Jordan water clashes

the water struggle was a major factor in the deterioration of Arab Israeli relationship that led to the six days war in 1967 (shemesh p. 32 ; murakami,p. 297 app. c4; kobori p. 130, wolf). On 1964, Israel completed and started using the National Water Carrier (NWC) that carried water from the Sea of Galilee for the Southern Negev desert (shemesh p. 43; murakami,p. 295 app. c4).

The Arab states opposed the Israeli National Water Carrier (NWC) project because it enabled Israel to irrigate the Negev desert(murakami,p. 296 app. c4) and support a population growth of up to 5 millions (sosland 2007 p. 80). Moreover, Syria did not regard Israel as a party with any Jordan river riparian right (sosland 2007 p. 79). Hence, the Arab states decided to divert the Jordan river tributaries to Syria and Jordan which would result in Israel loosing one third of the water planned for its NWC (shemesh p. 50;murakami, p. 296 app. c4; kobori p. 129), and Syria would gain more water then its allocation (shemesh p.49) according to the Johnston plan. the Arab scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult economically inefficient(wolf) and expensive (murakami,p. 296 app. c4)

On 1966, After few Israelis killed as their cars detonated mines (the perpetrators' tracks led to Syria) Israeli army destroyed Syrian ground moving equipment used for their diversion project. (shemesh p. 65). The Syrians nearly halted the diversion project. (shemesh p. 66)

The scheme was only marginally feasible, was technically difficult and expensive. Arab political considerations were cited to justify the diversion scheme.^[1]

In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo and decided:

The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel. ^[2]

However, Nasser, the Egyptian president, assured the Americans that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan^[3]

Israel exploited the DMZ incidents as pretexts for bombing the diversion project,^[4]

Israel agreed to exploit only the water quota allocated to it by the Johnston plan, and Eshkol announced that water was as vital for Israel 'as the blood in our vains'.^[5]

Notes

^ Masahiro Murakami (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East; Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. p. 296. ISBN 978-92-808-0858-2. Retrieved 15 July 2013. Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwater...According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive......Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees.
^ Avi Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books. pp. 229, 230. ISBN 978-0-14-028870-4. In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by Israel's diversion of water … The preamble to its decision stated: "The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel
^ Moshe Gat (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 101. ISBN 978-0-275-97514-2. Retrieved 7 September 2013. [on 1965]Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan
^ Michael B. Oren (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford University Press. p. 23. ISBN 978-0-19-515174-9. Israel exploited DZ incidents as pretexts for bombing the diversion project
^ Ami Gluska (12 February 2007). The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963–67. Routledge. p. 49. ISBN 978-1-134-16377-9. Israel agreed to exploit only the water quota allocated to it by the Johnston plan, and Eshkol announced that water was as vital for Israel 'as the blood in our vains'

[Murakami1995p296-1] Masahiro Murakami (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East; Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. p. 296. ISBN 978-92-808-0858-2. Retrieved 15 July 2013. Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwater...According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive......Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees.

[Shlaim2000p229-2] Avi Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books. pp. 229, 230. ISBN 978-0-14-028870-4. In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by Israel's diversion of water … The preamble to its decision stated: "The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel

[Gat2003p101-3] Moshe Gat (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 101. ISBN 978-0-275-97514-2. Retrieved 7 September 2013. [on 1965]Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan

[Oren2002p23-4] Michael B. Oren (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford University Press. p. 23. ISBN 978-0-19-515174-9. Israel exploited DZ incidents as pretexts for bombing the diversion project

[Gluska2007p49-5] Ami Gluska (12 February 2007). The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963–67. Routledge. p. 49. ISBN 978-1-134-16377-9. Israel agreed to exploit only the water quota allocated to it by the Johnston plan, and Eshkol announced that water was as vital for Israel 'as the blood in our vains'

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