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Russian irredentism

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  Russia and its territorial possessions throughout the Imperial (1721–1917) and the Soviet era (1922–1991), excluding Russian America (1741–1867)
  Soviet/post-Soviet territories that were never part of Imperial Russia: Tuva (1944–), East Prussia (1945–), western Ukraine (1939–1991), and Kuril Islands (1945–)
  Imperial territories/states that did not become part of the Soviet Union: Finland (1809–1917), Poland (1815–1915), and Kars (1878–1918)
  Soviet sphere of influence: Warsaw Pact (1945–1991; Albania until 1968; East Germany until 1990), Mongolia (1924–1991)
  Imperial sphere of influence and Soviet military occupation: northern Iran (1914–1918; 1941–1946), Manchuria (1892–1906; 1945–1946), northern Korea (1892–1906; 1945–1948), Xinjiang (1934), eastern Austria (1945–1955), and Afghanistan (1979–1989)

Russian irredentism (Russian: русский ирредентизм) refers to territorial claims made by the Russian Federation to regions that were historically part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, which Russian nationalists regard as part of the "Russian world". It seeks to create a Greater Russia by politically incorporating ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in territories bordering Russia. This ideology has been significantly defined by the regime of Vladimir Putin, who has governed the country since 1999. It is linked to Russian neo-imperialism.

Russian troops currently occupy parts of three neighbouring countries: southern and eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the Transnistria region of Moldova. Since it began in 2014, the Russo-Ukrainian War has been described by much of the international community as being a culmination of Russia's irredentist policies towards Ukraine. Examples of these irredentist policies being implemented in this conflict include the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014[1] and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, which saw the Russian annexation of southeastern Ukraine in 2022.

Ideological background

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Specifically looking at the viewpoints of post-Soviet Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Erdi Ozturk, a professor at London Metropolitan University, has commented that irredentist ideology relies upon a "distinction between civilizations by synthesizing nationalism with nostalgic visions of history, memory, and religion."[2]

History

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Imperial era

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From roughly the 16th century to the 20th century, the Russian Empire followed an expansionist policy.[n 1] Few of these actions had irredentist justifications, though the conquest of parts of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus in 1877 to bring Armenian Christians under the protection of the Tsar may represent one example.[3] Russia has also had an enduring interest in Constantinople (Istanbul), which was envisioned as the centre of Russian power.[4]

Post-Soviet era

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Russian-occupied and Russian-claimed territories in Europe as of 2023

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was thought that the Russian Federation had given up on plans of territorial expansion or kin-state nationalism, despite some 25 million ethnic Russians living in neighboring countries outside Russia.[5] Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres assert that Russia followed a non-irredentist policy in the 1990s despite some justifications for irredentist policies—one factor disfavoring irredentism was a focus by the ruling interest in consolidating power and the economy within the territory of Russia.[6] Furthermore, a stable policy of irredentism popular with the electorate was not found, and politicians proposing such ideas did not fare well electorally.[7] Russian nationalist politicians tended to focus on internal threats (i.e. "outsiders") rather than on the interests of Russians outside the federation.[8]

Russo-Ukrainian War (since 2014)

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See also: Russo-Ukrainian War and Russian neo-imperialism
Ukrainian regions wholly or largely claimed by Russia since 2014 (Crimea) and 2022 (Donbas, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia)

"Russia's border doesn't end anywhere".

—Vladimir Putin, 24 November 2016[9]

It has been proposed that the annexation of Crimea in 2014 proves Russia remains an expansionist state.[10][11][12][13] Vladimir Putin's speech on the Crimea annexation was described by analyst Vladimir Socor as a "manifesto of Greater-Russia irredentism".[14] Putin said that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had "robbed" Russia of territories and made Russians "the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders", calling this an "outrageous historical injustice".[15] After the annexation, the Transnistrian authorities requested Russia annex Transnistria.[16][17][18]

Following the Crimea annexation, armed Russian-backed separatists seized towns in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, sparking the Donbas War. They declared their captured territory to be the Donetsk and Luhansk "people's republics". During this unrest, Putin began referring to "Novorossiya" (New Russia), a former Russian imperial territory that covered much of southern Ukraine.[19] Russian-backed forces then announced plans for a new Novorossiya, to incorporate all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[20][21]

A 2015 survey by the Pew Research Center found that "61 percent of Russians believe parts of neighboring countries really belong to Russia".[22]

In his 2021 essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", Putin referred to Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians as "one people" making up a triune Russian nation. He maintained that large parts of Ukraine are historical Russian lands and claimed there is "no historical basis" for the "idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians".[23][24]

On 21 February 2022, the Kremlin recognized the Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine as independent states—the Donetsk and Luhansk "people's republics"—as well as their irredentist claims to the wider Donbas region of Ukraine. The following day, Russia announced that it was sending troops into these territories.[25][26]

Full-scale invasion of Ukraine (since 2022)

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A Russian propaganda poster in occupied Kherson in 2022 declaring "Russia is here forever [uk]!"
See also: Russian invasion of Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full invasion of Ukraine.[27] In announcing the invasion, Putin repeatedly denied Ukraine's right to exist, calling the country "an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space", and claiming that it was created by Russia.[28] It has been referred to as an irredentist war, going against the norm since World War II that sees territorial conquest as unacceptable.[29] Parallels were made between Putin's irredentism during the Ukrainian War and Slobodan Milosevic's irredentism during the Bosnian War.[30]

On 1 March 2022, images emerged in the press showing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in front of a map which appeared to show invasion plans for Moldova where Russia already has soldiers in the breakaway region of Transnistria.[31][32] South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov announced his intention to begin the process of annexation by the Russian Federation.[33]

Four months into the invasion of Ukraine, Putin compared himself to Russian emperor Peter the Great. He claimed that Tsar Peter had returned "Russian land" to the empire, adding "it is now also our responsibility to return (Russian) land". Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council sees these comments as proof that Putin "is waging an old-fashioned imperial war of conquest".[34]

On 8 June 2022, a draft bill was submitted to Russia's State Duma by a member of the ruling United Russia party proposing to repeal the Decree of the State Council of the Soviet Union "On the Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of Lithuania".[35][36][37] On 6 July, the speaker of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, threatened to "claim back" Alaska if the US froze or seized Russian assets.[38]

In September 2022, referendums on joining Russia were held in four Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine: the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, Zaporizhzhia region and Kherson region. The Russian occupation authorities announced that all regions had overwhelmingly voted in favor of joining Russia and that there had been a high turnout despite the ongoing war and depopulation. It was widely dismissed as a sham referendum by Ukraine and many other countries.[39][40] On 30 September, Putin announced in a speech[41] that Russia had annexed the four regions.[42] The annexations were declared illegal by the UN. On 12 October 2022, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution ES-11/4 advocating for territorial integrity of Ukraine, with 143 nations voting in favor, 5 against and 35 abstaining. It condemned the "illegal so-called referendums" and the "attempted illegal annexation" and demanded that Russia immediately reverse its decisions and withdraw its forces from Ukraine.[43]

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former Russian president, said that Ukraine should not exist in any form and that Russia will continue to wage war against any independent Ukrainian state.[44] He commented that Putin outlined "why Ukraine did not exist, does not exist, and will not exist".[45] In a March 2024 speech, Medvedev described Ukraine as part of Russia,[46] and spoke in front of a large map showing Russia in control of most of the country, with western Ukraine partitioned between other countries.[47]

Analysis

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See also: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262, United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, and Legality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
On 12 October 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution ES 11/4 declaring that the staged referendums and attempted annexation are invalid and illegal under international law.
  In favour: 143
  Against: 5
  Abstained: 35
  Absent: 10
Wikinews has related news:

Some Russian nationalists seek to annex parts of the "near abroad", such as the Baltic states.[48] Governor of the Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Yevgeny Balitsky has described how "all of the Baltics" were "all our lands, and our people live there," calling to "correct this...through the might of Russian weapons" and "get our people back, the former subjects of the Russian Empire".[49] Others also some fear potential escalation due to Russian irredentist aspirations in Northern Kazakhstan.[50]

Looking at the Russian efforts as a whole, the news network Al Jazeera has quoted University of San Francisco scholar Stephen Zunes as remarking, "The level of physical devastation and casualties thus far over a relatively short period is perhaps the [worst] in recent decades which, combined with the irredentist aims of the conquest, makes Russia's war on Ukraine particularly reprehensible in the eyes of the international community."[2]

U.S. news publication The Washington Post has stated that the Russian government could start a chain reaction of irredentist mass violence, which then "could break the international order".[51]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ The state expanded eastwards, westwards and southwards, which led to the conquests of Siberia, the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Uzbekistan.

References

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  1. ^ Nagle, John (8 May 2014). "Russia's nationalist quest risks future of European borders". The Conversation.
  2. ^ a b "Can Russia return to the world stage, as other aggressor nations?". Al Jazeera. 29 March 2022. Retrieved 7 April 2022.
  3. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 96.
  4. ^ Hamlin, Cyrus (December 1886). "The Dream of Russia". The Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved 7 April 2022.
  5. ^ Tristan James Mabry; John McGarry; Margaret Moore; Brendan O'Leary (2013). Divided Nations and European Integration: National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 365. ISBN 9780812244977.
  6. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 197.
  7. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 199.
  8. ^ Saideman & Ayres 2008, p. 196.
  9. ^ "Vladimir Putin: Russia's border 'doesn't end anywhere'". BBC News. 24 November 2016. Retrieved 19 June 2023.
  10. ^ Armando Navarro (2015). Mexicano and Latino Politics and the Quest for Self-Determination: What Needs to Be Done. Lexington Books. p. 536. ISBN 9780739197363.
  11. ^ Joseph J. Hobbs (2016). Fundamentals of World Regional Geography. Cengage Learning. p. 183. ISBN 9781305854956.
  12. ^ Marvin Kalb (2015). Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War. Brookings Institution Press. p. 163. ISBN 9780815727446.
  13. ^ Stephen Saideman (March 18, 2014). "Why Crimea is likely the limit of Greater Russia". The Globe and Mail.
  14. ^ Vladimir Socor. "Putin's Crimea Speech: A Manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism". Vol. 11, no. 56. Eurasia Daily Monitor.
  15. ^ "Crimea crisis: Russian President Putin's speech annotated". BBC News. 19 March 2014.
  16. ^ Bocharova, Svetlana; Biryukova, Liliya (18 March 2014). "Приднестровье как Крым" [Transnistria as Crimea]. Vedomosti (in Russian). Archived from the original on 11 December 2021. Retrieved 8 June 2021.
  17. ^ "Moldova's Trans-Dniester region pleads to join Russia". BBC. 18 March 2014.
  18. ^ "Transnistria wants to merge with Russia". Vestnik Kavkaza. 18 March 2014.
  19. ^ Kimmage, Michael (2024). Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability. Oxford University Press. p. 129.
  20. ^ O'Loughlin, John (2017). "The rise and fall of "Novorossiya": examining support for a separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast Ukraine". Post-Soviet Affairs. 33 (2): 124–144. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2016.1146452.
  21. ^ "Ukraine: Are 2014 pro-Russia rebels fighting 1920s war?". BBC News. 28 July 2014.
  22. ^ Casey Michael (19 June 2015). "Pew Survey: Irredentism Alive and Well in Russia". The Diplomat.
  23. ^ Düben, B A. "Revising History and ‘Gathering the Russian Lands’: Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian Nationhood". LSE Public Policy Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 2023
  24. ^ "Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians"". President of Russia. 12 July 2021. Retrieved 2022-11-04.
  25. ^ Jack, Victor; Busvine, Douglas (22 February 2022). "Putin recognizes separatist claims to Ukraine's entire Donbass region". Politico. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  26. ^ Borger, Julian; Roth, Andrew (22 February 2022). "Russia strongly condemned at UN after Putin orders troops into eastern Ukraine". The Guardian. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  27. ^ "Ukraine conflict: Russian forces attack after Putin TV declaration". BBC News. 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  28. ^ Durand, Olivia (24 February 2022). "Putin's invasion of Ukraine attacks its distinct history and reveals his imperial instincts". The Conversation.
  29. ^ Paul Hensel, Sara Mitchell, Andrew Owsiak (March 4, 2022). "Russian irredentist claims are a threat to global peace". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 31, 2022.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  30. ^ Harun Karcic (March 30, 2022). "Why NATO Should Worry About the Balkans". The Economist. Retrieved March 31, 2022. The similarities between Russian and Serbian irredentism are astonishing. Back in the 1990s, Serbian nationalists parroted the claim that Bosnia historically belonged to Serbia, that we Bosniak Muslims were in fact Christian Serbs who were forcefully converted to Islam under the Ottomans, and that Bosnia—as an independent and sovereign country—would not survive without Serbian tutelage. So closely are Bosniak Muslims able to identify with Ukrainians that monetary donations have been collected and prayers held at Bosnian mosques for Ukraine's defense.
  31. ^ Mitchell, Ellen (2022-03-01). "Belarus president stands in front of map indicating Moldova invasion plans". The Hill. Retrieved 2022-10-21.
  32. ^ "Belarus leader may have inadvertently revealed Russian invasion map on TV". The Independent. 2022-03-02. Retrieved 2022-10-21.
  33. ^ "Breakaway Georgian Region Seeks to Be Putin's Next Annexation". Bloomberg. Bloomberg News. 30 March 2022. Retrieved 30 March 2022.
  34. ^ Dickinson, Peter (10 June 2022). "Putin admits Ukraine invasion is an imperial war to "return" Russian land". Atlantic Council.
  35. ^ Новости, Р. И. А. (2022-06-08). "Депутат Федоров предложил отозвать признание независимости Литвы". РИА Новости (in Russian). Retrieved 2022-11-21.
  36. ^ Peseckyte, Giedre (2022-06-09). "Russian Duma questions Lithuania's independence". www.euractiv.com. Retrieved 2022-11-21.
  37. ^ Cole, Brendan (2022-06-09). "Russia Mulls Lithuania's 'Illegal' Independence From Moscow". Newsweek. Retrieved 2022-11-21.
  38. ^ Russian House Speaker Threatens to ‘Take Back’ Alaska
  39. ^ Trevelyan, Mark (28 September 2022). "Moscow's proxies in occupied Ukraine regions report big votes to join Russia". Reuters.
  40. ^ "Kremlin announces vote, paves way to annex part of Ukraine". Associated Press. 27 September 2022.
  41. ^ "Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia". Kremlin.
  42. ^ "Putin says Russia has 'four new regions' as he announces annexation of Ukrainian territory". Reuters. 30 September 2022. Archived from the original on 30 September 2022. Retrieved 30 September 2022.
  43. ^ "Ukraine: UN General Assembly demands Russia reverse course on 'attempted illegal annexation'". UN News. 12 October 2022. Retrieved 19 June 2023.
  44. ^ "Putin Ally Says There's '100 Percent' Chance of Future Russia-Ukraine Wars". Newsweek. 17 January 2024.
  45. ^ Luxmoore, Matthew (9 February 2024). "What Did Putin Gain From Sitting Down With Tucker Carlson?". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 23 February 2024.
  46. ^ "Putin ally says 'Ukraine is Russia' and historical territory needs to 'come home'". Reuters. 4 March 2024.
  47. ^ "'Ukraine Is, of Course, Russia:' Putin Ally". Newsweek. 4 March 2024.
  48. ^ William Maley (1995). "Does Russia Speak for Baltic Russians?". The World Today. 51 (1): 4–6. JSTOR 40396641.
  49. ^ Cole, Brendan (5 October 2023). "Russian Official Proposes Invading Five NATO Countries". Newsweek. Retrieved 5 October 2023.
  50. ^ C. Diener, Alexander (2015). "Assessing potential Russian irredentism and separatism in Kazakhstan's northern oblasts". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 56 (5): 469–492. doi:10.1080/15387216.2015.1103660. S2CID 155953187.
  51. ^ "Russia's land grabs in Ukraine could break the international order". The Washington Post. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2022.

Sources

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  • Saideman, Stephen M.; Ayres, William R. (2008), For Kin Or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War, Columbia University Press

Further reading

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