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http://www.un.org/sg/spokesperson/highlights/index.asp?HighD=4/24/2013

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37374

http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFLDE7670S520110708?sp=true

r. falk un. org


and Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, admitted that the United Nations has had a bias against Israel.[1]


My Sandbox pages





General

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Quotations

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  1. ^ "Ban Admits: UN is Biased Against Israel - Inside Israel - News - Arutz Sheva". Arutz Sheva. Retrieved 9 July 2015.
  2. ^ M. Cherif Bassiouni; Shlomo Ben Ami (2009). A Guide to Documents on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli Conflict: 1897-2008. BRILL. p. 24. ISBN 978-90-04-17534-1. The first Arab-Israeli war started in November 1947, as an immediate response of the local Palestinians to the Partition Plan decided by the General Assembly (Resolution 181), which the violently opposed. This immediately developed into a civil war between the two communities in Palestine
  3. ^ M. Cherif Bassiouni; Shlomo Ben Ami (2009). A Guide to Documents on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli Conflict: 1897-2008. BRILL. p. 90. ISBN 90-04-17534-2. security council resolution 44 at 1 Apr 1948 calling for a truce; security council resolution 46 at 17 Apr 1948 calling to end military activity;security council resolution 48 at 23 Apr 1948 appoints a truce commission;
  4. ^ Edward Alexander; Paul Bogdanor (31 December 2011). August 2013 The Jewish Divide Over Israel: Accusers and Defenders. Transaction Publishers. pp. 82, 107. ISBN 978-1-4128-0933-7. p. 82 .when the united nations voted for a two state solution in 1947, the jewish community under british mandate overwhelmingly accepted the plan, while the arab world unanimously rejected it. fighting immediatelly erupted, with arab leaders frankly admitting that they were the aggressors (35); p. 107 (35) jamal husseini, of the higher arab committee of palestine, informed the united nations:"The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight". Security Council Official Records, April 16, 1948. {{cite book}}: Check |url= value (help)
  5. ^ Michael Curtis (30 September 2013). Jews, Antisemitism, and the Middle East. Transaction Publishers. pp. ch. 5.6. ISBN 978-1-4128-5141-1. Jews, Antisemitism, and the Middle East, By Michael Curtis, books.google.com/books?isbn=1412851416, 2013 -ch. 5.6, "At the London Conference, September 1946—February 1947, the last attempt by Britain to reconcile the conflicting points of view, the Arab League strongly rejected any plan for partition of Palestine or for any Jewish state. ... In October 1947 the Arab League set up a Military Committee ... this Committee was given weapons, money, and authority to dispatch a force of three thousand volunteers to Palestine, who then crossed into the area and began attacking Jewish settlements. ...In March 1948 the mufti, al-Husseini, stated that the Arabs would continue fighting until the Zionists were annihilated by a holy war and the whole of Palestine became a purely Arab state. At best, this might include Jews who had lived in Palestine before 1914 or 1917.
  6. ^ Michael J. Devine (August 2009). Harry S. Truman, the State of Israel, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East. Truman State Univ Press. p. 106. ISBN 978-1-935503-80-4. Retrieved 19 August 2013. Weizmann had been called on before to meet with Truman, when the State Department was trying to switch the Negev from the Jewish to the Arab portion specified in the partition plan. Weizmann, who was a noted chemist, painted a picture for Truman that appealed to him as the farmer he had once born. By using desalted water, the Jews would make the desert bloom. Their experiments with desalination were already producing carrots, bananas, and potatoes in areas where nothing had grown for hundreds of years. If taken from the Jews, it would remain a desert. Aqaba, too, was crucial, Weizmann told the president. It was now a useless bay that had to be dredged, deepened, and made into a waterway that could accommodate large ships. If it was part of a Jewish state, Weizmann told Truman, "it would make a real contribution to trade and commerce by opening up a new route:' It would be a parallel highway to the Suez Canal, shortening the route from Europe to India by a day or more. Truman agreed that the Negev should remain part of the Jewish state. "I was extremely happy:' Weizmann later wrote. Truman then "promised that he would communicate [that] at once with the American delegation at Lake Success. Truman kept his word
  7. ^ Yoav Gelber (1 January 1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, 1921-48. Frank Cass. p. 243. ISBN 978-0-7146-4675-6. Jewish Transjordanian Relations: 1921 - 48, Gelber, p.243, "in mid december 1947...the Arab league determination to embark an organized anti Jewish terrorism in Palestine instead of the sporadic disorders
  8. ^ Yoav Gelber (1 January 2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 14 July 2013. A war between Israel and the Arab States broke out immediately, and the Arab armies invaded Palestine.
  9. ^ Yoav Gelber (1 January 2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 14 July 2013. the Palestinians and the Arab League — not the Yishuv — promptly rejected the UN resolution on partition following the vote in the General Assembly on 29 November 1947. Immediately and intentionally they embarked on frustrating implementation of partition by violence. At first, they instigated disturbances and gradually escalated them to a lull- scale war. The Arab League backed the Palestinians' campaign from the beginning and the Arab states joined in the fighting upon termination of the British mandate, invading the newly established Jewish state. The Arabs stubbornly repudiated any compromise that provided for a Jewish state, no matter what its borders were to be. Only in the wake of their military defeat did the Arabs make UN resolutions a cornerstone of their case and demand their strict fulfillment. Any study describing solely Palestinian suffering is one-sided and incomplete without properly weighing this plain truth: As victims of war, the Palestinians' own conduct gives adequate cause to deny them the adjective "innocent". Truly, they have paid a heavy price in this and ever since. They have been victims. But to a large extent they are the victims of their own follies and pugnacity, as well as the incompetence of their Arab allies.
  10. ^ Yoav Gelber (1 January 2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 13 July 2013. In December 1947 Syria bought a quantity of small arms from the Skoda plant in Czechoslovakia for the ALA. Jewish saboteurs blew up the ship that carried the cargo to the Middle East and sank it in the Italian port of Bari. The arms were later salvaged and reshipped in August 1948 to Syria — this time for arming Palestinian combatants — but the Israeli navy intercepted the freight and seized the weapons.
  11. ^ Bernard Joseph (1960). The Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948. Simon and Schuster. p. 8. Retrieved 14 July 2013. For example, all the land mines used against Rommel came from Jewish factories in Palestine.
  12. ^ Efraim Karsh (2000). Fabricating Israeli History: The "new Historians". Frank Cass. p. 140. ISBN 978-0-7146-5011-1. Retrieved 16 August 2013. If the United Nations took no further action, the people of Palestine would themselves be the only authority capable of determining their country's future when the Mandate came to an end. In these circumstances, the Jewish population of Palestine would no doubt have a right to try to establish a state in part of the country. But this right would be no better than the right of the Arabs to invite the intervention of the Arab League. The two actions would be legally on an equal footing'.51 Given that it was none other than the British Government that had prevented the United Nations Commission from taking those 'various steps' which, if taken, would have validated 'the Jewish claim to United Nations authority for their state', this legal sophistry anticipated, if not sanctioned, an Arab (including Transjordanian) attack on the Jewish State. Indeed, the invading Arab States lost no time in parroting Whitehall's 'legal' argument. 'There was no State there [i.e., in Palestine] recognized by any other State and there was no legal successor to the Mandatory Power', the Egyptian Prime Minister said in justifying his country's attack on Israel.52 As late as 14 May, a day before the Arab attack on Israel, Bevin cabled Kirkbride, clearly anticipating Transjordan's transgression of the boundaries of the newly-established State:" 51 Ibid.; 'Palestine — Legal position', Confidential Guidance prepared by the Information Office0 British Embassy in Washington, 20 May 1948. FO 371/68651; Beeley (New York) to Burrows, 3 May 1948, FO 371/68554/E6677. 52 Al-Sharq al-Adna in Arabic, 17 May 1948, 'BBC Monitoring Service — Summary of World Broadcasts', III, No. 52, 27 May 1948, p. 56
  13. ^ Efraim Karsh (2000). Fabricating Israeli History: The "new Historians". Frank Cass. p. 141. ISBN 978-0-7146-5011-1. Retrieved 16 August 2013. instruct all such officers to withdraw from and remain outside Palestine. 53 And by way of providing further proof that Bevin never told Abul Huda not to invade the Jewish areas — if such proof is at all needed at this stage — let me conclude this chapter with B.A.B. Burrows's memorandum of 7 May titled 'Palestine After May 14'. In this memorandum Burrows assessed that : "the Arab Legion would enter Palestine mainly by the Allenby Bridge, and would attempt to occupy the Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron areas, perhaps including Beersheba and perhaps extending across the southern Jewish area to Gaza (thus severing the Negev from the Jewish State] if the Egyptian Army had not moved in there. They would also no doubt secure the narrow strip of Palestinian territory on the Gulf of Aqaba [awarded by the General Assembly to the Jewish State]". It seems impossible at present to look much further ahead. The Arab Legion could probably hold the central Arab area fairly comfortably but might get into considerable difficulty if it tried to do more than this, e.g., an expedition to Jaffa or Haifa. 53 Foreign Office to Amman, 14 May 1948, telegram 382, FO 371J68852/E6327. See also M.T. Walker's memo of LI May on 'British Officers in the Arab Legion', anticipating a Transjordanian attack on the Jewish State: 'We should arrange with Sir A. Kirkbride, however that in the event of a Transjordanian attack on the Jewish State, instructions for the withdrawal of British officers should reach them with the least possible delay'. FO 371J68852./E6008.
  14. ^ Efraim Karsh (2000). Fabricating Israeli History: The "new Historians". Frank Cass. p. 152. ISBN 978-0-7146-5011-1. Retrieved 16 August 2013. United Nations became a distinct possibility. Suffice it to recall Burrows' suggestion of 7 May 1948 that the Foreign Office should intimate to Abdullah their acquiescence in his occupation of the Negev in order to see that Britain wished the soon-to-be-born Jewish State no good. The war was seen by the Foreign Office as a golden opportunity to undo the UN Partition Resolution and 'cut Israel down to size'. On 20 May 1948, five days after the Arab invasion of the newly established State of Israel, Bevin wrote to the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel: "'I do not (repeat not) intend in the near future to recognize the Jewish State and still less to support any proposal that it should become a member of the United Nations. In this connexion I hope that even though the Americans have recognized the Jewish State defacto they will not commit themselves to any precise recognition of boundaries. It might well be that if the two sides ever accept a compromise it would be on the basis of boundaries differing from those recommended in the Partition Plan of the General Assembly.'18 That these border revisions were not conceived in terms favourable to the Jewish State was evidenced by the tireless British efforts to induce the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, who arrived in the Middle East at the end of May 1948, to devise a solution that would reduce Israel to approximately the same size as that envisaged by the 1937 Peel Partition Plan — 18 Bevin to Lord Inverchapel. PREM 8v859, II, telegram 5459 of 20 May 1948.
  15. ^ Efraim Karsh (2000). Fabricating Israeli History: The "new Historians". Frank Cass. p. 157. ISBN 978-0-7146-5011-1. Retrieved 16 August 2013. If however, there is uncertainty on this question of the Negeb, it appears to me to be undesirable from our point of view to allow King Abdullah to push his negotiations with the Jews to anything like a conclusive stage. As Sir J. Troutbeck has pointed out (his telegram No. 508 to you) the Negeb is of little value to the Arabs while of strategic value to us, and King Abdullah may well be content to let the Jews have it the moment he sees that he has no prospect of getting Gaza. With all the other Arab States against him, Abdullah may even see advantage in having a wedge of neutral territory between him and Egypt. With the Negeb in Jewish hands moreover, it would be difficult for us to implement our defence obligations under Anglo—Transjordan Treaty save by air or via Aqaba.26 If anything, the above reports vindicate contemporary Jewish suspicions that the British were no less eager to have the Negev incorporated into Transjordan than King Abdullah himself. Dow's view, also shared by Troutbeck, that 'the Negeb is of little value to the Arabs while of strategic value to us' is precisely what was argued by Zeev Sharef in his autobiographical account of the 1947-49 War. Describing the thrust of Zionist thinking following the Meir—Abdullah meeting of 11 May 1948, in which Meir failed to convince the king not to attack the State of Israel at birth, but was nevertheless convinced that he did not contemplate the prospects of battle gladly or with self-confidence, Sharef wrote: 26 From Jerusalem to Foreign Office, 20 December 1948, telegram 697, FO 371J68603.
  16. ^ Efraim Karsh (2000). Fabricating Israeli History: The "new Historians". Frank Cass. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-7146-5011-1. Retrieved 16 August 2013. declare forthwith that HMG accepted the report in its entirety'.[30 . Whether a Jewish Statelet along the proposed British lines (see map) — without the Negev, with no land access to its capital, with its main naval outlet severely constrained, and with key economic installations and parts of its transport system controlled by foreign powers and manipulated to the benefit of its Arab enemies — should be defined as a 'rump of a state' (or as a 'compact state' as cynically termed by Bevin) is a matter of personal taste. What is eminently clear is that this statelet would have occupied a far smaller territory than that awarded by the UN Partition Plan, which in itself is described by Shlaim as anomalous and scarcely viable;[31 hence its economic and strategic position would have been extremely precarious, something of which the Foreign Office was keenly aware. 'Musa el-Alami would for his part accept the idea of a very restricted Jewish State, limited to the coastal plain', Burrows reported following a conversation with the 'moderate' Palestinian leader. 'I fancy with the arrière pensée that life for the Jews in such a small State would sooner or later become intolerable and it could be eliminated altogether'[32. But this was precisely the straightjacket in which Bevin and his advisers so tirelessly toiled to restrain Israel. [30 Ibid. 61st Conclusions, 22 September 1948, p. 20. [31 Shlaim, Collusion, p. 117. [32 B.A.B. Burrows, 'Conversation with Musa el-Alami', 6 December 1947, FO 371J61585/E1 1764
  17. ^ Rut Lapidot; Moshe Hirsch (1994). The Jerusalem Question and Its Resolution: Selected Documents. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 52. ISBN 978-0-7923-2893-3. Retrieved 31 August 2013. The [Partition Plan was overthrown by Arab violence on the field of battle, accompanied by unanimous and concerted Arab opposition in the General Assembly .... In April, 1948, the United Nations Palestine Commission, reporting its inability to carry out any part of the Plan, including the Jerusalem Statute, without large international forces, wrote: Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein. Armed Arab bands from neighboring Arab States..., together with local Arab forces, are defeating the purposes of the Resolution by acts of violence." The Arab onslaught described by a United Nations Commission in these terms began in the City of Jerusalem itself. The Arab world had taken up arms, not only against the establishment of a Jewish State, but also with equal fervor and greater success against the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem. In the Trusteeship Council the Representative of Iraq said: It is my duty to show that the Plan for the City of Jerusalem is illegal... the people of Jerusalem who are not sacred should not incur political punishment because their City is holy. Neither the Iraqi Government nor other Arab States arc prepared to enter into the details or to participate in the discussion of the Plan.
  18. ^ William Roger Louis (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I.B.Tauris. p. 420. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6. Retrieved 16 August 2013. To Bevin, 'partition' symbolized a bankruptcy of policy, the end of the road, and an admission of failure…. In Palestine he pursued the goal of the bi-national state with such tenacity…With a divided Palestine, Arab nationalism would continue to fester and would bring about the end of Britain's paramount position in the Middle East. In sum, Bevin's motivation must be found in areas of military power and economic resources, as well as in the idealism of the Commonwealth. Bevin believed that the answer to the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons should be sought in Europe rather than in Palestine, which he regarded as a predominantly Arab country. He found himself caught between a Jewish nationalism supercharged by the emotions of the Holocaust, and the anti-Zionism of the Arabs, without whose good will the British Empire in the Middle East would be doomed. The British could not support a Jewish state without alienating the Arabs. Nor could the British impose a settlement acceptable to the Arab countries without antagonizing the United States. The Middle East, in Bevin's view, was second in importance only to Europe; but in order for Britain to remain the dominant regional power, both Arab cooperation and the support of the United States were vital. Without them, Britain's influence would decline, and not only in the Middle East. Britain would sink to the status of a second-class European power like the Netherlands. That anxiety helps explain the emotional energy that Bevin and other British leaders expended on the regeneration of the British Empire in the Middle East and Africa
  19. ^ William Roger Louis (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I.B.Tauris. p. 539. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6. Retrieved 16 August 2013. if the Jewish state were small,however, it might be controlled. p. 540: In sum the British by mid-June 1948 believed that the consequences of partition might not be as bad as previously thought, but they held it as essential that the territorial scope of the new state should be small. Such a circumscribed territory would force the Jews themselves to curtail immigration and thus would make the Jewish state more acceptable to the Arabs. Its frontiers would have to be drawn with finality. Such was the British reaction to the war at the time when the two sides still appeared to be evenly drawn. The Bernadotte Proposals The key to the success of the truce of the 11th of June 1948, as Sir John Glubb accurately wrote in his account of the war, could be described as a simple military stalemate in which neither side would risk an advantage at that time. Both sides seized upon the injunction of the United Nations in order to pause, plan, and reorganize, which the Jews did more effectively than the Arabs. Contrary to the propaganda of both sides, the numbers of troops was fairly balanced with about 19,000 Israelis and 23,000 Arabs. The Arab Legion held the Old City of Jerusalem and the strategic point of Latrun, which commanded the main route from the coast to Jerusalem. The Jews held the coastal plain and a precarious corridor to Jerusalem (the 'Burma road' south of Latrun) as well as eastern Galilee. At this stage the general situation was more favourable to the Arabs, at least in the eyes of the Israelis. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 600 (help)
  20. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. pp. 603, 604. Retrieved 13 July 2013. It is impossible to arrive at a definite persuasive estimate. My prediction would be to opt for the loose contemporary British formula, that of 'between 600,000 and 760,000' refugees; but, if pressed, 700,000 is probably a fair estimate Cite error: The named reference "Morris2004p603" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  21. ^ Benny Morris (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge University Press. p. 81. ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6. Retrieved 14 July 2013. On 8 January, Ben-Gurion said that so far, the Arab countryside, despite efforts to incite it, had remained largely quiescent. It was in the Yishuv's interest that the countryside remain quiet, and this depended in large measure on the Yishuv's own actions. 'We [must avoid] mistakes which would make it easier for the Mufti' to stir up the villages, he said. Regarding the countryside, the Haganah's policy throughout February and March was 'not to extend the fire to areas where we have not yet been attacked' while at the same time vigorously attacking known bases of attacks on Jews and, in various areas, Arab traffic.75 This policy also applied to the Negev. The JNF's YosefWeitz, the chairman of the Negev Committee (the Yishuv's regional supervisory body), put it this way: 'As to the Arabs, a policy has been determined: We extend our hand to peace. Every beduin who wants peace, will be satisfied. But if anyone dares to act contrariwise – his end will be bitter.'76 A few weeks earlier, on 12 February, the commander of the Negev Brigade, Nahum Sarig, instructed his officers: Our job is to appear before the Arabs as a ruling force which functions forcefully but with justice and fairness. We must encourage the Arabs to carry on life as usual.We must avoid harm to women and children. We must avoid harm to friendly Arabs.
  22. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 116. Retrieved 13 July 2013. At the time, Ben-Gurion and the HGS believed that they had initiated a one-shot affair, albeit with the implication of a change of tactics and strategy on the Jerusalem front. In fact, they had set in motion a strategic transformation of Haganah policy. Nahshon heralded a shift from the defensive to the offensive and marked the beginning of the implementation of tochnit dalet (Plan D)—without Ben-Gurion or the HGS ever taking an in principle decision to embark on its implementation.
  23. ^ Benny Morris (1 October 2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. p. 185. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3. Retrieved 14 July 2013. "King Abdullah had always acknowledged Arab (as distinct from Jordanian) weakness, and his son, Prince Talal, openly predicted defeat.34 At the last moment, several leaders, including King Ibn Sagud and Azzam Pasha—to avert catastrophe—secretly appealed to the British to soldier on in Palestine for at least another year.35 Egypt's foreign minister, Khashaba, had already done so. He "wished they would remain, and suggested that it was their duty to do so."
  24. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 187. Retrieved 13 July 2013. "p. 187 Arab League secretary general Azzam told Kirkbride:...we will sweep them[the Jews] into the sea" . Al Quwwatli [ the Syrian president] told his people:"…we shall eradicate Zionism" ; p. 409 "Haj Amin... al-Husseini…In March 1948 he told an interviewer in a Jaffa daily Al Sarih that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionist were Annihilated". p 412: "The outbreak of hostilities triggered wide-ranging anti-Jewish measures throughout the Arab world, with the pogroms in Aden—where seventy-six Jews were killed and seventy-eight wounded—and Aleppo—where ten synagogues, five schools, and 150 houses were burnt to the ground—only the most prominent. Anti-Semitic outbreaks were reported as far afield as Peshawar, in Pakistan; Meshed-Izet and Isfahan, in Iran; and Bahrain.40 An atmosphere of intimidation and terror against Jews was generated by anti- Zionist and anti-Semitic propaganda in the generally state-controlled media. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 699 (help)
  25. ^ a b Benny Morris (1 October 2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. pp. 190, 191. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3. Retrieved 14 July 2013. In effect, Abdullah agreed to the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine and Meir agreed to a Jordanian takeover of the West Bank (albeit while formally adhering to whatever partition resolution the General Assembly would adopt).
  26. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 239. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Egyptians reached Majdal on 24 May and made it their headquarters,setting up a defensive perimeter. Some observers thought that the Egyptians—"wisely"—had, at this stage, in view of their logistical problems, "decided. . . to advance no further."272But on 28 May they renewed their push northward, reaching Isdud (Ashdod),their van digging in less than two miles beyond the village. This lastleapfrog may have been prompted by a Jordanian request to relieve the pressureon Latrun
  27. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 320. Retrieved 13 July 2013. If the front lines of 14 October were to turn into permanent borders, Israel would be truncated and extremely vulnerable. Moreover, the no-peace, no-war situation was untenable. As David Ben-Gurion put it to his ministers on 26 September, "A protracted truce will break us."1 The Egyptian expeditionary force had to be destroyed or, at the least, driven from Pales {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 229 (help)
  28. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 47. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Jews were to get 62 percent of Palestine (most of it desert), consisting of the Negev
  29. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. pp. 50, 66, 67, 72. Retrieved 24 July 2013. p. 50,"The Arab reaction was just as predictable: "The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East," promised Jamal Husseini.; at 1947 "Haj Amin al-Husseini went one better: he denounced also the minority report, which, in his view, legitimized the Jewish foothold in Palestine, a "partition in disguise," as he put it." ; p.66, at 1946 "The League demanded independence for Palestine as a "unitary" state, with an Arab majority and minority rights for the Jews. The AHC went one better and insisted that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the unitary state should stand at one to six, meaning that only Jews who lived in Palestine before the British Mandate be eligible for citizenship" ; p.67, at 1947 "The League's Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called "aggression," "without mercy." The League promised them, in line with Bludan, assistance "in manpower, money and equipment" should the United Nations endorse partition." ; p. 72, at Dec 1947 "The League vowed, in very general language, "to try to stymie the partition plan and prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,"; p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that "the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state.; p.412 "Iraq's prime minister had warned British diplomats that if the United Nations decided on a solution to the Palestine problem that was not "satisfactory" to the Arabs, "severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries."
  30. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 56. Retrieved 13 July 2013. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru's sister, who headed the delegation, occasionally threw out hints that something might change. But Shertok was brought down to earth by historian Kavalam Panikkar, another member of the Indian delegation: "It is idle for you to try to convince us that the Jews have a case. . . . We know it. . . . But the point is simply this: For us to vote for the Jews means to vote against the Moslems. This is a conflict in which Islam is involved. . . . We have 13 million [sic] Moslems in our midst. . . . Therefore, we cannot do it.
  31. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 61. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community—and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results.
    Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate—perhaps the Russian—a "huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs" (the Russian declined, saying, "You want me to hang myself?").
    But the Arabs' main tactic, amounting to blackmail, was the promise or threat of war should the assembly endorse partition. As early as mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League's volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA)—threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, "we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish." It would be a "holy war," the Arabs suggested, which might even evolve into "World War III." Cables to this effect poured in from Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Baghdad during the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations, becoming "more lurid," according to Zionist officials, as the General Assembly vote drew near. The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with "men, money and arms," and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies.
    They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc";p. 396 Al-Qawuqji told his troops that the purpose is "ridding Palestine of the Zionist plague
  32. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 67. Retrieved 13 July 2013. p. 67, "The League's Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called "aggression," "without mercy"'; p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that "the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state."
  33. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 79. Retrieved 13 July 2013. p.79 ,"Arab armed bands attacked Jewish settlements, and Haganah units occasionally retaliated...during the war's first four months the Arabs were generally on the offensive and the Jews were usually on the defensive."; p. 117 , "For four months, under continuous Arab provocation and attack, the Yishuv had largely held itself in check, initially in the hope that the disturbances would blow over and, later, in deference to international— particularly British—sensibilities. In addition, the Haganah had lacked armed manpower beyond what was needed for defense
  34. ^ Benny Morris (2008). July 2013 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 79. p. 79 ,"Arab armed bands attacked Jewish settlements, and Haganah units occasionally retaliated" , "during the war's first four months the Arabs were generally on the offensive and the Jews were usually on the defensive." ,p. 98, "In January 1948, High Commissioner Cunningham assessed that "official [Palestinian] Arab policy is to stand on the defensive until aggression is ordered by the national leadership. That widespread assaults on Jews continue and are indeed increasing illustrates the comparatively feeble authority of most of [the National] Committees and of the AHC. . .p. 98, "armed bands attacked convoys and settlements, often recruiting local militiamen to join in. Gunmen sporadically fired into Jewish neighborhoods and planted bombs. The Haganah, busy reorganizing, and wary of the British, adopted a defensive posture while occasionally retaliating against Arab traffic, villages, and urban neighborhoods. p. 101. "Most of the violence was initiated by the Arabs" ,The Arabs "planted bombs and mines along urban and rural paths and roads" , "The first organized Arab urban attack was launched against the Jewish Hatikva Quarter, on the eastern edge of Tel Aviv" , p. 117 , "For four months, under continuous Arab provocation and attack, the Yishuv had largely held itself in check, initially in the hope that the disturbances would blow over and, later, in deference to international— particularly British—sensibilities. In addition, the Haganah had lacked armed manpower beyond what was needed for defense {{cite book}}: Check |url= value (help)
  35. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 99. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Haganah still refrained from aggressive operations in areas not yet caught up in the conflagration. The policy was to "hit the guilty" and to avoid harming nonbelligerent villages, "holy sites, hospitals and schools," and women and children.117 The following instruction is indicative: "Severe disciplinary measures will be taken [against those] breaching [the rules of] reprisals. It must be emphasized that our aim is defense and not worsening the relations with that part of the Arab community that wants peace with us."118 Though Haganah reprisals increased in size and frequency during the following months, the organization remained strategically on the defensive until the end of March 1948.

    This was reflected in Haganah policy toward specific villages. Orders went out to the field units that villages interested in quiet or in formal non belligerency agreements were to be left untouched.119 Flyers were distributed calling on villagers to desist from hostilities.120 During February and March 1948 the HGS attached "Arab affairs advisers" to each brigade and battalion to advise the commanders on the "friendliness" or "hostility" of specific villages in their zones of operation.121 As late as 24 March 1948, Galili instructed all Haganah units to abide by standing Zionist policy, which was to respect the "rights, needs and freedom," "without discrimination," of the Arabs living in the Jewish State areas.122

    The policy changed only in early April

  36. ^ Jacob Neusner; Bruce D. Chilton; R. E. Tully (18 April 2013). Just War in Religion and Politics. University Press of America. p. 309. ISBN 978-0-7618-6094-5. " "Arab leaders threatened ...They spoke of driving the Jews into the sea and ridding Palestine "of the Zionist plague."
  37. ^ William B. Quandt (2005). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. 109-112. University of California Press. p. 109. ISBN 978-0-520-24631-7.

    **p. 109 between October 9 and October 12...the american response...call for cease-fire..in place...arms for Israel began to flow in modest quantities...

    **p. 112 Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full scale...resupply effort...short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on October 12...but...Sadat refused...;

    **p. 114 Soviet arms must not be allowed to dictate the outcome of the fighting...Israeli success on the battlefield had become an important factor in persuading the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end....with an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until ...realities on the battlefield led to a change of Egyptian and soviet calculations...;

    **p. 116 it was of prime importance that the fighting should be ended...when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self esteem intact..the airlift...the Soviets must see that the united states could deliver more than they could;

    **p. 123 the U.S would not permit the destruction of the 3rd army corps.

    **p. 114 U.S. influence with king Hussein had helped keep Jordan out of the war..

  38. ^ Dan Rabinowitz (2005). Coffins on Our Shoulders: The Experience of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel. University of California Press. p. 31. ISBN 978-0-520-93896-0. Coffins on Our Shoulders: The Experience of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel, books.google.com/books?isbn=0520245571, Dan Rabinowitz, ‎Khawla Abu Baker - 2005, p. 31, "The palestinian refusal to accept any form of partition of their homeland was absolute...The resolution by the U.N in favour of partition on November 29, 1947, triggered an immediate wave of Palestinian guerilla warfare against Jews, with hits and skirmishes in various parts of the country.
  39. ^ Malka Hillel Shulewitz (27 October 2000). Forgotten Millions: The Modern Jewish Exodus from Arab Lands. Continuum. p. 84. ISBN 978-0-8264-4764-7. on 24 November 1947 Heykal Pasha…[said in the U.N] :"The proposed solution might endanger a million Jews living in the Muslim countries. Partition of Palestine might create in those countries an anti-Semitism even more difficult to root out than the antisemitism which the Allies tried to eradicate in Germany...it might be responsible for very grave disorders and for the massacre of a large number of jews";p.86 "Iraq formally and overtly identified Itself with the 1947 threats of Heykal Pasha a mere four days later. Iraq's Foreign Minister, Fadel Jamall, made the following statement: The masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab—Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside Palestine than there are in Palestine. …any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq: It will breed Interreliglous prejudice and hatred.
  40. ^ Anita Shapira (5 November 2007). Yigal Allon, Native Son: A Biography. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 182. ISBN 0-8122-0343-7. Tel Aviv's outlying neighborhoods came under sniper fire and there were Arab attempts to attack isolated quarters. Transportation to Tel Aviv was dangerous: the village of Abu Kabir, at the entrance to the city, was known for its truculence. The village of Salameh was a center for hostile forces. Villagers from Yazur had hit Tel Aviv's traffic on more than one occasion.
  41. ^ David Tal (2004). War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy. Routledge. p. 83. ISBN 978-0-7146-5275-7. on 17 April the Security Council accepted a resolution calling the Palestinians and the Jews to accept a cease-fire. Jamal al-Husayni rejected the decision, claiming that as the cease-fire would he based on the Partition Resolution, and as the Jews continued their preparation toward the establishment of their own government, the Palestinians could not accept the Resolution. Shertok accepted the military terms of the Resolution, hut rejected its political term… neither side respected the truce…
  42. ^ David Tal (2004). War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy. Routledge. p. 84. ISBN 978-0-7146-5275-7. p. 84. "a call by the General Assembly for an immediate and unconditional cease-tire for ten days beginning on 5 may …The Arab representatives were unanimous in their claim that a truce would he accepted only if the Jews gave up their political aspirations…
    The Jews, on the other hand, rejected the political aspect of the truce proposal, as they resisted any delay in the proclamation of the Jewish State and…
    (P 85) Unknown to the Americans, Shertok had had second thoughts about the truce. While explaining to the American officials why the Jews should not accept a call for an immediate truce, Shertok implored Ben Gurion to consider a positive reply to the idea…
    Ben Gurion's answer was not unequivocal, he did not reject Shertok's arguments, but expressed his concern that the acceptance of a ten-day truce would open a gate to the prolongation of the British Mandate..Bevin had rejected the US proposal for an immediate truce on the grounds that it would require the prolongation of the British mandate
  43. ^ Mark A. Tessler (1 January 1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Indiana University Press. p. 300. ISBN 978-0-253-20873-6. Retrieved 27 August 2013. Eban cites the foflowing statement by the secretary-general of the Arab League as an example of Arab rhetoric and, presumably, of Arab intentions: "This will be a war of extermination. It will be a momentous massacre to be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades." An example of an act … was the massacre … of prisoners at Kfar Etzion, …. According to one Israeli account, the Arab Legion's conquest of the area was followed by the arrival of Arab villagers, "who massacred [Jewish] prisoners, both men and women being lined up and shot in cold blood: three men and a girl, who managed to escape under cover of darkness, were all who survived from the entire population to tell the tale." Although some sources suggest that these attacks were an attempt to take revenge for the slaughter at Deir Yassin, there were atrocities committed by Arabs even before the Deir Yassin episode. A vivid account is given by Uri Avnery, an Israeli journalist and politician who is highly critical of Zionist policy on most accounts. Avnery, who was himself a soldier in 1948, writes that in the early stages of the fighting "Arab irregulars and primitive villagers. .. Killed and mutilated every Hebrew who fell into their hands. We all saw the pictures of the severed heads of our comrades paraded through the alleys of the old city of Jerusalem. . . . No one can quite understand what happened later on without realizing the impact of these pictures on the small Hebrew community." … by Morris, whose account includes the statement of an English sergeant about the surrender of Jaffa: "The Arabs were frightened to death when they imagined to themselves that the Jews would do to them half of what they would have done to the Jews were the situations reversed. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 705 (help)
  44. ^ U.N Ad Hoc comitee on palestine ,press release GS/PAL/83, 24 November 1947,debate on alternative plan for partition of Palestine (PDF), p. 3, retrieved 2013-10-15, if the U.N decide to amputate a part of Palestine in order to establish a jewish state, no force on earth could prevent blood from flowing there…Moreover…no force on earth can confine it to the borders of Palestine itself…Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world… to place in certain and serious danger a million jews…Mahmud Bey Fawzi (Egypt) …imposed partition was sure to result in bloodshed in Palestine and in the rest of the Arab world
  45. ^ UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (1948). U.N, Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine A/AC.21/9 S/676 16 February 1948. U.N. p. 1. Retrieved 14 July 2013. Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |title= at position 37 (help)
  46. ^ Folke BERNADOTTE,United Nations Mediator on Palestine (1948). U.N, Security Council,THE OBSERVATION OF THE TRUCE IN PALESTINE DURING THE PERIOD FROM 11 JUNE TO 9 JULY 1948. U.N. p. 1. Retrieved 14 July 2013. Another of the major problems that arose during the truce was that of irregular forces which considered themselves as not bound by the cease-fire or truce. On the Arab side these consisted of the remnants of the former "Arab Liberation Army" under the command of Fawzi el Kaoukji, who operated in Northern Palestine, and various local Palestinian Arabs who either regarded themselves as loyal followers of Haj Amin el Husseini, the former Grand Mufti and present Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, or as independent partisans. These irregulars continued to attack the Jews and to carry on general guerrilla warfare. In northern Palestine, they gave rise to troublesome incidents in the areas around Birwa, El Tira, Nazareth and Jenin. In central Palestine, they were active in the Jerusalem area and around Latrun and Kafr Ana. In southern Palestine, they operated in the Gaza area and in attacking convoys to the Jewish settlements in the Negba. The regular forces of the Arab States would not accept responsibility for the irregulars, but did not take police action against them. A large part of the problem was solved towards the end of the truce when the Government Lebanon, on 4 July, accepted responsibility for Fawzi el Kaoukji and the forces under his command. On the Jewish side, the irregulars consisted on some elements of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and of the Stern Group. The scene of their operations was chiefly in Natanya, Tel Aviv and in the Jerusalem area. The Israeli Government accepted responsibility for all persons with the area occupied by its forces
  47. ^ UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE ,A/AC.25/SR/G/9, 19 February 1949,MEETING BETWEEN THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION AND NURI ES SAID, PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ, retrieved 2013-10-15, It would also be necessary to put an end to the bad treatment that the Jews had been victims of in Iraq during the recent months. The Prime Minister referred to the increasing difficulty of assuring the protection of the Jews resident in Iraq, under the present circumstances. In answer to an observation by Mr. de Boisanger, who wondered whether Tel Aviv was interested in the fate of the Jews of Iraq, the Prime Minister explained that he was not thinking in terms of persecution; he did not wish the Commission to receive a false impression with regard to his personal sentiments towards the Jews. But if the Jews continued to show the bad faith that they had demonstrated until the present moment, events might take place. (The Prime Minister did not clarify this warning)
  48. ^ UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE A/AC.25/W/19 30 July 1949,"The Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan so that any comment of theirs did not specifically concern the status of the Arab section of Palestine under partition but rather rejected the scheme in its entirety."


p. 86 Sasson concurred, and added that the Mufti had wanted (and had organised and incited) ‘troubles’, but not of such scope and dimensions.... The Arab Division of the JA-PD thought that the Mufti himself wanted quiet and that this was the official Arab position; but some of his close T H E F I R S T WA V E 8 7 associates, including Emil Ghawri, Rafiq Tamimi and Sheikh Hassan Abu Sa‘ud, were organising the ‘spontaneous’ rioting and shooting.1... In part, the AHC’s line was a response to the Arab public’s reluctance to fight. Indeed, HIS-AD officers reported that ‘most of the public will be willing to accept partition .... Towards the end of December 1947, Husseini appears to have sent AHC member and JerusalemNCleader Dr. Husayn Khalidi a letter explicitly stating that the purpose of the present actions was ‘to harass (and only to harass)’ the Yishuv, not fullscale assault.109...


Morris birth p. 88 During the second half of December 1947 and January 1948, the Mufti or his close associates appear to have tried to shift the focus of hostilities to the countryside. But the villagers were not rushing to join up115... The Mufti’s main military lieutenant, ‘Abd al Qadir al Husseini, responsible for the Judean Hills area, met a similar response at a meeting with the NC of Tulkarm...

Morris, birth, p. 89 But the Mufti’s policy regarding the countryside was also characterised by ambiguity. In late January... Both the AHC and the ALA during February-March seemed to signal Palestine’s Arabs that while low-level skirmishing by local militias and irregulars was fine and attacks on Jewish convoys, especially around Jerusalem, should be continued, a fullscale assault on the Yishuv was out of the question for the time being, though preparations for such an assault, to be unleashed just before or just after the British pullout, should be taken in hand...

p. 98

By the end of March, the Husseinis had managed to still the moderate voices in the Arab camp and had gained control over almost all of Arab Palestine. Most of the country was engulfed in warfare

http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/FCBE849F43CBB7158525764F00537DCB Security Council S/PV.260 2 March 1948 TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 2 March 1948 Mr. EL-KHOURY (Syria): The appeal to the people of Palestine "to take all action possible to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine" can have no effect as long as the cause of the trouble still stands. The attitude of the Arabs of Palestine has become very clear regarding the partition scheme. They consider it detrimental to their very existence, and it is not imaginable that they would accept consultation on the basis of the implementation of that scheme, although they may be ready, if that scheme is abandoned, to participate in and to contribute helpfully to consultations and to the re-establishment of order in Palestine. These consultations, however, must aim at finding another plan on the basis of justice, equity and workability for a unified future government of Palestin


http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/E511BC28D0A8964A852577E0006AA2A6, Security Council, S/PV.274, 24 March 1948, TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH MEETING, Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 24 March 1948, Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): The Arab States in general — I am authorized to say this in their names here... the Arabs of Palestine are just the contrary. They say, “We will agree to a truce if it is not used as a screen to shield the activities for the continuation of the implementation of the Plan of Partition.”...the Arabs certainly do not agree to the establishment of a permanent trusteeship regarding the City of Jerusalem...the Arabs consider the idea of creating a foreign state within their region, with sovereign power in Palestine, as an act of aggression, and that those who attempt to carry out this act are aggressors against human rights and the rights of the Arabs. Furthermore, the Arabs are ready to oppose such an act. The Arabs of Palestine would prefer, as I said before, to be exterminated rather than to allow such an act of aggression to go on within their country...

http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D3BC8AAA0231AAE0802564AD003974D2, Security Council, S/PV.270, 19 March 1948, TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH MEETING, Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 19 March 1948, Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): they are unmistakably convinced that the partition plan and any activity in the direction of its implementation are the only causes of the acts of violence occurring in Palestine. When those causes are removed, law and order will be automatically restored....


}}</ref>

deletion of a well supported text

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the problem

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a lot of my contributions are removed (fully or partially), by a group of the same users. This content removal does not comply with WP:PRESERVE : "Fix problems if you can, flag or remove them if you can't. Preserve appropriate content" and WP:CANTFIX. It seems that the first priority of those users is to remove content, either in line text, footnotes (explanatory footnotes) quotes or images.

examples of an unjustified content removal

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  1. The Diff page.
  2. what happened: He deleted the references, and as a by product he produced unsupported sentences. It could happen that someone will delete those sentences during the next week, because they are unsupported. Does the references deletion make sense?
  1. The Diff page.
  2. what happened: He deleted a wp:rs reference, because of an incorrect reason. But even if the reason was correct, he should have discuss it before deletion, or put an appropriate tag.
  1. The diff page
  2. what happened: He deleted a well supported sentence with its references.
  1. The Diff page
  2. what happened: He deleted a well supported sentence with its references. His reason is incorrect. (the arabs rejected any form of partition)
  1. The Diff page
  2. [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:United_Nations_Partition_Plan_for_Palestine/Archive_6#Quotation_3:_Yoav_Gelber_.281_January_2006.29._Palestine_1948:_War.2C_Escape_And_The_Emergence_Of_The_Palestinian_Refugee_Problem Talk page discussion]
  3. what happened:user:Trahelliven started a talkpage discussion, with an all sort of esoteric and meaningless points. Within 8 minutes user:Aua deleted the reference with the long quote.
  1. The Diff page
  2. what happened: he deleted 2 relevant images.
    1. his first reason:"One picture per section is enough". This is incorrect, and anyway should have been discussed.
    2. his second reason:"wp:npov must be applied to pictures". I am not sure. Anyway, I am the only one who have added Images with Arabs too (in other section), so that can not be the problem
  3. what happened:deleted 2 photos. In my opinion images add a lot to the attractiveness of an article. It is a pity to loose images.
  1. The Diff page
  2. [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:1947%E2%80%9348_Civil_War_in_Mandatory_Palestine#to_aua:_Why_did_you_deleted_.22Due_to_the_dangerous_situation_of_the_starved_and_besieged_Jerusalem.2C_Ben_Gurion_ordered_the_operation_Nachshon.7C.22 The talkpage discussion that I opened after this unjustified deletion]
  3. what happened: Deleted {Citation needed tag, which is against the rules. Claim of poor grammar- is that an acceptable deletion?. Claim that some terms should be expanded (i.e the opposite of being concise). Some esoteric reasons. Claim of a POV- even if it is true- he can add a balancing sentence rather than deleting it. (Nachshon started to save jerusalem and not because plan d)
  1. The Diff page
  2. what happened: he deleted a relevant and attractive image. His reason is not relevant and unacceptable.
  • There are a lot of more examples, with more users.
  1. The Diff page
  2. what happened: he deleted a {Neutrality disputed tag.nothing else was changed.
  1. Diff page]
  2. The talkpage discussion
  3. what happened: he deleted a couple of sentences with a seemingly reasonable objection. I have opened a talkpage discussion and explained. Then he had a new objection. I replied, and then he had one more objection. It repeated itself a lot of times and then he started again with an objection I have already explained. user:Pluto2012 and user:Nishidani has jouned this war of attrition. user:Pluto2012 said openly that I have to add his [mistaken] view too:"As long as you refuse, there will be endless discussions"

The proposal

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The policies WP:PRESERVE and WP:CANTFIX are fine. Since those users routinely ignore the rules, there should be a penalty for ignoring it within the Arab-Israeli conflict articles. Hopefully, such penalties, will decrease the unjustified removal of content. Ykantor (talk) 15:06, 1 October 2013 (UTC)

images templates

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Photomontage

photomontage

|photo2b=Pope Francis in March 2013 b.jpg |photo2c=LhotseMountain.jos.500pix.jpg |photo3a=Wedding Kimono.jpg |photo3b=Taj Mahal 2002.JPG |photo3c=Milk glass.jpg |photo4a=Komyozenji Stone garden 1.JPGK

imageframe

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Image_array

Building the Burma Road
A bulldozer tows a truck on the "Burma road",June 1948
convoy returning to Sarafand from Burma Road, 1948
image array. Butterfly Armored-car Gvar-Am-israel1948.jpg
Palmach-negev-instructed2operation.jpg

| image3 = | caption3 = | image4 = | caption4 = | image5 = | caption5 = | image6 = | caption6 = }}

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Multiple_image

Hadar Mall, Talpiot
Har Hotzvim high-tech park
Jerusalem Technology Park
Malha mall, Jerusalem

images2

[edit]
Header 1 Header 2 Header 3
row 1, cell 1 row 1, cell 2 row 1, cell 3
row 2, cell 1 row 2, cell 2 row 2, cell 3
previous version Sepsis next edit why Sepsis edit is tendentious
killed crushed to death emotionally magnifying effect
in a combat zone (null) implies an ordinary location
in part of an operation to eliminate tunnels used by terrorists to illegally smuggle weapons from Egypt into Gaza. (null) implies that the killing was an isolated case
during an Israeli military operation (null) ignore to mention the background
fellow ISM protestors eyewitnesses implies there were no conradicting eyewitnesses
Israeli government eyewitnesses saying Israeli government saying taking advantage of people usual suspicions towards governments formal announcement of what could be their own wrong doing
aa bb cc
a2 b2 c2


Fawzi al-Qawuqji's (3rd from the right) on 1936
Arab fighters near a burnt armored Haganah supply truck, near Jerusalem
An Arab road block, at the main road to Jerusalem
Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni
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