User:Ykantor/un1947partition

partition

Arabs- Palestine

During the early 1930's, "The grand mufti, Alami has claimed, expressed interest in the Idea of JewishPalestine as part of a larger Arab federation," . Kotzin2010p251

"...Musa al-alami surmised that the mufti would agree to partition if he were promised that he would rule the Arab state". Cohen2008p236

"...the two key Arab figures...-Haj Amin el Hussayand King Abdullah- would each be prepared to reconcile himself to such a solutiom., provided that he alone obtain exclusive control...Even if al-Alami's views could not be regarded as definitive evidence of the Mufti intensions...tragic, that neither Arab leader dared to admit his views in public". Cohen2014p268

Concerning rejection of any form of partition:

• Morris 2004 , p. 88, The AHC, which flatly rejected the resolution and any thought of partition, declared a three-day general strike

gelber "the Palestinians and the Arab League ... promptly rejected the UN resolution on partition"

Bassiouni: "The first Arab-Israeli war started in November 1947, as an immediate response of the local Palestinians to the Partition Plan ... which the violently opposed.

rabinowitch: "The palestinian refusal to accept any form of partition of their homeland was absolute"

Arabs states

Morris 2008 p. 66 All the regimes, none of them elected, suffered from a sense of illegitimacy and, hence, vulnerability. All the leaders, or almost all (Jordan’s Abdullah was the sole exception), lived in perpetual fear of the “street,” which could be aroused against them by opposition parties, agitators, or fellow leaders, claiming that they were “selling out” Palestine.

p. 67 The fear of the Arab “street” would figure prominently in the decision-making of most of the Arab regimes as they inched toward the invasion of May 1948.)

p. 73 in order not to appear weak-kneed and hesitant, moderate rulers—such as Abdullah—allowed themselves to be pressed into extremist policies (or at least utterances), lest they be seen as insufficiently zealous.

• Morris 2008
  • p. 66 :"All the regimes, none of them elected, suffered from a sense of illegitimacy and, hence, vulnerability. All the leaders, or almost all (Jordan’s Abdullah was the sole exception), lived in perpetual fear of the “street,” which could be aroused against them ... claiming that they were “selling out” Palestine."
  • p. 67: "The fear of the Arab “street” would figure prominently in the decision-making of most of the Arab regimes as they inched toward the invasion of May 1948."
  • p. 73: "in order not to appear weak-kneed and hesitant, moderate rulers—such as Abdullah—allowed themselves to be pressed into extremist policies (or at least utterances), lest they be seen as insufficiently zealous. "

Concerning the Arab population attitude: David Tal (2004). War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy. Routledge. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-7146-5275-7. "The Arab heads of state discussed partition at a meeting in Cairo on 8–17 December 1947...because of public reaction in Lebanon to the Partition Resolution, he found it difficult to show moderation.Samir Pasha of Jordan and Yusuf Yasin of Saudi Arabia warned that the climate in the Arab world was such that inaction by any Arab government would endanger the life of its leader". The Arab people rejected it as well (not the leaders only)

Morris 2008:

• p.11 : "the Arabs were serious in their determination to prevent a solution that would not grant full independence to a unitary state in Palestine". That means, the Arabs would not accept any other solution e.g. any form of partition, cantons, federation etc. This is not wp:or since it is similar to simple arithmetic WP:CALC, in the sense that demanding unitary state only is sufficient to prove that they rejected any form of partition.
• P 18 "The most important decision of the Arab League regarding Palestine was … to establish a military committee …The most significant power raised by the military committee was of no avail to the Palestinians. The ALA had been intended to be a force that would fight against any political solution that would not lead to the establishment of a unitary state in Palestine"

Edward Alexander: " the arab world unanimously rejected it."

• Morris 2008 p. 66: "The League demanded independence for Palestine as a “unitary” state"
• Morris 2004 p.60: "Palestine’s Arabs (and the Arab states) had rejected the UN partition resolution"; p. 65: "The AHC, which flatly rejected the resolution and any thought of partition" (The AHC was the Arab Palestinians leadership.)
• United Nations, section 116: on 1947 "The leaders of the Arab delegations "re-emphasized that no proposal which involved any form of partition or Jewish immigration would be acceptable as a basis for the solution of the problem" ; section 165 "The Arabs consider that all of the territory - of Palestine is by Tight Arab patrimony...., they would regard as a violation of their "natural" right any effort, such as partition, to reduce the territory of Palestine."

Arabs reactions

Arabs threats

Morris 2008 p. 396 references:

1. ref. 19. The phrase—“to drive the Jews in Palestine into the sea”—was reportedly used, for example, by gIzzedin Shawa, a representative of the AHC in London, in a conversation with an American diplomat (see Gallman, London, to secretary of state, 21 January 1948, USNA, box 5, Jerusalem Consulate General, Classified Records 1948, 800–Palestine). In his memoirs, Kirkbride quoted Arab League secretarygeneral gAzzam saying to him, just before the invasion: “We will sweep them into the sea” (Kirkbride, From the Wings, 24).
2. ref. 20. Sam Souki, UP, quoting al-Qawuqji speaking to his troops, undated but from February or March 1948, CZA S25-8996.

• Concerning the leaders, you are already familiar with the article and the talk page:

(from Morris 2008)

1. p. 187 Azzam Pasha told Alec Kirkbride: "We will sweep them [the Jews] into the sea" .
2. p. 187 Shukri al-Quwatli [ the Syrian president] told his people:"We shall eradicate Zionism".
3. p. 409 Haj Amin al-Husseini said in March 1948 to an interviewer in a Jaffa daily "Al Sarih" that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionists were Annihilated"
4. p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General # Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that “the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state"
5. p. 61,"mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League’s volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA)—threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, “we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish.”
6. p. 50 Jamal Husseini promised, “The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East”.
7. p. 412 Iraq’s prime minister Nuri al-Said told British diplomats that if the United Nations solution was not “satisfactory”, “severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries".
8. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, said: “We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in". (You deleted the source. I have yet to re find it)
9. Shulewitz p.86 "Iraq formally and overtly identified Itself with the 1947 threats of Heykal Pasha a mere four days later. Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fadel Jamall, made the following statement: The masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab—Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside Palestine than there are in Palestine. …any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq: It will breed Interreliglous prejudice and hatred." (one more source: url = http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/93DCDF1CBC3F2C6685256CF3005723F2%7C accessdate = 2013-10-15|title=U.N General Assembly ,A/PV.126,28 November 1947,discussion on the Palestinian question)
10. Shulewitz p.84 "on 24 November 1947 Heykal Pasha…[said in the U.N] :"The proposed solution might endanger a million Jews living in the Muslim countries. Partition of Palestine might create in those countries an Antisemitism even more difficult to root out than the antisemitism which the Allies tried to eradicate in Germany...it might be responsible for very grave disorders and for the massacre of a large number of Jews"
11. U.N Ad-Hoc committee on Palestine ,press release GA/PAL/83, 24 November 1947,debate on alternative plan for partition of Palestine, p. 3, retrieved 2013-10-15, Heykal Pasha…[said in the U.N] "if the U.N decide to amputate a part of Palestine in order to establish a Jewish state, no force on earth could prevent blood from flowing there…Moreover…no force on earth can confine it to the borders of Palestine itself…Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world… to place in certain and serious danger a million Jews…Mahmud Bey Fawzi (Egypt) …imposed partition was sure to result in bloodshed in Palestine and in the rest of the Arab world"

And, of course the famous Azzam Pasha quotation: " this will be a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Tartar massacre or the Crusader wars"

Arab resistance to the partition and Jerusalem int'l zone

the 16 February 1948 report:"Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein".

• Please stop saying that this sentence source is an Israeli document, if you can not prove it. We know that he sentence's source is the the 16 February 1948 U.N report.
• UNITED NATIONS General Assembly A/544 5 May 1948  :"The representative of the Arab Higher Committee declared that his people were opposed to the introduction of any foreign police or troops into Jerusalem or the placing of Jerusalem under Trusteeship....The representatives of Australia and of the Jewish Agency considered that the proper course was to adopt the draft Statute for Jerusalem and as an emergency measure bring into force such portions of it as were applicable in the circumstances. This was not acceptable to the Arab Higher Committee for the reason that this would amount to a total or partial implementation of the partition scheme...the representative of the Arab Higher Committee objected on political grounds to any suggestion that the Special Municipal Commissioner should be entrusted with the function of maintaining law and order
• General Assembly A/PV.135 14 May 1948 HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 14 May 1948:

1. "Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt) ...The idea of establishing a trusteeship system for Jerusalem was contrary to the right of self-determination to which the inhabitants of the Holy City were as much entitled"..."Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) said...would the trusteeship agreement submitted to the General Assembly be concluded, in accordance with Article 79, by the States directly concerned, including the Mandatory Power? The answer was in the negative, since the United Kingdom and the States directly concerned were opposed to that regime"
2. "Mr. EL-ERIAN (Yemen) reminded the Assembly that as Palestine remained under British Mandate for a few minutes longer, Article 79 of the Charter was the one that applied. As the Iraqi representative had already pointed out, the draft before the General Assembly was not in conformity with the provisions of that Article; it was difficult to understand how the United States representative, who supported the draft, could also have stated, as he had at the 140th meeting of the First Committee, that "any proposal must be based upon the authority of the Charter..."
3. The representative of Yemen associated himself with the Egyptian representative's remarks concerning the right of self-determination of the people of Jerusalem, a right which was provided for in the Charter. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution.

• U N I T E D N A T I O N S General Assembly Distr. UNRESTRICTED A/532 10 April 1948 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION :"ARAB RESISTANCE: The Arab Higher Committee has continued to oppose the resolution of the Assembly and has refused to co-operate with the Commission. Opposition to the resolution of 29 November 1947 has taken the form of armed resistance. The extensiveness of the frontiers of Palestine with the neighboring Arab States and the apparent ease with which they may be crossed, even when British troops are still in the country, have facilitated such resistance by making available increasing numbers of arms and men. This factor has greatly added to the difficulty of implementing the resolution of the Assembly. It is not only the Arab State, envisaged in the resolution, which cannot now be constituted according to the Plan, but the establishment of the Jewish State and of the International Regime for the City of Jerusalem are also obstructed by the Arab resistance. Arab opposition to the Plan of the Assembly has taken the form of organized efforts by strong Arab elements, both inside and outside of Palestine, to prevent its implementation and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including repeated armed incursions into Palestinian territory. The Commission had had to report to the Security Council that “powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein”."

An internet site, quoting "middle eastern studies" ,Moti Golani, middle eastern studies, Apr 2001, 37,2 , p.93? , The “Haifa Turning Point” The British Administration and the Determination of the Civil War in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948, Golani p 105 :"Cunningham was aware that the Arabs had triggered the violence, but he was dumbfounded by what he thought was the Jews’ eagerness to retaliate ------------------------------

Land Ownership

By 1948, after several decades of Jewish immigration, the Jewish population of Palestine had risen to about one third of the total, and Jews and Jewish companies owned 20 percent of all cultivable land in the country (Fischbach2013p24)

General

By 1948, after several decades of Jewish immigration, the Jewish population of Palestine had risen to about one third of the total, and Jews and Jewish companies owned 20 percent of all cultivable land in the country. Fischbach2013p24

• Shemesh, Moshe (2008). Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 1-84519-188-9.

• Ami Gluska (9 January 2007). The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963 67. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-96596-2. Retrieved 18 September 2013.

• Benny Morris (1 October 2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3. Retrieved 14 July 2013.