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The following is an archived discussion of a featured article nomination. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the article's talk page or in Wikipedia talk:Featured article candidates. No further edits should be made to this page.

The article was promoted by Ian Rose via FACBot (talk) 13 June 2024 [1].

Existence

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Nominator(s): Phlsph7 (talk) 08:22, 25 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Existence is the state of having reality. Often contrasted with essence, it is a wide and fundamental concept associated with various tricky problems, such as the status of imaginary entities like Santa Claus. Thanks to Of the universe for their GA review, to Jenhawk777, Bilorv, and Patrick Welsh for their peer reviews, and to Baffle gab1978 for their GOCE copy-edit of this level 4 vital article.

750h

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  • I have read through this article twice and have not seen any obvious problems. Expressing my support of this nomination. I love the examples used, such as "kangaroos live in Australia", which facilitate the reader’s experience. I’m happy to have been the GA reviewer of the Ethics article and hope to see it here sometime soon :-). 750h+ | Talk  04:13, 26 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    @750h+: Thanks a lot for the support! I'm working to get Ethics ready for a nomination and I'll let you know, hopefully after this one. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:47, 26 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Shapeyness

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Another great summary article on a massive topic like existence :) These are the only comments I have after reading through, I expect to support when they are cleared up but I might also make some more comments if I look through the source list. Shapeyness (talk) 15:22, 26 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for your input, I'm happy to see that you haven't become tired of reviewing those wide-scope articles :) and your background on Quine should prove quite useful for this topic. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) defends a different position by giving primacy to singular existence maybe it would be useful to say why, e.g. "arguing that general existence can also be expressed in terms of individual existence"
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • According to this view, a universal that has no instances in the spacio-temporal world does not exist optionally, this could be simplified by removing reference to the "spacio-temporal world" (if you decide to keep, should it be spatio-temporal?)
    I fixed the spelling but I left the term. I'm not sure how relevant the concern is but one universal could instantiate another universial without either of them existing in space and time. I don't think Aristotelians would be happy about that kind of existence so this way, we have our bases covered. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Right so this is actually a slightly more cautious wording, I didn't realise that at first. Shapeyness (talk) 11:00, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Abstract objects ... exist outside space and time the use of a spatial concept ("outside") here is unfortunate, although it gets the idea across pretty well. Maybe "do not exist with a location in space and time"/"do not have a location in space and time" would also work?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • On the relationship between abstract and fictional objects - in the source this seems more of a passing comment or something to keep in mind rather than an important point in its own right, do you think it is due weight to include? Maybe it would be better to discuss fictional objects more holistically in their own subsection or in "Modes and degrees of existence" given fictional objects are generally thought to exist or to have being in a different way
    That was more of an intermediary solution since I thought that fictional objects should be mentioned but I didn't want to give them their own section. I added a subsection called "Others" to discuss them in more detail. I also used the opportunity to add some information on intentional inexistence. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:21, 28 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Physical entities include objects of regular perception given the later reference to perceptions being mental objects, I see it being quite easy for a reader to get confused here by not realising the subtlety of the word choice (objects of perception, not perception itself). Also, idealists and indirect realists would argue the objects of perception are mental, so maybe best to reword.
    Good catch. The reference to perception was not essential here so I rephrased it. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • For instance, according to Gibson, a thing either exists or does not exist; this means there is no in-between alternative and that there are no degrees of existence This was very famously argued by Quine in "On What There Is". It is probably better to remove this sentence or put Quine here instead, or at the very least add a supporting secondary source here to demonstrate the importance of Gibson's argument
    Agreed, Quine would have been the better person to ascribe this view to. The main point of this phrase was not so much to talk about Gibson's or Quine's philosophy but to give the reader an idea about what this position means. I found a way to phrase the sentence differently that does not require attribution. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Yeah that makes the most sense I think, Quine is already well covered elsewhere. Shapeyness (talk) 10:56, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • On the previous point, when Gibson is first mentioned he is cited there too, do the secondary sources mention him in regards to existence being an elementary concept?
    Vallicella discusses him but the essential point is the view itself and not that Gibson in particular defends it so I removed his name. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:36, 29 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I don't think keeping reference to Gibson is harmful if RSes think they are important enough to mention in this context, just wanted to check. Either way is fine though. Shapeyness (talk) 09:53, 1 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) explored how being and nothing pass into one another in the process of becoming This is slightly confusing, although maybe it's because I don't know much about Hegel
    • Sorry, Phlsph7, I didn't get back to you on this before peer review ended. I was looking at the Rosen again, just because it is a source you chose, and found additional support for my suggestion about internal mediation on p. 93. But perhaps more appropriate for an article at this level would be something quite simply along the lines of "According to G. W. F. Hegel, there is no pure being or pure nothing, only becoming." This is enough to provide a little bit of the flavor of Hegel's thought to someone with no background in philosophy. It's also such a bare description of the opening of the logic that it would be supported by just about any secondary source that discusses that section. Cheers, Patrick (talk) 12:43, 27 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
      I implemented your suggestion and adjusted the page numbers, though I'm not sure whether it solves Shapeyness's concern. For whoever is interested, there was already a lengthy discussion during the peer review on how or whether to mention Hegel. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:36, 29 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
      @Patrick Welsh: would becoming (philosophy) redirect to the right concept, might be worth a link in that sentence if so. Shapeyness (talk) 09:55, 1 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
      I haven't read Whitehead, who is the primary subject of that article, but it sounds as though he took some inspiration from Hegel but departed on some fundamentals (e.g., his Aristotelian commitments). A wikilink on that term would probably be confusing to readers.
      "Dialectic" is a term that I think means less than some some scholars admit. In this case, however, it might be useful as a modifier to distinguish Hegel's views from at least some other accounts of becoming. Something like only a dialectic of becoming. Hegelian dialectic is an okay section of Dialectic, and it links out to the relevant section of Hegel for anyone who wants a more integrated account.
      As I said in the peer review, however, while I think that it's entirely appropriate to mention Hegel in this article, I don't think it is necessary. If it's a problem, I wouldn't object to its removal.
      Cheers, Patrick (talk) 18:30, 3 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Eastern philosophy is given slightly less space than western philosophy in the history section, that may be justified but just checking
    There would be many ways to expand that section but if we strictly followed the weight given to these views in the overview sources, we would probably have to reduce the section rather than expand it. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:36, 29 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • There is some sandwiching of text in the history section on my screen - choosing shorter images or using |upright for narrow images might help

Thanks for the responses so far! Comments on sources below. Shapeyness (talk) 15:29, 28 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Support promotion: this article covers everything I would expect, and checking against overview sources I can't see any major points that aren't covered. I think there is space for the Eastern philosophy section to be expanded some more without unbalancing the article or causing it to become overlong but it's not neglected as is. Overall, it is a well-written article that meets all the FA criteria. Shapeyness (talk) 14:47, 5 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks a lot for the support and all the insightful suggestions. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:08, 6 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Prose and image review by Generalissima

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I don't know how you do it Phlsph, you are amazing at both prose and sourcing for these extremely ethereal concepts. The layout of this article makes sense, and you do a good job breaking up the topic in a way that someone who might not know very much about ontology can understand.

@Generalissima: Thanks a lot for doing this review and for your kind words! Phlsph7 (talk) 08:10, 8 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Lede is good; my only concern is that instantiated might be a bit too obscure a term for the lede, where generally we want to distill concepts down to a very easy to understand level.
    I've been struggling for a while to get this passage right, I hope the new version is better. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:10, 8 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Much better! Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 17:06, 8 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Definition and related terms is good, see no prose issues here.
  • Types of existing entities is also good.
  • Modes and degrees of existence, Theories of the nature of existence, History, In various disciplines are all good.

And then in regards for images:

  • I'm a bit confused by your linking of certain names in image captions and not others; is there a MoS guideline I have overlooked on this? Nothing on MOS:CAPTIONS seems to indicate it.
    I'm not aware of any guideline. It's probably best to follow consistency and just link all. I hope I didn't miss any this time. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:10, 8 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Almost all pictures here are public domain due to their antiquity, and those that aren't are own work and CC licensed:
    • Existential quantifier.svg - Own work, good to go.
    • Avicenna lithograph - cropped.png and Thomas Aquinas by Carlo Crivelli.png - Public domain, good.
    • File:Bellerophon riding Pegasus and killing the Chimera, Roman mosaic, the Rolin Museum in Autun, France, 2nd to 3rd century AD.jpg - Public domain.
    • File:Bertrand Russell 1949.jpg - Creative commons.
    • File:Alexius Meinong 1900.jpg - Public domain.
    • "The School of Athens" by Raffaello Sanzio da Urbino (cropped).jpg - Public domain.
    • Anselm of Canterbury2.png - Public domain.
    • Franz Brentano in Vienna, 1875.png - Public domain.
    • Raja Ravi Varma - Sankaracharya - cropped.png - Public domain.
    • Head of Laozi marble Tang Dynasty (618-906 CE) Shaanxi Province China.jpg - Published under CC, statue itself obviously public domain.
  • All have alt-text.

And that's all for know. Happy to say I don't see anything else that needs fixing! Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 22:23, 7 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Support on image and prose review. The changes have resolved my only concerns here. Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 17:08, 8 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Source review

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Given how broad this topic is, I can't vouch much on the completeness of coverage. Does "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" have a publisher? Is it just my impression or are we using solely Western publishers? Spot-check upon request. Otherwise, nothing jumps out to me as problematic. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 09:02, 17 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Jo-Jo Eumerus and thanks for doing the source review! In their suggested citation style at [2], the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not mention a publisher. Concerning non-Western publishers, the problem is similar to the one we encountered in other philosophy articles where Western publishers dominate the field of high-quality academic English sources. I added several sources by non-Western publishers to the section "Eastern philosophy" to have at least all the main claims there covered by a non-Western source. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:08, 17 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Jo-Jo Eumerus: Does the article pass the source review? Phlsph7 (talk) 15:13, 21 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I wonder if there is African philosophy? Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 16:14, 21 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I just added a short paragraph in response to voorts's review, see my comments below. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:21, 21 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Jo-Jo Eumerus: Do you have the impression that your main concerns have been addressed? Phlsph7 (talk) 07:14, 26 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, with the caveat about completeness. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 07:28, 26 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

voorts

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Ceci n'est pas une critique. Review to come. voorts (talk/contributions) 18:47, 19 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hello voorts and thanks for reviewing this nomination. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:06, 20 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

More to come. voorts (talk/contributions) 19:20, 19 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  • According to this view, existence is more fundamental than regular properties because without it, objects cannot instantiate any properties. If existence is a second-order property, then aren't regular (first-order) properties more fundamental? I'm also not sure how that follows from the previous sentence.
    The basic idea is that a thing can't have properties if it does not exist. According to Nelson 2022, "instantiating any property whatsoever presupposes existence and so existence is not a further property over and above a thing’s genuine properties", meaning that regular properties "conceptually presuppose" existence. Strictly speaking, Nelson 2022 presents this as an argument against first-order theories and only uses this later to motivate second-order theories so I adjusted our formulation accordingly. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:44, 21 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • In addition to Eastern and Western philosophy, is there anything to add about Indigenous American philosophy and African philosophy?
    Done. They are not covered by the overview sources that I'm aware of so we need to keep this part brief to avoid WP:UNDUE. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:46, 21 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Are there any specific philosophers in those traditions that can be discussed? Additionally, I think that feminist philosophy and Afro-pessimism should probably be included in the "In various disciplines" section. Finally, are there any other philosophical traditions that you can think of that ought to be covered here? voorts (talk/contributions) 21:53, 22 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    These traditions don't have much of a written history and the sources cited mostly talk about general positions. We could try to find some contemporary representatives, but, as far as I'm aware, they are not particularly well-known.
    In deciding which philosophical traditions or theories to mention to fulfill the comprehensiveness criterion, I usually rely on overview sources, as recently discussed at Wikipedia_talk:Featured_article_candidates/archive93#How_to_assess_comprehensiveness_of_wide-scope_articles. My impression is that we have them covered as it is.
    I found a way to include feminism in the paragraph on existentialism. I'm not sure what to do about Afro-pessimism. If you can point me to an overview source that explicitly makes this connection then I can have a look. However, we have to be careful about continually expanding this article with minor topics since this would probably not result in overall improvements to the article. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:59, 23 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I'm not weighing in on this nomination (although I do wish some action were taken on my PR suggestion that the status of social institutions – such as money and the nation state – deserves attention in the article).
    Since it has come up again, however, I'll just offer that I would support reopening the general discussion linked above—perhaps in a more binding format.
    Even high-quality tertiary sources are often written by non-experts in the general field—and even those entries by experts are reviewed by the editor(s), rather than subject-matter experts not in the position of having directly solicited the submission (from people that they usually know personally/professionally).
    To be clear, such sources are way, way, way better than bare-minimum RS. It is my newbie opinion, however, that what they do, or do not, include should never count as the final word in a FA nomination, especially in cases concerning non-Western or otherwise underrepresented groups.
    Cheers, Patrick (talk) 18:56, 23 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Thanks for your input. Given that the discussion was about the inclusion of Afro-pessimism, I assume that your elaborations were intended as an argument in favor of it since here is not the right place to restart a recently-closed general discussion of FA criteria and Wikipedia policies. I'm not in priniple against including Afro-pessimism, but I haven't had luck in finding reliable sources for this and I don't want to claim in the article that there is an important connection if we can't verify it.
    By the way, I followed your suggestion and expanded the list of examples of social kinds in the section "Others" with "money" and "nation state". Phlsph7 (talk) 16:02, 24 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I commented only because a conversation in which I took part was invoked as if it established a consensus that I fail to see. Since the issue has come up in multiple nominations without (as far as I can see) being resolved, it seems like it might be worth pursuing further in a more general forum.
    As to Afro-pessimism, I agree with you that the onus is on the editor making the suggestion to show that there is a relevant literature that is not being represented.
    The mention in Others of money and the nation state is not really responsive to my suggestion. My recollection is that the PR had been open for several weeks and was closed out before we had a chance to discuss. If you are still interested, I would be happy to expand on the talk page once the FAC process is complete.
    Cheers, Patrick (talk) 18:47, 24 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • In the paragraph on existentialism, you should at least cite the major existentialists (e.g., Kierkegaard, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Nietzsche), since this is a broad-concept article and readers would likely be looking for those names.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:54, 21 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

That's all for now. voorts (talk/contributions) 23:42, 19 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

One more comment. Per ELNO #1, the references in further reading (except for Aristotle) should be either cited in the article or moved to the talk page using {{refideas}}. voorts (talk/contributions) 23:47, 19 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I decided to remove all of them since the article is not short on good sources. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:29, 22 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
One more minor point:
  • The last sentence of the last paragraph of the lead should be reworked as the first sentence to follow the structure of the article (history comes before various disciplines).
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 26 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Otherwise, support on 1a, 1c-e, 2, and 4; weak support on comprehensiveness. I still need to think through this question of what types of sources should be used to satisfy comprehensiveness w/r/t broad concept articles, but I agree that Afro-pessimism probably doesn't need to be in there at this point. voorts (talk/contributions) 22:55, 25 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
P.S. I have a current FAC at Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Addie Viola Smith/archive1, if you have time to take a look (it would also be a pretty easy source review). voorts (talk/contributions) 23:00, 25 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks a lot for the support. I'll see what I can do about that source review. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 26 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Query for the coordinators

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@FAC coordinators: I wanted to check whether this nomination is ready to be closed. It is 32 days old, has image and source reviews, and 4 supports. Phlsph7 (talk) 06:45, 27 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Big topic! I would prefer to see another comprehensive review. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 22:15, 30 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
For what it's worth, my peer review was conducted with the content-comprehensiveness criterion of FAC foremost in mind, and – in contrast to the equally general knowledge nomination – I found few causes for concern.
It is still my judgment that such a general article on existence should more directly address the status of social institutions. In particular, to whatever extent language shapes our basic sense of reality, how is this not discussed? It has certainly been overstated, but I do not think it can be, on that account, overlooked. More generally, we overwhelmingly live in the domain of a socially established "second nature", which is a concept with a philosophical pedigree dating back to Aristotle. I don't recall this getting much attention in my readings of the pre-FAC version of the article. What I read a few times in the course of doing the PR did not do justice to my satisfaction to this, in my considered judgment, crucial dimension of existence.
(Edit: my other suggestions, you will see were largely adopted.)
I'm willing to read the current version, however, and elaborate a little more on what I think is missing (assuming it's still missing) so that my review can be, as much as possible, assessed by non-philosophers. Perhaps it is fringe in a way that I simply do not see!
My concern is only to not again become involved in the kind of unproductive meta-debates that threw the knowledge nomination off the rails. During that review and subsequent conversation, multiple editors mentioned that the concerns I raised should have been addressed in PR, and I've tried to take the cue and weigh in there instead. But if another content-based review of this article might help avoid a second nomination not likely to attract additional reviewers, I'd be happy to go over it again. If I ask for something unreasonable, however, other reviewers and silent watchers need to please speak up. I have no desire to hold the status of this or any other article hostage. Patrick (talk) 23:27, 30 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I would like to see what you have to say regarding the current version of the article. voorts (talk/contributions) 23:38, 30 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for your expression of interest! In view of recent history, however, I am going to wait for input from FAC coordinators. Cheers, Patrick (talk) 02:14, 31 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I slightly expanded the current discussion of social kinds/institutions and mentioned the theory that language influences/determines how humans perceive the world. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:38, 2 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I somehow misread this as a suggestion to restart the whole nomination process, which seemed to me not a great idea. (Sorry, all!)
Wanting a fresh perspective on the current nomination process makes much better sense. A solicitation at Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Philosophy might yield a new set of eyes.
In any case, it's not likely I would have anything to add to my comments already visible to !voting participants.
Cheers, Patrick (talk) 20:55, 31 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the additions, @Phlsph7:. I think they improve the article, even just down near the bottom. I gave it another read and, as expected, have little more to add, with only one or two points that could be a content issue:
  • In the lead, shouldn't the essence of an entity are its essential features or qualities be the essence of an entity is its essential...? This reads to me as wrong, and I'm pretty sure it's ungrammatical.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:02, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Merriam-Webster (2024). "Definition of Existence". Merriam-Webster Dictionary. is not a high-quality source supporting According to some idealists, this may apply to all of reality. The other two, however, should be fine on their own.
    This source was mainly added for the first part of that passage: Existence is commonly associated with mind-independent reality.... I moved it to cover only that part. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:02, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Kierkegaard and Nietzsche predate the term/movement "existentialism", and Camus did not accept the label for himself.
    They are commonly categorized as existentialists. The names of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were explicitly requested above so I kept them but I removed Camus. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:02, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Should there be a discussion of Aristotle's concept of entelechy? It was important for Leibniz and a lot of late modern German thought, where it was often elaborated in organic metaphors. Put differently, does the article discuss the existence of "real potentialities", such as that of an (actually existing) acorn to become an oak? The acorn not an oak, but it still has that potential, which a tulip bulb, for instance, does not.
This comes up briefly in "Modes and degrees of existence", but it's associated only with Platonic forms. And then an argument against it gets more lines of exposition than the original claim. I would just suggest this position deserves a little bit more of a hearing. (I wasn't reading the article with this specifically in mind, so maybe the issue is already addressed and I just missed it.)
The contrast between potentiality and actuality is mentioned in the discussion of Aristotle in the history section. I added a footnote to expand the explanation and use the acorn-oak example. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:34, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Some people coming here are probably expecting to find discussion of what is the most fundamental physical unit, e.g., quarks, strings, etc. Should something be done to throw them more of a life-line?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:15, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Besides this, I do not have any further to add. I'm happy to join those who are already supporting a pass on prose. How to address FA comprehensiveness of the treatment of such an extraordinarily general phenomenon, however, remains unclear to me. Coordinators, however, are welcome to take into consideration that I have no specific content-based objections apart from the minor issues mentioned immediately above.
(Oh, and feel free, anyone, to relocate this comment if it makes more sense elsewhere on the page.)
Cheers, Patrick (talk) 18:51, 3 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for your review and the support on prose. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:15, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Ian Rose: thanks for having a look at this nomination and clarifying the issue. Jenhawk777 was involved in the peer review and they said they would consider doing an FA review as well but they were not sure whether this is acceptable given that they already did the peer review. My gut tells me that it shouldn't be a problem but I thought it best to confirm with you before getting started. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:00, 1 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@FAC coordinators: I Jenhawk777 would very much like to participate in this FAC, but I have already participated in its peer review and made contributions there, so I need to know if it is copacetic for me to do so here? Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:35, 2 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
By all means. FrB.TG (talk) 04:12, 3 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Jenhawk777, it would be great if you could review. As FrB.TG notes, your having opined at PR is not an obstacle to this; IMO it would be an advantage. Nor would having edited the article by way of, say, a copy edit or clarifying the sourcing. It is helpful if this is declared if it amounts to a significant proportion of the article, but usually this sort of detailed advance knowledge of an article is considered a plus for a reviewer at FAC. Gog the Mild (talk) 11:54, 3 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Awesome. I am pleased. Thank you so much for answering. I will get to that this evening. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:08, 3 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Jenhawk777

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I haven't seen a source review in these excellent previous reviews of content, so I am going to make a stab at a random check on those.Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

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Beginning with #1, it's good.Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
On #9, I could only access Van Inwagen. He's sufficient to support the sentence, so you might want to remove the other two.
#10 all three are good
#15; I didn't pursue this one all the way, but Robinson in Reason, Faith and History did not have pages 7 and 139 available for preview, and a word search for the quote using perceived did not come back to either of those pages.

OOps! Sorry, I have been interrupted by RL. I will be back. I promise! Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:29, 4 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I found the relevant passage from Robinson 2008, p. 139: We could also draw on a distinction between a thick and a thin concept of existence. The thin concept is the logical property that everything existent shares. A thick concept would be one that provided a metaphysical analysis of what it is to exist. What this is, and even whether there is such, will depend on substantive metaphysical truth. For example, according to Berkeley, esse est percipi vel percipere. This is not presented as a contingent truth, but as the correct philosophical perspective on what existence is. If he is right, it could not have been otherwise. According to Plotinus, being is what emanates from the One in its act of self-understanding. In both cases (and I do not wish to imply that they cannot be reconciled), a correct analysis of the source of existence throws light on the nature of existence for all existent things. This is not just a feature of idealist or theistic metaphysics. If certain sorts of arguments correctly showed that everything was spatial curvature, or spatio-temporally located causes – or even water – then they would show what the real as opposed to nominal essence of existence was. We could conceive it might be otherwise, but it could not. The "7" belonged to the chapter, which is unfortunately difficult to distinguish with the short footnote citation. The chapter is already given in the full citation template so I removed it from the short footnote citation. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:48, 4 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Well done. I love quotes, but there is no way around the fact that they are often problematic. Since you have multiple refs for relatively accepted concepts, I think that's entirely sufficient.Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:06, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I apologize for the interruption. Unexpected company dropped by, and darned if they don't expect me to pay attention to them! So - beginning again.
  • First, I want to whine a little about over citation in this article. Having multiple references for every, single, citation makes it much more difficult for any interested party to actually check sources. Other editors have fussed at me about this before as well. They admonished me to pick the best ONE, and go with it, unless the content being discussed is controversial, or they actually reference different concepts, in which case, they should be placed accordingly. This article has multiples repeatedly. It's not a plus. It's actually a hindrance. Source checking is tedious enough without having to check five of them at every one. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Apologies for the frustration with the references, I'll see what I can do about it. From previous reviews, my impression is that different reviewers have different philosophies about the use of references. For some, it's sufficient if the references of a passage confirm the main facts while others want also minor details and examples to be covered, which often requires the addition of extra references. For philosophy-related articles, reviewers sometimes challenge views that seem uncontroversial, which can be mitigated by having additional sources. If in doubt, I usually try to err on the side of caution by having too many rather than to few references to ensure WP:V. Source variety has the advantage that people who cannot access one specific source are able to use one of the alternatives. In an attempt to reach a middle ground, I removed several citations. We are not yet close to the one-reference-per-passage principle but I hope it's better now. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:36, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Believe me, I not only understand completely, I also sympathize. I edit articles on religion almost exclusively, and the only topic I can think of that might be considered more inherently contentious is politics. Everything gets challenged - and often in conflicting ways - one editor wants to remove what another wants to add, and so on. In places, multiple references are unavoidable, but when multiple refs are all saying the same thing, it is legitimate to see them as unnecessary. You are a marvelous writer and philosopher, and you have done an excellent job here. Do what you can. I accept the compromise. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:32, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Thanks for your kind words. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:15, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I was actually up to #20 in this section. The link to the archived version you cited of Platter's Divine Simplicity and the Triune Identity would not open for me, the google books version had no page numbers, and the Internet Archive didn't have the book at all. How did you access it? I am okay with you simply removing it if you like. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The preview function for Platter 2021 works for me. It could be that the preview depends on one's geolocation. The source explains how Aquinas distinguishes essense and existence. I removed it since the passage is already covered by the remaining references. I have access to most of the sources so feel free to ask me if you have problems accessing one of them.
I don't think that reviewers are expected to check every single reference, which would be a tremendous task for lengthy articles. They usually perform a spotcheck of a few selected references to see whether they support the claims they are used for. First-time nominators have to pass a spotcheck but spotchecks are not compulsory for every nomination. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:38, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A spot-check is all I am doing. Perhaps location is the issue, but removal solves the problem, so thank you. Jenhawk777 (talk) 15:55, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I also looked at #21 from this section. Why no capitalization or explanation for the question of Being here where it's first mentioned? Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I found a way to mention the "question of being". Some translations of Heidegger capitalize being while others don't. If you want, we could capitalize it. But it might be confusing for readers not familiar with Heidegger since the term being is usually not capitalized outside the Heideggerian context. I'm not sure if it's a good idea to dive deeper into Heidegger's philosophy since we might have to deal with some terminological issues if we do. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:54, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The reference capitalizes it, so that's why I asked, but it's appropriate either way. I like the added explanation here, and agree it's important not to go down the rabbit hole with him. Jenhawk777 (talk) 15:59, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Types of existing entities
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Remove this sentence - Different types of existing entities are discussed in academic literature. - it's not necessary. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:57, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Singular and general
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#24 I really liked Hofweber's way of describing the problem you mention here as having two parts: "what the stuff of reality is made out of" and "what the most general features and relations of these things are". Is there a way to include this to better clarify what's being discussed?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:46, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • It's super easy for non-philosophers to get completely lost discussing philosophy. Simplifying complex concepts for non-specialists is the goal of WP. The use of specialized terms - "instantiate" "spatio-temporal" "universals" and "particulars" - are terms that philosophers understand that are not automatically understood by others. It looks to me, very much, like all of the above reviewers are people with some grounding in philosophy, so they are familiar with these questions, and didn't call you on it, but what about those not familiar - those sophomores we write for? Simplification is a gift and a skill, and you have it, but it isn't consistently applied in this article. I find that a serious issue. What's the point of an article that no one who doesn't already know all of this could understand? Stanford, whom you reference in more than one case, is dependably good at simplification, yet that is not often included here. As I said in peer review, I would like to see simplification of the complex more consistently throughout this article. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I managed to remove the word "spatio-temporal" from the article. I moved the footnote explaining "instantiate" to the first occurrence. In priniple, the term could probably be removed from the article by replacing it with the word "exemplify". However, this would create problems since it is used in some quotes in our article, which would need to be removed as well. I added corresponding footnotes for the terms "particular" and "universal". The word "particular" could possibly be replaced with "individual" though I'm not sure that this makes much of a difference. I don't think that something similar is feasable for the word "universal". I'm not sure whether removing all the key technical terms of this topic from the article would have a negative impact on comprehensiveness. Which "Stanford" are you referring to? Phlsph7 (talk) 12:24, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    This is excellent, and I thank you for your efforts. Philosophers invented those terms for good reasons, and replacing them with sentence long definitions causes repeated awkwardness and corresponding struggle for us editors. Nevertheless, a sophomore is a sophomore, and talking - or writing - over their heads is just a waste of time and space. No pun intended. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:39, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jenhawk777 (talk) 15:55, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • In pursuit of simplicity, about half of paragraph three belongs in paragraph two, and vice versa. Keep that idea of simplification at the front of your mind here, and you can probably cut a good chunk of this out entirely. Concise is always, always better. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Which parts of the 2nd and the 3rd paragraph are you referring to? Their topics are slightly different. The topic of the 2nd paragraph is whether singular existence is a special case of general existence or the other way round. The 3rd paragraph does not state that one is a special case of the other. It discusses the question of whether there is general existence without singular existence. Even if the answer is no, this does not mean that general existence is a special case of singular existence. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:34, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    There are always alternatives to organization, but yours is fine just the way it is. Ignore this one. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:41, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I love this. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:35, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
#25 I was unable to run down Prior. The archived ref you have opens to Liebnitz. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From Prior 2006, p. 493: Philosophical discussion of the notion of existence ... First, there is the problem of what we are to say about the existence of fictitious objects, such as centaurs, dragons, and Pegasus; second, there is the problem of what we are to say about the existence of abstract objects, such as qualities, relations, and numbers. I removed the unhelpful link. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:05, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Well done. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:00, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I would remove all redlinks - Henry S. Leonard - in an FA that are not refs to non-English WP's.
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:08, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
There are simply so many refs, I am going to skip over most of them. I have found some problems in at least one ref in nearly every citation I checked, but they are small things that are easily corrected or deleted, so don't fret, just fix or delete.
Concrete and abstract
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They exist in space and time, and influence each other; they have causal powers and are affected by other concrete objects. Simplify causal powers by defining it - something along the lines of: "They exist in space and time, and influence each other. They are caused by and are able to cause effects on other concrete objects." An example wouldn't hurt. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Still needs simplifying/replacing or at least defining. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:08, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I tried to further simplify your suggested passage. It currently reads: They exist in space and time. They have effects on each other, like when a rock falls on a plant and damages it. I'm not sure that there is much more in terms of simplification that can be done. We could simplify the 2nd sentence by splitting it in two: They exist in space and time. They have effects on each other. This happens when a rock falls on a plant and damages it. To my ears, having a series of this type of short and simplistic sentences sounds like bad prose. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:42, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Short sentences may be bad prose, but at least it is understandable prose. I prefer long complex sentences myself, but in about one out of every three reviews, someone will tell me to split them. Your fix is perfect. This section is readable and understandable. It is phenomenal. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:46, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The second paragraph in this section is really good.
#34, for Faulkner and Gregersen p.298, I followed your link, but it wasn't there. It had no image available, so I couldn't verify. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From Faulkner & Gregersen 2017, p. 298: According to Platonists, abstract objects exist but not anywhere in the physical world or in people's minds. The preview works for me, so, as mentioned above, this could be caused by geolocation. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't know what the problem is, but I am having repeated problems with the archived links. I can access most of the linked citations using other methods, but not the links themselves. Nothing on simplifying jargon? Wikipedia:Manual of Style#Technical language says Do not use specialised vocabulary in contexts where more widely understood alternatives will do. I did mention that on the PR. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:10, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
For me, the regular links to google books preview the pages (at least some pages). The archived links to google books work but I can't preview the pages. I'll see what I can do about the simplifications. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:11, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I'm betting it's my security software giving me grief. Jenhawk777 (talk) 15:56, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Cool. About Realists, the article doesn't mention Plato, which is fine, he was a Realist, but this source specifically refers to Platonists and not Realists in general. Maybe just adding "Realists such as Plato accept the idea..." to better reflect the source.
I can't get to Prior, again. Is he a reference for "abstract objects have independent existence" or for "opinions about abstract objects are divided"? Can you get that for me? Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:03, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I implemented the suggestion. From Prior 2006, pp. 498–499: Some of these linguistic suggestions were taken very seriously by Plato and others have been taken seriously by other writers, and it is now common to describe as Platonism the view that abstract objects “exist” in a perfectly literal sense as part of the “furniture of the universe” alongside tables and chairs ... The view that there is no necessity to attribute existence in any sense to anything but concrete individuals is generally called nominalism. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:03, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you. Independent existence it is. Good ref. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:48, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Possible, contingent, and necessary
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Begin the second paragraph with your second sentence: "It is an open question..."
This paragraph mixes these ideas. That makes it harder for the non-specialist to follow. Take the first sentence (Most entities...) and the third sentence, (According to one view, ...) and move them - either to close the second paragraph, let them stand as a paragraph between the two you have, or let them open paragraph three. Three paragraphs for three concepts is easy to follow. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:07, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • #44 Pruss & Rasmussen specifically argue for the necessity of God. That's a good reference for sentence #3 and paragraph four, however, it says on page 2 quite specifically, we take no sides on what sorts of things can be causes; we leave it open, for instance, whether numbers, properties ... and other so called 'abstract' entities may have causal powers... I'm afraid I think your sentence that has them saying ... all abstract objects have necessary existence. misrepresents their actual view. Find a different source or delete the sentence.
  • I see this remains unchanged. Perhaps I am mistaken, but if so, and you intend to leave it as is, please find me the exact location for the statement you attribute to them - ... all abstract objects have necessary existence. - since I found one that seemingly contradicts it. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:06, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    It was my impression that the quote given below supports the sentence. But there is not much point in fighting over it so I added a second source, which says x is an abstract entity x necessarily exists. It shouldn't be too difficult to find more sources if that is still an issue. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:57, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    The statement itself is not the issue, since clearly some philosophers do think that. It's that the source does not support it. The quote you reference Some philosophers think that the divide between concrete and abstract things coincides with the divide between contingent and necessary things. cannot possibly be summarized as ... all abstract objects have necessary existence. And even if language could somehow be twisted into that absolute statement rather than a comparison between two categories, it still would not support the attribution, since this is actually a discussion of Krausses' views and not the author's. A different reference that makes the claim - or a restatement - will do just fine. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:57, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Do you think that the 2nd source, Cowling 2017, pp. 82–83, is sufficient to support this claim? Phlsph7 (talk) 11:42, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Yes - if you change "According to one view..." to "Nominalists view..." Link nominalists, and no more is necessary. That said, removing Pruss & Rasmussen is still needed. I have looked through most of their book trying to find something for you to support this claim. Perhaps you can find something I missed, but it isn't page 4. One source is sufficient. I'd go with that. Jenhawk777 (talk) 17:33, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I moved the reference to Pruss & Rasmussen. I used a slightly different formulation since Cowling 2017 does not generalize this view to all nominalists. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:28, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • This is not their view. According to them, this is a few of some philosophers. From Pruss & Rasmussen 2018, p. 4: Some philosophers think that the divide between concrete and abstract things coincides with the divide between contingent and necessary things. This is also more or less what we say. I can look for more sources if you think that it is controversial that some philosophers believe that. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:18, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • The entire book is about proving that there is such a thing as a necessary concrete being able to cause events (p.2). In working toward this goal, they do not take a position on what kinds of things can be causes, including whether or not abstract concepts can be or are necessary themselves. This means they take no position on whether abstract concepts have necessity. They don't need to. They are in pursuit of a concrete necessary being not an abstract one. You are correct that page 4 is part of the discussion of other views, but that does not automatically make it theirs. Theirs is stated on page 2. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:14, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
They include some good simplifications you might could use: "There was a time before items of our ordinary existence existed" and they have a list of them as examples of contingent items as things that may or may not exist.(Page 1) "A necessary thing exists no matter what" ... "a necessary thing cannot be assembled or disassembled" (Page 1) it is "anything capable of causation" (Page 2). Good accessible definitions there.

Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:29, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Okay, I've been at this for a few hours now and I am getting frustrated and tired, so I am going to take a break. I will be back. Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:56, 5 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Physical and mental
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The first paragraph in this section is brilliant. I don't want to look at any of the sources here lest I find a problem.
The second paragraph is also good, but I wonder that materialists and dualists are defined while 'Philosophy of the Mind' - currently a hot topic in philosophy - is not. Arguments here stretch along a spectrum between a purely causal sense that reduces mind to matter with no ontological discontinuity at one end, to a purely definitional sense at the other end that points out the impossibility of communicating subjective internal feelings of pain, color, taste, etc. by talking about molecules - where in the brain does a burned finger manifest? - and make it obvious there is ontological discontinuity. Qualia, consciousness, intentionality and causal power - going into detail is probably another rabbit hole - which you are good at avoiding - but perhaps at least a sentence on the issues? Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:58, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The term "philosophy of mind" seems to be quite self-explanatory. If you want, we can add a definition like "Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of mental phenomena and how they are related to the physical world". Some might consider this superfluous.
I'm not sure if I understand your second point. Currently, we just present the main views without going into arguments for and against them. You seem to suggest that we should discuss the arguments as well. This could make the section quite lenghy. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:42, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Again, it is only self-explanatory to those with familiarity, however, further discussion would add length, which I am reluctant to do. So, what to do?
The explanation already here begins with Idealists... but what kind of idealist? Plato, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel? Marx? Doesn't Idealists reject this view and state that mind is the ultimate foundation of existence ... assume the existence of an ultimate mind? That doesn't seem reflective of Hegel or Berkeley or Marx. This would, therefore, need to be broken down and that would add all kinds of length.
I prefer your superfluous sentence. Remove the sentence that begins with Idealists... and work in a better definition - something along the lines of "Philosophy of mind studies the human mind as something that requires more than a simply material explanation." You could even add that this is the 'mind-body' problem, and that would segue nicely into the problem of dualism and Descartes.
Yet, this remains the foundation of all scientific knowledge. Such a dilemma! My second point was just discussion of the interesting issues, not really a point. Jenhawk777 (talk) 21:18, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. I kept the sentence about idealism but weakened its claim. By the way, Marx is usually not categorized as an idealist and philosophy of mind does not generally assume that the human mind "requires more than a simply material explanation" (materialism is one position in philosophy of mind). Phlsph7 (talk) 17:14, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Marx was a follower of Hegel's ideology early in his life, so he was an idealist who later became a materialist. Many still refer to him as an idealist as he kept some aspects of it in his later works making him a bit of both. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:05, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
You're correct that materialism is one position in philosophy of mind, however, what you have here as materialism is a "hard materialism" or monism - "only physical entities exist on the most-fundamental level" - therefore some construction of its opposing views is necessary, but characterizing that using all idealists is just wrong.
Contemporary debate is generally between material monism and dualism. But Wasserman in (“Materialism and Mentality.” available on JSTOR) asks "How could people claim conscious awareness of something unless it is assumed that the conscious awareness 'causes' the claim to be made?" That question can be summarized as the issue of mind as something more than simple physicalism can explain. Conscious states are irreducible to physical states. That is something more.
Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics by Goldschmidt and Pearce also refers to "irreducible mentality".
  • Perhaps my simplification is an over-simplification. As you will. But this is not a good sentence as it stands, even with your redo, as it does not reflect the sources as evidenced below, and does not give a good description of the current issues - imo. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:05, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Idealists reject this view and state that mind is the ultimate foundation of existence while physical entities have a derivative form of existence, for instance, as mental representations or products of consciousness. I can't find the first half of this in Kelly, though it could be used to support the second half of the sentence. That is solely on page 88, however, not 87, and it is solely about Berkeley, not idealism in general.
Goldschmidt and Pearce do open with "idealists" in general, but in the last sentence of the first paragraph, it says different idealistic theories attribute very different sorts of priority to the mental which contradicts the claim being made for all idealists. They go on to describe Berkeley's view in a similar manner to your description: minds alone are fundamental and everything else depends upon them but again, that is only Berkeley.
Darvill is a dictionary of Archaeology, and doesn't seem like a good reference. It makes incorrect statements such as phenomena and events exist only in so far as they are perceived as ideas. No one actually claims the objects or events have no objective existence, just that we are unable to perceive what that might be. All we can know is subjective. The next sentence the mental or cognitive world is more important is also inaccurate. "Importance" is not the issue for any idealist.
Smart is the Brittanica reference on materialism and makes only one mention of Hegel as an idealist.
None of these are sufficient. This needs fixing. Jenhawk777 (talk) 17:29, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
As it stands, this statement qualifies as OR. You do see that, right? I'm giving you all the room you need to fix it too. Take advantage of that. Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:35, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I made some adjustments to the sourcing. Do you think this solves the problem? Phlsph7 (talk) 11:38, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The problem remains. You make a claim for "Idealists" with no source that says this "group" makes the statements you attribute to them. If no reliable source has combined the material in this way, it is original research. Berendzen is a great reference - but still doesn't say "Idealists..." That needs to be dropped entirely. If it were me, I would also remove all four of the original refs. How about something along these lines: "Idealism, a minority view in contemporary philosophy (Berendzen p.2), rejects matter as ultimate and views the mind as the most basic reality."(Sprigge) That's sufficient and simple, and reflects the sources. I have to say, I really like the sentences that open and close this section. Make these changes and this section is done. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:25, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I implemented your suggestion. I replaced Berendzen p.2 with another source since I couldn't find the supporting passage there. I'm not sure about your initial concern that a general claim about "idealism" in a source cannot support a claim about "idealists" (as a generic term) in an article. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:09, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
WP says that precise analysis must have been published by a reliable source concerning the topic before it can be published on Wikipedia.
Allow me to quote from the Stanford article on Idealism: Optimists who believe that, in the long run, good will prevail are often called “idealists”. This is not because such people are thought to be devoted to a philosophical doctrine... Even within philosophy, the terms “idealism” and “idealist” are used in different ways, which often makes their meaning dependent on the context... Then it goes on to say: all forms of idealism ...have in common the view that... which is a source for making a common reference to idealism in general - but not idealists.
You acknowledge here that you have taken claims about idealism and changed it to idealists, which imo, is not a generic term and amounts to OR. But perhaps you are right, perhaps I am being overly conservative in interpreting WP's rules. This is an FA candidate, and it's my understanding they are strict about these things, but it might be wise to ask. @FAC coordinators: can you please give me instruction on this? Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:00, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Here is probably not the best place to deep dive into this topic since the relevant passage is not part of the article anymore and the FAC coordinators are not official authorities on general content and policy disputes. We could continue this discussion on your talk page or you could ask at Wikipedia:Teahouse or Wikipedia:Help desk. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:20, 11 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I like the change you made, and of course you are right, this is now moot. I thought the coordinators would give me guidance on FAC requirements, that's all. This is done now. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:16, 11 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Others
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This section is also excellent. I checked all of #55. I think I, personally, would remove the APA, but the others are good. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:58, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  • Once again I am interrupted. I apologize. You know that, overall, my opinion is, this is an excellent article. I do not consider myself finished however. I will be back. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:58, 6 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:44, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Modes and degrees of existence
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#60 and 61, I love this IEP article. It's a great synopsis, and it is accurately portrayed here.
Good discussion of Inwagen. Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:19, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Theories of the nature of existence
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I love this section. #69 and #70 are good. Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:19, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Second-order theories
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The first paragraph is going to lose most readers. Actually, this whole section is problematic, except for the last paragraph, which is clear and easy to follow. IMO, explaining philosophy to sophomores is as hard as explaining quantum physics to second graders. Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:19, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Perhaps you might consider restating A key reason against characterizing existence as a property of individuals is that existence is in important ways different from regular properties like being a building and being 443.2 meters tall: regular properties express what an object is like but existence does not as "A key reason against characterizing existence as a property of individuals is that existence differs from regular properties. Regular properties, like being a building 443.2 meters tall, express what an object is like but do not directly describe whether or not that building exists." Santa Claus can be described, but that does not provide anything on his existence. Dropping the last half of the next sentence ... because without it, objects cannot instantiate any properties. would simplify and clarify as well.
#74 is good. Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:19, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I agree, this topic is difficult but it gets a lot of attention in the overview sources so we can't really avoid it. I implemented your suggestions. I didn't remove the last half of the sentence but reformulated it instead. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:26, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Always smart to make use of what a reviewer gives you. I'd say this is excellent and done now. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:38, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
First-order theories
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This section is an extremely difficult one, and you maneuver through it quite well. Since there is a good and complete discussion that follows, how about cutting down There are two types of first-order theories; according to Meinongianism, existence is a property of some but not all entities, which implies there are nonexistent entities; according to universalism, existence is a universal property exemplified by every entity into "There are two types of first-order theories: Meinongianism and universalism." Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:19, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:27, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Meinongianism
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Perhaps moving that nice and simple description into the first sentence here: "Meinongianism, which describes existence as a property of some, but not all entities, was first formulated by Alexius Meinong."

I'm going to have to quit for a while, but I will return. I love this article. You have done amazing work with complex topics. Don't be troubled by me raking you over the coals. It will add substantive weight to my ongoing and unwavering opinion that this is indeed one of WP's best articles. Jenhawk777 (talk) 22:19, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Universalism
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All good. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:34, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

History
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I am not doing this section. It is not comprehensive, and making it so would lengthen it enough to make it a separate article - which it should be. History doesn't add anything of real necessary value to this particular article. It should be split off into another FA for you. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:34, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The opinions about the value of history in philosophy differ widely. Most overview sources on existence discuss the historical dimension of this concept at least to some extent, so I think we should follow their lead by at least covering the most important developments. For example, Prior 2006 has different sections dedicated to different historical periods and Nelson 2022 dedicates the majority of their lead section to this issue. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:44, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
As you will. I won't hold it against you. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:40, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
In various disciplines
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Formal logic
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All good. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:34, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language
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Either the title needs to be changed to represent what's actually discussed here, or the discussion, which is mostly about perception, does. If the change concerning philosophy of mind is made up in section "Physical and Mental" then it doesn't need to be here, and epistemology isn't really discussed at all.

The last sentence of the first paragraph (the one about perception) belongs to the epistemology of perception (see the discussion of this problem at Epistemological Problems of Perception#2.1 Varieties of Direct Presence). We could move the contents of this subsection into the subsection "Others" if you prefer. This way, we avoid a title. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:48, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I like this idea. Avoiding a title is a time-honored approach. Yes, that sentence: In relation to perception, the problem of reference questions whether and to what extent perceptual impressions put the perceiver in contact with reality by presenting existing objects rather than illusions. really, really needs simplifying. Since you mention epistemology, then don't explain the connection, that connection should probably be made for your readers. Perhaps removing the title will eliminate this requirement. You can decide, but do remember that your readers won't know what you know.
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:26, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Oh, and speaking of titles, you have three sections titled the same: "Others". That is problematic for WP. Jenhawk777 (talk) 18:43, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
This would be a problem if these subsections all belonged to the same main section but I don't think it's an issue since they belong to different main sections. The links from the table of contents to the different subsections work as expected. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:26, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
WP MOS says For technical reasons, section headings should: Be unique within a page, so that section links lead to the right place. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:11, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Thanks for looking up the guideline. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:23, 11 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Others
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I am down to the last section, but I seem to have gotten far enough ahead of your responses that I should probably not give you more right now. I'll wait on you. I don't want to give my final opinion until everything is resolved. Jenhawk777 (talk) 16:34, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The first sentence of the first paragraph is unnecessary. You don't need to state what you go on to explain.
I left it since it helps make it clear to readers why these topics are discussed in an article on existence. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:27, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I recommend splitting the first paragraph into two beginning at "A similar problem concerns ..."
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:27, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
There are several awkwardly long and over-complicated sentences in the section on existentialism, which I grant you is difficult to explain with any simplicity. I like the list of common characteristics in the Stanford article that does simplify things some. You've worked a couple of them in toward the end, but perhaps a mention of the others in that second sentence? Instead of "One of its key ideas..." try "Among its key ideas including (any not otherwise mentioned) is existence precedes..." and so on.
Done. I'm not sure that we need a more comprehensive discussion of the other ideas of existentialism since the main connection here is the concept of existence. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:37, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't suppose you'd be willing to cut the last paragraph to only the first sentence would you? The discussion is inadequate (i.e. you mention the problem of evil without mentioning Evolutionary theodicy), but an adequate discussion seems like a rabbit-hole. Perhaps avoiding the whole thing? Jenhawk777 (talk) 20:00, 9 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
This discussion was explicitly requested during the peer review. I tried to restrict it to the most central points, meaning that many details were left out. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:37, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Phlsph7 All changes made here are good ones. I am also willing to accept what you have opted not to change as well. I don't agree, but that's just a personal opinion, so I will let that go and declare this section done. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:16, 10 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Conclusion

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  • Support. I have been through this article multiple times, in depth, and have randomly checked both sources and content from top to bottom. There were very few necessary changes, and they have been done. I probably know this article as well as the original editor now, and it is my considered opinion that it meets FA requirements. It is extremely well written. It simplifies complex ideas in a well-organized and easily accessible fashion. It is comprehensive and well-researched, reflecting contemporary views on this topic. It is neutral and compliant with WP policy - even the most conservative interpretation of those policies. Therefore, in my opinion, this is a top notch article that deserves FA status. Jenhawk777 (talk) 19:41, 11 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Thanks for your support, I appreciate all the time and effort you have poured into this review. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:20, 12 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The above discussion is preserved as an archive. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this page.
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