence seems out of place in telling the cause of the grounding without words to the effect that by being oblivious to the MCAS the pilots could not control the pitch angle since the MCAS controlled that angle without the pilots' knowledge. Banana Republic (talk) 03:22, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

Added details in cause, but it's getting wordy.Pierre5018 (talk) 04:29, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Yes, it was getting out of hand. I removed it. Blaming the MCAS for the two crashes, and explaining that MCAS controls the pitch is sufficient to give an overview for the cause. Banana Republic (talk) 04:45, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
It was still totally out of hand for an infobox, I've shortened it drastically per MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE: wherever possible, present information in short form, and exclude any unnecessary content. Avoid links to sections within the article; the table of contents provides that function. Rosbif73 (talk) 07:13, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Yes, the information should be short and concise. My concern is that talking about only the two crashes does not give the root cause. The root cause of the grounding is problems with the MCAS. Since MCAS is not a generally known word, a few words are needed to explain it, which is why IMHO in this article the cause should be a little longer than would be typical. If need be, apply WP:IAR. Banana Republic (talk) 13:51, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
The immediate cause of the groundings was the similarity between the two crashes. MCAS was subsequently identified as a common factor. As for the root cause, we need to wait for the inquiry results; IMO it probably lies somewhere within the certification process. In any case, the immediate cause is sufficient for the infobox; those who want slightly more detail can read the lead, and those who want the full story can read the whole article! Rosbif73 (talk) 14:01, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

Point taken about MCAS may not be the root cause. However, I think not mentioning MCAS in the infobox is an injustice. Perhaps we can just add the words "with the MCAS having been identified as the culprit". With the link to the article, we would not even have to explain what is MCAS. Banana Republic (talk) 18:38, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

the infobox could perhaps have a note explaining the long duration : the complexity and breadth of the systems involved in the fix, including MCAS, cockpit displays, sensors, flight control computer architecture, training. There is no single culprit, and consensus among regulators is yet to be achieved.Pierre5018 (talk) 19:30, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Perhaps I am misunderstanding the article, but I thought Boeing was working on fixing the MCAS in order to get the planes back up in the air. The infobox should be the article in a nutshell, allowing the reader to get the essential highlights of the article without reading the article. Banana Republic (talk) 20:19, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
It is not just MCAS. As mentioned above, the fix encompasses MCAS, cockpit displays, AoA sensors architecture, flight control computer architecture, computer-based training, flight simulators. There is a trust crisis between international regulators, FAA, Boeing, NTSB .... The FAA aircraft and systems certification process, the type rating and differences training for the MAX, and the extent of acceptable delegation with adequate FAA oversight are also being investigated. Pierre5018 (talk) 01:03, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
@Banana Republic: he infobox should be the article in a nutshell, allowing the reader to get the essential highlights of the article without reading the article. – No, that's what the lead is for. The infobox summarises certain key facts within those highlights. Have a read of MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE... Rosbif73 (talk) 11:09, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
Seems to me that MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE says essentially the same thing, but with different words. MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE says that the purpose of the infobox is to summarize (and not supplant) key facts that appear in the article. Since the issue with MCAS is a major portion of the article, I think it should appear in the infobox in some manner. Banana Republic (talk) 12:42, 13 September 2019 (UTC)

Certification inquiries : organize section

Not all inquiries are narrowly restricted to certification. Inquiries and investigations ? Suggestion of subsections, examplar flow, not exhaustive :

  1. Government and agencies
    1. US government inquiries and investigations (Congress: House and Senate hearings )
    2. US Department : DOJ inquiries and investigations
    3. US independent agency : SEC investigations into Boeing's 737 Max Disclosures
    4. US Department of Transportation (DOT) inquiries and investigations
    5. US DOT agency : FAA self-inquiries
  2. International regulators
    1. JATR FAA/NASA/regulators international inquiry
  3. Industry
    1. Boeing self-inquiry (panel)
  4. Investigative Journalism
    1. Seattle Times
    2. New York Times
    3. ...
  5. other inquiries and investigations

Pierre5018 (talk) 16:02, 18 October 2019 (UTC)

Accident vs incident

per ICAO : The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation has been ratified by 191 countries and applies to flights undertaken between them. Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation to the Convention defines an accident as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a person is fatally or seriously injured, or in which an aircraft sustains damage or structural failure that adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, or in which an aircraft is considered to be missing or is completely inaccessible.ICAO fact sheet (PDF).--Pierre5018 (talk) 13:13, 23 October 2019 (UTC)

Hi Pierre5018. Are you suggesting any change to the article? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 13:19, 23 October 2019 (UTC)
Hi Martin, ... I was putting a rationale for keeping the classification of American Airlines Flight 96 (1972) as an accident and not an incident, consistently with NTSB's report "AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INCORPORATED MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-10, N103AA NEAR WINDSOR, ONTARIO, CANADA, JUNE 12, 1972 " and with ICAO's definition of an accident. Regards !--Pierre5018 (talk) 13:26, 23 October 2019 (UTC)
Ah I see, thanks. Yes, I tend to agree with you. Martinevans123 (talk) 13:38, 23 October 2019 (UTC)

Transclusions

Looks like there was an attempt to share several sections of this article with the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System article. That work wasn't carefully done and left the latter article with about a dozen undefined references and some really goofy structure. I've cleaned up the references by arranging this article so that references are defined in the included sections. While things are fixed for now, transclusion like this is quite fragile because it's hard to document the dependency and nothing at all enforces the dependency or the ordering. That is, edits to this article can negatively affect the other article without warning. -- Mikeblas (talk) 23:00, 27 October 2019 (UTC)

Thanks. Shencypeter (talk) 23:23, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

Too long: Section Reactions to sub-article

Says it all. 2001:16B8:4877:7B00:AC25:D0A4:697F:8217 (talk) 12:07, 3 November 2019 (UTC)

AoA disagree alert: sources contradicting each other?

@Shencypeter: Is there a contradiction between sources that should be considered in the article ? --Pierre5018 (talk) 11:42, 13 November 2019 (UTC)

Transclusion of summary

I have transcluded the introduction from this article Boeing 737 MAX groundings into the section at page Boeing 737 MAX Worldwide groundings. This achieves the following:

  • Reduces the length of the Boeing 737 MAX groundings section, which has been marked as overlong.
  • Allows the overlength comment to be removed
  • Ensures that the two articles Boeing 737 MAX and Boeing 737 MAX groundings are always coordinated and up to date and eited only in one place. Ex nihil (talk) : Ex nihil (talk) 14:04, 21 November 2019 (UTC)

Thanks man Shencypeter (talk) 16:54, 29 November 2019 (UTC)

Repeated activation

To: user 217.165.89.108: Your edit summary shows a misunderstanding of MCAS. Your summary was:

"The logic is that MCAS forced only once to a nosedive. The repetition was due to the counteract "climb/pitch-up" by the pilots".

Yes, pilots counteracted, but MCAS repeatedly activated after the pilot counteractions. MCAS did not "force only once". It repeatedly forced dives. This is a key element in the serious controversy over the the design and approval of MCAS. It did NOT act "once"; it acted Repeatedly, as explained by numerous sources cited in this article. The Introduction to the article should include this essential fact about MCAS and the accidents. DonFB (talk) 06:51, 10 December 2019 (UTC)

Yes, you are right! Actually, I wanted to say: it can be also seen that MCAS forced (only once) to a nosedive until crash and it would repeat the action as many times as the pilots tried to counteract. Mathematically it can be described (nosedive + climb + nosedive + climb + nosedive + climb + ... + climb + nosedive + climb + nosedive + climb) + nosedive => It is effectively only "one unstoppable nosedive". By the way, as you said "repetition is a key element", it could be actually applied also to MCAS functionality, i.e. to provide another MCAS "disable function" through repetition, e.g., three subsequent pilot's climb counteract additionally to pulling back on the control column. In case of the updated MCAS will be unintentionally activated again due to a defect on both AOA sensors (low possibility but consider that EASA requires triple redundancies), pilot will instinctively try to counteract nosedive with climbing as they might forget the standard recovery procedure in a panic situation, IMHO. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2001:8F8:1749:7F3D:45CB:6A6A:89EF:7217 (talk) 06:33, 11 December 2019 (UTC)
Glad that we now agree on the revised text. DonFB (talk) 06:56, 11 December 2019 (UTC)
Once activated the MCAS system operates for ten seconds followed by a five second pause, during which normal pitch control is handed back to the pilots. If then the AofA nose-high condition still persists (as will appear to be the case to the system if the AofA sensor is faulty or damaged) the sequence will then be repeated, i.e., ten seconds of MCAS on, followed by etc., .... [2] This mode of operation was only revealed by the manufacturer after the second accident.
BTW, the 737 Max only had one AofA sensor feeding MCAS as-built. The requirement for a second sensor was introduced after the Ethiopian Airlines accident.
For anyone who's interested, "FAA head testifies before House committee on Boeing 737 MAX concerns" here: [3] - although I can't say it makes for particularly edifying viewing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 09:44, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

References

Reduction of nesting

I proceeded to elevate heading levels above unnecessary super headings, to ensure that each section's header is prominently displayed in bold-face in Desktop and Mobile.Shencypeter (talk) 01:04, 7 January 2020 (UTC)

Released internal Boeing messages that disparage 737 MAX, regulators

Hi all! There was attempt to put the internal Boeing messages released in January 2020, showing employee mockery of the aircraft and its regulators by saying "the MAX aircraft was designed by "..owns" and supervised by "...keys". Though it describes the situation before MAX crashes simply but precisely through figurative way so that it says more than our thousand words in the article, but it is obsolete and will have minimum effect on the current re-certification process, where the regulator has already revoked its authority to issue individual airworthiness certificate, i.e. they are not "...keys" any more but really take back the "main keys" to the regulation process. Furthermore the design owner are not more "..owns" as they are providing adequate access for the regulatory compliance. Furthermore the message is already reflected in phrase by editor Pierre: "...inadequately communicated the changes to the FAA, which poorly understood them" but also the body of article reflects the message in depth. This is my opinion as nobody (anonymous) and please feel free to give your expert opinions in order to come to best conclusion...ciao! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.200.162.14 (talk) 13:47, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I think one sentence about these messages is appropriate for the Lede. The issue is not whether the messages are "obsolete" and thus will not affect recertification, but rather, that they relate directly to the MAX, the grounded airplane, and are reported as representing a degraded safety culture at the company. DonFB (talk) 14:14, 11 January 2020 (UTC)
It is vital to include them because this is the history of how we got to here. Ex nihil (talk) : Ex nihil (talk) 15:55, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I see, score 3:0 for YES, it should be in the Lede! And I have to put it back as I am the one, who removed it. One question, are the internal messages same as the new batch of messages disclosed at the day the CEO resigned in December 2019: Boeing Discloses ‘Very Disturbing’ Messages on Max to FAA?87.200.162.14 (talk) 17:15, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I think messages just released are the same ones referred to, but not publicly quoted, earlier. Suggested text: "In January 2020, Boeing revealed derogatory messages exchanged by some of its employees about the FAA and the airplane's design and safety." DonFB (talk) 17:24, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I put back the removed "mockery messages" with same formulation but in the different position / timeline: "In December 2019, Boeing ousted its CEO over mismanagement of the crisis and the same day released its internal messages to FAA showing employee mockery of the aircraft and its regulators." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.200.162.14 (talk) 04:03, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

"...inadequately communicated the changes to the FAA, which poorly understood them" - unfortunately this is only correct as regards the MCAS system, the leaked e-mails reveal that Boeing management and employees appear to have deliberately misled the FAA inspectors and their own airline customers in order to remove the requirement for simulator training, and this is I suspect the reason for the FBI's confiscation of these documents back in March-April 2019 pending possible criminal charges, it being a felony apparently, to lie to a federal (i.e. FAA) official. [4] [5] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.164 (talk) 10:22, 13 January 2020 (UTC)
"Boeing Persuaded Lion to Drop Simulator Training for 737 Max" - news item here: [6] and "Boeing Mocked Lion Air’s Calls for 737 Max Training Before Deadly Crash" here: [7]
One suspects that it is not a good idea to refer to your customer's crews as "idiots" if you want that airline customer to continue to buy more aeroplanes off you, especially when, after a horrendous crash(es), you then try and blame those same crews for being 'inadequately trained' when it was you yourself who had previously persuaded them not to receive more training that might have averted the accident(s).— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.164 (talk) 09:03, 14 January 2020 (UTC)

DC-10 groundings

Hi. Re these groundings there is a suggestion from sources of problems with certification procedures, echoing findings related to DC-10 groundings in the 1970s, which is important information to include in the article.

However.

From the given links and some more ferreting about I couldn't identify a source that groups the three DC-10s (as they have been grouped here), nor any source connecting that group of three to the "blue ribbon panel" written about here, nor further linking that to the current 737 Max issues. For us to select these three incidents and present them as direct precursors of the blue ribbon panel's criticisms of government and then to contrast that with the subject of this article when no reliable source does so, is WP:SYNTHESIS even if it's true.

The separately linked and presented items of information are highly pertinent and need to be appropriately woven into the article, probably the Certification inquiries section would be the place.

It's obvious that the "See also" section is not the place for it. The "See also" section is for "A bulleted list of internal links..." with (maybe) "a brief annotation". Not a paragraph of editorial in progress linking three articles and externally sourced. Someone remove it, shape it nicely, and pop it in the right place please? Cheers! Captainllama (talk) 21:36, 23 October 2019 (UTC)

Hi Capt'n, A subsection under reactions by experts could be a suitable place. The subsection could refer to articles by experts linking the DC-10 with the MAX.--Pierre5018 (talk) 02:55, 24 October 2019 (UTC)
The relevance of the DC-10 is not the Chicago accident of 1979 but The Windsor Incident of 1972 where a cargo door came off a DC-10 in flight resulting in the aircraft almost crashing. After the incident the FAA was going to make an Airworthiness Directive (AD) ordering the cargo door design to be fixed but in a 'gentleman's agreement' with McDonnell Douglas the AD - with-which compliance would have been mandatory - was changed to an advisory only, with the result that a DC-10 crashed in Paris two years later, after a cargo door blew open in flight.
An AD in 1972 would have effectively grounded each DC-10 until the doors could be modified, but McDonnell Douglas would have lost money, so they persuaded the FAA to make the requirement non-urgent.
If an AD had been issued, as was required for such an incident with such drastic safety implications, the deaths in 1974 would not have occurred. The costly litigation resulting from the crash effectively led to the decline of McDonnell Douglas such that it was unable to afford the development of any entirely new passenger aircraft designs. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.172.212 (talk) 10:39, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

Fail to find any relevance to the MAX from something that happened in the last century and a different company, have we actually any reliable sources that link MAX and DC-10, if not it has no place. MilborneOne (talk) 13:48, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

The relevance is in the current accusations of the FAA not doing its job, Re; the 737 Max, and thereby allegedly allowing an unsafe aircraft to carry passengers resulting in several hundred avoidable deaths. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.172.212 (talk) 16:05, 1 November 2019 (UTC)
But that has nothing to do with decison many decades ago, you need a reliable source to link the actions taken over the DC-10 and the 737 MAX. MilborneOne (talk) 16:17, 1 November 2019 (UTC)
I think See Also should focus on airliner groundings--the subject of this article--not on accident causes. Articles on similar causes can be linked at the individual accident articles. DonFB (talk) 20:18, 1 November 2019 (UTC)
Clip from a new Channel 4 documentary showing what the pilots had to cope with, here: [8] The difficulty in operating the manual trim is the factor that was not replicated in the original simulator software and had to be upgraded with a patch after the Ethiopian accident.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 12:14, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Cargo doors blowing off are not really comparable with hidden software that changes flight control logic. Martinevans123 (talk) 12:34, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Perhaps not, but both occurred on aircraft that had supposedly been 'certified' as 'safe' by the FAA. And in both cases the FAA allegedly 'bowed to pressure' from the manufacturer.
... aviation certification authorities exist to ensure the safety of the aircraft crews and travelling public, not to assist a company in making money from a particular aircraft design. As it is, here both the certifying authority, and the manufacturer, have in effect shot themselves in the foot, and will be lucky if the rest of the world is willing to take them at their word for the foreseeable future. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 12:44, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
You make a perfectly valid point. Maybe this could be brought out somewhere in the text? Martinevans123 (talk) 12:57, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Possibly, but I prefer to leave that to others to decide. Unfortunately for both the organisations concerned, I suspect their troubles may not yet be over.
The FAA (and CAA before it) has a dual mandate that has historically been subject to discussion and debate: the agency's mandate is both to promote and regulate air commerce. So, although the FAA does not literally "assist a company in making money from a particular aircraft design", the agency, according to its founding legislation, has two goals that are in tension and probably, at times, in conflict with each other. I believe "foster" was the term used in the first enabling legislation of 1926. The FAA act of 1958 explicitly uses the words "promote" and "promotion" and "regulation". In any case, if an explicit linkage in the article text is made between grounding of the DC 10 (or any U.S. grounding order) and the MAX case, that comparison must have RS referencing. DonFB (talk) 14:16, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Don't fret. I'm sure the Donald will make it all better. Martinevans123 (talk) 14:31, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
The point about the DC-10 is that it wasn't grounded after the Windsor Incident, and as a result over 300 people died. It wasn't grounded because the manufacturer persuaded the FAA not to ground it, but instead to give the manufacturer and airlines a time period in which to allow the modifications to be made. The THY aircraft that crashed near Paris supposedly had had all the required door modifications incorporated when it left the McDonnell Douglas factory - it was delivered to Turkish Airlines new. Upon examination of the wreckage however it was discovered that they hadn't all been carried out. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 14:50, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
So clearly has no relevance to the MAX grounding. MilborneOne (talk) 17:37, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Both incidents might be seen as relevant to the topic of aircraft certification, generally, in the USA? Martinevans123 (talk) 17:46, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Quite so. The current controversy is not confined solely to the aircraft themselves, but to the method by which commercial air transport aeroplanes are certificated as safe in the US. It is because of this controversy that the various other aviation authorities are currently declining to accept the FAA's word when it comes to the 737 Max aircraft and are instead insisting on performing their own separate and impartial checks. This situation is a result of changes in the certification system introduced independently by the US in 2013 by which manufacturers are allowed to effectively 'self-certify' new aircraft, a situation which, had it been widely known outside the US, would probably have led to this same 'lack of trust' situation earlier. [9]
The current certification systems as implemented by most of the rest of the world were devised in the 1920s to provide checks-and-balances such that (honest) mistakes in design and faulty manufacturing could be caught and corrected before the aircraft ever got near fare-paying passengers. At a stroke the US has negated their implementation of this impartial system in the eyes of the rest of the world.
Certification requirements are meant to ensure that an average pilot on an average day can operate the aeroplane to a high degree of safety, and the reason for this requirement is so that a company's highly-skilled test pilots, who get to fly any new aeroplane first, and who may become so used to a bad or potentially dangerous characteristic over time such that they no longer see it as a problem, are not the final judge of an aircraft being capable of being flown safely by other less-experienced pilots - who make up the bulk of the pilots out there.
The consequences of negating such a well-thought out and long-practised system, both in terms of lost lives, and in subsequent impact on a company's balance sheet, and reputation, should by now be self-evident. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 09:38, 8 December 2019 (UTC)
All true and makes it clear that mention of the pre-2013 DC-10 accidents are not relevant here. MilborneOne (talk) 10:48, 8 December 2019 (UTC)
Yet more unpleasant revelations from leaked manufacturer's e-mails in a NY Times article here: [10] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.164 (talk) 07:04, 10 January 2020 (UTC)

The NY Times article gives no indication as to the credentials of the sources of those emails and internal messages or that they have determined the authors to be authoritative sources of valid complaints. Does the janitor’s personal opinion on the airplane’s design hold the same weight as the Chief Engineer’s? The media has shown no discernment between the two—indeed that has been the media’s MO for the entire 737 MAX story—and Wikipedia seems to be following in their footsteps, resulting in Wiki information that is at best “fake news.” Pete.pereira (talk) 10:37, 19 January 2020 (UTC)

Which news articles specify a janitor's opinion as a source? Which text in this article is "fake"? The term "fake news" is as you've used it is a foolish demagogic epithet. Reasonable and intelligent people can discern between news in the National Enquirer (fake) and news in the Seattle Times or New York Times (legitimate). Recommended reading: wp:V, wp:RS. DonFB (talk) 02:32, 21 January 2020 (UTC)

Article too long – discussion of possible splitting strategies

The {{too long}} tag has been added to this article again, and rightly so IMHO. I've tweaked the hidden note so as to direct discussion here in the hope of achieving consensus before anyone goes for a WP:BOLD (and likely contentious) split!

Some of the historical content (e.g. the timelines or the repeated return-to-service projections) could no doubt be condensed without losing anything important, but I think there is still too much information for a single article. The big question, then, is how best to organise the split. For me the main criterion (beside readability of the main article, of course) is that we need to avoid the risk of content being duplicated between the sub-articles – in other words, the split needs to be well-defined, so that there is little possibility of hesitation as to which content belongs in which sub-article. Suggestions welcome! Rosbif73 (talk) 07:42, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Suggest reversing the transclusion of Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which currently relies on this article, so that it contains details of its investigations and the grounding article highlights only the most important points from it. Shencypeter (talk) 09:58, 6 January 2020 (UTC)
Not sure what you meant.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 11:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System was the first well-intended split that became an orphaned article. 80% of its content has been transcluded from here; it really should be the other way around, if we transclude at all. Organization Designation Authorization was also created from this article. We should not be defining what delegation is from within the groundings article anyway. Further, the ICAO conventions, below -- I've already hinted with a {{seealso}} linking to aviation accident analysis which could explain where the investigations are conducted. The snippet got restored. Shencypeter (talk) 13:39, 6 January 2020 (UTC)
It does not matter if only 1 article links to MCAS, it's not orphaned then. You are confusing moving content (cutting and pasting) and transcluding (automatic inclusion of an article part in another one), usually of the WP:LEAD section to avoid maintenance problems. It was the case initially for MCAS but not anymore. I'm not sure what the ICAO have anything to do with our discussion, the subject is to organize Wikipedia, not discuss its content.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 15:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)
A simple methodology:
Of course not all splits are necessary, the order by size is 1. Reactions (86k) 2. (tie) Groundings and Systems(76k), 4. Return to service (56k) 5. Financial impact (39k) 6. Certification (34k) 7. Accidents (29k). 1., 2. and 3. should be done immediately. Note all have the approximate recommended size. And at least, some reserve from editors to avoid adding every little new article should be welcome, WP:NOTNEWS.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 11:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)
Done (finally) but in the meantime the Certification section grew a bit, but I think the smaller Return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX should be merged in Boeing 737 MAX Certification. Also, the Systems section grew uncontrollably away from the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System article. It should still be split in MCAS. --Marc Lacoste (talk) 18:34, 22 February 2020 (UTC)
Good execution @Marc Lacoste:! Shencypeter (talk) 04:56, 25 February 2020 (UTC)

Groundings plural?

Does the name of this page need to be in the plural? The subject of the article is the (worldwide) grounding of the aircraft, so "Boeing 737 MAX grounding" should suffice. 62.254.152.243 (talk) 02:56, 3 March 2020 (UTC)

  • Agree it should be singular. The grounding did arrive sequentially via a number of national aviation authorities but I never see it referred to in the plural. It's grounded, one grounding. If it is grounded again in 2021, then it'd be groundings. I'll move it shortly unless there is another opinion here. Ex nihil (talk) 08:30, 3 March 2020 (UTC)
  • I can see the logic of both and have no strong preference. But given that the title has lasted for nearly a year I expect this would be a controversial move. Accordingly, please wait for consensus to emerge before moving the page (or, perhaps better still, start a formal move request). Rosbif73 (talk) 10:48, 3 March 2020 (UTC)
FWIW the aircraft was grounded over a period of time by a number of countries in separate 'groundings' so plural should be fine as it is.

Encyclopedic content, not news

Most sources for this article and its sub-articles are news media, and as such have an undertone a little bit sensationalist, often transposed here. While most are reputable, I think the articles would benefit from having more aviation media references, leading to a more factual, encyclopedic content, as I have done recently.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 15:25, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Timeline

@Marc Lacoste: The following information from the cited aviation herald:

On Nov 10th 2018 Boeing sent out multi-operator messages informing operators about the MCAS (Maneouvering Characteristics Augementation System) stating:

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and dunng flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column tnm switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

Boeing, PRIMARY source https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page#/flight-deck

Overview The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was designed and certified for the 737 MAX to enhance the pitch stability of the airplane – so that it feels and flies like other 737s.

MCAS is designed to activate in manual flight, with the airplane's flaps up, at an elevated Angle of Attack (AOA).

Boeing has developed an MCAS software update to provide additional layers of protection if the AOA sensors provide erroneous data. The software has been put through hundreds of hours of analysis, laboratory testing, verification in a simulator and numerous test flights. Before it is finalized, the software will be validated during in-flight certification tests with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives.

Yes, it's not a fly by wire aircraft, that's why MCAS is blind to whatever else the plane is doing. It will blindly turn on MCAS for 10 seconds regardless of the current trim level. This discussion is posted To resolve the cn and vn tags only.

Shencypeter (talk) 23:19, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

Pulitzer winning RS series, add?

Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting winners: Dominic Gates, Steve Miletich, Mike Baker, and Lewis Kamb of The Seattle Times

X1\ (talk) 08:40, 8 May 2020 (UTC)

feel free to incorporate into existing text
Over the next several months, The Seattle Times's coverage of the ongoing crisis revealed how management decisions at Boeing and the FAA pushed for cost-saving solutions, but ultimately produced a flawed design with insufficient oversight. [60]-- Shencypeter (talk) 14:08, 8 May 2020 (UTC)
Already added in Reactions_to_the_Boeing_737_MAX_groundings#News_media--Marc Lacoste (talk) 04:57, 9 May 2020 (UTC)
All of them?
  • March 17, 2019 Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
  • May 5, 2019 Engineers say Boeing pushed to limit safety testing in race to certify planes, including 737 MAX
  • June 22, 2019 The inside story of MCAS: How Boeing’s 737 MAX system gained power and lost safeguards
  • October 3, 2019 Boeing rejected 737 MAX safety upgrades before fatal crashes, whistleblower says
  • October 2, 2019 Boeing pushed FAA to relax 737 MAX certification requirements for crew alerts
  • March 26, 2019 Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX system baffles some involved in developing the jet
  • August 1, 2019 Newly stringent FAA tests spur a fundamental software redesign of Boeing’s 737 MAX flight controls
  • October 27, 2019 Interactive: Two tragic flights, 12 problems
  • October 29, 2019 A Lion Air crash victim, his family’s loss and a year of quiet mourning
  • December 29, 2019 Boeing’s 737 MAX crisis leaves it badly behind in ‘arms race’ for next decade’s jets
X1\ (talk) 00:29, 10 May 2020 (UTC)
What was added is the Pulitzer prize recognition for the Seattle Time reporters. Feel free to add references to ST articles where relevant.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 07:11, 10 May 2020 (UTC)
The ST list above is useful if it could be incorporated X1\ Ex nihil (talk) 16:17, 11 May 2020 (UTC)

Lead problem

You are very active on the article and have made many edits to it. I have made almost no changes to your many edits in the body of the article. However, you have repeatedly made significant rewrites to the Introduction of the article, which is a very important section, and should remain relatively stable, with only incremental and necessary changes. I have accepted a lot of your changes to the Introduction, but I have also found many of your edits to that highly visible section to be problematic, because of issues with accuracy, loss of information, pov and grammar, and therefore I have reverted or revised those changes. Your edit summary about not respecting another's work is false and amounts to a personal attack, which I urge you to refrain from doing. You can be Bold in making your preferred changes, but I advise using more restraint if editing the Introduction. DonFB (talk) 00:13, 28 September 2019 (UTC)

@DonFB:, we have been involved for as long as the planes have been grounded; I have observed a repetitive pattern of you pasting over a preferred version of the lead without using the undo function, retaining some changes while losing others-- it seems to be provocative, dominating, your remark about it being the most visible section, says why you would be compelled to do this and pay little attention to the rest of the article-- why would anyone play with a microphone that isn't broadcast on air?
Thank you for starting the discussion; my gripe with your so-tagged ce edits is that, each time the lede grows, you trim it out in a way that our "pizza" has a little bit of all toppings-- like a quarter piece of pepperoni, making me question the importance of such statements as "airlines canceled thousands of flights" -- over 180 days and 390 aircraft that comparison looks like a daily figure, not over six months. Insignificant compared to Boeing's quarterly loss of 4 billion dollars. If the lede is to be useful there has to be an importance filter. Shencypeter (talk) 01:11, 28 September 2019 (UTC)
You mention "a preferred version of the lead". In fact, I have noticed that the lead seems to be "preferred" by all other editors without change for many days or longer, and suddenly you rewrite it, sometimes with the loss of information (especially dates) or with grammar, usage or clarity problems. As soon as you rewrite it, the lead becomes "preferred"? Depending on problems that I see in the rewrite, I either revise or Undo, whichever is more efficient. If the lead is stable for many days or longer, I believe the kind of sudden rewrite you have repeatedly done is problematic. Your changes often appear to be primarily for stylistic reasons. Some of those changes are fine, but not all of them. If I see a loss of information (for example, the 'who' of 'who grounded?'), I will restore the information when I believe it to be vital to an informative lead. Fact-wise, airlines did cancel thousands of flights within weeks of grounding; I believe that's an important and very clear metric which shows the impact of the groundings, and should be included explicitly in the lead. You said cancellations are "insignificant" compared to Boeing's financial loss. That's a non-sequitur: both impacts are significant; they're not directly comparable, nor need they be; they're two separate negative aspects of the groundings, and both are worthy of mention in the lead. Since you used the word "provocative," I'll respond that your repeated rewrites of a generally stable lead could be construed as provocative; my editing responses are intended to restore some, perhaps not all, of the pre-existing text that was supported by consensus, as indicated by stability of the text over a preceding period of many days or longer, until you changed it. You're probably not aware of edits I made to other parts of the article before you began contributing to it. DonFB (talk) 02:29, 28 September 2019 (UTC)

@DonFB: At least three other editors "Thanked" me when I revert you. You have never allowed time to see how others think of the lead. By now the grounding article should summarize the scandal and how it compares to unforeseen problems with other jets that led to grounding and repairs, not elementary information like "March 11 and March 13" or the FAA being the Max's certifier. Your most recent contribution added "After the first accident" and " After the second accident " despite the last paragraph begins with "Following the grounding orders".......... You have repeatedly gamed the system by copy-pasting old content to conceal the fact that you are reverting major parts of other people's work. And that is dominating and unacceptable. Shencypeter (talk) 23:43, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

I also have been thanked multiple times for reverting or revising your changes to the lead. I don't agree with your concept that basic information can now be omitted from the lead. This is an encyclopedia, not a newspaper. When you want to make changes to the lead, I recommend a more incremental approach. . DonFB (talk) 02:25, 2 November 2019 (UTC)
An example of the kind of problem introduced by your over-eagerness to repeatedly rewrite the lead is seen in the very first phrase, incorrectly punctuated, of your recent revision: "On March 10 2019". Aviation authorities did not begin grounding on that date, as shown by referenced entries in the "Regulators" table of the article. China was the first regulator, on March 11; Ethiopian Airlines was first to ground, on March 10. Both facts formerly resided in the lead until you eliminated them. Therefore, I also recommend that you be more careful, both with facts and writing. DonFB (talk) 03:03, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

I'm not really following this article day-to-day, I find it bloated and evolving too fast. It has to maintain a balance between brevity and precision, and right now it seems it doesn't achieve either one. The lead section is a good example. It's always changing and often too long. It needs stability and conciseness. I don't know which editor is right or wrong and I don't care, I care about the resulting text. The lead section should be a summary of the article body, not the place for each minute detail. I hope for the end of the MAX crisis soon, to be able to examine the whole article without it changing before the end of my read.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 07:15, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

Take it easy guys! That the lead section is always changing and often too long shows the editor's creativity and it has also three good reasons: 1. The problem to be described is a complicated type, which involves a sophisticated engineering feature (MCAS) of a best selling aircraft (MACS or MAX) from the world largest manufacturer. 2. The timeline is quite long with many milestones worth to be mentioned => difficult to shorten it! 3. Jargon is to be avoided so that editors have to use plain English as short as possible to describe the point 1 => really a challenge! So, just have fun in completing the article before the end of the MAX crisis!! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2001:8F8:1749:7D64:257F:13DC:878C:5C65 (talk) 12:04, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

Inline remark from DonFB: For your consideration: I included "appointed by the FAA" purely to be informative, though I recognize it could conceivably be construed as casting doubt. Not a huge deal; however, omitting its origin (from the Intro) can give impression that it is a standing organization, rather than, in fact, one convened ad hoc by the FAA for the express purpose of reviewing MCAS (and reached conclusions unfavorable to the FAA, belying idea that it might be biased in favor of the agency.)

This is just one example where multiple editors have preferred brevity while you keep restoring it. I made an anchored link to how JATR was formed instead. Shencypeter (talk) 17:25, 29 November 2019 (UTC)
You misunderstand the issue. An editor expressed no objection related to brevity; the editor evidently felt that "appointed by the FAA" could imply doubt might exist whether JATR would be neutral. I believed those four words added to the reader's understanding of the investigation, but I'm not insisting that they be restored to the lede. I have, however, made some new edits to the lede, correcting an inaccuracy you introduced, and claritying the timeline of events that your edits made less clear. DonFB (talk) 09:08, 30 November 2019 (UTC)
Your trimming of Seattle Times is inexcusable, the JATR also cited that the FAA was unaware of the changes.Shencypeter(talk) 23:20, 4 January 2020 (UTC)
I trimmed it, because it's the kind of addition you chronically make during your repeated rewrites of the lede that have contributed to the section becoming too long. I've accepted your revert, but corrected an inaccuracy in your text. DonFB (talk) 01:36, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
@Shencypeter: What made you write "In March, Seattle Times reported that MCAS gained more power and lost safeguards after it was certified. " That is not my understanding. Didn't MCAS gain more power concurrent with the flight testing process, not after certification. An aircraft system such as the Flight Control Computer with its software cannot be changed after certification without a change impact analysis followed by re-certification of the updated software. What is the exact citation of the Seattle Times ? --Pierre5018 (talk) 23:34, 4 January 2020 (UTC)
Yes, the exact citation from the Seattle Times needs to be fully understood. I assume you meant even after certification. This should all be fully explained in the main body of the article anyway. Martinevans123 (talk) 23:42, 4 January 2020 (UTC)
Full text is here: the FAA was oblivious to a late change of MCAS to emcompass low speed flight. Originally MCAS relied on an AOA sensor and high G-force.

[ https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/] Shencypeter (talk) 00:02, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

@Shencypeter: I do not read that changes were made after certification. What happened is that Boeing submitted a safety analysis document to the FAA and later changed the requirements and principle of operation without updating the analysis. However all of this probably happened before certification. Please find exact reference or delete. Let's not make assumptions about the sequence of events.

We could probably write "after approval of the initial version of MCAS". Moreover, NYTimes wrote "While the F.A.A. officials in charge of training didn’t know about the changes, another arm of the agency involved in certification did. But it did not conduct a safety analysis on the changes.

The F.A.A. had already approved the previous version of MCAS. And the agency’s rules didn’t require it to take a second look because the changes didn’t affect how the plane operated in extreme situations."[1] --Pierre5018 (talk) 01:21, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

Pierre, do you accept my recent revision: "changes not adequately communicated to the FAA during certification"? DonFB (talk) 01:38, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
@DonFB: Don, I had written summary statements about the shortcomings of the system safety assessment, and sadly those were eventually erased by other editors. In my opinion, the safety analysis not being updated to the a final configuration of MCAS is of top importance. It is not only a problems of poor communication between the applicant Boeing ant the certification authority FAA. The core issue is that the safety assessment wasn't adequate. Per the JATR report, the process did not satisfy the objectives of SAE ARP 4754A.

"Recommendation R8.12: The FAA should ensure that agreement of any limited application of a development assurance process includes the requirement for the applicant’s safety analysis processes to satisfy the ARP 4754A safety assessment objectives. o Observation O8.12-A: The limited application of a development assurance process agreed between the FAA and Boeing did not adequately consider the applicant’s safety analysis process and how that integrates with the tailored development assurance process for complex and integrated systems."--Pierre5018 (talk) 02:02, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

Yikes, a classic example of impenetrable bureaucratic gobbledygook. Anyway, hopefully my adjustment will work; I'm also amenable to your suggestion: "after approval of the initial version of MCAS". I think we agree the changes did not happen after certification, which I also cannot find in the sources, but during the process. DonFB (talk) 02:24, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

I don't understand what is your continued obsession to suppress the lead content ambiguously.

Boeing released more than 100 pages of internal messages on Jan. 9. In the communications, provided to the Federal Aviation Administration, lawmakers and the public, employees talked about pushing regulators and airlines — including Lion Air, the carrier whose 737 Max first crashed in October 2018 — to approve the new planes without requiring pilots to undergo simulator training. Other workers raised safety concerns and complained about lax standards.


In one of the messages, from April 2017, one Boeing employee told another, “This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys.” Another showed a Boeing employee hopeful they could “gang up” on regulators and steer them “in the direction we want.” Boeing, earlier this month, said the messages “do not reflect the company we are and need to be, and they are completely unacceptable.” Shencypeter (talk) 23:39, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Correct. And very little of that information was included in your unhelpful change to the lede. Regarding "obsession": you are the person who chronically changes the lede, all too often introducing wrong or unsourced information. Numerous of those edits have been reverted by other editors. You can edit anything you want here, but I note that 64 percent of your total edits are to this article, so you might look in the mirror when it comes to "obsession". DonFB (talk) 00:01, 2 February 2020 (UTC)

You appear to be the one suppressing article too long and lead too long tags and doing little to address these issues. You are reintroducing content trimmed in from other articles, and the lead section is now tasked to reference from all these subarticles. This article is only stable because you resist changes from all other editors as well. Shencypeter (talk) 08:49, 23 February 2020 (UTC)

Unfortunately, you again badly misread or misunderstand events here. I have never removed the 'article too long' tag. Your last sentence about the article being 'stable' because I 'resist' changes makes no sense, nor is your assertion about such behavior true. I advise you--again--to read wp:NPA. I will address exactly what I choose, which is primarily to make sure the article retains basic information about the groundings--remember, the article's subject--in the lede. DonFB (talk) 09:18, 23 February 2020 (UTC)

20% of your last 500 edits have been reverts. Shencypeter (talk) 10:42, 25 February 2020 (UTC)

A disproportionate number of them, sadly, were corrections to your edits that were mistakes, unsourced, or pov. DonFB (talk) 18:57, 25 February 2020 (UTC)
Oh, sorry, that number is likely inaccurate because it doesn't even count where you simply pasted over. Your recent resistance to transclusions shows you are unwilling to reach consensus with all editors anyway. The lead is now inaccurate and trying to represent all Subarticles. Shencypeter (talk) 12:06, 28 February 2020 (UTC)
I can understand your frustration, since so many of your edits have been reverted by multiple editors. I remain opposed in principle to transcluded portions of articles. It's a solution in search of a problem, and in fact, can cause problems, such as awkward text repetition and absent references within articles. Its worst offense is forcing editors to gain consensus twice for the same edit. About your broad statement, "The lead is now inaccurate": two items in the lead are not present in the article, 'House criticism', which you added, and 'derogatory' messages. You are free to remove those pieces of text. DonFB (talk) 02:03, 29 February 2020 (UTC)
Shencypeter, DonFB: Both of you should avoid personal attacks. Besides civility, it wears down other editors willingness to improve the articles. More diversity would be a good thing for the articles.
DonFB: on WP:Transclusion: I can understand you want to remove them, but for now, as the articles are moving too fast, it allows to avoid maintenance problems. When everything will be settled down, we could improve these sections by tailoring each of them for their article. It's not "a solution in search of a problem": the problem is clearly maintenance problems when two sections have the same subject but grows differently,; and there is no need to gain consensus twice, but only once on the source page.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 06:25, 29 February 2020 (UTC)
You have previously mentioned "maintenance" problems in a conversation we had about transclusion. The maintenance problems I see are needless text repetition and missing references when text is transcluded. In short, transclusion causes problems, rather than solving them. Just because transclusion is possible does not mean it should be done. You state consensus is only needed on the source page. Perhaps. I have long thought the opening sentence of the MCAS article is unnecessarily jargony and clumsy: "The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is a flight control law (software) embedded...." I have not tried to change it, however, because I did not expect agreement at that article. I would not hesitate to change it at the Grounding article, except that it is transcluded and can only be changed at the source article. Transclusion is a needless straitjacket on editors. Each article should stand on its own, with consensus therein. If information at any given article needs to be updated, it can be done at that article by the editors involved. The idea of "synchronization" sounds nice, but causes more problems than it solves, if, indeed, it solves any. You seem to agree with my point of view when you say, "we could improve these sections by tailoring each of them for their article". Indeed. We could. Today. I'm not convinced by your argument that we must wait until "everything will be settled down." Quality improvements can and should be done sooner, rather than later. DonFB (talk) 06:53, 29 February 2020 (UTC)
Maintenance problems arise when the same information is present in multiple places. After a while, each copy evolve separately because both won't be updated at the same time (especially with changing content like ours) and both become different, with different meanings and different references. This is useful when a main article have several subarticles like here: the lead section of each subarticle should be a great summary of each subarticle, and should be a great subpart for each subsection. It could be improved maybe with specific summaries, but for now the main article was such in a sorry state that the best thing to do right now is to improve the lead section of each subarticle. Go ahead and improve the MCAS lead section, and the others too! The transclusions could be reversed if you prefer, but it would be the same thing at the end.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 11:02, 1 March 2020 (UTC)

Your continued suppression of the correct technical term is troubling. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/04/09/boeing_737_max_software_fixes/ Shencypeter (talk) 09:04, 9 April 2020 (UTC)

I'll assume this message--couched in inappropriately personal terms--is intended for me. The phrase (runaway stabilizer) can be used in the article--just not in the lead, in accordance with explicit guidance in the Wikipedia Manual of Style and this guideline (as well as common sense) to avoid jargon in an article's lead. I doubt one person out of a hundred would know what the phrase means, and there's no compelling reason to use it in the lead when plain language is fully adequate. In the Register article you cited, you'll notice that the phrase is not used until the middle of the sixth paragraph. Immediately following, the writer says: "That's a fancy way of saying the nose is pointed down". Fancy is not appropriate for the lead to a Wikipedia article, as the guidelines I linked above emphasize. The first paragraph of the Register article uses "loss of control and subsequent nosedive"--phrasing that will be clear to anyone. That's also how Wikipedia lead sections should be written, as I've already noted in edit summaries and this discussion. DonFB (talk) 10:38, 9 April 2020 (UTC)


References

  1. ^ "Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change". 2019-06-01.

DonFB, This is the lead section of one article, it need not be all encompassing to include newly coined vague definitions of delegations, Subsystem's, or technical jargon when citations can support it. It has been abundantly clear that the delegation has gone too far and that was what was revoked in November. You go in and make like they are two very different ideas. "Boeing, FAA, and Airlines" --- all this to update a crew manual, when it sufficed to say that Boeing provided the instructions.

Your undo count and frequency is way beyond assuming good faith, DonFB. Shencypeter (talk) 14:45, 11 June 2020 (UTC)

No source says, in your words, "delegation...was what was revoked in November". No source says the ODA program was revoked or suspended. The FAA withdrew Boeing's authority to issue airworthiness certificates. That is not the whole of ODA, which involves design, engineering, and construction. An overarching issue in the grounding and the resulting certification investigations has been the FAA designee program, which should be clearly explained in the lead--as I have done--in a single sentence. Removing that information, as you have multiple times, is not helpful or informative. DonFB (talk)

I hereby resign from this toxic environment for my own mental health Shencypeter (talk) 23:12, 11 June 2020 (UTC)

Government-speak in lede

Pierre, my purpose in using the "inadequately explained" phrasing was to try to avoid any further engineering-style text in the lede and simply to condense the issue to its simplest terms: inadequate communication, poor understanding. That wording covers the broad topic of the failure to update. With the re-addition of the analysis text, it is now redundant to have both sentences. I recognize you want more specific technical wording, but I believe bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo in the lede like, "development assurance objectives for civil aviation systems" is very reader-unfriendly and is not even informative, except to engineers and government bureaucrats who habitually use that kind of opaque langugage. A major reason why the lede keeps re-growing, like a salamander leg, is due to the repeated addition of overly dense government-speak, which should be confined (and explained) in the body of the article. DonFB (talk) 18:49, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

@DonFB:

Don, thanks for the message. Key points for the lede include: (1) MCAS was changed and the required engineering update to the safety analysis was not done; (2) safety analysis and other engineering processes were poorly executed and did not meet the objectives for developing aircraft systems, as required by law; (3) the engineering data was poorly communicated and understood by the certification authority. Your update only covered point (3). As to the mumbo jumbo, anyone familiar with certified avionics and flight systems understands "development assurance objectives for civil aviation systems". If you update the lede, please make sure that you cover (1) and (2).

Ok, let's look at the issues. 1) The required update was not done. Result: inadequate communication to FAA of the revised state of MCAS. 2) Safety analysis was poorly executed. This can be expressed far more simply than by relying on the unhelpful mouthful, "development assurance objectives for civil aviation systems". See below for my suggested wording. 3) Re: mumbo jumbo. You said: "anyone familiar with certified avionics and flight systems understands..." I'm sure you're correct about that, and you make my point precisely. My point, once again, is that the vast majority of readers of the lede section are not, in fact, people who are "familiar" with such things. Note carefully the following excerpt from the Wikipedia guideline, Make technical articles understandable: "the lead should not assume that the reader is well acquainted with the subject of the article". I will slightly extrapolate that idea as follows: In the lede, do not assume readers are familiar either with the overall subject, or with specific concepts in the subject.
Now, replacing government-speak with Plain English, we can have:
"Media and government investigations found that Boeing's documentation did not adequately explain MCAS to the FAA, which poorly understood the system, and Boeing's engineering on the MAX failed to meet regulatory standards."
DonFB (talk) 22:11, 11 January 2020 (UTC)
@DonFB: The order of importance is (1) not doing proper engineering and (2) communication to the FAA. It is not just about complying to standards, but failure to fully assess the hazards of MCAS and mitigating the risks.

Text suggestion:

"Media and government investigations found that Boeing failed to fully assess the hazards of MCAS and mitigate its risks. MCAS was redesigned with much more control authority, late changes that were not followed by an update to the safety analysis submitted for certification. Boeing's development assurance did not comply with the standards for civil aviation systems. The JATR questionned whether the MAX met the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Finally, Boeing did not adequately explain MCAS to the FAA, which in turn poorly understood it."--Pierre5018 (talk) 23:23, 11 January 2020 (UTC)
Pierre, the fact that FAA poorly understood them should be clear in the statements: that they are unaware. Besides we now have evidence that Boeing wanted to underplay MCAS and minimize training, it's abundantly clear that a lot of the technical aspects of certification were skipped during the Jedi mind tricks. Shencypeter (talk) 03:28, 12 January 2020 (UTC)
Pierre, you're correct about all those problems. We just don't have enough space in the lede to include so much detail. Our challenge is to summarize and condense the most important issues, and do it in ordinary language. DonFB (talk) 04:29, 12 January 2020 (UTC)
IMHO. no problem to briefly formulated the issues in the lede but please do not miss the precision, e.g. where can I read that FAA "poorly understood" the changes? Then, otherwise the mockery messages would only say: designed by "..owns" without - supervised by "....keys". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.200.162.14 (talk) 05:35, 12 January 2020 (UTC)
I'm reasonably satisfied with the wording at this moment <holds breath>. And I'm ok not including the "poorly understood" phrase in the lede, but if you want to see sources for that idea, search some of the media articles about the JATR report from around Sept-Oct 2019. DonFB (talk) 05:44, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

Safety analysis and delegation

@DonFB:, You wrote : "Investigations found that Boeing, under delegation from the FAA, did not properly analyze the safety of late design changes to MCAS nor adequately inform the FAA."

Aircraft or systems safety assessment is part of engineering done by the applicant (Boeing), not a task to be done by the certification authority (FAA). The document must be approved by the certification authority, or by its delegate. Safety analysis was not delegated, but its approval was. At least, this is my understanding.--Pierre5018 (talk) 21:22, 13 January 2020 (UTC)
Actually, that was written by another editor. I reverted to the earlier phrasing. I agree with your comment, that analysis is not delegated, but approval is. DonFB (talk) 21:27, 13 January 2020 (UTC)
"Panel Clears 737 MAX’s Safety-Approval Process at FAA " here: [11] and "Independent panel says process for certifying 737 Max was safe" here: [12]
This is likely to ensure that the UK CAA, EASA, and other international aviation authorities will insist on their own separate certification of every new US-produced commercial transport category aeroplane for the foreseeable future. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:08, 17 January 2020 (UTC)
That's just speculation. Buffs (talk) 21:32, 24 January 2020 (UTC)
"European and Middle Eastern aviation regulators plan to conduct their own certification reviews of the next new Boeing plane" here: [13] and "Boeing’s Next Jet Faces More Scrutiny From Foreign Regulators, Amid 737 MAX Crisis" here: [14] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:10, 6 February 2020 (UTC)
One plane model is not "all". Buffs (talk) 20:59, 10 February 2020 (UTC)
Well as 'one plane model', excepting the 737 Max, is all that is currently up for Certification at the moment, that will have to suffice, except to say, that we shall just have to wait and see. "Proposed US legislation aims to restore faith in aircraft certification", here: [15] and "Three U.S. Senate Democrats propose sweeping reforms after Boeing 737 MAX crashes", here: [16]
FWIW, any competent and diligent independent and impartial certification authority should have caught and rejected MCAS fed by only one sensor before it was incorporated into any production aircraft, never mind that aircraft actually being released with MCAS on for sale to an airline to carry passengers with.
That's pretty much the whole point of Certification.
... to protect crew and passengers from 'nasty surprises' that can be avoided with good design and manufacture.
.. I should also perhaps add that this system is to a great extent reliant on the manufacturer being honest with the certification authority in informing the authority truthfully on how the various designs and systems work, or are intended to work. Similarly the onus is on the authority not to make frivolous demands for changes to a design that may incur unnecessary delays or additional cost to the manufacturer. Thus there needs to be an element of mutual trust between manufacturer and certification authority.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.134 (talk) 09:55, 10 March 2020 (UTC)
"Transport Canada test pilots had questions about Boeing’s 737 Max as far back as 2016", here: [17] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.134 (talk) 08:22, 16 March 2020 (UTC)
Please check if it's already mentioned in Boeing 737 MAX certification Shencypeter (talk) 07:37, 17 March 2020 (UTC)
"Prosecutors, Regulators Probe Boeing 737 MAX Production Issues" here: [18] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.145.115.28 (talk) 19:28, 28 April 2020 (UTC)
"Congress releases scathing report on Boeing 737 Max" here:[19] and "Deadly 737 Max Crashes Were ‘Horrific Culmination’ Of Failures By Boeing And FAA, House Report Says", here: [20] and "Congressional report blasts Boeing for deadly 737 Max jet failures", here:[21] and "US: Boeing engineers, management blamed for 737 MAX crashes", here: [22]
Final House Committee Report on The Boeing 737 Max Aircraft (pdf) here: [23]
"Union for FAA’s safety engineers urges more changes to Boeing 737 MAX before it can fly again" here: [24] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.163 (talk) 14:37, 25 September 2020 (UTC)
Former NTSB Chairman Jim Hall commenting on suspicions that Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, which crashed in 2009 due to the failure of a single sensor (i.e., a radio altimeter) feeding the flight control system, may be relevant to the current investigations, here: [25] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:08, 23 January 2020 (UTC)
Current news items on the 2009 Turkish Airlines accident, "Boeing Refuses to Cooperate With New Inquiry Into Deadly Crash", here; [26] and "Boeing refuses to play ball as Dutch MPs reopen 2009 crash involving 737", here: [27]
"Boeing Fixing New Software Bug on Max; Key Test Flight Nears" here: [28] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:22, 7 February 2020 (UTC)
If IP editor 95.144.50.147 intends to do much more editing in Wikipedia, it would be great to create an account and to sign her contributions. Ex nihil (talk) : Ex nihil (talk) 12:13, 8 February 2020 (UTC)
Thanks, yes I know, but I prefer to let regular Wiki users decide whether to add linked information to the actual Wiki pages or not. Unfortunately, much that has emerged after recent events is less than complementary about the two organisations concerned. I suspect that both organisations over the next few years may have good reason, over-and-above the unfortunate deaths on the two flights, to regret certain decisions they made from 2005-onwards.
Um, you are no less a "regular" user when you create an account; but it is helpful for discussions if you have a handle as the discussion would make no sense if you didn't see who said what. You can still remain completely anonymous with a handle (in fact, more so than when you use an IP that may link directly back to your person). Of course you are free to edit without an account, but it helps. Averell (talk) 19:30, 12 February 2020 (UTC)
Thanks for the kind reply, yes I know but I still prefer not to ATM.

Edits in lead

@Shencypeter: Sadly, your recent edits to the lead fell short of accuracy, even with footnotes. You wrote that the FAA "trusted Boeing to deliver a software update by April 2019". As seen in secondary sources (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-13/trump-says-u-s-grounding-boeing-737-max-aircraft-after-crash; https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-against-boeing; https://www.barrons.com/articles/regulators-found-high-risk-of-emergency-after-first-boeing-max-crash-51564602281) the FAA believed the crew manual updates were "sufficient" while Boeing worked on a fix. The April date is relatively incidental to the story; the real importance is the FAA belief that the Boeing Bulletin and the AD would temporarily suffice in case of another malfunction. Your wording gives a wrong impression that Boeing failed to meet an obligation. I included corrected facts in my revision of the text.

On the matter of "retribution", the source you cited (Harvard Business Review) talks about a fearful environment in the 787 Dreamliner factory, not the 737 MAX factory, and generalizes that idea to the whole company. It's an unsupported distortion to use that article to say that MAX workers "feared retribution". Interestingly, the HBR article includes a correction, which indicates the author at first believed the problems described happened in a 737 factory, and then discovered (and corrected) what kind of factory was actually involved--Dreamliner.

You garbled the date of the Boeing Bulletin/FAA AD. They were two separate events, one day apart: November 6 (Bulletin) and November 7 (AD). I fixed the error. DonFB (talk) 03:56, 6 July 2020 (UTC)

Sadly all this belongs in 737 certification and has no place in this article. Shencypeter (talk) 04:27, 6 July 2020 (UTC)

What's "all this"? DonFB (talk) 04:51, 6 July 2020 (UTC)
@Shencypeter: you have to address DonFB's observations. Also, please refrain to changing the lead section every 5 minutes, nobody can follow, thanks.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 17:57, 6 July 2020 (UTC)

@Shencypeter: Your recent revert only degrades what has been qualified as the "best" paragraph by an anonymous reviewer. It was achieved over many cycles by many authors in good faith. Please refrain from making changes without identifying what was wrong and how the new text is better. The lede need some sort of stability and continuous careful improvement, not radical changes.--Pierre5018 (talk) 00:17, 30 January 2021 (UTC)

I completely agree with Pierre's comment, especially that "careful improvement, not radical changes" are preferred. A consensus of at least three editors favors the newest version. That should be respected. DonFB (talk) 00:38, 30 January 2021 (UTC)
+1. We were getting close to some pretty good wording, and then we see some radical changes and at least one WP:POINTy edit. There's really no reason to be editing the lead every day; in the absence of new facts, the lead should be stable. The current version has been described by an uninvolved editor as the "best", let's keep it that way. I'd suggest a moratorium on even minor changes until new facts come to light. Rosbif73 (talk) 07:59, 30 January 2021 (UTC)
I concur.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 14:10, 30 January 2021 (UTC)

Transclusions

I raised the issue of fragile transclusions (see Talk:Boeing_737_MAX_groundings/Archive_2#Transclusions) before. Another spate of edits has damaged the references again, since the transclusions remain fragile and editors aren't aware, or careful around them. Has any thought been given to the restructuring of the article so it's not so easily damaged? -- Mikeblas (talk) 15:38, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

Thanks but could you do this without assigning blame. Shencypeter (talk) 23:55, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

Why believe the MAX is going to be safe after remediation?

How safe is a passenger who boards a 737 MAX after remediation?

The most interesting information for most readers are details related to

A. It wasn't safe before;

B. It's supposed to be safe now, but why believe that?

- what is now ordered to be done to make the MAX safe?

- if carried out, what indicates that those will be enough?

- what reason is there to think that these measures will be carried out?

- will the FAA now be on the job to make sure Boeing doesn't slack on safety again?

There's some good info in:

FAA finalizes its plan for the return of the Boeing 737 MAX Aug. 3, 2020 at 2:28 pm Updated Aug. 6, 2020 at 3:50 am https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-finalizes-and-opens-for-comment-its-plan-for-the-return-of-boeings-737-max/

Wikipedia is not a forum. I'm pretty sure you can find some airliners forum on the net. If you want to contribute, read the 4 articles and point out precisely where they lack some information, and even provide some solid references to fill those voids. The Seattle Times is already a frequent source for those. Thanks.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 06:23, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
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