Talk:2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement

Problems

This article seems like a needless separation of information that belongs on the 2020 Nagorno-Karabagh article -- This information hardly warrants an article of its own, at least not in the current form where the majority of text is simply just a point by point retelling of the points agreed upon. Eik Corell (talk) 12:12, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

KeepIt is a very important and historical agreement (not like the previous flimsy cease-fires) so it should be kept.Polmas (talk) 12:15, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

A ceasefire agreement that has ended a war (and may potentially induce to end a 30 year old conflict), that is going to change a lot the politics of Armenia and Azerbajan and the whole Caucasus in general and which may provoke the first major territorial change in many years looks pretty notable to me. Also, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war article is already too long and crowded. Super Ψ Dro 12:22, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

I was just about to comment that the naming of the article was what threw me off initially, i.e that these weren't really established in the same way as the Bishkek Protocol, but I just noticed the new name and it all seems a little better now. Eik Corell (talk) 12:32, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

Since we have established a consensus for notability, I am removing the notability tag. Polmas (talk) 12:47, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

Kelbajar rayon vs map

The article says that "The Republic of Armenia will return to Azerbaijan the Kelbajar rayon by November 15th 2020". However, the map in this article only includes the western part of the Kalbajar District in hatched colors (to be returned to Azerbaijan), while it depicts the eastern part (the part that was part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) in light green (hosting Russian peacekeeping force). Which one is correct? --67.160.159.188 (talk) 02:55, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

The map

Cordyceps-Zombie Hi, I've removed the map as the details about control are not known yet. The only thing we know is withdrawal from 3 surrounding districts. The actual military control of Azerbaijan is also unknown, therefore we need to wait until the details are cleared and an official map is provided. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 08:51, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

Deployment of observation points at Karabakh

Russian Ministry of Defense published map of deployment of observation points at Karabakh. This map could be used in the article and for updating the war map. https://t.me/SputnikArmenia/10137

According to the armistice "the parties stop at the positions they occupy." And according to the map part of the Karabakh south to the Shushi is ceded to Azeris. This implies that Azerbaijan had control over those area. --Yakamoz51 (talk) 14:23, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

Oppose Sputnik is not a reliable source. --► Sincerely: SolaVirum 23:16, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

Map

other map

Map showing rules, including dates, for individual territories.

I have created a map of the agreement, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire map.svg. As with all war-time maps it is based on the best available information, and will evolve with the situation. @CuriousGolden removed the map, stating that "[we must] wait until an official map is released". My opinion would be that it should go in the article, possibly with a disclaimer. Any other opinions? Mapeh (talk) 18:08, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

Hello, details of the peace deal are not known yet. Also, your map shows the Azerbaijani gains to Shusha as a one long road, while the official maps released by Russia show that all of the southern half is controlled by Azerbaijan. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:15, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

I based it on the map in the main article on the war (QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg), but can obviously be updated just as that map was. Mapeh (talk) 18:27, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

@CuriousGolden: details of the peace deal are not known yet - they are right in the article, points 1 to 9. TerraCyprus (talk) 02:33, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

I too made a map ;-) Which more covers the hole area and I hope is more in line with the actual text of the ceasefire statement. I also included where the information is unclear. --Don-kun (talk) 21:50, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

Wait for official boundaries by either governments. As of now, many publications provide significantly different maps. --► Sincerely: SolaVirum 23:14, 11 November 2020 (UTC)

The maps are in the section for Terms of agreement, no need to wait. TerraCyprus (talk) 02:32, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

And there is another map: "Staged map of border changes in Karabakh as per 2020 Armenia- Azerbaijan Agreement.png", @Don-kun: in your map, the unblocked transport arrow should better go to the south, not? TerraCyprus (talk) 02:44, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

The third map has quite flawed borders, compare to the first two which use the same more detailed sources. No, the unblocked arrow should not (necessarily) go south. The agreement does not mention where the link(s) should be, neither that its only one. Even building new ones is part of the agreement, so it could literally be everywhere in Armenia (topography aside). That's why I choose to put the arrow in the middle. --Don-kun (talk) 05:50, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

All of the maps here have a lot of mistakes in them. The control of Shusha isn't a long snake-like control (per Russia's official map), which makes the 2 maps here immediately wrong. The map with caption "other map" shows remaining parts of Zangilan and Qubadli Districts as Russian peacekeeper control, which again is also wrong. I have removed the maps from the article until a correct map is made. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 07:40, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

No, the part of Zangilan and Qubadli is not wrong. Its exacly what the agreement is saying: contact line of november 9th is monitored by Russian peacekeepers and no further mentioning of both districts. One might disagree where the contact line exacly is, but its pretty clear that there is a contact line through both of these districts. --Don-kun (talk) 08:22, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Agreement has not said anything about Qubadli and Zangilan having Russian peacekeepers. The peacekeepers are meant to be deployed in non-Azerbaijani controlled Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact in the Russian government map, most of it is shown under Azerbaijani control and rest is shown to be given away to Azerbaijan. Therefore, it's wrong. These things are exactly why I'm saying we need to wait for some time to know the details. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 10:35, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

To be honest, I think we're getting to the point where this is just a bit disruptive. Look, Solavirum and CuriousGolden, I've worked with you both a fair bit on this topic now, and I know you're acting in good faith here, but the BBC has published an almost identical map to the ones we have here, and Golden's point above, peacekeepers are meant to be deployed in non-Azerbaijani controlled Nagorno-Karabakh is precisely why it is accurate to show the areas of the former NKAO remaining still under Armenian control, remaining under Armenian control. It seems that we're misguidedly holding off on including a map with the hope that there'll be a reinterpretation of what the parties stop at the current territorial positions they occupy means. I'm going to re-add the map by Mapeh, which looks excellent to me, as we should follow the RS (BBC) on this until we see other reliable sources saying otherwise. Jr8825 • Talk 10:56, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

@Jr8825: My problem wasn't with who controls what. I had problems with the 3 specific maps here which I pointed out in my latest comments. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 10:59, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Your problems are based on your interpretation of the treaty, so are ultimately WP:OR. We have an authoritative source to go from here, echoing the maps we have. Jr8825 • Talk 11:03, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

We need to base the maps based on the only official map source we have available right now. Which is the Russia government peacekeeper map. I didn't know making up a map completely based on the mapmaker's assumptions was allowed? The map should display the available information and not touch on subjects not known to the public yet. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 11:12, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Unfortunately, this isn't how Wikipedia's policy works. We follow reliable secondary sources, of which the BBC is one, and we prioritise these over primary sources (see WP:RSPRIMARY) in order to avoid original research and interpretive issues, precisely as we are having here. Unless you can point to a policy objection that I'm not seeing, I'll go ahead and add the maps shortly. Jr8825 • Talk 11:24, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Russian Ministry of Defense already published maps of deployment of observation points and borders at Karabakh. Those maps could be used in the article and for updating the war map. https://caucasus.liveuamap.com/en/2020/11-november-russian-ministry-of-defense-published-map-of --31.145.12.106 (talk) 11:28, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

The Russian map has an obvious contradiction to the text of the statement: Agdam in the map stays under Armenian control. But their map of the contact line is mostly similar to my map :) Also, CuriousGolden, I did not make *any* asumptions in my map. It is purely what the text of the agreement says. You are the one making asumptions. And many of the other maps too, ignoring the uncertainties. --Don-kun (talk) 11:37, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

If we're using any of the maps here, then Mapeh's map seems the most correct. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 11:47, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

The same Russian MOD maps on different news websites also. please check them and I hope they help.

https://news.am/eng/news/612714.html https://caucasus.liveuamap.com/ https://niqnaq.wordpress.com/ https://www.ft.com/content/c9dab829-3b4a-4464-a0c3-4d5c51aa1b0e https://cybershafarat.com/2020/11/11/the-russian-view-peacekeepers-in-karabakh/ https://cybershafarat.com/2020/11/10/nagorno-karabakh-region-agreement-map/--31.145.12.106 (talk) 11:55, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Don-kun's map marks the area of Kalbajar with the former NKAO as 'unclear', as it's not explicit (in the English translation at least) whether the treaty refers to entirety of Kalbajar District or just the area outside of the former NKAO (roughly Artsakh's Shahumyan Province). Given that a chunk of Artsakh's Martakert Province is not mentioned anywhere, this area is to remain under Armenian control, so the main interpretative element of Mapeh's map is the decision to mark the area of all of Martakert Province as remaining under Armenian control. However, this is corroborated by the BBC's map which is why it's acceptable and the most reliably sourced map we currently have. Jr8825 • Talk 11:59, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Would also like to point out that if we're using Mapeh's map, then names should be changed to WP:COMMONNAME (e.g. Shushi to Shusha, Karvachar to Kalbajar, Kovsakan to Zangilan, Berdzor to Lachin, Akari to Hakari). — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:04, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

This is a good point. Ideally we should have both the Armenian and Azerbaijani transliterations for each of these places to please everyone. Is this possible @Mapeh:? Jr8825 • Talk 12:08, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi @Jr8825 and CuriousGolden:, I have uploaded a new map. All place-names in disputed areas are now bilingual (monolingual elsewhere), and there is also the former border of the NKAO (including claimed Shahumyan) for context. Mapeh (talk) 14:13, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi, great, but there are some mistakes. You've marked Shahumyan as part of NK, which it isn't. You haven't marked Madagiz as AZ-controlled and I'm not a very big fan of one language's names being bigger and more visible than the other. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 14:30, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Correcting the former NKAO border and adding a label for Magadiz are good suggestions. As for the names, they are the same size and well, both languages can't be on top. I personally think the italics helps emphasise the Azeri equally. Jr8825 • Talk 14:40, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

My concern wasn't the text's placement or it being italic. The Azeri names are visibly smaller than Armenian names (obvious example in Kalbajar name). Also, I suggest not putting same thing twice if the names are same in both languages (e.g. Hadrut). — CuriousGolden (T·C) 14:50, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

To be honest, the font looks exactly the same size to me. Can you confirm this Mapeh? I quite like the duplicate identical names as it adds consistency, but don't feel particularly strongly about this. Looking again at Magadiz, it's not that the label is missing but that the area controlled by Azerbaijani seems to be a little incorrect – can it be tweaked so that it matches File:QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg and encompasses Magadiz? I've checked and we do have a secondary source (TASS) confirming it came under Azeri control. Also, is it possible to slightly increase the size of all the labels, as they're a bit smaller than the original version? Jr8825 • Talk 15:07, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

I want to point out the problems with the map of Mapeh as I view them: a) Zengilan and Qubadli are not mentioned and they are not part of Lachin. This is an interpretation or even an error. b) We dont know the extention of Kalbajar, thus chosing one of the possible district borders is a interpretation. c) (at least in the caption) No 'corridor' to Nakhchivan is mentioned in the statement nor where it would be. It mentions just transport in general and does not specify, thus a map should not show anything more specific or a interpretation of this clause. d) The Lachin-corridor should go up to Stepanakert, as it is mentioned in that way (in connection with the new road around Shush*) in the statement. e) At least in my opinion it is an interpretation to make any statements about the remaining, not mentioned areas. It may be the logical conclusion, but the agreement does not say the areas on both sides of the front stay under control of Azerbajan or Artsakh. When the aim of the map is to show the content of the agreement, it should not show anything not in the agreement. (at least if it can be understood as part of the agreement, not talking about general topography here)

About the NKAO+Shahumyan border: An alternative to switch to the NKAO border is to leave this in and change the caption to "border of declaration of independence in 1991" which would be correct. --Don-kun (talk) 16:44, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi @CuriousGolden, Jr8825, and Don-kun:. Here are my replies to your various comments:

• The place names are the same size for both languages, 3,5px. In an effort to be fair, one goes first (Armenian), the other get extra emphasis (italics, Azerbaijani). I will make the labels bigger. I put both languages even when they are the same so to not have to chose between the Armenian and Azeri fonts.
• Since 1992 the NKAO has claimed Shahumyan, hence it's inclusion in it's theoretical Artsakh-point-of-view boundaries. This was obviously never recognized by Azerbaijan, like many other elements on the map (Armenian place names as well are not official for example).
• I will adjust the Azeri-conquered zone in both the North and the South according to errors spotted compared with QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg.
• I will extend the Russian-guarded corridor to Stepanakert/Khankendi. The agreement doesn't specifically say to Stepanakert/Khankendi, but since it mentions Shushi, this can be inferred.
• All sources do not include the NKAO part of Karvachar/Kalbajar district in the zone to be transfered by 15 November, so I think there isn't any issue with this.
• The arrow of point 9 (Nakhchivan-Rest of Azeribajan transport links) could go anywhere in Armenia, including the Sout where it already is. It is a purpusfully vague arrow to show this as-yet undefined situation.
• I don"t exactly understand point e @Don-kun:, could you explain it in a different way ?

It work on these changes now and upload a new map within an hour or two. Mapeh (talk) 17:29, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Alright, all the points are good except one. Shaumyan Province was never part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Not everything Artsakh claims is/will be part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Also, I didn't quite understand. Are you going to colour road to Stepanakert (even road which is part of NK) in same colour as Lachin? Because that can be quite confusing. NK should be one colour and Lachin different since it's not part of NK. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 17:37, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

@CuriousGolden: I can see the argument both ways for whether the former NKAO borders or borders claimed at independence should be shown, although I would personally prefer the former NKAO borders. @Don-kun: the BBC's map shows Zengilan and Qubadli as areas that Armenian troops are to withdraw from, in the same way that Mapeh's does. Jr8825 • Talk 19:48, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

I'm fine with Shaumyan being shown there as long as it's different colour/border style than former NK borders to make a distinction. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:04, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

• Shahumyan was part of the declaration of indipendence and was under control of NK during the war in 1992. So if you phrase the caption a bit different I think this is ok.
• I am not sure that you can trust the QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg either, I used different sources and many like the Russian map above point to that there is not that much left of NK south of the Lachin corridor.
• More to CuriousGolden: The road up to Stepanakert is the same in Lachin and in the former NKAO, the agreement does not state otherwise.
• The statement says Kalbajar, which could mean both possible extentions of the district. Everything else is a interpretation.
• The arrows could be positioned better, but the main point here is the text in the caption.
• Last point is difficult to explain. In the caption you write that some areas in the conflict zone "stay/remain under its control", be it AZ or AM. This is to be expected, but not in the agreement. This is why I used a gray hatching and a caption just saying there is no specification for this areas.
• About Zengilan and Qubadli: What the BBC shows on their map does not change the facts that both districts are not part of Lachin and are not mentioned in the agreement. Of course you can make a map with the same informations as the BBC. But then you have to take them in total and have to frame it as "agreement as depicted by the BBC" not as just a depictino of the agreement text that differs from that the map shows. --Don-kun (talk) 18:07, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Shaumyan province was never accepted by the Soviet government (not just AzSSR, but USSR as a whole) as part of Nagorno-Karabakh. It doesn't become part of Nagorno-Karabakh when a separatist government says so. And about the road, I don't think part of NK needs to be shown differently because it falls onto the road. It doesn't really change anything. Reason Lachin corridor is shown in different colour is because it's not a part of NK that will be with Russian peacekeepers. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:14, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi @CuriousGolden, Jr8825, and Don-kun:. I have uploaded a new map. To reply to the comments that were made while it was being made:

• As you say Golden, considering Russian patrols will be in the whole of Armenian-controlled Artsakh anyway, coloring the road red (signifying Russian patrols) in NKAO is redundant. I will reduce the road to just the Lachin corridor.
• As you suggested Don-kun, I'll move the arrows slightly so they are more visible.
• Concerning the borders of NKAO. According to Azerbaijan NKAO does not exist anymore. According to Artsakh it has included Shahumyan since 1992. A NKAO that does not include Shahumyan is not a point of view of anyone, so it wouldn't make sense I feel. The caption should state explicitly "NKAO as claimed by the Republic of Artsakh, not recognized by Azerbaijan" (or something along that line); I will change the caption on the image description page accordingly.
• No map linked to above shows the Karvachar/Kalbajar district to be transferred by 15 November as including parts of NKAO. I think there needs to be a certain realism here.

Mapeh (talk) 19:34, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

You're implying that Shaumyan was not part of NK only according to Azerbaijan. Shaumyan was never part of NKAO during the Soviet times and the USSR government never approved Shaumyan as part of NK. Again, a separatist government claiming it does not change the fact that it was never part of the Nagorno-Karabakh region or Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. If you're keeping it, then caption should be "borders claimed by Artsakh", not "borders of NKAO". — CuriousGolden (T·C) 19:39, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

I think the most accurate would be "Borders of NKAO as claimed by Artsakh". Mapeh (talk) 19:49, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

How would that be accurate? "Borders claimed by Artsakh" is what it literally is. See the (QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg) and how it's written there. Borders of the actual NKAO doesn't change when a separatist government says so. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 19:53, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

@Mapeh: the NKAO was the Soviet administrative division, defunct since 1991. Jr8825 • Talk 19:55, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

@CuriousGolden: Artsakh also claimed territories outside of the former NKAO (Karvachar/Kelbajar, Berdzor/Lachin, etc.) So just "Borders claimed by Artsakh" would seem inaccurate to me, maybe "NKAO (Borders claimed by Artsakh)"?

@Jr8825: Yes, of course, but it has legal significance.

Mapeh (talk) 20:00, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Artsakh agreed to giving these territories up willingly in a peace deal, meaning it does not claim them anymore. And the status of Artsakh is not even known at this point anyway. We don't know if there'll be an "Artsakh" to talk about. So, a caption like "Pre-war claimed borders of Artsakh" would be fine. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 20:03, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

I have uploaded a possible compromise: just show the bits outside of pre-2020 Artsakh-controlled territory. We can add a caption such as "Territories also claimed by the Republic of Artsakh". Would this work @CuriousGolden:? Mapeh (talk) 20:21, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Yes, that's fine. Also, you should change the word "conquered" to "recaptured" or "captured" since "Conquered" breaks WP:NPOV. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 20:25, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Done. I'm going to add the map to the article page. Mapeh (talk) 21:31, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Thanks for your efforts. My main concern is about exactly where the line of contact is, particularly south of Shusha, so I hope you'll be able to tweak this as more info comes to light. I suspect the Armenian snake towards Hadrut may simply be out of date information (I don't especially trust File:QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg on this). Jr8825 • Talk 21:49, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

The map by Mapeh seems quite fair but hard to understand, there are several colors and zones. The map by EurAsiaNet ( https://eurasianet.org/in-karabakh-deal-as-many-questions-as-answers ) seems to me quite simple. I think we should make use of it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.230.79.194 (talk) 06:06, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree and I would also like to point out that there's no confirmation whatsoever that the remaining parts of NK will remain under "Armenian control". There have already been reports of Armenian military leaving the remaining parts of NK. We could use what Eurasianet used: "Land with no scheduled cession to Azerbaijan". And also, the southern gains of Azerbaijan is not quite correct in Mapeh's map. On a less relevant note, I don't think enclaves/exclaves in and out of Nagorno-Karabakh should be marked as given or kept since there probably won't be any enclave/exclave situation there. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 06:10, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

I also like the IP editor's suggestion. Could this be looked at Mapeh? @CuriousGolden: the deliberate ambiguity over the future of Armenian control can be cleared up with the caption's wording. I think "remaining under Armenian control" is fine, as there's no scheduled transfer to change the current situation and "remaining" doesn't strongly imply that this is a permanent situation (although I'm sure Armenians will interpret it this way...) Jr8825 • Talk 07:33, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

"Land with no scheduled cession" avoids making any interpretations, which should be our top priority in my opinion. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 07:37, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png (NB: This map is missing the transfer of the two enclaves in the North).

Hi all, I will be busy this weekend but if any changes are decided here I will be able to make them on Monday afternoon. No problem for what is above; that said the map in IP's link seems quite similar to September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png, no? Concerning the caption, "Land with no scheduled cession" seems like a good legend to me. We can then see in the coming weeks what exactly happens and adapt accordingly. Mapeh (talk) 12:43, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi, yes it's pretty similar to September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:45, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

Hey there, I'm the guy that made September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png! I figured it was easier to modify it from the Russian version than continue the English version as it was very outdated. I replaced the Russian text with English text, then reuploaded. Whatever inaccuracies were in the Russian version were thus in the English version. I did not check any details. Unknown-Tree (talk) 18:54, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

@Unknown-Tree: thanks for your help, those boundaries now seem to be the most commonly shown, although I don't know how authoritative their source is. @Mapeh: the frontlines on our main article map File:QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg have been updated to match this live map and are similar to Unknown-Tree's offering; I think we should do the same. Could you do this when you're back on Monday? Cheers, Jr8825 • Talk 19:43, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 19:51, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

@CuriousGolden: I now just droped the mentioning of Russian troops along the ceasefire line, as this line will change across time anyway. I hope the map now gives a good overview of the agreement. --Don-kun (talk) 19:31, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi all. Sorry I was away unexpectedly yesterday as well. The frontline was updated by someone else over the weekend (although I had to do minor corrections afterwards), so all good there. A couple of things have changed on the map:

• Minor background corrections as said.
• Southern front line was updated by someone else, I did minor corrections, and it is now the same as QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg.
• Changed color of Azeri-captured area, since old color was near identical to Karvachar/Kelbajar area.
• I came accross your comments, @CuriousGolden:, here (commons:User_talk:Ahmetlii#2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire map.svg)
  • "Ashghi Asghjakend" and "Khachen" corrected to "Ashaghi Aghjakend" and "Askeran"
  • Bolding standardized to no cities apart from the capital Stepanakert/Khankendi
  • I didn't change the Southern frontline however and prefered to stick to the one in QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg as we have done so far.

Should we keep the new color for Azeri-captured areas? Or any other suggestions? The old color made it hard to tell the two apart, especially around the Mravi/Murovdagh mountain in the north.

Mapeh (talk) 12:48, 17 November 2020 (UTC)

Thanks for the changes. However, QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg is quite flawed. It basically uses LiveUAMap as reference for some but doesn't include other parts LiveUA has for whatever reason. Since many of the villages in the southern front have been independently confirmed through geo-location on Twitter, I suggest making southern border like in https://caucasus.liveuamap.com . I don't mind the new colour btw. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:54, 17 November 2020 (UTC)

I'm not against CuriousGolden's suggestion, it has the added benefit of clearing up the issue of labelling the area south of the Lachin corridor as Lachin, when it actually isn't. @CuriousGolden: are you able to have a scout around and see if there are any other reliable sources showing the same borders/frontlines as liveuamap.com? @Mapeh: my main suggestion is re-adding the former oblast borders back in. I think they provide important context and help illustrate how much of the former "official" NKAO territory has been taken by Azerbaijan, how much remains under Artsakh's control, and why the other areas are being transferred back to Azerbaijan (it's not a newly-drawn map, but reflecting formal territorial divisions except for where the current frontlines crossed these). If this has to come at the expense of the extra areas claimed but never controlled by Artsakh, I think it's much more advantageous to show the former NKAO. Jr8825 • Talk 19:24, 17 November 2020 (UTC)

The Russian MOD has published this map yesterday; I think this is as official as information can get. I could readjust the Southern frontline according to this map? There are some other particularities (no difference between Agdam district and NK, part of territory controled by Azerbaijan pre-2020 north of Martakert/Aghdara is also included in NK, no sign of Mravi/Murovdagh territorial change), but I think we can ignore those for the moment and see how the ceasefire agreement is enacted.

I'll add the border of the former NKAO (without Shahumyan, I don't agree but this seems to be the norm in all sources) and keep the "Other zones claimed by Artsakh" label.

Mapeh (talk) 11:04, 18 November 2020 (UTC)

I don't think we can follow all aspects of that MoD map, particularly as Agdam district is specifically mentioned in the ceasefire agreement. re: Shahumyan district, whether ot not it was within the former NKAO isn't something that can be disagreed about, it simply wasn't. I agree the best compromise is to have it shown with a separate label. Jr8825 • Talk 11:51, 18 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree with Jr8825 here. The Russian MoD map shouldn't be used as a definite source as it's barely even detailed and it tends to have mistakes (e.g. there being shown Russian posts in Agdam district in first maps and it being removed later). Also, replying to @Jr8825:'s request yesterday: Here's a pretty prominent mapper/geolocator's map about the latest situation around Khojavend/Martuni (much closer than it is on the map), here's another map by another prominent Twitter mapper/geo-locator and another one. Please note that these are not some random mappers and they geo-locate all footage to confirm before adding it to their maps. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 15:19, 18 November 2020 (UTC)

As promised, I have added the former NKAO boundries, but without Shahumyan provice (which is in dotted lines). Concerning the Southern frontline, to be honest it's a mess. Here is a map where I overlaid the different frontlines that each source gave. Nowhere do they all match. Sometimes they're further North, sometimes they're further South than the frontline currently on the map. Whether the Western fringe of the Gubadli and Zangilan districts was captured by Azerbaijan is ambiguous. So, to be honest, I don't see what consensual changes can be made to the Southern frontline, as every change is contradicted by a different source. Mapeh (talk) 13:31, 19 November 2020 (UTC)

@Mapeh: We should at least colour the areas that all the 3 sources in your overlaid map agree on (e.g. areas near Fuzuli and Martuni, east of Shusha and near Gubadli). — CuriousGolden (T·C) 13:38, 19 November 2020 (UTC)

@CuriousGolden: Done. New Southern frontline has been uploaded. Mapeh (talk) 21:59, 20 November 2020 (UTC)

@Mapeh: Looks great, thank you. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 07:57, 21 November 2020 (UTC)

Hi all. Just a quick note to say that it seems as if Russian troops will be stationed around Dadivank monastery, in a similar fashion to the Lachin corridor. Check this article [1] as well as the Russian Army maps [2] (cf. "Ванк" [Vank] towards the North-West). We'll have to see how this evolves (the article explicitely talks about ongoing "negociations"), and then can adapt the map accordingly in the following days. Mapeh (talk) 12:00, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

This is most likely either temporary or just in the church itself, so it wouldn't be big enough to put on the map. We should wait until Kalbajar District is handed back, then we'll most likely know the real deal. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:50, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

@CuriousGolden: Yes agreed. Let's wait and see. Mapeh (talk) 13:22, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

What is the point in adding Armenian names to 7 formerly occupied districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh? Those names were never official, or internationally recognized, and will not be used from now on. Why not just use only official names? Grandmaster 23:08, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

@Grandmaster: it makes sense to include the Armenian names as they were frequently used by English secondary source coverage of the war and related events (for example, there are 285,000 Google hits for "kalbajar fire" because of the reports of house burning during evacuations, (such as here on Al Jazeera). Jr8825 • Talk 17:45, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Exactly. Kalbajar is the official internationally recognized name, also used in UN Security Council resolution # 822. It is official name of the place in the USSR and Azerbaijan. Other names are not used by anyone, nor they ever had official internationally recognized status. Grandmaster 17:50, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Actually you're completely right about that, I wasn't paying attention there as of course it's the Azeri name (I've now struck that comment). My preference is still to keep both so that both parties to the conflict have their nomenclature represented (mostly for the sake of even-handedness). Both ethnic groups have some claim on the region (historical, cultural or because of the de-facto situation before the war). I understand your point about legal recognition, and wouldn't say that I'm particularly adamant about keeping the Armenian names, it's just I don't see any reason to remove it, as I don't think the current stituation is harmful or confers legitimacy. Jr8825 • Talk 18:00, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

I think it'd be better if we just included one WP:COMMONNAME for the cities (e.g. just Stepanakert; Shusha; Martuni; Kalbajar..). Because some of the names in Armenian (e.g. Varanda, Jrakan) weren't even used by most Armenians themselves to refer to these renamed cities outside NK, so including them doesn't really add anything of value. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:01, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

I'm firmly against the suggestion of using only one name within NK proper, as places such as Shusha/Shushi and Stepanakert/Khankendi have within recent history had populations of both ethnicities and are sigificant to both. I think Grandmaster's point about the surrounding occupied Azerbaijani districts has a stronger basis, I just think it's case of WP:BROKEN, particularly as they were the names that Artsakh/Armenia military would've used during the conflict itself (and presumably also the (illegal) Armenian settlers in those areas). @CuriousGolden: do you have sourcing for the claim that Armenian names weren't used by Armenians themselves? Jr8825 • Talk 18:08, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Nope, I'm mostly speaking of personal experience on social media (which is WP:OR, I know). I don't mind any addition really, just wanted to give my 2 cents. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:12, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

It makes sense to use 2 names for places inside the NK, but not so much for the regions outside of it. Districts outside of NK had no Armenian population before the conflict, and I only learned those alternative names from Wikipedia. I agree with CuriousGolden, even Armenians don't use them. Grandmaster 18:22, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

I think it is important that both names be used in disputed areas. The presence of both brings added value to the map and costs nothing. Even in regions outside the former NKAO the Armenian names are quite common (Google lists a quarter million webpages that use "Karvachar" and not "Kalbajar" [3] and over half a million that use "Berdzor" and not "Lachin" [4]). There is also the secondary problem that, if we only put one, which one do we put? For certain towns there is no clear answer, and there will inevitably be endless debates. I must say that my personal preference would be to make the whole map bilingual (and so put Jermuk/Istisu and Julfa/Jugha for example), but I find that the current situation is a good compromise. Mapeh (talk) 12:44, 8 December 2020 (UTC)

Dear Mapeh The official ceasefire agreement available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384 says only transport links / transport communications. The green arrow currently shown on the map may satisfy the desire for single "land corridor" in Azerbaijani / Turanist circles, however the agreement says nothing about single "corridor" generally and nothing about the speculative concept of a corridor via Meghri / Syunik specifically. "Zangezur corridor" is a POV concept circulating in partisan Azerbaijani / pro-Azerbaijani media only. Leaving anything vague and unsupported on that map that would resonate with militarist propaganda on one side is highly undesirable, especially with the view of ongoing 2021 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis. Could you please remove that arrow from the map completely ASAP, thanks. Regards --Armatura (talk) 18:58, 23 May 2021 (UTC)

Dear Jr8825, it looks like Mapeh logs in to Wikipedia / Wikimedia rarely in 2021 (previous login was in February), hence there is a chance this sensitive redundancy is going to be left there for some time before he could reply, do you have any quicker solutions like suspending the use of the file while the author is awaited to come back with a reply? There are already propaganda articles being published using this map... Thanks, --Armatura (talk) 22:45, 29 May 2021 (UTC)

Hello Armatura. I have replied to your message here. Regards, Mapeh (talk) 11:56, 31 May 2021 (UTC)

Thanks, Mapeh, opened a new map discussion thread here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_ceasefire_agreement#The_green_arrow_over_Syunik_in_Ceasefire_agreement_map, and linked it on 2020 NKR war talk map as well. --Armatura (talk) 17:01, 31 May 2021 (UTC)

already broken/violated - new 'deal' from Trump admin.

This agreement is already a part of history. They have now signed a new agreement arranged by the Trump administration. However, some fighting is apparently still going on. But this article should be removed from ITN and 'retired.'[/s] 50.111.24.158 (talk) 15:19, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

Source? — CuriousGolden (T·C) 15:25, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

I think they refer to the ceasefire in late october, that was indeed broken. --Don-kun (talk) 16:31, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

They said "this agreement" in a talk page about the 9 November deal. So I don't think they're talking about the late October deal. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 17:38, 12 November 2020 (UTC)

My mistake - that was an old news story that popped up by mistake on a news site.50.111.24.158 (talk) 00:16, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

A Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion

The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion:

• 2020 Armenia protest.png

Participate in the deletion discussion at the nomination page. —Community Tech bot (talk) 21:50, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

Cession

Hi Nzanjani, I've now reverted two of your edits. I don't believe your wording changes represent an improvement to the current wording, which was reached through discussion in the map section above. Under the ceasefire, the area is not specifically mentioned and will consequently remain under Armenian/Artsakh control for the immediate, foreseeable future, as attested by secondary source commentary on the ceasefire. Personally, I think the clearest and most neutral wording would be to say that it's the "area of NK remaining under Armenian control", but several Azeri editors objected to this, so the current compromise is "no scheduled cession to Azerbaijan" (I personally think this is a little bit leading, but because it's factually accurate I think it's an acceptable compromise). This caption is purely a description of the terms of the treaty, as they are reflected in practical terms on the ground. It's irrelevant to the legal status of NK under intl. law (which, of course, is that it has always been de jure part of Azerbaijan, since Artsakh unilaterally declared independence - nobody's disputing this here). Jr8825 • Talk 20:48, 17 November 2020 (UTC)

You appear to be espousing a biased perspective that favors the Armenian position. This is directly contrary to Wikipedia rules, which demand neutrality. Nagorno-Karabakh is de jure Azerbaijani territory, which you are effectively refusing to acknowledge by reverting my edits. If we want to talk about de facto control, let’s make that clarification, but there can never be any “cession” to Azerbaijan because it is already part of Azerbaijan; only control can be ceded. You state that Nagorno-Karabakh will “remain under Armenian/Artsakh control for the immediate, foreseeable future” but that is totally unclear. The agreement makes no such mention of it and one cannot rely on uncited secondary sources, which are merely hearsay, as you have. The most accurate edit to the color key is to simply note that Nagorno-Karabakh will remain under Russian peacekeeping oversight and leave governance status up to future negotiations to determine. I am simply trying to remove hints of bias on an issue whose ultimate resolution is very much unclear at this juncture. Nzanjani (talk) 20:58, 17 November 2020 (UTC)

Firstly, please remember that Wikipedia has a policy that we should comment on the content, not other editors. Regarding "Nagorno-Karabakh is de jure Azerbaijani territory, which you are effectively refusing to acknowledge", please see the last sentence of my comment above.

Now, some sources (with my emphases):

• "The truce last week stipulated that Armenia turn over control of some areas it holds outside Nagorno-Karabakh’s borders to Azerbaijan." Associated Press
• "The deal leaves a cloud of uncertainty over parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that will continue to be administered by local ethnic Armenian authorities including the enclave’s main city Stepanakert" The Guardian
• "ambiguities were related to ... the start of the negotiation on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh." (so, as negotiations haven't yet started, Armenia will be retaining control of the area under the current terms of the ceasefire) Reuters
• "The deal has prevented the conclusive defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh and the likely expulsion of its Armenian inhabitants. Russia is sending about 2,000 peacekeepers to protect the remaining Armenian population, separate the two adversaries, and patrol a corridor that will connect Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh" BBC/Carnegie Moscow Center Jr8825 • Talk 21:52, 17 November 2020 (UTC)

Your response makes no attempt to defend the wording of the color key re: “cession to Azerbaijan” and instead focuses entirely on de facto control, affirming my original point. It appears as though another user modified the color key accordingly. I agree with the edit and, as such, have no further comments. I am satisfied that the color key no longer reflects a pro-Armenian bias and now is in accordance with Wikipedia policy. Restoring neutrality was my sole objective. Nzanjani (talk) 04:07, 18 November 2020 (UTC)

I urge you to reflect on why you felt the need to revert my edits, which were fair, accurate, and sensible. Ensuring the integrity of Wikipedia requires an unbiased fact-based perspective. Nzanjani (talk) 04:10, 18 November 2020 (UTC)

You don't seem to have read or understood the sources linked above, but as you're happy with the current revision I think we can leave it at that. Jr8825 • Talk 11:41, 18 November 2020 (UTC)

Explanation

Do we have any reliable sources about analysts explaining why Azerbaijan stopped short of regaining all of its internationally-recognised territory when it was just a few kilometers from NK's capital? --ExperiencedArticleFixer (talk) 15:55, 25 November 2020 (UTC)

Russian interference. But there's no really good source so far. Grandmaster 23:04, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

I read an analysis somewhere saying that Azerbaijan would've faced much greater international pressure and a humanitarian crisis if it had pushed on to besiege the large Armenian population of Stepanakert (which was trapped because of both roads to Armenia being cut). I can't remember where I read this – it would've been an RS, as I'm picky about what I read, but unfortunately I follow a large number of current affairs sources! If it's helpful I can dig around and see if I can find the source again, although I'm a bit snowed under at the moment. (Also Stepanakert didn't have the historic Azeri population that Shusha did, so perhaps that was factored in because of international image, alhtough I'm not sure whether this was explicitly said in the source or my own inference!) Jr8825 • Talk 17:28, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Thomas de Waal, an expert on the conflict wrote that in his article for Carnegie Peace Endowment. But that is just his opinion, not an official information. We will probably never know what exactly happened. Grandmaster 18:15, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Expert opinion published in reliable sources is perfectly acceptable (it's actually preferable to the primary source official statements) – it just needs to be appropriately attributed. Jr8825 • Talk 18:18, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

Here's another source that provides a different explanation (threat of Russian military intervention after a helicopter shoot down), but de Waal's opinion is mentioned there as well: [5] Grandmaster 16:12, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Update needed

So? Did Armenians evacuate Kalbajar? --ExperiencedArticleFixer (talk) 01:04, 26 November 2020 (UTC)

Yes, it was returned to Azerbaijan. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 09:16, 26 November 2020 (UTC)

agreement => declaration/statement

Well, in original document it says "заявление" (in Russian), which means declaration or statement, but definitely not agreement. What about moving this page to 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire declaration/statement. Let's discuss before the edit request. Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 20:10, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

@Գարիկ Ավագյան: "Ceasefire agreement" is the natural English translation and its usage is pretty broad – "ceasefire statement" isn't a common phrase, while to my mind "declaration" implies a stronger agreement. "Ceasefire agreement" doesn't necessarily imply any significant negotiation beyond agreement on the terms of the ceasefire, and anyway I think we should follow the English secondary sources on this. Jr8825 • Talk 17:35, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree with Jr8825. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 17:42, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

The green arrow over Syunik in Ceasefire agreement map

• Dear map creators and specifically - Mapeh (as the last mapper who edited the ceasefire agreement map). Thanks very much for your work on ceasefire agreement map. The official ceasefire agreement text available on Kremlin website says only "transport links" and "transport communications" in the context of "unblocking regional communications", without any further specification - where, what kind and how many links. The thick green arrow over Syunik currently shown on the map (created by a user who was blocked for abusing multiple accounts for pro-Azeri POV pushing) essentially reflects the single land corridor concept that president Aliyev desires - this was not agreed with Armenia or Azerbaijan and this is clearly not what the published ceasefire agreement said. "Zangezur corridor" is a POV concept pushed by partisan Azerbaijani / pro-Azerbaijani media (particularly aggressively after 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War) based 1) partly on extinct the Gobles plan, 2) partly on Halil pasha's Turanist ideas of land continuity between Turkey and Azerbaijan and 3) partly on extinct discussions between Azerbaijan and Armenia on swapping Nagorno Karabakh for a land corridor via Meghri - none of them reflected in this ceasefire statement. Leaving anything vague and unsourced on this map that would resonate with propaganda, especially with the view of currently ongoing 2021 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis, is highly undesirable as it gives legitimacy to an illegitimate idea. Therefore,

1. shall we remove that green arrow from the map completely and wait until the transport communications are defined by trilateral Azerbaijan Azeri-Russian committees working on unblocking the regional communications, please?
2. and, while we are discussing, can the disputed map (the version with green arrow over Syunik) be temporarily suspended from showing up in Wiki articles please, at till this discussion is over? Many thanks. --Armatura (talk) 16:55, 31 May 2021 (UTC)

• There is an ongoing deletion discussion about the so called "Zangezur corridor". Just as I said there, same applies here. The so called "corridor" doesn't exist, this isn't imaginarymaps.com. There is also no agreement of this "corridor", which for some "not really obvious" reason, is shown exactly where the Az propagandists want it to be with that green arrow. Per the 'delete' contributions [here], and the arguments presented here, I agree with both of the last points. This should've been done long ago. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 10:30, 1 June 2021 (UTC)

• I believe it is better to wait for the outcome of the discussion on deletion of the article about Zangezur corridor. The article needs an illustration, and it is not known at this point what the community decides. Grandmaster 14:19, 1 June 2021 (UTC)

This is the map of the official ceasefire agreement, not a map of hoax theories and speculations. This map should reflect only what ceasefire agreement explicitly says, without assumptions and WP:OR. That green arrow or "Zangezur Corridor" concept you favor are not supported by the ceasefire agreement text in any way, hence they should have no place on this map. Wikipedia is not a crystal ball, as a matter of fact, see WP:CRYSTAL. --Armatura (talk) 17:15, 1 June 2021 (UTC)

The agreement says: The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. There is only one way how the transport connection between NAR and the rest of Azerbaijan could be established, and it is shown on the map. It is not something new, it existed in Soviet times. Grandmaster 22:00, 1 June 2021 (UTC)

Not true. No POV / OR / CRYSTAL, please. That singular "only way" is in President Aliyev's and his followers' dreams, but not in the ceasefire statement (this map should reflect only what the ceasefire statement says). You know well that there are at least two possible (and partially existing) rail routes, as you can see [here], Armenia prefers the Yerevan-Ijevan-Gazakh route, while Azerbaijan prefers Zangilan-Meghri-Nakhchivan route. But the ceasefire statement does not say "railroads only". If you check Transport, you will find out that the term "transport" includes air, rails, roads, water, cable, pipeline, etc. The statement says nothing like "Armenia gives part of his land to Azerbaijan as a corridor" or "Armenia not allowed to have transport links over Azerbaijani territory.". It says "unblocking regional communications". E.g., transportation between Georgia and Azerbaijan is not blocked - Azerbaijani people / cargo can move via Georgia and Georgian people / cargo can move via Azerbaijan, but it does not mean that Georgia cedes a land to Azerbaijan as a "corridor". Whereas the current thick green arrow pushes exactly that twisted "corridor" propaganda (absent in the agreement) --Armatura (talk) 23:08, 1 June 2021 (UTC)

Who talks about ceding the land? The land will remain the property of Armenia, but under Russian control. Russian border guards will be protecting the corridor, and Russian railways will be servicing it. Obviously, the corridor will work both ways. Aliyev said a number of times that Armenia will use it to reach Russian markets, as well as Iran via Julfa, as that was the railway connection that existed in Soviet times. Armenia may prefer other routes, but it needs to find investments, which is quite unlikely. Zangezur corridor will be financed by Azerbaijan and Russia, who definitely have finances. I don't really understand all the panic in the Armenian media over the transport corridor, but I think it is related to upcoming elections. Grandmaster 00:01, 2 June 2021 (UTC)

What's fundamentally wrong with what you are saying, Grandmaster, is a refusal to understand that Wikipedia is not a place for your or my or anybody's personal interpretations and forecasts. If ceasefire agreement says A, B and C, then the map illustrating it should show exactly A, B, and C, and not Ä, β, 𐌸 or 废话. 2+2 equals 4 and not 5. I can't make this more simple. --Armatura (talk) 11:24, 2 June 2021 (UTC)

In my understanding, the green arrow does not necessarily show the exact location of the rail and motorway link. It just indicates that there will be a connection between the NAR and the rest of Azerbaijan, according to the agreement. Grandmaster 15:44, 2 June 2021 (UTC)

That's your subjective understanding, which does not correlate with what the agreement or Wikipedia policies say. Which again takes us to my point that there should be no ambiguous vagueness left on this map, to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations such as the one you described. The map should be as unequivocal to a neutral reader as 2+2=4 and it clearly ins't now. --Armatura (talk) 16:03, 2 June 2021 (UTC)

• Support 1 and 2: the current version of the map is misguiding with that arrow, the transcript says All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. And not that there will be one specific corridor to be used only by Azerbaijan, located wherever people speculate it will be, we shouldn't mix fact with opinion/speculation. The current version of the map pushes a WP:CRYSTAL propaganda concept pushed by one partisan side. thus I vote removal by WP:OR, WP:CRYSTAL and WP:NPOV. - Kevo³²⁷ (talk) 08:46, 3 June 2021 (UTC)
• Comment: @Mapeh: would it be possible to change the Azerbaijani-green line with arrows to a dotted back line with arrows, with a small truck icon next to it? I made a mock up and it looked decent, but I don't currently have an SVG editor installed on my PC. @Armatura: do you have any suggestions for other ways we could visually show the improved transport connections mentioned in the ceasefire text? I think this solution would make it clearer than it's not a territorial concession. Jr8825 • Talk 00:39, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

Many thanks for joining the discussion, Jr8825. If we are specifically talking about the railway links that could pass through Armenia ensure transport communication between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan, then two most possible rail routes are highlighted in this article: https://eurasianet.org/armenia-proposing-restoration-of-rail-route-through-azerbaijan-to-russia. But even these are speculations at best currently, as the ceasefire statement does not specify where / how many / what type of transport connections, it just says unblocking all transport communications in the region, and all obviously includes 1) not only railway (although railways are likely to be the first modality to be unblocked, as at least they are talked about both by Azerbaijan and Armenia) but also other means of transportation - roads and even airspace, 2) not only one but several 3) not only Azerbaijan communicating with Nakhchivan (and hence also with Turkey +- Iran +-Georgia) via Armenia, but also Armenia being allowed transport via Azerbaijan - to Russia +- Caspian sea +- Georgia. Imagine a map showing all transport communications between Georgia and Azerbaijan - the ceasefire agreement map should show all possible Armenia<->Azerbaijan communications which, IMHO, could be hypothetically drawn based on the Soviet-era Caucasus transport maps. The largest number or suggestions/hypothetical considerations on communications I found in here: https://oc-media.org/ru/statyi/stoit-li-ozhidat-bolee-tesnykh-svyazey-na-kavkaze/. All these speculations can be included only with the legend saying that these are purely theoretical possibilities not stated by the ceasefire agreement and not agreed by post-statement talks, but added by wiki users, with attribution to reliable neutral sources (Aliyev's unilateral wishes are not a reliable source). Or the easier option - not to have any theoretical collection on this map till any connection becomes reality. --Armatura (talk) 01:35, 4 June 2021 (UTC)

Any final thoughts on the green arrow Mapeh, Jr8825 ? ZaniGiovanni (talk) 14:22, 23 June 2021 (UTC)

@ZaniGiovanni: I think the green arrow is abstract enough to be fine as the status quo, although as I said above I think replacing it with a dotted black line with a small truck icon would be even clearer. Unfortunately I don't have the time to download Inkscape and get to grips with it, so I can't make changes myself. You might want to try some of the links at WP:SVG to see if you can find an editor who's willing to help you out, if you still feel it's very important. Jr8825 • Talk 18:57, 26 June 2021 (UTC)

Dear @Jr8825, the arrow isn’t status quo at all, the creator of it, CuriousGolden, also was heavy on POV pushing (and is now blocked). Moreover, they added that arrow without broad consensus. I suggest a removal of the arrow or two possible train routes as dotted lines with train icons (one via Syunik that Azerbaijan wants and one via Ijevan that Armenia prefers). If @Mapeh is kind enough, I’d ask them to please consider changing the map. Regards, ZaniGiovanni (talk) 09:53, 27 June 2021 (UTC)

ZaniGiovanni what you suggest for Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan connections, makes sense to me, as the Armenian side agreed that train connections for transporting cargo would be okay, the PM Pashinyan himself said that. However, it's not the only problem of the current map. The agreement didn’t say "mainland Azerbaijan gets connections to Nakhichevan and Armenia gets no connections", it said unblocking all communications in the region, which means if we want to accurately reflect the agreement’s essence on the map, then there should also be vague signs showing the connections of Armenia’s eastern regions to Russia and Caspian sea and Armenia’s Syunik and Vayots Dzor region to Iran by route[ other than the current Meghri road. (I have not included Turkey as it shows no signs of unblocking Armenia). That will be fair and inclusive of all agreement points, instead of selectively showing just Azerbaijani interests. Jr8825, Mapeh was willing to change the map as needed, he just wanted a consensus for that. And he we are, trying to reach that consensus, instead of removing the current map and edit warring. --Armatura (talk) 18:37, 27 June 2021 (UTC)

Removal of 'Transport connections and "corridor" dispute'

I'm contesting the removal of this relevant sourced content by Armatura. It doesn't seem reasonable at all, or to have been done in good faith. — Alalch Emis (talk) 20:02, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

I'll just mention that reverting a revert is not a good tone but a recipe for sparking an edit war. This article is about the official agreement which has NO mentioning or room for any "corridors", and merging text on transport connections from another article (without pushing any unwarranted "corridor" agenda in) is under discussion as mentioned in the top of this and source article. Hence I removed it, while the discussion is ongoing. With this in mind, can you please self-revert, participate in the discussion above and wait to see what others are saying? And WP:AGF, please, and if you cannot - provide reasons. Thanks. --Armatura (talk) 20:23, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Is the addition of this section not an improvement to the article? You yourself said "the implementation of that point should be in the Aftermath (it isn't at the moment)". This concerns the implementation of point 9 -- the Azerbaijani side calls the implementation "Zangezur corridor". The current content reflects that. It's a part of the aftermath of the signing of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. I don't understand why this should be removed, and how the merge discussion affects it. I have to reiterate that your removal did not seem consistent with your earlier comment, so it did not appear to have been done in good faith meaning that I still feel justified in reverting and maintaining this pertinent addition. Regards. — Alalch Emis (talk) 20:29, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

When something is being discussed on talk page, it is a generally a good tone to make your proposal, and wait to see what others say, and discuss again, to come up with consensus, instead of rushing with controversial additions. No, my proposal is far from legalizing the purely Azerbaijan-Turkey-promoted "corridor" concept under the Aftermath (to the point of making it a subheader or a synonym of transport connections), but rather moving the NPOV transport connections text under agreement Aftermath and then in NPOV (not Azerbaijani POV) language explain who promotes what. You talk about WP:CONTENTFORKING, yet you started populatiing your controversial addition with what Mirzoyan said, which is WP:CONTENTFORKING. You have not provided valid reasons for assuming bad faith, against WP:AOBF. --Armatura (talk) 21:37, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

The Zangezur corridor probably should be mentioned somewhere here, but does it have to be through exact copied text from its article, having to add unnecessary several tags on both articles instead of just slightly rewriting the copied text? Super Ψ Dro 20:51, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

The transclusion has been done per WP:SUMMARYSTYLE and WP:SYNC. Lead transclusion as a summary is a highly formal and optimized way to add to one article what has already been covered in another article, and starts from a premise that the lead (per MOS:LEAD) should be a summary of the body. If there is unnecessary detail in the lead it is either the case that the lead should be trimmed (highly likely in general), or that using transclusion refinement the transclusion can be appropriately adjusted to match the intended purpose. "Slight rewriting" is often problematic leading to WP:CONTENTFORKING especially in controversial matters, especially in WP:WORDISSUBJECT matters. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:00, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

@Super Dromaeosaurus: regardless of what I said in the above comment, do you want to try out your "slightly rewriting" solution for including the missing information? — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:07, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Would that get the <noinclude></noinclude> tags removed? To be honest I am not sure why were they added, I assumed it was some kind of attribution tag or something like that. Super Ψ Dro 21:15, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

@Super Dromaeosaurus: You can see what <noinclude> does by reading WP:PARTRANS. Keep in mind that WP:SYNC is a guideline. Rewriting would get rid of those, but "getting rid of those" is not a good in itself. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:19, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

@ZaniGiovanni: First of all, don't talk to me like that, in an emotive and threatening tone or you will see what will happen. Second, why are you disputing the addition? — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:12, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Comment Just to be clear, I'm disinterested in this issue. My only involvement was correcting the cite error caused by adding note without a noteslist. 89.241.33.89 (talk) 20:55, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

ty IP, your fix was needed. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:00, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Comment I think the merger proposal is not about mechanistic moving of the disputed “corridor”, but incorporating the text about transport connections – these are different things. While it is being discussed, it is better to wait for consensus. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 21:16, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

WP:NOTFORUM— Alalch Emis (talk) 19:48, 8 October 2021 (UTC)

I think the Armenians who lost the war in Karabakh think that they will win with wikipedia special forces.Wikipedia armenian army.. Armenians are chasing a dream again. On many pages on Wikipedia, I see only articles created with Armenian sources. This is really funny. It's obvious that wikipedia will soon be edited. All your propaganda efforts will be in vain. It is a war indemnity given by Armenia for losing the Zangezur Corridor at the end of the 44-day war. You should get used to it by now.Fullstackdev (talk) 12:14, 8 October 2021 (UTC)

Article 9 implementation

I suppose the title of this section is not "wiki-friendly". Wouldn't it be better to rename it to "Unblock of transport communications"? Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 07:37, 14 October 2021 (UTC)

agree, Article 9 is not self explanatory or notable enough to be self sufficient as a subheading, but “unblocking transport communications” would do perhaps, not sure whether there is a noun “unblock”. --Armatura (talk) 22:30, 15 October 2021 (UTC)

Yes, it is much better. Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 09:00, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Merging Zangezur Corridor into Aftermath of the agreement [re-opened, bumped]

The following discussion is an archived record of a request for comment. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this discussion. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.

The result of this discussion was a rough consensus against the merge.

Before discussing the rationale for the close I will first outline various important principles. Firstly, per WP:NOTAVOTE my close was not a tally of which side gained more numerical support but rather was based on the strength of the arguments presented by either side. Secondly, per WP:FORUMSHOP raising essentially the same issue on multiple noticeboards and talk pages, or to multiple administrators or reviewers, or any one of these repetitively, is unhelpful to finding and achieving consensus. This same topic was discussed in an AfD about 8 months ago. I did not take comments made in that AfD into account nor did the topic being raised again affect my close (WP:CCC), but I note here that repeatedly raising contentious issues for discussion without a single year (at bare minimum) passing is highly unlikely to lead to a collaborative environment that benefits our ability to cover this topic area in a neutral and encyclopedic manner. Thirdly, accusations against other editors, forecasting, and vague claims of government propaganda are not particularly good support or oppose rationales. Nationalistic advocacy in editing is an understandable concern, but editors are reminded not to engage in battleground behaviour and to assume good faith in those they disagree with.

Both sides made arguments claiming that one or another result would be in the interests or advance the agenda of countries and alliances. This argument was not taken into account during the close, as little to no PAGs were cited supporting how we as editors must respond to such interests here nor do I believe any are applicable in this case. Supporters of the merge claimed that the corridor's notability and coverage fell mostly or exclusively under the scope of the ceasefire agreement article. Oppose supporters provided examples of sources discussing the corridor before the war, weakening this claim. Additionally, oppose supporters argued that the corridor had enough on-going coverage both in connection to and outside the ceasefire agreement that merging would either give it WP:UNDUE weight or lead to inadequate coverage on wiki of the corridor. Supporters did not effectively counter-argue the arguments of oppose voters. Therefore, in light of the applicable policies and guidelines I see a rough consensus against the merge as the closure most appropriate in this case.A. C. Santacruz ⁂ Please ping me! 22:41, 22 February 2022 (UTC)

---

Should Zangezur corridor be merged into 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement (this page)? See filer's original question for details. El_C 22:17, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Merge discussion re-opened, invovled close overturned. El_C 14:16, 15 January 2022 (UTC)

Discussion top|result=The result of this discussion was no consensus to merge. Brandmeister^talk 21:27, 9 January 2022 (UTC)

I propose merging Zangezur corridor into 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. I think the content in Zangezur corridor can easily be explained in the Transport connections subsection of Aftermath section of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, and a merger would not cause any article-size or weighting problems in 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. Thanks for your thoughts. --Armatura (talk) 20:41, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

• Support as the nominator, per my proposal above --Armatura (talk) 20:41, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

Of note, merger does NOT necessarily mean copying ALL the content. Citing WP policy:

A merger is the process of uniting two or more pages into a single page. It is done by copying SOME or all content from the source page(s) into the destination page and then replacing the source page with a redirect to the destination page.

The 2020 agreement contains a point about unblocking transport connections, and the implementation of that point should be in the Aftermath (it isn't at the moment) and which is happening (like today Azeri civil flight has conducted over Armenian air) and Zangezur Corridor article contains content about transport connections, although spiced with unilaterally promoted "Zangezur Corridor" speculative concept which remains contested per WP:CRYSTAL. --Armatura (talk) 21:32, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

• Oppose. The Zangezur Corridor article is currently formulated as a WP:WORDISSUBJECT. Controversial WORDISSUBJECTs are very inopportune to be combined with regular subjects, they are difficult to cover properly and require a particularly sensitive treatment. This is why a separate article is absolutely warranted. WP:SUMMARYSTYLE inclusion here would be great, but not merger. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:09, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

Comment: In reference to this comment (diff) in an underlying section, and other comments by advocates of merging -- it is apparent that the merge side wants to negate the subject of the Zangezur corridor, as it is currently formulated based on an arduous (but ultimately relatively constructive) process of collaboration and discussion, involving mediation, and wants to select certain elements that they define as "transport connections" while avoiding this term. They don't want Wikipedia to cover "Zangezur corridor" as a notable term under WP:WORDISSUBJECT -- they want this subject (a term) not to be covered (or for it to be merely mentioned in passing). But they are unable to establish that the term isn't notable and not worthy of the usually comprehensive encyclopedic coverage. Based on this, I conclude that this merge initiative is a relitigation of the May AfD. The merger as advocated here would result in the subject of Zangezur corridor not being covered on Wikipedia.

If this merger is supposed to happen, some major fault would have to be found in the Zangezur corridor article. But no such fault can be found, because the article passed AfD, was subsequently collaborated on fairly intensely, and is built on solid references.

It is with this in mind, and having also in mind that this topic has historically involved canvassing and is within a DS area, I'm pinging an administrator to get his thoughts on this discussion possibly requiring wider participation, or some specific action, to be properly resolved (having in mind that RfC can't be used for merge discussions). Basically I'm afraid of canvassing taking place leading to a superficial appearance of consensus to merge, which would result in something that is equivalent to censorship (removal of a controversial, but notable, term). Pinging @Joe Roe:, and also earlier mediator @Mikehawk10: (who is not an admin) — Alalch Emis (talk) 22:06, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Alalch Emis The topic, the neutrality of which is disputed, has not "passed AfD" in flying colours as you may remember, and it was specifically about deletion, that decision is not written on the stone and does not apply to other suggestions (like merger). Time actually made it clear that the agenda of "corridor" is almost exclusively pushed forward by Azerbaijani and Turkish government related sources, and the fact that Azerbaijan and Turkey have such isolationist agenda instead of following the legal 2020 agreement can be perfectly explained in the aftermath of the 2020 agreement article in neutral language, as their view (which no other country shares) on what should happen after the war. Also, WP:ASPERSIONS prohibits casting accusations without evidence; whom exactly do you direct your accusation of canvassing and with what evidence? WP:AGF prohibits accusing other editors of bad faith without clear evidence in the form of diffs - it can be seen as inflammatory, aggravate a dispute, and cause accusation of bad faith on your part; what is the evidence for claiming bad motives in others? What made you to selectively ping those two particular senior editors, was it by chance getting the answer you want? And why convert a polite discussion that has a chance of becoming something constructive into a drama board which is going make others demotivated in participating? --Armatura (talk) 19:39, 10 October 2021 (UTC)

@Armatura: When I say canvassing I'm using it like the closer of the AfD did -- not directed at any editor or (ostensible) group of editors, but as a general impression of the goings-on when this topic is concerned.

I didn't ping involved editors in the Zangezur corridor content disputes and deletion discussion, but uninvolved editors, asking them about what they think about a need for wider participation. I did this per WP:CONSENSUS. This is because I think that editors who frequent this area are emotionally or ideologically invested in winning an argument. I deduce this from various comments, such as yours when you say that covering the concept/term "Zangezur corridor" means legalizing this notion, and another merge proponent's that as a concept, but not a reality, this subject should not be comprehensively covered in a separate page (see: Wikipedia:Wikipedia is comprehensive and WP:WORDISSUBJECT). Forgive me, but this does not appear rational. How can encyclopedic coverage of a fact of discourse legalize it? Nothing is legalized on Wikipedia. Wikipedia strives for neutrality, but it can't make the world neutral or more accordant to norms of international law... The world is rife with conflict, crazy biases, manipulations of discourse. We give these things encyclopedic coverage. The readers (such as when they search for "Zangezur corridor", a very visible term) want this from us, and it is our mission to provide them with relevant answers to their queries. The term "Zangezur corridor" however imperfect the AfD was, was found to be a viable subject, and has been given due encyclopedic coverage, based on reliable sources. The article is pretty good. You yourself contributed a bulk of it, providing a clearer outline and better context. But now and the other merge advocates are negating this progress, retrograding to the ditches of the May AfD, using the same arguments. This is an inconsistency. It coincides with you mentioning how Azerbaijan is now flying civilian flights over Armenian territory (which is happening roughly in the area in which a transport corridor would hypothetically form), as if this is causing the "Zangezur corridor" to gradually transform from a concept to a reality. It looks like you are trying to marginalize the usage of the "Zangezur corridor" by redirecting the separate Wikipedia article in order to right a great wrong through censorship.

So, I have grave doubts about your proposal's constructiveness. I see the proposal as potentially (i.e. certainly if implemented) destructive. Merging two articles concerns the subjects of both articles. Per WP:MERGEREASON, merging is done in cases labelled as "Duplicate", "Overlap", "Short text", "Context".

Here we clearly don't have a duplicate; we don't have a large overlap of the subjects because Zangezur corridor concerns itself with a term/concept (per WP:WORDISSUBJECT), that relates to only one aspect of the the agreement, and one side's rhetoric and interpretations (and responses thereof), and this article concerns itself with the "ground truth" -- the term is not neutral, but coverage of the topic is neutral when the term is identified for what it is (just like gay agenda is a non-neutral [hateful] term, but the article is neutral when this concept is clearly identified as a disparaging term -- your proposal is just like proposing to merge Gay agenda with LGBT movements); "short text" is likewise is not the case; this is not a short article that needs to be contextualized -- aside from neither article being short, the context for the agreement (war, etc.), is already present, and the term "Zangezur corridor" has it's own historical context (that significantly predates the agreements).

So when you stress that merger does NOT necessarily mean copying ALL the content it appears that you want to induce a pseudodeletion via redirect of the Zangezur corridor article, instead of a real merger. Really, according to the merge proponents here, the encyclopedic subject of the contested "Zangezur corridor" term would be lost on Wikipedia, and the term would only be mentioned in passing. It doesn't look like anything would be merged in reality. It only looks like the Zangezur corridor article would be blanked, and a wholly new section would be written, perhaps reusing a few references. This is not merger, it is (pseudo-)deletion. This is why I called it a relitigation of the May AfD. Wider participation is needed for this to resolve. — Alalch Emis (talk) 19:06, 12 October 2021 (UTC)

Alalch Emis, WP:WALLOFTEXT with excess use of policies just to defend a point of view, sorry. --Armatura (talk) 05:43, 14 October 2021 (UTC)

• Support - Zangezur corridor (or "Nakhchivan corridor") doesn't exist in reality, and guessing if it may or may not one day is WP:CRYSTAL. At best, it should be merged with the ceasefire agreement article, as according to Aliev and Azerbaijani media (who are the main pushing force for this non-existent corridor), it's the extension of said agreement. Quote: "Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared that the ceasefire agreement contained a special provision on the establishment of the "Nakhichevan corridor" [6]. The term has been increasingly used by Azerbaijani authorities since the end of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, while Armenia has steadily objected to it, asserting that “corridor logic” deviates from the ceasefire statement trilaterally signed at the end of that war. So if anything, this non-existing corridor only should exist on Wikipedia as a part of the agreement page, as Azerbaijani authorities and media claim it is. It doesn't warrant a standalone article. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 22:26, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

• Oppose to cover all the information currently on that article here would give it WP:UNDUE weight, and I don't think it is anyone's goal to lose information for no reason. If I remember correctly, the failed AfD of the article concluded the Zangezur corridor is notable enough as to have a page. If a concept is notable, there's no reason as to merge it into another article. Super Ψ Dro 13:55, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

I thought I'd mention that you are the creator of this article, Super Dromaeosaurus, that you were not opposed to its deletion (admitting being under influence of one-sided Azerbaijani resources when creating it) and that the RfC did not have strong consensus, for full transparency. And this discussion is not about notability but the content - most of the content is about unblocking transport connections which can easily go to aftermath of the agreement which envisaged that unblocking, and what is left can be mentioned as Azerbaijani position in a sentence or two, with another sentence or two about reactions to it. Best wishes, --Armatura (talk) 19:48, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Originally yes, you are right, but the article has been substantially improved ever since. My opinion has changed, and I believe the article can stay separate. Super Ψ Dro 19:53, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

• Oppose facts are painful. Do not try to remove this corridor, which was given as war compensation, on wikipedia. This would damage the credibility of wikipedia. The article you want to remove cannot be called a simple way of transportation because it is mentioned in many sources. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Fullstackdev (talk • contribs) 12:22, 8 October 2021 (UTC) <---blocked indefinitely hours after [7] [8].

• Support. There is no need for a separate article, since the topic began to spread widely in the Azerbaijani media immediately after the signing of the 2020 ceasefire agreement. This point of view of the Azerbaijani side on unblocking transport communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be succinctly explained in the section directly related to this article. A separate article gives a distorted impression that the "corridor" exists and was agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is incorrect. (See WP:SYNTH, WP:CRYSTAL, WP:OR). Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 08:01, 10 October 2021 (UTC)

• Support The idea of the Zangezur corridor is merely an idea, a concept, but not a reality, (and one can argue that since it is unknown whether or not this idea will be realised, Crystal is in place) and thus doesn't require a separate page and if it is to be discussed in a page, then it would fit well merged with the article 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, especially considering that those who are pushing for the realisation of the idea of the Zangezur corridor (most notably the Azerbaijani government) argue that it's legitimacy is proven in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. KhndzorUtogh (talk) 16:51, 11 October 2021 (UTC)

• support : looking back at this article most of it's notability was based on sensationalism and speculation, deserves a section about it at most. - Kevo³²⁷ (talk) 21:43, 16 October 2021 (UTC)
• Oppose. Zangezur corridor is a transport project that will exist for many years to come. It cannot be just an aftermath of a conflict, this is a transportation related article. Also, the article cannot be merged as per Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Zangezur corridor, the result of which was to keep the article. Grandmaster 11:43, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not WP:CRYSTALBALL - a collection of unverifiable speculation or presumptions. Wikipedia does not predict the future. All articles about anticipated events must be verifiable. It is not appropriate for editors to insert their own opinions or analyses. --Armatura (talk) 15:39, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Not applicable. The article does not contain personal opinions, only verifiable info. And second, AFD results cannot be undone by voting here. Nominate again, if you do not agree with the article's existence. Grandmaster 18:01, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Also, according to the rules, any controversial mergers should be nominated at WP:PM. So this vote here is invalid, unless you follow the procedure. Please nominate at the proper venue for the larger wiki community to evaluate your proposal. Grandmaster 18:07, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Deletion and merger are two very different animals, and decision about one does not apply to the other. The merger's quite straightforward, actually, nothing controversial about it - there is unilaterally promoted by Aliyev-Erdoghan tandem "corridor" concept pursuing geopolitical ambitions, a there is the trilateral statement followed by trilateral negotiations about restoring connections which has no word about "corridor". As long as cabbages are divided from cucumbers rather than served a soup, things should be fine. In fact, the process is already started in 2020 agreement article (not by myself), hence keeping this article in its current form can be viewed as WP:content forking. --Armatura (talk) 20:30, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Again, according to the rules, you must take it to WP:PM. There is a procedure for mergers that needs to be followed. Also, the result of AFD was to keep, not to merge into something. Grandmaster 23:09, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

I took it to WP:PM myself. Grandmaster 23:38, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Thank you Grandmaster, I was going to propose that. I am personally not opposed to the merge if the consensus says so, but I don't think it's fair that only users from Armenia and Azerbaijan comment in the proposal. I don't like implying this kind of stuff nor is it accepted by Wikipedia policy, but all (if I remember correctly) Armenian editors who participated here or in the AfD voted to delete/merge while all (again, if I remember correctly) Azerbaijani editors here or in the AfD voted keep/opposed the merge. I am worried that neutrality might not be fullfilled unless we have users from other countries here as well. Super Ψ Dro 14:05, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

You are absolutely right. I might be wrong, but this gives the impression of another way to get the article deleted, even though the AFD result was to keep. I don't see any new arguments against the existence of Zangezur corridor as a separate article. I think issues like this should not be decided by Azerbaijani and Armenian editors only. We need wider Wikipedia community to decide on contentious issues like this. I think that we may also take this to RFC and ask uninvolved editors to join the discussion. The more outside opinions we get is the better. Grandmaster 14:27, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

Grandmaster, Super Dromaeosaurus, I don't mind wider participation in pure principle, but I would warn against simplifying people's comments here based on their national sympathies ("Azerbaijan for corridor" vs "Armenia against corridor") in disregard of the content and strength of those arguments. Wider participation does not mean you get rid of the ethnic bias you are concerned about automatically: one may find people casting pro-Azerbaijani-view opinions ("votes") mostly come from brotherly Turkey and countries of Islamic Cooperation, understandably outnumbering everybody else, we had such a situation in 2020 war related discussions before, and that has to be taken into account in wider discussion takes place. BW --Armatura (talk) 17:50, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

I'm generally against such divisions, we are all here to build encyclopedia, but we do have our biases, and let's be honest, we can see where delete or merge votes come from until now. So I would prefer if uninvolved editors decided this, or provided their opinions. Regarding the arguments for deletion/merge, we saw them before, and they were dismissed when closing the AFD. Eventually, this will be decided not by the number of votes, but by the strength of the arguments, like it was done for the AFD. Grandmaster 18:13, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

Here is another interesting analytical article: [9] It refers to Zangezur corridor by a different name, calling it Araxes Rail Link. But the general idea is the same. It makes no sense to merge Zangezur corridor into another article, when the idea is being seriously discussed by politicians and the expert community, with potential involvement in development works of the EU and other international organizations. The facts from this article could be use to update Zangezur corridor, in particular the estimates of potential freight transportation volumes, etc. Grandmaster 09:56, 19 October 2021 (UTC)

The article is called "Araxes Rail Link", it focuses on rail specifically and it is careful enough not to mention any "Zangezur Corridor" at all, and yet your conclusion is that "it refers to Zangezur corridor" and that "the facts from this article could be use to update Zangezur corridor"?? With that logic one may say that Silk Road is alternative name for "Zangezur Corridor". Sorry, but what you are suggesting is against WP:SYNTH and WP:OR policies --Armatura (talk) 20:58, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

• Oppose This is a standalone concept that existed well before the 2020 war, being mentioned in 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2012, at least. So it's not merely an aftermath of the 2020 agreement. Brandmeister^talk 13:43, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

Except that those pre-2020-war sources have nothing to do with the post-2020-war situation or the agreement on transport connections, or the current article - a case of WP:SYNTH. --Armatura (talk) 17:50, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

Ridiculous. Why they should have anything to do with them in the first place? Naturally, any pre-2020 source will not mention "the post-2020-war situation or the agreement on transport connections", because it preceded those events. Brandmeister^talk 19:00, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

Adhere to WP:CIVIL, please, if you really expect answers to your question, unless throwing emotional rhetoric is the primary goal. I did not use epithets in regard to your reasoning. --Armatura (talk) 19:38, 18 October 2021 (UTC)

• Support The ceasefire agreement doesn't mention a "corridor", and assuming whether it will or will not exist is indeed WP:CRYSTAL. Unblocking communications doesn't mean a "corridor", and even if communications will be unblocked, it's still going to pass through Armenia's territory, and it doesn't mean what Az government wants it to be. Logically then, it's only reasonable to merge this non-existing and concept "corridor" to the ceasefire agreement page, when even the Azeri authorities say it's an extension from. --Steverci (talk) 16:50, 19 October 2021 (UTC)

  I think it was already explained that whether something does or does not exist is not a reason to delete an article. We have articles about imaginary things or political concepts. The main criteria for article's existence is WP:notability, i.e. A topic is presumed to be suitable for a stand-alone article or list when it has received significant coverage in reliable sources that are independent of the subject. Is the topic notable enough for an article? It certainly is because it it has received significant coverage in reliable sources. Grandmaster 18:22, 19 October 2021 (UTC)

It is also explained in WP:ADVOCACY policy that raising the visibility or credibility of a specific topic, term or viewpoint leading to disproportionate coverage, false balance and reference spamming, installing a favored content are not appropriate. The article's content in its current form is a mix of things that are objective and not questioned (trilateral agreements on unblocking communications, pre-existing connections) and questionable promo content of "Zangezur Corridor" - a narrow POV of governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey, defended by editors from those / interest in those countries, it is far from being invisible. "significant coverage in reliable sources" is an overstatement, the sources predominantly mention that Azerbaijan and Turkey badly want that so called "Zangezur Corridor" (yes, in quote marks) " to become a reality, even though it is not even clear what is meant by "corridor" and what agenda Azerbaijan with Turkey pursuing with promoting that specific term. A merger with an objective content of 2020 NK agreement is very important for putting an end to low-key advocacy battle here and avoiding giving undue weight to POVs of certain governments . --Armatura (talk) 20:51, 21 October 2021 (UTC)

How is the coverage disproportionate? It is based on what's reported in media. And it is widely reported, and even if it is "a narrow POV of governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey", that is not a reason for deletion of the article. It is still a notable topic. Please check again WP:notability. Your arguments have already been dismissed at AFD. Zangezur corridor passes the notability threshold, as it is being discussed almost daily in various media and analytical papers, and Wikepidia readers need to know what it is. Also, it is quite interesting that yesterday Vladimir Putin seemed to be speaking in favor of the corridor, or transport communications from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan: [10] Grandmaster 09:42, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

I warn against repetitive promotion of a propaganda term here. Putin did NOT say "he is in favor of Zangezur corridor", he only said "Азербайджан заинтересован в том, чтобы нормально осуществлялась связь с Нахичеванью, чтобы разморозить коммуникации" (Azerbaijan interested in unblocking communications between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan), it is the strange conclusion / wishful thinking of Azerbaijan media, and your habit of using the term "Zangezur Corridor" as synonym to "unblocking transport connections". I understand you may do that under the influence of (nearly 100% government-controlled) Azerbaijani media, but WP:SYNTH, WP:OR, WP:ADVOCACY still apply - something Wikipedia readers may not realise if we don't make it clear in this discussion. --Armatura (talk) 21:25, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

There is a high chance that in a few days Zangezur corridor will become a reality: [11] While not officially confirmed, we know by experience that such rumors eventually turn out to be true. So as you can see it is not just what Azerbaijani media writes. This is reported in the Armenian media. And it is reported in the official Russian media too: [12] [13] Grandmaster 13:02, 23 October 2021 (UTC)

We don't rely on personal forecasts in Wikipedia, Wiki it is not a cristall ball or a collection of hunches. --Armatura (talk) 13:55, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

• Oppose. Per arguments against the nomination.--Nicat49 (talk) 02:46, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

Nicat49, with all due respect, you provided no arguments, and this is not a vote. --Armatura (talk) 16:43, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

• Comment: Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova also talks about Zangezur corridor: [14] Grandmaster 16:39, 28 October 2021 (UTC)

Not true. She did NOT say “Zangezur corridor”, as one can see from direct citation of her speech, she talks about “unblocking transport connections in the region”. Why Russian government related TASS agency decided to twist it and present it as “Zangezur corridor dispute” - we can go and ask to people working in TASS for Azerbaijan… could I please ask you to check your sources carefully and to add your further comments to your “vote” instead of making a new first level bulleted opinion each time? Thanks. --Armatura (talk) 05:43, 29 October 2021 (UTC)

Second this. There have been quite a few pseudo arguments of "unblocking transport connections in the region = Zangezur corridor". One is what the actual ceasefire agreement says, the other is Aliev's propaganda claiming that there is a provision in the agreement regarding a "corridor". ZaniGiovanni (talk) 06:06, 29 October 2021 (UTC)

people working in TASS for Azerbaijan? How so? TASS is Russian state agency. If they use this terminology, then it certainly is not something only Azerbaijan and Turkey claim. Grandmaster 09:35, 29 October 2021 (UTC)

The brightest example is Saadat Kadirova - a head of department in TASS and an Azerbaijani by ethnicity who in public debate announced that “the Armenian terrorists must be drowned in piss in their church!”. http://misra.ru/vot-pochemu-armyanskih-terroristov-nado-mochit-i-v-sortire-i-v-hrame/ I am sure you are aware of this individual. I am sorry to say you cannot bring an apparently manipulated and mis-cited statement from of a Kremlin-controlled and Kadirova-edited newspaper as an argument. If anyone wants to push this twisted TASS article further with Aliyev-style “so what if” arguments, I may escalate this as advancing a partisan POV . --Armatura (talk) 10:03, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

First, I see no evidence that this article is written by Kadyrova. Second, apparently you do not speak Russian. That is not what she said. She just repeated words of Putin about terrorists. He said that we must destroy terrorists wherever we find them, even if they hide in a toilet. Also, TASS employs many Armenians, so what? Grandmaster 14:33, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

My language competencies are available on my page, I lived and worked in Moscow for years. Мочить / Замочить is a profanity slang with many translations, each uglier than the next. Here’s an English source for the outrageous xenophobic speech by Azerbaijani departmental head of TASS - “ Kadyrova Saadat, the political scientist from Azerbaijan, within transfer of "Nightingales of LIVE", justified blows to Christ Vsespasitel's temple in Shusha, having quoted as Vladimir Putin according to which terrorists need "to be wasted in the outhouse" https://news.myseldon.com/en/news/index/238794590 The article you are pushing as reliable source is apparently (and intentionally) misrepresenting the words of Zakharova - any third party editor could see that but you don’t or won’t. You may not have realised this but constant stonewalling to frustrate the discussion opener and oppose the suggest change is discouraged in Wikipedia per WP:FRUSTRATE . I respectfully ask you to stop that. --Armatura (talk) 21:42, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

First, I see no relevance of Kadyrova to this particular report of TASS. And second, please mind WP:AGF. How providing sources is stonewalling or frustrating? This thread here was started by you commenting on the source that I provided. Grandmaster 11:13, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

constantly throwing newer and newer bulleted comments with POV references, thus making the whole discussion too long to read resulting in irritation of others, discouragement of others and keeping the status quo - this is the definition of stonewalling. Assumption of good faith is default and a stonewalling can be in good faith too but it doesn’t make stonewalling less irritating. --Armatura (talk) 12:20, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

I only did it once, citing a source that I considered important. How is that "constantly"? You are the one making this discussion long with unrelated comments and bad faith assumptions. I suggest we stop this discussion now, it is not going anywhere good. Grandmaster 19:22, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

Anybody has a right to consider some things more important than others and have a point of view that differs from others, I am not questioning that right. But there is always an option of gracefully stepping back at the right time by saying something like "yeah, on second read it does not really say what I initially thought it was saying" instead of defending the initial position indefinitely. Challenging / critically analysing the sources you provided [ in this case - 1) Arax Rail Link and 2) Zakharova speech, none of which had a single mentioning of the word "corridor" in their body text) is any editor's right and should not ascribe "bad faith" and "unrelated comments" to the challenger and thus discourage them. This said, I agree this dialogue has been going nowhere pleasant for some time already, hence taking your suggestion to stop here. Best wishes. --Armatura (talk) 21:40, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

• Oppose. This corridor was proposed before the ceasefire and continues to be discussed after the ceasefire.--Seggallion (talk) 07:33, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

• Support. It's not clear to me that we have enough verifiable information that this appropriate for a standalone article, per WP:NOPAGE. This may change in the future, but the calculus now dictates that we merge. AlexEng^(TALK) 00:18, 18 January 2022 (UTC)

• Oppose per Seggallion. The notion is still being discussed, therefore should have its own article and coverage — Toghrul R (t) 08:22, 18 January 2022 (UTC)

• Oppose. There is no logic in merging since neither side claims the corridor's immediate relevance to the conflict now, and the concept as currently addressed is becoming more and more detached from the 2020 war. The Armenian leadership insists border issues have nothing to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the Azerbaijani leadership believes the conflict to be over. Since the merger proposal was submitted, the term has only further widened in use and has been picked up by independent sources that seem to use it well beyond the context of representing Azerbaijan's point of view, including just this month The National Interest [15] and the IWPR [16] (so WP:NOTNEWS does not apply here). Note that the term is also currently used by Armenian media, albeit consistently placed in quotation marks. This just goes to show that the concept is of current relevance, relatively wide scope of use and is referred to as such for lack of a better term. Parishan (talk) 13:48, 27 January 2022 (UTC)

• Oppose To me, its a separate article, that exists outside the concept of the ceasefire, and it has its own attributes and developments that are separate. Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:23, 28 January 2022 (UTC)

Involved close overturned, discussion re-opened

 Administrator note: Brandmeister, you should pretty much never close a structured discussion you're party to. That's such a basic thing on the project (uninvolved closes) that, frankly, it raises concerns as to your competence (WP:CIR), especially in an area covered by WP:ACDS like WP:AA2.

Now, as to the structure, Armatura: did you list it at WP:PROPMERGE? Doesn't matter. I'm re-opening and bumping this merge discussion, even though it's from Oct, so may normally be seen as stale. I'm puzzled so few people raised the matter of this involved close (the optics alone are terrible). Weird. Anyway, use WP:ANRFC to get an uninvolved closer if one doesn't come along. Obviously, doing so in-house is a big no-no. Sorry, I'm not really around, so please ping or contact me only if it's urgent. Good luck everyone! El_C 14:16, 15 January 2022 (UTC)

Many thanks, El_C, I raised the involved close issue with Brandmeister on his talk page, only to meet resistance... And thank you for listing at Wikipedia:PROPMERGE yourself, I don't have a lot of experience in complex mergers, and "Zangezur corridor" was my first attempt, will know what to do next time. --Armatura (talk) 17:34, 15 January 2022 (UTC)

@El C: I acted in accordance with WP:MERGECLOSE because in my view no clear consensus for merging emerged: Any user, including the user who first proposed the merger, may close the discussion and move forward with the merger if enough time (normally one week or more) has elapsed. [...] Closing of merger discussions differs from closing of requested move discussions in that closings by involved users are allowed. Admins are not needed. But I don't mind asking a neutral closer anyway. Brandmeister^talk 21:00, 15 January 2022 (UTC)

Brandmeister, right, I forgot about that weirdness, but now I'm remembering — that extra-allowance is just about giving involved users the leeway to merge / close merge discussions that are obvious or otherwise uncontroversial (to help with the backlog). That isn't the same as deciding on fraught ones (usually the case for ACDS topics) that they are a party to. That is out of step with WP:NACINV and WP:BADNAC. When controversial, you, as an involved participant don't get to evaluate the strength of the arguments so as to arrive at a no consensus outcome. That's just not done. BTW, there was no requirement to close the discussion. You really didn't have to do anything anyway. El_C 21:58, 15 January 2022 (UTC)

El C btw, I was wrong to access that the merger was a tie. I can count 6 Support and 5 Oppose votes, given the Merge vote by the proposer. This just gets stranger, I didn't even notice that it was striked down by a now indeffed user back in October. I swear I've seen many established editors vote "as a proposer" or "as a nominator", and it's always accepted. But for some reason, it wasn't counted here. Given also how inappropriate it was for someone so involved to judge the strength of the arguments and close the merger based on it. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 13:15, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

ZaniGiovanni, WP:NOTAVOTE, not urgent. Anyway, I presume this susceptibility for involved abuse of the merge procedure is partly to do with it not requiring admin intervention for any potential close, like XFD, RM, etc. It also seems relatively obscure. Folks usually go for an RfC for such proposals (i.e. when controversial), where this kind of nonsense would never be tolerated for months and months.

I understand the reasoning (backlog) to allow for limited involved merge closes, but it also opens the door for involved users to unliterally shut down fraught discussions, which is grossly inappropriate. And then said user can claim that they didn't realize involved closes for merges are not for that (and they have cherry-picked excerpts from WP:PROPMERGE to prove it). This way, the likelihood they'd face consequences for the abuse remains low either way. Needless to say, I don't like it. But it is what it is. El_C 13:43, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Yes of course El C, I understand the WP:NOTAVOTE, that's why I said someone uninvolved should have judged the strength of the sides at the end. My vote count was actually regarding the closer comment "no consensus", when clearly there was rough consensus, even tho again the strength of the arguments should've been judged separately and by an uninvolved user. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 13:55, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Okay, but you keep pinging me here. What urgent matter do you require assistance with? El_C 14:00, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

I was on auto mode lol completely missed that part, apologies. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 14:05, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

I suggest an RFC then, with the larger wiki community involvement. It will get resolved quicker, and will not be decided by the usual contributors only. Grandmaster 15:06, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Pardon me, but I'm not sure what's the reason for this "suggestion" other than WP:JDLI. This is how merger proposals are done, and we already have rough consensus. Now we only need an admin or a qualified third party editor to evaluate the strength of the arguments. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 15:29, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

To me, it does not look like rough consensus at all, but of course it would be good if this merge discussion would be closed the proper way, based on the strength of the arguments. Grandmaster 15:33, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

"To me" is irrelevant here. Reminder that this vote was closed as "no consensus", while 6 v 5 votes is the definition of rough consensus. But again, strength of the arguments matters most, and it's not up to me or you to decide it. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 15:39, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

The merge proposal can be converted to an WP:RFC if the filer is so inclined (Armatura), just not a new one (retaining past contribs). I would recommend this. Also, this hasn't happened yet, but I should probably be preventative with the following instruction to everyone: no mass pings, please. And, in general, please don't test the boundaries of WP:CANVASS. Anyway, ping me if going with an RfC is preferred and I'll do the things.

Note that an RfC will take longer to resolve than the WP:MERGEPROP procedure likely would (normally one week or more). An RfC usually lasts for about 30 days (by convention, as the duration for Legobot's delisting). I've closed a few normal (i.e. non-WP:SNOW, etc.) RFCs as low as the 20-day mark, but not many. And that's about as low as I go (again, rarely). Far, far more often, however, the RfC will take longer than 30 days to close. Months are not uncommon, so it'd be prudent to remain patient as WP:ANRFC often ebbs and flows idiosyncratically. El_C 15:45, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

I support the RFC. It is always good to have broader community involvement. Zangezur corridor article has already survived the RFD, so it makes sense if the wider community passes decision on this too. Grandmaster 16:13, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

It’s not like this wasn’t posted in the Wikipedia:Proposed article mergers#NEW REQUESTS just yesterday if “broader involvement” is what concerns you. We can wait for other users’ inputs from Proposed Article Mergers, or run an RfC, which I don’t think differs much or will have significant change. Either way, if it’s up for nominator to decide, I have no say here just opinion. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 16:26, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

I think it is not just one user, we can all make the decision to convert this discussion into an RFC, since El_C recommends doing it. After all, anyone can start an RFC. Merge discussions do not generate much interest, as is evident from this discussion. We did not get any outside opinions whatsoever after all this time. Grandmaster 17:13, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Look, this is my dilemma. I don't want to have a mini-RFC about whether the MERGEPROP should be converted to an RfC, nor do I want to do so by fiat. Leaving it up to the filer is my pragmatic solution. But, indeed, I do recommend it since it's a bit under a cloud now, after the already soft-XFD thing that is MERGEPROP, got turned into mush. I think the extra-hardening afforded by the full weight of an RfC would be better (to remove any remnants of that cloud) than just MERGEPROP re-do. But, personally, I'm fine either way. El_C 17:32, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Many thanks for taking the issue forward, El_C, these things are beyond my experience, I am happy to be guided by your experience. Could you please convert it to RfC, as you suggested above? Best wishes, --Armatura (talk) 19:16, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

By the way, Grandmaster, wanted to ask you, if you are that concerned about getting wider and neutral participation to form a consensus, why (as somebody who is quick to react to any important events in AA topic) did you not react to Brandmeister's problematic involved closure? --Armatura (talk) 19:24, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Regarding previous closure, I was not sure about the rules, since they are a bit ambiguous in this regard, as was discussed above. As for the RFC, since you have no objections, I would appreciate if El_C could kindly assist us with arranging it. Grandmaster 19:29, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Staying silent may leave an impression that one is happy to keep the status quo (and the article) that way, be careful, mate. When one is not sure, one asks a question, as simple as that, regardless of which outcome one favors. --Armatura (talk) 19:40, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Armatura, there is a right to silence and it should rarely if ever be used to criticize someone. El_C 22:23, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

I agree with that and respect WP:NOTCOMPULSORY in 99.9% cases, El_C. But it is the high selectiveness of his/her silence (when it suits the interest) that I am increasingly concerned about, this is not the first time. --Armatura (talk) 22:34, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Armatura, if it is that 0.1 percent somehow, then the WP:EXTRAORDINARY maxim would apply. To that: I don't understand what that one diff is meant to illustrate, but regardless, you can't compel someone to speak, or hold it against them when they don't. So it probably would be best to just move on. El_C 22:49, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Grateful for your kind advice, El_C, as always. I'd be happy to move on from that, if it was just that, but there is a lot more to it. I am not talking one-off event, I am talking behavioural pattern. Will discuss the details in ANI. --Armatura (talk) 22:57, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

RfC launched

I converted the MERGEPROP to an RfC. I'm also leaving all MERGE tags/notices in place for now. Hopefully, it'll bring more folks to the discussion. El_C 22:17, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Much appreciated, El_C, the more and the more diverse the better! --Armatura (talk)

El_C, thanks a lot for your kind assistance. Grandmaster 23:19, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

@Armatura and Grandmaster: for sure. Glad I was able to help. El_C 23:31, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

Please see WP:RFCNOT - merges are explicitly not appropriate for RfCs. --Redrose64 🌹 (talk) 20:57, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

Redrose64, it's a logged WP:ACDS action for reasons which I have elaborated on above, even if that information page says otherwise. Which, granted, I wasn't cognizant of at the time, but it's still better in this instance to extend and expand in this respect. El_C 00:20, 18 January 2022 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The president of the self-declared

The president of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, also agreed to an end of hostilities.[3] - This statement, which based on the Facebook post of the Arayik, should not be included into the article as per WP:WEIGHT. Arayik did have any role in the ceasefire agreement. No contacts or negotiations done with Arayik. Ceasefire was signed between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. No one even asked Arayik's opinion or agreement, he just wrote post on the facebook, where he claimed that "he agreed". No other evidences or proves that someone asked Arayik's agreement. Any solid objections? --Abrvagl (talk) 17:15, 5 May 2022 (UTC)

It was reported by Ria Novosti and he's still the president. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 14:28, 10 May 2022 (UTC)

Update needed as of 2023

In lieu of the follow-up war earlier this year, and the fact that the terms of the ceasefire agreement were not respect (such as, for example, through the Lachin blockade), this page should be edited in its aftermath section and even in the initial starting summary to reflect this. --Dynamo128 (talk) 09:25, 26 October 2023 (UTC)