User:Ykantor/Sandbox/Palestine1948- British diplomacy and policy

British diplomacy and policy

The dispute source

In my opinion, user:pluto2012 has wrongly deleted the section: "British diplomacy in support of the Arabs". The diff file is [1].

October battles

My proposal: The section recovered and modified

British diplomacy and policy

British policy within Palestine

"But in fact, British policy - as emanating both from Whitehall and from Jerusalem, the seat of the high commissioner - was one of strict impartiality" (benni morris, 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war, p.78)

Moreover, Whitehall’s fears that the circumstances of the withdrawal from Palestine might subvert Britain’s standing in the Middle East occasioned a number of major, organized British interventions against the Jewish militias, or noninterventions in face of Arab attack" (benni morris, 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war, p.81)

"British fears were generated by the high quality displayed by the Haganah and the scenario of a rapid depletion of British forces in Palestine ...These fears also probably underlay the weapons searches conducted on Jews during the first months of the war. Against the Arabs the British employed mainly curfews and detentions" (Moti Golani, middle eastern studies, Apr 2001, 37,2, p. 102 )

• "On December 31 (1947), Macatee, the American consul general in Jerusalem, filed a report summing up the events of the month following the UN decision to partition Palestine. ... The Jewish Agency, wrote Macatee, was correct to a certain extent in its claim that the British were supporting the Arabs. " MilsteinSacks1997p190

Jerusalem

Even as the Foreign Office was declaring its support of an internationalized Jerusalem, British agents in Palestine were secretly seeking to ensure the occupation of the city by the Arab Legion (Zamir 2010 p. 35)

At the end of April, the British authorities in Jerusalem forced the Haganah to withdraw its troops from Sheikh Jarrah, which it had just occupied, claiming that the British army needed the road for the evacuation of its troops from the city. Yet at the same time, Se` ze, the French military attache´ in Beirut, reported that the British had allowed two companies of the Arab Legion to be stationed in British camps in Jerusalem. (Zamir 2010 p. 35)

British diplomacy and policy outside of Palestine

Britain, which at the time was one of the major powers in the Middle East, supported the Arabs (outside of Palestine), as far as they could avoid antagonizing the the Americans.Louis2006p420 "Bevin embarked resolutely on pro Arab policy on Palestine to which he obdurately clung even when it had been revealed as a stark failure" (Herbert Vere Evatt and the establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist, by Daniel Mandel 2004, p. 11

"In the House of Commons, Bevin kept the House informed of the situation in Palestine. He was openly pro-Arab in his sentiments, declaring, “We must remember that the British sergeants were not hanged from the tree by Arabs". On the same day, Bevin told the Commons, “I do not despair. Britain will be withdrawing on 15th May and when everyone has faced that fact, much may happen. Christopher Mayhew, Bevin’s Parliamentary Under Secretary, noted in his diary Bevin’s low view of the Jews, There is no doubt in my mind that Ernest detests Jews. He makes the odd wisecrack about the ‘Chosen People,’ explains Shinwell away as a Jew; declares the Old Testament is the most immoral book ever written...He says they taught Hitler the technique of terror-and were even now paralleling the Nazis in Palestine. They were preachers of violence and war-’What could you expect when people are brought up from the cradle on the Old Testament?” ("books.google.com/books?isbn=1597811319 Partners Together in This Great Enterprise - David W. Schmidt - 2011 - Page 307)

"In London's estimation, Arab goodwill was simply more desirable than the friendship of a future Jewish state" ,books.google.com/books?isbn=186064449X, britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World - Lawrence J. Butler - 2002, Page 78)

"the new prime minister, Clement Attlee, was anti-Zionist, while Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was outright hostile ... and they, like Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax in the 1930s, saw British interests served by a pro-Arab policy " (books.google.com/books?isbn=0300116098 Churchill's promised land: Zionism and statecraft - Michael Makovsky - 2007 -Page 227)

British motivation

The reasons for this was laid out in a British staff memo which stated "No solution of the Palestine problem should be proposed which would alienate the Arab states. If one of the two communities had to be antagonised, it was preferable, from the purely military angle, that a solution should be found which did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arabs; for in the that event our difficulties would not be confined to Palestine, but would extend throughout the whole of the Middle East" Karsh2002p72 . The diplomat Sir John Troutbeck wrote:

"We [and the Arabs] are partners in adversity on this question. A Jewish state is no more in our interest than it is in the Arabs.... Our whole strategy in the ME is founded upon holding a secure base in Egypt, but the usefulness of the base must be gravely impaired if we cannot move out of it except through a hostile country". Karsh2002p73

Moreover, The British policy-makers believed that the Jewish state would eventually become a Communist state, thus giving the Soviet Union a toe-hold in the Middle East. Morris, p. 113, 2003

"Ernest Bevin wrote one of his rare personal letters, in which he discussed Soviet motives. Among other things, it reveals that he shared the belief, not uncommon in British official circles, that the Jewish state would eventually become communist" (Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization, 2006, By William Roger Louis ,p.443)

"The British could not support a Jewish state without alienating the Arabs. Nor could the British impose a settlement acceptable to the Arab countries without antagonizing the United States. The Middle East, in Bevin’s view, was second in importance only to Europe; but in order for Britain to remain the dominant regional power, both Arab cooperation and the support of the United States were vital". Louis2006p420

"Truman's policy toward the dispute was widely interpreted in Washington, London and elsewhere as unduly favorable to the Zionists. ...and frustrated the British, who considered Arab goodwill the cornerstone of their Middle east position. (p.65) British officials vehemently opposed partition because it threatened their strategic imperatives in the Middle east."

The U.K against partition

For these reasons, the British in the months before May 1948 did their best to encumber and block partition Louis2006p420 Karsh2002p73 Trygve Lie wrote in his memoirs with some anger:

"Great Britain had placed the Palestine matter before the Assembly with the declared conviction that agreement between the Arabs and Jews was unattainable. This did not deter the British representative, [Colonial Secretary] Arthur Creech Jones, from informing the Assembly that Britain would give effect only to a plan accepted by the Arabs and the Jews.... The British approach proved to be not in accord, in my opinion with the either the letter or the spirit of the partition plan.

The United Kingdom could not progressively turn over authority to the Palestine Commission as the Assembly resolution provided, but only abruptly and completely on 15 May. Neither did it "regard favourably any proposal by the Commission to proceed to Palestine earlier than two weeks before the date of the termination of the Mandate". London would not permit the formation of the militia which the Assembly's resolution called for, nor would it facilitate frontier delimitation. The Assembly had further recommended that the United Kingdom endeavour to evacuate by 1 February a seaport and hinterland in the area of the Jewish state adequate to provide facilities for immigration" Karsh2002p73 .

General Sir Alan Cunningham wrote to Creech Jones at this time to complain "It appears to me that H.M.G.'s policy is now simply to get out of Palestine as quickly as possible without regard to the consequences in Palestine". Karsh2002p73

In February 1948, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin assured the Jordanian Prime Minister Tawfiz Abu al-Huda of British support for a Jordanian invasion once the British left Palestine . benni morris, 1948, p. 193 . British officials regarded the prospect of an Arab invasion favorably as offering an excellent chance to overturn the UN partition resolution.

"French intelligence, for its part, provided Ben-Gurion and Shertok with ongoing details of Arab political and military plans against the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine), particularly after the UN partition vote, as well as of the secret Anglo-Arab collaboration against the establishment of a Jewish state." (Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 21)

"another motive: to obstruct an Anglo-Jordanian move that would have enabled King Abdullah to take over Jerusalem. "(Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 33-34)

"February 1948 transformed the question of a Jewish state into part of the confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. It was partly the result of a British smear campaign that equated Zionism with communism in order to influence the advocates of partition, especially in the United States, to reassess their support for an independent Jewish state. In Paris, British diplomats warned their French counterparts that the future Jewish state might become a base for Soviet influence in the Middle East." (Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 28)

Bevin warned the Jordanians not to invade Israel

"at the end of April, the American ambassador in London warned the Foreign Office against using the Arab Legion to invade territories allocated to the Jewish state" (Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 35)

On 11 May, Se`ze gave details of secret decisions taken by the Arab League’s political and military committees convened in Damascus. Under Jordanian and British pressure, the Arab armies’ invasion plan, which had originally targeted Haifa, was revised so that the Arab Legion would now focus its attacks in the direction of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.(Zamir 2010 p. 36)

British officials regarded the Arab invasion favorably

"The British, however, had to exercise extreme caution and conceal their true goal, as the Americans already suspected that the Arab Legion was being exploited as a British tool. In fact, at the end of April, the American ambassador in London warned the Foreign Office against using the Arab Legion to invade territories allocated to the Jewish state. The Foreign Office was therefore anxious to give the impression that Britain was no longer responsible for the Arab Legion or for its British commanding officers. In the following weeks the British government announced that it would cease providing military and financial assistance to the Arab Legion and that British officers serving in it were to resign from the British army. But only a few in Washington or in the Arab capitals were misled by the British statements" (Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 35)

"the invasion of palestine by the arab legion might lead to ...American demands on britain to halt financial support to Abdullah" (Jewish Transjordanian Relations: 1921 - 48,gelber, p.276 )

Provoking Egypt to join the war in Palestine was central to the British secret strategy. French sources give details of the British agents’ tactics — teaming up with Azzam to press King Faruq to instruct his army to join the war despite the opposition of his Prime Minister. They also included an undertaking to supply the Egyptian army with weapons and ammunition from British stocks in the Canal Zone and a deliberate underestimation of the military strength of the Jewish forces. Like other Arab rulers. King Faruq. under public pressure to take action, was vulnerable to British machinations. He could not remain on the sidelines while his rival, King Ahdullah. was sending forces to Palestine. The May II report from the French Military Attaché in Beirut on the secret discussions of the Arab League’s political committee in Damascus reveals that apart from King Abdullah. other Arab leaders were hesitant, seeking a way to delay an invasion of Palestine. It also exposes the British agents’ direct intervention in their decisions (doc.396). At the last minute, King Faruq overruled his reluctant Prime Minister and commanded his army to go to war. Although other politicians opposed the King’s decision. Zamir2014p179

Reduce the jewish state size

British officials regarded the prospect of an Arab invasion favorably as offering an excellent chance to cut Israel "down to size". Bernard Burrows of the British Foreign Office's Middle East Department wrote:

"It is tempting to think that Transjordan might transgress the boundaries of the United Nations' Jewish state to the extent of establishing a corridor across the Southern Negev joining the existing Transjordan territory to the Mediterranean and Gaza. This would have immense strategic advantages for us, both in cutting the Jewish State, and therefore Communist influence, off from the Red Sea and by extending up to the Mediterranean the area in which our military and political influence is predominant by providing a means of sending the necessary military equipment etc. into Transjordan other than by the circuitous route through Aqaba".

Morris, p. 113, 2003

On 20 May, Bevin informed Baron Inverchapel, the British Ambassador to the United States:

"I do not (repeat not) intend in the near future to recognise the Jewish State and still less to support any proposal that it should become a member of the United Nations. In this connection I hope that even through the Americans have recognised the Jewish State de facto they will not commit themselves to any precise recognition of boundaries. It might well be that if the two sides ever accept a compromise it would be on the basis of boundaries differing from those recommended in the Partition Plan of the General Assembly". Karsh2000p152

In this regard, the British launched a sustained diplomatic offensive to have the United Nations recognize all of the areas taken by the Arabs as belonging to those Arab states, especially Jordan and to reduce the borders of Israel to being more or less what the Peel Plan of 1937 had advised.

" undesirable from our point of view to allow King Abdullah to push his negotiations with the Jews to anything like a conclusive stage...the Negeb is of little value to the Arabs while of strategic value to us, and King Abdullah may well be content to let the Jews have it the moment he sees that he has no prospect of getting Gaza. With all the other Arab States against him, Abdullah may even see advantage in having a wedge of neutral territory between him and Egypt. With the Negeb in Jewish hands moreover, it would be difficult for us to implement our defence obligations under Anglo—Transjordan Treaty save by air or via Aqaba."

"Burrows reported following a conversation with the ‘moderate’ Palestinian leader. ‘I fancy with the arrière pensée that life for the Jews in such a small State would sooner or later become intolerable and it could be eliminated altogether’"

"the British government was switching to the ‘Glubb’ option. They followed the Foreign Office’s attempts to exploit the war in Palestine to realize Britain’s strategic goals in the Middle East and presumed that a union between Greater Jordan, including the strategically important Negev, and Syria was now the focus of British efforts to build a defense system in the region. Iraq was to join at a later stage" (Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 33-34)

At June 1948 british officials thought that "if the Jewish state were small,however, it might be controlled" they were against a palestinian state because it would be too small to be viable, and its' leader would be the Mufti.(the same page)

Ceasefire: As convenient to the Arabs

In the early days of the war, the British delegation at the UN blocked all efforts at a ceasefire (which was felt to hurt the Arabs, who winning the war at this point more than the Israelis) and because of fears that Article 39 of the Chapter 7 of the UN Covenant might involve sanctions against the Arab states. Karsh2002p77 The British changed position on the ceasefire in the spring of 1948 when the Arab armies were in possession of substantial chunks of Palestine with the Egyptians holding much of the Negev and the Jordanians holding a large section of central Palestine. Karsh2002p77 Sir Ronald Ian Campbell, the British Ambassador to Egypt was instructed by Bevin to tell the Egyptian government after the first ceasefire:

"It might be presumed that the period of truce will be utilised by the Jews to establish an effective administration not only in those parts of their November State which are behind the military lines, but also in the Arab areas which they have occupied, such as the Central and Northern Galilee. If the Arabs are to be in a position to bargain on equal terms, it is essential that they should establish some real authority in the areas behind the lines occupied by their forces. This is particularly important in the area to the south of the Egyptian front line. The greater part of this area was awarded to the Jews last November and the Jewish settlements there are still holding out and presumably maintaining contact with Tel Aviv. We shall have great difficulty in supporting the Arab claim to retain this part of Palestine unless it can be shown that it is in fact and not in name only under Arab administration during the truce...."Karsh2002p79

.

The Arab leaders, he revealed, were willing to accept a last-minute American proposal and delay the invasion, but had to give in to Abdullah, who insisted on sending his forces into Palestine (Zamir 2010, p.36)

From New York, Parodi reported on 19 May that Alexander Cadogan, the British ambassador to the UN, in collaboration with the Syrian envoy whose country was serving on the Security Council, was obstructing a Franco-American initiative to impose a ceasefire. Indeed, the Foreign Office informed the Quai d’Orsay that Britain would not hesitate to use its power of veto if the American proposal for a ceasefire was approved.(Zamir 2010, p.36)

An arms supply - before the invasion

The U.K Navy blocked the Jewish arms supply

"The British blockade of the Palestinian coast prevented any substantial increase of these quantities until mid-May. Concurrently, the Arabs succeeded in smuggling into the country small arms that their emissaries had purchased in neighbouring countries. The ALA brought a certain number of support arms and a few artillery pieces and armoured vehicles." (Gelber, Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem, p.13)

"Apart from Cunningham, no British official thought seriously of halting the ALA penetration of Palestine. Except for protesting, the High Commissioner, too, made no serious effort to obstruct the incursion" (Gelber, Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem, p.51)

The U.K " had accelerated the supply of weapons and ammunition from their stocks in the Canal zone to the Arab Legion in the months preceding the Arab invasion."Zamir , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46,` No. 1, 17–58, January 2010 ‘Bid’ for Altalena: France’s Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, p. 35)

On 1948 "on 26 January, Lovett urged the british ambassador to issue a statement saying Britain would suspend all shipment of arms to the Arab states…London refuse…it signed a treaty with Transjordan to provide additional arms to the Arabs" (Bard 1991 p. 173) Frus1948p563

An extract of Bevin replies to U.K. parliament members on 28 April 1948:

11. Mr. Cocks- asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, under the agreements to supply given quantities of arms to the Arab States, His Majesty's Government have guaranteed to deliver these arms by certain fixed dates; and whether, in view of the publicly announced intention of these States, or some of them, to invade Palestine after 15th May, he will suspend for a period further deliveries of such arms.

§ Mr. Bevin- The answer to the first part of the Question is "No, Sir." But I must point out that the Governments concerned, who are under an obligation to ensure that the armament and essential equipment of their forces shall not differ in type from those of our own forces, naturally expect that when they place contracts in this country we shall carry out the contracts as speedily as is technically possible. With regard to the second part of the Question, it is impossible to forecast the outcome of the United Nations discussions on Palestine and the future of the country is so uncertain that it is impossible to take decisions now as to the action which may be required in respect of the period after 15th May.

§ Mr. Cocks- In view of the fact that no fixed dates are set down for the delivery of the arms, that the Arab Council held a meeting this week in Transjordan, and the reports from Cairo, Syria and Bagdad that action is contemplated in the next few days, will the right hon. Gentleman suspend delivery of these arms or allow the Jews to have arms with which to defend themselves?

§ Mr. Bevin- From all my information about Palestine at present, it seems to me that the Jews are the better armed of the two, but I cannot draw a distinction, and I have no intention of interfering until I get the decision of the United Nations. From that I refuse to move.

§ Mr. Cocks- The right hon. Gentleman will let people be murdered before he arrests the murderer.

§ Mr. Bevin- No. I appealed to both the Jews and the Arabs in London and warned them that we would leave Palestine. We must remember that the British sergeants were not hanged from the tree by Arabs.

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more: Mr. Cocks asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the public declaration by King Abdullah of Transjordan that after 15th May he intends to invade Palestine and take military action against the Jews; and what steps he proposes to take on this announcement under the terms of our alliance with Transjordan.

Mr. Bevin- My attention has been drawn to Press reports of 23rd April of a declaration by King Abdullah in this sense. ... As regards the Arab Legion, the intention is that its withdrawal from Palestine should be completed before the termination of the Mandate.

Mr. Cocks- Is it not a fact that in our treaty of alliance with Transjordania that country agrees not to adopt an attitude that might create difficulties for us, and to concert with us to settle disputes by peaceful means according to the Charter of the United Nations?...

Mr. Janner- ... it would be in accordance with the treaty we have entered into with Transjordan that we shall continue to subsidise the Arab Legion if they should take unilateral action against any section of the community in Palestine?

Mr. Bevin- That question does not arise.

Mr. Benn Levy- Is the supply of British equipment, money and officers to continue to Transjordania irrespective of whom they may elect to attack?

Mr. Bevin- This matter is before the United Nations and I must await the result of the discussions going on.

Mr. Cocks- ... the Treaty of Alliance—... Is it not a fact also that in Article I Transjordania agrees not to adopt in regard to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance and might create difficulties for the other party?

Mr. Bevin- Those terms have not been violated or intended to be violated by Transjordania. I do not propose to draw their attention to the matter until I have the result of the consideration by tht United Nations. When I have it, then I must examine the whole problem.

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§ Mr. Edelman- Is it not a fact that under the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty the arms of the Arab Legion may not be used in Palestine without the consent of His Majesty's Government?

§ Mr. Bevin- I must have notice of that Question.

-===================== France prevented a large sale of arms by a Swiss company to Ethiopia, brokered by the U.K foreign office, which was actually destined for Egypt and Jordan, and denied a British request at the end of April to permit the landing of a squadron of British aircraft on their way to Transjordan.Zamir2010p22

An arms embargo- In favour of the Arabs

Finally as part of the diplomatic effort to support the Arab war effort, the British supported an arms embargo, which was felt to favour the Arabs more than the Israelis.Karsh2002p76 The British reasoning behind the arms embargo was that as long as it was in place, the United States would be prevented from supplying arms to Israel, and if the embargo were lifted the United States could supply vastly greater number of weapons to the Israelis than the British could supply arms to the Arabs.Karsh2002p76

"bevin telegraphed kirkbride at july 1948 "I will do my utmost to help king Abdullah...but I cannot... supply of amunition" since it will "flout the UN..and cause "lifting of the U.S arms embargo on the Jews" (The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the ..., By William Roger Louis, p. 546)

Shemesh, p.176 The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East

The U.S and the U.K

p. 402

• Through November 1947–May 1948 the Great Powers failed to intervene in the civil war and force partition
• in May and June 1948, when the Arab states launched a war of aggression, in defiance of the UN resolution, against the Yishuv. The international community refrained from intervention.

• But, thereafter, the Western Great Powers, acting both through the United Nations and often directly and independently, significantly ...curtailed its battlefield successes in a series of cease-fire and truce resolutions, starting at the 2nd truce of 18 July... .On 18 July, at the end of the Ten Days, ...,in October and November, when IDF advances had brought the Egyptian forces in the south to the defeat. The UN–Great Power interventions in December 1948 and early January 1949, ..., quite simply saved the Egyptian army from annihilation. The IDF had twice been on the verge of closing the trap, ..., when the United States and Britain ordered it to pull back—the British bluntly threatening direct military intervention—and Ben-Gurion complied.

(Morris 2008 p. 402-403)

Aftermath of 1948 war

The transcript makes it clear that British policy acted as a brake on Jordan.” “King Abdullah was personally anxious to come to agreement with Israel", Kirkbride stated, and in fact it was our restraining influence which had so far prevented him from doing so." Knox Helm confirmed that the Israelis hoped to have a settlement with Jordan, and that they now genuinely wished to live peacefully within their frontiers, if only for economic reasons". Louis1984p579

footnotes