Talk:World War II/Archive 57

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A questionable addition to the "Allies close in" section

The section tells about several battles in Easter Europe, and it has a questionable addition (coloured)

On 22 June, the Soviets launched a strategic offensive in Belarus ("Operation Bagration") that destroyed the German Army Group Centre almost completely. Soon after that, another Soviet strategic offensive forced German troops from Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland. The Soviets formed the Polish Committee of National Liberation to control territory in Poland and combat the Polish Armia Krajowa; The Soviet Red Army remained in the Praga district on the other side of the Vistula and watched passively as the Germans quelled the Warsaw Uprising initiated by the Armia Krajowa. The national uprising in Slovakia was also quelled by the Germans. The Soviet Red Army's strategic offensive in eastern Romania cut off and destroyed the considerable German troops there and triggered a successful coup d'état in Romania and in Bulgaria, followed by those countries' shift to the Allied side.

The text about a puppet government in Poland and its fight against AK does not belong to this section. The fight against AK had no significant military and political impact. In addition, for example, there were similar hostilities between British occupation forces and Communist partisans in Greece, and if we tell about AK vs the Soviets, why should we ignore ELAS vs UK? In my opinion, this text reflects a Polonicentric views, and I am going to remove it. However, I agree that the Allied actions in occupied/liberated territories should be discussed in a separate section (probably, in "Occupation ").

Second, a description of the Warsaw uprising is also biased. It provides unneeded details (for example, the name of the Warsaw suburb is not needed in this huge article, where even much more significant information is omitted for brevity), and it creates a wrong impression that Soviet army deliberately stopped to let Nazi to suppress the uprising. Whereas I agree that the Soviets could provide more help to the rebels, many (if not majority of) authors agree that the Soviet troops stopped primarily because they were exhausted, their material resources were depleted, and stretched communications didn't allow their replenishment.

Third, in 1944, the USSR launched four major offensives that literally smashed lion's share of Wehrmacht, and that dramatically accelerated the end of the Third Reich, however, the current version of this section dilutes this information with much less important facts, so reader's attention switches to much less important events. There is no even a single photo from Eastern Front (I remember there was a photo, but it was replaced). I think this should be fixed. In my opinion, previous versions of the article (e.g. this one) described those events much better. I am going to restore it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:59, 25 July 2019 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert: yes I think it would be better if it Focuses on the overall picture and for the Warsaw up rising rewrite just a bit? For a Eastern Front picture is Should be something iconic to it

I agree. The text is Polonicentric. I think the description of the Warsaw Uprising is inaccurate according to our article about it. The Soviet Army wasn't "passive". They took the east bank and launched artillery and air attacks on German positions. Berling's troops attempted to cross the river and join the Home Army. Moreover, I think we should avoid imputing motives when we simply don't know. Similarly, we don't know Stalin's secret motives for setting up the Polish Committee of National Liberation. It seems a reasonable thing to do under the circumstances. Some have said he was having an affair with Wanda Wasilewska! An encyclopedic article like this should not delve into such speculation. I agree with restoring the previous version of this paragraph (I assume that's what you meant).--Jack Upland (talk) 09:07, 26 July 2019 (UTC)

References

Battle of Britain

I believe that Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain should be linked.Xx236 (talk) 10:16, 26 July 2019 (UTC)

I am not sure. Most of them were the citizens of the states that had already been at war with the Axis. Majority of WWII battles (except, probably, Eastern front theatre) involved multinational personnel. In some cases, the article already says explicitly about that: thus, it says that the Poles participated in many battles in several different theatres of war.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:53, 26 July 2019 (UTC)

Allies and Axis

Just wondering why there isn't a list of the allies and axis on the page instead of providing the link to allies v axis? I know there are many allies and axis, but perhaps the largest players could be listed?

-Bill — Preceding unsigned comment added by 4.78.188.9 (talk • contribs) 17:58, 26 July 2019 (UTC)

It shows Both Allies and Axis leaders in the info box Jack90s15 (talk) 22:28, 26 July 2019 (UTC)

Should the start of the war be changed to 1937?

1937 was the Marco Polo bridge incident, which started the Asia-Pacific theatre of the war. Ȝeſtikl (talk) 16:53, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

Please read the previous discussions on this talk page to assess your chances of changing this. Britmax (talk) 17:09, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

I don't exactly understand your answer. Could you clarify? Are you comparing this to the previous Invasion of Poland discussion?Ȝeſtikl (talk) 18:41, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

I am suggesting that you read this article to get some idea of the debates that have already taken place on this subject. Britmax (talk) 19:13, 12 August 2019 (UTC)

Even if you oppose changing the start of the war to 1937, shouldn't the start of the war in the Pacific be 1937? In the article, it says that the fighting in the Pacific broke out in 1941?! Ȝeſtikl (talk) 18:48, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

I'm not aware of any significant fighting in the Pacific before 1941. The war between China and Japan was fought almost entirely on continental Asia. Mediatech492 (talk) 17:20, 12 August 2019 (UTC)

You'd need to find a lot of sources that say the Second Sino-Japanese War was part of WWII, because the academic consensus is that WWII started with the German invasion of Poland. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 02:02, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Italy began before in East Africa.82.53.124.215 (talk) 19:25, 16 August 2019 (UTC) The war started in 1939

Collaboration/Resistance

Prologue (NOT to be included in the subsection):

Over the past few months, Talk:World War II has debated “collaboration” more than Westminster and Brexit. Though some seventy-five years have elapsed since the war ended, the term “collaboration” still stands as a dodgy and combustible topic. The most significant problem appears to be the lack of consensus from scholars and the proper definition of the term. Perhaps, there is a unity of mistrust among countries who have been branded as fostering collaboration and absent themselves from any moral standpoint of decency. This might explain why scarcely the mere mention of collaboration conjures collusion among editors and finger-pointing, not only in Wikipedia as we have seen, but elsewhere. As we have witnessed, the cauldron boiled over, and summary judgment quickly followed, perhaps because of a growing attitude or assumption about collaboration. One thing is quite clear: little faith is to be had in whoever writes this subsection. Factual evidence presented by scholars, historians, and well-known authors is not enough it seems. Perhaps one’s national conscience deterred their scholars from addressing it in the past. When they had, they were dismissed by frivolous attempts aimed at discrediting their work. Indeed, the epistemic justification of the information — the credibility of the available evidence regarding that particular time — in and of itself supports the decision to write about it. The epistemological thought process — the study and determination to write a book on collaboration — has been rendered by scholars, university professors, historians, and yes, by those who were discredited by some. In this subsection, those writers who have been referenced had no fear of their writings. In fact, for them, it was a release. Therefore, nowhere can that same transfer of information be hindered: not on Wikipedia, nor anywhere else. The pulse of one nation’s people, transferred to historians or authors who are — or were — natives of German-occupied Europe, has become the most crucial references on this subsection and have analysed the evidence in detail. In closing, today is European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, and the posting of this subsection was not accidental. We must all be reminded that the unfortunate consequence of the omission of ‘collaboration’ will give the public the impression that nationalistic views take precedence over truth. That impression will undermine the public’s confidence in Wikipedia’s impartiality: specifically, its editorial board, whom I greatly respect. Therefore, let us widen our lenses, and barring any unforeseen crisis, it is doubtful the subsection will go unwritten. Wikipedia’s editors alone possess agency to act. Lastly, if it is ignored, its moral implications will be sacrificed on the altar of one’s national pride. Bigeez (talk) 21:57, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

                                                       COLLABORATION

“The final verdict on how well we withstand the moral and ethical challenges of the war is not that of a judge, who determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. But it was — and remains — too easy to blame just Hitler and the Nazis.”

Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War Il, Chapter 1, p. 38 — István Deák

The term “collaboration,” is frequently used as a moniker for cooperation with the enemy. “The literature of resistance is prolific: that of collaboration sparse indeed," wrote historian David Littlejohn. Yet, to “refute the existence of any collaboration means to deny the obvious facts … and without it, the picture of World War II would be incomplete.” In 1941, Philippe Pétain expressed an understanding between the Vichy French and Hitler, agreeing upon a "collaboration" which he “accepted in principle.” Collaboration was introduced earlier “by the Fourth Hague International Convention of 1907 that outlined the citizenry’s duty to obey the enemy, so long as the latter abided by the terms of The Hague Convention.” Differences between collaborator and collaborationist were also defined, the former "who trafficked with the Germans for material gain"; the latter "out of ideological considerations." In this subsection, collaboration is defined as a cooperation between the vanquished foreign territories and the Axis Powers. Major historians agree that the advancing German Army needed local cooperation or “beneficial accommodation.” “It became clear that without some degree of local collaboration it would be impossible to exploit the resources for German war needs for effective control over the populations of these countries.” “As a consequence, national governments, local authorities, native populations, and social classes, interest groups, individuals, were eager to tolerate or actively collaborate with the Germans.” These collaborators were “impelled by various motives who thought it convenient to cooperate with the Axis Powers,” “Some did so freely, others with reservations, many by force or by deception.” To some, it was a means to an end like the Poles in Byelorussia and members of the Home Army, who “working as auxiliary police used it as a cover for subversive activities and for acquiring military training.” In the Channel Islands, “the British government instructed the islands’ leaders to practice “passive cooperation.” Those who were “wise to cooperate with their new masters … hoped that in return the collaborators might absorb the brunt of the subjugated peoples’ rage, like a “lightning rod, to rob the resistance of its manpower.” Economically, many couldn’t resist profiting “from close collaboration with their new masters, but in all countries, except semi-independent Denmark, the population became far poorer.” “Unfortunately, the line between appeasement and collaboration was not always clear. In May 1941 the British military intelligence chief in Singapore wrote: “A particularly dreadful aspect is the number of British firms in Shanghai and elsewhere which are not above turning a dishonest penny by trading with the enemy.”” See Collaborationism and Collaboration during World War II

Collaboration consisted primarily in participation of hostilities on the Axis side. Nazi ideology-driven collaboration was a factor. There were four main reasons for it: 1) support for Nazi-Fascist culture, 2) antisemitism, 3) anticommunism, and 4) a nationalistic desire for establishing an independent fascist-type state. At times, there was a combination of all of the above. “There were shared beliefs in antisemitism, hatred of Soviet communism, enthusiasm for National Socialist ideology, and hope for a united Europe even though under German Nazi Supremacy.” The combination of anticommunism, antisemitism, and the desire for establishing an independent fascist state is best seen in Ukraine. “A patriotic people who had never known independence, and had suffered more foreign occupations than any other European nation … from the Ukrainian nationalistic point of view, there was a huge advantage: German occupation was beginning to make Ukraine a monoethnic country. It is no wonder that Ukrainian militiamen and civilian volunteers assisted the Germans in the massacre of Jews, Poles, and Communists.” The Ukrainians eventually were caught between German and Soviet crossfire, termed “at the very heart of the bloodlands since the aim of the German occupation was to exploit all resources for their war effort.” Operation Barbarossa “opened the way to collaboration and resistance on a scale with which nothing in Western or Northern Europe could be compared.” “Collaboration had an ethnic character: Ukrainians, Belarusians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Caucasians and members of some Asian nationalities were assembled in ethnic units and served the Germans as Waffen-SS volunteers, armed militiamen, policemen, concentration camp guards, low-level administrators, professionals, workers, and laborers. There were Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian policemen, and Croatian/Bosnian Muslim, Scandinavian, Dutch, Belgian, and French Waffen SS divisions, brigades, 'legions', or battalions, most of them bearing the names of historical heroes.”

The first reason for ideology-driven collaboration, Nazi-inspired symapthies, evolved after World War I. The reasons for this “range all the way from the idealism inspired by the most evil of all political theories, National Socialism and the magic charisma of the Führer to the prowess and devotion of the German soldier.” The dissolution of the Central Powers after World War I, multi-nationalism in the collapsed German Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russian Empire, the partition of Poland, the rise of communism, “sowed the seeds for deep resentment.” “Bourgeois-led capitalists of Europe feared the advent of Soviet-led communism, and considered the Nazi movement in Germany and the Fascist movement in Italy their true models.” “There is no doubt as to the defeatist attitude of the Western and northern European governments when confronted with German aggression as in France where right-wing leaders preferred Nazi rule to the threat of a communist takeover. Some said, ‘Better Hitler than Stalin’, while the political Far-Left agitated against rearmament, expressing their hatred for the bourgeois French Republic.” Collaboration by paramilitary groups or armies which thus supported Nazi ideology, particularly in Western Europe, were France's Marcel Déat and the Milice française, the 33rd Waffen SS in France, Belgium's Léon Degrelle and the Légion Wallonie, Norway's Vidkun Quisling with Nordic countries including Denmark, and Dutch Waffen-SS units in the Netherlands. Germany's Vernichtungskrieg ignited ethnic and Nazi-driven Waffen-SS divisions.

The second reason for ideology-driven collaboration was Antisemitism and the identification and killing of ethnic and religious groups, or “undesirables.” This took place throughout Europe, particularly Western Ukraine, Lithuania, and Byelorussia. “For many of those who saw their world crumbling before and after World War I, the Jews — the traditional scapegoats of Christian societies — who after 1917 also were associated with the Bolsheviks, were seen as the prime destroyers of this world. Antisemitism became one of the central features of all Europeans who were susceptible to the solutions proposed by Rome and by Berlin … with Nazi Germany becoming the bulwark against Bolshevism.” The Holocaust, what the Nazis called the Final Solution to the Jewish Question, and the Third Reich’s “determination to murder all the Jews of Europe, developed over time.” “The common denominator was that very few Europeans came to the aid of their Jewish brethren. True, there was not much they could do. But it was also the case that the Holocaust could never have been accomplished with the efficiency and completeness that it was without the active participation of hundreds of thousands of non-German Europeans and the indifference of tens of millions of others … and that only the assistance of masses of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Frenchmen, Dutch, Poles, and many other Europeans made the Holocaust possible.” No occupied territory was immune to the collaboration in the Nazi desire to eradicate European Jewry. “Most notorious of all where the so-called Trawniki men, Soviet POW’s, who would volunteer to serve the SS plan to create a ‘living space’ for German colonists in Poland. Trained at Trawniki in Western Ukraine, they tortured and shot hundreds of thousands of Jews under strict German supervision.” Even the “elected administrators of the Channel Islands readily cooperated with the German commanders: they consented without murmur to the conversion of Alderney Island into a lethal concentration camp for Russian and Jewish slave laborers and prepared lists of families who were of Jewish origin, and handed the families over to the Gestapo.” In some cases, Jewish nationals were deported into German custody en-route to concentration camps or labor camps. Fascist paramilitaries terrorized or murdered indigenous Jews. State-sponsored religious and minority hatred for the Jews, the Roma, as well as for the communists, was pervasive. Ultimately, those who collaborated in Hitler’s Final Solution did so as “collaborators, cooperators, or as accommodators.” “Some Poles make much of what they call Jewish collaboration with German occupation forces, meaning those Jews who headed the Jewish Councils (Judenrat), served in the Jewish police openly (armed only with batons), or acted as spies and agents of some German intelligence service. But these individuals simply tried to prolong their lives and those of their families; they were not committed collaborators.” "On the other side, scores of Polish farmers were executed by the Germans, together with their entire families, for sheltering Jews." Waffen-SS divisions implicated in the persecution and execution of Roma (Gypsy) and Jews was seen, particularly in Eastern European collaborators, such as those found in Western Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, France, Poland, and Hungary, where some of the highest German-recorded number of Jews were sent to concentration camps. Included are the Latvian Waffen SS, and Estonian Waffen-SS, and the paramilitary or Einsatzgruppen. Collaboration ranged from “the denunciation of the Jews to the seizing of their property, with some being murdered: others were left to perish, like the Roma, Soviet prisoners-of-war, and strangers or ‘Ortsfremde’.”

The third reason for ideology-driven collaboration was communism. Countries with communist majorities were manipulated by German propagandists igniting ethnic unrest, such as the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Former military and police fought communist threat like Latvia’s 2nd SS Infantry Brigade, and the Ukrainian Galician Division. “Fear of Stalin terror such as forced collectivisation, mass executions and deportations inspired many embittered against the Soviets. These also included the paramilitary groups known by Hilfsfreiwillige.” There was even a “Russian liberation army created within the German Wehrmacht and survived to the end of the war, known as the Vlasov Army, which volunteered to create an anti-communist Russian army.” In Greece, Rallis’ Greek Security Battalions fought communist ELAS partisans. Though viewed by many as a traitor, others recount Rallis’ “situation in Greece had become so desperate, that is was better to collaborate with the occupiers than to let one’s own people die of starvation. Arguably, Rallis failed to improve the situation, and their followers saw the Greek collaborationist leaders as tragic heroes; their critics saw them as poltroons.”

The fourth reason for ideology-driven collaboration was the hope for establishing an independent fascist-type state. European countries subsumed by Waffen SS divisions, and for whom ideology-driven sympathies festered, hoping to establish an independent fascist country to partner with Nazi Germany include Vidkun Quisling in Norway, Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, Anton Mossert in the Netherlands, Pierre Laval in France, Stepan Bandera in Western Ukraine, and Georgios Tsolakoglou in Greece. Auxiliary police (like the Estonian Auxiliary Police) and paramilitary forces (Einsatzgruppen and Feldgendarmerie), were responsible for containing resistance. In the Balkans, there were some who were uniquely different: rather than collaborators, they were allies with the Axis and desired to establish an independent fascist-type national state which included Slovakia and Croatia from the dismembered country of Yugoslavia. “Although the Croats, Serbs, and Greeks had their own collaborationist government, only Croatia was genuinely independent.” The Croatian Handschar Waffen-SS which included Moslems from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavian, and Greek Security Battalions engaged communists. Detention and execution of POWs, either semi-voluntarily or compulsory, also occurred. See Collaboration with the Axis Powers

                                                           RESISTANCE

“Occupied countries had a resource nearer home: their own peoples.” Ch. 1, p. 4 — M.R.D. Foot

Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-45

Resistance by local populations took place in every occupied country that the Axis Powers overran, as a result of the repressive nature of the occupiers. A resister was anyone who resisted by a) not cooperating with their occupiers or b) endangering themselves or others; either passively or actively. Resisters came from “all walks of life, not only communists, but teachers, engineers, lawyers, merchants, businessmen, civil servants and priests ... officers, NCO's, and partisans.” For some, the “changes at the battle front made resisters out of collaborators.” Resisters were emboldened by Axis defeats incurred at El Alamein and Stalingrad and the simultaneous invasion of North Africa by the United States. “For others, such as those in Poland, the Baltic countries, the German-occupied Soviet Union, Greece, and Yugoslavia, there was plenty of provocation for the unleashing of German fury.” Small numbers of resisters included those who printed illegal newspapers or used the wireless to communicate and receive radio messages from London. Large-scale bands of fighters were common as well as widespread partisan movements like the Free French Army, Polish Underground, Greek Resistance, Yugoslav Partisans, and the Russian partisans. Even the Italians who changed sides and joined the Allies in 1943 were “as brave and efficient as any other in the world.” “German policies in Byelorussia resulted in a growing resistance movement, which toward the end of the occupation was the second-largest in Europe, following Tito's resistance in Yugoslavia.” Noteworthy was the monumental undertaking of the Polish Underground. The “great Polish Warsaw Uprising in the late summer and early fall of 1944 involved tens of thousands of fighters and hundreds of thousands of victims and had grave worldwide political consequences whose effects are still felt.” “Perhaps more than any other country, Poland produced some fabled resistance fighters.” “Władysław Bartoszewski, a Catholic journalist and writer, was an early political prisoner at Auschwitz, who became the most famous member of the Council for Aid to the Jews (Żegota), founded by Zofia Kossak-Szczucka within the Polish Delegatura in Warsaw, Europe’s only underground organization solely dedicated to assisting Jews. He received innumerable honors and decorations, among them the recognition by Yad Vashem in Jerusalem as ‘Righteous Among the Nations’.” At times, resistance was complicated depending on one’s nationality, religion, or ethnicity, particularly in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. “In northern and Western Europe, resisters fought the Germans and local traitors in expectation of the arrival of the Allied liberators, but the situation was much more complicated in the broad range of countries from Estonia to Greece and from Czech lands deep into Russia.”

Extensive, Allied-assisted partisan warfare was the aim of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), which Prime Minister Churchill said “would set Europe ablaze.” The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) adapted the British model upon Churchill's recommendation to President Roosevelt, who appointed “Wild Bill” Donovan as its chief. The OSS would eventually rival the SOE, setting up training camps in the United States and overseas and successfully “sending thousands of agents around the globe.” Some times, both Allied intelligence services cooperated in unison with resisters, such as the ‘Jedburgh Teams’ which were sent to Occupied France prior to the D-Day invasion, comprised of “one OSS or SOE officer, one officer of French nationality, and one British or American radio operator, playing a crucial role.” In the Balkans, both Churchill and Roosevelt aimed to keep Greece and Yugoslavia free from Stalin's attempt at control. “Churchill's gamble paid off, because Greece and reconstituted Yugoslavia never entered the Soviet bloc.” At times, both Greek nationalist and communist forces acted in unison, such as the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge linking the Athens to Thessaloniki railway by “EDES and ELAS under the leadership of the SOE.” The only German general kidnapped occurred in Crete by the SOE.

In Southeast Asia, resistance was far more complex, as the dynamics were different than in Europe. The Japanese also presented themselves as liberators of colonial peoples, and this was accepted by at least parts of the local independence movements. In reality it was much different, since the Japanese sought its own colonial empire and intended to subjugate every country they invaded. However, in the last weeks of the war, the Indonesian independence movement was able to leverage its limited collaboration with the Japanese to gain their support; enough to declare the Netherlands East Indies free, which doomed the Dutch attempts to resume control after World War II ended. In French Indochina, the Viet Minh gave rise to an anti-Axis partisan movement. This initiated Vietnam’s anti-colonial movement, in which the American OSS became a key player. See Resistance during World War II

References

Semi-protected edit request on 1 September 2019

Please make it "Fall of Nazi Germany" and "Collapse of Japanese and Italian Empires" in the result box. 2409:4062:188:32B3:9692:BCFF:FEBE:BD0F (talk) 05:37, 1 September 2019 (UTC)

 Not done: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit semi-protected}} template. — MRD2014 (talk) 23:30, 1 September 2019 (UTC)

Question

Why not divide the article into topics such as the Syrian Civil War article? 2804:14C:5BB5:8B2F:610E:7132:B82D:8CDA (talk) 20:09, 25 August 2019 (UTC)

Would you kindly be more specific ... for the "Collaboration/Resistance" subsection or for the entire World War II article? Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 17:54, 26 August 2019 (UTC)

The whole article. I like your idea. 2804:14C:5BB5:AE1E:9044:8B01:751F:44BF (talk) 15:09, 31 August 2019 (UTC)

Collaboration/Resistance

Hello Paul Siebert (talk), and Nick-D (talk),

I was wondering if you both had a look-see on the above Collaboration/Resistance subsection? It is not beyond work if we could only set aside any drawbacks or excesses. Any advice would be greatly appreciated. I know you both only wish the best for the article. All aside, I hope you don’t feel me entitled to have overstepped the mark. But I would not be as bold as this if I didn’t think it would be for the article’s benefit. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 22:44, 27 August 2019 (UTC)

As noted on your talk page, the material is obviously much too lengthy for this article. Nick-D (talk) 22:22, 31 August 2019 (UTC)

Hello Nick-D (talk), we will strive to hit the mark. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 00:40, 2 September 2019 (UTC)

"Nobody knew"

I would just like to make a quick comment on this edit [1]. It might seem reasonable that "at the time nobody knew it would turn to a worldwide war", but in fact nearly everybody knew that. It was seen as a sequel to the First World War world-wide, and the term "Second World War" and "World War II" started appearing in September 1939. Don't guess before making an edit; look it up first. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:46, 1 September 2019 (UTC)

Sorry, I did not make any "guess", "nearly" is not equal with "surely". However, this is really not decisive, since "official" start would meant that by the time of the action it is openly declared what starts, but such did not happen, my explanation just pinpointed something to the editor. However, there are different views when the start should be dated or to which event, nevertheless 1 Sept is the most commonly accepted date.(KIENGIR (talk) 07:55, 2 September 2019 (UTC))

However, I agree we should no use the term "officially".--Jack Upland (talk) 08:49, 2 September 2019 (UTC)

Agreed. It is indeed the official date in many countries, but this article should reflect a global perspective. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:29, 2 September 2019 (UTC)

Collaboration & Resistance

Hello Paul Siebert (talk), and Nick-D (talk), I've done some chiseling of the prior subsection, hoping I've embodied all we had in mind, considering the constraints. Cheers, Bigeez (talk) 20:42, 2 September 2019 (UTC)

                                                       COLLABORATION

“The final verdict on how well we withstand the moral and ethical challenges of the war is not that of a judge, who determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. But it was — and remains — too easy to blame just Hitler and the Nazis.”

Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War Il, Chapter 1, p. 38 — István Deák

“Collaboration” is commonly used as a moniker for cooperating with the enemy. Although a controversial topic, to doubt its existence is to deny the obvious, and “without it, the picture of World War II would be incomplete.” In 1941, Philippe Pétain spoke of an understanding between the Vichy French and Hitler, agreeing upon a collaboration which he “accepted in principle.” Collaboration was set forth by the Fourth Hague International Convention of 1907, outlining the citizen's duty to obey the enemy so long as the “latter abided by the terms of The Hague Convention.” ‘‘Collaboration’’ is defined here as a cooperation between the vanquished territories and the Axis Powers. Historians agree that the German Army needed local cooperation or “beneficial accommodation” since without some degree of collaboration, it would be “impossible to have control over the vanquished.” As a result, many were “eager to collaborate with the Germans,” “impelled by various motives, who thought it convenient to cooperate with the Axis Powers.” “Some did so freely, others with reservations; many by force or by deception.” Those who were “wise to cooperate hoped that in return the collaborators might absorb the brunt of the subjugated peoples’ rage, like a “lightning rod, to rob the resistance of its manpower.” Economically, neither the British colonies (Singapore) nor the Americans colonies (Philippines) could resist profiting “from close collaboration with their new masters.” See Collaborationism and Collaboration during World War II

Collaboration consisted primarily in participation of hostilities on the Axis side. Nazi ideology-driven collaboration was a factor. There were four main reasons for it: 1) support for Nazi-fascist culture, 2) antisemitism, 3) anticommunism, and 4) a nationalistic desire for establishing an independent fascist-type state. For some, there was a combination of all of the above. “There were shared beliefs in antisemitism, hatred of Soviet communism, enthusiasm for National Socialist ideology, and hope for a united Europe even though under German Nazi Supremacy.” The combination of anticommunism, antisemitism, and the desire for establishing an independent fascist state is best seen in Western Ukraine. The Ukrainians were eventually caught between German and Soviet crossfire, “at the very heart of the bloodlands.” Operation Barbarossa had “opened the way to collaboration and resistance on a scale which nothing in Western or Northern Europe could be compared.” Collaboration assumed an ethnic character: “Ukrainians, Belarusians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Caucasians and members of some Asian nationalities were assembled in ethnic units and served the Germans as Waffen-SS volunteers, armed militiamen, policemen, concentration camp guards, low-level administrators, professionals, workers, and laborers. There were Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian policemen, and Croatian/Bosnian Muslim, Scandinavian, Dutch, Belgian, and French Waffen SS divisions, brigades, 'legions', or battalions, most of them bearing the names of historical heroes.”

The first reason for ideology-driven collaboration, Nazi-inspired symapthies, evolved after World War I. The dissolution of the Central Powers, multi-nationalism in the collapsed German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, the partitions of Poland, the rise of communism, were among the factors which “sowed the seeds for deep resentment.” Collaboration by paramilitary groups or armies which supported Nazi ideology, particularly in Western Europe, were France's Marcel Déat and Milice française, the 33rd Waffen SS in France, Belgium's Léon Degrelle and the Légion Wallonie, Norway's Vidkun Quisling with Nordic countries including Denmark, and Dutch Waffen-SS units in the Netherlands. Germany's Vernichtungskrieg ignited ethnic and Nazi-driven Waffen-SS divisions.

The second reason for ideology-driven collaboration was antisemitism and the identification and killing of ethnic and religious groups, or “undesirables,” throughout Europe, particularly in Western Ukraine, Lithuania, and Byelorussia. “Antisemitism became one of the central features of Europeans who were susceptible to the solutions proposed by Rome and Berlin, with Nazi Germany becoming the bulwark against Bolshevism.” The Holocaust, what the Nazis called the Final Solution to the Jewish Question, and the Third Reich’s “determination to murder all the Jews of Europe, developed over time.” “The common denominator was that few Europeans came to the aid of their Jewish brethren, and could never have been accomplished with the efficiency and completeness that it was without the assistance of masses of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Frenchmen, Dutch, Poles, and many other Europeans.” “Most notorious were the Trawniki men, Soviet POW’s trained at Trawniki in Western Ukraine, who tortured and shot hundreds of thousands of Jews under strict German supervision.” The “Channel Islands cooperated with the Germans who handed the Jews over to the Gestapo.” Mass killing of Jews after the start of Operation Barbarossa was perpetrated by specialised troops composed of local volunteers and “would never have succeeded without the collaboration of many non-German Europeans. Conversely, the survival of many Jews would have been inconceivable without the opposition of many non-Germans to the Nazi presence.” Ultimately, those who collaborated in Hitler’s Final Solution did so as “collaborators, cooperators, or as accommodators,” including the Judenrat that served in the Jewish police as spies of the German intelligence service. However, they “sought to escape their doomed fate and were not committed collaborators.” Many Europeans were executed by the Germans for sheltering Jews. Waffen-SS divisions implicated in the persecution and execution of the Roma (Gypsy) and Jews were seen in Eastern European collaborators, Western Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, France, and Poland, where the highest German-recorded number of Jews were sent to concentration camps, including the Latvian Waffen SS, Estonian Waffen-SS, and the paramilitary and Einsatzgruppen.

The third reason for ideology-driven collaboration was communism. Countries where communism flourished were manipulated by German propagandists igniting ethnic unrest, as in the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Former military and police fought communist threat like Latvia’s 2nd SS Infantry Brigade and the Ukrainian Galician Division. “Fear of Stalin terror such as forced collectivisation, mass executions and deportations inspired many embittered against the Soviets including the paramilitary groups known as Hilfsfreiwillige,” while a “Russian liberation army created within the German Wehrmacht (Vlasov Army), became an anti-communist Russian army.” In Greece, Rallis’ Greek Security Battalions fought communist ELAS partisans.

The fourth reason for ideology-driven collaboration was the hope for establishing an independent fascist state. European countries subsumed by Waffen SS divisions where ideology-driven sympathies festered, aspired to establish an independent fascist country to partner with Nazi Germany. These include Vidkun Quisling in Norway, Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, Anton Mossert in the Netherlands, Pierre Laval in France, and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine. Auxiliary police (like the Estonian Auxiliary Police) and paramilitary forces (Einsatzgruppen and Feldgendarmerie), were responsible for containing resistance. In the Balkans, Georgios Tsolakoglou of Greece's collaborationist government and the allies of the Axis, such as Slovakia and Croatia, from dismembered Yugoslavia, sought independent fascist states. The Croatian Handschar Waffen-SS which included Moslems from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavian, and Greek Security Battalions engaged communists. Detention and execution of POWs, either semi-voluntarily or compulsory, also occurred. See Collaboration with the Axis Powers

                                                           RESISTANCE

“Occupied countries had a resource nearer home: their own peoples.” Ch. 1, p. 4 — M.R.D. Foot

Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-45

Resistance by local populations took place in the Axis’ occupied countries as a result of their repressive nature. A resister was anyone who resisted by a) not cooperating with their occupiers or b) endangering themselves or others; either passively or actively. Resisters came from “all walks of life, not only communists, but teachers, engineers, lawyers, merchants, businessmen, civil servants and priests ... officers, NCO's, and partisans.” For some, the “changes at the battle front made resisters out of collaborators” who were “emboldened by Axis defeats incurred at El Alamein and Stalingrad and the simultaneous invasion of North Africa by the United States.” Some printed illegal newspapers or used the wireless to communicate and “receive radio messages from London.” Widespread partisan movements kept German divisions occupied, such as the Free French Army, Polish Underground, Greek Resistance, Yugoslav Partisans, Russian partisans, and the Italians who changed sides and joined the Allies in 1943. “German policies in Byelorussia resulted in the second-largest resistance group in Europe, following Tito's resistance in Yugoslavia.” Noteworthy was the Polish Underground's “monumental undertaking of the Warsaw Uprising” and Europe’s only underground organisation dedicated to assisting the Jews (Żegota). At times, resistance was complicated depending on one’s nationality, religion, or ethnicity, particularly in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Extensive, Allied-assisted partisan warfare was the aim of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), which Prime Minister Churchill said “would set Europe ablaze.” The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) adapted the British model upon Churchill's recommendation to President Roosevelt, who appointed “Wild Bill” Donovan as its chief. The OSS would eventually rival the SOE, setting up training camps in the United States and overseas and successfully “sending thousands of agents around the globe.” At times, the Allied intelligence services cooperated in unison with resisters, such as the ‘Jedburgh Teams’ and were sent to Occupied France prior to the D-Day invasion, comprised of “one OSS or SOE officer, one French officer, and one British or American radio operator, playing a crucial role.” In the Balkans, both Churchill and Roosevelt aimed to keep Greece and Yugoslavia free from Stalin's attempt at control. “Churchill's gamble paid off, because Greece and Yugoslavia never entered the Soviet bloc.” At times, both nationalist and communist forces acted in unison to defeat the common foe, such as the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge linking the Athens to Thessaloniki railway by “EDES (nationalists) and ELAS (communists) under the leadership of the SOE.”

In Southeast Asia, resistance was far more complex as the dynamics were different than in Europe. The Japanese also presented themselves as liberators of colonial peoples, and this was accepted by at least parts of the local independence movements. In reality it was much different, since the Japanese sought its own colonial empire and intended to subjugate every country they invaded. However, in the last weeks of the war, the Indonesian independence movement was able to leverage its limited collaboration with the Japanese to gain their support; enough to declare the Netherlands East Indies free, which doomed the Dutch attempts to resume control after World War II ended. In French Indochina, the communist Viet Minh gave rise to an anti-Axis partisan movement. This initiated Vietnam’s anti-colonial movement, in which the American OSS became a key player. See Resistance during World War II

From a quick read, the piece on collaboration presumes that the collaborator is driven by some sort of ideological imperative to assist an occupier/enemy. Whether my understanding of this is correct, an often ignored piece of collaboration in France that greatly assisted the progress of the war for Nazi Germany was that of the French naval dockyard workers. Without the huge resource of these dockyards and the newly constructed submarine bases, the Battle of the Atlantic would have been very different. German shipyard workers were in short supply and these facilities would not have functioned without the French workers turning up for work every day. There is little suggestion that they did so because they supported the Nazi regime. Darlan may have felt some sympathy (especially following the sinking of the French fleet in 1940 by the British) - but generally this workforce turned up to work under German direction just because that was what they did for a living. This is covered quite extensively in Hellwinkel, Lars (2014). Hitler's Gateway to the Atlantic. German naval bases in France 1940-1945 (Kindle, English Translation ed.). Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 978 184832 199 1. So, the relevance on this is that, unlike, say, the (obviously reprehensible) actions of the Milice helping round up people to go to concentration camps, the collective actions of the French naval dockyard workers affected the course of the war, making the Battle of the Atlantic a much more difficult fight. Hence it could be considered incomplete not to mention this vital war work. (There were also French aircraft workers making Luftwaffe training aircraft, but that seems to be a less direct support of the conflict). ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 11:29, 3 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello ThoughtIdRetired (talk), thank you for your insightful comments. As you wrote, it is frightfully true that life went on as usual, even for the French dockyard workers. Perhaps out of the need to survive and feed one's family, life went on. Of course, as you mentioned, Darlan's, Petain's, or Lavall's influence held great sway among those who worked at St.-Nazaire or elsewhere. Maybe, it was more ideological than you might believe? In my earlier, longer draft, I included a quip from British historian Bertram Gordon who proposed a definition of collaborator and collaborationist, the former "who trafficked with the Germans for material gain" and the latter "out of ideological considerations." Perhaps those French dockworkers were both collaborators and collaborationists? I will not suppose what they were, but simply, they did what they did, and for whatever reason/s, survived. All the same, those dockworkers' cooperation, between themselves and the Axis Powers, amounted to a "collaboration." Respectfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 00:30, 4 September 2019 (UTC)

Thanks for your remarks, Bigeez. The source I mentioned, Hellwinkel, had access to correspondence between senior people in the French navy and naval dockyard administration and so has much insight into French decision-making (at several levels of seniority). To pick out a single illustrative quote would be misleading by its brevity. If you get a chance to read it, I would recommend it as a quality source. It has not yet had much influence on the more general works on WW2 as it is fairly recently published in English. It does also mention some resistance activity - and the (possibly overstated) threat of espionage by French workers influenced Hitler's thinking on, for instance, the evacuation of the heavy surface fleet in the Channel Dash.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 07:56, 4 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello ThoughtIdRetired (talk), I have not read this source, yet I am in agreement with the premise. Specifically, Chapter 4 of Hitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940-1945, confirms the dodginess of the collaboration between Vichy and Germany pertaining to the marine bases' dockworkers. Quoting Hellwinkel:

"Nevertheless, it is a fact that French dockworkers collaborated with the German Kreigmarine for four years of the occupation period. Whether they did this voluntarily or because they had no choice owing to the lack of alternative employment is difficult to judge some seventy years on."

Chapter 4, Collaboration, Hitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940-1945

Again, the conundrum is much the same: Hellwinkel isn't definite either. Then, there is the Danish collaboration, who were recruited to assist the Germans for their shore installations as well (Schutzkommandos). If we were not placed under size constraints, I agree with you that it was an important aspect of the war and deserves a para. Hellwinkel's book appears to be a reprint of his doctoral dissertation to Christian-Albrecht University in Brest, which I do not hold against him. The book is a good read, no doubt. The other authors referenced in the subsection, however, are well-established authors in their field and either are sitting or past university chair/posts. Yet, we'll have it in mind in regards to your suggestion about a sentence or two on marine/shore installations. Your points are well taken, and deserve attention by our editors. Respectfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 17:57, 4 September 2019 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Bigeez, your texts are still too long, and their style is significantly different from the rest of the article. Nevertheless, they are definitely an improvement as compared with the first version. What is needed to do is (i) to make them much shorter, (ii) to remove general theorizing (e.g. there is no need to explain in this article what does "collaboration" mean), (iii) to think what materials can be moved from other parts of the article to this new section (to avoid duplications and to save space).

In connection to that, I think the first paragraph of the Collaboration section can be removed completely: a link to the Collaborationism article is quite sufficient. By the way, this content may be added there. The four reson of collaborations definitely should be included, as well as the most notable examples. I is important to avoid unneeded generalisations (thus, "The Ukrainians were eventually caught between German and Soviet crossfire" relates to some Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, whereas Central and Eastern Ukraine was not involved in these events), and concretizations (you list Estonians or Urkainians collaborators, but you forget about Russians, e.g. Lokot Republic). It would be desirable to avoid quotations (to save space and preserve article's overall style).

If you don't mind, I may try to work with your text in next couple of weeks (if I'll have time, which is not very likely). If you yourself will be able to shrink it as much as possible (preserving just the major ideas and the most essencial facts), I believe many people will agree to add this section to the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:15, 4 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello Paul Siebert (talk), Thank you for the thumbs up, and I do value your guidance and critique. I know, my journalistic prose style is hard to shake off, yet we will perservere to hit the mark.

Yes, I must have had a momentary lapse in memory recall ... Autonomous Lokot and Kaminski! I will put it in under either "communist reasons," or somewhere apropos.

I'll bring it in a little, perhaps not hemming it too much, and awaiting your guidance further. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 01:02, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

I will like to call to the attention that Yugoslav monarchist resistance, known officially as "Yugoslav Army in the Homeland" ("in Homeland" in opposition to the royal family itself and parts of governament which were exiled in London) and who´s coverage we have here within Chetniks article, has been sistematically hijacked towards the "collaborationist" aspect of them, while their resistance efforts were continuously ignored and put in shadow. Somehow seems the same group has found interest in the ascense of their mention at all, while continuously keeping to move the article content towards favoring the "collaboration mainly" theory in their article, and related ones. This has been contrary to the conclusions at Wikipedia talk:Requests for mediation/Draza Mihailovic which dealt preciselly about this aspect of resistance and collaboration in regard to Chetniks leader Draza Mihailovic and his actions. Considered by some historians as the first resistance force in Europe to wage open combat against German forces, their faith today suffers from the "victors write the history" sindrome, and also the "Chetniks defended the restauration of monarchy, one which represented the rule of a Serbian dinasty over Yugoslavia as in first Yugoslavia existed, and thus receving no simpathy from others but just Serbs, and ones which were not Partisans, cause Partisans were majoritarilly, again, formed by Serbs, as well."

The truth is that once Yugoslavia entered the war, Axis powers defeated Yugoslav royal army, and the king and his governament went to exile to London from where they tried to coordinate the resistance troughout the war. Hitler, an Austrian who grow up seing his country, the Austro-Hungarian empire, being destroyed after a war against Serbia which was supposed to have been easy for such a powerfull empire against a minor country, has a deeply-rooted hateriot towards Serbs as documented by plenty of historians. He has an uttely enrooted hateriot towards Jews and Slavs, specially Russians and Serbs, perciving them as main danger for his megalogermanic ambitions. This was perceved by Brittish intelligence as well, which manipulated Serbian power structure in order to make Yugoslavia not stay along the pact, but incentivate Serbian generals to want to enter into war with Hitler. This was obviously a suicidal missin in 1941, and Yugoslav royal army, made up almost exclusivelly by Serbian veterans from WWI and Balkan Wars, clearly inferior in combat power is overan by Germans. This created the situation of an occupied Yugoslavia where basically Serbian areas were target, while Croatian capital Zagreb receves German troops with enthusiasm and streets full of population giving them flowers. Germans establish the Indepent State of Croatia as their main regional ally, divide the provinces with minorities along its neighbouring allies, and establish an occupied diminished to its maximum, Serbia ruled directly by them. Serbs form two resistance movements,as the society itself was divided earlier, monarchists join the Chetniks while leftists form the Partisans. Initially it´s Chetniks who lead the resistance, however, after extremelly hard reprisals on behalve of Germans on the population, Chetniks decide to carry their actions ore carefully, while Partisans take that oportunity to establish themselves as main trouble-makers towards Germans, with less regard towards civilian casualities in the reprisals of their resistance actions. This creates a highly complicated situation, where Chetniks, in colaboration with the king in exile in London and consequently in line with Churchill, engage in a more strategic resistance where their main goal becomes survival until a moment of a joint action along main Allied powers, Partisans become the active and thus more visible, force that fights activelly the invaders. Chetniks, although labeled as mainly Serbian movement, they included Montenegrins, Bosniaks, even Slovenes, while Partisans were mainly formed by rural Serbs until 1943 when once they receve the backing of the Allies, start see other nationalities joining mo re and more as more evident the Axis defeat became perceved. In the end of the war Axis forces were defeat and Partisans leader, Tito, didn´t comply with the agreement of sharing the power with monarchists, but insted he saw the opportunity, with help of Soviets which were kicking Germans out everywhere around Yugoslavia, to kidnap power for himself. He quickly captured Mihailovic and in a tipical communist-charade he condemned him to execution for alleged collaboration during the war. Since Tito ended being accepted as Yugoslav leader, the issue of legitimising his accusations of his resistance rivals ended being crutial and was brainwashed in the country and outside world for over 40 years. While Yugoslav Chetniks ended being condecorated by the White House for their role in liberating Yugoslavia, Tito was engaged in deleting that information by indoctrinating everyone that they were a nationalist movement engaged in collaboration which fought against them along Axis forces which was to be equalised with Ustashe a clearly pro-Nazi army of the Independent State of Croatia. Even I got to learn as child in 1980s Yugoslavia in Belgrade school how Tito Partisans were the "ones" while Ustashe and Chetniks were "bad guys". The problem is that today, we see a chronic lack of Serbian editors in en.wiki, while others have no simpathies towards them, and there are editors with clear simpathies to either non-Serb groups or pro leftists, all with clear interest in engaging in negative description of them. The later events from the 1990s where Serbs were again portrayed as "bad guys" and the association with WWII Chetniks was intentionally made, further unhelped this unbiased analisis of Chetniks as resistance movement. Much literature was also been written with clear biased agenda as well, putting the unbiased one in a stance of euqal or minority. I believe we as an encyclopedia should not fall into this trapp and we should label Yugoslav monarchists for the struggle they had and not by modern-day groups of interest. FkpCascais (talk) 04:47, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello FkpCascais (talk), thank you for your knowledge on the subject. I, too, am aware keenly of the issues you mentioned. Let us not get sidetracked here, since this subsection is only a "brief" on Collaboration/Resistance, not a detailed account. Secondly, the article is not Serbocentric, or for that matter, Polocentric or Hellenocentric. Rather, it is a generalised account: geocentric. Thirdly, in the subsection, I have made no mention of Yugoslavia under the Collaboration section: would you suggest I include it? I am at a loss for your reasonings of why you are pontificating upon excessive shortcomings of the article, yet I do not see the basis for your suggestions. Fourthly, I understand your contentious points but please reference all your statements you state, as "truth."

Wikipedia will maintain its 5 Pillars here. Respectfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 20:57, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

I thank you very much Bigeez for your attention. I apologise if I failed to make my points and its direct relation to this article obvious, cause I thought they generally were. By just taking a look, one can easily see that ammong Yugoslav movements only Partisans are mentioned, so by your answer I am not sure where do you stand regarding the absense of others. You can openly state your stance, no problems with that, and we´ll go from there then. Thank you again. FkpCascais (talk) 01:58, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

I take serious issue with Fkp's long screed on Yugoslavia. There are several incorrect assertions and a very strong pro-Chetnik POV in that long post, including that Chetniks initially led the resistance, and that Chetniks were some sort of multi-ethnic force, among others. The resistance to the Germans in the German-occupied territory of Serbia was by both the Chetniks and Partisans (in some cases in concert with each other) until the Chetniks turned on the Partisans in late 1941. The Chetniks remained Serbo-centric (with a strong Montenegrin element) throughout the war, for example, the Slovene Chetniks never numbered more than about 500 men likewise the Bosnian Muslim Chetniks, while the Partisans always had multi-ethnic leadership, and while the rank-and-file started off dominated by Serbs, they were truly multi-ethnic from late 1942 onwards if not earlier. The Chetniks were pro-Allied in their long-term stance, but due to their lack of activity against the Axis they were drawn into collaboration with the Axis powers from 1942 onwards in order to fight the Partisans, which ultimately resulted in them being abandoned by the Allies in 1944. Let's not be inserting false information about the Chetniks into this widely read article. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 02:42, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

@Peacemaker67: can you please tell us what was the main visual identification Chetniks during WWII had? FkpCascais (talk) 03:01, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

I would say the kokarda with the double-headed Serbian eagle, usually worn on either the šubara or šajkača. How is that relevant to their collaboration? Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 03:08, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

Naaah, if you were the peacemaker you were in the 1990s you would also still recongnise them even in more distance by something else then the "kokarda", you know what I am refering to. FkpCascais (talk) 03:57, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

Stop talking in riddles. What on earth does what I saw in the 90s have to do with what Chetniks wore in the 40s? And what on earth does either thing have to do with whether the Chetniks collaborated with the Axis, which is the point of this thread? Try to stay on topic. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 05:15, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

Fkp, stick to the sources instead of misinterpretations. Put some quotes or just drop the stick. 89.164.129.173 (talk) 20:00, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

Dear fellow Wikipedians, FkpCascais (talk) and Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me), perhaps we can all strive to post the blog- or forum-style contributions over on my (talk) page in order to maintain Wikipedia's basic principles. There, it would be most appropriate, and allow space on Talk:World WarII for others' meaningful dialogues on additions/subtractions to World War II. Respectfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 23:54, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello FkpCascais (talk), Mia culpa for excluding the Chetniks. I can assure you, its ommission was not a plot. Although complicated and a subject of controversy, the Chetniks under Draža Mihailović will be included. Mihailović, defender of the downtrodden who slept in spartan simplicity with his soldiers, was known the world over. But, uneasy lies the head that wears the crown. The thick-as-thieves courtship between his communist/Croat adversary Tito, and Churchill’s son Randolph, along with a few Tito-smitten advisors and a Soviet plot, was to prove his downfall. The Chetniks now felt that the British sold them down the river. I am aware of the strong partisan reports against Mihailović. In those post-war communist kangaroo courts, the accused were proclaimed guilty before they could even open their mouths, then executed. Mihailović was one such tragic character, who bore the brunt of a few Chetnik “accommodations."

Lastly, I had the distinct honor of meeting George Vujnovich at an OSS affair. He led Halyard, the OSS mission to rescue 500 downed American pilots in Yugoslavia. The audience listened quietly as he recalled his mission, crediting its success to Mihailović, even after Mihailović was disparaged by Churchill and Roosevelt. Vujnovich received the Bronze star; Mihailović, the Legion of Merit. I don't recall any American medal bestowed on Tito.

Vujnovich considered one of his most valuable possessions a picture of Mihailović. The Vujnovich-signed copy of The Forgotten 500 is one of mine. Respectfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 23:54, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

Bigeez, you will strike serious opposition if you are intending to incorporate Fkp's pro-Chetnik propaganda along the lines of what you have just regurgitated above into this article. Read the lead of the Chetniks article for a fair and neutral (if not perfect) treatment of the Chetniks, using reliable secondary and academic specialist sources. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 06:12, 9 September 2019 (UTC)

I apologise gentleman, I had unexpected duties these days and only today I am being able to come back.

@Peacemaker67, I guess we forgot their beard. They became vastly known for their beards. Everyone knew it was Chetniks as soon as would see beardy soldiers in distance, much earlier than being able to identify their insignia. They made a compromise to keep the beards uncut all the way until the country was not free from Germans and other Axis forces. The beards were later used in Tito Yugoslavia to unfairly atribute them negative connotation. But we are not Tito Yugoslavia, and we should describe them neutrally. I knew you would come and I wrote my initial comment clearly pointing our aspects we disagreed in.

@Eli Bigeez, thank you very much for your atention and response. Yes, Chetniks continued fighting despite loss of official support. That obviously says a lot about them. Long time ago there was a mediation where the aspect of their collaboration was mediated. The mediation concluded that Chetniks collaboration was sporadic and oportunistic in nature. That was the conclusion to which the mediation cometee came after seing all sources presented and hearing the arguments from all sides. I participated on the side opposing the simplistic characterization of them as collaborators, while Peacemaker67 came by the time the mediation was closing and he strongly sided with the editors who were insisting in describing them the way they are perceved in Croatia, where Serbian monarchy and Chetniks as their supporters, were most negativelly perceved. Despite earlier agreement to respect the outcome of the mediation, that didn´t happened, and insatisfied with the outcome, their side, now counting with Peacemaker67 support, changed the content of the articles as they wished. Peacemaker67 was by then a new editor. He is very eloquent, and later has done some great work in several different areas, however, when the subject is Chetniks, he has a strong pro-Croatian view. It makes me a lot of confusion to see him being able to be such a great editor and then changing totally regarding Chetniks. He already accused me here to be a pro-Chetnik editor when in fact I am just opposing his radical negative view on them shared mostly by Croats, where is included in overall anti-Serbian narrative. I admit that as a Serb I may have some positive bias towards them, but I am certainly not a nationalist, and my family is divided, with most of my father´s side having been monarchists, and my mother´s side included actual Partisans which saw combat. So, it would be logical for me to have some pro-Partisans bias I guess, but I do my best to be as objective as possible, because, in the end, it is only by learning the truth and understanding the reasons and consequences of the real events, that open way for evolution. So, I don´t claim any truth, I actually search neutral and objective editors to see by themselves how our articles stand at this time regarding Chetniks, and how missrepresented they are since Peacemaker67 highjacked them towards the extreme negative perception of them and denial of their resistance role. He also denies the awards given officially by USA. I don´t mind continuing this discussion elsewhere but I will please ask you to leave at least the content of the discussion until this comment of mine, so other editors involved in the WWII can see a problem existing in one of the WWII theatres. FkpCascais (talk) 22:02, 9 September 2019 (UTC)

Who you are , what is the background of your family or your personal opinions don't matter. Stick to the sources and stop accusing other editors you disagree with.89.164.236.17 (talk) 20:25, 10 September 2019 (UTC)

I don´t think Peacemaker67 needs your help, neither I need any suggestions from you. If you are so obssessed that you need to edit Wikipedia, please deal with the indef-ban you are subjected to, and stop using the altering IP program to evade the ban. BTW, none of what you are saying makes no sense, because the mediation took place before you started editing Wikipedia, and you don´t know what happened there. Sources are not the problem. I have many sources, some even gathered here: User:FkpCascais/Sandbox23. There are enough sources to write two totally opposite articles, one praying them as Allied heroes, and other as evil collaborators. Because of that, we couldn´t just limit to add whatever claims that are sourced, but rather gather all sources and leave the mediators come to a balanced conclusion. That is how they concluded that their collaboration was sporadic and oportunistic in nature. However, the mediation conclusion was not respected, and anti-Chetnik side changed the content of the articles selecting sources and content that provides a very negative perception of them. I believe our articles regarding the Chetniks have a major WP:UNDUE problem which I wish to bring to the atention of the comunity. I openly introduce myself to the editors which don´t know me despite being an over decade old editor, and I openly assume the possible bias I may have. My intention is not to have any pro-Chetnik narrative, however, I also oppose the anti-Chetnik one that has been pushed into the articles. That is why I wish neutral editors involved in WWII articles to see by themselves the situation, which seems quite fair. But I am refering to real senior editors, not indef-banned vandals. FkpCascais (talk) 18:54, 11 September 2019 (UTC)

References