This is an archive of past discussions about World War II. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.
I think listing only the national leaders of the major powers is quite sufficient for this level of article. The various sub-articles can be more specific depending on their subject areas. I agree Churchill should be listed before Truman; he played one of the most prominent roles for most of the war, whereas Truman was almost a non-entity on the world stage up until FDR's death.
Sorry, the question was "do we need more than ONE commander (sorry for a typo)? If I remember correct, the infobox always contained just one commander per a country.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:32, 23 May 2018 (UTC)
Tough. Also, because 'which country' is another controversial issue. I'd say just one, but Japanese is a problematic case. I think a good case can be made for Tojo, in fact he is likely a better choice if we have to chose him or the Emperor (who was more of a figurehead). I'd oppose adding Truman, he presided over the mopping up. Just like we don't add the British PM who replaced Churchill around that time (and nobody even remembers his name outside historians, for the same reason). (Btw, I am glad France is not there, keeping the 3 Allies is enough... on that note, I am not really happy with Chiang Kai-shek - China wasn't that important of a war theater, through of course this may be a bit of my Western bias speaking about a front where next to no Westerners participated in...). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here09:42, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
Euro-bias. Without China bogging down 1.5 million Japanese troops, then Soviet Union would have faced Two Front war (Nazi on west, Japan on east), then the outcome of WW2 would surely be rewritten. China was instrumental in preventing USSR from getting into a Two Front war and had basically fought Japan to a stalemate. Rwat128 (talk) 21:09, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
This has been discussed many times before, with the previous version reflecting the consensus of who to include. From memory, this was settled through a RfC. I've reverted the change. Nick-D (talk) 11:30, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
Just a response to Piotrus's comment: Truman was the one who dropped the A-bombs on Japan, so he is significant. I don't know what role Clement Attlee played at the end of WW2, but he should be treated with contempt just because a Wikipedia editor doesn't remember his name. And China was a highly significant war theatre. In loss of life, China came third after the USSR and Germany. Chiang was treated as a major world leader at the time, for example, participating in the Cairo Conference. China was alone in East Asia (apart from the USSR) in not surrendering to Japan, after the British Empire had lost Hong Kong and Singapore. China, which had been fighting Japan long before the Westerners, lost its major cities but still hung on. It had some support from the US including the Flying Tigers. So China and Chiang has to be mentioned.--Jack Upland (talk) 11:45, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
Significance of atomic bombing in Japanese decision to surrender is questionable, so that argument does not prove Truman's significance.
Regarding China, it is a traditional American view that it was significant (Churchill disagreed with that in his "Second World War"). China was virtually defeated by 1941, it poses no significant military prob;em for Japan. It was in the same state the USSR would be had Barbarossa achieved its goal: a vast land devoid of military industry and presenting minimal military threat. Hitler didn't plan to conquer the Asian part of the USSR, because he was not interested in that. Japanese hardly needed to establish full control over whole China, but when they needed to advance further into China's mainland, they did that easily in (operation Ichi-Go) even in 1944, when their failure in Pacific was evident.-Paul Siebert (talk) 15:38, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
China was winning over 50% of the major battles with Japan since 1939. See Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War, this shows that China was winning over half the major battle engagements with Japan since 1939, long before US entered WW2 against Japan. So China was definitely not "defeated by 1941", the Japanese was virtually stalemated in China, with the territorial controls shifting back and forth.Rwat128 (talk) 21:09, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
regarding China--FDR was the only one who considered China important--the other Allies all ignored Chiang. FDR thought that the millions of Chinese soldiers would fight the Japanese Army--they did not do very well and kept losing. It was the Russian army that moved in in 1945--FDR had been begging Stalin to do so and Stalin did so on schedule. As for numbers killed that seems to be an off-beat fascination on the part of lots of Wiki editors. Military historians emphasize winning and losing battles, not how many civilians died. Rjensen (talk) 17:12, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
Indeed. Perhaps we need to re-examine or restart the mentioned RfC with the question of China (it was big, it had a large army, and it didn't seem to have mattered at all, Japan was defeated by the Allies, de facto US, and that result is unlikely to have changed if the China had surrendered. I am not saying China should not be mentioned in the article, it was a front with some notable events, ex. Nanking, but if China is mentioned in the lead, so should be IMHO France with De Gaulle, for example... and I'd prefer we just stick to the Big Three+the Axis). (And nobody commented re: Tojo vs Hirohito, see Hirohito#Accountability_for_Japanese_war_crimes, historians still debate how much control he head, whereas nobody doubts Hideki Tojo was responsible for many Japanese decisions). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here06:43, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
Strongly Oppose reopening RfC. As the original member who participated in the RfC on commanders in WW2 Infobox back in 2010, see Archive 44[1] in 2011, Archive 10 [2] in 2013, and Archive 45[3] in 2011. I've participated in each of these dating back in 2010 and was originally the one who asserted inclusion of Chiang Kai Shek. There is absolutely no need to re-open this, you should read the Consensus that was ultimately formed. It was very conclusive about inclusion of China. Period!Phead128 (talk) 21:25, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
The atomic bombing is significant regardless of its role in the Japanese surrender (which is basically a meaningless question). Many historians talk about the lives lost in war, but perhaps military historians don't. This is an article about history, not just military history. We have to look at the human toll on China, which was major. And that makes China significant. And China also tied down a large number of Japanese troops — more than were deployed in the South Pacific. The difference between China and France is that France surrendered and China didn't. You could also draw a parallel between the British Empire and China. The British Empire lost almost every battle, and lost major cities like Hong Kong and Singapore. If the USA and the USSR had not entered the war against Germany, the British Empire could not have won. But significance is not about success.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:49, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
Several works are devoted specially to the role of bombing in Japanese surrender (see, e.g. Pape. Why japan surrendered). That China was tying down Japanese troops was not too important, because they could not be used in Pacific when US obtained naval superiority. In addition, the most significant troops were permanently stationed along Amur to protect from a possible attack of the USSR, which kept more than half million troops there during the whole war.
Regarding Britain, it was the only power that was actively resisting to Hitler from the very beginning to the very end, and served as a core around which all new Alleys united.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:22, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
Strongly disagree. This is Euro-bias. Without China bogging down 1.5 million Japanese troops, then Soviet Union would have faced Two Front war (Nazi on west, Japan on east), then the outcome of WW2 would surely be rewritten. China was instrumental in preventing USSR from getting into a Two Front war and had basically fought Japan to a stalemate. Rwat128 (talk) 21:09, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
From memory, the RfC which led to the current formulation of the countries and leads in the infobox was a long-running process with a fairly conclusive result in the end. I don't see what would be gained from re-opening the matter. Nick-D (talk) 09:54, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
If under "current" you mean this, I agree. The current scheme is confusing and ridiculous. If we add Attlee, than Chamberlain should be added too. I think formal criteria is not the best approach.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:58, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
Strongly Oppose reopening RfC. As the original member who participated in the RfC on commanders in WW2 Infobox back in 2011, see Archive 44[4] in 2011, Archive 10 [5] in 2013, and Archive 45[6] in 2011. I've participated in each of these dating back in 2011 and was originally the one who asserted inclusion of Chiang Kai Shek. There is absolutely no need to re-open this, you should read the Consensus that was ultimately formed. It was very conclusive about inclusion of China. Period! Phead128 (talk) 21:25, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
Figures in the "Casualties and war crimes" section
I propose to make a strategic decision about figures in this section. I find illogical when killing of 6 million Jews or several million of other civilians are mentioned along with killing of several thousands of others. I agree that Katyn or Vohlyn massacre were separate events, however, killing of 6 million Jews was a series of single events too. Why do we combine some events under a single umbrella name and explicitly mention few others? Thus, the section says about "millions of other Slavs", and then it specifically mentions 200,000 ethnic Serbs. What is the reason to separate ethnic Serbs from other Slavs?
I propose to remove these figures, and add just to list those Nazi collaborators (Ustaces, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian and other nationalists) who were engaged in mass execution of civilians.
In addition, if population transfer in the USSR is mentioned, the story about deportation of ethnic Japanese in the USA should be mentioned too.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:43, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Because Soviets, Ustaces and UPA waged a separate conflicts within WWII, if you notice the first set of numbers relates to "civilians died as a direct or as an indirect result of Nazi racist policies" so they are related to German atrocities. Btw, I have no issue if you write a statement about Japanese deportations. Finally, I have an issue with lumping several nations as Slavs, that's rather dismissive, when you list other rather small sub-categories (Gypsies, Freemasons, Jehovah's Witnesses, homosexuals, etc.) and then 200 million people are just Slavs. --E-960 (talk) 13:56, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Also, if you want to go down that road and question every detail, then why not remove items such as "firebombing of Hamburg", how many other cites in Germany and especially Japan were fire bombed, or "every fifth West German was a refugee from the east"? --E-960 (talk) 14:07, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
You probably did not understand me. Hamburg is mentioned separately, because it was an event, and it is mentioned as an event in the Course of war section, not in Casualties section. Hamburg gave a start to the massive bombing campaign, and that is why it is mentioned separately, in a wider context.
In contrast, I see no logic behind mentioning Serbs as Axis victims separately from other Slavs. Ustaches were the Nazi puppet regime, OUN also was Nazi collaborator, as well as many other ethnic groups who were subordinated to Nazi. Many Belorussians were killed not by Nazi, but by Latvian, Ukrainian or Lithuanian militia, why don't we say that? Do you mean only Germans and Croatians committed war crimes?
A correct and unbiased way to say that would be to write that, besides Jews, XX millions civilians, mostly Slavs were killed, by Nazi, as well as by Nazi puppet states (Ustaches, etc), and ethnic militia (Latvians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, etc). Besides that, some semi-independent political groups, for example UPA were engaged in massive ethnic cleansing (Vohlynia Massacre), and several ethnic formations of Wehrmacht composed of POWs (Russian Riberation Army) or volunteers committed numerous war crimes during antipartisan warfare and suppression of uprisings (Warsaw, etc). That is a neutral way to do that.
War crimes of the USSR should be mentioned separately, and a link should be provided. I also find incorrect to write about "deportation to Siberia" (most ethnic groups were deported to Central Asia or Far East), and to combine executed and deported (these are two very different things).
Re Slavs vs Gypsies, I do see logic behind that. Gypsies were killed because they were Gypsies, but Russians were not killed due to their ethnicity: they were killed because they were Slavs, and Nazi saw no difference between Belorussian and Russian population. I see no problem with mentioning of ethnicity when it is relevant (it is relevant in the case of Jews or Gypsies, but not for Russians).
Re deportations, there were Axis deportations and Allied deportations, we need to group them accordingly.
Finally, I am not questioning every details, I am talking about a uniform approach to providing details: it is incorrect and biased approach to combine 6 million of victims in one line and then to talk in details about tens of thousands of others.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:44, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Paul Siebert, this is getting old, are you now the article 'decider' because for the past 2 months or so, you hit this article by storm, all you are doing is either trying to change everything in the article or challenge things. And, it's really annoying to see all those red herring arguments, above you mentioned that there is nothing about the internment of Japanese-Americans, so I said you should put that in, but all of a sudden you are not interested in doing that, so that was just a excuse to attack the new sentence. This is Wikipedia, so stop trying to "fix" everything, because by nature of the process you will never have a "perfect" paragraph in each section. --E-960 (talk) 15:10, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Please, correct me if I am wrong, but I thought it is our duty to fix everything we find incorrect. I have not been working with this article for several years, I see that some changes that happened during this time were positive, but I also see something that is definitely not an improvement. Why cannot I propose to discuss these changes?
Do you call me a 'decider' because I decide to discuss something on a talk page? I found it illogical. If other users disagree with what I propose, I make no changes, if the changes are supported, they are implemented.
By the way, it is not I but you who started to add more details in this section. The recent collage discussion was initiated not by me too.
Re Japanese internment, I probably misunderstood you: I thought you proposed to add an info about deportation of Asian population committed by Japanese, not internment of Japanese-Americans, so I decided that was off-topic. Internment of Japanese Americans was removed recently (not by me, btw), because we tried to get rid of smaller scale events. However, these small facts seem to re-appear, so it is logical to return to this subject again. I personally don't think we need to add all of that into this huge article, that is why we need to agree about some general threshold for inclusion.
"Duty"? You are taking this a bit far, Wikipedia is not the army, and when you say "fix everything we find incorrect", it comes across as a loaded statement because not everything you think needs "fixing" actually does. Most things you challenge can be categorized as personal preferences. --E-960 (talk) 15:58, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Of course, Wikipedia is not an army, don't take my words too literally. If you think I am advocating my personal preferences, please, explain what exactly do you mean, because, I myself think all what I say is supported by reliable secondary sources. By the way, there is a consensus that any significant change in this article should be discussed no the talk page first. You started to edit the section without discussing the changes first, and I, instead of reverting you, started a talk page discussion. I see absolutely no problem with what I am doing.
I see other problems with this article, and I am intended to fix them in close future. However, I will do that through a talk page discussion (we already agreed upon some changes that I have not implemented yet). It is nothing wrong in challenging some article's aspects on the talk page, and I don't understand who and why can disagree with that approach.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:19, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
The rules you describe are not really Wikipedia guidelines just your interpretation of them, so now an editor before making any changes needs to submit a discussion and you will weight in on whether you think they are acceptable? That really does come across as policing the article. Besides in a previous discussion you complained that there is too much focus on Germany in general, now I added one short 20 word sentence about the Ukrainian insurgents, and added detail on the Soviets and Croatian Ustaches, and you challenge that. --E-960 (talk) 16:43, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
I find your tone redundantly aggressive. Just open this and read the page notice (after "Attention editors"). I am not sure I misinterpreted what this page notice say.
Regarding your recent edits, I do not think they are incorrect or irrelevant, I am just thinking about bringing them in accordance with the overall section's style. It is absolutely correct to inform a reader that not only Nazi and not only Germans committed war crimes, but, in my opinion, the way this information is presented is not fully correct. More specifically, if some user will see a mention of 100,000 killed Poles, they may decide to add the number of Jews killed in Kovno pogrom, or to explicitly mention the number of Ajraskommando's victims, and so on, and so forth. How can we stop this section from uncontrollable infation in that case? Who will decide which concrete incident deserves mention, and which should be excluded?--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:49, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Soviet deportations and Japanese American internment aren't really comparable, hundreds of thousands of Soviet deportees died. I am not necessarily opposed to inclusion of Japanese American internment, but drawing any equivalence with Soviet deportations would be blatant Stalin apologia. Also I don't really see much point listing separate collaborators, as Nazis recruited collaborators among almost all the nations they occupied except Jews.--Staberinde (talk) 18:18, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Germans recruited a number of Jews, eg. Gestapo informants. Jewish collaborators were proportionally rare and many of them murdered by the Germans. Xx236 (talk) 09:11, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
Whereas I agree that many Soviet deportation events were more punitive than dictated by military considerations, one has to take into account that American deportations occurred in a situation when there was absolutely no immediate military threat. It is not correct to compare deportation of Volga Germans in a situation when Wehrmach was just few hundred kilometers from Volga and internment of Japanese Americans in a situation when there was no military activity on a continent at all. We cannot imagine how severe the actions of the US government (and spontaneous actions of the US civilians) would be had at least one Nazi bomber dropped a single bomb at, for example, Manhattan. I even do not consider as situation of a full scale German or Japanese invasion of continental US. In that sense, you are absolutely right: it is absolutely impossible to equate Stalin's deportation with internment of Japanese Americans, because a context where these events occurred was totally different. I would say, it would be even incorrect to equate different deportation events in the USSR: for example, preventive deportation of Volga Germans had much more analogy with Japanese internment, whereas deportation of Chechens was more punitive.
Regarding mortality, it was high among ordinary civilians and refugees too.
Regarding recruitment of collaborators, one must discriminate between (i) those who was recruited semi-forcibly (for example, POWs recruited to Russian Liberation Army, or some ciivilians from Belirussia or Baltic states), (ii) those who volunteered enthusiastically (Ukrainians, some Lithuanians and Latvians), (iii) those who collaborated with some Nazi puppet regime (Ustaches, Slovaks), and (iv) those who never collaborated (Poles).
However, I agree that in this article we need to show just a general picture. To do that, we must agree about the acceptable level of detailisation, and to apply this criterion globally in this section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:42, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
I don't agree with your approach to editing in the first place - you're constantly trying to question every detail and re-engineer the entire article, and this in effect is a form of POV pushing. You need to respect the input of other editors, which built this article over time. This text does not need the type of radical changes you propose Also, your argument why we should include a reference to the bombing of Hamburg, but remove other individual examples in the text from other events is the best example of POV. Why have such detail as "reduce morale, and "de-house" the [German] civilian population"? If that's that case than I would like to add and expand such detail regarding the German strategy behind the bombing of Warsaw and London. --E-960 (talk) 03:16, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
By the way, about five years ago I was editing this article, and I added a significant amount of text to it. Now, when I came back I found that the article was changed significantly. However, I don't consider it as disrespect to my efforts, that is a normal editorial process. In connection to that, I am wondering why did you decide that the article in its present state is something that is supposed to be untouchable, whereas it was quite ok to change the article during last 5 years? By saying that, I do not imply I want to restore the old version (as I already said, some new additions are definitely an improvement). However, I find you approach, do-not-touch-it-because-I-think-it-is-good, totally unacceptable: if you like some concrete version, be ready to defend it when someone challenges it. If you cannot find good counter-arguments and sources, then you cannot prevent others from editing.
Your reference to POV pushing is hardly constructive: you actually accuse me of disruptive editing, which means an accusation of bad faith. As a rule, such accusations require solid evidences, so it would be good if you avoid them in future. The atmosphere of this talk page is very friendly, let's preserve it.
Your argument about Hamburg is something I cannot understand. We definitely need to tell about strategic bombing (I believe, you agree with that), however, we cannot tell about Cologne, Dresden,, Leipzig, Berlin, and other cities separately. It was quite logical to mention just one event, which marked a start of this campaign. What POV do you see there? However, if you have anoth idea, let's discuss it. Frankly, before I added the sentence about Hamburg, I tried to discuss it on the talk page, but majority of users expressed little interest to it. I myself do not find this sentence optimal, if you have any idea how to improve it, let's do that.
Re Warsaw or London, as far as I know, Axis and Western Allies had different strategic approaches towards bombing. Axis leaders saw mostly military component in that, but the Western Allies believed one of the most important goals of bombing was to reduce population's morale, and, taking into account that they were democratic powers, they considered strategic bombing as a political tool (the tool to convince a nation to surrender). In contrast, Nazi, being totalitarian, didn't think in that way. Ironically, strategic bombing would be efficient against democratic powers, and it proved to be inefficient against totalitarian regimes, but, it was America and Britain who chose this tool, because it fit better in their mentality. I can find sources that describe this theory (I don't remember it right now).
I also do not understand why do you separate Warsaw and London from other events. Other bombing campaigns were equally destructive, for example, bombing of Stalingrad, which almost completely destroyed the city. However, we do not discuss it, because it was just a part of a bigger battle. In connection to that, do you find correct the approach when the battle of Stalingrad, which, by its scale and strategic implications, dwarfs some theatres of war, is described just with one sentence, whereas many other minuscule events are covered in much more details?
Meanwhile, as you probably noticed, this article is not a featured article, and there is no guarantee that it will remain a good article if someone decided to review it. That means we have a lot of things to do, because this article tells about a very important subject, and it would be very good if we upgraded it to the FA status.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:59, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
Let's not do that unilaterally. It would be better to come to a general consensus on the inclusion threshold and than act accordingly. I think we need at least to give E-960 some time to respond and share their ideas on that account. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:54, 12 July 2018 (UTC)
There is nothing to discuss. The threshold for inclusion is verifiability. Everything must be properly sourced. Unsourced text is forbidden, and adding it is absolutely prohibited. If I remove it it, any attempt to restore without a proper reference will be a blockable offence. Hawkeye7(discuss)10:58, 12 July 2018 (UTC)
I think if you put a "citation needed" template, all needed references will be added soon. The problem is not only in verifiability, because not every verified statement deserves inclusion in this article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 12:19, 12 July 2018 (UTC)
Now the first bombing is The Blitz, 1940-1941, More than 40,000 civilians were killed by Luftwaffe bombing during the war, a number comparable to the number of Polish civilian victims of bombings in September 1939. The cruelty of WWII started in Poland 1939, the other crimes logically continue the September. Hitler instructed Wehrmacht generals Vernichtung Polens im Vordergrund. Ziel ist Beseitigung der lebendigen Kräfte. Herz verschließen gegen Mitleid. Brutales Vorgehen. Der Stärkere hat das Recht. Größte Härte. Jede sich neu bildende lebendige Kraft ist sofort wieder zu vernichten. Verfolgung bis zur völligen Vernichtung.[3]] WWI was cruel but it was mostly a war between soldiers. The Germans implemented colonial wars in Europe.
In June 1943 the British and Americans began a strategic bombing campaign against Germany with a goal to disrupt the war economy, reduce morale, and "de-house" the civilian population - German goals in Poland should be also described.
I am not convinced that the Blitz would deserve a place outside the context of the larger UK-Germany campaign, and in fact it is included in that section. There is currently not dedicated section to bombings of civilians targer (NB the 1940 German bombing of Rotterdam with many more casualties than Wielun is also not mentioned.).
What would make Wielun worthwhile to mention, is that be taking on a civilian target Germany already on day 1 of the war in Europe engaged in total war. But outside such a context, I think it is too much of a footnote to this already overburdened article. Arnoutf (talk) 15:02, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
Agree, a short note stating that Germans bombed civilian targets from 'day one' would be fine, but no more than one short sentence. --E-960 (talk) 15:21, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
Xx236, with due respect, bombing of Warsaw was just a minor incident as compared with, for example, bombing of Stalingrad. Strategic bombing campaign deserves a separate attention for a very serious reason: this was the only bombing campaign that was considered as an independent military campaign, which was planned according some concrete internal logic and had a long term strategic objectives. All other bombings served an auxiliary role (each of them were just a part of some concrete military operation), whereas the bombing of Axis cities can be considered as an independent theatre of war.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:15, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
As I have written, Germans prepared the bombing of Warsaw before the war. There is a basic difference between the preparation of a total war and moving step by step during the war.
The war in the West was just a minor incident, so maybe we should rewrite proportionally the whole text?
Joshua Zimmerman ("The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945") quotes Jodl's opinion that France and UK were able to win in 1939. So maybe not only Polish civilians were adressed by German bombs but French politicians too. So maybe the war in Poland wasn't just a minor incident?
I didn't say war in Poland was just a minor incident, I said the scale of Warsaw bombing was relatively moderate to deserve a separate attention. Re Zimmerman, he is hardly a big expert in WWII as whole to pay too much attention to his opinion.
Re "not only Polish civilians were addressed by German bombs," you are missing a very important point. Hitler, as well as other totalitarian leaders, didn't pay much attention to the opinion of civilians, so he was not planning to send any messages by bombing of enemy's cities. The primary objective of Nazi war efforts was military conquest of the enemy, which was supposed to be achieved by defeating enemy's army, and any bombing was just a component of the army's war efforts. Any Nazi bombing campaign, including the Battle of Britain, was just a prelude to a land invasion. However, you are absolutely right, and a massive bombing campaign could have served as a message for democratic nations, and that could have affected a decision of democratic leaders to ask for peace (this doctrine was proposed by Giulio Douhet, an Italian war theorist). However, since Hitler was a totalitarian leader, this idea contradicted to his belief, because he thought people's opinion means nothing for a leader. That was a primary reason why this doctrine was not adopted (another reason was that German industry was less powerful than American one).
In contrast, democratic leaders adopted this doctrine, because it fit their democratic mentality. Ironically, this approach proved to be not working for the German population that was controlled by a totalitarian regime. Nevertheless, by bombing German cities, Allies were trying to address directly to the people to convince the t=nation to surrender. That is why Anglo-American strategic bombing was a separate war campaign, in contrast to bombing of Coventry, Stalingrad, Belgrade, Warsaw, Leningrad etc, which were just a part of military operations against these cities.
Re "The war in the West was just a minor incident, so maybe we should rewrite proportionally the whole text? " What exactky do you mean?
What specific change to the article's text is being proposed here? General complaints are not very helpful. I'm wary about placing undue emphasis on Poland, but seeing the text being proposed could help to alleviate this. Nick-D (talk) 22:43, 31 July 2018 (UTC)
Undue emphasis - the destruction of several towns and nassive bombing of the city of Warsaw, massive executions of civilians in 1939 to enslave the Polish nation.
WWII in the East was an extermination, not a traditional war like the WWII. You may not describe genocides as a military play of uniformed boys. Xx236 (talk) 06:48, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
EE nationalistic historians - exactly. Anyone who opposes the Western-centric traditional narration is nationalistic.
I just wanted to write about Women in WWII but I have found Women in World War II. It describes the few women who fought but doesn't describe the millions of female victims of the WWII. Don't civilian victims belong to the war?Xx236 (talk) 08:09, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
Exactly. For example, if Xx236 believes "WWII in the East was an extermination, not a traditional war" (which, in my opinion, is a correct assertion), they are more than welcome to expand the section that is specially devoted to this aspect (I mean, "Genocide and war crimes"). If they believe too much attention is devoted to the hostilities in the West, let's think together how to give a more balanced view. Xx236, you are not a customer, but a user, if you see something should be changed, don't complain, but change it. Nobody will do this work for you.
Regarding Warsaw bombing, I totally disagree. Warsaw was not destroyed by bombing in 1939, but Stalingrad, as well as many Soviet, Japanese or German cities, was. Unless you provide any additional reason why should we speak about Warsaw separately, I don't see why should we do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 11:15, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
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I am surprised to see that the Kursk battle is mentioned only passingly. To the best of my knowledge, this was the largest tank battle of the II World War; and it would be advisable to devote at least a short paragraph to it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Efroimsk (talk • contribs) 23:19, 13 August 2018 (UTC)
It has been previously pointed out that the Eastern Front is somewhat neglected in this article. At the same time, in an article like this everything only gets the briefest mention.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:51, 14 August 2018 (UTC)
There is currently about a para on this battle split across several paras. It was one of many huge battles on the Eastern Front, and wasn't decisive: historians now agree that it was something of a stalemate, with the successful Soviet counter-offensives which followed Kursk being more important to the outcome of the war. I think the coverage is about right, noting that this is a very high level article. Nick-D (talk) 10:06, 14 August 2018 (UTC)
Nick-D, you are not right: "Battle of Kursk" ≠ "Unternehmen Zitadelle". "Operation Citadel" was conceived by the Germans, and their plan was to encircle a group of Soviet armies around the city of Kursk. This objective was not achieved, and the German advance had stalled (the outcome was "indecisive"). That was the end of the battle from the German point of view, but not from the Soviet one. The Soviet plan (from the very beginning) had two steps: at the first step, they planned to stop German attack (and they achieved that goal by 16th of July), and, after the attack had stalled, to start their own offensive. That is why the Battle of Kursk was longer than "Unternehmen Zitadelle": it includes "Operation Kutizov" and "Operation Rumyantsev", and the total result was a decisive Soviet victory that marked a totall loss of strategic initiative by Wehrmacht in the East, and dispelled last Hitler's hope on a separate peace with Stalin on favourable conditions. In other words, this battle had enormous political and strategical effects that marked a qualitative change in the course of the war, and that fact definitely should be stressed in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:02, 30 August 2018 (UTC)
I tried to look for an additional book dealing with the WWII in this bibliography. But the bibliography contains ca. 240 titles. It is therefore totally useless. I would propose to delete 200 of this titles. Nearly 40 titles are sufficient to get more informations about this subjekt. Kind regards --Orik (talk) 18:21, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
I reverted this edit, because we cannot have too many photos in this section. Meanwhile, I am wondering what purpose the Cairo photo serves in this section. The meeting with Chinese leader was not the most important event, Tehran conference was much more important. By saying that, I don't propose to replace this photo with the photo og the Big Three. Any ideas?--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:35, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
I agree, and have just re-removed it. It's a dull photo of no clear historical significance. More broadly, there are way too many photos, and many don't seem well chosen. Given the topic of this article, it should only include high quality images of key topics, but instead we have a mixture of iconic photos and images of little clear significance. Regarding the Cairo photo, at the moment we have three essentially identical "family photos" from the Allied leader-level summits. One seems plenty. A photo of the "big three" leaders at either the Tehran or Yalta conferences would work best IMO - Tehran would be preferable as this was probably the most important such meeting. I'd suggest the image included in this section, which is clearly PD and good quality. Nick-D (talk) 06:07, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
But there are so many photos and so many events in the war that are significant to somewhere in the world. I guess it's interesting that Chiang was treated as one of a Big Three.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:33, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
If I remember correct, Churchill could not understand why Roosevelt exaggerated importance of China. It seems Chiang was treated as a member of a Big Three only by Roosevelt.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:36, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
Regarding the Tehran photo, I would prefer not to show Stalin's photo in the article without a serious reason. 1943 was the year of titanic tank battles, whereas the pictures do not create such an impression. so I would propose a photo with a Tiger tank. . I understand that is the second photo of the same battle, but this battle was a central event of the year.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:01, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
I don't think that we should have two photos of Kursk. Modern historians generally argue that the post-Kursk Soviet offensive was actually more significant than the battle itself (the German offensive was always doomed to failure, and the battle was something of a stalemate, but the Soviet offensive was a major victory which liberated much of the Ukraine). Nick-D (talk) 21:08, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
Nick, Battle of Kursk did include a post-Citadel offensive. However, this offensive became possible only after the German offensive was stopped. Citadel was not doomed to failure: it failed only because the Germans attached the most heavily fortified region if human history. It took tremendous efforts to stop Germans. I agree that a success in Citadel could not have lead to a full German victory. However, it could lead to stabilisation of the frontline, and, probably, to a separate peace between Stalin and Hitler (this possibility was Roosevelt's nightmare).--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:24, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
Modern historians argue that the Soviets clearly had the upper hand in 1943, and would have been able to have stopped a German offensive anywhere. I haven't seen any suggestions that either Hitler or Stalin were looking for a negotiated end to the war in 1943. The general view seems to have been that the Germans would have been better off fighting defensively rather than attempting a major offensive, but this would have only delayed their defeat. See, for instance, David Glantz or Robert M. Citino's work on the topic. Nick-D (talk) 22:13, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
If I remember correct, it was Glanz who said: "After Stalingrad, it became clear that Germany would not win; after Kursk, it became clear the Soviets could not lose." That means before Kursk there was a possibility of some stalemate or even a separate peace at favourable (for Germany) conditions. That was the outcome Roosevelt tried to avoid, hence his idea of "unconditional surrender". You should remember that, according to Glanz, Kursk was the first battle in the whole war when Wehrmacht had not been successful in breaking through enemy's defence. That Germans would not succeed in that seems obvious retrospectively, but it was absolutely not obvious to those who were fighting in that war, and, importantly, that happened because the tremendous efforts of the Soviet army that, at cost of very high losses, tipped the balance to the Allied side. A time between Stalingrad and Kursk was a "gray zone" where the events could have turned in a direction that prevented the Axis complete defeat.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:11, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Regarding Chiang, he didn't attend Tehran because Stalin didn't want to meet him because the USSR was neutral in the war against Japan. It's not surprising that the Canadian PM attended conferences in Quebec! During the war, China was part of the Big Four. In 1945, China became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Canada and Australia didn't. Chiang's standing has suffered because lost the Chinese Civil War in 1949, but he was clearly considered a major world leader at the time. These days many English-speakers don't realise China was in the war. Therefore I would vote for including a picture of Chiang. And regarding Stalin, why not have a picture of him? We have plenty of pictures of Hitler.--Jack Upland (talk) 00:17, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
It is an interesting interpretation, although a little bit illogical. The main opponents of Japan were the US and Britain (not China). Nevertheless, Stalin saw no problem to meet the major Japan's enemy, Roosevelt, who already won several important battles in the war with Japan (China hadn't). How do you explain that Stalin saw no problem to meet Roosevelt, but expected to have problem after meeting with Chiang? I see no logic here. Second, in 1943, after Kursk and Midway, a situation has changed: it was clear that Japan is loosing the war, and Germany probably too, so it was Japan who was more concerned not to irritate USSR, not vise versa.
Anyway, your own words demonstrate the importance of Chiang: if he was not invited to Tehran because Stalin didn't want to see him, that shows a real hierarchy. However, I suspect, the reason was different: I see absolutely no questions the Big Three could discuss with Chiang. Was China helpful in Pacific? No. Did it play any military role in Asia (except South-East China)? No. If we imagine a situation that Barbarossa was a success, this hypothetical situation would be an good analogy of a situation in China in 1943: Moscow (Peking), Leningrad (Shanghai), Nanking (Gorky), Sverdlovsk (Wuhan), and almost all other industrial centers are occupied, and further Axis advances are limited only with the conqueror's capability of controlling the occupied territories (Hitler didn't plan to move behind the A-A line, and the Japanese didn't move further just because they didn't need to; when they needed (in 1944) they did that relatively easily. I would say, China's military contribution was hardly comparable even to the effect of a 500,000 Soviet army located in Far East: it was tying down a whole Kwantung Army, which was stronger than the army that was fighting in China mainland.
To point was that the Cairo Conference dealt with the war with Japan, the Tehran Conference didn't. This is not my interpretation. It is well documented in the Wikipedia article and other sources.[4] Hence, Chiang only went to Cairo, and Stalin only went to Tehran. It was not a matter of hierarchy.--Jack Upland (talk) 05:28, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
If I remember correct, Japan was discussed, but, taking into account that the USSR bore a major brunt of the war against the European Axis, the sides agreed that the USSR would join the war against Japan after Germany would be defeated.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:54, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
In general I support Jack Upland's call for a greater emphasis on China in this article, and a photo of Chiang somewhere is a good way of doing it. I think we could all agree that Wikipedia policy doesn't really care what the 'Big Three' thought of Chiang and China, it cares what our verifiable sources say. Because for the last decade at least there has been a tilt from old Western narratives about who was relevant in the war; e.g. we know from Laurence Rees that for one single American GI or British Tommy who gave his life to the war, 54 Soviets did (and Rees etc also explain that as why D-Day was postponed by a year or even two). Similarly, this generation of historians emphasize that China took the overwhelming majority of bullets in Asia (and over 20 million civilian deaths). According to strategies of bait and bleed, both were by Allied design. With this in mind, use a photo of Chiang. The only question is where. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:09, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
There's already quite a bit on China in the article. I haven't seen any historian of any standing suggest that the Allies were so cynical about China. Instead, they usually argue that if anything too much resources were allocated to the Chinese, and emphasise the lighting-fast nature of the Allied advance through the Pacific from late 1943 (only possible once the necessary shipping had been constructed and troops trained). Nick-D (talk) 06:18, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Chumchum7, If the only Soviet achievement were "to take overwhelming majority of bullets", there would be no reason to devote much space to the Eastern Front. I am insisting on giving greater coverage of the Eastern front because the Soviets send overwhelming majority of bullets to the Axis solders (Eastern front killed more than 50% of all Axis military). Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about China. However, I don't mind to add more description of Chinese losses in the section specially dedicated to that subject.
In addition, if we want to honor Chinese soldiers of civilians, lets show solders and civilians. I doubt Chiang's image (who was a ruthless, murderous and inefficient leader) is the best option.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:26, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Returning to the topic of this section, I think that the article has way too many dull posed photos of senior politicians. What Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, etc, looked like is pretty well known! (and just a click away when reading Wikipedia articles). Nick-D (talk) 06:35, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Cynicism isn't usually the word used, it's realpolitik. Roosevelt was a well-documented master of the art; take his often-quoted response to HUMINT on the Holocaust, for example. Historians of great standing show that democracies prefer to have their non-democratic allies fight total wars, because they don't win elections by letting their boys get killed. I agree with you that there is content on China in the article, and I'm just saying that in support of Jack Upland, there is room for more. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:51, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Taking bullets was obviously not the only Soviet achievement, and nobody said it was. The Soviet Union achieved very many things; brilliant generalship, technological advances, civilian resilience, production of materiel, the list goes on. I support the insistence on giving greater coverage to the Eastern Front. Chiang's image would not necessarily glorify him any more than Hirohito's image would glorify Hirohito, nor would it contradict our reflection of verifiable sources on Chiang's ruthless, murderous, inefficient record. If the majority view of sources say there's a paradox between Chinese deaths and Chinese effectiveness, then it can go into the article too. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:51, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Chumchum7, let me reiterate: In China, Japan reached its "A-A line". And that is the major difference between the Soviet and Chinese contributions in Allied war efforts. Actually, nothing was happening in China after 1941 which was comparable, by strategic implications, to El Alamein or Guadalcanal. If Wehrmacht reached the "A-A line" in 1941 (I assume a hypothetical situation that that hadn't led to immediate collapse of the Grand Alliance), it would be totally incorrect to speak about any significant role Stalin could play during strategic meetings of the Allied leaders. He would be a second rank leader, and that is exactly who Chiang was.
I agree that suffering and losses of Chinese people should be better explained. However, one has to keep in mind that majority of victims were civilians (and a significant part of them were a result of 1942-3 famine). I do think this question should be described in more details, but in the "Casualties and war crimes" section. And that does serve as an argument to emphasize the role of Chiang.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:28, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Oxford historian Rana Mitter is an authority on the role of China and the positive peer reception of his Forgotten Ally: China’s War with Japan, 1937-45 (2013) did a lot to revise the mainstream view. That will be a useful source for us at this juncture. In many interviews online, Mitter talks about the book, the addition of Wang Jingwei to Mao and Chiang, Stalin's pragmatic assistance to Chiang, and Chiang's 4 million troops fighting Japan; e.g. here: [5] -Chumchum7 (talk) 05:38, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
Thanks to the efforts of a few editors, quite a bit on the war in China has been added to the article over the last year or so. I suspect that the extent of this coverage is now greater than in most narratives on the war. If there are specific changes you'd like to propose, please start a new thread to do so. Nick-D (talk) 05:53, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
(edit conflict)I didn't find any specific facts in her article that support her assertion that Chinese role is underestimated. Obviously, a wast China required enormous resources to maintain control over it, so Japan had to keep significant troops to control conquered territories and protect a frontline. However, in contrast to Germany, Japan's military capabilities were limited not by manpower, but by her technology. The only exception was air forces, but China was not the theater that required a significant number of trained pilots. With regard to the rest, Japanese efforts in Pacific were limited with her capability of deliver troops there, so it would be incorrect to say that the need to keep 1.2 million troops in China had any significant effect on the war in Pacific. In addition, the size of Japanese army in mainland China was comparable with that of Kwantung Army, which was stationed in Manchuria to protect it against a 500,000 Soviet army that was stationed along the Amur river during the whole war. In that sense, the effect of the idle Soviet troops was similar to the effect of whole Chinese army. Even at the very end of the WWII, Japanese troops were not defeated by China, and they surrendered just because they were ordered to do so by Hirohito.
To summarise, China was the first (future) Ally who started to fight against a future Axis power. The story of the beginning of SSJW has been covered well in the article, and that is correct. Probably, we can tell more about that period. However, after 1941, China was de facto defeated, and all subsequent events in that theatre had only moderate strategic importance. China suffered enormous losses, but it inflicted relatively minor losses on Japan (if I am not wrong, more Japanese military died from diseases than were killed). Therefore, an adequate way to describe China in this article would be a detailed coverage of 1937-41 events and description of civilian and military casualties in the "Casualties" section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:06, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
With regard to the discussion about the Tehran Conference above, it's true that Stalin did agree to declare war on Japan after the defeat of Hitler, but Japan didn't know that. If Chiang had gone to Tehran, Japan would surely have known, and it would look like the USSR was violating neutrality.--Jack Upland (talk) 19:45, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
Stalin attended the conference with the leaders of two major military opponents of Japan: USA and UK. Wasn't it a violation of neutrality? In addition, in 1943, major Japan's concern was to keep the USSR neutral. It would be a nightmare for Japan if the USSR broke neutrality, and Japan would prefer to turn a blind eye on minor violations of neutrality, such as negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill, and I sincerely don't understand how could Kaishek's presence change the situation. Actually, the very fact that the USSR broke a neutrality pact in August 1945 was a decisive factor that convinced Hirohito to surrender: before that, Japan still hoped Stalin would be a mediator in prospective negotiations with the US about a peace treaty.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:29, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
Your statement is based on a false premise. Stalin's attendance at conference with his Allied leaders (vs Germany) was definitely not a violation of his neutrality treaty with Japan. The treaty in no way prohibited such activities. Mediatech492 (talk) 14:55, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
Stalin's meeting with Churchill in 1941 was definitely not a violation, because Britain was not at war with Japan. However, after Pearl Harbor, when the US and Britain were at war with Japan, any meeting where a joint military activity was discussed could be considered as an unfriendly step by Japan. Japan couldn't know what exactly did they discuss (it could never be sure a military activity against Japan was not discussed; actually, it was discussed, as you know). In any event, I don't see why a meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt was in accordance with the Soviet-Japan pact, and a meeting between Kaishek and Stalin was. During a meeting with Roosevelt, Stalin could discuss not the aspects of the war with Germany, but the details of a future attack of Japan (actually, this question was discussed). Similarly, a meeting with Kaishek (had it happened) could be devoted to a Chinese help to the USSR in the war with Germany (that sounds ridiculous, but formally that was possible). Therefore, from a formal point of view, the presence of Kaishek would not be a formal violation of neutrality (not more than meeting with Roosevelt).
In any event, I am not sure Stalin cared too much about that, because in 1943 it was Japan who was more interested in keeping the USSR neutral. If Stalin did object to invitation of Kaishek, a reference to the neutrality pact was just a formal pretext.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:40, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
First of all, Chiang Kai-shek's surname is "Chinag", not "Kaishek". Nobody called him Kai-shek except family and close friends. Referring to him in this informal is disrespectful and shows your lack of knowledge of the basic subject matter. Secondly there is nothing in the the treaty which prohibited Stalin from meeting with Chiang, for any reason. Mediatech492 (talk) 17:57, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
Yes, I made this mistake again. "Chiang" is even easier to write. With regard to disrespect, what about "Uncle Joe"? Going back to the main question, if you agree that a meeting with Chiang was not a violation of the pact, what all this dispute is about?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:36, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
Because we are discussing the argument that Chiang Kaishek was not invited to Tehran because his meeting with Stalin would be a violation of USSR's neutrality.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:54, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
Ok, I removed the Cairo image as redundant. I also propose to think about Casablanca: this was a meeting between just two Allied leaders, and no important agreements were achieved there.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:40, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 10 November 2018
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The use of Indigenous languages also became a technological device as part of Canada's and US's communications. Indigenous members of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps developed for transmitting vital messages in WW2. Know as "code talkers", their role was similar to the American First Nations who spoke Navajo and were know as “Windtalkers”. [7]JIllPrice (talk) 16:46, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
Seems to be an omission in such a comprehensive article that goes into so much detail on other topics. Code-breaking gets a passing mention as part of the 'Technology' section but afaics there's nothing on e.g. the Double-Cross System and Operation Scherhorn, etc. I hereby call for a dedicated section, and invite drafting below for discussion. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:45, 29 October 2018 (UTC)
That seems rather undue. Modern historians generally argue that almost all the intelligence operations other than code-breaking (on all sides) had pretty minor results. The various spy rings, etc, rarely produced results - the only one which springs to mind as being truly influential is the Soviet penetration of the Allied nuclear program, and even that didn't pay off until after the war. These efforts also didn't involve many people or resources. That said, what text are you proposing? Nick-D (talk) 10:51, 29 October 2018 (UTC)
Thank you very much for the reply. With a view to the text, you concur that code-breaking did not have minor results, so we could start by folding that out into a dedicated section: Cryptanalysis of the Lorenz cipher was instrumental in the Battle of Kursk, Ultra was vital to the Battle of the Atlantic; the Battle of Arnhem failed in large part because commanders ignored SIGINT (as well as HUMINT from Dutch spies) on enemy positions. On the subject of spy rings, etc, D-Day was dependent on a deception operation named Operation Fortitude involving the double-agent Duško Popov, some say Soviet spy Richard Sorge personally enabled the Red Army to free up 18 divisions from the Far East for the Battle of Moscow, and the list goes on. But more importantly, the threshold for inclusion is not what we think historians agree about causality (and it's really debatable whether historians generally agree spies were irrelevant) but verifiability. The amount of sourcing on WWII espionage is vast, which also adds WP:NOTABILITY. Isn't Wikipedia meant to be a reflection of the available literature, rather than a reflection of a thesis about cause and effect? This is the tip of the iceberg, including both SIGINT and HUMINT:
In addition I would recommend Max Hastings 2015 work, The Secret War: Spies, Codes And Guerrillas, 1939–45. London: William Collins, 2015. ISBN 9780007503742, an excellent, detailed overview of the effects of espionage in WW2 Simon Adler (talk) 05:12, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
Yes, it's a great point to include the clear overlap between field agents, code-breakers and the resistance war. To the latter can be added NKVD, OSS and SOE (particularly effective in Yugoslavia and Greece) and the mass of sabotage (as well as intelligence) against Germany provided by cells among the millions of slave labourers dragging down the Nazi war machine from the inside. Per The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan, the Untermensch ensured plenty of German tanks were already malfunctioning when they reached the Eastern Front. -Chumchum7 (talk) 05:37, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
I think the question remains what text do you want to add to the article? As it stands, there is more about espionage than about the development of the atomic bomb. Many things happened in WW2, and they are all clamouring for attention. The main organising concept is the narrative, and the main criteria for inclusion seems to be the effect on the outcome of the war (see discussion at the start of the section). I think this is problematic, but there it is.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:35, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
Well, in the name of consensus I'd hoped we could all chip in for content, but I'm happy to start the brainstorm if that's what you want. Here's a start:
====The intelligence war====
Cryptography and SIGINT was used extensively during World War II, with a plethora of code and cipher systems fielded by the nations involved. The break into the most secure Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated "PURPLE" by the US Army Signals Intelligence Service, started before the US entered the war. Product from this source was called Magic; the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, General Hiroshi Ōshima, routinely sent information about German plans to Tokyo which was immediately read by Roosevelt and Churchill. Decryption by the Allies of the German "Enigma" Cipher created product named Ultra. The first complete break into Enigma was accomplished in 1932 by the Poles, who passed their technology and methodology to the French and British in July 1939, and evacuated their team of code-breakers at the start of the war to continue their work. Ultra contributed to many Allied victories, including the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of Kursk.
Churchill's order to "set Europe ablaze" was undertaken by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which developed a plan to train HUMINT spies, guerrillas and saboteurs for deployment in occupied Europe; eventually, this would become the Special Operations Executive. America had no overarching military intelligence agency until Roosevelt, inspired by the British, started the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) which in 1942 became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which after the war became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[1][2] The Soviet NKVD had been well-established for many years before the war, and its staff were Stalin's most trusted personnel; agents included Richard Sorge, who accurately reported that Japan had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union in 1941, and double-agent Kim Philby, a senior SIS officer with access to most of Britain's intelligence reports. NKVD operatives were also crucial to partisan warfare and the establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Europe toward the end of the war.
References
^Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (2001) p 329.
^R Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (U of California Press, 1972)
1934 is seven years before the Soviets entered the war, which is plenty of time for them to establish themselves. Also, the NKVD did have a previous incarnation from 1917 to 1930; so when it was re-established it came with a cadre of experienced men. Furthermore this later incarnation also incorporated the previously separate OGPU and all its men and resources, which included more than a few former Cheka men. The NKVD was not a novice bunch in 1934, and by 1941 it was very well established. Mediatech492 (talk) 20:31, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
(iii) "The Soviet NKVD was the culmination of many years of the absolute power of the Russian state, which had masterfully pioneered tactics such as "maskirovka", "spetsoperatsiya", false flag, "aktivniyye meropriyatiya", "kompromat", "provokatsiya" and "mokroye delo". Run by Stalin's right-hand-man Lavrentiy Beria, it was not just the USSR's primary intelligence organization, but also the Interior Ministry of the Soviet Union, with a monopoly on law enforcement (when it merged with the secret police OGPU in 1934), operation of the Gulags, political repression including extrajudicial mass killings of perceived and real enemies, cooperation with the Gestapo and Denazification; during the war it took its methods abroad and even had its own front-line divisions.
I don't support the proposed text at all. It's focused on various individuals, when the intelligence war was conducted on an industrial scale. The text also makes no mention of the Axis intelligence efforts (which were quite successful until about 1943) and their attempts at sabotage campaigns (which were total failures). Nick-D (talk) 07:24, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
That's why I've said that is just a start to the brainstorm, and have asked for us all to chip in, in the name of consensus. What text do you propose? -Chumchum7 (talk) 07:45, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II covers what was by far the most effective element of the German intelligence efforts (though it doesn't yet seem to cover the German successes in breaking convoy codes during the Battle of the Atlantic). Their human intelligence campaign was a small-scale fiasco for most of the war. Nick-D (talk) 09:30, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
Nick-D are you going to make a contribution to reaching consensus here, for example by proposing an alternative to the content you objected to? For what it's worth I see see no policy or guideline infringement by mentioning a few individuals in a total war. Conceptually, every description of a subject uses examples of its details, e.g. a description of a human body could mention a freckle and a description of a metropolis could mention a street corner. But with your objection in mind, here's another go:
Cryptography and SIGINT was used extensively during World War II, with a plethora of code and cipher systems fielded by the nations involved. The break into the most secure Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated "PURPLE" by the US Army Signals Intelligence Service, started before the US entered the war. Product from this source was called Magic; the Japanese routinely sent information about German plans to Tokyo which was immediately read by Western Allied leadership. Their decryption of the German "Enigma" Cipher created product named Ultra. The first complete break into Enigma was accomplished in 1932 by the Poles, who passed their technology and methodology to the French and British in July 1939, and evacuated the Polish Cipher Bureau at the start of the war to continue its work. Ultra contributed to many Allied victories, including the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of Kursk.
The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) trained HUMINT spies, guerrillas and saboteurs for deployment in occupied Europe; eventually, this would become the Special Operations Executive. America had no overarching military intelligence agency until - inspired by the British - it started the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) which in 1942 became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which after the war became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[1][2] The Soviet NKVD had been well-established before the war, and its staff were Stalin's most trusted personnel; it accurately established that Japan had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union in 1941, and used double-agents to access Britain's intelligence reports. The NKVD was also crucial to partisan warfare and the establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Europe toward the end of the war.
We could treat this as a minimum basis or stub, and add further detail depending what the consensus is on the amount of space to allocate to this section. -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:06, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
If there are no objections from other editors, I will add the content to the article with the understanding that at some stage Nick-D will be getting round to editing the section further. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:15, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
What's the rush? The above material remains deeply flawed: it doesn't capture the scale of the SIGINT efforts, most of the material is not sourced, and there's nothing about the Axis intelligence efforts. I'm not sure what you're hoping to achieve with snide comments? Nick-D (talk) 06:23, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Nick-D, I totally refute this allegation. I am working to consensus, using the Talk page before editing, have responded to a request for content, have offered compromise content and have invited others to chime in; I have also assisted you below on a point of accuracy with the matter of civilian deaths in Tokyo and Hiroshima. I apologize if in doing so I inadvertently hurt your feelings. As it stands you have made a false assumption about my comments. In so doing you have used uncivil language, not in keeping with the standards of our community. This is no example to be set for others. Per WP:IDENTIFYUNCIVIL, please strike through the sentence containing the word "snide", and that should be the end of it. We all make mistakes, tone can easily be misinterpreted on the internet, and you are hereby forgiven. So far, nobody else has stepped forward to object to the proposed content, so if you want WP:CONS to wait for you, please be kind enough to let us know within what time-frame you're going to come up with the content you'd prefer. Many thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:22, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
No-one else has actually supported the inclusion of the material you've proposed, or even having a dedicated section on this topic, so there is obviously not grounds to include this. Nick-D (talk) 08:11, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
Nick-D, you've ignored my request to please strike out the line containing the word "snide". You have said that you are going to prepare alternative content, and have ignored my request to let me know when you are going to do so. Instead have now said that there is no grounds to include this, though it's not clear whether you are referring to the section in general or just my proposal specifically. On grounds for inclusion, we clearly have different views on the way WP:CONS works. From my perspective I've been patient and consultative. I've tried to clear up a misunderstanding. I've apologized. I'm asking you one more time to be a good sport and strike out the line. There are standards at stake here. If you continue you to ignore my request, I will reluctantly put it on the record for discussion at the relevant noticeboards. I have not been snide, and we all have an obligation to assume good faith. -Chumchum7 (talk) 12:07, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
Stuff like "at some stage Nick-D will be getting round to editing the section further" isn't exactly polite... Nick-D (talk) 09:19, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
Nick-D, I hope you're well. I'm keeping my word, and bringing this issue to conclusion. It's been over one week since you said you need time to go and research and write your preferred text. I have held back from editing the article out of respect for that. During this time you have not responded to my request for an indication of when you you are going to get back with said text. During this time you have not striked through the sentence in which you alleged I was "snide". I've explained above that this was a misinterpretation, and that Wikipedia standards are at stake. We are all bound by WP:AGF and WP:CIVIL. You are further bound by WP:ADMINCOND and WP:ADMINACCT, etc. I am not going to strike out your line myself, out of respect for boundaries. With the absence of a civility noticeboard at this time there are very few options left other than requesting the involvement of other administrators. Per WP:BOOMERANG I would invite scrutiny of my own conduct. The request would include the information that you have made the 2nd biggest number of edits on this article [6] and have been editing this article for 12 years and 457 edits, which were mostly deletions of content, the majority of which in the last three years were hard reverts [7]. This is evidence of your great work; it might also have become significant with regard to your stance here. I say this to give you a friendly and collegial explanation and notice for my next step before I take it. That will be within the next 24 hours or so. I still hope that before then you will be able to strike through the line, in order to maintain Wikipedia standards. I would be most grateful, and would look forward to continuing to support your work in the future. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:29, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
If it's helpful, the reasons I haven't proposed any text here are 1) no other editor supports adding a section on this topic 2) I don't want to engage with you given your conduct such as that in the post above and elsewhere 3) I'm a volunteer here (like everyone else) and can write on whatever topics I please. Regards, Nick-D (talk) 10:38, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
References
^Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (2001) p 329.
^R Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (U of California Press, 1972)
Allies close in (1944)
I removed the mention of 200k civilians killed in Warsaw, because we do not provide this type figures in the Course of the War section. Should we add this information to the War crimes section?
The only serious problem that I see in this section is the image from Warsaw uprising. This event (more precisely, the behaviour of Soviet leadership) had long lasting political consequences, but its strategic implications were minimal. The second important battle in 1944 in terms of political effect (and the first important in terms of German military losses) was Bagration. Therefore, it would be correct to replace Dirlewanger's photo with one of Bagration photos. 1944 was the year of four major Soviet offensives where Germany sustained immense losses. The images do not reflect that fact.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:08, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
The 200,000 number should be removed, our rationale for no death counts having reached consensus for this article. It should be added to War Crimes as it was part of the Nuremberg Trials. However Operation Bagration should not be emphasized over the Warsaw Uprising per se for a number of reasons. (i) Emphasis and notability among sources. One example of many: Britannica has the Warsaw Uprising, but not Operation Bagration. [8] (ii) Categorization. There's no doubt that Soviet action on the Eastern Front was the most important factor in the defeat of Nazi Germany, and that should receive due weight in this article with it being made clear that engagements such as e.g. the Second Battle of El Alamein were tiny by comparison; but Bagration was just one aspect of several parts of this titanic front rather than a separate subject. (iii) Sources don't actually say the uprising was strategically insignificant. They say it was one of the perceivable causes of the Battle of Romania, with the Eastern front halting in Poland in response to the obstacle of the (perceivably anti-Soviet) uprising, after which Soviet forces could swing south to protect their flank and seize the Ploiesti oilfields while Germany did the job of suppressing Warsaw and killing most of the Polish resistance, which had already embarked on a guerrilla war against the Soviets. Straightforward military-political realism. Note the advances in blue on this map [9] coincide with the strategic halt outside Warsaw. (iv) Some sources say the Warsaw Uprising is one of the places, if not the place, where the Cold War percievably started, in which case it has huge significance. The point being that Poland was a British and American Ally and an Allied liberation of its own capital was cut off by the nearby Soviets (in contrast with the French liberation of Paris facilitated by the Americans), with a view to postwar political realities. It's verifiable that prompted by the Soviet strategic halt, Australian, British, Canadian, New Zealand, Polish and South African airmen undertook over 200 resupply flights from the heel of Italy and were denied Soviet landing rights 5 minute's flying time from Warsaw; damaged Western Allied planes attempting to land due to German AA fire were attacked by the Soviets, the sources show. Historians tend to treat that as highly significant. (v) As to Oskar Dirlewanger himself, what he did against the Warsaw Uprising is verifiably one of the most notorious examples of Germany's sadism in the war. For Wikipedia purposes, that is not less significant than the causal factors in the defeat of Germany, it's an important part of comprehensive coverage of the subject of WWII. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:03, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
As I said, Warsaw uprising had serious political implications, and it, along with Katyn, poisoned relationships between the two countries. That is why it is important, and that is why it has a separate article in Britannica. However, its contribution to Allied war efforts was minimal. In contrats, Bagration was the most calamitous defeat of German army (and the Axis as whole) during the whole WWII. In addition to Bagration, there were three other major offensives in the East, and they had enormous effect on the course of the war. The photo must reflect the fact that 1944 was the year of a series of massive offensives in the East. The Dirlewanger's photo does not serve this goal. However, I think this photo can be preserved in the article, but it is more relevant to the "War crimes" section. In general, taking into account that more civilians were killed in this war than military, we definitely have to expand the war crimes section significantly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:29, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
I disagree. Bagration resulted in a fast advance of Red Army and eventually to the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops. Had the 1944 been less successful for the Soviets, it is quite likely that the war would have ended later, Berlin would be captured by Western Allies, who sustained much greater casualties, and most central European country would be occupied not by the USSR, but by Britain and the US. The whole European history of XX century would be different without Bagration. In contrast, the only consequence of Warsaw uprising was that Poland has more reasons to hate Russia. What else?
Re "...with the Eastern front halting in Poland in response to the obstacle of the (perceivably anti-Soviet) uprising..." That is a very odd interpretation. Whereas it sounds logical that Stalin could provide more support to the uprising (except allowing berlingowcy to cross Vistula and join the uprising), one has to keep in mind that the Red Army was desperately exhausted, and it was incapable to advance further without reinforcements. No evidences exist that Stavka delayed Vistula-Oder operation in responce to the Warsaw uprising. In contrast, existing sources say Red Army was not prepared for any significant offencive in this region during that time.
Actually, you are shifting the emphasis from my major point (1944 was a year when Red Army was extremely successful, and its four major offensives essentially destroyed Wehrmacht and shaped the political situation in Europe, and this fact should be reflected by adding the relevant photo.) to the question if Bagration was more imprtant than Warsaw. I am not sure that type argumentation is correct.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:47, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
Sources
Frequently in discussions here, people have referred to the latest revisionist historians as the ultimate authority, and discounted older historians, and popular perceptions. I think this is a flawed approach. If this article was written entirely based on the latest revisionists, it would present a view of the war that no one holds and that would be unrecognizable to vast majority of readers. We should present a consensus view of the war and acknowledge different viewpoints.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:04, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
Is this currently a problem with the article text? The article obviously needs to be current with the scholarship on the war, which is evolving quite rapidly. Some of what are widely considered the best books on the war have appeared in recent years (for instance, Adam Tooze's 2006 book The Wages of Destruction is generally considered the best work on Nazi Germany's war economy). Some works which used to be considered standard are now at rather dated (The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich for instance, or the many books which presented a sympathetic account of Nazi generals who are now generally considered major war criminals). Works like the Oxford Companion to World War II and Gerhard L. Weinberg's A World at Arms are my go-tos: they're pretty much up to date, and wide-ranging. As a feature of modern scholarship on the war is to more fully recognise its extent, new and well-reviewed works should be drawn on to ensure that the article is appropriately comprehensive. Nick-D (talk) 09:35, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
"Frequently in discussions here, people have referred to the latest revisionist historians as the ultimate authority, and discounted older historians"
That should not be "frequently", that should be "always". It is one of the most important content guidelines in Wikipedia, included in Wikipedia:Identifying reliable sources:
"Age matters:
"Especially in scientific and academic fields, older sources may be inaccurate because new information has been brought to light, new theories proposed, or vocabulary changed. In areas like politics or fashion, laws or trends may make older claims incorrect. Be sure to check that older sources have not been superseded, especially if it is likely the new discoveries or developments have occurred in the last few years. In particular, newer sources are generally preferred in medicine."
"Sometimes sources are too new to use, such as with breaking news (where later reports might be more accurate), and primary sources which purport to debunk a long-standing consensus or introduce a new discovery (in which case awaiting studies that attempt to replicate the discovery might be a good idea, or reviews that validate the methods used to make the discovery)."
"With regard to historical events, older reports (closer to the event, but not too close such that they are prone to the errors of breaking news) tend to have the most detail, and are less likely to have errors introduced by repeated copying and summarizing. However, newer secondary and tertiary sources may have done a better job of collecting more reports from primary sources and resolving conflicts, applying modern knowledge to correctly explain things that older sources could not have, or remaining free of bias that might affect sources written while any conflicts described were still active or strongly felt."
Jack Upland&Dimadick, I disagree with you both. There should be no general rule in that case. The very term "historical revisionism" is vague: overwhelming majority of old historians were considered revisionists at the beginning of their career. I think, decisions should be make for each case separately. For example, the German war efforts is a pretty well studied subject so it is quite likely that any new revisionist author who writes about that should be treated with cautions. In contrast, in some other fields, more reasons exit to expect a breakthrough. Thus, a major breakthrough occurred when the USSR dissolved, and a large number of data became available. That means the books written about the USSR that were published in 2000s are more preferable in this article than older monographs or papers. Probably, the same can be said about China, although it is still remaining a closed society, so we may expect good revisionist studies of China in close future.
In connection to that, Jack, what exactly are you concerned about? Which revisionist sources did you have in mind when you were writing your post? --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:50, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
It has mainly come up in discussion of weight. For example, Stalingrad. Perhaps the latest revisionist historians consider it to be a mere skirmish etc, but the fact that people at the time considered it was important needs to be taken into account. I think editors should be more broad-minded.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:17, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
"Stalingrad. Perhaps the latest revisionist historians consider it to be a mere skirmish"
Yes indeed, who thinks Stalingrad was a skirmish? Presumably that was irony to illustrate the point. The irony can be put to good use here because it serves to show that whether the case of Stalingrad being called a skirmish would be revisionist or not, more importantly it would be WP:FRINGE. Thus one needs to distinguish between (i) revisionism that is well-received by peers in the field (if not popular consciousness) and therefore adjusts the majority view or instigates a polar debate and further research, and (ii) revisionist fringe theories that are contested by peers in the field and thereby strengthen the existing academic consensus (if not popular consciousness) such as the notorious David Irving. It has been rightly said above that most established historians could have been considered revisionist at some stage, and there is important revisionism underway in recent scholarship as professionals make it their job to obtain fresh evidence which support fresh perspectives. -Chumchum7 (talk) 08:17, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
Yes, I was trying to illustrate the point. A real example that has occurred is with the nuclear bombs. Paul Siebert pointed out that some historians do not think the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings won the war. I tend to agree, but this is not the only issue. There are many people that think they did. I think there needs to be a balanced representation.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:35, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
Is a problem with the article text you'd like to see addressed? When WP:FRINGE stuff has found its way into the article, it's usually removed once it's called out (BTW, which historians argue that Stalingrad was a skirmish?! - I'll take them off my to-read list). Nick-D (talk) 09:21, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
If such trend exists, you will be able to show concrete examples (e.g., undue weight is given to a revisionist source X, a mainstream source Y is underrepresented).--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:08, 7 November 2018 (UTC)
Jack Upland, you write (regarding the atomic bomb): "... some historians do not think the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings won the war. I tend to agree, but this is not the only issue. There are many people that think they did. I think there needs to be a balanced representation." This is a very interesting question: should Wikipedia translate the common popular views, myths and misconceptions, or it should rely on expert's opinion? In my opinion, if peer-reviewed sources are available on some subject, we should write what they say, and we can ignore popular books, newspaper articles and films. That is especially relevant to WWII, because a new mythology is gradually forming about it, so American historians had to organise round tables to discuss what to do with that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:42, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
Historians all agree the war was already decisively won when the bombs were dropped. the issue was whether the Japanese would surrender or fight an invasion & retreat to the mountains and fight on for years. Rjensen (talk) 23:00, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
Correct. However, one must separate the factors that lead to a decisive defeat from the factors that triggered a decision about unconditional surrender. A popular belief is that it was an atomic bomb, but scholarly sources disagree. Should we reproduce popular beliefs, or we should say what real experts think on that account?--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:36, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
not sure where one discovers "popular beliefs" -- Historians disagree on how important bombs were in forcing the surrender (versus role of Russia). We can document that disagreement. Rjensen (talk) 04:46, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
Are there any serious debates about this subject? When I am searching for modern sources, I find Pape, or Wilson ("Did the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki force the Japanese to surrender in 1945? Did nuclear weapons, in effect, win the war in the Pacific? These questions matter because almost all thinking about nuclear war and nuclear weapons depends, in one way or another, on judgments about the effect of these attacks.Scholarship about Japan’s decision to surrender can be divided into three phases. During the first twenty years after Hiroshima, historians and strategists rarely questioned the necessity of using the atomic bomb or the decisive role it played in bringing World War II to a close. In 1965, however, a revisionist school began examining the decision to use the bomb more closely, raising moral questions about the use of nuclear weapons and asking probing questions about the motives of U.S. leaders. They continued to believe, however,that the bomb was instrumental in ending the war. Since 1990 new scholarship, including recently declassified documents and extensive research into Japanese, Soviet, and U.S. archives, has led to new interpretations of Japan’s surrender. New questions have been raised about the centrality of nuclear weapons in coercing Japan to end the war. In particular, analysis of the strategic situation from a Japanese perspective has led some scholars to assert that the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war may have been as important or even more important in coercing Japan’s leaders." International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 162–179), or similar sources. Clearly, after 1990s, a consensus is that atomic bombing was less important than Americans believed previously. BTW, Wilson himself goes even further in his views on the role of the atomic weapon.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:41, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
Wilson (2007) states the issue very well: "In the spring of 1945, Japan was already largely defeated and Japan’s leaders knew it. They hoped, however, to win better terms than simple surrender through diplomacy or battle." So the issue is not "winning" or "defeat" it's deciding why Japan decided to surrender then and not sooner or later. Rjensen (talk) 14:10, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
Correct. Japan was essentially defeated by mid 1945, and that was achieved by conventional warfare in Pacific. Atomic bombing hadn't added too much to that. Japanese military were not impressed with conventional or atomic bombing of cities, partially because their main base in Manchuria was still pretty safe, and because Korea still had a significant industrial and military potential. However, when the USSR broke a neutrality pact, and Kwantung army demonstrated poor fighting capabilities, the position of the war party in Japanese establishment had been shaken, and they agreed to surrender unconditionally.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:33, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
with the abomb the Army could no longer protect the Emperor in Tokyo--he had to leave (for the mountains) or surrender. Leaving meant he could no longer rule, and surrender meant that he could rule. He made the decision. USSR invasion did not involve a similar threat to the emperor. Rjensen (talk) 01:32, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
Incorrect. The Japanese leadership still believed they could move the Emperor and his government to Korea or Manchuria, it was a wast territory with a strong economic potential, which was not affected by war. Soviet invasion deprived them of that opportunity, but atomic bombing did not prevent that. Second, had you been familiar with the subject, you would have known that the main reason for Japanese refusal to surrender was that Americans disagreed to preserve imperial institutions, which means there were absolutely no reason to expect the Emperor would continue to rule. --Paul Siebert (talk) 02:04, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
no--the Japanese leadership was hopelessly deadlocked. Stephen S. Larg states re the abombs: together with Russia’s subsequent entry into the war against Japan, politically they created, albeit not immediately, the extreme national emergency that made it possible for the Emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender. Even then, it took two imperial interventions to end the war. [Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography (1992) p 125] Relocating the government to Korea or Manchuria meant permanently abandoning Japan--exile--the US Navy controlled the sea and air passages. Rjensen (talk) 03:55, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
Nevertheless, Pape and Wilson say that. Do you really believe these authors are not experts? Hirohito was more like a religious leader, so no exile could prevent it from ruling over his people.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:12, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
You did not read Pape closely: Pape does not discuss Korea or Manchuria--but he does state explicitly that by June 1945 "the connection with the Asian mainland was now completely cut" (p 127). There was no way to get the Emperor and gov't to Korea or Manchuria. He states: "the final straws, which led to acceptance of immediate surrender, were the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6 and the Soviet attack on August 9." [Pape p 183] Pape work is primarily about US planning & uses only American (& British) sources and uses no Japanese language sources. Mostly for Japanese thinking he relies on two old books (Butow--1954 and Kirby-1969 also Sigal 1989) Pape is indeed part of the debate--but he admits "The most widely accepted explanation of Japan's surrender is atomic coercion." so he agrees he's in the minority. (Pape p 191]. He does agree "the atomic bomb was the catalyst of the Emperor's decision" [p 185] but wants to say that J's military vulnerability was the most important long-term factor. Rjensen (talk) 05:01, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
Well, it seems you think I am claiming the Soviet invasion was the sole and primary factor. I do not say that. I only say that the role of atomic bombs was grossly exaggerated, and that stereotype was strong in the past; now, thanks to Pape, Wilson and other authors, the current point of view (not in a popular culture, of course) has changed.
Regarding "complete cut", Pape, obviously meant a regular connection that allowed massive material or troops transfer. I am sure it would not be a problem to move Hirohito to Korea.
I don't remember which author, probably Wilson (maybe, Pape) demonstrated that the main decision makers in Japanese cabinet were military, and their major base was a Kwantung Army headquarter. Only after the Soviet troops broke Kwantung army's resistance, the influence of the JIA dropped, and the "peace party" became capable of pushing the decision to surrender.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:00, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
What led the Japanese leadership to end the war and the exact way this occurred is a famously complicated subject, and as far as I'm aware there isn't a consensus among historians on the topic. I'd suggest that the article not get into this huge debate, but simply link to the relevant article. Nick-D (talk) 07:21, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
Actually, I don't think any additional coverage of this topic is needed, the article in its present form describes that question quite adequately.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:26, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
I agree with above This is a survey level article. Such minutia is better served in a separate article more focused to the subject. Mediatech492 (talk) 14:43, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
"page needed" in the Axis attack of the USSR section
We already discussed this question recently, and I explained that these references are to journal articles, the first and last page are already provided. Wikipedia standards require a exact page only when a book is used as a source (which it totally reasonable, because articles are small, and they are devoted to some narrow topic). Adding the "page needed" template to journal articles, despite the fact that that issue has already been explained on the talk page, is unacceptable. I put notes to the article's text, and if the "page needed" template will appear again, I will consider it as a bad faith attempts to cast a doubt on the article's content and to spoil the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:45, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
However, Japan announced its surrender on 15 August, and the islands were occupied after that. The same anachronism is repeated in the body of the article. Also, why is the invasion of Korea not mentioned as well? Clearly, this was a threat to Japan.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:24, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
This is a good catch. I'd suggest changing this sentence to "With an invasion of the Japanese archipelago imminent, the possibility of additional atomic bombings, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Japan announced its intention to surrender on 15 August 1945, cementing total victory in Asia for the Allies". The Kurils were an unimportant sideshow which don't belong in the lead (Manchuria was by far the main Soviet effort, and a key factor in Japan's surrender). The 2 September date is somewhat bureaucratic - hostilities ceased on the 15th. Nick-D (talk) 09:31, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
Yes, Kurils hardly deserve mention. With regard to Manchuria, some authors think that even the very fact that the USSR broke a neutrality pact was a key factor: Japan was still hoping she could have initiated some negotiations about surrender term, and the USSR, being a neutral party, could be a mediator in those negotiations. When the USSR broke a neutrality, it shattered the last Japan's hope for more favorable surrender terms, so there were no reason to continue the war. Therefore, I would suggest:
""With an invasion of the Japanese archipelago imminent, the possibility of additional atomic bombings, the Soviet entry into the war against Japan and its invasion of Manchuria, Japan announced its intention to surrender on 15 August 1945, cementing total victory in Asia for the Allies"
I made several changes that, I believe, will cause no objections. My explanations are below.
1. I added the discussion of the Operation Spring Awakening, which was the last Germany's offensive. By its scale it was comparable to the battle of the Bulge, and strategic implications were very significant.
2. I added the battle of Battle of Königsberg, which had much greater scale than the battle of Hamburg.
3. I regrouped the text to explain what parts of Germany remained unoccupied by the time Soviet and American troops met at Elbe.
4. I removed the mention of surrender of German troops in Italy, because there were several local surrenders in different parts of Europe, and I do not understand why surrender in Italy deserves a separate mention.
5. I put a description of the Battle of Berlin into a separate paragraph to emphasize political, military, and symbolic importance of that battle.
I reverted you on the Italian surrender. It is significant as the first "unconditional" surrender of the Germans. Srnec (talk) 01:03, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
I also propose to significantly shorten this text:
Meanwhile, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) were destroying strategic and populated cities and towns in Japan in an effort to destroy Japanese war industry and civilian morale. On the night of 9–10 March, USAAF B-29bombersstruck Tokyo with thousands of incendiary bombs, which killed 100,000 civilians and destroyed 16 square miles (41 km2) within a few hours. Over the next five months, the USAAF firebombed a total of 67 Japanese cities, killing 393,000 civilians and destroying 65% of built-up areas.[1]"
This text provides too many details. We do not tell how many civilians were killed in Hamburg, Warsaw, London, Hiroshima. I don't understand why Tokyo should be an exception. We do not tell what part of German or Soviet urban areas was destroyed, and I don't understand why should we tell about Japan. I propose this version:
"Meanwhile, the United States Army Air Forces launched a massibe firebombing campaign of strategic cities in Japan in an effort to destroy Japanese war industry and civilian morale. A devastating bombing raid of 9–10 March destroyed a significant part of Japanese capital and killed large number of civilians. In total, the campaign lead to destruction of more than a half of urban areas.[2]
The March 10 raid on Tokyo was the single most deadly air raid of World War II (including the atomic bombings), making it probably one of the highest casualty events in history. The air campaign against Japan was massive in scale, and one of the main campaigns of the Pacific War, so I'm not sure what the case is to reduce the coverage of it. I'd suggest rewording the para to:
Nick, there were several most deadly WWII events (a single most deadly battle, single most deadly siege etc.). My question is what makes 1945 Japan so special that we are providing numbers for Japanese losses only? If we decide to provide numbers, we should do that in the whole article. We must be consistent. --Paul Siebert (talk) 13:32, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
We'd need to slightly improve the wording here for precision because Enola Gay's final death toll at Hiroshima is 135,000. [10] So Tokyo is the single most deadly conventional bombing raid of the war, and if the sources have it we can specify whether the 100,000 deaths were immediate or eventual. But what's the rationale for cherry-picking a conventional bombing raid while omitting e.g. the up to ~300,000 civilians and POWs murdered in the six-week Rape of Nanjing or the 641,803 famine deaths during the siege of Leningrad? -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:35, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
Exactly. However, what is the reason for providing figures for civilian victims and ignore military? In general, I think if we start showing figures for some events, the article will gradually convert into a statistical handbook, because it is not possible to propose a satisfactory threshold for figures inclusion.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:19, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
I don't think the BBC People's war is a reliable source - it's certainly not a high quality one (the people who wrote the narrative sections appear to be obscure historical consultants). Multiple RS state that Tokyo was the single most deadly air raid of the war. That said, I take the point about the desirability of avoiding figures for individual battles. How about:
Nick, more German civilians were killed in Allied bombing raids than the Japanese. Don't we have to mention them? However, if we provide number of the Axis civilians, why do we ignore the Allied civilians? If we show the figures of civilians killed, why do we ignore KIA? That is a Pandora's box. Actually, we have a special section, "Casualties and war crimes", and all this information should go there: the most lethal bombing raid, the most lethal siege, the most deadly battle, etc. The only thing that can be left in this section is:
"Meanwhile, the United States Army Air Forces launched a massibe firebombing campaign of strategic cities in Japan in an effort to destroy Japanese war industry and civilian morale. A devastating bombing raid of 9–10 March was the deadliest conventional bombing raid in the history. Over the next five months, all major Japanese cities were severely damaged and large number of civilians were killed."
I agree that the BBC source is a tad WP:PRIMARY and it's merely an indication of what's out there. A more WP:SECONDARY source here says the upper range of estimated Hiroshima deaths is even higher than that: "Perhaps the most frequently published figure in the United States suggests "from 70,000 to 140,000" died at Hiroshima" and from many Japanese sources including later death from nuclear fallout, the figure is "200,000".[11] If we're keeping this Japan par by cutting the numbers, then due to our responsibility for WP:NPOV we ought to ensure we include here that most WWII civilians killed of any single ethnicity were murdered by the Japanese (i.e. the Chinese), according to most sources (note some sources say murders of Soviets by Germans are higher than Chinese by Japanese, if one includes all Soviet ethnicities; though afaia it's Soviet military deaths and Chinese civilian deaths that tend to be the highest, in the majority view of sources). Notions of victimhood and revenge are controversial and we ought to eschew that debate:[12] Balance of perspective here will be a force for article stability. -Chumchum7 (talk) 05:43, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
"The air campaign against Japan was massive in scale," - hardly, the largest raid ever against Japan consisted of around 300 B-29's. The RAF OTOH was regularly sending out twice this number of Lancasters and Halfaxes against Germany, and carried out raids of over 1,000 bombers on a number of occasions. Total bomb tonnage dropped on Japan 1941-45 was around 300,000 US tons, whereas the RAF dropped around 900,000 long tons on Germany. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.172.235 (talk) 10:17, 21 November 2018 (UTC)
Multiple reliable sources describe the air campaign against Japan as being massive in scale or similar. As described in the Air raids on Japan article, many raids involved more than 500 of the huge B-29s and they routinely destroyed entire cities. By the end of the war, the Twentieth Air Force could dispatch more than 800 aircraft at once. Nick-D (talk) 10:24, 21 November 2018 (UTC)
As far as I know, there is no consensus about that in scholarly community. Literally speaking, if two states are allies, it implies that some alliance has been signed between them. "Wartime allies" is even more strict: it implies that these states signed a military alliance, and they were acting accordingly. In connection to that, I still cannot understand what document signed by Nazi Germany and the USSR stipulated any joint military activity. The closets candidate was the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, but it was de facto a neutrality pact, and the only activity that could be considered a joint activity was invasion of Poland. However, Entente did not consider Soviet Union as a wartime ally of Nazi Germany in 1939, and no war was declared on it by Britain or France. The Winter war was not a result of a wartime alliance with Nazi Germany, because the latter were not at war with Finland, and it even provided some moral support to it. Occupation of Bessarabia was not a result of a wartime alliance either, because Romania was not an enemy of Britain or France. By the way, the annexation of Bessarabia in 1918 was not recognised by the USSR (and by the USA too, by the way), so this Soviet action stays apart from other expansionist steps made by Stalin.
With regard to the occupation of the Baltic states, this step was considered as hostile by Nazi Germany, and it triggered a decision to start Barbarossa planning. In summary, the words "former wartime ally" should not be used in this case, because this idea is not universally accepted.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:16, 26 November 2018 (UTC)
What does "ally" mean. 1) We can ask the dictionary. Webster Unabridged: ALLY = a sovereign or state united, banded, or associated with another in a common cause or by treaty or league *the duke and his allies* *an eastern empire with strong western allies* This seems to fit USSR-Germany. 2) the 1939 pact had a major military dimension--it contained a secret protocol to arrange a new partition of Poland between Germany and the USSR. That took place as each invaded Poland from opposite directions a couple weeks apart. 3) look at some recent titles: The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941 by Roger Moorhouse - 2014 https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0465054927 4) The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitlerhttps://books.google.com/books?id=OupmAAAAMAAJ by Geoffrey Roberts 1989. 5) Timothy D. Snyder a leading specialist (at Yale) often uses the term: "In fact, the war began with the German-Soviet alliance that destroyed Poland" Bloodlands (2012) at https://books.google.com/books?id=maEfAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA410Rjensen (talk) 21:35, 26 November 2018 (UTC)
Re 1. Which "common cause" are we talking about in a context of MRP? Starting from late 1939, there were no common cause, and contradictions were growing. With regard to September-October 1939, see Roberts's opinion below. Instead of asking a dictionary (which leaves too much freedom of manoeuvre), let's ask Britannica. It says:
"Alliance, in international relations, a formal agreement between two or more states for mutual support in case of war."
In connection to that, I am wondering which formal agreement existed between the USSR and Nazi Germany that stipulated a mutual support in case of war?
Re 2. A good answer to that question is provided by Roberts (the author you refer to). In his article [13], he addresses this very question, and his conclusion is:
"This is not the generally accepted view of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which posits that on 23 August 1939 there was a definite agreement to partition Poland between Germany and the USSR and to allow Soviet subjugation of the Baltic states. The evidence for this view is quite simply that this is what subsequently happened. However, that fact is no proof of any prior commitment. The evidence, at least on the Soviet side, is that there was no such plan, agreement or definite intention. In signing the pact with Nazi Germany Stalin finally abandoned the policy of collective security and opted for safeguarding Soviet interests via neutrality and independent manoeuvring. Beyond that the new foreign policy embodied in the pact remained fluid. A strategy of territorial expansion into Eastern Europe was only one of the possibilities present at the moment of the signing of the pact; and whether or not it should be the chosen course of action would depend on the circumstances. After all, on 23 August 1939 nothing was certain. Would Hitler really attack Poland? Would the Poles fight back and how successful would they be? What would Britain and France do? What were the chances of another 'Munich'? What would be the consequences of any forward Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe? Until these and many other quandaries were resolved there could be no question of any precipitate action. In the meantime Soviet foreign strategy was kept in a state of abeyance. Only an analysis along these lines can explain the surprising ambiguity, hesitancy and uncertainty that characterised Soviet foreign policy in the days and weeks immediately following the conclusion of the pact with Nazi Germany."
Re 3-5. I prefer not to limit myself with reading titles. The example of Roberts clearly demonstrates all flaws of this approach. Yes, Roberts authored a book where he summarised his previous research of that period of Soviet history. This book was intended for a general reader, and it needed some captivating title. "The Unholy Alliance" is a just paraphrase of "The Holy Alliance", and this title definitely catches reader's attention. However, what Roberts writes in his book is more close to what he wrote in his earlier articles.
Roberts clearly sees the pact as a non-aggression treaty, and it contrasts it with a full scale military alliance that Soviet Union, Britain and France planned to sign, but never signed.
Snyder writes very vividly, but he is frequently inaccurate in usage of some terms (I found many reviews of his book, where he is being severely criticised, I am going to add them into the article about Bloodlands when time allows). In addition, the military history of 1939-41 is not a focus of his study, he seems to be an expert in somewhat different field. He just picked the term "alliance" because it is used very frequently by journalists who write about the Nazi-Soviet pact, but it is more journalism than a strict definition.
By writing "war time ally", we mislead a reader, who may conclude there were some formal treaty that stipulated some mutual support in a war against some common enemy. However, as Roberts demonstrated, even partition of Poland was not stipulated by the pact or its secret protocol, and later actions of Soviet leadership clearly demonstrated that they did not consider this pact as some agreement about any joint actions. Interestingly, it was Nazi propaganda who was trying to present the MRP as an alliance, so by presenting the USSR as Geramny's ally we actually reproduce what Nazi propaganda says.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:55, 26 November 2018 (UTC)
1) On misreading Roberts: he states he is talking about "at the moment of the signing of the pact" --he is discussing the ambiguous period in late August. he is NOT talking about the 2 year friendship. Germany and USSR were allies after Sept 1 when real wars were going on--USSR provided major help in that war--no soldiers but it provided the oil and food that ruined the British blockade of Germany, it cooperated in invading Poland & destroying Polish forces--and it ordered Communist parties to oppose the British/French war efforts. 2) Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy stresses that Hitler wanted "alliances" -- Tooze repeats the term pp 292, 319-- and says USSR in 1939 was his "preferred alliance partner" (p 320) 3) formal written agreements are NOT needed between allies--there was no formal UK-France alliance and all RS call them allies. Rjensen (talk) 05:45, 27 November 2018 (UTC)
1. No. He discusses the behavior of Soviet leadership in September too: thus, read the discussion of Ribbentrop's telegrams. He says clearly about the Soviet policy "in the days and weeks immediately following the conclusion of the pact with Nazi Germany", i.e. the very period that marked the greatest degree of cooperation between the two powers. With regard to alleged "the 2 year friendship", Germany provided no support for the USSR in Winter war, and even provided a moral support to Finland. Annexation of the Baltic states in mid 1940 was seen as a hostile act by Germans, and their general staff started planning invasion of the USSR. November negotiations shattered the last hope for an alliance, and relationship stated to deteriorate further. By the way, if November negotiations were about an alliance with Germany, can't it serve as an indirect proof that there were no alliance before that? "...it provided the oil and food..." - in the same way the US provided oil and aviation fuel for Japan in 1937-40. Does it make the US Japan's ally in her war with China?
2. Yes, Hitler (actually, Ribbentrop, who was a Russophil) wanted an alliance with the USSR, and German propaganda tried to present MRP as an alliance. However, there was a big difference between what Ribbentrop wanted to achieve and what happened in reality. In addition, you use the sources that use the word "alliance" in passing, but ignore the sources that perform a deep analysis of this issue. In addition, you totally ignore an obvious fact that the word "alliance" has different meanings in English, and it is unclear whether the authors you cite use this word as a colloquial "alliance", or they speak about a "war time military alliance". The above example of Roberts is a clear demonstration of your mistake: this author uses the word "alliance" in a title of his book, but he demonstrates, in the book, that the USSR was not a German ally. It is clear, that the phrase "a wartime ally" implies that the USSR signed a military alliance with Germany, which means you are supposed to provide the sources that (i) clearly describe the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as a military alliance, (ii) debunk the sources that say the opposite.
3. Maybe (although that contradicts to what Britannica says). However, Britain and France at least declared a war on the same state (Germany). We cannot say the same about the USSR. By the way, by September 1, it was in de facto war state with future German ally, Japan.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:24, 27 November 2018 (UTC)
the assumption all along is that alliance requires a signed alliance. ("USSR signed a military alliance with Germany"). wrong. Britain and France did NOT have a signed alliance (1939-40) and US did not have a signed alliance with UK or USSR or China. (UK and USSR did have a signed alliance.) In summary "Ally" is used by the RS when there is no signed alliance. Rjensen (talk) 20:37, 27 November 2018 (UTC)
That is an interesting question. Britain and France were the allies in WWI, and I am don't know when and how their allied relationships were terminated in the interwar period. Can you point at any fact that can mark a termination of their allied relationships? In any event, since Britain and France were the allies in WWI, and there were no indication that their allied relationships were terminated, it would be correct to see them as allies, and their actions demonstrated they were the allies: they almost simultaneously declared a war on Germany, they together planned military actions against the USSR in 1939 (By the way, they planned a military intervention against the USSR not because they believed it was a German ally, but because they planned to defend Finland, which was not their ally, and not a German enemy). Britain and France were the allies in the WWI, they were the two victorious powers, they maintained collaboration after the WWI, they played a leading role in the League of Nations, they coordinated their activity in all main international events (including the Munich agreement, planned alliance with the USSR, etc). Can you tell me on what country did the USSR and Germany declared a war (together)? Can you give me an example of joint military planning of a serious military campaign by the USSR and Nazi Germany? I am pretty sure these examples are not existing. In contrast, the relationships between the USSR and Nazi Germany were extremely hostile starting from 1933. Nazi Germany initiated signing of the Anti-Comimtern pact (which was openly anti-Soviet), Nazi Germany and Soviet Union waged a proxy war in Spain, Soviet Union took enormous efforts to create anti-German collective security system ("Litvinov's line"), there was a serious military incident between the Soviet Union and one anti-Comintern pact signatory, Japan (which formally ended only in mid September 1939). All of that demonstrates a very hostile relationships between the USSR and Nazi Germany, and we need to see a really strong evidence of allied relationships (not just a non-aggression treaty, even taking into account its secret protocol) between Nazi and the Soviets to call them "wartime allies".
That the US had no treaty with China or Britain is correct. However, nobody says the US were an ally in 1940: the US were neutral until the very end of 1941. Later, the US signed the Declaration by United Nations, which was a formal alliance against the Axis.
Saying that the United States had no treaties with China or Britain is incorrect. At the time the United States had several standing treaties with both countries. Mediatech492 (talk) 05:49, 28 November 2018 (UTC)
Triple Entente is considered as a treaty that made Britain and France allies. In addition, these two states were acting as very close allies both during the WWI and interwar period. There were no urgent need in formalizing their relationships in a form of an additional treaty. Their role in the League of Nations, joint military planning, their guaranties to Poland, joint military actions in 1939-40 - all of that speaks for itself. When two countries are in de facto allied relationships for several decades (including co-belligenence in a world war), signing a special treaty may be redundant: what is the need in this formality if there is a full understanding between these two countries, and it is obvious for both parties that mutual support is vital for their survival? Nothing of that existed between the USSR and Nazi Germany: they were deeply hostile states before August 1939, and we need a serious proof to speak seriously that previous hostile relationships changed to an alliance. This proof could be either a formal and full scale military treaty (of the same type as the triple Anglo-Franko-Soviet alliance these states were trying to sign in 1939) or a joint declaration of war on the same enemy.
Regarding t he US, you are speaking about 1941, when the US-Japan relationships started to deteriorate rapidly, which finally had lead to Pearl Harbor. I am talking about the earlier period, because many key SSJW events happened earlier, and American oil was vital for that.
If you disagree with these arguments and want to continue this discussion, maybe it would be good to follow Icewhiz's advice and continue on the MilHistory page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:31, 28 November 2018 (UTC)
As there is no proposal to change the text of this article (which provides quite a good short summary of the Nazi-Soviet agreement), there's no need to discuss the matter here. Nick-D (talk) 10:26, 28 November 2018 (UTC)
If you want to discuss the general question (e.g. how we treat these across several different WWII articles in a "blurb" (non-extended) fashion in our own voice) - then Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history is probably the best forum (with a notice here on the discussion there - as some of the domain experts watch this page and not that). Icewhiz (talk) 11:32, 28 November 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 30 November 2018
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Meanwhile, the United States Army Air Forces launched a massibe firebombing campaign of strategic cities in Japan in an effort to destroy Japanese war industry and civilian morale.
That's two ways of writing the same date. If your other contributions are any guide you have better uses for your time. Britmax (talk) 16:19, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
I am a little concerned you're new to the topic because you're using websites over academic publications by known authors. Give other editors time to review all the number changes you think need to change ....see what historians have to say.--Moxy (talk) 22:23, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
I would recommend Jack90s15 to do one thing first: go to WP:RSN and ask people about the sources he is using for death toll figures. That is a usual way to resolve the situation when there is a disagreement about some sources. If the consensus will be "Yes, these sources are very good and reliable", Jack90s15 can use that as an argument in the discussion, and the changes he proposes may have more chances to be accepted by others.
In any event, asking a question on the RSN and other noticeboards is a good exercise, and if Jack90s15 is a newcomer, and he going to edit Wikipedia in future, it would be useful for him to master this important skill.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:11, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
P.S. Usage of colons to format your posts properly is a good skill too. That makes a talk page discussion you are involved in more readable, by doing that, you show respect to others, and they are more likely to respond more positively to your arguments.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:11, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
P.P.S. I think, despite the fact Jack90s15 believes he is acting in a good faith, this his edit may be seen differently by others. I don't think it is an effective way to edit this article. Jack90s15, this article is very popular, many people are reading it every day, and if some impprtant figures are permanently changing here, that may discredit Wikipedia in eyes of a reader. Let's discuss these figures first on the talk page, and if other people will agree with you, you can implement these changes. Meanwhile, it would be better if you self-reverted. --Paul Siebert (talk) 23:32, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
Thank you Paul you know I'm trying to do good that's why my two sources are from the national World War II Museum and the Holocaust Museum. In Washington DC and New Orleans and top historian have contributed to both museums. so you know that they're accurate the sources. I am Requesting to be Allowed to make the changes for the soul reason it will help improve Wikipedia credibility because for the World War II casualties page has 70 million to 85 for the death toll that is why I put over 70 million .and for the Holocaust page you have 17 million victims overall.Jack90s15 (talk) 00:13, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
And those two numbers are backed by the United States Holocaust museum in Washington DC
when you add all the deaths it over 70 million so it does match the numbers that are uses in scholarly and match the numbers that part of the World War II casualties page and the 17 million number is in line with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum number and the wiki page one Jack90s15 (talk) 00:13, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
I am Requesting to be Allowed to make the changes for the soul reason it will help improve Wikipedia credibility
my two sources are from the national World War II Museum and the Holocaust Museum. In Washington DC and New Orleans and top historian have contributed to both museums. so you know that they're accurate the sources. I am Requesting to be Allowed to make the changes for the soul reason it will help improve Wikipedia credibility because for the World War II casualties page has 70 million to 85 for the death toll that is why I put over 70 million .and for the Holocaust page you have 17 million victims overall.Jack90s15 (talk) 00:16, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
And those two numbers are backed by the United States Holocaust museum in Washington DC
And the national World War II museum Jack90s15 (talk) 00:13, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
when you add all the deaths it over 70 million so it does match the numbers that are uses in scholarly and match the numbers that part of the World War II casualties page and the 17 million number is in line with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum number and the wiki page Jack90s15 (talk) 00:16, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
Jack90s15: Where we have different sources that disagree on totals, we include the different sources, and state the range of the totals they reach. We do not deem one source conclusive and remove the rest. Also, when other editors dispute your changes, you need to discuss here, as you have above, and then allow time for people to notice the discussion and comment. Laszlo Panaflex (talk) 00:28, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
Read the tips in the welcome template on your talk page, they may help you. Very few people have a sole reason for doing anything, by the way. Britmax (talk) 00:34, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
I am doing this to improve Wikipedia credibility the 70 Million is part of the range Total on the ww2 casualties wiki page so it right to say over 70 Million died it is backed by the the national World War II Museum and the Holocaust Museum In Washington DC does not use 11 Million they use 17 Million Jack90s15 (talk) 00:41, 5 December 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 16 December 2018
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Allied leaders (priority position chronologically)
As about the priority position of the Allied leaders in the mainbox, I believe that the name of Winston Churchill must be the first name of the Allied leaders. I propose that, beacause the United Kingdom was the first country declared the war on Germany (not by a beetween two countries difference, but by an allied anti-Axis view), but also because Churchill worked hard about the establishment of the Alliance[1].
There were several long discussions on that subject, and arguments were proposed in favor of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. Your argument is purely formal, and, following your logic, Kaishek should be first, and Stalin - second.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:09, 24 October 2018 (UTC)
I respect your opinion. But, Kaishek's and Stalin's wars with Japan during 30's, were in the place of between their countries differences. Were their wars on those years looked by an Allied anti-Axis view? Also, UK's declaration of war on Germany, whic also was the first allied-viewed declaration of war was chronologically a prior. Inspirduser (talk) 11:24, 25 October 2018 (UTC)
Point of formality. In Chinese nomenclature the family name is given first, followed by the personal name. Therefore when speaking formally, Chiang Kai-shek should be referred to as "Chiang", not "Kaishek". Mediatech492 (talk) 15:38, 25 October 2018 (UTC)
I just wanted to say that, taking into account that the current order is a result of long discussions where various arguments had been presented, the first thing to do would be to analyse those arguments and to make sure your rationale outweighs all previous arguments.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:59, 25 October 2018 (UTC)
Oppose The chronology of Allied leaders and which nations leaders to be included has been discussed ad nauseum since 2011. I was one of the original participants, there is no need to resurrect this discussion once again.Phead128 (talk) 20:50, 20 December 2018 (UTC)
The article seemed to short in its narrative:
Thought I would add to it, without to much verbage and maintaing its conciseness:
1. After " In October Italy attacked Greece, but the attack was repulsed with heavy Italian casualties; the campaign ended within days with minor territorial changes.[113]"
ADD:
Mussolini reasoned that Greece was defenseless but, “to his chagrin and humiliation — was easily brushed aside by Greek resistance, shored up by five Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. Worse for Mussolini, on Nov 14, the Greeks mounted a counteroffensive that pushed the Italians out of Greece and deep into Albania. On March 9, 1941, Mussolini decided to redeem Italian honor by launching a new invasion into Greece, this time using twenty-eight divisions (known as the Italian Spring Offensive). Despite the greatly enlarged force, the Italians were again pushed out of Greece. Hitler watched Mussolini falter, yet had no great desire to bail out his Italian ally ... but he desperately wanted to secure the Romanian oil fields and to provide protection for the southern flank of the Soviet invasion he was planning.”
[1]
2. Then, after "Germany started preparation for an invasion of the Balkans to assist Italy, to prevent the British from gaining a foothold there, which would be a potential threat for Romanian oil fields, and to strike against the British dominance of the Mediterranean.[114] Germany responded with simultaneous invasions of both Yugoslavia and Greece commencing on 6 April 1941; both nations were forced to surrender within the month.[119]"
ADD:
The rapid collapse of Yugoslavia the Germans to send the bulk of their 12th Army directly into Greece, circumventing Greece's defensive Metaxas Line at the Greco-Bulgarian border and a diversionary force to attack the Metaxas Line instead. Similar to France’s Maginot Line, these string of defensive forts, eponymously named for their prime minister, fell after three days. The Germans entered Salonica on April 9. The blitzkrieg outflanked and divided the Greek forces in the west and British forces in the east, inevitably leading to the retreat of the British to the historical pass at Thermopylae. The Greeks hastened German strategy by maintaining their army in Epirus, refusing to leave ground won from the Italians in the Greco-Italian campaign.[2] Without hope, Wilson ordered the evacuation of Allied forces; most left mainland Greece by April 30 for Crete or Egypt.Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).
3. After "Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war.[121]"
Then:
In Greece, the flight of King George II and the placement of a far-right puppet government in Athens led to a power vacuum and the emergence of ELAS, a large left-wing guerrilla movement, while the nationalist forces did likewise, forming EDES. Germany’s shrewd tactics relied on enabling Greek-fascist Security Battalions to keep the communists at bay, both America’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Great Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) armed and supplied ELAS and EDES with hopes of quelling their bitter rivalries.[3]
Greek partisans continuously engaged Axis troops up until their final departure from Greece in 1944.[4][5]
Far-right puppet government=Hellenic State (1941–1944)
Greek People's Liberation Army=ELAS
National Republican Greek League=EDES
The problem is that the Mediterranean theatre was not the most important theatre of war. If we implement your changes, the volume of this section will become greater than, for example the Axis attack of the USSR section, which visually shifts a balance from key theatres to lower importance theatres. In this article, only the most important events are mentioned: thus, the list of events that were left beyond the scope in the Axis attack of the USSR section include, for example, the greatest tank battle in history (Battle of Brody (1941), more than 4000 of tanks from both sides), the Battle of Białystok–Minsk (1.5 million troops from both sides, about 0.5 million losses), and so on. If we include in this section even every battle that involved more than 100,000 troops, the section will be huge.
My point is that the relative size of each section should be roughly proportional to the relative scale and strategic implications of the events described in it. In connection to that, we need to think about removal of text, not about its expansion.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:06, 25 December 2018 (UTC)
I agree that the extend of the proposed text here is greatly excessive. Historians tend to regard the 1940-41 Yugolsav and Greek campaigns as side shows. The tone of the text is also quite different to that of the article. Nick-D (talk) 23:24, 25 December 2018 (UTC)
Hi all,
Excellent points by all, and thank you for responding on this chilly Christmas Day.
It's that the article seems to go nowhere for the first point. At the end of the sentence,"the campaign ended within days with minor territorial changes.[113]" would be the perfect continuum for the "Allies first victory against the Axis," in light of Churchill's quote on "heroes fight like Greeks," etc. Instead of my long phrase, it could simply be, "As Hitler watched his ally falter, and with the necessity of securing his southern flank for the upcoming Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece was inevitable," or something along that line. It's presently so nebulous, the average first-time reader's impression is that the Balkans were a shoo-in.
For my second point, yes, I would agree, no need to be so long, but the reader has again, no clue about the invasion of Greece This was an invasion with more than 100,000 troops. At least tell the reader that:
"The rapid collapse of Yugoslavia allowed the Germans to send the bulk of their army directly into Greece, dividing the Greeks and British in half. Greece was forced to surrender within the month.[119]"
Lastly, the article addresses Yugoslav rebellion from within, but does not mention Greek rebellion. Sufficient to say after, a short version would be nicely encapsulated and understood by readers:
"Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war.[121 In Greece, a similar large-scale left-wing guerrilla movement gripped the country with logistic sustainment from America’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Great Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE)."
Bigeez, I don't see why we cannot try to do that. Indeed, Greek resistance was an important factor, and it caused serious tensions between Stalin and Churchill. Of course, too much attention to that would be too Anglocentric view, but saying a little bit more than the article says currently (it says nothing, actually :)) would be fine.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:39, 26 December 2018 (UTC)
Hello Mr. Siebert,
Thank you for your quick response.
Next, how would I do this in light of the existence of the list of confirmed editors to this article? I guess any confirmed editor can to add this small bit of info, albeit crucial. I recommend, after the present sentence:
"Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war.[121]"
Greek resistance continuously engaged Axis troops up until their final departure from Greece in 1944.[7][8]
Nevertheless, I believe either or both statements would do justice to both FDR's and Churchill's policies in crippling Axis control of Greece, without adding too much and detracting from the article's objective.
Cheers,
Bigeez (talk) 13:43, 26 December 2018 (UTC)
Hello again Mr. Seibert,
Shall I go ahead and add these two sentences with the references as displayed above? I will await your approval.
Cheers,
Bigeez (talk) 00:18, 29 December 2018 (UTC)
I have a different edition of the book used as a reference, but nothing in the broad page range supports the proposed text. Given that there were resistance movements in literally every occupied country, this seems excessive detail. We should be looking for ways to be more concise, and not bolt on extra details to the already over-sized and at times not particularly well balanced article. Nick-D (talk) 00:47, 29 December 2018 (UTC)
Good afternoon Nick,
Point well taken. Nonetheless, if I may, the existing sentence for the suggested edit is beneath "Mediterranean (1940–41)." The existing sentence is:
Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war.[122]"
Therefore, the point was simply to allow our readers to follow on the same thought, stating Greek resistance along with the Yugoslav resistance. As an editor with past experience, the novice — a newby WW II reader — gathers from the article that Greek resistance did not occur. Mr. Seibert agreed that Greek resistance wasn't mentioned at all as well. Since it was crucial, if not moreso – in light of Curchill's sphere of influence split over Yugoslavia/Greece – why not include it?" Otherwise, if the goal is to reduce the article size, probably better to delete the sentence referring to Yugoslav Resistance altogether and be done with it, and place a blanket statement in the article's inception, that partisan resistance spread across Europe and Asia after the Axis powers took control. Or better, perhaps, add a subheading for resistance?
Rather, I believe Mr. Seibert's affirmation that it "would be fine" to add the two sentences. Plus, it is more educating to the reader.
It makes no difference who adds it: the editors, or I can, surely. I was awaiting Mr. Seibert's direction and from the editorial board.
HI PAUL AND NICK D
After further refining with working references, hopefully this is would be pleasing to the editorial staff. The references are spot-on as well. One, is first-hand fact (Patrick Leigh Fermor); the other, Susan Hueck is the go-to on OSS/SOE Greece, having combed through the National Archives with her archaeologist's shovel. It can follow immediately after the existing sentence Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war.[122]":
As I already said, I think Greek partisan movement deserves mention not because of its scale, but because of its political significance: it was one out of thee major partisan movements with a strong leftist component (other two were in Yugoslava and Italy). I think it would be good if all three were adequately described (and connected to the post-war events). Can you think about that?
Hi Paul,
Thanks much. Points well taken. Will ponder a couple of sentences in regards to all three; the Balkans and Italy. I’ll endeavor to keep it curt: I thank you and Nick D for your guidance, touch (ever so briefly) on Crete. After all, that great travel writer lived with the folk, for heavens sakes.
Cheers
Bigeez (talk) 18:10, 5 January 2019 (UTC)
I still don't think we need this - it's just bolting more and more details on. There were small scale but active guerrilla wars across much of South-East Asia (for instance, in New Britain, Borneo and Malaya), a large-scale guerrilla war in the Philippines and the failure of the Allies to incite one in the Netherlands East Indies was significant given that this foreshadowed that the Dutch attempt to re-conquer the region was doomed. I don't think that the article should specifically cover these wars at all, but we would benefit from consolidating material into a small section somewhere. Nick-D (talk) 21:55, 5 January 2019 (UTC)
Thank you for reminding about South-East Asia. It definitely deserves mention, at least because anti-Japanese resistance in Vietnam lead to formation of the movement that later ruled in North Vietnam and formed a core of Vietcong (which was a key factor in a start of Vietnam War). Furthermore, modern North Korea regime has roots, at least, partially, in anti-Japanese resistance, the same can be said about China. In connection to that, I think we should think about the Collaboration and Resistance section. I think it would be more correct to separate it from the Course of the War section, because it would not be easy to connect it to the events in some specific theatre of war at specific moment. Nevertheless, both collaboration and resistance were massive, they had serious strategic implications and long lasting post-war effect (recent events in Eastern Europe demonstrate it perfectly). Unfortunately, I am not ready to write it right now, maybe Bigeez can try to propose some draft on the talk page?--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:21, 6 January 2019 (UTC)
Thank you, gentlemen, for these wonderful comments and topics to consider. I’m in agreement with you both. Personally, the article is beautifully written considering it’s topic size. Everything else out there is 4-500 pages, or more. Let’s not forget, I will wager that most readers are middleschhoolers grasping for any knowledge about their grandparents; or school projects, or those riding the bus or tube. By the time they get to where they’re going, anyone can be educated on WW II.
I know many who have read it, and used it for a reference. Does it need an overhaul with a cudgel? Certainly not. It might be heavy on strategy and light on resistance, but nevertheless, it’s well-written and obviously has been refined many times.
Here and there, perhaps, the reader might question a thing or two. For example, resistance is brought up under Poland and Yugoslavia. Yet, really nowhere else. That’s how this all started on my part.
For that reason, the article would certainly benefit from a Collaboration/Resistance subheading. Otherwise the middle schooler or regular bloke doesn’t have a clue. On that same line of thinking, another subheading on SIS and SOE, along with the Yanks’ OSS, wouldn’t go afoul either. Both would be smaller in size than what you might think.
Off the top of my head, I remember reading, at least twice, the massacre at Nanking, and Polish resistance. Granted, it does flow nicely. However, if the object is to reduce article size, why be repetitive?
There’s more. Such as usages of words that could be cutout. For example, in the beginning of the article, when Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, no need to say the colonies in the “Pacific Ocean,” but simply, “the Pacific.” We all get it.
Sorry for overextending my stay.
Thank you for that bit of confidence. I will write up something in the Talk” page regarding Collaboration and resistance.
Cheers,
Eli
Bigeez (talk) 07:12, 6 January 2019 (UTC)
Eli, I agree that we need to avoid repetitions, so if the Collaboration/Resistance section will be created, all content related to that subject should be moved there. With regard to "Pacific Ocean" etc., that is a standard and permanent problem: each article (and this article in particular) has a tendency to inflate, so it is highly desirable to revise it from time to time. I would be grateful if you looked through the article and cleaned it ("Pacific Ocean" -> "Pacific" is a good catch).--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:57, 6 January 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul,
Thank you for the vote of confidence and that my comments haven't been passed over from the hordes you must receive; which in itself must be daunting. Be that as it may, I hope to accomplish a proper going over, but not without receiving guidance and final nod from the editorial board. I can assure you that I will prove equal to the task.
Oh well, no rest for the wicked … .
Eli
Bigeez (talk) 04:55, 8 January 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul and Nick D,
"Into the breech" I leapt.
Upon re-reflection, perhaps the issue of Collaboration/Resistance and SOE/OSS might be best addressed under "Impact?"
In this way, it will keep it shorter. There is no need in rewriting a beautifully-scripted article by introducing new subtopics at this point. By stating under, Impact," ... we don't need to add more verbiage. In this regard, we can eliminate the Soviets' NKVD, begun before the war even started, blah-blah. Overall, it will achieve the objective: keeping it shorter, simply stating the facts, and employing Wiki links for the reader to be enriched. Am I too anglophilic? Comments?
Cheers,
Eli
Bigeez (talk) 00:03, 11 January 2019 (UTC)
Eli, I am not sure "Impact" is an appropriate place, because the section is supposed to describe primarily 1939-45 events. Yes, those events had (and continue to have) very strong impact on modern events, but that is not the reason for discussing them in the context of impact only. I think we definitely need this section as a separate section, and I cannot understand why it has not been created yet. This section should describe partisan warfare, resistance in Europe, China and Indochina, pro-Axis nationalist movements, waffen-SS, participation of non-German pareamilitary in the Holocaust (which was massive), and other things that were really important part of WWII events.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:12, 15 January 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul,
You ought perhaps to know that I‘ve always feared that the article was short of these topics, and yet, I didn’t want to press the issue too much. I’ve got sharp eyes for anything out of order, but I didn’t want to ruin a beautifully-scripted article and hollow out its conciseness, for the sake of resistance/collaboration/SOE/OSS and these other equally-important topics you mentioned. In fact, I am more and more beginning to see Nick D’s point about it all ... keeping it shorter ... and by suggesting more text, I feared I would be a disappointment. Perhaps, it is why I stressed placing resistance/collaboration in the “Impact” part, so as not to appear at lengthening the article and confirm his expectations. I do agree that these topics are crucial to the article, and will strive to incorporate them ... and ... keep it short. I haven’t given up the fight, not by a long chalk. Thank you both for your encouragement.
Cheers,
Eli
Bigeez (talk) 05:15, 19 January 2019 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 4 February 2019
This edit request to World War II has been answered. Set the |answered= or |ans= parameter to no to reactivate your request.
I would like to change the combatants listed. "Allies" will be changed to a list of the allied powers in ww2, and "Axis" will be changed to a list of the Axis powers in ww2.
For the Aliies, Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, Norway, Australia, India, South Africa, France, Poland, China, New Zealand, Ethiopia, Brazil, Philippines, Mongolia, Mexico, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, and Luxembourg. The Axis Powers will be, Nazi Germany, Empire of Japan, Italy, Kingdom of Romania, Kingdom of Hungary, Slovak Republic, Kingdom of Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Vichy France, Soviet Union(Invasion of Poland). Also the States under axis control will be listed under allies. Such as, France, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Luxembourg. Ian22schaefer (talk) 04:21, 4 February 2019 (UTC)
The current concise infobox reflects the results of a very lengthy discussion a few years ago. Including lots of countries resulted in a overly complex infobox. Your suggestion that the countries Germany invaded and brutally occupied be presented as allies of Germany is not well thought through. Nick-D (talk) 07:53, 4 February 2019 (UTC)
Listing Poland, Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia (countries without even a puppet regime) as German allies would be a travesty. Icewhiz (talk) 08:05, 4 February 2019 (UTC)
Leader death icons
I'm relatively new, so I'm not totally sure what to call these, but should we add little icons for the deaths of the leaders next to their names in the infobox? That is, FDR died of natural causes, Hitler committed suicide and Mussolini was executed, all within the span of the war; it might be valuable to include this under the "Commanders and Leaders" header.
JeanLackE (talk) 18:05, 27 January 2019 (UTC)
This has been discussed previously, with the consensus being to not do this on the grounds that it's confusing for readers (especially as these three leaders all died in the final stage of the war, when the outcome of the conflict was decided). Nick-D (talk) 05:11, 2 February 2019 (UTC)
Good deal. Should we leave this section for posterity (I couldn't find an answer to that question when I looked through the contributions history to the talk page), or ought I delete it? JeanLackE (talk) 15:45, 6 February 2019 (UTC)
Hi Paul Siebert and Nick-D,
You have my nod on that. It is, to say the least, unnecessary. I am currently working on the recommendations that Paul mentioned. Nick, I thought, perhaps, if you might have any others that are cogent ... (see right above, my note to Paul) it would be helpful. Cheers
Eli
Bigeez (talk) 03:19, 3 February 2019 (UTC)
I noticed the numbers of killed civilians started to re-appear in the Casualties section. Now the article provides the figures for 22,000 Polish officers killed during the Katyn massacre, 100,000 Polish civilians and 30,000 Ukrainians (this war of figures, I suppose seems like a resurrection of the old dispute between nationalistic groups of editors), etc. I am still wondering if we really need to present all these figures, and if yes, why don't we present the number of civilians killed by, for example Arajs Kommando (about 26,000 Jews), by Dresden bombing, or those who were starved to death during the Leningrad blockade?
I still believe we have to purge this section from all figures except the most important categories (Axis, Allied, most persecuted ethnic groups, biggest civilian losses by country, and few other), otherwise the process of inclusion of figures for each ethnic group will become non-contrallable.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:03, 7 February 2019 (UTC)
Yes, I agree. We have a very large separate article on casualties of the war which discusses these issues, and it does seem like people cherry pick particular population groups to list here. [[User:Nick-D|@Username:]] ([[User talk:@Username:|talk]]) 06:23, 8 February 2019 (UTC)
over 60 million died in ww2 so I will put it to say that
I have just reverted these and the below changes. As is stated by the article's edit note, significant changes should be discussed. These changes were not, and you appear to be operating on the basis of single sources when the article draws on a vast range of sources. Please also don't mark significant changes as being minor. Nick-D (talk) 09:29, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
An estimated 11 to 17 million civilians died as a direct or as an indirect result of Nazi racist policies, its 17 million 11 million is not used any more by United States Holocaust Memorial Museum So I will fix that
Jews 6 million
Soviet civilians around 7 million (including 1.3 Soviet Jewish civilians, who are included in the 6 million figure for Jews)
Soviet prisoners of war around 3 million (including about 50,000 Jewish soldiers)
Non-Jewish Polish civilians around 1.8 million (including between 50,000 and 100,000 members of the Polish elites)
Serb civilians (on the territory of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) 312,000
People with disabilities living in institutions up to 250,000
Roma (Gypsies) 196,000–220,000
Jehovah's Witnesses around 1,900
Repeat criminal offenders and so-called asocials at least 70,000
German political opponents and resistance activists in Axis-occupied territory undetermined
Homosexuals hundreds, possibly thousands (possibly also counted in part under the 70,000 repeat criminal offenders and so-called asocials noted above)
although their extermination was not an official goal, 3.6 million Soviet POWs out of 5.7 died in Nazi camps during the war it was
it was Deliberate Policy
This death toll was neither an accident nor an automatic result of the war. It was the Nazi state's deliberate policy. German treatment of Soviet POWs differed dramatically from German policy towards POWs from Britain and the United States, countries the Nazis regarded as racial equals to the Germans. Of the 231,000 British and American prisoners held by the Germans during the war only about 8,300—3.6 percent—died in German custody.Jack90s15 (talk) 05:29, 4 December 2018 (UTC)https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nazi-persecution-of-soviet-prisoners-of-war
Whilst Britain, Germany, and the United States were signatories of the Geneva Conventions regarding treatment of prisoners of war the Soviet Union was not, Lenin having rescinded in 1919-21 all International Treaties signed by the Czarist governments. The Nazi government therefore felt it was under no legal obligation to treat Russian POW's in the same manner as they were obliged to treat Western ones.
Земское В.Н. К вопросу о репатриации советских граждан. 1944–1951 годы // История СССР. 1990. № 4 (Zemskov V.N. On repatriation of Soviet citizens. Istoriya SSSR., 1990, No.4Jack90s15 (talk) 06:09, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
85,000,000 died from all causes
I will put 85,000,000 for the death toll I will put down to The figure of over 85 million includes deaths from war-related disease and famine.
Jack90s15 (talk) 06:13, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
Jack90s15
You have changed text that is sourced and removed cn tags without adding citations. You are also applying a specific number where sources indicate that a range is appropriate, based on sources that do not cite their sources or discuss their methodology. Please allow for discussion before making such significant changes, and please stop starting new discussion threads for every comment you make. Laszlo Panaflex (talk) 16:22, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
The ww2 Casualty page has 85 million for all deaths that is why I put it that page is linked wit this page so that is why I put it Jack90s15 (talk) 17:14, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
Wikipedia pages may not be used as sources for other Wikipedia pages; you must examine the underlying sources at that page and cite them here. You have also changed sourced information again and removed a source without discussion. Please make one change at a time so they may be individually assessed – some of these changes may be appropriate, but changing sourced content is not. And again, please allow for discussion here before making these changes. Laszlo Panaflex (talk) 18:10, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
Jack90s15 appears to be referring to the World War II casualties page. As that page discusses, estimates of casualties are indicated because exact totals cannot be determined. Further, there are different methodologies for arriving at estimates, again making exact totals impossible to state. Thus we discuss ranges instead of precise figures, and even the 70-85 million figure on the casualties page does not bear a specific cite. Laszlo Panaflex (talk) 18:42, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
And now you have changed sourced content again, here and here, and removed a source without discussion again, here. You don't get to throw out a source just because you don't like the number it states. Laszlo Panaflex (talk) 19:02, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
Jack90s15 (talk) 22:04, 4 December 2018 (UTC) I put the 17 million number I cited the holocaust museum they do not use the 11 million number)and I put why I did with the sources for the death toll of World War IIJack90s15 (talk) 22:04, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
and I did try put the same source back in and I did put the source back in Jack90s15 (talk) 22:07, 4 December 2018 (UTC)
Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Danski454 (talk) 09:58, 18 August 2018 (UTC)
Not done: as said above, you need to be an autoconfirmed user. QueerFilmNerdtalk 04:03, 10 September 2018 (UTC)
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