Talk:William Lane Craig/Mediation

Topic - William Lane Craig

Editors involved

• Squatch347 (talk · contribs)
• Theroadislong (talk · contribs)
• ජපස (talk · contribs)
• GretLomborg (talk · contribs)
• Bill the Cat 7 (talk · contribs)
• Approaching (talk · contribs)
• PaleoNeonate (talk · contribs)
• Shinealittlelight (talk · contribs)

Previous discussion - Dispute Resolution Noticeboard discussion

Beginning of discussion

This page will be the location for the informal mediation that I will be conducting. We will pick up where things left off from the Dispute Resolution Noticeboard discussion, namely, the discussion on Draft 4. Now, a majority of editors seem to find the version of the article acceptable - however there are some issues that I will highlight before we proceed. For reference, below is Draft 4 as it stands. I will outline my concerns from a policy point, and we will resume discussion there.

Can everyone pop a message below just confirming they're OK to proceed and see this discussion? Thanks. Steven Crossin ^{Help resolve disputes!} 18:03, 20 July 2019 (UTC)

Confirmation from editors

• Ready! Squatch347 (talk) 19:36, 20 July 2019 (UTC)
• Okay. —Approaching (talk) 22:06, 20 July 2019 (UTC)
• I'm not listed above as an involved editor, but I'm ready. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:01, 21 July 2019 (UTC)

  Fixed that, sorry about that - took the list largely from the DRN editors involved list. Steven Crossin ^{Help resolve disputes!} 01:04, 21 July 2019 (UTC)

• Okay. jps (talk) 05:05, 21 July 2019 (UTC)
• Sure. - GretLomborg (talk) 05:52, 22 July 2019 (UTC)
• I'm living in my parents basement, play D&D on weekends, and I've never kissed a girl. So, yeah, I'm good to go.  :) Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 23:46, 22 July 2019 (UTC)

• I didn’t realise Will Byers was a real person ;-) Steven Crossin ^{Help resolve disputes!} 12:03, 23 July 2019 (UTC)

Biography section

Biography section has been implemented with Draft 6, with a few discussed changes

Biography section - Draft 4 Biography William Lane Craig was born August 23, 1949 in Peoria, Illinois to Mallory and Doris Craig. [new cites] Craig was is the second of three children born to Mallory and Doris Craig. His father's work with the T. P. & W. railroad took the family to Keokuk, Iowa, until his transfer to the home office in East Peoria in 1960. While a student at East Peoria Community High School (1963–1967), Craig became a championship debater and public speaker, being named his senior year to the all-state debate team and winning the state championship in oratory. In September 1965, his junior year, he converted to Christianity became a Christian, [new cites ] and after graduating from high school, attended Wheaton College, majoring in communications.[new cites ] Craig graduated in 1971[[new cites ] and the following year married his wife Jan, whom he met on the staff of Campus Crusade for Christ.[new cites] They have two grown children and reside in suburban Atlanta, Georgia. In 2014, he was named alumnus of the year by Wheaton. In 1973 Craig entered the program in philosophy of religion at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School north of Chicago, where he studied under Norman Geisler. In 1975 Craig commenced doctoral studies in philosophy at the University of Birmingham, England, writing on the Cosmological Argument under the direction of John Hick.[new cites ] He was awarded a doctorate in 1977.[new cites ] Out of this study came his first book, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (1979), a defense of the argument he first encountered in Hackett's work. Craig was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship in 1978 from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation [new cites ] to pursue research on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus under the direction of Wolfhart Pannenberg at the Ludwig-Maximillians-Universität München in Germany.[new cites ] His studies in Munich under Pannenberg's supervision led to a second doctorate, this one in theology, awarded in 1984[new cites ] with the publication of his doctoral thesis, The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus During the Deist Controversy (1985).[new cites ] References Issues presented by mediator Issues I see, I'll break down sentence by sentence. If I don't see an issue, I'll state as such. William Lane Craig was born August 23, 1949 in Peoria, Illinois to Mallory and Doris Craig. [new cites[1][2][3][4]] Text - the text is fine here. References are ideally formatted with Template:Cite book - {{cite book |last= |first= |date= |title= |url= |location= |publisher= |page= |isbn= |author-link=}} is the standard format, documentation for how to use can be found at the template documentation page. This allows for universal in-line citations rather than a bibliography section which doesn't allow for accurate verification. References 1. The encyclopaedia reference - a few issues exist here. Reading through the text of the entry, the wording does not read neutrally and appears to be written in this manner e.g. "...possibly ranks as the most important Christian apologist..", "Craig's academic pedigree is enviable" - this appears to be written in the author's opinion rather than a statement of facts, which we cannot see. The other issue being that from this entry's preview in Google Books, the bibliography is not visible, so we cannot verify the content. I would need to see this before proceeding, but would be cautious about the use of this book for anything other than raw facts such as date of birth, birthplace etc, and instead rely on the secondary sources they cite (which we need a copy of). I'm also concerned about circular referencing. A tertiary source of this nature shouldn't be used just to give a primary source more merit, if that is what the tertiary source is citing. It would be similar to a secondary source (e.g. New York Times) writing an article saying "Barack Obama said that on his website, he won 50 Nobel Peace Prizes". Now, this is obviously false, but simply because a secondary source reports what someone has said about themselves, does not make the statement a fact. There's actually an example of this occurring in this section which I'll address separately. 2. An editor cannot verify a citation with just "William Lane Craig" 2007". I've hunted down the site, but can't view the content of the source as it's subscription only. Looking over the actual article, it's unclear where it's being used in the text. Since this source appears to only be used twice, and one use is struck through, I would recommend this be removed as it contains information provided elsewhere. 3. Source is fine for biographical personal information. 4. Reluctant to ever use someone's CV as a reference for anything, since it's purely self published. Apart from the line regarding his spouse in this section, the CV cannot be used as a reference, especially since there are secondary sources for each usage, and these are preferred. While a student at East Peoria Community High School (1963–1967),[5] Craig became a championship debater and public speaker,[1] being named his senior year to the all-state debate team and winning the state championship in oratory.[6] Text - I'd remove "Craig became a championship debater and public speaker" since it's solely reliant on the encyclopaedia entry which we can't verify whether it's a circular reference or quoting a secondary source's characterisation of Craig. References - I'm alright with source 6. Source 1 should go as I mentioned. The reference that I found has Craig listed only under "Speech Individual Events Individual Champions" - specifically under "Individual Medalists, by Year" and I don't see his name mentioned anywhere else on that website, so I'm actually not seeing this text supported by the source. It needs to be updated. Source 5 for what it is citing here is fine. I have read through the text in the source (which is merely Craig's response to a personal question asked) which says "She explained to me about the high school debate team at East Peoria Community High School (which was, by the way, very good, having won state that year). So when I became a freshman the following year I went out for the team and started debating". - this text doesn't state that Craig was part of the team that won state championships when he was on the team, and stating as such as written in the article is inaccurate. In September 1965, his junior year, he became a Christian,[7][8] [new cites [1][9]] and after graduating from high school, attended Wheaton College, majoring in communications.[10][new cites [4][11]] Craig graduated in 1971[1][[new cites [4][11]] and the following year married his wife Jan,[4] whom he met on the staff of Campus Crusade for Christ.[1][new cites[12]] They have two grown children and reside in suburban Atlanta, Georgia.[12] In 2014, he was named alumnus of the year by Wheaton.[11] Text - all OK References - ref 1 needs to go, as does reference 4 except for note about his spouse. 12 is OK. Ref 7 & 8 seem fine too. 9, Craig's opinion, is fine in this instance too. In 1973 Craig entered the program in philosophy of religion at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School north of Chicago, where he studied under Norman Geisler.[13][14] In 1975 Craig commenced doctoral studies in philosophy at the University of Birmingham, England,[15] writing on the Cosmological Argument[16] under the direction of John Hick.[1][17][new cites [16]] Text - OK References - 13 is the encyclopedia again - disallowed for reasons mentioned elsewhere. 14 is Craig's answer to a question - OK here. 15 appears to be possibly written by Craig himself, but it's a bio page, so for this content mentioned, OK. 16 is fine. 1 should be removed (encyclopedia again), 17 is fine. He was awarded a doctorate in 1977.[1][2][new cites [4]] Out of this study came his first book, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (1979), a defense of the argument he first encountered in Hackett's work.[16] Craig was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship in 1978 from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation [new cites [4][18]] to pursue research on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus under the direction of Wolfhart Pannenberg at the Ludwig-Maximillians-Universität München in Germany.[15][19][new cites [18]] His studies in Munich under Pannenberg's supervision led to a second doctorate, this one in theology,[11][20][16] awarded in 1984[10][new cites [4]] with the publication of his doctoral thesis, The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus During the Deist Controversy (1985).[21][new cites [22]] Text - reads largely OK. Would like independent verification of the doctorate award since they're all attributed to Craig's personal statements rather than somewhere else - if he started a doctorate at Univ of Birmingham, there should be a record somewhere. This text: Craig was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship in 1978 from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation [new cites [4][18]] to pursue research on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus under the direction of Wolfhart Pannenberg at the Ludwig-Maximillians-Universität München in Germany.[15][19][new cites [18] - It's a synthesis sentence - while he did research under Pannenberg [3], and was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship by the AvH Foundation, it doesn't link the two together. This is our synthesis of what sources say. References, encyclopaedia and CV has to go. Reference 2 also has to go for reasons mentioned elsewhere. 16 is still fine here. Concerned about using 15 for this info as it's a bio written by Craig. I'd remove ref 20 in the sentence about his second doctorate, as it's a primary source already supported by two secondary sources. Sources 21 and 22 are fine. OK, so that's my summary of issues overall. Let's proceed from here, thanks. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 19:53, 20 July 2019 (UTC) Discussion Here's a University of Birmingham web announcement that covers the degree claim. Leave it to others to decide whether it's worth anything. Supports a couple biographical claims like his PhD and professorships. Maybe even worth mentioning in his bio that he gave the Cadbury lectures. [4]. University faculty/presenter bios [5], [6], [7] —Approaching (talk) 22:23, 20 July 2019 (UTC) I agree that the encyclopedia piece contains some opinion. But it also contains useful report of biographical facts that are clearly not opinion. I have access to the full article, and none of the secondary sources contain any of the stated biographical facts. So the encyclopedia article may be a secondary source, not a tertiary one, and it seems that we do not know where they got the biographical facts they published. But that doesn't undermine its status as RS for these facts, does it? Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:26, 21 July 2019 (UTC) How can you trust a source that doesn't indicate from where the information is gathered? I pointed out the problems with this source and nearly had my head bit off. I'm still engaging in a conversation with the editors of the encyclopedia. I think there is an issue with their editorial policy. It's not clear to me that the source can be used for anything. jps (talk) 05:07, 21 July 2019 (UTC) Let’s keep the discussion focused on the content at hand please and not on each other. I’ve already made my determination on the source, but I’d like a copy of the full text of that entry nonetheless. I’ll discuss with some editors I know about it’s use, but the source is rather questionable at present and the argument for its reliability has not been sufficiently made at this time. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 09:51, 21 July 2019 (UTC) The Gale "Biography in Context" source from 2007 has since been superceded by an updated entry on their site from 2018. As with the Bloomsbury encyclopedia article, the Gale source provides many biographical details without clearly stating what the source of the information is. It then lists several "further reading" sources, including the Bloomsbury article, some of Craig's academic work, Craig's website, his CV, his imdb entry, and also this article from CHE. I'm not clear on whether such Gale pieces are RS, and, as with the Bloomsbury piece, it's hard to tell where they are sourcing the information. "Further reading" does not normally suggest that the listed works are sources for the content in the article. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:48, 21 July 2019 (UTC) If we can’t determine from where they gathered information about a biographical subject I would also discourage its use. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 09:51, 21 July 2019 (UTC) This seems to me an unreasonably strict standard. For example, on this standard, we could not regard the Stanford Encyclopedia Piece on Descartes as a reliable source for biographical information about him. For example, I cannot tell where the SEP article has sourced the claim that Descartes died in 1650. Since the SEP is clearly RS for this fact, I don't see why the Bloomsbury article isn't similar. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:42, 21 July 2019 (UTC) Not a reasonable comparison here. We have a few tests for determining reliable sources. My suggestion to not use this "encyclopaedia" is based on a few factors which I've applied from our reliable sources policy, specifically WP:SCHOLARSHIP, line "Material such as an article, book, monograph, or research paper that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable, where the material has been published in reputable peer-reviewed sources or by well-regarded academic presses". Stanford's Encyclopaedia of Philosophy has significant information about their editorial policies including qualifications required to contribute, specifically under "Editorial Policies, point 3", namely contributors are normally invited by Stanford to contribute, must have an accredited Ph.D in the field of Philosophy, and have published refereed work on the subject they are writing about, namely, articles in peer reviewed journals or books from reputable publishing houses. It also contains information on those involved in the editing process, and a very clear list of guidelines for the encyclopaedia entries listed here, including how entries should be written. An argument in favour of the reliability of this entry has not been made, nor has the same standard been met as the source you are mentioning here. Since it has been stated that the secondary sources referenced in the entry do not contain the information in the entry, the question then turns to - do Baggett and Robinson as authors of the entry meet the "experts in the field" RS criteria required for use of a source. As a mediator, it is not my place to make that decision - but to point out that they would usually need a PhD in the area (both do) and have peer-reviewed published works on the subject matter to be classed as an authoritative source on Craig. I've looked, and don't see that criteria has been met. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:25, 21 July 2019 (UTC) Thanks for the reply. If I'm understanding you, it turns out that you're not relying solely on the criterion I called "unreasonably strict". Instead, you're saying that the book must meet this criterion: "Material such as an article, book, monograph, or research paper that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable, where the material has been published in reputable peer-reviewed sources or by well-regarded academic presses". Do you agree that Bloomsbury Academic is a "well regarded academic press"? Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:45, 21 July 2019 (UTC) Bloomsbury themselves are a well regarded publisher, but that is not what I'm primarily referring to here, no. The entry on Craig in this book (which we cannot see the sources on, and as you stated that you've seen, does not reflect the content written in the entry is a factor). That the book has only one editor listed is another factor, and that the two people that have written the entry have not appeared to meet the "experts in the field" criteria for this sort of source, considering all other factors I've previously noted. Who publishes a book is not the only factor in determining if a reference is reliable, but it is a factor. As I mentioned, I'd like a copy of a link to the entry with bibliography posted here, and I'll confer with others on the matter for their take on the source - which we cannot fully do without access to the text. Finally, since this information largely exists in secondary sources, it is preferred to cite them (which has already been done here) rather than this source. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 13:38, 21 July 2019 (UTC) I don't know how to supply you with the full text of the Bloomsbury article; I got it from the library. Is there something you'd like me to do to help you gain access? In any case, I do have a couple of points I want to make in response. First, if I'm right--and I'd appreciate your eyes on it too here to confirm--then the source is not tertiary, or at least it isn't deriving the information from the cited secondary sources. So (again if I'm right) we cannot at present conclude that the source is not secondary. It may well be. We have to know what their source is to determine that, and, if I'm right, we don't know what their source was. Second, I don't understand where you're getting the policy about "experts in the field" or "only one editor". As I read the policy you quoted, it says that if a book is published by a respected academic press, it's reliable. Can you say something, or cite another policy, to explain why I'm misreading it? Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:58, 21 July 2019 (UTC) It’s not always as clear cut as “the publisher is respected” that makes a source reliable. It’s also a question of the author and their reliability (that’s covered in WP:Verifiability under “what is an RS”. The one editor note is in regard as to this book - unless I’ve missed something this book only notes one person was involved in editing the entries. The other factor here in play is that if we have no way to verify content in the entry, it may be considered failing to meet the “fact checking and accuracy” criteria for books as reliable sources. I think the best way to proceed here is I’ll make a posting at the reliable sources notice board and get outside opinions on this source. If you have a copy of the book, can you scan and email me the relevant pages? My email is listed on my user page. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 17:21, 21 July 2019 (UTC) As per above, I've asked a question at the reliable sources noticeboard. It's listed here. Let's see how it goes, and proceed from there. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 17:51, 21 July 2019 (UTC) Thanks. WP:VERIFIABILITY says that "In Wikipedia, verifiability means that other people using the encyclopedia can check that the information comes from a reliable source." So, if an RS reports a fact, we don't need to be able to verify the fact itself, but only that the source is reliable. In this case, I'm contending the source is reliable according to the policy you quoted, since it was published by a well-regarded academic press (and because there is no overriding concern about unreliability of the source). I do not see a source in policy for your idea that two editors are better than one, or the idea that the authors of a piece published by a respected academic press need to be "experts in the field" (not to say that they aren't in this case). These are reasonable ideas, but they're not in policy as far as I see, and I therefore don't see how policy would exclude a source on this basis. What I see is that the policy is suggesting that, in the absence of some reason to suspect unreliability, we should trust the judgment of Bloomsbury Academic, since it is a well-regarded academic press. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:13, 21 July 2019 (UTC) Based on my review of the source inclined material in the article, I see things that give me concerns the source may be unreliable and that we should favour other sources that report similar information. I want to reiterate that I’ve got no skin in this game, I just call things as I see them based on my 11 years of experience as a mediator here. Of course I might be missing something here, hence my post for a review at RSN. I think further discussion on this source should wait for that outcome. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 00:01, 22 July 2019 (UTC) That's fine with me. If you decide you want to keep talking with me, a good way to convince me would be to quote the specific policies you're depending on, or explain how I'm not understanding the policy you've referenced above. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:30, 22 July 2019 (UTC) Let's wait for the RSN thread to be resolved for the moment, I'm also noting that there's been little participation here from anyone else as of yet so would like to see more people involved here. I have further reasons and policies which I've referenced when making my recommendation to rely on other sources, but for the moment I think it's best to wait for other parties to join the discussion and see the result of the RSN (since I am really just a mediator here, and it's not my job to mediate a difference of opinion between just the two of us!) Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 02:50, 22 July 2019 (UTC) I don't have a problem discussing the credibility of the Bloomsbury article. But while we're hashing it out, we can also figure out what statements it is being used as a source for, and find alternative sources for those statements. —Approaching (talk) 23:39, 21 July 2019 (UTC) I would appreciate that approach. jps (talk) 11:02, 23 July 2019 (UTC) Biography section - Draft 6 William Lane Craig was born August 23, 1949 in Peoria, Illinois to Mallory and Doris Craig. [new cites] [old cites ] Craig was is the second of three children born to Mallory and Doris Craig. His father's work with the T. P. & W. railroad took the family to Keokuk, Iowa, until his transfer to the home office in East Peoria in 1960. While a student at East Peoria Community High School (1963–1967), Craig became a championship debater and public speaker Craig competed in debate [old cites ] being named his senior year to the all-state debate team and and won the state championship in oratory.[new cites ] In September 1965, his junior year, he converted to Christianity became a Christian, [new cites ] and after graduating from high school, attended Wheaton College, majoring in communications.[old cites ][new cites ] Craig graduated in 1971 [old cites ][new cites ] and the following year married his wife Jan, whom he met on the staff of Campus Crusade for Christ.[old cites ][new cites] They have two grown children and reside in suburban Atlanta, Georgia. In 2014, he was named alumnus of the year by Wheaton. In 1973 Craig entered the program in philosophy of religion at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School north of Chicago, where he studied under Norman Geisler.[old cites][new cites ] In 1975 Craig commenced doctoral studies in philosophy at the University of Birmingham, England, writing on the Cosmological Argument under the direction of John Hick.[old cites ][new cites ] He was awarded a doctorate in 1977.[old cites ][new cites ] Out of this study came his first book, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (1979), a defense of the argument he first encountered in Hackett's work. Craig was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship in 1978 from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation [new cites ] to pursue research on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus under the direction of Wolfhart Pannenberg at the Ludwig-Maximillians-Universität München in Germany.[new cites ] His studies in Munich under Pannenberg's supervision led to a second doctorate, this one in theology, [old cites ] awarded in 1984 [old cites ][new cites ] with the publication of his doctoral thesis, The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus During the Deist Controversy (1985).[new cites ] References Rationale: I had a go at addressing Steven Crossin's concerns. Since I dropped the encyclopedia entry, I had to find a different source for Craig's birthplace. I also condensed the debate team sentence for the same reason, since we can still show he was in debate and did well there without it (which I think is a very important biographical detail here). I started to use User:Approaching's source from the University of Birmingham, but decided to use the university's programme for the lectures rather than their announcement, since it had a clearer statement of when Craig was awarded his first Ph.D, though I think the fact he got it was pretty clear already. I don't think there's a synthesis issue with the Pannenberg sentence: the AvH Foundation source says Pannenberg was Craig's host. That said, I pulled in some other already-used cites further support the links in that sentence. - GretLomborg (talk) 06:37, 22 July 2019 (UTC) As an aside, I think the fact that we've been able to find further verification of the most critical biographical details in the encyclopedia article speaks well to its reliability, and least for the kinds of biographical facts where it's most useful. - GretLomborg (talk) 06:37, 22 July 2019 (UTC) I like the edit to the debate sentence, it does well to keep the point of that addition while addressing the Mediator's concerns. Question for the mediator, Steven Crossin your points about relying on CVs are well taken. Would those extend to their presence on a source that we would believe has done due diligence? I'm not necessarily saying we have that here, more a point of curiosity. IE if a CV was published by a journal or collection edited by professionals in the field, would that help, or is this a larger concern? On the Encyclopedia matter, I think the question of editors and peers is relevant and am interested in what the RS group has to say. With that said, I'm not sure your initial criteria of "neutral" wording is quite accurate. Those phrases are definitely laudatory, but that isn't odd for a biographical entry. Take a look at any Einstein (I'm not comparing the two directly of course) biography and you'll see similar laudatory comments about the subject's 'gifts' and being 'the most influential,' etc.[8][9][10] This is not to say that we should blindly accept such comments for inclusion of course, but rather that if the source and editors turn out to be reliable, I'm not sure the language itself is that problematic. With that said, I don't think the source is strictly necessary for this edit, so if we can agree on Draft 6, then we could move along while the other process continues. Squatch347 (talk) 13:16, 22 July 2019 (UTC) I'm sympathetic to Squatch's comment. That's because it's generally difficult to find ideal sources for this kind of a BLP. The person is quite well-known in his fields, but not well-known enough to have independent reliable sources record a lot of detail about his life. So I'm happy to provisionally accept multiple less-than-stellar-but-still-workable sources supporting a claim, while looking for better sources. That said, I know this is just my personal inclination, and might not meet the letter of the law regarding WP:RS. —Approaching (talk) 17:58, 22 July 2019 (UTC) I agree with you. The main difficulty, secondary sourcing-wise, is with biographical details about his life needed to populate a sketch of it. He's enough of a public figure to have gotten a lot of attention, but not enough of one for his personal life and background to have gotten much attention in secondary sources (though he's gotten some, and definitely enough for these paragraphs sans some dates). Our article benefits from supplementation either with autobiography or tertiary sources like the encyclopedia article to fill in biographical gaps and some details, especially given that these facts are of an uncontroversial nature. - GretLomborg (talk) 19:28, 22 July 2019 (UTC) Just for comparison, look at the two sources for Daniel Dennett's parents. None of this is to second-guess policies, however. I'm just saying that this is a systemic problem. —Approaching (talk) 01:36, 23 July 2019 (UTC) Support. Regardless of the noted discussions above, I support this version for inclusion. Squatch347 (talk) 13:22, 24 July 2019 (UTC) Support. Yeah, it looks pretty good to me. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 06:32, 25 July 2019 (UTC) I'm basically fine with the language in this draft, but I continue to want the encyclopedia as a source. It looks like the RSN post didn't draw much attention, but the one person who weighed in aside from people in our dispute said that the encyclopedia article clearly is a reliable source. So I'm happy with this draft, except that I'm for including the encyclopedia source as well. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:58, 26 July 2019 (UTC) Hi all. Since we have a majority consensus here for the draft, let’s move on with the next section of the article. I do see that the RSN didn’t garner much feedback at all, which is rather disappointing. Since we have other sources in the above draft that are already used for the draft of the text, I would suggest we keep the draft as it is, since for basic facts such as the above, there’s actually no need to have multiple references for a statement. In further drafts, if there are statements in the article that can not be attributed to other references, we can discuss whether the encyclopaedia article is suitable. It will depend on what other reliable sources say about the matter. For example, if we had a statement in an article where a majority of sources disputed the statement, but one source affirmed the statement, it would be a matter of discussion as to how, and if, to word the draft. No editor here has made a sufficient argument as to ‘’why’’ the Encyclopedia article has to be used, especially when other, undisputed sources can be used and concerns have been raised about its reliability by several editors - I note the single comment at RSN but don’t feel this forms a clear enough consensus here, and after a review of their edits, feel their opinion may not necessarily be an authoritative one based on their areas they edit and their history of edit warring on religious article topics- though I may open an RFC on future drafts if we need to. We’ve been on one of the shortest sections for weeks, and discussion has been slow. There’s consensus on the draft, which has sources that haven’t been disputed by anyone. Let’s move on. I’ll be implementing this draft at some point today, and we will move on to the next section. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 23:07, 26 July 2019 (UTC) I think I am fine with this, but is there a clear explanation for why the Bloomsbury Encyclopedia entry is being used to source the "being a Christian" line in particular? It actually does make some sense to me as it seems reasonable that Christians evaluate this statement, but it is interesting that this is the one place where this source is being introduced. jps (talk) 16:53, 27 July 2019 (UTC) I'm fine with not using the Bloomsbury Encyclopedia article in cases where we have better references, as long as we have a consensus those better sources can be primary sources, that we don't have to WP:ASF biographical facts, and that we could still use the encyclopedia if it's the best source for some passage. It has the most thorough presentation of Craig's biography of any source I've seen, and we've already fact-checked much of it ourselves. - GretLomborg (talk) 18:57, 29 July 2019 (UTC) @Jps, I think it was unintentional in this instance to include the encyclopaedia entry for the Christian statement, since there are three other sources here, so I've removed it. As per a thread on my talk page, it's been mentioned that a lot of the bibliography for the entry is attributed to Craig, or those that has responded to Craig's statements, views etc. Given this, I would recommend the source being treated as a primary source more than a secondary source here (e.g. If I made a statement about myself/a view I hold, and another book wrote about my view and cited what I said, there's little difference here.) But I agree that if we cannot find better references, it will be appropriate to have a discussion on how, or if, to include the line of text. I'm going to implement the Draft 6 as written, I think we have enough alternate sources and the text is agreed on, so let's move onto the next section. Cheers. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 01:49, 30 July 2019 (UTC) Unless there is a reason to doubt the source explicitly, I see no reason not to use primary sources. jps (talk) 11:46, 30 July 2019 (UTC) It all depends on ‘’what’’ the primary source is being used for, really. I’d have no reason to doubt the subject of an articles statements about their personal life (where they born, kids etc) but care is always required when using primary and self published sources. We will cross that bridge when we get to it, however. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 13:56, 30 July 2019 (UTC) I'm fine with moving forward. Two comments. First, I don't agree that there's little difference between a reliable secondary source repeating what a primary source said, on the one hand, and the primary source itself, on the other. The secondary source adds credibility in many cases. Second, primary sources for biographical information have been disputed in this very discussion (about when he became a Christian). So these recent remarks are surprising to me. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:01, 30 July 2019 (UTC) I take somewhat serious exception to the proposal that a secondary source which simply repeats a primary source can somehow "add credibility" to the primary source. I also think you have not understood the substance of my inquiry into Craig's conversion story. If you would like, I would be happy to work through our misunderstanding. For example, you could try to WP:Write for the enemy and see where you might have misunderstood what I was saying. jps (talk) 16:19, 30 July 2019 (UTC) Sure. I think you'd say that the words 'became a Christian' are ambiguous, and that, in one ordinary sense of the words, Craig has always been a Christian. I think you'd also say that, when Craig says that he became a Christian at the age of 16, he is using the words 'became a Christian' in a different sense--one that is distinctive of American evangelical Christians. I disagree with each of these points, and I do not see RS supporting any of them. But if this is the kind of scrutiny we can expect of primary sources about Craig, then I think we can expect primary sources to be of little worth on any point, no matter how trivial. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:02, 30 July 2019 (UTC) I think you'd say that the words 'became a Christian' are ambiguous This is not what I mean. in one ordinary sense of the words, Craig has always been a Christian I also do not have evidence that this is necessarily the case. when Craig says that he became a Christian at the age of 16, he is using the words 'became a Christian' in a different sense--one that is distinctive of American evangelical Christians I am not sure there is a "different sense" to this than an "ordinary sense". Indeed, increasingly, the "ordinary sense" for certain points of Christian belief may indeed follow closely the sense that I contend is being described by Craig when he tells his conversion story. The only means by which this is distinctive of Evangelical Christians is that it is an important means by which they give their testimony. But if this is the kind of scrutiny we can expect of primary sources about Craig, then I think we can expect primary sources to be of little worth on any point, no matter how trivial. Scrutiny is one thing, claiming that they are unreliable is another. My main goal here is to fairly describe the notable aspects of Craig's biography. For example, there is confusion about what "conversion" means among those who are not closely connected to Christianity. My goal is to make sure that the understanding is communicated for the benefit of the reader. Primary sources give us the content and we offer the clearest explanation we can. jps (talk) 21:00, 30 July 2019 (UTC) Let's move things along. Secondary sources, like all, are always subject to scrutiny. Care must be taken here - a secondary source that almost entirely gets it's content from a primary or self published source must be treated with due care, and if the source is absolutely required, should at a minimum be attributed to the author. For example, a public figure could write a personal biography about themselves on their own website, making all sorts of wild claims (e.g. first person to walk on Mars, a multi-nrillionaire, won 50 Nobel Prizes etc etc) and a secondary source, for whatever reason, could write that those things were said, and attribute it to the subject themselves. This does not make what was originally self-published reliable and accurate. I am not necessarily saying that occurred, or is occurring here, but does need to be treated with care. Regardless, the career section is up next. We should try proceed and work on further sections in the interest of progress. Given the text has been agreed on, when we come across text that we have a lack of sources on, we can further discuss. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 04:25, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

Career section

Career section has been implemented with Draft 3, with a few discussed changes. As noted, I'm OK with using 2 sources for the last discussed item, combined they give enough verification of the statement.

OK, let's progress to the career section. Below is Draft 0 as written. Let's get to work on finding high quality sources for this content. User:Steven_Crossin/Mediation/ProposalsTemplate Career section - Draft 0 (current version) Craig joined the faculty of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1980, where he taught philosophy of religion for the next seven years. In 1982 Craig received an invitation to debate Kai Nielsen at the University of Calgary, Canada, on the question of God's existence, and has since then debated many philosophers, scientists, and biblical scholars. After a one-year stint at Westmont College on the outskirts of Santa Barbara, Craig moved in 1987 with his wife and two young children back to Europe, where he pursued research for the next seven years as a visiting scholar at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Louvain) in Belgium. Out of that period of research issued seven books, among them God, Time, and Eternity (2001). In 1994, Craig joined the Department of Philosophy and Ethics at Talbot School of Theology in suburban Los Angeles as a Research Professor of Philosophy, a position he currently holds, and he went on to become a Professor of Philosophy at Houston Baptist University in 2014. In 2016, Craig was named Alumnus of the Year by Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. In 2017, Biola created a permanent faculty position and endowed chair, the William Lane Craig Endowed Chair in Philosophy, in honor of Craig's academic contributions. Craig served as president of the Philosophy of Time Society from 1999 to 2006. He helped found the Evangelical Philosophical Society and served as its president from 1996 to 2005. References Career section - Draft 1 Craig joined the faculty of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1980, where he taught philosophy of religion for the next seven years.[old cites ] In 1982 Craig received an invitation to debate Kai Nielsen at the University of Calgary, Canada, on the question of God's existence,[new cites ] and has since then debated many philosophers, scientists, and biblical scholars. [old cites ] [new cites ] After a one-year stint at Westmont College on the outskirts of Santa Barbara, Craig moved in 1987 with his wife and two young children back to Europe, [new cites ] where he pursued research for the next seven years as a visiting scholar at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Louvain) in Belgium. [new cites ] Out of that period of research issued seven books, among them God, Time, and Eternity (2001). In 1994, Craig joined the Department of Philosophy and Ethics at Talbot School of Theology in suburban Los Angeles as a Research Professor of Philosophy, a position he currently holds, and he went on to become a Professor of Philosophy at Houston Baptist University in 2014. In 2016, Craig was named Alumnus of the Year by Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. In 2017, Biola created a permanent faculty position and endowed chair, the William Lane Craig Endowed Chair in Philosophy, in honor of Craig's academic contributions. Craig served as president of the Philosophy of Time Society from 1999 to 2006. [old cites ] [new cites ] He helped found revitalize the Evangelical Philosophical Society and served as its president from 1996 to 2005. [old cites ] [new cites ] References Rationale: Mostly dropped the encylopedia article, but had to use a back-of-book bio from Amazon to replace it. Couldn't find a good source for the bit about the books from his time at Louvain, I found a few on Google Books where he mentioned Louvain in the preface, but I'm not willing to do more digging for that passage. Fixed some other small errors. - GretLomborg (talk) 23:07, 31 July 2019 (UTC) Thanks for taking a first pass at this. I see the encyclopaedia is only used once now, but a supplemental reference you provided covers this text as well. Could we proceed with using that one only instead (reference number 7). Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 00:35, 1 August 2019 (UTC) I'd be fine with that if everyone thinks the author bio would stand. - GretLomborg (talk) 04:18, 1 August 2019 (UTC) Yeah, thanks! I have a couple of thoughts. First, we say he taught at TEDS for "seven years", but the source says He taught philosophy of religion at TEDS from 1980–1986. This might mean from fall 80 to spring 86. Not sure. But if that's what it means, then it's not quite six years. I propose that we say "...where he taught philosophy of religion until 1986." Second, the sentence about debating Nielsen implies (I think) that this was his first debate as a professor, but the Stafforini blog post suggests that a debate with R.I.G. Hughes was his first debate. Not sure how to fix that; maybe we should just drop mention of the Nielsen debate. Unfortunately I haven't been able to find a better source listing all of his debates and the Stafforini piece appears to be a blog post, which is not great. References 5 and 6 appear to be missing--hopefully they are supposed to be good! Other than that, I like this draft. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:30, 1 August 2019 (UTC) I like your "until 1986" language, do you want to make a new draft with it? I actually think I made a mistake with the Kai Nielsen thing, so I undid my change and updated the ref. The 1991 Nielsen debate at the University of Western Ontario I initially found must have been a rematch, as Craig says elsewhere he also debated Nielsen in 1982 at the University of Calgary (which seems to have been Nielsen's home institution). I wonder if we should use Craig's list of debate transcripts [11] as a reference too. - GretLomborg (talk) 04:18, 1 August 2019 (UTC) Agree with all above. The one lone debate reference does seem out of place. It would make more sense if this was his entrance into that area or some major notable event. I think the idea of removing it and substituting a short list of notable debates makes more sense, though I'm not sure it makes sense here. Squatch347 (talk) 13:30, 1 August 2019 (UTC) I don't think it's out of place, personally. He describes the 1982 debate like it was a turning point and the start of a new phase in his debating career, so I think it's the most notable in the context of his biography. I think the mention should stay (though maybe the personal significance emphasized) and if we go deeper into the debates we should do it elsewhere. - GretLomborg (talk) 14:16, 1 August 2019 (UTC) That is a good point, it serving as a change in his career direction would be appropriate in that section. I agree with your suggestion that we include why it was relevant to him there to help the flow and tie in this point to the rest of the narrative. Squatch347 (talk) 14:19, 2 August 2019 (UTC) The line "...where he pursued research for the next seven years as a visiting scholar at the..." is a bit wordy. Could be simpler as "...where he was a visiting scholar..." Seems like it's less WP:PEACOCKy too. jps (talk) 22:12, 1 August 2019 (UTC) I don't think it sounds "peacocky" to say someone was researching for a period of time. It does appear to be a phrased used on our example articles as well. Regardless, the proposed text is more succinct so I have no objections. Squatch347 (talk) 14:23, 2 August 2019 (UTC) Yeah, I admit it's tantalizingly YMMV in terms of "peacock" concerns, but I have seen a similar kind of game played before at Wikipedia with visiting positions. I don't think that this is what is going on here, but I am inclined to say it's best to avoid this if possible. Glad that succinctness can be a sufficient rationale. jps (talk) 15:10, 2 August 2019 (UTC) Career section - Draft 2 Craig joined the faculty of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1980, where he taught philosophy of religion for the next seven yearsuntil 1986.[old cites ] In 1982 Craig received an invitation to debate Kai Nielsen at the University of Calgary, Canada, on the question of God's existence, an event at which Craig says his enthusiasm for such debates was kindled due to the large crowd it drew[new cites ]. Craig and has since then debated many philosophers, scientists, and biblical scholars. [old cites ] [new cites ] After a one-year stint at Westmont College on the outskirts of Santa Barbara, Craig moved in 1987 with his wife and two young children back to Europe, [new cites ] where he pursued research for the next seven years as was a visiting scholar at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Louvain) in Belgium until 1994. [new cites ] Out of that period of research issued seven books, among them God, Time, and Eternity (2001). In 1994At that time, Craig joined the Department of Philosophy and Ethics at Talbot School of Theology in suburban Los Angeles as a Research Professor of Philosophy, a position he currently holds, and he went on to become a Professor of Philosophy at Houston Baptist University in 2014. In 2016, Craig was named Alumnus of the Year by Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. In 2017, Biola created a permanent faculty position and endowed chair, the William Lane Craig Endowed Chair in Philosophy, in honor of Craig's academic contributions. Craig served as president of the Philosophy of Time Society from 1999 to 2006. [old cites ] [new cites ] He helped found revitalize the Evangelical Philosophical Society and served as its president from 1996 to 2005. [old cites ] [new cites ] References I incorporated the changes discussed above. I changed the "pursued research" sentence to be more accurate, but I want to say that the original version of that sentence was in no way puffery. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:26, 2 August 2019 (UTC) I like it, but maybe we could condense the new text at "an event at which Craig says..." a little bit. Maybe something like "where he found that debates are an effective venue for defending the Christian worldview."? I think that follows the source more closely, too. - GretLomborg (talk) 15:53, 2 August 2019 (UTC) Is such additional commentary even necessary? I think it's good to point out his first debate and that he continued to engage with debates ever after, but what do we want the reader to gain from understanding why Craig likes to debate? What is it that we are trying to explain here? jps (talk) 16:04, 2 August 2019 (UTC) To be honest, I'd also be fine with staying with the original text of this sentence. - GretLomborg (talk) 16:09, 2 August 2019 (UTC) I think it's natural for a reader to wonder why this guy is so into debates, and how he got into that, since it's unusual for an academic. So we've got an answer here. Seems of interest to me. I'm fine with either my wording or the suggested alternative. Mine has the virtue of explaining that it was specifically the fact that debates draw crowds that impressed him. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:16, 2 August 2019 (UTC) Before about a half century or so ago, debating used to be a more popular pastime for academics. To my eyes, it seems that Craig in his superannuated approaches harkens back to these kinds of nineteenth century/early twentieth century sensibilities, and in that I'm not particularly surprised that debate features as an enjoyment for him. More to the point, in other commentary about Craig do we find much confusion as to why Craig likes debating? This is the first I've been aware that there might be some surprise as to this. jps (talk) 16:54, 2 August 2019 (UTC) "Superannuated approaches" is still more violation of WP:BLP and I request that it be struck. Shinealittlelight (talk) 17:37, 2 August 2019 (UTC) Ha! No. jps (talk) 15:44, 3 August 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight: I think there may be warrant for some kind of debate-focused section, and maybe we could incorporate something about Craig's motivations there. These biographical sections are pretty matter of fact and high-level, so this might not be the best place for that kind of detail. - GretLomborg (talk) 18:48, 2 August 2019 (UTC) I agree with the idea of creating a debate section and moving this information there. But, if we're not going to write a debate section, then I'd vote for keeping this info in his bio. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:54, 2 August 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight: Maybe you could start a draft of such a section, where we can start collecting material for it. I think User:Squatch347 might have an interest in that, too. I'd suggest that it focus on his adult debate career, starting with this event, and we move the stuff about his motivations there. @Steven Crossin: How would you recommend proceeding on something like this? - GretLomborg (talk) 19:04, 2 August 2019 (UTC) I think a debate-focused section might be okay, but would want it to be focused on the debates which received serious outside notice rather than those that were promoted by organizations that hosted them or the personalities involved, for example. jps (talk) 15:46, 3 August 2019 (UTC) My take on this one has a few factors. The first would be a question of - is there significant coverage about their Craig’s debating in secondary sources, that can’t be covered more appropriately in a career section (since it already is covered there somewhat) and secondly, value to the reader by having a second separate section. I would think it could fit into a well written separate section, but would need a revision on this draft. Perhaps the start of the article could be written in chronological sections, e.g early life, and then go from there. Think a separate section could be workable, but also important to keep a balanced article using content mostly from secondary sources. At the moment, a fair bit is attributed to Craig or his website ReasonableFaith (which should be used with care as a self-published source (the lede mentions he established and runs the website - at the very least this is a primary source and secondary coverage should be the predominantly used sources on any Wikipedia article)) Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 21:57, 3 August 2019 (UTC) I think we should work through the existing article before working on authoring new sections (especially since this has been so slow). Do you have a process for doing that, and perhaps collecting material that we plan to add/relocate there as we find it? - GretLomborg (talk) 03:29, 4 August 2019 (UTC) I agree. Here's a brief list of sources: The Chronicle article [12] says that his debates garner "hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube" and it mentions his debates with Sam Harris ("large, sold-out auditorum at the University of Notre Dame"), Paul Draper, and Christopher Hitchens (which it counts among "high-profile events"). This Fox News piece mentions his debates with Harris and Hitchens as well. This book review in NYT mentions his debate with Bart Ehrman. This New Yorker article mentions the debate with Harris. This Scientific American article (by Michael Shermer, a critic of Craig) mentions his debate with Shelly Kagan at Yale. This article mentions him being "pitted against a panel of three Oxford academics including Daniel Came" and Stephen Priest. This opinion piece in the Independent mentions his debates with "Lawrence Krauss, Lewis Wolpert, Peter Atkins, and Sam Harris" and also mentions his debates with Anthony Flew, Stephen Law, Dan Dennett, and Cristopher Hitchens. This Telegraph piece mentions his debates with "Daniel Dennett, A.C.Grayling, Christopher Hitchens, Lewis Wolpert and Sam Harris" and also his (then upcoming) debate with Peter Atkins. Maybe that's a start. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:54, 4 August 2019 (UTC) OK, that's great. If we are going to work on the existing article for now, can a trimmed down draft be proposed on the Career section, and we can revisit this debate section later? I would recommend the section to be somewhat brief, but can visit that when the time comes. Also pinging users we've not heard from in a while to see if they're still willing to participate in the discussion? @Squatch347:@Theroadislong:@Bill the Cat 7:@Approaching:@PaleoNeonate: Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:48, 5 August 2019 (UTC) Yes, I sure am. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 07:11, 5 August 2019 (UTC) Me too. Was on a break. Back now. —Approaching (talk) 17:16, 8 August 2019 (UTC) Hello everyone, sorry I didn't respond sooner I generally stay off Wiki on the weekends. I think the current proposal of finishing out this section first then addressing the debate section later makes a lot more sense. I don't think we need to necessarily shoe horn it in here and it will give everyone some time to ponder what the structure/purpose should be. I also like Revision 2 as written. I think the inclusion of the "why are we telling you this factoid" is good and will tie in later to discussions revolving around his debates. Now, not to throw a monkey wrench in, but it seems odd that his career section doesn't mention Reasonable Faith the organization. As we've noted, it is a often used source in the bio, clearly is a major part of his time/notability, but we don't reference it in the article at all. That seems odd. It could be something as short as "in 20XX he and A,B,C started the ministry Reasonable Faith with the stated goal of "X,Y,Z." Squatch347 (talk) 14:37, 5 August 2019 (UTC) Reasonable Faith (the organization) is mentioned in the Chronicle article. Could use that as a source. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:42, 5 August 2019 (UTC) The latest Reasonable Faith public filings are from 2014: [13]. Since then, it has attested with ECFA since it is not required to file a form 990 and apparently has not done so. ECFA indicates that it has been pulling in about USD $1million each year. jps (talk) 15:46, 5 August 2019 (UTC) Career section - Draft 3 Craig joined the faculty of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1980, where he taught philosophy of religion for the next seven yearsuntil 1986.[old cites ] In 1982 Craig received an invitation to debate Kai Nielsen at the University of Calgary, Canada, on the question of God's existence.[new cites ]. Encouraged by the reception, Craig and has since then debated many philosophers, scientists, and biblical scholars. [old cites ] [new cites ] After a one-year stint at Westmont College on the outskirts of Santa Barbara, Craig moved in 1987 with his wife and two young children back to Europe, [new cites ] where he pursued research for the next seven years as was a visiting scholar at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Louvain) in Belgium until 1994. [new cites ] Out of that period of research issued seven books, among them God, Time, and Eternity (2001). In 1994At that time, Craig joined the Department of Philosophy and Ethics at Talbot School of Theology in suburban Los Angeles as a Research Professor of Philosophy, a position he currently holds, and he went on to become a Professor of Philosophy at Houston Baptist University in 2014. In 2016, Craig was named Alumnus of the Year by Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. In 2017, Biola created a permanent faculty position and endowed chair, the William Lane Craig Endowed Chair in Philosophy, in honor of Craig's academic contributions. Craig served as president of the Philosophy of Time Society from 1999 to 2006. [old cites ] [new cites ] He helped found revitalize the Evangelical Philosophical Society and served as its president from 1996 to 2005. [old cites ] [new cites ] In the mid-2000s, Craig established the online Christian apologetics ministry ReasonableFaith.org. References Rationale: Started with User:Shinealittlelight's draft, condensed the debate motivation, added mention of the foundation of ReasonableFaith.org based on text that's already in the lede. Not super happy with my sourcing for the date: not sure if JPS's ProPublica link to tax filings are kosher for that, but did find a vague "over ten years ago" in some transcript. Earliest archive.org captures are from 2007. - GretLomborg (talk) 17:01, 5 August 2019 (UTC) I've been away for a bit, but glad to see the progress. I think this draft is an improvement on the previous one. It's a good idea to keep vanilla career details near the top, while leaving the less "traditional" career information to the end of the section (as you did with his website). I think the content on his debates should go to the bottom too, so it wouldn't interrupt the discussion of his academic/professional career. —Approaching (talk) 17:35, 5 August 2019 (UTC) I think this looks fine. Squatch347 (talk) 13:27, 6 August 2019 (UTC) On giving it a second look, I think you should change "apologetics" to "Christian apologetics". Presumably people can present an apologia for a range of different views. —Approaching (talk) 23:39, 6 August 2019 (UTC) done - GretLomborg (talk) 13:54, 7 August 2019 (UTC) Pleased with this version more than others. Thanks to my ideological opponents for taking on-board my ideas. jps (talk) 16:22, 7 August 2019 (UTC) Hi all. Do we have a consensus to proceed with this version? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:47, 9 August 2019 (UTC) I still favor using the encyclopedia source, but aside from that I'm happy with this version and willing to incorporate it and move on for now. Shinealittlelight (talk) 10:23, 9 August 2019 (UTC) I'm ok with it. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 08:07, 10 August 2019 (UTC) I don't have objections to this version either, thanks for the ping. Possibly that a better word than "established" could be used (it seems strange to describe the creation of a website) but it's not a major problem. I agree that mentioning the site is WP:DUE. —PaleoNeonate – 02:47, 11 August 2019 (UTC) According to the site, Reasonable Faith has chapters and a podcast, so I'm not sure what all they do, but they appear to be more than a website. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:13, 13 August 2019 (UTC) Since there hasn't been further objections to Draft 3, and it looks all good to me, I'll implement Draft 3. We will then move on to the next section in the article (P.S. I am always lurking on wiki. Sometimes I may not be actively commenting here, sometimes I just like to see discussion run along and chime in as I see necessary. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 19:39, 14 August 2019 (UTC) Hi all. Taking a look, some of this is still sourced to Craig's CV. Do we not have another source for the material? (specifically "Craig served as president of the Philosophy of Time Society from 1999 to 2006.) Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 15:51, 17 August 2019 (UTC) It's in the encyclopedia entry. I can't find any other source that's better than that. Here's a press release from Miami University: [14]. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:18, 17 August 2019 (UTC) At face value, reading all sources I could find that mentions Craig and this text, it all reads exactly the same (as if it was written by the same person, or at least the information sourced from the same location). Since the Philosophy of Time Society does exist, can we find a source maybe from the organisation that lists Craig as President? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 16:42, 17 August 2019 (UTC) I think it might be possible to do so through the proceedings, but I cannot find electronic copies of these. Someone might be able to get their hands on them by e-mailing the officers. jps (talk) 00:55, 18 August 2019 (UTC) Wouldn't it be WP:SYNTH to rely on the proceedings? They aren't going to say when his first and last years as president were, so we'd need to infer that from the fact that he's first listed in one year and then listed in every year up to the last year he served. And we'd need proceedings from every single year to determine directly that he wasn't the president in any other years. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:19, 18 August 2019 (UTC) Technically yes, but if we can find other material to back up the primary source, we can trust it as accurate. I'm not necessarily disputing whether it is true or not, however the only sources we've found for this information are what appear to be self-written biographies of Craig (or at the very least are from primary sources), his own CV, and an encyclopaedia entry which notes Craig as the reference for significant amounts of material. If we can find an additional reference for this to verify, I feel that'd be ideal here. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 09:39, 18 August 2019 (UTC) Oh, I see. I did find a call for papers from a 2000 issue of the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association which lists Craig as the recipient of submissions, and the website for the Philosophy of Time Society says that receiving submissions is the role of the President. So that's some (weak) evidence. We could also just email the current president for verification. I do want to note again that the encyclopedia entry does not cite its sources, as is standard in many serious encyclopedias (e.g., the SEP entry on Descartes does not cite its source for Descartes's year of death), so I don't think we can say that it "notes Craig as the reference for significant amounts of material." Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:31, 18 August 2019 (UTC) Anyone willing to e-mail Prof. Callender [15]? Otherwise, I guess I could do it. jps (talk) 14:09, 19 August 2019 (UTC) I already did two days ago :-) Still awaiting a response. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 14:10, 19 August 2019 (UTC) One could also contact the American Philosophical Associations. Meetings of the Philosophy of Time Society typically occur during APA Division Meetings, and it wouldn't surprise me if they both had documentation, and had staff who were actually available to help. For a start, a good question to ask would be if they have access to the Chronos Journal, and if not, how one could go about accessing it. —Approaching (talk) 15:30, 19 August 2019 (UTC) As I understand WP:Verifiability, an email from the current president won't suffice. In other words, it's not a bad idea to email him, but he'll need to supply some published RS that we can cite. The proceedings of the society, Chronos, may contain the relevant information, but then again it may not. I have a copy of a volume of collected proceedings that was edited by Oaklander, and it contains no info about officers of the society--it only contains the philosophy articles. Hopefully the president will get back to Steven with some RS documentation. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:46, 19 August 2019 (UTC) My impression of what User:Steven_Crossin is saying is that we'd still cite the CV, encyclopedia, or whatever for this, but with more confidence since someone further verified it. - GretLomborg (talk) 16:15, 19 August 2019 (UTC) ^this. I'm trying to find something to back up the claim. I suggest in the meantime we proceed without it, and can revisit this sentence if we do find a source other than Craig or the CV. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 10:23, 20 August 2019 (UTC) I think we can leave it in. The call for papers User:Shinealittlelight found corroborates it. I've also been in communication with some of their current/past presidents. They're working on compiling an overall list which includes Craig, which is another corroboration. @Shinealittlelight: could you provide a cite for the 2000 issue of the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association that you found? - GretLomborg (talk) 17:10, 20 August 2019 (UTC) Sure, it's Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Assocaition 74:2 (Nov. 2000), p. 162. I also reached out to the secretary, they often have some of these kinds of records in their personal files, or at least, are familiar with the leadership documents. Squatch347 (talk) 11:59, 20 August 2019 (UTC) I received a response from the secretary, V. Alan White, PhD. Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Wisconsin--Green Bay, Manitowoc Campus. Here is the text of his response: "Hi David (if I may)-- I have been a member of the PTS for decades and recall Craig's presidency of course; I believe I never saw him because he attended the Pacific meetings while I only did the Central ones.  I was secretary under his successor L. Nathan Oaklander--whom I've known since 1983--and he might have inherited any material that Craig sent him.  I'm unsure that Nathan retained his email at UM--Flint, but you may contact Chair Prof Jami Anderson at jamia@umflint.edu for further contact info.  Good luck.   Alan" I can, of course forward that email to anyone who would also like to see it. Do you think it is worth reach out to Prof. Anderson or does this serve as a validation of the CV info? Squatch347 (talk) 00:07, 21 August 2019 (UTC) Hi, I think we've got enough here. I think we can cite the encyclopaedia in this instance, and the reference Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Assocaition 74:2 (Nov. 2000), p. 162. to bolster the reference. I'm not fond of ever referencing someone's CV apart from personal bio information as just general bad practice, merely because anyone could theoretically say anything on their CV. I think we can move on now, I'll go ahead and make the edit to the article. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 00:20, 21 August 2019 (UTC) Just to be clear: that APA proceedings page only says that submissions for their session should be sent to Craig. It doesn't explicitly say that Craig was the President. You have to infer that from the APA source plus the information on the Society webpage, which says that the President is the recipient of submissions, and the assumption that the role of the president as the recipient of submission has not changed since 2000. My point: this citation is WP:SYNTH as support for the claim that Craig was the president. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:32, 21 August 2019 (UTC) (edit conflict x 2) In this instance, since we have another source that states he was President, I'm OK in this limited circumstance to put the two references together to verify the claim. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 00:36, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

Philosophy and Theology section

Draft 7 Implemented

OK, the last and most significant one. Let's try get through this quickly, if we can. I'll start with the pasting in the whole section - let's first have a discussion about the quantity of text in this section. In previous versions of this article, the content was far more lengthy, and some editors wanted the section to talk in depth about Craig's views, so I think it's important we first discuss, and make balanced, reasoned arguments for inclusion/exclusion of content, before we work on specific drafts. My initial concern is that this section does reference ReasonableFaith.org, which is a primary (and some could argue, a self published source, but at the minimum, it is a primary source) and our reliance on it should be reduced substantially. Sounds good? Let's begin. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 00:41, 21 August 2019 (UTC) I am temporarily suspending the discussion. See Discussion paused section. Philosophy and Theology section general discussion In line with other articles on philosophers, I would suggest we cover each main view point as a summary with appropriate attribution ("Craig argues..""Craig says..."). One of the drawbacks of previous sections was that it was trying to cover too much of the primary page's back and forth on current status, opposing views, and non-summary details. This is a biography more than a page on the actual argument, thus it should suffice to summarize Craig's position with a clear phrasing of the subject as not consensus or fact, but his argument. Squatch347 (talk) 00:50, 21 August 2019 (UTC) I find it challenging to briefly assess so much material for length. All other things being equal, shorter is better. I do think the old version was a bit long winded. The above draft, however, does trim out some RS-supported details that seem relevant, interesting, and worthy of inclusion. So I guess I'm generally of the opinion that the current draft is a little short, but that the old draft was a little long. A couple of other remarks: the title of this section doesn't really reflect the contents. Several of the views discussed are not really apologetics. E.g., Molinism, his views of eternity, or his view of divine aseity are not apologetics. So I'd support changing the title to something like "Philosophical and Theological Views". Another note: Molinism is not a view of divine omniscience, so that sub-section should be called something else. Also, some of the content is not accurate in my opinion, but we can discuss that when we get to the details. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:48, 21 August 2019 (UTC) Agreed with this. Squatch347 (talk) 13:37, 21 August 2019 (UTC) I agree with User:Shinealittlelight that the section title needs to be corrected, except I would suggest that it be changed to "Philosophical and Theological Work" or "Philosophy and Theology." I agree with User:Squatch347 that this is a biography, so the focus should be on Craig and the goal should be to summarize his work in each of his main academic areas of activity in an accurate and comprehensible way. Some trimming of this section was needed, but I agree that the current version is too short. I think the only practical way to work through this is to focus on each subsection individually. - GretLomborg (talk) 04:04, 22 August 2019 (UTC) Philosophy and Theology could work. I'm not overly familiar with Christian theology in general, but at a cursory glance I looked for a good example, and found John Calvin (a featured article, but it lists him purely as a theologian) and Thomas Aquinas (C class article, but former good article). Augustine of Hippo uses "Views and thought" and then has separate sections for Philosophy and Theology. I don't see any reason we can't combine it into one section with the suggested title, however. I think these three may be good reference points for how such sections should be written, both in terms of what they should contain, and also how they should be written. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 05:59, 22 August 2019 (UTC) It has been mentioned before that the article on Alvin Plantinga is a good model here. It contains a section called "Philosophical Views" that was what inspired my suggestion. Shinealittlelight (talk) I think Augustine of Hippo and Alvin Plantinga specifically are great models to chose. By topic, short, but complete, expansion of views written with the proper attribution. Squatch347 (talk) 13:19, 22 August 2019 (UTC) My general impression is first that I agree that this section needs to be truncated substantially, but I would prefer to use sources that reference Craig as a guide for what is important rather than Craig's work himself. I also agree with retitling "Philosophy and Theology". One thing I think we might want to consider is that while Craig is most famous for being lauded by evangelical believers at all levels, there are theologians (especially those who are not evangelical) who have had occasion to take issue with various approaches that Craig has taken. I think making sure that the topics that have been noticed by secular sources and non-evangelicals are likely the ones we should focus the most on, but it would be also a good idea to mention the points that his comrades-in-arms think are the best arguments from evangelical apologetics perspectives. jps (talk) 17:42, 22 August 2019 (UTC) I do not agree that the religious affiliation of the author of a given source is the correct way to assess its reliability or weight in this case. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:07, 22 August 2019 (UTC) It absolutely must be since Craig takes religious positions on various topics that are in line with certain religious positions and not with others. Part of what makes a work WP:NPOV is making sure that sources are not all from the same POV. jps (talk) 18:19, 22 August 2019 (UTC) We should judge weight and reliability based on credentials, citations, and the reputation of the venue in which they are published. Morriston is an expert in philosophy of religion who has published several well-received critiques of Craig in well-respected journals. His work is a good example of a critical source that might be worth citing. Who cares if he's a Christian? It's the wrong measure. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:30, 22 August 2019 (UTC) This seems like a straw horse. Why don't you try to deal with the substance of my argument rather than talking about retired philosophers nobody yet has brought up? jps (talk) 18:41, 22 August 2019 (UTC) Morriston is cited in the current version of the article, so he has been brought up in that sense. I'm not sure why it matters that he has retired; actually, I'm sure it doesn't matter. Here's another example: van Inwagen had a critical exchange with Craig recently on abstract objects. Van Inwagen should be excluded because he's a Christian? Again, wrong measure. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:53, 22 August 2019 (UTC) You seem to not understand my point. Nowhere did I say we should exclude Christians because they are Christians. That you think this is my position is a huge problem and it's borderline insulting. jps (talk) 16:18, 24 August 2019 (UTC) I characterized you as thinking that the religious affiliation of the author of a given source is the correct way to assess its reliability or weight in this case. I understood your response above to this as an affirmation that indeed this is your view: you said religious affiliation absolutely must be the way we assess reliability or weight. So now you're insulted by my characterization? That's puzzling to me. But, in any case, I'm glad to know that we agree after all that the religious affiliation of authors is not the right measure for reliability and weight. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:15, 24 August 2019 (UTC) I have to disagree with jps's approach here for a couple of reasons. The most important of which is that it doesn't match our approach to the three articles we referenced as guides and of high quality. In all of those the issues are summarized from the subject's point of view or based on their argument. In none of them do we seem to approach sources based on their religious background, nor do we deal heavily with contemporary or later criticism. We either need to treat this subject in the same manner or make an argument why our comparison articles are wrong. Additionally, while we of course prefer secondary sources, I'll note that all three of those articles are heavily reliant on primary sources since they are summarizing the subject's position on a topic. Squatch347 (talk) 13:54, 23 August 2019 (UTC) Secondary sources are to be preferred. Preferring primary sources is a way to slant the article. Craig is no Augustine of Hippo. Referring to primary sources for Augustin of Hippo makes a bit more sense when you've got plenty of secondary sources that mention the primary sources. Since Craig in certain areas is pretty marginal in terms of who has noticed what he's going on about, it is not really appropriate for us to go into depth explaining his variously intricate positions on matters that have not generated outside interest -- especially when there are instances of secondary sources which have paid attention to some of his more famous claims. jps (talk) 16:18, 24 August 2019 (UTC) Craig is not a marginal figure. By my count, using Google scholar, has an h-index score of 33 (he has 33 publications with at least 33 citations). And his work is in the top journals in the field, and has been published by the top presses. This record of publication is comparable to philosophers at the best philosophy departments in the world. So obviously the claim that he's marginal is likely to be challenged, and is also harmful to Craig. As a result, I regard the claim that he's marginal as yet another WP:BLP violation. If these violations do not stop, I'm leaning towards asking for administrator involvement. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:44, 24 August 2019 (UTC) Alright, enough. Lets cool this discussion down please. I would remind everyone that BLP does indeed apply to talk pages. The aim here is to create a balanced, well written article. Going at each others throats is never helpful. If administrator involvement is ever required, I'll be the one to handle this. Now, as for the structure of the article, in particular this section, we should follow the Manual of Style - Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Philosophy#Philosophers_3 is the closest guideline here. Articles on philosophers and theologians do often summarise their viewpoints, and it is not always necessary to solely rely on secondary sourcing for this. Writing an article such as this requires many policies to be weighed, but that is my role here. I would recommend we put our personal views on the subject aside (as I do see that there are some that are having an effect in here) and focus on Wikipedia policy. Presenting the views of a subject needs to be weighed with giving their view undue weight or prominence, also relying on one or a few primary sources is a problem too (for example, if this section relied predominantly on Craig's website ReasonableFaith, then I would recommend we discuss alternatives, or trimming down some content (also copying large swathes of text would be a potential copyright issue). Secondary sources that cover Craig's views are recommended too, and any claims that Craig has made that are widely rebutted/disputed in reliable sources can of course be considered. I'll start by retitling the section, and then we will work on drafts from there. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 23:53, 24 August 2019 (UTC) I'm very happy to have you in charge of enforcing BLP policy here, thank you. I realize that my views aren't the topic, but since you mentioned personal views, I'd like to state for the record that I disagree with almost every single one of Craig's views. I very much want the article to follow Wikipedia policy, and I'm happy to focus on that. I haven't worked through every section in detail, so I'm not 100% confident about this, but I think that there will are sufficient secondary sources that we don't have to rely on any primary sourcing at all. His most notable books are reviewed in high-quality philosophy journals, and his work has (as I indicated above) generated a lot of critical discussion, which often includes a presentation of the views being discussed. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:06, 25 August 2019 (UTC) That's fair enough. I've done my fair share of mediation on religious/ethnic disputes in my time, so am aware that often, people do have strong views on the subject/topic area. Secondary sources are always preferable, and I'm sure we will be able to work towards a version that complies with policy. I'm a little tied up today with a Wikimedia chapter board meeting, but after that I'll be free. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 02:09, 25 August 2019 (UTC) Is your argument that Craig is WP:FRINGE and therefore WP:FRIND applies to the sourcing? - GretLomborg (talk) 18:55, 22 August 2019 (UTC) Hi all. Chiming in very briefly to ask to try to keep conversation restrained for the next 24 hours. This week I’ve had real life matters to attend to so my comments here have been limited. I’ll reply more in due course, thanks. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 22:13, 22 August 2019 (UTC) I'll be out of pocket until Wednesday, I think my position has been clearly stated enough so that my absence shouldn't be an issue. Squatch347 (talk) 13:54, 23 August 2019 (UTC) Alright, let's get started. This will take some time - let's please start from Draft 0. I'd prefer the section be done as a whole, it may take many drafts, but please put together a proposal for the entire section, cite your sources (remember, secondary sources are preferred) and continue to attribute statements to Craig "e.g. Craig believes, Craig states etc etc. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 16:04, 26 August 2019 (UTC) Hi Steven. Thanks for getting this started. I wanted to mention that Squatch347 proposed some language on my talk page for just the first sub-section on the Kalam argument. Anyone here should feel free to have a look. Presumably Squatch347 didn't propose it here because it's not a draft of the whole section as you requested. Shinealittlelight (talk) 17:28, 26 August 2019 (UTC) I've been busy lately, sorry. Happy to see this discussion happen. Do we have a sense of what the important views ought to be, to start with? I used to follow some of his earlier work on philosophy of time, but it seems like he has a range of positions he's developed at length on a range of different issues. Maybe picking those issues out will help us develop the shape of this section. —Approaching (talk) 17:01, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Philosophy and Theology - Draft 0 (current version) Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has worked extensively on a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam has a venerable history in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's popularization resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general; the philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, Wes Morriston of the University of Colorado Boulder, specifically challenged Craig's support of the argument. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig supports its premises by appealing to his interpretation of the Big Bang model. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. He also proposes the universe cannot be infinite in part because an actual infinity of items cannot be formed by successive addition, a claim which Morriston criticizes in particular. Craig argues that the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Divine omniscience Craig is a proponent of Molinism, supporting the doctrine of middle knowledge and also applying it to a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, Christian particularism, and the problem of evil. Formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, the doctrine of middle knowledge holds that logically prior to his decree to create a world God knew what every possible creature he might create would freely do in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place him. On the basis of his knowledge of such counterfactuals of free will and his knowledge of his own decree to create certain creatures in certain circumstances, along with his own decision how he himself shall act, God automatically knows everything that will actually and contingently happen, without any perception of the world. Divine eternity Craig believes that "God is timeless without creation and temporal since creation." After examining arguments aimed at showing either that God is timeless or omnitemporal, Craig defends the coherence of a timeless and personal being, but he also believes the arguments for divine timelessness are unsound or inconclusive and so instead argues in favor of divine temporality. Craig believes that acceptance of a B-theory of time would moot these arguments, and thus concludes that a theory of time is a watershed issue for a believer’s doctrine of divine eternity. As such, Craig defends his adoption of A-Theory of time in The Tensed Theory of Time (2000), and critiques arguments for the B-Theory of time in The Tenseless Theory of Time. According to philosopher Quentin Smith, "Craig has made some important and positive contributions to the tensed theory of time in general." Resurrection of Jesus Craig has written two volumes arguing for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus (1985) and Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (3rd ed., 2002). The first describes the history of the discussion, including David Hume's arguments against the identification of miracles, while the second is an exegetical study of the New Testament material pertinent to the resurrection. Craig believes that there was a literal resurrection, rejecting some alternative explanations such as Gerd Lüdemann's hallucination hypothesis. Craig Morriston specifically challenges Craig's arguments relating to this subject. Divine aseity Stating that the Quine–Putnam indispensability thesis is the chief support of platonism, Craig criticizes Willard Van Orman Quine's naturalized epistemology and confirmational holism, and also rejects the metaontological criterion of ontological commitment. This is ultimately in support of his belief in divine aseity or self-existence. Craig rejects the view that God creates abstract objects and defends nominalistic perspectives on abstract objects. Craig favors a neutral logic, according to which the formal quantifiers of first-order logic, as well as the informal quantifiers of ordinary language, are not ontologically committing. He also advocates a deflationary theory of reference, according to which referring is a speech act rather than a word-world relation, so that singular terms may be used in true sentences without commitment to corresponding objects in the world. If one stipulates that first-order quantifiers are being used as devices of ontological commitment, then Craig adverts to fictionalism, in particular pretense theory, according to which statements about abstract objects are expressions of make-believe, imagined to be true, though literally false. Other views Craig is a critic of metaphysical naturalism, New Atheism, and prosperity theology, as well as a defender of Reformed epistemology. He also states that a confessing Christian should not engage in homosexual acts. Craig maintains that the theory of evolution is compatible with Christianity. Craig is not convinced that the "current evolutionary paradigm is entirely adequate" to explain the emergence of biological complexity, and he is inclined to think that God had to periodically intervene to produce this effect. He is a fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture and was a fellow of the International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design. As a divine command theorist, Craig believes God had the moral right to command the killing of the Canaanites if they refused to leave their land, as depicted in the Book of Deuteronomy. This has led to some controversy, as seen in a critique by Wes Morriston. The prominent atheist Richard Dawkins has repeatedly refused to debate Craig, and has given what he calls Craig's defense of genocide as one of his reasons. Craig has also proposed an Apollinarian Christology in which the divine logos stands in for the human soul of Christ and completes his human nature. References Philosophy and Theology - Draft 1 external refs: Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has worked extensively on a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner: "1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modest version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in the second premise, that time is finite, and he offers two main philosophical arguments to support it: that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is metaphysically impossible due to the consequential absurdities that arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics, and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. Craig's conclusion is the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support the Kalam argument have been controversial and widely debated. The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy have published critiques of them. Craig has worked extensively on a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam has a venerable history in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's popularization resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general; the philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, Wes Morriston of the University of Colorado Boulder, specifically challenged Craig's support of the argument. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig supports its premises by appealing to his interpretation of the Big Bang model. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. He also proposes the universe cannot be infinite in part because an actual infinity of items cannot be formed by successive addition, a claim which Morriston criticizes in particular. Craig argues that the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Divine omniscience Craig is a proponent of Molinism, supporting the doctrine of middle knowledge and also applying it to a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, Christian particularism, and the problem of evil. Formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, the doctrine of middle knowledge holds that logically prior to his decree to create a world God knew what every possible creature he might create would freely do in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place him. On the basis of his knowledge of such counterfactuals of free will and his knowledge of his own decree to create certain creatures in certain circumstances, along with his own decision how he himself shall act, God automatically knows everything that will actually and contingently happen, without any perception of the world. Divine eternity Craig believes that "God is timeless without creation and temporal since creation." After examining arguments aimed at showing either that God is timeless or omnitemporal, Craig defends the coherence of a timeless and personal being, but he also believes the arguments for divine timelessness are unsound or inconclusive and so instead argues in favor of divine temporality. Craig believes that acceptance of a B-theory of time would moot these arguments, and thus concludes that a theory of time is a watershed issue for a believer’s doctrine of divine eternity. As such, Craig defends his adoption of A-Theory of time in The Tensed Theory of Time (2000), and critiques arguments for the B-Theory of time in The Tenseless Theory of Time. According to philosopher Quentin Smith, "Craig has made some important and positive contributions to the tensed theory of time in general." Resurrection of Jesus Craig has written two volumes arguing for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus (1985) and Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (3rd ed., 2002). The first describes the history of the discussion, including David Hume's arguments against the identification of miracles, while the second is an exegetical study of the New Testament material pertinent to the resurrection. Craig believes that there was a literal resurrection, rejecting some alternative explanations such as Gerd Lüdemann's hallucination hypothesis. Craig Morriston specifically challenges Craig's arguments relating to this subject. Divine aseity Craig has worked on the challenge posed by platonism to divine aseity or self-existence. Craig rejects the view that God creates abstract objects and defends nominalistic perspectives on abstract objects. Stating that the Quine–Putnam indispensability thesis is the chief support of platonism, Craig criticizes Willard Van Orman Quine's naturalized epistemology and confirmational holism, and also rejects the metaontological criterion of ontological commitment. This is ultimately in support of his belief in divine aseity or self-existence. Craig rejects the view that God creates abstract objects and defends nominalistic perspectives on abstract objects. Craig favors a neutral logic, according to which the formal quantifiers of first-order logic, as well as the informal quantifiers of ordinary language, are not ontologically committing. He also advocates a deflationary theory of reference, according to which referring is a speech act rather than a word-world relation, so that singular terms may be used in true sentences without commitment to corresponding objects in the world. If one stipulates that first-order quantifiers are being used as devices of ontological commitment, then Craig adverts to fictionalism, in particular pretense theory, according to which statements about abstract objects are expressions of make-believe, imagined to be true, though literally false. Other views Craig is a critic of metaphysical naturalism, New Atheism, and prosperity theology, as well as a defender of Reformed epistemology. He also states that a confessing Christian should not engage in homosexual acts. Craig maintains that the theory of evolution is compatible with Christianity. Craig is not convinced that the "current evolutionary paradigm is entirely adequate" to explain the emergence of biological complexity, and he is inclined to think that God had to periodically intervene to produce this effect. He is a fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture and was a fellow of the International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design. As a divine command theorist, Craig believes God had the moral right to command the killing of the Canaanites if they refused to leave their land, as depicted in the Book of Deuteronomy. This has led to some controversy, as seen in a critique by Wes Morriston. The prominent atheist Richard Dawkins has repeatedly refused to debate Craig, and has given what he calls Craig's defense of genocide as one of his reasons. Craig has also proposed an Apollinarian Christology in which the divine logos stands in for the human soul of Christ and completes his human nature. Bibliography (new entries) Bradley, Raymond Dynevor (2009). "The Kalam Cosmological Argument". In Birx, H. James (ed.). Encyclopedia of Time: Science, Philosophy, Theology, & Culture, Volume 1. SAGE. ISBN 9781412941648. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Copan, Paul (2017). "Introduction". In Copan, Paul; Craig, William Lane (eds.). The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Volume 1: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 1–12. ISBN 9781501330797. Retrieved 20 June 2019. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Craig, William Lane (2017). "The Kalam Cosmological Argument". In Copan, Paul; Craig, William Lane (eds.). The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Volume 1: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 302–317. ISBN 9781501330797. Retrieved 20 June 2019. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Moreland, J. P. (December 2003). "A Response to a Platonistic and to a Set-Theoretic Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument". Religious Studies. 39 (4). Cambridge University Press: 373–390. doi:10.1017/S0034412503006565. ISSN 0034-4125. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Oppy, Graham (2006). Arguing about Gods. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781139458894. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Reichenbach, Bruce (2019). "Cosmological Argument". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 ed.). Retrieved 26 August 2019. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) Vilenkin, Alexander (2017). "The Beginning of the Universe". In Copan, Paul; Craig, William Lane (eds.). The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Volume 2: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 150–158. ISBN 9781501335891. Wainwright, William J. (May 1982). "Reviewed Work: The Kalām Cosmological Argument, by William Lane Craig". Noûs. 16 (2). Wiley: 328–334. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help) References Summary: Mainly updated the Kalam section with a draft I'd been working on that is a new redaction of the pre-dispute version with improved sourcing and some additions. Since it's so different than the current version, I just struck the old version out that and replaced it with mine without going through each of the changes in detail. My main sources were the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (which covers Craig extensively) and a 1982 critical book review of Craig's 1979 book The Kalam Cosmological Argument. I'm using Harvard cites so I have many new entries for the bibliography. My goal was to summarize Craig's personal work on the argument and its reception/criticism, in a way that a reader might be able to understand it in context without already knowing the material we're covering. I also reverted a recent change to the divine aseity section to make things clearer there. I also struck a passage in the Resurrection of Jesus section which was just wrong: "Craig Morriston" is not a real person (rather a hasty jumble of William Lane Craig and Wes Morriston), the source is an paper by Law (not Morriston), and the Law paper only mentions Craig in a list of examples in a footnote five pages in. Going forward, I think there's value in looking at the current and pre-dispute versions in parallel. - GretLomborg (talk) 22:05, 26 August 2019 (UTC) Thanks for this. I don't have time to propose a full draft right now, but I might in the next few days. Here's some quick feedback on the Kalam stuff. I like that there's a statement of the Kalam argument included in this draft; I think that's for the best. But I don't think we need the clarification that he has recently opted for a weakened premise 1. That seems like more detail than necessary here. I also think it is too much detail to present his two philosophical arguments and his empirical considerations in favor of premise 2. Instead, I'd propose something like "Craig provides several philosophical and empirical arguments in favor of premise 2" or something to that effect, perhaps with some indication that the arguments are controversial. The alternative, in my opinion, would be to rewrite the stuff on Hilbert's hotel, etc., so that it is appropriately clear to the general reader, but that would in my view require an exposition that is way too long. As it stands, I think this material is too densely written, and isn't going to be informative to the general reader. Another thing: the statement that his "interest is mainly in the second premise" is pretty unclear to my mind. A number of RS, such as this, say that he regards the first premise as obvious, and so he mainly focuses on defending the second premise. I think that's a clearer way of putting it. There's an incomplete sentence ending "beginning of the universe implies". Not sure how that was intended to end. Finally, Morriston isn't clearly a Christian philosopher, and I think that goes beyond the source. I also thought that a fuller list of references to critical discussion after the Smith quote would be more illustrative of what he means. Two references doesn't really bear out his claim that it is the most discussed argument. Finally, where is the "more plausible than not" language coming from? I don't see that in sources, but maybe I'm missing it. Can you give a quote? I thought Craig was more confident in his conclusions than that. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:33, 27 August 2019 (UTC) On "Craig provides several philosophical and empirical arguments in favor of premise 2": I don't think we can condense it that much, since those philosophical and empirical arguments are Craig's main contribution and are the things his critics actually critique on this topic. We need to include some details of them, at least enough to enumerate them. I'm open to different language, though I think the focus here should be on clarity not brevity. I included his weakened premise 1 for biographical reasons to reflect his current thinking, though it could probably be made more concise and less prominent. I fixed the incomplete sentence in the draft. I'm open to changing the phrasing on his relationship to premise 2, especially since sources vary. Looking back, I think I got the "interest" phrasing from Copan 2017, p. 4. The "more plausible than not" phrasing came from the pre-dispute version, and we can change that, too. I've read very little of Craig's writings, and I don't think I've seen the phrasing that he himself uses to close the argument. Morriston appears to be a liberal Christian: Craig actually makes the claim more explicitly on his website (they've met). Morriston's self-description that "he's not that kind of Christian [conservative kind]", is saying that he's 'a' kind of Christian. He says more in the podcast that I didn't transcribe which paints that picture, and didn't object to the host labeling him as a Christian. I think the label is helpful as it shows there's some diversity in Craig's critics (i.e. they're not all atheists). - GretLomborg (talk) 04:48, 27 August 2019 (UTC) Without comment to the value of any of this content being included, some of this can be compressed prose wise. E.g. the Kalam Cosmological Argument section - I don't see the need to dot point his three points, this can be combined into one sentence. Other parts can likely be combined somehow, e.g. ...two main philosophical arguments to support it: that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible,[11][12][13] and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible.[14][15][4] - both parts of the sentence end with is metaphysically impossible, so these can likely be combined somehow. Shinealittlelight's other points above are good ones. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 02:40, 27 August 2019 (UTC) I removed the numbered list from the draft based on your feedback, though I think it's been presented as a list in every source where I've encountered it. - GretLomborg (talk) 04:48, 27 August 2019 (UTC) Steven, is it preferable to excise all primary sources, or is it better to leave them in but back each one with secondary sources? Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:36, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I think this current version is a pretty good one. I took a look at the pre-dispute version of the page and I think this represents substantively everything that it covered within it. There are only a couple of small points between the two that we might want to discuss. 1) This sentence is in the original and I think it does a good job summarizing the points taken by Craig in his work: "Craig's discussion of the evidence for each of these events includes a defense of the traditions of Jesus' burial by Joseph of Arimathea, a close exegesis of the Pauline doctrine of the resurrection body, and an investigation of pagan and Jewish notions of resurrection from the dead." 2) I think the summary of the Divine Command justification for the killing of the Caananites isn't quite correct as I understand it. The Divine Command ideology relates to the Israelite's justification for the act, not God's since God wouldn't be issuing commands to himself.[16] Rather, as I'm reading Craig's argument, it is that God must still have morally sufficient reasons to issue a divine command.[17][18] A better phrasing might be: "As a divine command theorist, Craig believes the moral obligations of humans are based in God's commands, but that God has no such moral obligations. Craig asserts that God's commands though, must be in conjunction with his own nature of goodness and as such he had the moral right to command the killing of the Canaanites in judgement of their actions, as depicted in the Book of Deuteronomy. This has led to some controversy. The prominent atheist Richard Dawkins has repeatedly refused to debate Craig, and has given what he calls Craig's defense of genocide as one of his reasons. Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Oxford University (where the debate was to take place), Daniel Came, described Dawkins' rationale as "opportunistically using these remarks as a smokescreen to hide the real reasons for his refusal to debate with Craig." 3) I think we probably need to add a section on the Theory of the Atonement, which seems to be more recent.[19]. Craig defends a Penal Theory of Atonement, but I haven't had time to track down any sources or verbage for it. I'll try to work through that this week and post some additional language for inclusion. Squatch347 (talk) 14:53, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Philosophy and Theology - Draft 1.1a Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has worked extensively on and promoted a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam has a venerable historywas first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference contemporarysome scientific and philosophical ideas that he believed were relevant. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner: "1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modestdifferent version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in the second premise, that time is finite, and he offers two main philosophical arguments to support it: his contention that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and his contention that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is metaphysically impossible due to the consequential absurdities that he believes must arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics, and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past.The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. Craig believes that a cosmic singularitysingularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. Craig's conclusions isare that the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support the Kalam argument have been controversial and widely debated. The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy have published critiques of them. References I want to thank Gret for incorporating many of the changes that have been made to the first piece. I offer here some tweaks that I think might be able to remove some WP:PEACOCK terms and provide proper attribution. Note that I am not completely happy with this construction, but I do think it necessary to point out when a contention is that of Craig's and when it is one that is generally accepted. For example, the two philosophical arguments that Craig uses to advocate for the non-existence of infinities are clearly his contentions and not generally accepted. The prior wording did not indicate this to my reading, but I acknowledge my proposed changes add a bit of heavy-handed redundancies of attribution. I think there may be a way to write these things so that this isn't a problem, but it can be difficult. Secondly, I have to beg for forgiveness for doing this exercise piecemeal. I honestly don't have a lot of time to do this all at once, but I am looking forward to moving onward to the other subsections. Please indulge me, if you would. jps (talk) 15:13, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Query The statement "Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God" is verifiable, but it is utterly impenetrable to me and does not explain what Craig actually believes here. Unfortunately, I'm not sure exactly what Craig believes vis-a-vis the "nature" of the cause as it is impenetrable in both sources which indicate only that Craig claims this but doesn't adequately (in my estimation) explain what Craig is actually convinced of here. I think it's got something to do with a vague quality of subjectivity and eternity, but this is pretty handwave-y still (and certainly would be opposed to the original Kalam formulators' beliefs, incidentally). Is there a way to rewrite this sentence so that a casual reader would be able to figure out why Craig thinks the "nature" implies "personal" Godhood? jps (talk) 17:19, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I think I have a sense of why he believes this. But it would make this section inordinately long if we decided to go into this level of detail on his views. I might be able to do so, given some time, but I worry it might be disproportionally detailed in light of this being a BLP. In fact this has come up earlier on the Talk Page, and I thought that if people do want to go into such detail, it might be helpful to create a separate article dedicated to his views. —Approaching (talk) 17:33, 28 August 2019 (UTC) It is unfortunate that this sensibility would make the section overlong. Granting that, might it be better to be even more succinct, then? Perhaps saying something like, "Craig claims that the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God." rather than hinting at some other argument about "natures of causes"? jps (talk) 17:50, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I'm waiting to hear what others think. Should we aim to keep this section short and simple, or are we free to go into detail? —Approaching (talk) 18:28, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Thanks for this interesting draft, JPS. I agree with some changes but not others. I share your concern with evaluative language ("extensively", "venerable history", etc). However, your use of the term "promoted" strikes me as odd and uncharacteristic. I'm not sure that language is appropriate for reporting research. It seems better to say "Craig has worked on a version of the Cosmological Argument called...". Also, it's unusual to specify "that he believed were relevant"; we know that if a researcher appeals to data, they believe it to be relevant. In fact this language risks looking like editor bias in implying that these are "believed to be relevant", but are not actually so. We know you're committed to keeping such personal evaluations out of the text, so you couldn't have done that on purpose. Still, better safe than sorry. I have similar concerns in a later paragraph with your insertion of "his contention". The previous clause makes clear that these are two arguments he offers. It's redundant to call them "his contention"(s). Likewise, later in the same paragraph, with "he believes must". Hope this helps. Also, thanks for alerting me to this discussion. I have been busy, and I appreciate being tagged so I can participate. —Approaching (talk) 17:33, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I am not particularly fond of "promoted" either, but it is undeniable from the sources that this is the idea that Craig is pushing the most (independent of research itself). He thinks it is one of the most convincing ideas he has in debates with secularists. How we describe this is, of course, the art. jps (talk) 17:41, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Re: "He thinks it is one of the most convincing ideas he has in debates with secularists.": I don't think that's actually true. When researching one of the other sections I came across him stating that cosmological arguments aren't as compelling as moral arguments in the context of his debates. - GretLomborg (talk) 20:18, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I also remember reading or listening to something like this, but in the context I found, I interpreted him to mean that he found moral arguments to be more compelling from a "keeping the faith" standpoint. In other words, I think he finds moral arguments as useful apologetics for a lay audience, but he focuses his intellectual output in both speaking and writing towards his cosmological argument. Regardless, I think it clear that Craig develops this argument for the sake of evangelism. Might want to dig up some sources on this, however. jps (talk) 21:51, 28 August 2019 (UTC) As for why "some scientific and philosophical ideas that he believed were relevant", I think it important to specify that Craig chose specific claims. He is not attempting to make anything more than a jaunt through the ideas he is interested in. This is a different sort of endeavor from, say, someone who is doing theoretical physics who has to deal with any and all pieces of evidence that are relevant. Again, how we indicate this to the reader is a separate matter. I just think it important that we maintain the idea of Craig's editorial control over his argument. He typically only addresses arguments, theories, and ideas that support his idea. jps (talk) 17:43, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Finally, in general, the reason I am using attribution where I am is because it is not otherwise clear to me from the prose itself where Craig is talking about things that everyone agrees about (e.g. "the Big Bang") and things people do not agree with (e.g. that infinities are logical impossibilities). We need to be able to distinguish between facts and opinions. Attribution is one way to do that, but there are certainly others. I'm open to alternative suggestions that don't suffer from sounding like we're just whining about this being, like, just his opinion, man. jps (talk) 17:46, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Both the "Big Bang" and "infinities are logical impossibilities" are controversial ideas in their respective fields. The standard model (FLRW) of the Big Bang is criticized because of the cosmic singularity, the question of origin, and its failure to incorporate quantum gravity. To claim one idea is not really controversial but the other is veers into personal evaluation (WP:OR). It also risks falling into the trap of Christian apologetics versus atheist apologetics that this article has fallen into before. I think a better move is to start by just accurately summarize the argument, and avoid inserting personal evaluations or ideologies into the text. Later on, once we have that foundation laid, we can polish it. —Approaching (talk) 18:28, 28 August 2019 (UTC) The Big Bang is not controversial at all. No one legitimately claims that the FLRW metric is incorrect. That's just a misunderstanding on your part. The point is that there is no empirical evidence one way or another for infinities while there is empirical evidence for the Big Bang. This has nothing to do with personal evaluation. jps (talk) 19:12, 28 August 2019 (UTC) We, as Wikipedia editors are in no position to take such philosophical positions in writing the article. We cannot take sides in the apologetics battle. We have to stay encyclopedic. —Approaching (talk) 20:20, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I agree that we take no philosophical positions. But the fact that the Big Bang happened is not up for debate. There are no "two sides" to this. That's the way to stay encyclopedic. On the other hand, the claim that infinities do not exist is up for debate. In order to not take a "side", we must attribute Craig's opinion as an opinion. jps (talk) 20:23, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Isn't that done even without the contention language? He offers two arguments. Arguments can be wrong. He doesn't prove or show. - GretLomborg (talk) 21:21, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I see what you're saying, but an "argument" does not necessarily mean "opinion". For example, a mathematical proof is an "argument" but it is not an "opinion". jps (talk) 21:44, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I have some quibbles with the language, but I don't have enough time to go into them all in detail now or follow the whole discussion, so these are first impressions. For instance "...in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference contemporarysome scientific and philosophical ideas that he believed were relevant.: I think "some" is too nonspecific and I don't see the problem with contemporary, since the Big Bang and stuff like Hilbert's Hotel are uncontroversially contemporary relative to "medieval Islamic philosophy." The statement "that he believed were relevant" either goes without saying or has the connotation that the ideas actually weren't relevant, which is untrue. Relevance is distinct from correctness, and I think the reception of his arguments shows that they were at least relevant. Also, I'm a little curious about this rewrite: The latter requires that any expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past. Can you explain why you rewrote it this way and why you swapped out the Tufts interview with the Discover Magazine blog post, which only appears to speak about the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem briefly? - GretLomborg (talk) 21:16, 28 August 2019 (UTC) I think the adjective "contemporary" is ambiguous and potentially misleading. David Hilbert was born in 1862, after all. I'm not sure that Craig's ideas are uncontroversially relevant, nor do I think that relevance is demonstrated merely by people engaging with a topic. In fact, in some of the critiques we are referencing, I see the relevance of the claims to the argument itself as being at issue. We should try to make it clear that it is Craig who claims the relevance or use a different word if it is just to indicate that these are Craig's claims. Because to say only "scientific and philosophical ideas" is to make a judgment that Craig's formulations are uncontroversially attached to his development of Kalam. I rewrote the sentence about BGV to conform more closely to what BGV actually proves which is simply a past singularity. I replaced it with Sean Carroll because I think it important to indicate that it is not just Vilenkin who agrees with this assessment. jps (talk) 21:44, 28 August 2019 (UTC) Philosophy and Theology - Draft 2 Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has published worked extensively on in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference and provided defenses of its premises that appeal to contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modest version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise. that time is finite, and he He offers two main philosophical arguments to support it. The first of these arguments appeals to mathematician David Hilbert's famous example of an infinite hotel. Craig uses Hilbert's example to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and, on this basis, he concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning. The second argument claims that the series of events in time must be formed a process that he calls "successive addition." He argues that such a process can never produce an infinite series, and concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning. : that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is metaphysically impossible due to the consequential absurdities that arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins, and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics. and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. Craig's conclusion is the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. The conclusion of the Kalam argument is that the universe had a cause. But Craig adds an additional argument for the claim that the cause must be a person. His argument for this depends on a distinction he draws between personal and non-personal causes. He claims, first, that the cause of the universe must be timeless, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that a timeless non-personal cause would have only eternal effects. Since Craig thinks the universe is not eternal (per the Kalam), he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support the Kalam argument have been controversial and widely debated. The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, philosophers Adolph Grunbaum, Quentin Smith, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston, and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy,, and Paul Draper have all published critiques of them. References A few remarks. First, Steven, I don't think we can handle doing more than one sub-section at once, so I'm focusing here just on the Kalam section. I hope that's ok. Second, I've tried to capture some of jps's concerns about making sure the work is attributed, but in a way that I think sounds a bit less derisive. Third, I prefer having the premises of the argument in a list, so that's how I did it here. Fourth, I tried a rewrite of the (still very brief) explanations of his philosophical arguments for the second premise; I think my version improves clarity and accessibility to a general reader. Fifth, I've struck a bunch of the detail from the paragraph on empirical arguments. None of that is supported by the secondary sources, and in fact I cannot find a discussion of Craig's treatment of the BGV theorem in any secondary source, so I'm suggesting we not cover it. Sixth, I've tried my hand at a rewrite of his treatment of personal vs. non-personal causes; the Morriston article I'm citing is available here: [20]. It seems very helpful on this issue. Seventh, I've struck the statement from Smith, since (i) I think it isn't clearly true, and (ii) Smith isn't independent since he has published a book with Craig. Finally, the last sentence in the draft mentions several philosophers without providing citations; I can fill those in if you all like them. Maybe can we also move those citations to a single note at the end of that sentence? Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:12, 29 August 2019 (UTC) I like some of the changes you've made here, Shinealittlelight. Your exposition of the two arguments for the second premise is clean and clear. I'd like to offer the following feedback: (i) I suggest the following orphan-sentence: "The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." could be well incorporated into the previous paragraph as follows:"Craig has published extensively in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which "[seeks] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument and provided defenses of its premises that appeal to contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general." (ii) Out of deference to jps' worries, which I don't want to downplay, I will endorse his decision to strike "extensively" from the first paragraph, and replace the language with something more neutral. (iii) I'm curious why you decided to strike the updated version of the first premise of the argument, assuming it better reflects the current status of the argument. (iv) With all the things you've cut out, is there a way to preserve the sources? This BLP tends to have a lot of persistent attacks on sourcing, so I feel like it's better to have more than less. (v) I think the criticism discussion in the final paragraph needs to be reworded. Currently, it sounds a bit like atheist-apologetics. I say this because virtually all publications that have an impact receive critical attention, so it seems a bit odd to make this point. A better move might be to briefly summarize the specifics one or two of the critiques. I've said a lot here. I don't expect it all to be incorporated, but I hope the comments are nonetheless helpful. —Approaching (talk) 02:09, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Thanks for the feedback. I agree with (i). On (ii), I'm fine with a different word for 'extensively'; however, I do think it should be noted that he has published a rather large number of books and articles on this topic. I don't see why 'published extensively' isn't the appropriate way to indicate this. But I'm open to alternative suggestions. On (iii), I'm not aware of a secondary source that states the argument with the weakened first premise. If there's such a source, it might be preferable. On (iv), please let me know if you see a way to add a source back in. I'm fine with adding them in wherever possible. Finally, on (v), I think it's nice to give five or six examples of where his work has been discussed, but just about any citation of a work of philosophy by a philosopher is going to be critical. That doesn't mean that the work is bad; to the contrary, it means that the work is a real contribution, since that's how philosophy works. But there may be further sources that defend Craig's argument from these critiques; if I get a chance I'll check to see if there are any such. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:49, 29 August 2019 (UTC) On the use of extensively: I do think he has written extensively on it. More than that, I think he's responsible for single-handedly revitalizing the argument and has probably been the biggest contributor to cosmological arguments in several centuries. So I don't question his impact at all. I do concede to jfs, however, that I don't know if we have a clear standard for what counts as extensive, and whether we might not be able to say that about most things a scholar specializes in– that they have worked extensively on it, this making the term trivial. It's not a deal breaker for me. I guess I just feel like I've said no to many of jfs' suggestions and he needs to catch a break, at least from my annoyingly contrarian stance. :) —Approaching (talk) 07:01, 29 August 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight: I'm still super busy, so I don't have time to respond fully, but I have a couple points that I want to chime in on: I like your edits around explaining the philosophical arguments. Regarding primary and secondary sourcing, Steven Crossin said above: Articles on philosophers and theologians do often summarise their viewpoints, and it is not always necessary to solely rely on secondary sourcing for this. I think we can use primary sources with moderation, especially in cases to augment or clarify secondary sources or bring them up to date, so I think we can leave in some of the material you struck as primary. That said, there is a secondary source for his use of the BGV theorem: the article in Inference by Vilenkin says that Craig has appealed to the BGV theorem, and we have primary sources where he's done so as well. I think we should include it, especially since it makes his biography up-to-date. I think Smith is independent of Craig: he's an atheist and took an opposing position in the book they worked on together, and I like his quote (which comes from a critique) because clearly illustrates how widely debated his work has been. I don't think it should be struck. I agree with Approaching on the criticism section. I also agree with your comment above on philosophical criticism. My intent with the original phrasing was to go from general comments (the adjectives both came from secondary sources) and then give some diverse examples, but not so many that it may give the opposite impression from your point about philosophical criticism. I feel if we try list every critic, or critics and supporters, it starts to feel like vote or poll. - GretLomborg (talk) 04:43, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Thanks, Gret. I guess my view is that the best way to combat constant sourcing challenges is to limit primary sourcing as much as possible. I defer to Steven if he thinks that's not right, and to the group if the consensus is to include more primary sourcing than I included. I definitely think it's a bad idea to include philosophical material that can only be given primary sourcing. The BGV theorem is an example here: the Vilenkin source says Craig appeals to the theorem, and says nothing else about Craig; it does not, for example, summarize how he uses it. So I don't see that as a good source here if we intend to also keep our explanation of how he uses the theorem. If we just want to leave it in as a source for the claim that he does appeal to it, and we leave out any explanation of how, then I'd be fine with that. I'll defer to the group on Smith. As I say below, I'm also just not a fan of the quote insofar as it's kind of unclear in the way it is worded. Finally, it's funny, I guess I'm just used to philosophy, but lots of critics to me means that you made a contribution. Again, I'll defer to the group. I've also suggested looking for defenses of Craig by third parties. I think there probably are some of those as well. Shinealittlelight (talk) 22:29, 29 August 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight: I think you're broadly correct on the sourcing challenges, but I don't think we need to take it that far. WP:PSTS (amplified by this explanatory supplement that it links) make it clear that primary sources can be used. For instance, I don't think a reasonable challenge could be made to the BGV theorem stuff on sourcing grounds if we have the Vilenkin source that mentions Craig plus a primary source of Craig actually using it. Similarly, on the Kalam premises, we have so many secondary sources talking about Craig's original formulation that a small update referencing a non-selfpub primary source should not be an issue. I think the main sourcing issue was a lack of inline cites with a majority being to Craig himself. If we inline cite everything and increase the proportion of cites to non-Craig people, I think sourcing will be less of a sore spot and the challenges would be reduced. - GretLomborg (talk) 17:08, 30 August 2019 (UTC) Ok, I see your point about WP:PSTS, and I agree that using primary sourcing for minor elaborations or amendments is ok, as in the case of the update to his formulation of the first premise. However, the update to formulation still seems like a very minor point to feature in the text, and I think it might be better placed in a footnote. What do you think of that? On the BGV stuff, I still think any inclusion of this is likely to be challenged. The Vilenkin source only says that Craig appeals to the theorem, and doesn't say what he uses it to support. And, in fact, in other places, Vilenkin seems to think that Craig attempts to derive the existence of God directly from the theorem, which, as I understand Craig, is not correct--I think he only appeals to BGV to support premise 2 of the Kalam. So we have no secondary sourcing on what Craig thinks BGV supports, or how he applies it. As a result, I would expect someone to challenge this material. As with everything, though, I could be wrong, and consensus may not end up going with my view. Shinealittlelight (talk) 17:59, 30 August 2019 (UTC) Briefly, I find the expanded explanation of infinities to be overwrought. I'm much more comfortable with the truncated version above and don't find much that is better in this version to be worth keeping. In particular, a reader can read about the infinite hotel and transfinite arithmetic through the relevant wikilinks. The explanation of a personal cause is actually somewhat worse than above -- completely opaque. I understand it is lifted in part from SEP, but SEP doesn't explain the premises and conclusions in ways that I can follow. Here is the quote: "His argument for this depends on a distinction he draws between personal and non-personal causes." Fair enough. A personal cause would be one caused by a person while a non-personal one would be one that has no person involved, I suppose. Is that the sense of the sentence? If so, this is fine. Then: "He claims, first, that the cause of the universe must be timeless, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that a timeless non-personal cause would have only eternal effects." This is a meaningless sentence for someone who studies the physics of time and causes. I don't know if this is just mixed metaphors or if it is something that can be separated from questions of causality or the arrow of time, but if it isn't, then this is way too deep in the weeds for us. I get the impression that Craig simply has not had any critique of this claim from competent outsiders which makes the thing rather primary and, as I intimated above, nearly impossible to follow. Finally, "Since Craig thinks the universe is not eternal (per the Kalam), he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal." This does not follow at all in brief. Is Craig saying that timeless personal causes don't need to cause eternal effects? How on Earth does he come to that conclusion? What makes a "person" able to bridge this gap? This just leaves more questions than it answers. It looks to me like it is a simple bald assertion, which I would be happy to leave, but I marvel that people think this is a coherent explanation of Craig's position (indeed, SEP suffers from the same problem). I can follow Craig's reasoning to this point. I do not know what to make of it beyond this and I find almost no one who has attempted to explain it beyond Craig himself (or SEP's mimicry). We need something more than just an incomprehensible jaunt. I think the last sentence in the Morriston article is what we have to deal with, "...even if it could be shown that the first event in the history of the universe has a cause it is not at all obvious that this cause must be a person." This makes sense to me. The attempt to explain Craig's beliefs adjacent to Morriston's conclusion do not. If I cannot understand the prose and I'm familiar with the subject, what reader is going to understand them? jps (talk) 11:00, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Jps, you say my version of the explanation of his two philosophical arguments is "overwrought," but in fact my version is about forty words shorter than the previous one. So I just disagree with you here. I think my version is easier to understand and in fact less detailed and shorter than the previous version. As for the stuff on personal causes, I agree that it's hard to explain his argument briefly. However, it seems to me that part of what you're saying here is that you think the argument is unconvincing or that you have objections to his reasoning. And of course that isn't surprising: I have objections to his argument as well, and I am not convinced by it, and I agree with Morriston's remark that you quoted. But that doesn't mean that there's anything wrong with the presentation of the argument I gave. In any case, maybe I'll try again on this passage and see if I can improve it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:12, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Overall, I think this draft moves us in a better direction. I have some thoughts on the specific changes, just so we can help codify some of the consensus; (i) I like the current wording in the first paragraph, published is a neutral and accurate term here and this removes some of the peacock language jps was correctly concerned with. No objection from me. (ii) Ditto on the change all the way through the philosophic defense. I think the list is stylistically correct (this is usually the structure of a formal argument) and the phrasing seems more accurate to the sources. I don't think we can really argue that he has switched the language of the first and second premises since that seems to be the construct he still uses in his blogs and professional writings. I suspect that the source quote might have been taken a bit out of context. If we want to make that argument, I think we need to review the context of that source to be sure it supports inclusion. (iii) The rewrite on the hotel is good, though I think the closing of the hotel section isn't quite right. I would change a couple of things. First, "that actual infinite collections are physically impossible..." He isn't using the word "actually" but appealing to a class of infinites known as "actual" rather than "potential." Second, I would change the ending of that sentence to "he concludes that the existing universe cannot be composed of an actual infinite set of temporal moments." I think the current wording is closer to the conclusion from the second defense. (iv) Why the "he calls" language? That seems a bit unnecessary, I think that is a pretty standard term. The second sentence isn't quite correct, successive addition can be a type of infinite (a potential one). It might be more accurate to say, "He argues that such a process cannot produce an actual infinite set of objects and therefore could not produce a past eternal universe." (v) Language change to standard model is good. (vi) I think we should be very hesitant to remove the BVG Theorem language. There are a couple of sources about it and it does seem to be pretty pervasive in his formulation of this defense. It also seems to have been a subject of some notability [21] or at least controversy. (vii) The "personal cause" section is a good start. I think it might be stated a bit more concisely. Something like: "The conclusion of the Kalam argument is that the universe had a cause. Craig maintains that the nature of this cause must be a "a beginningless, uncaused, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, [and] enormously powerful"[22] by necessity of the argument. He goes on to argue that because the cause is "timeless," only a personal cause would be able to elicit a temporal effect." This could probably use some wordsmithing. (viii) The Smith quote is also worthy of inclusion in my opinion as it highlights the perception or at least notability of Craig's work in this argument. (ix) Agree with your edits to the philosophers section, critiques is a perfect word to. Squatch347 (talk) 15:25, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Thanks for these replies. On (iii), I think you're right; we can fuss with the exact language, but I agree that it should be 'actual' instead of 'actually'. On (iv) I'm not aware of anyone but Craig who uses 'successive addition' in this way; I figured he probably coined that term. Do you have any source that uses it independently of him? On (vi), I'm all for putting something about BVG in, but not if we only have primary sourcing on it. I find very limited coverage anywhere else. unlike with other aspects of his work on this, I don't find any secondary source (so far anyway) writing something like an explanation of his use of BVG. I like your suggestion in (vii), but it would be good if we had the claim you quoted in a secondary source. I'd be interested to hear from Steven whether he thinks that the Smith quote is appropriately independent. The claim itself is kind of weird. I think the first time I read it, I misunderstood him as claiming that the kalam is the most-discussed argument for theism, and I thought that was just clearly false insofar as the fine-tuning argument has received way more attention. But, reading it again, I see that I may have misunderstood his claim, which is actually sort of hard to understand (which is a different reason not to include it). Anyway, I still think it should come out, but I may be in the minority here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 22:20, 29 August 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight: on (iv), here are some examples of that term being used long before Craig: [23], [24] - GretLomborg (talk) 17:08, 30 August 2019 (UTC) Ok, the Kant reference is pretty decent. Still, I think 'successive addition' in these contexts is something like a technical term; I regard it as clarifying to include some indication of this fact. Maybe "philosophers call" insteac of "he calls". Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:04, 30 August 2019 (UTC) I had assumed, reading it, that "successive addition" was simply the bare meaning of that term, repeating an addition process iteratively. I think the Kant version is similarly used. Philosophers call is fine with me, I'm just not sure it is quite accurate, I'm not sure this is a technical term of art rather than a construction. Apparently in teaching, the term is more commonly "repeated addition" WP:Multiplication and repeated addition, but it means (generally) the same thing. On (vi), would it matter that this primary source contains a letter from one of the authors? That letter would seem to be, essentially, a secondary source on Craig's use of the theorem and an explanation. Prof. Vilenkin writes similar summaries to other bloggers who've asked him, none of those sources specifically would meet RS standards, but it does seem to be a consistent take that Prof. Vilenkin agrees to this formulation. I did find this [25] in which Vilenkin directly addresses the usage of the theorem. On (vii) this might be a bit difficult. I can find plenty of sources referencing it, but they are simply quoting Craig himself. Would a debate transcript work? I don't think that gets us much more reliability than directly quoting, but those are probably pretty available. On (viii), good idea. Squatch347 (talk) 14:14, 2 September 2019 (UTC) Hi all. Just letting you know that I am recovering from a minor injury so need to take a few days to rest and recuperate. You're all doing pretty well here generally, just try to not let discussion get too out of hand, focus on the content at hand and try to compromise with each other to find a version of the article we can all live with that complies with policy. Give a little to get a little, etc. Please email me if my attention is needed urgently, but I will try to be back by Monday. Thanks all. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:56, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Glad to hear you came through it ok, good luck and feel better soon. Squatch347 (talk) 15:25, 29 August 2019 (UTC) Oh snap! Get well soon Steve. I wonder what happened. —Approaching (talk) 01:44, 30 August 2019 (UTC) No rush! Hope you feel better. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:47, 30 August 2019 (UTC) @Steven Crossin: I'm sorry to hear that, but I'm glad to hear you're ok! - GretLomborg (talk) 17:08, 30 August 2019 (UTC) I want to make a follow up point here. This is a BLP. The section on arguments is supposed to summarize ideas associated with a BLP. Does it make sense to insist on including critiques? Can you imagine if we started doing this with every view, idea, or action written about in the BLP? Do we even insist on critiques for most BLPs? Don't you feel like such a critique is better found on the article itself or on an article dedicated to the BLP's views? It seems obvious that there's an over-emphasis on criticism here. And I say this as someone who Is personally partial to some of the criticism. I enjoy reading and thinking about it. —Approaching (talk) 17:35, 30 August 2019 (UTC) The point of including these references is to show that his work has received attention. When a philosopher's work receives attention, it's almost always critical. That's true even of universally recognized world-famous figures in the history of philosophy like Russell or Quine or Wittgenstein. If this doesn't assuage the worry, I'd suggest that we try to find citations of Craig's work that cite it to agree with or defend it. Here's one possible example: [26]. Funny, though, this isn't entirely a positive article, as it provides a new formualtion of the Kalam. But you can make it sound positive by calling it a "development" of Craig's work. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:43, 30 August 2019 (UTC) I understand. I don't even have a problem with criticism in the article. I just don't know if that's a required part of a philosopher's BLP, and I'm concerned about the insistence on it. I just don't see it in, say, Daniel Dennett's BLP. Or [Russell]'s. Or Thomas Nagel's BLP. Or John Rawls. These BLPs simply lay out the important works of these philosophers, and leave it at that. —Approaching (talk) 16:37, 1 September 2019 (UTC) I tend to agree with Approaching here and I think I mentioned something to a similar effect earlier. I think we need to be very careful including critiques outside of broad statements about attention received. It isn't encyclopedic to essentially shepherd a debate and I think is part of the reason this page ends up being fought over so often. If we keep it consistent with other philosophers we should essentially be summarizing the BLP's views and linking to a more indepth page if one exists where that full and frank detailing of the debate can be summarized. Squatch347 (talk) 14:14, 2 September 2019 (UTC) Philosophy and Theology - Draft 3 Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has published worked extensively on in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which "[seeks] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference and provided defenses of its premises that appeal to contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modest version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise. that time is finite, and he He offers two main philosophical arguments to support it. The first of these arguments appeals to mathematician David Hilbert's famous example of an infinite hotel. Craig uses Hilbert's example to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and, on this basis, he concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning. The second argument claims that the series of events in time must be formed a process that he calls philosophers call "successive addition." He argues that such a process can never produce an infinite series, and concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning. : that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is metaphysically impossible due to the consequential absurdities that arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins, and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics. and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. Craig's conclusion is the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. The conclusion of the Kalam argument is that the universe had a cause. But Craig adds an additional argument for the claim that the cause must be a person. His argument for this depends on a distinction he draws between personal and non-personal causes. He claims, first, that the cause of the universe must be timeless, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that a timeless non-personal cause would have only eternal effects. Since Craig thinks the universe is not eternal (per the Kalam), he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support work on the Kalam argument have has been controversial and widely discussed and debated. The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, philosophers Adolph Grunbaum, Quentin Smith, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston, and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy,, and Paul Draper, and Robert Koons have all published critiques of them discussions or critiques of Craig's work on the Kalam. Divine omniscienceDivine Providence Craig is a proponent of Molinism, supporting the doctrine of middle knowledge and also applying it to a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, Christian particularism, and the problem of evil. Formulatedan idea first formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina according to which God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person would perform under every possible circumstance, a kind of knowledge that is sometimes termed "middle knowledge." Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. The idea is that, by relying on his middle knowledge, God is in a position to choose the best circumstance to actualize, taking account of the free choices that agents will perform in such a circumstance without interfering with the free will of those agents. Craig also appeals to Molinism in his work on a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism.. , the doctrine of middle knowledge holds that logically prior to his decree to create a world God knew what every possible creature he might create would freely do in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place him. On the basis of his knowledge of such counterfactuals of free will and his knowledge of his own decree to create certain creatures in certain circumstances, along with his own decision how he himself shall act, God automatically knows everything that will actually and contingently happen, without any perception of the world. New Entry: Perzyk, Ken (2013). "Recent Work on Molinism". Philosophy Compass 8/8: 755–770. doi:10.1111/phc3.12057. References I've incorporated some (not all!) of the suggestions from the discussion of the Kalam section above, and I've taken a stab at the Molinism section. Apologies if my use of reference functions is incorrect; I'm a beginner on that stuff and could use some help getting it right. There are also still references to be filled in. I had second thoughts about the suggestion that 'actually infinite' should be 'actual infinite'; a search suggests that both terms are standard, and I think 'actually' reads better in this context. I also tried to soften the last part of the Kalam section, where we talk about the attention Craig's work has received. Maybe it's too soft now, I don't know. In the Molinism section, I've suggested a new title and also removed the primary sourcing (which was way too pervasive in this sub-section). I found an excellent summary in Philosophy Compass that refers to Craig's published applications of Molinism to various issues. I think some of the applications of Molinism that he has proposed--the ones that were only sourced to his self-published website--are not ideas he has published, and should be left aside in our article. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:15, 2 September 2019 (UTC) This looks good to me. You've done fine on references as far I can tell, Shine. (Is that "new entry" line supposed to go in the references section though?). Some minor reference housekeeping issues: (i) Reference #4 is not specified, (Looks like it might be defined in the full body of the article, just not this section) (ii) Reference #30 misspells "Existence", (fixed) (iii) Reference 8 and 10 can be combined. (this turns out to be intentional, the duplicate source is crossed out) That said, here's what I think is a major problem: The BLP has been issue-flagged to death. Do we have a clear idea on when the article is good enough to resolve those flags? We're working hard on the article but it doesn't seem like we have a clear sense that we're doing well. —Approaching (talk) 18:26, 2 September 2019 (UTC) Feel free to fix any errors in the references at will! As for issue flags, I for one have never been very clear about the rules about placement and removal of flags, and I'd appreciate a discussion of that with Steven before we wrap everything up here, as I suspect that such flags will constantly be an issue going forward. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:41, 2 September 2019 (UTC) Turns out @Shinealittlelight: @Approaching: I wonder if we could ask Steven Crossin to take a look at the issue templates and make a judgement call about which ones should stay on the article while we're working? - GretLomborg (talk) 23:19, 3 September 2019 (UTC) This is a good write up in my opinion. Thank you Shine and Approaching for doing a lot of the yoeman's work in getting this together. I think, like we said earlier we can wait on Steven to get a better sense of the quote from Smith. I think I agree with you on the actual vs. actually language. My only concern was that the term "actually" sometimes can read as if we are using it in the common vernacular rather than a specific term. What do you think about linking to the wikipedia reference to show that this is a specific concept? Something like: "Craig uses Hilbert's example to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and, on this basis, he concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning." Would that work? I also have one small grammatical change: "He argues that such a process can only never produce a potentially infinite series, rather than an actually infinite series and thus concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning. I think I have a couple of citations for you as well to round out that last paragraph. Adolph Grunbau[27], Quentin Smith[28], Paul Draper[29], Robert Koons[30] The only issue I think I have with it is the BVG section, which isn't a show stopper in any sense. We have a book put out by Craig and Prof. Sean Carroll which is, essentially, a cleaned up version of their debate[31] in which Prof. Carroll goes into detail on Craig's use of the BVG theorem. Would this, along with the two quotes from Prof. Vilenkin work as a sufficient secondary source? Squatch347 (talk) 14:08, 3 September 2019 (UTC) What does "timeless" mean? It certainly is being used in a different sense from what its standard definition is. To be clear, I cannot understand the "personal cause" prose here or in Draft 2 at all. It is completely impenetrable. jps (talk) 14:12, 3 September 2019 (UTC) I gather from what he says that he means something like this: a thing is timeless just in case it stands in no temporal relationship to anything. Here a "temporal relationship" is something like existing before or existing after. For example at one point he says: "either God existed prior to creation or He did not. Suppose He did. In that case, God is temporal, not timeless, since to exist prior to some event is to be in time." Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:29, 3 September 2019 (UTC) This is still unclear to me. Is there an example of anything else that stands in no temporal relationship to anything? jps (talk) 19:24, 3 September 2019 (UTC) I don't think that there's any uncontroversial example. But many philosophers have thought that mathematical entities (like the natural numbers) are like this. Typically they argue that it sounds untrue to say, for example, that the number 2 exists now, or that it was prime on my birthday, or whatever. Is Craig saying God is like the number two, then? Because that would entail dealing with such arguments as constructivism (philosophy of mathematics). jps (talk) 00:50, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Craig does not think that there are such things as the natural numbers (in this sense, he is what's called a nominalist), so he would not say that God is like the number 2. As I said, there are no uncontroversial examples of timeless entities. You might think everything is temporally related to something. But some philosophers deny that, most commonly when it comes to numbers and other mathematical entities. And Craig claims that, had God never created anything, he would not have stood in any temporal relations to anything. That's what he means when he says that "without creation" he is timeless. Or at least that is how I understand his view. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:09, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Also might want to see this. God's timelessness is here said to be "the traditional view", and there's a discussion of Craig's view near the end. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:36, 3 September 2019 (UTC) This site does not work for me. jps (talk) 19:24, 3 September 2019 (UTC) You mean the link isn't working, or that you just can't understand the content at that page? Not sure what you mean. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:53, 3 September 2019 (UTC) The link was not working earlier today. Now that I read the page today, I think that this might indicate that it's way too arguable a point to include in our discussion. To quote that last line: "While philosophers often come to conclusions that are reasonably settled in their mind, they are wise to hold such conclusions with an open hand." With that caveat, it would be problematic for us to insert such a feature into the syllogism without any attempt to contextualize it. jps (talk) 00:50, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not following. What is "way too arguable a point"? Are you under the impression that we should only include Craig's views if they are true (or uncontroversial or something)? If so, I don't agree with that criterion. We should say what his views are, so long as they have received attention in appropriate sources, even if (as for example I think) many of his views are mistaken. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:09, 4 September 2019 (UTC) You can include arguable points that Craig makes attributed to him, but we were framing a discussion of the "traditional view". jps (talk) 20:15, 8 September 2019 (UTC) Philosophy and Theology - Draft 4 Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has published worked extensively on in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which "[seeks] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference and provided defenses of its premises that appeal to contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist (i.e. the past is finite). Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modest version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise. that time is finite, and he He offers two main philosophical arguments to support it. The first of these arguments appeals to mathematician David Hilbert's famous example paradox of an infinite hotel. Craig uses Hilbert's example to argue that actually infinite collections are metaphysically impossible, and, on this basis, he concludes that the series of past events in time is finite and therefore has a beginning. The second argument claims that the series of events in time must be formed a process that he calls philosophers call through a process of successive addition. He argues that such a process can only produce a potentially infinite series, not an actually infinite one, never produce an infinite series, and concludes that the series of events in time is finite and has a beginning. : that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is metaphysically impossible due to the consequential absurdities that arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins, and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics, and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. expanding universe will have begun with gravitational singularity in the past. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. Craig's conclusion is the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. The conclusion of the Kalam argument is that the universe had a cause. But Craig adds an additional argument for the claim that the cause must be a person. The Kalam argument concludes that the universe had a cause, but Craig further argues that this cause must be personal rather than non-personal. His argument for this depends on a distinction he draws between personal and non-personal causes. First, he claims , first, that the cause of the universe must be timeless, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that a timeless non-personal cause would have only eternal effects. Since Craig thinks the universe is not eternal (per the Kalam), Given his arguments in favor of a non-eternal universe, he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support work on the Kalam argument have has been controversial and been widely discussed and debated. The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, philosophers Adolph Grunbaum, Quentin Smith, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston, and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy,, and Paul Draper, and Robert Koons have all published critiques of them. discussions or critiques of Craig's work on the Kalam. Divine omniscienceDivine Providence Craig is a proponent of Molinism, supporting the doctrine of middle knowledge and also applying it to a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, Christian particularism, and the problem of evil. Formulatedan idea first formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina according to which God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person would perform under every possible circumstance, a kind of knowledge that is sometimes termed "middle knowledge." Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. The idea is that, by relying on his middle knowledge, God is in a position to choose the best circumstance to actualize, taking account of the free choices that agents will perform in such a circumstance without interfering with the free will of those agents. Craig also appeals to Molinism in his work on a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism.. , the doctrine of middle knowledge holds that logically prior to his decree to create a world God knew what every possible creature he might create would freely do in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place him. On the basis of his knowledge of such counterfactuals of free will and his knowledge of his own decree to create certain creatures in certain circumstances, along with his own decision how he himself shall act, God automatically knows everything that will actually and contingently happen, without any perception of the world. New Entry: Perzyk, Ken (2013). "Recent Work on Molinism". Philosophy Compass 8/8: 755–770. doi:10.1111/phc3.12057. References Rationale: I think we've been making good progress, and I'd like to thank Shinealittlelight for his efforts. I decided to create a new draft now (based on Draft 3) rather than make comments on the above draft because I won't be participating in the mediation for the next couple weeks, and I want to make some wording tweaks that are easier to do than explain. Also, my apologies again for being a little too rushed. I only made changes to the Kalam subsection: Move the quote for the Wainwright 1982 p=328 source to another sfn. It only displays if it's in the first. I don't like relying on that behavior to get the quote in, but Harvard cites seem best where we're citing different pages of the same source. Maybe there's a better way. Add clarification to premise 2 Phrasing around Hilbert's Hotel Wikilink some terms I like the concept behind the using the ref to introduce the clarification of Craig's change to the first premise. I modified it to start "note" ref group to better differentiate from normal refs, and call that out to the reader. I think we need to be more precise about what kind of possibility Craig's talking about. I understand that's important to Craig's point (e.g. infinity is a mathematical possibility that cannot be instantiated in reality). The original text used "metaphysically impossible," so I re-introduced that. The wikipage for it isn't great, but this random Quora question that I found while confirming my intuitions may or may not help [32]. Modified introduction of "successive addition" clarified "events" to "past events" Restored the BGV stuff. Phrasing around the personal cause stuff. I feel like this might make a bit more sense with some mention of an agent making a choice to make the transition from eternal to temporal. Maybe cause of the universe must be a choice made by a personal creator? Wainwright summarizes it as "Following Ghazali, Craig argues that this cause must be a personal will. Nothing but the arbitrary choice of a free agent could account for the fact that the world was created at one time rather than another, or (if time comes into being with the first event) for the fact that the first event did not have a predecessor." I think "Craig's arguments to support the Kalam argument" is more accurate. Restored the Smith quote, and used the source for it to source his critique. Restored the critique language a the end and struck the placeholder for the discussions. I feel that would probably end up being disproportionate given how briefly we summarize Craig. - GretLomborg (talk) 23:14, 3 September 2019 (UTC) Thanks, Gret. I can go along a few of these changes. But I have some issues: I still feel that the BGV stuff should not be in, especially with what amounts to basically primary sourcing. And I still don't like the Smith quote. But I'll be interested to hear from our moderator on this. The move back to "critique" would make the Koons reference inappropriate, since that isn't really a critique, and it is not on the topic of his arguments in support of the Kalam, but is instead a reformulation of the Kalam itself. I do not favor the use of 'metaphysical possibility' in an article like this, which is meant for a general audience. Only specialists would care, and they're going to know that metaphysical possibility is what's relevant here anyway. I think that the current phrasing of the stuff on personal causes makes it seem to the reader as if they are supposed to know what a personal cause is; if we keep the language that says he introduces the distinction, that serves to alert the reader to the fact that this distinction is Craig's distinction, not one that the general reader is expected to know. I strongly disagree with including that 'i.e.' parenthetical in the premise. I think that the stuff after 'i.e.' is not equivalent to what came before, and that the claim that they are equivalent is in effect an error in Craig's arguments for that premise. Building the claim to equivalence into the premise itself thus makes the premise unnecessarily strong, since conceivably there could be arguments for the premise (as I formulated it) that do not require that equivalence. It's also not how Craig repeatedly formulates his argument, and it isn't how secondary sources state his argument, either. Maybe this point is a bit OR, but I'll make it anyway: Wainwright's explanation of Craig's argument is incorrect. He claims that Craig's idea is that we need a personal cause to explain why the universe was created at one time rather than another. But this is not Craig's view. For one thing, on Craig's view, time began with the universe, so it makes no sense to say that the universe could have been created earlier or later. For another, his argument does not have to do with arbitrariness, but with the idea that a personal cause is needed to explain how the universe can be a temporally finite effect of a timeless cause. The Morriston source more accurately gets at his argument. We could go further into why he thinks that only a personal cause in this case can have a temporally finite effect, but I think that going further into the matter is undue, and I think what I wrote is enough to get the gist. But I am open to suggestion. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:02, 4 September 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight: I think I was too hasty on the critique language and Koons, so I'll defer to you on that. I'll also defer to you on the parenthetical, since got most of my understanding from the Wainwright and you seem to be in a better position to judge the different sources. I don't think your comments on Wainwright and Morriston are WP:OR, and I'd say they're in fact exactly the kind of discussion we need to have on talk pages to write the best article. On metaphysical impossibility: I think there's some tension between general, intermediate, and specialist audiences, and I think we should shoot for something that's meaningful for a general reader but accurate for a specialist. If a general reader doesn't understand the word metaphysical, they can just ignore it and still get the sense of impossibility. I feel using the term "metaphysical impossibility" will be important for some intermediate readers. - GretLomborg (talk) 05:07, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not sure the BVG reference does amount to primary sourcing. The references added are both from Prof. Vilenkin (which doesn't directly address Craig, but we do have a source that does that) and Prof. Carroll referencing Craig's argument. Prof. Carroll would seem to constitute a secondary source (even if the work is a joint publication by both of them) as to Craig's usage of the theorem. I don't really see how we can leave it out given how frequently it seems to be referenced in his public appearances and publications. ::# We might be splitting hairs a bit on the critique language, but I also agree with Shine here that I think the previous formulation is probably more accurate. ::# The change to paradox is appropriate, that language struck me as odd yesterday. I also agree with shine here that metaphysically impossible doesn't quite work for the reader here even if it is the more accurate term for what Craig is arguing. Perhaps a middle ground like: "actually infinite collections are impossible, and, on...?" ::# I think Gret's language is a bit more clear and distinct in the personal cause section. It also appears that a personal agent as distinct in causal capabilities is a concept that predates, or at least exists apart, from Craig as well.[33] Given that, I think adopting Gret's language here is fine. ::# Also support Shine's objection to the parenthetical. I get why it is a tempting addition given how we've detailed the explanation, but it does add unnecessary content to the premise that Craig doesn't appear to be adding. Squatch347 (talk) 14:17, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Maybe we can ask Steven Crossin to say whether he thinks that Carroll's joint publication with Craig is sufficiently independent to serve as a secondary source for Craig's use of BVG. If so, I'm fine with inclusion (assuming that he Carroll about it in enough detail--I haven't yet read it). I just don't think the current sourcing is sufficient. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:14, 4 September 2019 (UTC) The claim that "Craig uses Hilbert's example to argue that actually infinite collections are metaphysically impossible...." is not, in point of fact, true. Craig doesn't use Hilbert's example to argue actual infinities are impossible because Craig doesn't have the mathematical training nor sophistication to understand the point of the transfinite arithmetic inherent to the example Hilbert is offering. What Craig is actually doing is using his appreciation of Hilbert's story to argue that because it offends his sensibilities, it must be that infinities do not exist. That is a common feature of Craig's use of mathematical arguments. For example, he rejected Hartle-Hawking states because of a distaste for imaginary numbers. We should not include a point that accepts Craig's distaste for modern mathematics like this. The wording in Draft 1 was better where it just stated plainly what Craig argued and did not try to make it seem like he was using someone else's example. jps (talk) 00:55, 4 September 2019 (UTC) The example was indeed Hilbert's example. According to historian of science Helge Kragh here, Hilbert simply used the example in class to introduce his audience to the difference between finite and infinite sets, and he did not regard the example as illustrating anything particularly important. So it's hard to see how anyone could misunderstand his point; perhaps jps can provide a source explaining that he had a point about transfinite arithmetic in mind if that is indeed the case. Aside from that, however, it is notable that Hilbert himself took up the "finitist" point of view, and argued that the physical universe was likely not infinite. See here for a discussion of some of his views. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:04, 4 September 2019 (UTC) The key is that the example is not illustrative of anything important, but for Craig it has become an existence proof. It is a misapprehension in that reading. jps (talk) 10:47, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Right, so Hilbert did not actually use the example to make a sophisticated point about transfinite arithmetic. Rather, Craig accurately relayed the example itself, he did not regard the example as "an existence proof", and he used the example in his own argument for the idea that the universe had a beginning. He did not attribute this argument to Hilbert, and we did not say that he did. So what we did say--that he used the example to construct one of his two philosophical arguments for the premise that the universe had a beginning--is correct. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:28, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I agree that Craig faithfully reproduces the hotel example. But after that point, it's hard to know what more to say other than, "Craig doesn't believe in actual infinities because of this." I don't see much more that we can say. I do not see how this follows other than through misunderstanding, but that's obviously WP:OR. The best we can do is say that Craig doesn't believe in the existence of infinity in the physical world because of his discomfort with Hilbert's hotel. The wording I outline has a reading where we might attribute more to Hilbert's pedagogical example than what Hilbert intended even as it may be what Craig actually believes. I think paring down may be necessary. jps (talk) 11:34, 4 September 2019 (UTC) 'Physical world' doesn't quite get Craig's view right; he thinks that there can be no actually infinite collections whether physical or not. I don't believe he says he is uncomfortable with the example. Rather, he says that the example illustrates why actually infinite collections are absurd. I'm not too worried about misrepresenting Hilbert on this given that Hilbert was a finitist. But perhaps it is worth emphasizing in some way that this is Craig's argument and not Hilbert's. Perhaps propose some language in a new draft. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:50, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Craig is "uncomfortable" with the example inasmuch as he claims it somehow indicates to him "an absurdity". Those of us who deal with infinities, however, don't find the example to be any more absurd than any other counter-intuitive point. I'll spare other examples. To think that Hilbert would have endorsed Craig's understanding of "absurdities" because of Hilbert's program is quite the stretch, but it is problematic borderline POV-pushing implication of the above. jps (talk) 14:10, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Again, your opinions of whether Craig's arguments succeed, or your view of the role of intuitions in these debates, are not relevant to what we are to include in the article. Unless, of course, you have published them in a reliable source, and they have had a sufficient impact to make them due for some attention. We all understand that you, like me, disagree with Craig's reasoning and you think his arguments do not succeed. Great. That's philosophy for you. Now can we please get back to explaining what his influential work says as documented in reliable sources? I also want to make clear that I did not say that Hilbert would endorse Craig's reasoning about the hotel example; rather, I said that Hilbert was a finitist, and so I'm not too worried about someone thinking that Hilbert was a finitist, since they would be correct to think that. That Hilbert was a finitist is not a stretch, it's a fact. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:05, 4 September 2019 (UTC) You've missed my point. The problem is that as we use David Hilbert as a personality in the prose, we would have to deal with Hilbert's positions. Hilbert was not a finitist in the same way that Craig is a finitist. We run the risk of getting readers confused with all this. Let's simplify back to Craig's favorite example and just describe the points that are obviously his. jps (talk) 15:44, 4 September 2019 (UTC) "The second argument claims that the series of events in time must be formed a process that he calls philosophers call through a process of successive addition." There is no definition of "successive addition" provided in this context. As such, it is a meaningless statement. Addition is an operation defined on a set or a group. That is not the sense in which Craig seems to be talking about it here. Therefore, the argument as presented is problematic. It is better stated in Draft 1 where it doesn't beg the question. jps (talk) 00:57, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I agree that the term 'successive addition' is unclear in this draft. What I tried to do before is to indicate that it is being used in a philosophical sense, but without spending several sentences explaining it with an example and so on, since that would in my opinion be undue. I don't agree that the term is meaningless; I could myself explain it in a few sentences. I don't understand the claim that his argument "begs the question" or why that opinion of his argument would be relevant here unless it is found in RS and an argument is given for thinking that including that opinion in our article is due. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:04, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Without a definition of successive addition, there is no explanation. jps (talk) 10:47, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Please propose an alternative wording that incorporates an explanation of 'successive addition'. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:28, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Unfortunately, I cannot do this as it looks like is is a Craig neologism that has not been adopted by third-parties. I could try to summarize what Craig thinks "successive addition" is, but that would be relying on him too much, IMHO. jps (talk) 14:10, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I also thought that it was specifically Craig's term until Gret found a similar use of the term in Kant. This was discussed above. There are many secondary sources that discuss Craig's use of the term. See, for example, this source: [34]. So I don't see the trouble of finding appropriate sourcing for a more expansive discussion of his use of 'successive addition'. Rather, the challenge in my opinion is to explain it with appropriate brevity. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:05, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Using a Kant definition for something that has relevance to so-called "contemporary updates" to an idea is problematic. I don't think Hilbert would have accepted Kant's "successive addition claims", but this is original research again. Let's simplify. jps (talk) 15:44, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not sure we are talking about a neologism, but rather a simple modifier to a verb. It seems to simply mean the process of addition, done successively, or iteratively. IE taking 1 and adding it to 1, then taking the result and adding 1 to it, then taking that result and adding 1 to it, etc. Squatch347 (talk) 14:17, 4 September 2019 (UTC) The problem here is that there is more than one way to formalize this process. Much time has been wasted over whether analytic continuation, for example, can give a meaningful assignment to certain divergent series which is one way to interpret the idea you are talking about here. Craig is using successive addition to mean something meaningful to him, but because it is not a formal definition or proof, it is hard for me to know what he thinks this process actually is (and whether the vast mathematical literature on series, partial sums, and the like, are at all relevant to his attempt to attach this to some sort of theory of time). jps (talk) 14:23, 4 September 2019 (UTC) "...potentially infinite series, not an actually infinite one..." this is a meaningless statement. jps (talk) 00:58, 4 September 2019 (UTC) These are pretty common terms in philosophy; certainly not meaningless. They might be unclear to the general reader without further explanation, though. I'd favor the suggestion above that we link to the wiki article on these ideas. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:04, 4 September 2019 (UTC) An infinite series is not distinguished between potential and actual infinities. jps (talk) 10:47, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I agree that no infinite series is a potential infinity. Not sure what the point is, or what is being proposed here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:28, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Agree with Shine here, these are generally accepted terms[35], I'm not sure what you are saying is incorrect here or what you are proposing. Squatch347 (talk) 14:17, 4 September 2019 (UTC) You didn't understand the page you linked to. The issue is not with potential or actual infinities. The issue is with infinite series being so distinguished. You'll note the technical term "series" is not found anywhere in the page you linked to. jps (talk) 14:26, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Still not clear what's being proposed here. It's standard to talk of collections, series, and sets being either actually or potentially infinite. Examples are numerous. Our own article on actual infinity talks that way, so do several articles on the SEP and lots of RS on Craig's stuff and on related matters. I don't see that anyone is claiming that potentially infinite series are in fact infinite series (which would be an error). So again, I'm not sure what is being proposed here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:05, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I think you haven't appreciated that the term series has a very particular definition in mathematics that makes the statement as written above nonsensical when in appeal to actual infinity. Best to just avoid the word and talk about Craig's hang-ups with actual and potential infinities. jps (talk) 15:50, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Additional gratuitous insults to Craig (specifically: "Craig doesn't have the training nor sophistication to understand..."). @Steven Crossin: moderation is needed here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:26, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Stop with the WP:CRYBLP already. It's ignorant. jps (talk) 01:40, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Let's keep things factual rather than project our own opinions of the subject of the article please. We should be going off what reliable sources say about Craig, and nothing else. (For the record, I'm doing better. Motorbike accident). Jps, might I suggest you come up with a new draft that you feel works better based on your comments? Currently, we are up to draft 4. Making some progress so far, but let's keep our opinions of Craig off this discussion please. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:07, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I am having a hard time coming up with a new draft because I think we've gone in a direction I don't think is appropriate. I really do think that Draft 1 has been better than all the following drafts for the most part. jps (talk) 10:47, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 4(a) Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has written and spoken worked extensively on in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument that, he argues, proves the existence of God. While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference added appeals to contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas in the argument's defense. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modest version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise that time is finite, and he offers two main philosophical arguments to support it. The first one appeals to Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and thus the past is finite and has a beginning. The second argument claims that because each successive event in time is finite, time is demarcated by a finite process and thus must have a beginning. : that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is impossible due to the consequential absurdities that arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins, and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics, and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. The Kalam argument concludes that the universe had a cause, but Craig further argues Craig's conclusion is the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. The conclusion of the Kalam argument is that the universe had a cause. But Craig adds an additional argument for the claim that the cause must be a person. His argument for this depends on a distinction he draws between personal and non-personal causes. First, he claims , first, that the cause of the universe is outside of time, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that causes that are outside of time only have eternal effects if they are non-personal. Since Craig thinks the universe is not eternal (per the Kalam), Given his belief in a non-eternal universe, he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support work on the Kalam argument have has been controversial and been discussed and debated by a variety of commentators. The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, philosophers Adolph Grunbaum, Quentin Smith, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston, and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy,, and Paul Draper, and Robert Koons have all published critiques of Craig's work. discussions or critiques of Craig's work on the Kalam. References As before, I've based this draft on Gret's latest (Draft 4 in this case), but have removed prose that I considered to be original research, problematic wording, and some instances of attribution errors. I'm, in particular, not satisfied with "the cause of the universe is outside of time, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that causes that are outside of time only have eternal effects if they are non-personal." but this is a better formulation than the ones found in Drafts 2 through 4, in my estimation. jps (talk) 15:35, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Good work, I'm largely happy with these changes. I still have a couple of issues that I mentioned in response to the last draft: I'm not happy with the sourcing on the BVG stuff, I'd still drop the Smith quote at the end, and 'critique' doesn't work with the Koons reference. A couple of other small points. First, I see that jps strikes 'philosophical' here; I included that because Craig also gives empirical arguments for the premise, so the two philosophical arguments are not all his arguments. Second, given the source I provided before, I don't think that Hilbert clearly regarded his hotel example as involving a paradox, which may be suggested by calling it "Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel". I'd favor just saying it is his example. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:03, 4 September 2019 (UTC) "sourcing on the BVG stuff" -- I don't care much about BVG, but if we're going to include it I want the description of what it says to be accurate and sourced to reliable sources. "critique", it seems to me, is a matter of opinion. Would "commentary" be better? (Though it is redundant with "commentators" earlier in the paragraph.) How about something like "discussed and debated by a number of commenters, including ... [list of all the commenters]". Shinealittlelight (talk) 20:20, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Sure. jps (talk) 20:56, 4 September 2019 (UTC) I think it is arguable whether the arguments Craig is offering are "philosophical" or not. They are in one rather broad sense, but in another sense they are "rhetorical". Best to keep it simpler, I think. His empirical arguments are not much noticed, I believe. Well, he gives more than two arguments, so what we have in this draft is not accurate. That's the point. Shinealittlelight (talk) 20:20, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Got it. We could switch the construction to a passive one to say, "Two of the arguments Craig offers in support are..." or something to that effect. jps (talk) 20:56, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Whether Hilbert considered the Grand Hotel a "paradox", I think, is irrelevant. Craig is not referencing Hilbert, per se. He is referencing the example and the example is listed in most compendia as a famous "paradox". Still, you can call it an example if you like, I don't much care. jps (talk) 19:40, 4 September 2019 (UTC) One other thing that's a bigger deal, which I missed on first reading. This draft has this language: The second argument claims that because each successive event in time is finite, time is demarcated by a finite process and thus must have a beginning. I don't think that this is really his argument. He doesn't depend on the premise that the events themselves are finite; rather, he thinks that the sort of process by which the events are successively added can only ever produce a finite sequence. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:08, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Similar to the "personal cause" wording that I intimated above, I am not 100% happy with this phrasing either, but I really must plead ignorance as to what "process" could ever "successively add" "events". I think we're too far in the weeds. If we can make the phrasing even simpler, that might help. jps (talk) 19:40, 4 September 2019 (UTC) Agreed that simpler is normally better where possible. Happy to see progress here. We may not find a solution that everyone is 100% happy with, but might get close, and compromise is always a decent outcome where possible. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:04, 5 September 2019 (UTC) I still don't really understand how to construct this, but if I were forced to try on an exam I might say, "The second argument claims that time is made out of a finite number of events added together and Craig contends that such a construction cannot be infinite into the past meaning that there was a beginning." I don't even know if that's actually what the second argument is, but given my readings of the sources and the protestations here, it's the best I can do right now. I would love to know exactly why it has to be a finite number of events. I at first thought it was because of "events" themselves being finite, but Shinealittlelight has made me re-read and I think there is something "process oriented" in the construction of the argument that depends not at all on the duration properties of events. jps (talk) 10:26, 5 September 2019 (UTC) This is a pretty good draft, good work jps. A couple of small issues and suggestions: All of the first and second paragraphs are good, no real objection here. One question, why do you replace the word 'published' with 'written and spoken?' Just curious what your thought process was for that. I think that it is important to note not just that Craig has published this but that it is one of his most common speeches as well. I think this is indicated in the sources. jps (talk) 14:04, 5 September 2019 (UTC) Ah, yeah I think that's ok. It might be a better formulation to say "published and spoken," written I think doesn't convey that the sources we are citing are in journals. Squatch347 (talk) 13:22, 6 September 2019 (UTC) Sure, but he's also written about it in places that were self-published. But arguably, self-published is still "published". NBD. jps (talk) 01:03, 8 September 2019 (UTC) I'd also agree that the best language in the third paragraph is the language jps proposed: "Two of the arguments Craig offers in support are..." It reads better and doesn't convey a sense of totality that I'm not sure we can support. Draft 4a's wording of the Hilbert language is fine with me, it is a good middle ground. This is probably the biggest bit of work for us to get finalized, but I looked through this section on the version of On Guard that we have linked and think I have some proposed language: "The second argument claims that time is formed by a process of successive addition, with each moment being added to the previous set of moments (see: A-Theory of Time). Craig maintains that this process is insufficient to form an actually infinite set of moments and thus could not produce an eternal universe." There is a second part to the argument, but I think this gets the primary point across, nor can I quite figure out how to succinctly word it[36]. I'm not sure how to include the reference to a-theory of time that is later in the article, but it does seem relevant here. I think part of the problem is that the pre-dispute version contained a bit more reference to Craig's view on temporal becoming, which is relevant to this point. We could explain it, but that makes this section a bit unwieldy. Yes, A-theory of time might be relevant here, but it is again rather getting into the weeds. I wish we could simply state it so that someone could understand it without having to take a journey into various philosophy of time matters. jps (talk) 14:04, 5 September 2019 (UTC) I'm ok with the BVG language as is, however, I think a more accurate summary would be: "expanding universe will have a time-like boundary condition in the past." This is closer to the argument being made in the sources and closer to what their paper is primarily about. This is not quite correct as BVG is formally argued. In particular, boundary condition is a technical terms that doesn't really apply to this theorem which merely points out that tracing worldlines towards the proper time past in an expanding FLRW metric will lead to a singularity if this is the only physics that is invoked. I think Craig claims something else in some of his work, but if we're going to quote this theorem, I think it important we get it right by the theorem's own telling. jps (talk) 14:04, 5 September 2019 (UTC) Fair, I was trying to create a slightly more readable, but accurate assessment of the theorem's point here. Perhaps something like "...expanding universe will be incomplete in the past?" I don't like the incomplete language as it is a little opaque in my opinion, but making it a little more clear like "has a starting point in the past" or something like that is adding too much to the theorem that isn't quite there. Squatch347 (talk) 13:22, 6 September 2019 (UTC) I don't think "incomplete" is correct. A singularity is pretty complete. The issue fundamentally is that "starting point" and "singularity" do not have to mean the same thing. Craig argues that they are the same thing, but the theorem itself does not do that. jps (talk) 01:01, 8 September 2019 (UTC) A singularity is not what is being described as "incomplete" in that sentence, the past is. This is, essentially, the same language used im BVG's published theorems. I don't think that that actually is what Craig is arguing here. Rather, I think he is referencing the BVG theorem to argue that there is a boundary edge in the past, a boundary that could be described as a beginning. Squatch347 (talk) 14:06, 9 September 2019 (UTC) No other issues with this. The personal cause language and the agreement between Shine and jps is good: "discussed and debated by a number of commenters, including..." Squatch347 (talk) 13:39, 5 September 2019 (UTC) (a) I'm not a fan of the "written and spoken" language. Philosophers and theologians give talks, but precedence is always given to written work. It seems odd to highlight the speaking claim in the context of his philosophical views when his notability as a speaker is rooted in his religious evangelistic/apologetic work. I think his speaking career should be addressed in a separate section dedicated to his religious activities. The norm of other philosopher BLPs serve as guidance: They rarely attribute views as being written and spoken. (b) The use of "claim" early in the passage sounds like an agenda slipping in. According to WP:CLAIM: "To write that someone asserted or claimed something can call their statement's credibility into question, by emphasizing any potential contradiction or implying a disregard for evidence. Similarly, be judicious in the use of admit, confess, reveal, and deny, particularly for living people, because these verbs can inappropriately imply culpability." (c) The following sentence reads a bit clunky: "The second argument claims that because each successive event in time is finite, time is demarcated by a finite process and thus must have a beginning." Aside from these issues I'm broadly happy with this version. Good job jps. Also, Steven Crossin (talk · contribs), glad to hear you're doing better. No pressure, but when you have time could you address the issue of setting goals for addressing the tags/flags on the article? There is a massive pile of them on the article, and I wonder if all this work actually goes towards resolving those issues. Is there a criteria to meet on resolving those problems? Some way we know we're making progress? Hate for all this work to be in vain. —Approaching (talk) 21:50, 5 September 2019 (UTC) Yes, that's something I'll consider once we're doing with the mediation after we're done with the rewrite. May ask for outside input on the content to get an additional opinion once we're done. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 14:42, 6 September 2019 (UTC) Wondering if we can agree on the above text and implement this? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 05:16, 9 September 2019 (UTC) The explanation of the successive addition argument in this draft is not accurate, among other problems. I favor draft 5 over this. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:23, 9 September 2019 (UTC) Rather unlike Shinealittlelight, I find Draft 5 to be more problematic. Not the least of which the use of infinite series as a term for something that is not an infinite series as defined mathematically. jps (talk) 09:53, 10 September 2019 (UTC) Here's a quote from the basic set theory text by Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, & Levy: "A simple notion which is extremely useful in mathematics is the notion of an ordered pair. The ordered pair <a, b> is an element which corresponds to a and b (taken in that order) such that (i) For all a, b, c, d, if <a, b> = <c, d> then a = c and b = d. As suggested by Wiener and Kuratowski such a notion can be defined in ZF by DEFINITION IV. <a, b> = {{a}, {a, b}}. [proof of (i) from Def. IV omitted here] ...the notion of an ordered triple, and in general, the notion of an ordered n-tuple, for n [greater than or equal to] 3, are defined by DEFINITION V. <a, b, c> =df <a, <b, c>>. <a 1, ... , an> =df (a1, <a2, <a3, ..., <an-1, an>>, ... >>" So, as I say, since Weiner proposed this in 1915, standard set theory has regarded sequences (series) as identified with certain sets, and sets can of course contain anything as members. This isn't a matter of controversy; it's just basic set theory. Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:25, 10 September 2019 (UTC) SERIES AND SEQUENCES ARE NOT THE SAME THING. How many times can I repeat this? jps (talk) 18:39, 10 September 2019 (UTC) No need to yell. I think 'series' and 'sequence' are synonyms, and that mathematicians do not distinguish the terms. In that the Fraenkel et al. text, they use 'series' several times for sequences of non-numbers. But whatever. It sounds like you would be fine if we just replace the word 'series' in my formulation with 'sequence'. That's fine with me, as it seems to me like a trivial difference. Let it be 'infinite sequence' instead of 'infinite series', then. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:02, 11 September 2019 (UTC) This took nearly a week for you to acknowledge. I am bowled over that you think that mathematicians do not distinguish between series and sequences and encourage you to talk to one as soon as possible. In my experience, they are some of the most stuck up when it comes to getting jargon right. Let me address the wording below switching series for sequence (there are still issues). jps (talk) 02:10, 11 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not sure what you think I acknowledged, but I also don't care. Let's move on. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:25, 11 September 2019 (UTC) Jps, I expect editors involved in mediation I run to conduct themselves in an appropriate manner, and I will not tolerate virtual shouting or similar behaviour. I realise that working through disagreements here can be challenging, but civility is a non-negotiable minimum standard that I require, and I hope I don’t have to remind anyone here about how to conduct themselves again. We’ve made significant progress on this article so far and are working steadily along. Try to focus on what you can agree on (it’s working slowly) and put the other disagreements aside. I am happy that we’ve had several drafts on sections to try and address concerns and comments with text. Let’s keep doing that. Thanks. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:48, 11 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 5 Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has written and spoken worked extensively on in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument that, he argues, proves the existence of God. While the Kalam has a venerable history was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig updated the argument to reference added appeals to contemporary scientific and philosophical ideas in the argument's defense. Craig's work has resulted in renewed contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. The classical form of the argument, as well as Craig's, "[attempt] to prove God's existence by showing that the world must have a beginning in time." Craig originally formulated formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argument in the following manner as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." However, in his later literature, Craig prefers to use a more modest version of the first premise: "If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause of its beginning." Craig's interest is mainly in defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise that time is finite, and he offers two main several arguments to support it. The first one appeals to Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel example of an infinite hotel to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and thus the past is finite and has a beginning. The second argument claims that because each successive event in time is finite, time is demarcated by a finite process and thus must have a beginning. The second argument is that the series of events in time is formed by a process in which each moment is added to history in succession. Craig claims that this process can never produce an infinite series, but instead forever approaches infinity as a limit, and thus that the past is finite and has a beginning. : that the existence of an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible, and that forming an actual infinite number of past events through successive addition is metaphysically impossible. According to Craig, the existence of an actually infinite number of things in reality is impossible due to the consequential absurdities that arise, which he illustrates using the example of Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. Stating that the mathematical conventions stipulated to ensure the logical consistency of this type of transfinite arithmetic have no ontological force, Craig concludes that finitism is most plausibly true, which means that the series of past events in the universe must be finite, so it must have had a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker metric Big Bang model, the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins, and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics, and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past. Craig believes that a cosmic singularity marks an origin of the universe in the finite past. The Kalam argument concludes that the universe had a cause, but Craig further argues Craig's conclusion is the premise that the universe began to exist is more plausible than not, and the beginning of the universe implies the existence of a cause that transcends it. The conclusion of the Kalam argument is that the universe had a cause. But Craig adds an additional argument for the claim that the cause must be a person. His argument for this depends on a distinction he draws between personal and non-personal causes. First, he claims , first, that the cause of the universe is outside of time, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims that causes that are outside of time only have eternal effects if they are non-personal. Since Craig thinks the universe is not eternal (per the Kalam), Given his belief in acceptance of the Kalam argument for a non-eternal universe, he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig claims that, due to its nature, the cause must be a personal being which he refers to as God. Craig's arguments to support work on the Kalam argument have has been controversial and been discussed and debated by a variety of commentators including The philosopher Quentin Smith states: "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." For example, philosophers Adolph Grunbaum, Quentin Smith, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston, and atheist philosopher Graham Oppy,, and Paul Draper, and Robert Koons have all published critiques of Craig's work. discussions or critiques of Craig's work on the Kalam. Divine omniscienceDivine Providence Craig is a proponent of Molinism, supporting the doctrine of middle knowledge and also applying it to a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, Christian particularism, and the problem of evil. Formulatedan idea first formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina according to which God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person would perform under every possible circumstance, a kind of knowledge that is sometimes termed "middle knowledge." Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. The idea is that, by relying on his middle knowledge, God is in a position to choose the best circumstance to actualize, taking account of the free choices that agents will perform in such a circumstance without interfering with the free will of those agents. Craig also appeals to Molinism in his work on a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism.. , the doctrine of middle knowledge holds that logically prior to his decree to create a world God knew what every possible creature he might create would freely do in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place him. On the basis of his knowledge of such counterfactuals of free will and his knowledge of his own decree to create certain creatures in certain circumstances, along with his own decision how he himself shall act, God automatically knows everything that will actually and contingently happen, without any perception of the world. New Entry: Perzyk, Ken (2013). "Recent Work on Molinism". Philosophy Compass 8/8: 755–770. doi:10.1111/phc3.12057. References I incorporated some of what we talked about above, and added a few other little things, and added back in the work I did on the molinism section (which is unchanged from what I did before). I also tried again on the successive addition argument. Here's what I think: the basic argument is pretty clear: he thinks that the series of events in time was formed by successive addition (adding one moment to the last in succession), and he thinks that no infinite series can be formed by successive addition, so he thinks that the series of events in time is finite. What's obscure, I think, is why he thinks that an infinite series cannot be formed by successive addition. He has a lot to say here, but it isn't easy to summarize, and I think we should not try. (If I were to try, I would say something like this. Craig reasons that, if the past is infinite, but formed by successive addition, then (i) an infinite span of time would be sufficient to have reached the present moment, and (ii) such a span would have elapsed as of any moment that occurred a finite amount of time ago (e.g., as of one week ago). Thus it would follow that the present moment already occurred in the past. Given the absurdity of this result, he concludes that the past cannot be both infinite and formed by successive addition. Again, I do not think we should include this or anything like it; it's too "in the weeds" as jps says; I don't think this level of detail is necessary to get the gist of his thought on this topic.) Final remark: I struck the Smith quote again since it didn't fit with what I was trying to do to simplify the last bit, and because (as I've said) I'm not in favor of including it; I understand that this is not yet consensus, and if someone wants to add it back in for the time being that is fine with me. But I would still like to hear from Steve about whether it's appropriately independent when he gets a chance, and also about the similar question concerning the use of Carroll as a source for the BVG stuff (given their co-authorship). Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:54, 6 September 2019 (UTC) This is pretty close for me. I think the successive addition language is good as is the distinction between an infinite an limit, that gets to what he is arguing here and is relatively clear to the reader. Everything else is fine here as well with only a few outstanding points already referenced: 1) jps and I are working on the BVG language a bit 2) I agree with Approaching's concerns on the opening (I think a "published and spoken" is probably the most accurate formulation) and the overuse of the word 'claims,' especially in the personal cause section. That structure gives off the impression that these are bald assertions rather than more detailed arguments in the formal work, which I don't think is accurate. 3) The already stated support for the Smith quote, which I think we can wait on Steven to help us with. Also, no objection to the Providence section, I think your wording is great. Good update. Squatch347 (talk) 13:31, 6 September 2019 (UTC) Thanks for addressing my concerns with this one. (i) When I said I wasn't a fan of "written and spoken", I was specifically referring to the "and spoken" part. I think that should fall under his apologetic career, while his philosophical views (which are found in philosophical publications), should only refer to his written work, which is consistent with the other philosopher BLPs. (ii) First it says Craig offers several arguments for the second premise. Then it refers to "the first" and "the second". That reads a bit weird. Several is non-denumerating, while "the first" and "the second" imply you have denumerated the list. (iii) Everything is presented as "the argument states", but suddenly when it comes to a personal cause, it switches to much more subjective language. "Given his belief in...", "Given his acceptance for". That sudden shift sounds weird and inconsistent. It seems better to just say the argument concludes with... These are all relatively minor issues, I think. I'm happy to leave minor text tweaking to after mediation, and get the most critical issues resolved, namely the flags. —Approaching (talk) 21:59, 6 September 2019 (UTC) Thanks all. @ජපස:, could you give your thoughts on this? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 08:15, 7 September 2019 (UTC) I'll start to work through this, but I may have to do it piecemeal: 'Craig claims that this process can never produce an infinite series, but instead forever approaches infinity as a limit...' I think the second part of this problematic. First of all, this is not an infinite series in any case, so no one would argue it would be so produced. How about just Craig claims that this process can never produce something infinite and leave it at that? To distinguish between this an something that "forever approaches infinity as a limit" is, arguably, the technical definition of an actual infinity if you believe that limits are met (as in Zeno's paradox). Rather than argue through this, we should stay simple. jps (talk) 16:26, 7 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not following. You say this is not an infinite series in any case. What is 'this' referring to in this claim? Shinealittlelight (talk) 17:34, 7 September 2019 (UTC) Actually, the ambiguity is kinda the point. The thing the "infinite series" "this process" can produce is ambiguous. And an infinite series is necessarily a sum of numbers. It is not a timeline, essentially by definition. jps (talk) 00:57, 8 September 2019 (UTC) Still not following. Craig doesn't claim that a process of successive addition can produce any infinite series. In fact, one of his premises is that a process of successive addition can't produce any infinite series. Also, in standard set theory a series (or sequence) is understood as a certain kind of set, and sets can be sets of anything, not just numbers, so I really don't get what you're after here. Not trying to be difficult; I just really don't understand what you're saying. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:28, 8 September 2019 (UTC) While I don't pretend to understand "successive addition" as Craig imagines it, the definition of an infinite series is an infinite sequence of numbers that are added to each other. I'm not sure how to be anymore clear than this. jps (talk) 20:11, 8 September 2019 (UTC) You may need to consult a basic set theory text. Sequences are standardly identified with certain sets, and sets can have anything as a member, not just numbers. This isn't something I'm interested in debating further. Shinealittlelight (talk) 23:11, 8 September 2019 (UTC) You may need to click on the wikilink. jps (talk) 23:29, 8 September 2019 (UTC) JPS, can I offer you a constructive, yet unsolicited suggestion? Your opinions are valued here. Nevertheless, they seem to be critiques of the substance of the BLP's views. It's perfectly fine that you have strong opinions on his views, but the sort of evaluations you offer don't belong in a Wikipedia article, but a philosophy journal. As Wikipedians, it's not our place to assess the philosophical quality of his claims. We are merely to describe what he says. You might argue that he is mistaken based on some sources, but you seem to be working purely off of your opinion. That's why I think we're having a little trouble here. Still, I am interested in the issues you are raising, and I'm happy to discuss them, and maybe even incorporate them into the article if they meet the criteria to do so. With that in mind, do you mind explaining what *this* is, and why it's not an infinite series on my personal talk page? I've always been intrigued by your views, but I couldn't take the time to explore them because they were inappropriate for the situation. —Approaching (talk) 17:55, 7 September 2019 (UTC) Let's just stick to the article content, shall we? jps (talk) 00:57, 8 September 2019 (UTC) Any chance I can get a link to the three references in question for this sentence? I'd like to see what the sources actually write, directly quoting the sources rather than interpreting what they say/mean might be a way for me to move this discussion along. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 04:03, 8 September 2019 (UTC) The SEP piece is here: [37] Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:15, 8 September 2019 (UTC) The second source, Sinclair and Craig 2009 p117 can hopefully be accessed via preview or books, in a section titled 2.2. Argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition. —Approaching (talk) 05:01, 9 September 2019 (UTC) Proposed fix for this sentence: "Craig claims that this process can never produce an infinite series sequence of events,but instead forever approaches infinity as a limit, and thus that the past is finite and has a beginning." This is less ambiguous and seems to keep the same meaning. The "instead approaches infinity as a limit" is typically the definition that physicists use for infinity, so this is not a thing that can be stated plainly as such. I cannot find a place where Craig actually does the on the one hand/on the other with "approaches infinity as a limit" being an alternative to a process not making an infinite sequence of events. What quote do you have that you think does this? jps (talk) 02:16, 11 September 2019 (UTC) seems to keep the same meaning Lol. Ok, well, on second thought I think 'collection' reads better than 'sequence', and also reflects the language in the Wainwright review better. Would that be ok with you? I have a quote from Craig that says "a potential infinite is a collection that is increasing toward infinity as a limit but never gets there" in his Reasonable Faith book. He also uses that language in several other places when explaining what a potential infinity is. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:58, 11 September 2019 (UTC) Collection is fine with me! I think that Craig makes a distinction between potential and actual infinities that most mathematicians would not make, so let's attribute this idea to him rather than describing it. Here's my next attempt: "Craig claims that this process can never produce an actual infinite series collection of events, but instead produces only a potentially infinite one. On this basis, he argues the past is finite and has a beginning." jps (talk) 17:47, 11 September 2019 (UTC) I'm fine with this. I'd prefer a version that glosses what "potential infinite" means instead of merely giving a wikilink, but if this is the best we can do, I can live with it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:35, 11 September 2019 (UTC) The definition of potential infinities is itself controversial. It's best we don't touch it here. jps (talk) 00:17, 12 September 2019 (UTC) I think what I should have said is that I'd prefer a version that glosses what Craig understands by 'potential infinite'. And what he means by it is given in the quote I gave above. We could say: ...by which Craig understands a collection that "is increasing toward infinite as a limit but never gets there." This quote can be sourced to a piece by Morriston. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:22, 12 September 2019 (UTC) The problem is that this gloss seems to me to assume some facts not in evidence. Craig, I guess(?), believes that there is something called the "infinite" which cannot be reached through normal mathematical processes, I gather. This is why he distinguishes between limits as potentialities(?) and actualities. The problem is that we are going to get bogged down in the full glory of the arguments that are Craig's as opposed to what is generally accepted. So, I think, if we were going to write this accurately it would read something like, "Craig believes that the collection of events may form a set that is potentially unbounded and would therefore, as a limiting case, have an infinite size. Craig does not think such a set is actually infinite." In that working, at least, I think all of the things we are identifying are unequivocally accepted as axiomatic. In your formulation, there is some awkwardness with regards to what exactly "increasing toward infinite" means or what exactly "never gets there" means. jps (talk) 00:59, 12 September 2019 (UTC) But if we use Craig's own gloss, and attribute it to him, that lets the reader know how Craig himself is thinking about the matter. Attributing it to Craig allows the reader to decide how clear or reasonable Craig's formulation is. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:09, 12 September 2019 (UTC) I would be okay with using a craig quote, but not one that is as truncated as you recommend because it leaves too much undefined in Craig's own words. The reader is liable to wonder what the phrases I indicate mean. Craig may or may not explain these adjacently (I argue that he does not), but by providing a small quote like these we simply make things less clear, in my estimation. jps (talk) 01:48, 12 September 2019 (UTC) A fully attributed quote here from Craig could work in this instance, e.g. Craig xyz view is "blah blah blah" - direct quote rather than paraphrasing in this instance. That way we 100% writing their view as written in the attributed source. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 05:32, 12 September 2019 (UTC) In principle, I agree. However, I am finding that the clearest quote that I can find (from his book) goes on for a paragraph and really engages with a lot more subjects than we need, so I will not even post it here. A small quote like that given above, I think, just provokes more questions than it answers. jps (talk) 10:29, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Fair enough. Reading the discussion above, it seems we might have got close to a consensus with "Craig claims that this process can never produce an actual infinite series collection of events, but instead produces only a potentially infinite one. On this basis, he argues the past is finite and has a beginning." In the spirit of compromise, can we agree this version can work here? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 10:59, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Sure, I can live with that. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:20, 12 September 2019 (UTC) jps (talk) 12:48, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Also agreed that this is the clearest and most accurate formulation so far. Good job jps. Squatch347 (talk) 15:47, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Per Steven Crossin, moving the BVG section up here again. Sorry for putting my last comment in the wrong place. The clarification to "past eternal" is a good catch, thanks jps. Agreed with that change. My only hesitancy is that the addition of gravitation is not (solely) what Craig and Carroll are talking about in the source. I think the wording might confuse a reader into thinking that this is a black hole type event rather than an initial state. Perhaps the term "initial singularity" rather than "gravitational singularity?" Open to other language possibilities, I'm just worried the term currently in the draft could imply something that the sources don't necessarily mean. Squatch347 (talk) 15:47, 12 September 2019 (UTC) "Initial singularity" carries with it connotations that may be somewhat misleading. It's simply a singularity that is found in a FLRW metric (as opposed to a Schwarzschild metric). There isn't a standard term for such a singularity, but it is certainly the case that it is mathematically the same as the singularity found in the Schwarzschild solution, it's just that the metric outside of the singularity is different which makes the observation of the singularity (or impossibility of such) at issue for those trying to make the distinction. This is all rather hairy, of course, and it's probably not fair to the reader to try to distinguish this too much when Craig himself doesn't make this point. We could just say "singularity" and leave it at that. The linked article is decent at explaining how the one at the Big Bang is different than the one at the center of black holes. jps (talk) 16:18, 12 September 2019 (UTC) What's the proposed sourcing for the wording here? The current sources are, in my view, inadequate. Are you guys proposing to use Carroll's contribution to the Craig-Carroll source? If so, what page? Shinealittlelight (talk) 22:43, 12 September 2019 (UTC) I think jps and I are both using a bit of our academic backgrounds (well I'm using most of my training while I imagine jps is only using a little since his is more advanced than mine) in application here. To jps, the problem I see with listing it as a gravitational singularity is context. I like the idea of linking the gravitational singularity article behind whatever wordsmithing text we come up with, that article does have a lot of good information for an interested reader. However, simply labeling the application of the theorem here as a "gravitational singularity" obscures the implications being referenced in this argument. If we were writing a BLP article and we referenced a DUI hit and run as a "car accident" we wouldn't be doing the article justice because we are leaving out the specific context. When applied to this context, Prof. Vilenkin uses the language "Inflationary Spacetimes must have a past boundary (a beginning)." [38] Notice in this section he is specifically talking about the application Craig is using, is the universe past eternal? I think we should reference that "past boundary" language to be more consistent and accurate to the sources in context. To add to this, the structure of the talk in this video is similar to the one he gave at the “State of the Universe” prompted this New Scientist article [39] in which Vilenkin uses the boundary language again rather than singularity "“It can’t possibly be eternal in the past,” says Vilenkin. “There must be some kind of boundary.”" Underlying this is that the gravitational singularity is incidental to the boundary result, this is a geometric theorem. As Vilenkin states in our third source, gravity is irrelevant, you could have repulsive gravity and this would theorem would still hold. The point of the theorem is that the spacetimes have an absolute boundary, a T=0 as it were, rather than a gravitational singularity that existed in time forever then expanded. We should also note in that source Vilenkin doesn't reference a "gravitational singularity," but rather a "beginning" (this is more of a popular rather than scholarly article). All of the sources I can find have him specifically referring to this as either a past boundary or a beginning rather than a gravitational singularity. So I think using that language would be a bit OR on our part. Squatch347 (talk) 14:46, 13 September 2019 (UTC) Thanks for the reply, but I think my concerns are sort of prior to what you're talking about here. In my opinion, we need a secondary source on Craig's use of the theorem, and our language should reflect its language. The only candidate source of this sort we have--correct me if I'm wrong--is the Carroll discussion (which is not clearly a secondary source, though it might be). The other sources being referenced here seem to me primary or to suffer from OR/SYNTH problems. I'm claiming that anything we say on BVG should be sourced in the Carroll discussion, and, once we identify what claims we can support with that source, we can get Steven to weigh in on whether it's appropriately regarded as a secondary source for those claims. But that means I need to know: what do you want to say about BVG that can be sourced in the Carroll discussion, and what page are we referencing? Meanwhile, my current vote is not to mention BVG at all. Shinealittlelight (talk) 17:41, 13 September 2019 (UTC) Sorry, most of those sources were more aimed at my discussion with jps on terminology. I agree with you that I wouldn't consider them secondary sources necessarily for Craig's use. I'll address that specific point below. Squatch347 (talk) 13:59, 16 September 2019 (UTC) In terms of sources, I think the sources we have are pretty clear what's going on, but I am sympathetic to the claim that we don't have enough. My main goal here is to make sure the text is accurate with respect to both what Craig argues (and what people pay attention to) and what the papers actually say. As I've said, if the consensus is that we should remove discussion of this point on the basis of mediocre sourcing, I certainly would not object. jps (talk) 17:51, 13 September 2019 (UTC) @Squatch347: In popular language, Vilenkin uses terminology which aligns to Big Bang popularizations, thus beginning and boundaries and so forth. In the paper itself, the result simply shows a diverging density of geodesics when following them to their proper time past. This is as far as the theorem goes. In fact, others have pointed out that it doesn't even necessitate a singularity if you add a little bit of physicality (assuming that energy-divergent particles are not properly modeled as geodesics: [40]). We need to be careful not to mislead the reader with our wording. Vilenkin's own popularizations, while innocently intended, easily fold in too many distracting possible misconceptions. jps (talk) 17:51, 13 September 2019 (UTC) (re to Shine and Jps) - If the remaining sticking point is the mention of BVG, and we can perhaps agree that removal of this may be appropriate due to limited sourcing, would there be any other issues with this specific draft? If not, perhaps we could make that alteration and then proceed with the rest of the article? I note 5a might also have agreement? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 18:24, 13 September 2019 (UTC) That's fine with me. There are a few suggestions that need to be incorporated still, I think. On sourcing for BGV, in the Craig-Carroll article (really transcript, but published sort of in an article format), on p. 42, Carroll says "Dr. Craig says that the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem implies the universe had a beginning." Carroll immediately claims that Craig is in error to think this, and he goes into a brief discussion of why he thinks that the theorem does not imply this. So here are my questions: First, is this the source you guys want for the claim that Craig says the BGV theorem implies that the universe had a beginning? And second, is this source appropriate for this claim? My view is that it is not a good source, both in that this "debate article" is a joint publication (so not clearly independent), and because the stuff they're saying frankly seems to me half-baked and pitched at a popular level. It's certainly very brief. (I'm also not sure what to make of Fortress press--does anyone know about it? Did they peer-review this stuff?) So I'd prefer it was not in the article, but that we instead focus on the work Craig has published in serious scholarly venues. In the meantime, though, since I'm not really in favor of including this at all, I'm of course ok with leaving it out pending further discussion. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:36, 13 September 2019 (UTC) I don't think removal is really a valid option. Craig uses his interpretation of the BVG as a fundamental starting point for his defense in essentially every presentation and published source. "Craig’s defense of P2 is significantly more interesting and complex than his defense of P1. I will address Craig’s argument from physics, specifically his use of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem to assert an absolute beginning of the universe and his arguments against the Caroll-Chen and Hartle-Hawking cosmologies. We will begin with the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which asserts that: ”...a cosmological model which is inflating – or just expanding sufficiently fast – must be incomplete in null and timelike past directions. Specifically, [there is a] bound on the integral of the Hubble parameter over a past-directed timelike or null geodesic.”25 Craig claims that because our universe is expanding fast enough to satisfy the theorem’s assumptions, the BGVT proves that it must have had an absolute beginning in time." [41] There are a few other sources that discuss Craig's use of the BVG theorem as well, though I think this first one is the most clear.[42], [43], [44], [45], [46] For JPS, I agree with you that the second source for Vilenkin is certainly a more pop-science publication and writing, but the first was an academic conference at the University of Chicago. I think you and I could debate the physical implications of the BGVT (and I think that would certainly be fun), but when we are looking for a clarifying sentence we have to use the language of the sources we are citing. And the language of the sources we are citing, along with at least one of the author's own choice of words for a broader audience (which Wiki is also doing) was to use the term "past boundary." Squatch347 (talk) 13:59, 16 September 2019 (UTC) As I've pointed out, "past boundary" is misleading as to what the paper actually says. jps (talk) 22:07, 16 September 2019 (UTC) I get that you feel it is misleading. But it is the language we are using in the source we are citing. @Steven Crossin:, I think we might be at a slight impasse here and could use some guidance on Wiki Policy. I've suggested using language from the source we are citing, jps is concerned that it doesn't accurately reflect the original paper the source is referencing. The author of the source we are using is one of the co-authors of the original paper. Squatch347 (talk) 13:20, 17 September 2019 (UTC) There is a difference between someone making a popularization statement and someone proving something. These types of wordings matter for Wikipedia at least. Sadly, I think the best consensus here may be to remove the theorem completely. I'm sympathetic to your concern that it is somewhat central to Craig's argument (it is, indeed, the one thing he seems to mention every time he talks on this subject to academic audiences), but I'm afraid that this argument may be so esoteric and, frankly, obscure that it may not be able to cover it decently. Craig, for better or worse, does not get many people willing to debate this theorem on its terms. Even Vilenkin balks at engaging with that rhetoric. An alternative may be to go even simpler and not explain the theorem at all except for perhaps a link to the original paper and a link to something like cosmic inflation and FLRW metric. Shrug. jps (talk) 18:01, 17 September 2019 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight:, do any of the sources listed above work for you as additional citations to include the BVG section? Squatch347 (talk) 13:20, 17 September 2019 (UTC) The paper by Denigris is self-published and so not RS. The other papers do not make any reference to Craig's use of the BGV theorem. So no, I don't see that these are usable sources. He may mention this theorem in his recent presentations. But he has made little use of the theorem in his published work (so far as I can tell), and RS secondary sources do not discuss it. So we should ignore it. Unless of course someone wants to make the case that the published debate with Carroll is secondary RS (which I doubt). In that case, we can at least cite Carroll as stating that Craig takes the theorem to show that there's a beginning of the universe. But, as that Carroll source does not tell us much about how Craig understands the theorem or why he thinks that it has this implication, it isn't much use in explaining Craig's view. So I am voting to leave it out. I don't think it's a big loss. I think that, if Craig continues to work with the theorem, he is likely to publish more on it and get more response in secondary sources, and we can then include it. But not now. That's my take, anyway. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:39, 17 September 2019 (UTC) Hi Shine, the link I sent was to the open source version so people could review. It was published in The Winnower, which while not exactly the greatest journal ever published, is a peer reviewed journal[47]. Craig also wrote about it in the Blackwell Companion to Natural theology (a primary source for this claim, not secondary) [48], Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration[49], On Non-Singular Space-times and the Beginning of the Universe [50], and Beyond the Big Bang [51]. And we reference an article by Vilenkin where he notes that theists (the only example of which he references is Craig, who is also the only one he links to in his citation)e of craig) use the BVGt to argue for a beginning of the universe as part of a cosmological argument. These are, of course, primary sources, but reference to this theorem does seem to be consistently used in his published works (post 2004 when the theorem was published of course) and in his talks. My concern with removing that reference is that I think it misrepresents his published work on the subject. Use of this theorem seems to be the primary reference used in all of his recent work around which he constructs the rest of that defense. The reference to the laws of thermodynamics is, for example, a sub-part of that argument (he is dealing with an exception to the theorem). I'm not sure we need a whole set of secondary sources to relay the simple fact that Craig references the theorem as support for his premise. Not only is that point obvious, but we don't require that standard in any of our other A-Class articles such as Daniel_Dennett. What could require secondary sources is the second sentence explanation. And that sentence does have secondary sources. The concern there is that we are using different wording than the sources referenced. Squatch347 (talk) 14:16, 18 September 2019 (UTC) The Winnower, from what I can tell, is not "peer reviewed" in the usual sense of the term. It's an archive that allows users of the site to review the work post publication. So it's effectively self-publication. And as for the primary sources, I just would rather avoid primary sourcing in this article since that's been such a source of complaints. In any case, I am again happy to defer to Steven's judgment. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:33, 18 September 2019 (UTC) I think that is a pretty fair summary, but it does contain some element of peer-review. It is open peer-reviewed by approved members, but the reviews aren't blind, they are available for readers which makes it different from more traditional journals. Its impact factor is pretty low so this shouldn't be considered a major journal or publication, but that it has an impact factor at least implies some level of legitimacy. I generally agree with you that this isn't a particularly great source. However, I think more importantly is that I'm not sure we really need it for what we have in there. There are two statements that we have in the text that need sources. 1) The simple fact that Craig has invoked this theorem (which isn't controversial, isn't about his understanding of it, and doesn't need a secondary source, akin to our other example articles). 2) The theorem generally states X. This statement absolutely does require a secondary source and I think the current Craig citation should probably be removed. We aren't, as written, saying "this is how Craig says it" we are saying "this is what the theorem holds." We do have secondary sources for this statement, and two sources from one of the authors that provide clear descriptions of the theorem. Squatch347 (talk) 13:52, 19 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 5(a) Divine omniscienceDivine ProvidenceMolinism Craig is a proponent of Molinism, supporting the doctrine of middle knowledge and also applying it to a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence and predestination, biblical inspiration, perseverance of the saints, Christian particularism, and the problem of evil. Formulatedan idea first formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina according to which God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person performs under every possible circumstance, a kind of knowledge that is sometimes termed "middle knowledge." Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. The idea is that, by relying on middle knowledge, God does not interfere with the free will of people, instead choosing the best circumstances given a complete understanding for how they will choose to act in response. Craig also appeals to Molinism in his discussions of a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism.. , the doctrine of middle knowledge holds that logically prior to his decree to create a world God knew what every possible creature he might create would freely do in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place him. On the basis of his knowledge of such counterfactuals of free will and his knowledge of his own decree to create certain creatures in certain circumstances, along with his own decision how he himself shall act, God automatically knows everything that will actually and contingently happen, without any perception of the world. New Entry: Perzyk, Ken (2013). "Recent Work on Molinism". Philosophy Compass 8/8: 755–770. doi:10.1111/phc3.12057. References I think the Molinism section is better in draft 5 than before, but I would like to simplify the language a bit and also wikilink more. Also, I think the section should just be called "Molinism" as that is the unifying theme (and not just divine providence). Whaddya think? jps (talk) 01:17, 8 September 2019 (UTC) I'm fine with that title. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:28, 8 September 2019 (UTC) The word 'might' there isn't correct; 'would' is correct. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:30, 8 September 2019 (UTC) Well, it's a counterfactual for everything but the one outcome which actually happens. We actually don't have a tense that captures that. "Would" is incorrect as it is assumes the hypothetical is correct, but this is not explicit in our formulation. jps (talk) 10:41, 8 September 2019 (UTC) I have read this last comment from jps several times and cannot make heads or tails of it. If I say 'If Clinton had won, Trump would have lost', I don't assume either that Clinton won or that Trump lost. In any case, the correct formulation is what I wrote before using 'would'. Counterfactuals of freedom relevant to Molinism have the form "Had circumstance C obtained, so-and-so would have freely done A". And it makes sense that this is so, since God has to know what we would do in various circumstances to come to a conclusion about what we will do by actcualizing those circumstances. 'Might' doesn't cut it.Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:10, 8 September 2019 (UTC) "Might", I agree, doesn't capture the issue wholly as well. The problem I am having is that "would", as proposed and described in your explanation, indicates something like an AB testing environment for counterfactuals. We have here, however, a claim that there is a density of possibilities each of which *might* happen based on contingency of free will agents choosing prior actions. Given A or B, free agent would choose (say) A, but we don't know that the A or B choice is what will be presented. This is a key aspect of middle knowledge arguments, as far as I can tell. We have run into the problem that I think we need to indicate both subjunctive and conditional tenses which is a conjugation we do not have. jps (talk) 11:21, 8 September 2019 (UTC) "We don't know that the A or B choice is what will be presented" isn't right if we're talking about God. He is supposed to know which possible circumstance he will actualize. So he puts that knowledge together with his "middle" knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom and gets a conclusion about what we will do. That's the idea. Molinism is the view that he has knowledge of such counterfactuals of freedom and utilizes them in this way to get foreknowledge of free actions. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:38, 8 September 2019 (UTC) We agree with each other on the definition, I think. But the issue is that the audience (the reader) is the one who has to interpret the sentence and not God. We're talking about how the actions of God are explained. That is, the description as offered is of a set of possibilities as imagined by the person learning about the middle knowledge. If God were the audience, we wouldn't need to use either the conditional nor the subjunctive tenses as presumably there is perfect knowledge of what outcome will result. jps (talk) 13:31, 8 September 2019 (UTC) Still somehow I'm missing your point; apologies if I'm being slow. Here's the disputed statement: God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person would perform under every possible circumstance. In other words: for each possible circustance C, person x, and free action A, God knows each fact of the form: Had C obtained, x would have performed A. This doesn't imply that we know anything--it's saying that God would know these counterfactuals. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:55, 8 September 2019 (UTC) The problem is that C is already a conditional according to my reading of what Craig is arguing in the sources. There is a reading of "...which free actions each person would perform..." that implies that the C is deterministic when, in fact, the C is conditional and predicated on the free will of x. The problem with the wording "...which free actions each person might perform..." is that there is a reading that implies that God does not have sufficient foreknowledge of what A will occur. There is a tension here to describe this properly so that people don't misinterpret the Molinistic conceit. jps (talk) 17:59, 8 September 2019 (UTC) What if we get rid of the helping verb entirely? This might actually solve the problem. See what you think. jps (talk) 19:59, 8 September 2019 (UTC) Still don't understand the worry about the original, but I can live with this suggestion unless other editors have a problem with it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 23:20, 8 September 2019 (UTC) In case anyone is wondering, I've added some paragraph breaks to make it easier for me to read. I have some vision issues and these edits help me. If I made any mistakes, I apologize (fix them or tell me and I'll fix them). Also, may I please request that if anyone makes a complex edit (i.e., more than 2 or 3 lines), that you add paragraph breaks when appropriate. I would really appreciate it.  :) Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 02:23, 10 September 2019 (UTC) @Steven Crossin: An editor involved here just made an edit to the main article. I thought we weren't doing that. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:50, 11 September 2019 (UTC) Yes thanks, I spotted that earlier, however as they were restoring removed content by an IP, thus restoring the article to the status quo I have no issue with the edit. If someone involved here makes an edit there’s no consensus for, believe me, they’ll know about it. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:42, 11 September 2019 (UTC) OK. But fyi, he reverted the removal of material that was recently added by an uninvolved editor. When that material (about Harris) was originally added a short time ago, I would have reverted it, because I didn't think it belonged. But I didn't revert it because I thought we weren't supposed to edit the article. In my view, returning to the status quo would look like removing that material about Harris altogether. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:31, 11 September 2019 (UTC) Noted, thanks for mentioning that. I think since the addition happened in the reception section, we can discuss that addition when we get to the reception section overall. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 05:32, 12 September 2019 (UTC) I wanted to bump some of the discussion about BVG. It is a relatively minor change, but the gravitational singularity isn't quite correct, and certainly doesn't convey the sense it is being used here. I would suggest something more akin to "incomplete in the past" which is the language the authors actually use. At very least we need to remove gravitational as a modifier as that includes a whole class of objects not under discussion. Squatch347 (talk) 13:57, 11 September 2019 (UTC) What the theorem states is that a gravitational singularity is what results (and, to be clear, it is manifestly a gravitational singularity, although it is true that because it is in the FLRW metric, it is not the same kind of singularity as one that shows up in black hole metrics -- if you prefer we could call it a Big Bang singularity but notice that this is a fairly obscure distinction that doesn't even have a redirect page yet!). I don't see any way around this. What Craig thinks this singularity represents is another matter. But if we are going to state what the theorem says, I think we have to state what it says. jps (talk) 17:47, 11 September 2019 (UTC) Sorry if this distracts from the substantive issue about BVG here, but I'm still worried about the sourcing for BVG. Steven Crossin, do you think that what Carroll says in the joint publication of Carroll and Craig can be counted as an independent source on this topic? If not, I think we don't have adequate sourcing for inclusion. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:28, 12 September 2019 (UTC) To be clear, I would not object to removing this entire discussion completely, but if we are going to include it I would like to make sure it is solidly explained and opinions are properly attributed. jps (talk) 00:54, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Might not be adequately independent in this situation. We have no substantiative way of knowing how much was contributed to by Craig, and by Carroll. If editors here can agree to exclude this part, I think it's probably for the best. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 05:32, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Actually, I think that it's pretty clear what was from Carroll, since it's basically a transcript of their debate, and it is clearly labeled which remarks are from which speaker. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:22, 12 September 2019 (UTC) Fair enough. Do we have access to the book so I can see? I assume we are discussing draft 5, particularly this section of text - ...and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem.[20][21][22] The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past.[23][24][25]. For my benefit, can you point out exactly what part is in dispute, and the supplied material for the reference so I can review? I may be able to propose an alternate wording once I see the passage quoted. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 11:40, 12 September 2019 (UTC) If you swap "eternal" for "past-eternal" (the theorem says nothing about the future) and also specify that the solution is wholly dependent on general relativistic solutions and rather avoids any questions of necessary quantum gravity corrections, that would work. Otherwise, you could simply omit the hairy claim that the universe "cannot be eternal" which is not precisely what the paper this is all based on is saying. (They don't even define past-complete in their paper in spite of using it in the title other than to give the formalism of a necessary singularity or, at least, an arbitrarily high density of geodesics.) jps (talk) 12:53, 12 September 2019 (UTC) For clarity, if we are discussing content of 5a, let's keep it there - some of the discussion about Draft 5 seems to be bleeding in here and it's a touch confusing for me to follow. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 13:17, 12 September 2019 (UTC) This section looks fine to me. No serious problem. —Approaching (talk) 23:30, 13 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 6 Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has written and spoken [VERB HERE] extensively in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig added appeals to scientific and philosophical ideas in the argument's defense. Craig's work has resulted in contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. Craig formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argumentversion of the argument as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." Craig's defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise, and he offers several arguments to support it. The first one For example, Craig appeals to Hilbert's example of an infinite hotel to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and thus the past is finite and has a beginning. The second And, in another argument, Craig says is that the series of events in time is formed by a process in which each moment is added to history in succession. Craig claims thatAccording to Craig, this process can never produce an actually infinite seriescollection of events, but instead forever approaches infinity as a limit, and thus produces only a potentially infinite one. On this basis, he argues that the past is finite and has a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics. and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past. The Kalam argument concludes that the universe had a cause, but Craig further argues that the cause must be a person. First, he claims says that the cause of the universe is outside of time, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims says that causes that are outside of time only have eternal effects if they are non-personal. Given his acceptance of the Kalam argument for a non-eternal universe, he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig's arguments to support the Kalam argument have been discussed and debated by a variety of commentators including philosophers Adolph Grünbaum, Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston, Graham Oppy,, Paul Draper, and Robert Koons. Molinism Craig is a proponent of Molinism, an idea first formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina according to which God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person would perform performs under every possible circumstance, a kind of knowledge that is sometimes termed "middle knowledge." Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. The idea is that, by relying on his middle knowledge, God does not interfere with anyone's free will, instead choosing which circumstances to actualize given a complete understanding of how people will freely choose to act in response.is in a position to choose the best circumstance to actualize, taking account of the free choices that agents will perform in such a circumstance without interfering with the free will of those agents. Craig also appeals to Molinism in his discussions of a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism. References Hi all. I tried to incorporate everything that was said above in this draft. Feel free to suggest any further tweaks. Still to be done: we need to agree on a verb in the first sentence. I would be fine with published or written. Also, some references still need to be filled in. I didn't do this because I don't understand the reference markup system we're using, and I didn't feel inclined to figure it out. Sorry! Shinealittlelight (talk) 23:52, 13 September 2019 (UTC) It should be, "actually infinite collection of events" instead of "actual infinite collection of events", I think. jps (talk) 00:38, 14 September 2019 (UTC) Done.Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:43, 14 September 2019 (UTC) Sources For Grunbaum: jps (talk) 11:43, 14 September 2019 (UTC) The Paul Draper reference, I believe, is to a debate. I'm not sure how best to source it. There is plenty of evidence and even a transcript of the debate, so perhaps someone can find a clean version that is on "neutral" ground (rather than hosted with commentary, for example). jps (talk) 11:24, 15 September 2019 (UTC) No, I don't think we should cite debates like that. I had in mind his "A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument", 2003, in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, L. Pojman (ed.), pp. 42-47. Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:10, 15 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not particularly enthused about book chapters, myself. Is there any other possibility? jps (talk) 15:19, 15 September 2019 (UTC) That's all we have from Draper as far as I can tell. If consensus is against inclusion, we'll have to drop it. I'm inclined to keep it, though I recognize that a book chapter is not as good as a journal article. Perhaps others can chime in. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:11, 15 September 2019 (UTC) The BVG stuff we can continue to discuss above, sufficed to say I don't think we can have a valid version without some reference to it. Related to the rest of this draft, if I recall correct at some point it was suggested that we use "published and spoken" which works, it covers the variety of activities and mediums we are citing or referencing. I might stick with "would perform" rather than "performs." The tense in the latter I think undermines that these are possible worlds rather than actualized ones. Otherwise the draft is fine. For sources, here are some of the ones I added earlier: Paul Draper: Robert Koons: I don't think this does it. He acknowledges Craig and puts his book in the bibliography, but that's it. There is no engagement with specific Craig-ian points in this paper. jps (talk) 20:59, 16 September 2019 (UTC) Quentin Smith: Squatch347 (talk) 13:32, 16 September 2019 (UTC) Squatch347, I don't see that the Draper paper you refer to (which is co-authored with two other authors) mentions Craig at all. Are you sure that's the paper you meant to cite? Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:19, 16 September 2019 (UTC) Shinealittlelight, looking back on it I don't know why I picked that original paper or Paul Draper in the first place. I might have been thinking of their 1997 debate, which is the only interaction I can seem to find now. Its possible I was going down a rabbit hole of Microsoft Academic and there was a middle citation, like Smith citing Craig and then being cited by Draper or something. Since I think I was the original one to come up with that list, I suggest we replace Draper with Gustavo E. Romero and this citation , it isn't the most robust interaction, but it does reference him and cite his views as part of a larger debate. Squatch347 (talk) 13:14, 17 September 2019 (UTC) Also, I prefer 'would perform' as well, which fits better with how people usually talk about counterfactuals of freedom, but I was trying to compromise with jps. Do you feel strongly about this? Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:22, 16 September 2019 (UTC) There is a long discussion above about this. I think the proper conjugation is a neologism "would might" which doesn't exist in English. People who don't believe in God would prefer to emphasize the "might" while people who do would emphasize the "would". In either case, it's not really possible to capture the full counterfactual and contingent nature of the claim in normal English verb usage. This made no sense to me above, and makes no sense to me now, but I was trying to compromise. As I said above, Molinism says God has "middle knowledge" of counterfactuals of freedom, which have the form: If possible circumstance C had obtained, x would have freely performed action A. But I can live with jps's preference even though I don't understand why it is his preference. Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:09, 16 September 2019 (UTC) JPS is correct that English lacks some of the conditional implications in the counterfactual. With that said, stripping out the would only gets us further away from that meaning. In jps' version there is no conditional language at all. This reads more like a Calvinistic view rather than Molinism. We, at the very least, need a "would" in this sentence to imply that Craig sees God as choosing among multiple different possible worlds rather than the single one implied in the current language. It would be better to say "would freely perform" but I can live with the would.Squatch347 (talk) 13:14, 17 September 2019 (UTC) I don't like the "would" by itself because it presupposes the contingent action. But using the word "might" makes it seem like the action is not predetermined. Stripping out the conditional language does run the risk of being strictly Calvinist, but I note that Craig only dislikes Calvinism for its acceptance of philosophical tension and not its confessional offering: [52]. Now, I am happy to consider other offerings, but I actually find using just the word "would" to be more problematic from the perspective you are pointing out than leaving all the helper verbs out. jps (talk) 17:40, 17 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not sure your explanation of might in that sentence is correct. Molinism holds that if a possible world a is actualized then a person will perform action x. It doesn't hold that if a possible world a is actualized a person might perform action x. The use of the word "might" there implies that the person might not perform action x in possible world a. Squatch347 (talk) 14:25, 18 September 2019 (UTC) - Guys, I like this. (i) I definitely think it's an improvement to replace "speaking and writing". I propose "Craig has developed in extensive detail a version of the cosmological argument called...". (ii) The first sentence under Molinism is quite long, and the topic is difficult to explain as is. I propose: "Craig is a proponent of Molinism, a theological idea that aims to resolve the tension between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Molinism was first formulated by Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in [some date in the 15th century?], but has received renewed attention from philosophers in light of contemporary philosophical interests such as modal logic and possible worlds semantics, the Free Will Defense to the problem of evil, and philosophical theology and philosophy of religion." (citation for free will defense: Chapter 2 section 2 of Jerry Walls' book titled "Hell", citation for modal logic and possible world semantics: Chapter 7 of Molinism: The Contemporary Debate edited by Ken Perszyk, citation for philosophical theology and philosophy of religion: Chapter 2 of Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology edited by Michael Rea). Hope this helps put the topic of Molinism in its wider philosophical and theological context for the reader. —Approaching (talk) 03:48, 17 September 2019 (UTC) I think both of these additions. The latter does a great job of adding the context of this view point in the philosophic community which is consistent with other BLPs we are using as examples. Squatch347 (talk) 13:14, 17 September 2019 (UTC) I do not like the first sentence as it strikes me as WP:PEACOCK. I don't think that Craig's publications are "extensive" nor particularly "detailed" (at least, not in the areas I am interested in, for example). I also think it is arguable whether Craig's work represents a consistent "development" or not. It's simply a republication with updating using some modern citations. Simpler is better, I think. jps (talk) 17:40, 17 September 2019 (UTC) I'm also not happy with the proposed change for Molinism. First of all, it's fine to say that Molinism is a theological idea, but I'm not sure that the language that it "aims to resolve the tension" is felicitous. First of all, Molinism itself does not aim, but rather its proponents might. This is pedantic, of course, but I think the current wording is better which attributes to Molinists themselves instead of the ideology. Somewhat worse is the wording that presumes that there is a tension between free will and divine foreknowledge. I do not think that everyone agrees that this tension exists or needs resolving. I have no doubt that this is something that Molinists believe, but the way it is worded does not make it clear that this is not just something that is plainly obvious, for example. Finally, I'm not sure that Molinism has received renewed attention from philosophers *writ large*. Surely, only philosophers of religion and perhaps, even more narrowly, theologians are interested in this sort of argument. I do not see any secular philosophers playing around with Molinism except for, perhaps, as an object lesson of sorts. I may be wrong in this. If so, enlighten me, but the cites you propose seem to be firmly grounded in the closed shop of people who are starting from theistic conceits (and perhaps even Judeo-Christian ones(!)) and working outwards. Finally, the connection to modal logic and possible worlds semantics is, I think, meant to emphasize that these are the tools that some Molinists would like to use. If so, I would prefer we say it like that. There is an implication, perhaps unintended, that Molinism is somehow inspired by modal logic and possible world semantics which is not something I think is true in general. Past that, I am unclear as to whether the Free Will Defense of the problem of evil or interest in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion really are "contemporary philosophical interests" as opposed to historical interests. Is there more interest today in these things than in years past? I don't think we have strong evidence for that. I also don't think that including the Free Will Defense (unclear as to whether capitalization is appropriate here, incidentally) illuminates much in this description of motivations either. We already link to Free Will as a concept and looping in the problem of evil just seems like a needless aside. Craig, like most post-Augustinians, accepts Free Will as a matter of course, so it's not particularly illuminating to backtrack on this except for maybe as a kind of contrast with rigid Calvinism (but that too may be a straw horse -- see my comment above). Finally, while it is indubitable that philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion are relevant to a Molinist's impulses, I don't think mentioning these subfields is particularly illuminating in the context of this discussion. Is there a particular reason to mention them? I think it is fairly obvious that this is the main subject area for Craig in any case. jps (talk) 17:40, 17 September 2019 (UTC) Thanks for the comments. I'm happy to drop the terms "extensively" and "detailed" (although I'll note your own draft 4a was happy to use the word "extensive"). —Approaching (talk) 05:07, 18 September 2019 (UTC) True! The criticism equally applies to my oversight there. It's hard to get these things right. jps (talk) 11:14, 18 September 2019 (UTC) I would recommend having a look at section 2.4 here: [53]. It says characterizes Molinists as accepting the view that God has middle knowledge, which is knowledge of "counterfactuals of freedom." These are conditionals of the form "If person S were in circumstances C, S would freely do X." That's the standard formulation, and while of course the theory itself is controversial, reporting that this is indeed the theory is not controversial. It's just what the theory is. And so what we have in draft 6 is a non-standard formulation of it. I can live with that, but I confess that our formulation strikes me as pretty weird. Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:13, 17 September 2019 (UTC) I'm not quite sure I understand your point here. Are you saying that we should remove the bits about God choosing circumstances and focus instead on the counterfactuals of freedom? jps (talk) 02:12, 18 September 2019 (UTC) My point is that the SEP article provides the standard formulation of counterfactuals of freedom, which can be found in most of the authors who discuss Molinism, and which varies from our current formulation. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:30, 18 September 2019 (UTC) I don't see a meaningful difference between the wording discussed above and the wording from SEP, except, perhaps, that there is a variable assignment. I'm not a big fan of using variables unless it is to avoid redundancies when referring to them many times later on. I don't see that as being an issue for us. jps (talk) 11:12, 18 September 2019 (UTC) That's a surprising reversal of what you've said, since before you didn't want a formulation using 'would'. I guess we can go back to 'would' then, since you don't see a meaningful difference between the two formulations?Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:47, 18 September 2019 (UTC) Sorry, you missed my point completely and put words into my mouth that mean the exact opposite of what I wrote. Do you want to play the game where you try to write for the enemy again? jps (talk) 13:56, 18 September 2019 (UTC) Civil, please. This conversation is getting off track and things are not moving along so well. The longer this goes on, the more I may opt to review the proposals presented and the relevant sources and make a recommendation on which to go with. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 14:16, 18 September 2019 (UTC) Just trying to understand. The SEP formulation uses 'would'. JPS says he see no difference. But before I thought he didn't want 'would'. Perhaps I misunderstood. I just don't get it. I'm happy to defer to Steven. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:24, 18 September 2019 (UTC) Is it worth me explaining it again? You have indicated that you do not understand me with every response you've made about this point. jps (talk) 15:42, 18 September 2019 (UTC) I mean, at least I thought I understood that you didn't like the formulation using the word 'would'! But I guess I didn't even understand that! Yeah, you're right, it is probably not worth trying anymore. Needless to say, I favor the standard formulation from the SEP article. I'll leave it to others to suggest any further changes, however. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:10, 18 September 2019 (UTC) I fully agree with Shine. The arguments seems to be about how we want to phrase what we think Molinism is saying. We have a reliable secondary source here with clear language, let's mimic that so we can remove ourselves from the process. That is the point of utilizing secondary sources, so that editors aren't publishing WP:OR or WP:Synth. Squatch347 (talk) 13:56, 19 September 2019 (UTC) The goal of SEP is quite different from Wikipedia. SEP has a goal of being a resource for those who are interested in getting an in-depth look into philosophy. As such, contingencies and counterfactuals are handled at the level which a philosopher would find appropriate (that of the axiomatic). Wikipedia is not so formalized. In particular, we need to be all things to all people as best we can. The source itself is fine, but we cannot use it to describe Molinism in careful detail without quoting it in full -- which we obviously cannot do. Our goal, then, is to summarize Molinism in a way that is WP:NPOV while adhering to the best sources, including SEP. Since we cannot revisit in exhaustive detail the axioms that Molinism relies upon, it is inappropriate to follow SEP in lock step for a sentence or two. In short, we do not have the context necessary for a reader to understand properly what the assumptions and terms of art for Molinism are in such a brief accounting. We need to be more careful in our wording than SEP has to be because we are not writing a philosophical investigation of Molinism -- we are writing a biography of an adherent. jps (talk) 02:07, 20 September 2019 (UTC) Discussion paused Hi all. I am pausing the discussion to refocus everyone, as we are getting off track and I need us to try get back on track and we are starting to veer into original research territory in some of these discussions. We need to determine if the sources provided in the recent drafts are reliable, sufficiently neutral, and of reasonable weight, and often, little more. It's our role to state what the sources say, directly quoting them if needed. Squatch347 is correct here. We should remove ourselves from the process in terms of interpreting what we think the sources say, and instead state what they say. Unless there's concern about the sources reliability, I suggest we move this along and state what the source says, rather than second-guessing the content of the source. It's not our place, but only to ensure that such sources meet the appropriate Wikipedia policies. Now, we currently have 7 different draft variants for the Kalam Cosmological Argument and several for the Molinism section, and discussion has become fragmented. So, before we continue, please note your preferred draft for both the Kalam and Molinism sections, and I will then re-focus the discussions in those drafts. Thanks. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 07:53, 20 September 2019 (UTC) I'm happy with draft six, with the following changes: I'd keep 'would', I'd use the Draper ref I provided, I'd use 'published' or 'published and spoken', and I'd defer to you, Steven, about whether to include BGV. I'm willing to compromise on any of these points, though. Shinealittlelight (talk) 10:31, 20 September 2019 (UTC) I'm also happy with draft 6. Agree with addition of 'would,' 'published and spoken,' and I would add the BVG reference, but use the language from our source 'past boundary." Squatch347 (talk) 13:16, 20 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 6 works for me too. —Approaching (talk) 06:40, 21 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 6 looks fine for me too. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 03:35, 22 September 2019 (UTC) I am not happy with Draft 6 and was detailed as to why. No one really responded to those points. jps (talk) 12:12, 21 September 2019 (UTC) jps, can you outline them briefly here. I will make an assessment on your concerns - we seem to have a broad consensus for Draft 6 apart from yourself, so if you can note very briefly, your concerns and how you'd change these points, we can try to address and move on. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:19, 21 September 2019 (UTC) Craig has written and spoken [VERB HERE] extensively in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. I think we should remove "extensively". It seems User:Approaching agreed. Could we do this? While the Kalam was first developed in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig added appeals to scientific and philosophical ideas in the argument's defense. I think we need to refrain from using the word "developed" here as it implies a kind of refinement which is arguable. I would prefer something a bit more demonstrative: "While the Kalam originated in medieval Islamic philosophy...." This would avoid some of the arguments over POV and is in line with my concern over using the word "developed" in general. Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. I think we need to say something like "to reconcile the perceived conflict between God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will". The current wording presumes that there is something that needs to be reconciled which is an opinion rather than a fact. Also, to clarify, I would prefer to leave BG out if the choice was between that and using the "past boundary" language. I think the wording in the Molinism section is better without "would" than with it, but this is not a showstopper for me. I also think there might be a syntactically smoother way to say the penultimate sentence: "God does not interfere with anyone's free will, but instead chooses which circumstances to actualize given a complete understanding of how people will freely choose to act in response. Again, not a showstopper. jps (talk) 15:04, 21 September 2019 (UTC) Your suggestions 1 and 2 seem reasonable suggestions and rather minor. Other editors, can we accommodate this? Little bit of give and take here I think. And thoughts on jps’s point 3 and other comments? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 16:06, 21 September 2019 (UTC) On 1, would the new language be "Craig has written and spoken in defense..."? I guess that's ok, and I don't want to hold up moving on for this, but is there any way at all to indicate that Craig has published a rather large amount on the Kalam, and that this work has been his biggest contribution to philosophy of religion, both in terms of quantity published and citations? Because I feel like any objective, neutral profile of the man that wanted to be complete would inform the reader that this has in some sense been the biggest topic in his work; that seems to be a point of interest about him. On 2, I don't get it, but 'originate' is fine with me. (Not sure how you originate an argument without developing it, but whatever!) On 3, I'm fine with adding 'perceived', though I don't think it is necessary and I don't accept the reason jps gives for adding it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:43, 21 September 2019 (UTC) One other thing: you can clearly reconcile A with B. But can you reconcile conflict? Doesn't 'reconcile' require two things being reconciled? I'm not sure. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:50, 21 September 2019 (UTC) With point 1, I'm feeling that "extensively" is subjective - it's our opinion inserted into the article, unless there are sources that describe him as extensively working on this argument? There's no debate that Craig worked on the Kalam argument, however describing it as such seems to be our assessment of his work rather than what sources say. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:38, 22 September 2019 (UTC) We can see using google scholar that his work on the Kalam has included dozens of articles and at least two books, and that this work has collectively received hundreds of citations. Would that be a more objective way to put it? As I said, I think it would be great to think of a way to indicate to the reader that this has been his biggest body work, and is, based on citations, the contribution that philosophers of religion most recognize him for. I don't have a source that says 'extensively'; I'm basing my judgment on his publication record. Is the idea that this is OR? I'll try to get you a copy of that source in a bit. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:35, 22 September 2019 (UTC) Yes, I think this would definitely be original research and would favour its removal. There's no doubt at all that he's worked on the argument, but by ourselves writing "extensively" we are making our own assessment of the work, rather than reporting how references characterise it. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 11:50, 22 September 2019 (UTC) The SEP source says the Kalam argument "received new life in the recent voluminous writings of William Lane Craig". Maybe we can use that with attribution? Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:58, 22 September 2019 (UTC) I guess I question the value it adds, if there's just one source for it. I don't feel it adds that much to the text to be honest, removing extensively makes the statement purely factual and removes any subjective interpretation of his work. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:27, 22 September 2019 (UTC) Ok, well, I disagree. This is what he is best known for among philosophers of religion, and that seems to me like a factual point of general interest to the reader. But give and take, right? I can let it go. Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:34, 22 September 2019 (UTC) Can I get a link to this content please - New Entry: Perzyk, Ken (2013). "Recent Work on Molinism" specifically, p. 755-756. I'd like to review the content. Thanks. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:42, 22 September 2019 (UTC) I see two point (1)'s. I'm okay with removing extensively although I don't think it's a deal breaker or anything. On (2) I think JFS is simply wrong about it being arguable that arguments can be refined and the right word is developed. I don't see the issue there. (3) (Molinism and "perceived") I think it's okay to call it a perceived tension. —Approaching (talk) 04:57, 22 September 2019 (UTC) I've now reviewed the Perszyk source (thanks for providing it, Shine). The quote I'm seeing says Other issues include Craig (1999) on the inspiration of Scripture, Christian exclusivism ((1989) and (1995)), the perseverance of saints (1991b), and missionary evangelism (1993). I'm wondering if we could maybe change Craig also appeals to Molinism in his discussions of a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism.[32] to Craig also appeals to Molinism in his discussions of a wide range of additional issues, including the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism.[32] Purely factual, and I'm not seeing how this part adds value, as it seems to be our interpretation of the content. Will review the other proposed sentence now. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 12:27, 22 September 2019 (UTC) Dropping 'wide range' is ok with me. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:33, 22 September 2019 (UTC) Good edit. jps (talk) 02:38, 23 September 2019 (UTC) Draft 7 Kalam Cosmological Argument See also: Kalam Cosmological Argument Craig has written and spoken in defense of a version of the Cosmological Argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the Kalam originated in medieval Islamic philosophy, Craig added appeals to scientific and philosophical ideas in the argument's defense. Craig's work has resulted in contemporary interest in the argument, and in cosmological arguments in general. Craig formulates his Kalām Cosmological Argumentversion of the argument as follows: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence." Craig's defense of the argument mainly focuses on the second premise, and he offers several arguments to support it. The first one For example, Craig appeals to Hilbert's example of an infinite hotel to argue that actually infinite collections are impossible, and thus the past is finite and has a beginning. The second And, in another argument, Craig says is that the series of events in time is formed by a process in which each moment is added to history in succession. Craig claims thatAccording to Craig, this process can never produce an actually infinite seriescollection of events, but instead forever approaches infinity as a limit, and thus produces only a potentially infinite one. On this basis, he argues that the past is finite and has a beginning. Craig also appeals to various physical theories to support the argument's second premise, such as the standard Big Bang model of cosmic origins and certain implications of the second law of thermodynamics. and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. The latter requires that any universe which has on average been in a state of cosmic expansion cannot be eternal. expanding universe will have a gravitational singularity in the past. The Kalam argument concludes that the universe had a cause, but Craig further argues that the cause must be a person. First, he claims says that the cause of the universe is outside of time, as it causes the beginning of time itself. He then claims says that causes that are outside of time only have eternal effects if they are non-personal. Given his acceptance of the Kalam argument for a non-eternal universe, he concludes that the cause of the universe must be personal. Craig's arguments to support the Kalam argument have been discussed and debated by a variety of commentators including philosophers Adolph Grünbaum, Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston, Graham Oppy,, Paul Draper, and Robert Koons. Molinism Craig is a proponent of Molinism, an idea first formulated by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina according to which God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions each person would perform under every possible circumstance, a kind of knowledge that is sometimes termed "middle knowledge." Molinists such as Craig appeal to this idea to reconcile the perceived conflict between God's providence and foreknowledge with human free will. The idea is that, by relying on his middle knowledge, God does not interfere with anyone's free will, instead choosing which circumstances to actualize given a complete understanding of how people will freely choose to act in response.is in a position to choose the best circumstance to actualize, taking account of the free choices that agents will perform in such a circumstance without interfering with the free will of those agents. Craig also appeals to Molinism in his discussions of the inspiration of scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the Saints, and missionary evangelism. References Discussion Incorporating changes discussed above. Can we get an agreement for this version? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 02:47, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I am satisfied with this version. jps (talk) 02:55, 23 September 2019 (UTC) Looks good to me, except for the use of "performs" instead of "would perform". Saying "performs" is infelicitous. But it's not a dealbreaker, and we can address it after mediation. —Approaching (talk) 03:30, 23 September 2019 (UTC) For what it's worth, I think "would perform" reads better. jps, are you alright with "would perform"? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 03:33, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I understand the impulse, but part of the discomfort is because the contingency is not well-explained. What if we rewrote as "God possesses foreknowledge of which free actions people will perform in response to every possible circumstance"? This removes the conditional tense for a future one that seems less problematic syntactically. jps (talk) 03:46, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I don't understand this, jps. Are you saying that until someone explains this idea well to you, you will not accept "would" language in the article? Or are you saying that because (in your opinion) the explanation of contingency isn't adequate, we cannot use "would" language? I'm struggling to make sense of the issue here. What does the explanation of contingency have to do with how we represent counterfactual language in this article? —Approaching (talk) 04:25, 23 September 2019 (UTC) Because there is a reading of the proposed wording which implies an inevitability that is strictly opposed to the ways Molinists describe their beliefs. In contrast, there is a linguistic ambiguity in future tenses. There is also a linguistic ambiguity in the present tense, but it is perhaps more antiquated and thus can appear less appropriate. There is no ambiguity of contingency in the use of the phrasal verb "would perform".jps (talk) 04:42, 23 September 2019 (UTC) Is either version in the text cited? I feel like we're splitting hairs here. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 04:49, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I just don't see these problems, and neither do Molinists apparently (see | the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Molinism, which is written by a Molinist and freely uses "would" language). —Approaching (talk) 05:18, 23 September 2019 (UTC) 'Would' is correct per all sources on Molinism. I'm ready to move on here, though. Shinealittlelight (talk) 10:31, 23 September 2019 (UTC) That's not true: "Thus, God elects to save those whom he knows will respond to his grace...." [54]. I have explained above why I think cribbing from the philosophy encyclopedia is problematic. It's rather surprising to me that I'm the one standing up for making sure sovereign election is well represented in brief, but if all y'all are okay with this propagation of possible confusion who am I to stop you? jps (talk) 11:48, 23 September 2019 (UTC) If I'm understanding the objection, it's over the objection of tense (would perform versus performs). Reading the text, I see Given that God knows the length of days and the number of hairs of a person (Lk. 12:7), it is not difficult to think that God would completely know what a person would choose to do. I'm seeing this as supporting the "would perform" tense rather than the "performs" tense? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 11:55, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I don't see it like there is a support of one tense over the other. Rather I think that the situation is that because of the way we are summarizing Molinism we end up implying something different than what is ideal. But, as I said, if the consensus is that this misleading aspect is either not understood by others or not important, then just go with the the other tense. jps (talk) 13:40, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I think we should move along, this is a give and take after all, and if it's a minor point I think we can live with a compromise version. I'll revert to the "would perform" version, because it seems to have the most consensus and be more in line with quoted sources. I'll wait 48 hours before implementing the current draft and then we can move on to the next section. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 13:46, 23 September 2019 (UTC) I want to gently flag the fact that this is not a debate over mere language preferences, but is a question of factual (in)accuracy. But I'm happy to set the issue aside if we can move on to more relevant issues. —Approaching (talk) 03:33, 24 September 2019 (UTC) I think this version is fine. I still think removal of the BVG language is incorrect given that it is the baseline point Craig is using in his discussion of the physical evidence and it is pretty uncontroversial that he says it. Is the secondary source concern about how we are describing the theory's implications? If so, why don't we just strip that part? Squatch347 (talk) 13:54, 23 September 2019 (UTC) The problem is, unlike an example like the Hilbert hotel where we can just say, "Craig has used XXX example" and let the wikilink speak for itself, this theorem is so technical that we don't have a dedicated place where it is discussed in the 'pedia on purpose because it is, frankly, not a very important theorem as it is not relevant to many if not most pre-inflationary models. So we would have to describe the theorem for the reader but there is no consistent way to do that in a neutral voice as we discovered above. What's worse, it seems to me to be bad practice to attribute to Craig what he thinks the implications of the theorem are because the best sources we have who explain what the theorem says (the sources from those who understand it best) are clear when they comment on Craig's work that Craig's claimed implications do not follow. This puts us in a sticky bind because while it is undeniably true that Craig has described the implications of the theorem for his ideas one way, every expert I've read who has bothered to comment on this situation says that he has incorporated some mistakes in his interpretation. But the standard understanding is one that is essentially reserved for experts. Wikipedia just isn't set-up to handle a discussion at this level of obscurity. jps (talk) 14:28, 23 September 2019 (UTC) Is there a way to return to the BGV theorem question later? Just curious if we have the option of tabling the issue for now and picking it up at a later point. —Approaching (talk) 03:33, 24 September 2019 (UTC) We can, however is there agreement here that other sources have expressed opinion that Craig’s view on BGV is inaccurate or has possible mistakes? If there’s agreement on that, we could do a construction like “Craig described X as Y, which was commented on/disagreed by/contradicted etc etc by Z”. That way, we give the viewpoint of the article subject, but point out that this view point has been disagreed with by other experts/persons involved in the field. Thoughts? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 04:22, 24 September 2019 (UTC) Sorry I missed this Steven. I know there are critical sources out there, but I couldn't reference specific ones off the top of my head (JPS would be the best person to ask, since he claims to have read several). On googling I found two sources. The first involves intriguing personal correspondence with Vilenkin himself (along with a critic, cosmologist Lawrence Krauss, and Craig himself). [[55]]. Also, here is Sean Carroll, another prominent cosmologist, who discusses his view on what the theorem does (and does not) prove [[56]]. I'm sure there's more out there for someone who wants to google. —Approaching (talk) 02:04, 28 September 2019 (UTC) I don't see these as RS for this. If he has done serious work on BVG that has had an impact, there should be secondary sources in the form refereed publications and books from academic presses that talk about his work. But there aren't such sources, at least as far as I can tell. In my opinion, blogs, self-published correspondence with the primary subject, and other primary sources aren't good enough, don't show notability, and don't give the independent perspective we are looking for. Shinealittlelight (talk) 04:15, 28 September 2019 (UTC) Perhaps the miscommunication is that I don't think the article is saying Craig has done serious work on the BGV theorem. Rather it is saying that he references it as support for an argument. I'm still not sure why we are applying the stricter sourcing requirement for that basic assertion. That Craig references it is pretty well established, no? Squatch347 (talk) 04:42, 28 September 2019 (UTC) I'm with Squatch347. I don't think anyone is saying Craig has done serious work on the BGV. (He hasn't. He's a philosopher, not a physicist.) Rather, he uses it as scientific evidence in support of his argument. I think that statement is quite uncontroversial (except to JFS, who has a laundry list of concerns about it). JFS' concerns, and Steven's question, seems to be about whether Craig's view on the BGV is inaccurate/mistaken. And my sources (insufficiently reliable as they are) help answer that question. Vilenkin himself thinks Craig's presentation of the theorem is fine, but he disagrees with the philosophical implications to theism. A prominent critic meanwhile, Sean Carroll, disagrees with the cosmological implications drawn (without claiming Craig's presentation of the theorem is in error. In sum: it seems reasonable for for editors (or at least me) to not suppose that Craig presents the theorem incorrectly, but it is reasonable to suppose the inferences he draws are controversial. Hope that's a fair editorial stance to take. —Approaching (talk) 04:55, 28 September 2019 (UTC) You guys may just disagree with me, but let me put my point slightly differently. I think this section should summarize Craig's contributions to philosophy and theology. Not everything he has ever said or thought. So yeah, it's uncontroversial that he has mentioned the BGV in support of his claim that the universe had a beginning. But, to date, his reference to the theorem has not played any role in his actual contributions to philosophy and theology. How can we tell? Because high-quality (not blogs, not self-published) secondary sources do discuss his contributions, but they don't mention his use of BGV. That's my point. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:13, 28 September 2019 (UTC) Oh, of course. The BGV was invoked in the context of providing a summary of Craig's argument, and listing, hopefully in a sentence or two, the evidence for each premise. That, specifically, is what I'm okay with. Are you saying that's a problem too? —Approaching (talk) 02:24, 30 September 2019 (UTC) I'm saying that I don't agree that his use of BGV to support the second premise of the kalam should be included, because that part of the evidence he provides for that premise has not received any coverage in high quality secondary sources, unlike the stuff that's currently in draft 7. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:45, 30 September 2019 (UTC) I continue to think that there are not good secondary sources on this issue. What source(s) would you propose? Shinealittlelight (talk) 09:45, 24 September 2019 (UTC) If it really is just me as the dissenting view, I think Approaching is correct that we should shelve this and move on. If I can find something that satisfies what I think is the objection (a secondary source describing BVG) then we can return to it. In the mean time, it might help if I understood a bit better why the existing sources presented explaining it weren't acceptable. Squatch347 (talk) 13:47, 24 September 2019 (UTC) I think your idea, Squatch347, is to use the Carroll piece to support statement that Craig appeals to the theorem, and then use secondary sources that don't mention Craig to explain the theorem itself. The problem with this approach is that (i) the Carroll source isn't very good, both because it is just a transcript of a talk, and because it isn't clearly secondary, and (ii) the fact that there isn't any secondary engagement with Craig's use of the theorem tends to suggest that inclusion is undue. Those are my issues. If you could find a high quality, clearly secondary source that dealt with Craig's views on the theorem, I'd be all for inclusion, and I'd just want to summarize that source. But we don't have such a source, and I think that this fact should inform our view of whether to include it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:40, 24 September 2019 (UTC) Just briefly, the problem is that when pieces are written for the general public they tend to lose nuance and incorporate misconceptions. This is certainly true when parsing differences between what it means to be "past-complete" in the context of GR, what a "singularity" entails, and, perhaps most importantly, what the assumptions are that go into any theorem. It is not fair to our readers to give an incomplete view of this, but it is not clear that there is a complete view to be had outside of the primary sources written for a technical audience. jps (talk) 13:42, 25 September 2019 (UTC) My reason for looking into (temporarily) shelving the issue is that it will take a lot of time and effort to parse the details, almost certainly requiring original research, to the detriment of other issues in the article that might be more immediately important. I'm cool with whatever you guys decide in the end. —Approaching (talk) 04:31, 25 September 2019 (UTC) I think it's fine to temporarily shelve the BGV discussion, move on, and loop back to it later. That said, I think we should ultimately include it: 1. We have strong enough sources to support mention Craig's use of it. I think some of our sources do count as secondary, but even if they don't, I think supporting it by the primary sources would be acceptable per policy: "WP:PSTS policy states: "Unless restricted by another policy, primary sources that have been reputably published may be used in Wikipedia, but only with care, because it is easy to misuse them" (emphasis mine). The care required here is to make sure we're not adding our own analysis of the primary source, which we should be safe from if we only assert the fact that Craig references the theorem. 2. If there are concerns over it being to difficult for us to write a brief explanatory summary of the theorem, perhaps we could just quote one of the summaries we have (e.g "According to Vilenkin: 'loosely speaking [the BGV] theorem states that if the universe is, on average, expanding, then its history cannot be indefinitely continued into the past.'"). For that, I prefer Vilenkin since he seems to be more of a neutral party that's gotten stuck in the middle of this debate. - GretLomborg (talk) 20:55, 27 September 2019 (UTC) Hi all, I think shelving for now is a good idea. Since it's not in the draft 7, can we implement and move on? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 00:25, 1 October 2019 (UTC) I think that's a good thing to do right now. jps (talk) 02:10, 1 October 2019 (UTC) Fine with me. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:26, 1 October 2019 (UTC) Yes, move along. Nothing to see here.  :) Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 05:20, 4 October 2019 (UTC) Vote yes. Shelf it. —Approaching (talk) 23:49, 5 October 2019 (UTC) In the interest of moving along, I'll go with the consensus. Squatch347 (talk) 13:06, 12 October 2019 (UTC) Great, all. This has been implemented. Shall we move on to the next section? Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 08:35, 15 October 2019 (UTC) I'm okay with moving on. It seems some may be burned out from this process, though. jps (talk) 10:40, 21 October 2019 (UTC) Sorry, thought this was rhetorical. Makes sense to move on. Squatch347 (talk) 12:32, 21 October 2019 (UTC)

Divine Eternity

Draft 11 Implemented

It has been a while, so I am going to try and post a suggested edit for the next section and see if that can start some conversation. I am not especially skilled at wiki markup language, so if my collapse or other editing is incorrect, please feel free to fix it, and sorry. Squatch347 (talk) 13:59, 29 October 2019 (UTC) Draft 1 Divine Eternity Craig argues that God exists as timeless absent creation and temporal in relation to creation. He gives two arguments in support of that view. First, he says that if a temporal world exists, then in virtue of his real relations to that world, God cannot remain untouched by its temporality. Second, Craig says that if a temporal world exists, then in virtue of his omniscience, God must know tensed facts about the world, such as what is happening now, which Craig argues is sufficient for his being temporally located. Much of Craig's discussion relates to the differences between the A-Theory and B-theory of time. Craig supports an A-Theory interpretation in which tensed facts and the passage of time are ontologically real. In The Tensed Theory of Time (2000) Craig examines arguments for and against a tensed understanding of time, commonly called the A-Theory of time. In The Tenseless Theory of Time (2000), Craig conducts a similar review of arguments for a tenseless construct or B-Theory of time. Elements of Craig's philosophy of time differentiates between time itself and our measures of it (a classical Newtonian theme), and includes an analysis of spatial "tenses" to the location of the "I-now", his defense of presentism, his analysis of McTaggart's paradox as an instance of the problem of temporary intrinsics, and his formulation of a tensed possible worlds semantics. References Here is my initial draft for the section on Divine Eternity. It could definitely use some additional sources, so far I've only source poached and it is pretty primary source heavy. Given the number of articles on Google Scholar and Microsoft academic additional sources shouldn't be hard, but we can start that process while we discuss if this is the right content. I think this version incorporates Craig's views in a similar manner to our previously agreed version without getting too in depth into the details or redundant like the original pre-dispute version. It covers his work on time and its implications without getting to in depth, though I think (given how much he has published on it) his views on time could be broken out into another section. Squatch347 (talk) 13:59, 29 October 2019 (UTC) Thanks for posting an initial draft. I understand people here may feel burnt out, but we've come a long way. We can take our time, there's no deadline here :) Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 09:16, 1 November 2019 (UTC) For additional sources here are what I've found: Tensed World Semantics: [57], [58], [59] What Craig argues in "Tensed Theory of Time:" [60], [61], [62] McTaggert's Paradox: [63], (Craig's use of A-theory in relation to McTaggart's paradox)[64], God's relationship to time pre/post creation: [65], [66], [67] God cannot be untouched by the temporality of the world: (ibid), [68], [69] Passage of time as ontologically real in A-theory: [70] Craig's use of A-theory related to time and measurement and "I-Now" framing: [71], [72] Craig's analysis of both A-Theory and B-Theory are discussed here: [73], [74] After looking through these I think the second paragraph might need to be expanded/split out. It does look like Craig's work on time has been larger than initially realized. There are several dozen papers that cite his works in relation to their discussions of presentism, passage of time, and ontology of spacetime matrices. Squatch347 (talk) 15:22, 4 November 2019 (UTC) Apologies, but I don't have tons of time to devote to this right now. I think this draft looks good, though the sourcing could be improved. I agree that the philosophy of time has been a major focus of Craig's, and the paragraph on that could be expanded. Though, I think now might not be the right time for that, and we should perhaps focus on completing a first pass through the article. I think I had some sourcing for stuff in this section, and I'll try to add that later. - GretLomborg (talk) 17:55, 11 November 2019 (UTC) References Draft 2 Divine Eternity Craig argues that God exists as timeless absent creation and temporal in relation to creation. He gives two arguments in support of that view. First, he says that if a temporal world exists, then in virtue of his real relations to that world, God cannot remain untouched by its temporality. Second, Craig says that if a temporal world exists, then in virtue of his omniscience, God must know tensed facts about the world, such as what is happening now, which Craig argues is sufficient for his being temporally located. Craig has published extensively on the theory of time. His work has focused variously on the ontology of temporal passing including analyses of presentism, and the ontology of spacetime matrices. He argues that spacetime matrices, while useful constructs, are not ontologically meaningful and thus should not be conceived of as literally representing how space and time interact. Rather, Craig adopts a variant of philosophic presentism which maintains that only the present exists and that the experience of temporal passage represents an ontologically real phenomenon. These positions are summarized in different theories of time, sometimes referred to as A-Theory and B-theory of time. Craig supports an A-Theory interpretation in which tensed facts and the passage of time are ontologically real. In The Tensed Theory of Time (2000) Craig examines arguments for and against a tensed understanding of time, commonly called the A-Theory of time. In The Tenseless Theory of Time (2000), Craig conducts a similar review of arguments for a tenseless construct or B-Theory of time. Elements of Craig's philosophy of time differentiates between time itself and our measures of it (a classical Newtonian theme), and includes an analysis of spatial "tenses" to the location of the "I-now", his defense of presentism, his analysis of McTaggart's paradox as an instance of the problem of temporary intrinsics, and his formulation of a tensed possible worlds semantics. References I've updated the second paragraph as recommended to contain a bit more of Craig's impact on the theory of time which seems to have plenty of source material. I've also added in some secondary sources as noted in the last version. Squatch347 (talk) 14:32, 12 December 2019 (UTC) I think this draft looks good. - GretLomborg (talk) 21:46, 2 January 2020 (UTC) What are you guys thinking about sourcing in this version? It looks like a good bit of primary source references, which I thought is what we are trying to avoid. Also, I don't see that the claim He argues that spacetime matrices, while useful constructs, are not ontologically meaningful and thus should not be conceived of as literally representing how space and time interact is in the sources cited for that sentence. Can you provide a sentence from those sources that supports this? The Zimmerman seems to suggest that Craig accepts a Lorentzian space-time. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:21, 3 January 2020 (UTC) I think the support can be taken from a couple of quotes (which I'll add), but is inherent in the discussion in both papers of Craig's criticism of Minkowski's interpretation of Special Relativity. The sentence in the article is essentially an explained version of that rejection. From the first source: "In particular, Craig presents, in the second volume, a series of arguments against the mind-dependence interpretation of becoming and the “spatializing” of time....Similarly, four-dimensionalists who think objects perdure—persist by having different temporal parts at different times—comprise those who think that this position presupposes the B-theoretic ontology,3 as well as those who argue against this connection.4 Endurantism and presentism are undoubtedly natural partners—just as perdurantism and eternalism are. The interesting question, however, is whether members of these pairs entail each other. Craig sides with those who think they do (2000b, Ch. 9). In particular, he argues (ibid., pp. 184–191) that the combination (defended, among others, by Mellor, van Inwagen, Rea, Lowe, Johnston, and Haslanger) of endurantism with the B-theory of time is implausible...9 “Spacetime realism [i.e., the view that all events populating the 4D spacetime manifold tenselessly exist on the same ontological footing] raises a host of problems due to its entailment of the doctrine of perdurance …” (2000b, pp. 124–5, our emphasis; cf. 2001a, p. 192); “If one is a spacetime realist, then, barring conventionalism, things must have spatio-temporal parts” (ibid., p. 202n68); “A consistent spacetime realist will … view objects as spatio-temporal entities which perdure” (2001a, p. 94n54)." From the second source: "The first apparent conflict [between A-theory and Relativity] is primarily between relativity and presentism. Relativity is formulated in terms of a four-dimensional manifold of space-time points. Taken at face value, the theory attributes important spatiotemporal structure to this manifold..It is past and future objects and events that stick in my craw. The four-dimensional manifold of space-time points, on the other hand, is a theoretical entity posited by a scientific theory; it is something we would not have believed in, were it not for its role in this theory; and we should let the theory tell us what it needs to be like. As a presentist, I believe that only one slice of this manifold is filled with events and objects...Of course, if the description of the particles contained statements about where they are now, Newton’s picture of the physical world would include a privileged present. But the same could be said about the relativistic four-dimensional block: If a description of the present distribution of matter were added to relativity (along with information concerning which distributions of matter were or will be present), then a privileged slicing of the manifold would reappear. What should one conclude from the parity of Newton’s theory and relativity on this score? At the very least, it appears that a simple “physics-doesn’t-see-it” objection to the A-theory is not a radically new kind of objection that only became available after Einstein. If relativity is to provide a powerful new argument against the A-theory, the A-theorist must be convicted of something worse than merely positing a layer of space-time structure that relativity fails to mention. I added quite a bit of secondary sourcing to this section before running out of steam. Looking at my notes I have another 15 or so secondary sources to add, do you have a suggestion of where they might be useful? Currently the ratio is 6 of 14 being primary sourced, one of which is a kind of over-citation noting that he uses two arguments. Squatch347 (talk) 14:33, 3 January 2020 (UTC) @ Shinealittlelight (talk), just wanted to follow back and see if this answered your questions. Squatch347 (talk) 13:18, 15 January 2020 (UTC) @Squatch347: Sorry I haven't responded until now. First, I'm not seeing that first quote you provided in the source. I find the first part of the quote--the part before the ellipsis--on pp. 328-329. But the rest I don't find in the article at all. Did that come from a different source? Maybe I'm crazy. In any case, as I read it, the first quote you provided here--wherever it came from--says that Craig thinks that presentism and endurantism are mutually entailing, and that eternalism and perdurantism are as well. I don't see the path from here to the proposed text. I guess near the end of that first quote it quotes Craig (or at least I think that's a quote from Craig) saying that "space-time realism raises a host of problems" because (he says) it is committed to perdurantism; however, the fact that space-time realism raises problems falls short of his rejecting it and calling that way of thinking about space and time a "useful construct". What about the second quote? Well, that is from this paper by Zimmerman, who is talking about his own views, not the views of Craig. The cited Zimmerman piece says very little about Craig. Specifically, all it says is (footnote 10) that Craig argues that Lorentzian space-time is "not so bad." So I don't see how the quote--or in fact the source--supports the proposed text. Here's what I think. We should be trying to strip out every primary source. And we should be relying heavily on high-quality secondary sources very closely. And, if we can get secondary sources to support a sub-section on his views of the metaphysics of time, we should have a seperate sub-section for that. Seperate, that is, from the section on divine eternity. Sorry to be the holdout here, but I think that this article is going to continually have problems if it isn't iron-clad. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:34, 15 January 2020 (UTC) Adding another comment here: I just reviewed Helm (2011), and it basically doesn't talk about Craig's views of divine eternity. This piece, on the other hand, looks very useful. So does this. I don't have time now to write a new proposal; maybe I can do so sometime in the next week or so. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:49, 15 January 2020 (UTC) No worries of course, I just wanted to make sure your concerns were addressed. I think that is because the link is the condensed published critical note (which makes sense given the way I wrote the reference, sorry). The full version can be found here: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/525/1/presentism_and_relativity.pdf We should probably include that link the in reference itself for clarity. The second source is specifically talking about A-theorists in that section and consequences of their views. He is specifically referring to the consequences of the presentist a-theory supporter, which is what Craig is described as. You can find a similar description of A-theorists as rejecting spacetime constructs with Craig described in that camp here [75] (section 2). Or, for a more clear (but primary source) you can see here [76]. An adoption of A-theory presentism is, by definition, a rejection of the spacetimes as ontologically real, but they can still be useful as he describes here in another primary source [77] or here [78] I'm not sure I fully agree with the concept of removing all primary sources in this article (or even making it 90% secondary source) reference. We are describing Craig's views, so some set of primary sources would seem appropriate. He is also a living philosopher, so there aren't going to be the kind of retrospective reviews of his work that we would use for people like Descartes or Plato. The current ratio of 50-60% secondary sources seems pretty much in line with our other well-rated bios of living philosophers pointed to in the opening of this thread. The problem we are going to run into here, as is common in all articles referencing published fields, is that follow on papers and secondary sources are rarely a restatement of views. Generally, a simple restatement doesn't meet the criteria to get published. So we are relying a bit more heavily on the consequences of a position as explored by another philosopher or physicist. I'm also not quite in agreement that our goal here is to make this article 'iron-clad against criticism.' It is going to have problems even if it is iron-clad, there are those (and the talk page archives there are a good witness to it) that make this page a hill on which to plant their flag for theism or atheism. We've (not you and I) spent several thousand words in our own discussion arguing about whether to include that he became a Christian in high-school because of a technical theological debate to positions no one said Craig held. Given that, I don't think there is much hope of us getting this page past future conflict. Rather, we can simply do our best to express Craig's positions and work in similar style and form to our other biography pages. I do like your additional sources, those are very helpful. I think a straight replacement of Helm with the first PLATO source would be warranted. I'd add this if you are looking to write a new proposal as well; [79]. Looking forward to reading your proposal. If time gets away from you, I'll also add the two sources you have here as replacements of the Helm 2011 reference in my proposal. Squatch347 (talk) 14:03, 16 January 2020 (UTC) I guess I would not be inclined to rely on the longer, unpublished version. And I would see relying on Zimmerman in this way as pretty synthy: as in, we'd be saying that Zimmerman correctly draws a conclusion about A-theorists, and that since Craig is an A-theorist, this must be his view. That's not, in my view, a good basis to attribute the view to Craig. I generally think we should avoid using the RF website if we can. The Ramero piece, again, says very little about Craig's views. I bet we can do better; I'll have a look when I get a chance. About primary vs secondary sourcing, I'd be interested to hear what Steven Crossin has to say. The problem with relying on primary sources is that there's a serious worry that, because of the role Craig plays in popular "debates" on campus, and because he's an unusually controversial philosopher, and because he has a lot of fans too, his article is constantly going to be a battleground, more so than, say, Plantinga's article. And we need to make sure we're being careful to include the notable work that he has done, and not the work that has made little impact. My view has been that we have a ton of rock solid secondary sourcing on Craig's most influential ideas, and that this is therefore what we should entirely rely on. There's no shortage in my view. And if one of his ideas hasn't received coverage in secondary sources--book reviews, for example, in high-quality academic journals--then there's an argument to be made that the idea is either not notable or not yet notable. But the truth is that the vast majority of his work gets a lot of fair-handed, professional attention, so there's no trouble in approaching it from that direction. We go off the rails, in my view, when we stop relying on high-quality, academic, secondary sources. Shinealittlelight (talk) 20:25, 16 January 2020 (UTC) Well, it should be noted that the longer version is referenced in the published link. I think the practice is relatively standard to publish briefer versions for page count cost purposes. I definitely don't think that would make it fall short of a reliable source. I'm not sure it is synthy. He refers to Craig as proponent of A theory presentism and then separately describes the consequences of that belief. There is a middle ground, I believe, that we can agree to that doesn't necessarily require a direct quote, which also isn't us reading into the text; but rather reading the whole text, in context. If you can find a better source I'm definitely for it, but I think that Craig holds these positions is established enough for me to support inclusion of it in the article. I don't disagree with you about it being a battle ground. I'd only point out that the same tendency will come from being too limited in what is covered (ie how it is now). An article that doesn't reference significant positions he has defended will also be seen as attempting to minimize his impact which will only draw a different group to the page to build it out with what they see as notable. Again, I think there is a middle ground where we can list the bulk of his work, sometimes using primary sources if necessary, but expound or add weight to sections that have received wider academic notice. We haven't gotten there quite yet, but the section we will need to add on the Atonement is a great example. This has received a good deal of attention in (I don't want to say popular press, because these aren't like the NYT, maybe religious press?) the press, but hasn't received a lot of academic response yet (it is too early to expect that). I think it is still notable as he has staked out a clear position and defended such. Still, I think you are right that there might be additional secondary sourcing we can find. I'm open to it. But there is still a lot of work to do on this article and I don't want to make the perfect the enemy of the good. If we draw out each section for a month or two, I'm not overly confident we will finish at all. Squatch347 (talk) 12:16, 17 January 2020 (UTC) I wanted to let you know that I reached out the Steve and see if he was still active. He is, unfortunately, busy at work, but promised to review drafts by email. I sent him this version a week or so ago. I imagine if the three of us are happy with this version (or something similar) he will be fine with us posting, though I'll ask. Squatch347 (talk) 14:33, 3 January 2020 (UTC) I think this draft looks good too. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 09:19, 5 January 2020 (UTC) I am still lurking around now and then, sending me a {{ping|Steve Crossin}} is the best way for me to be alerted. Steven Crossin Help resolve disputes! 04:29, 8 January 2020 (UTC) Draft 3 Divine Eternity Concerning God's relationship to time, Craig holds that God is timeless prior to creation, but that he has been temporal since the first moment of time at the creation of the universe. According to Craig, the alternative to this view is the claim that God retains his timeless existence even when he is related to temporal events: though timeless, he causes things at certain times, for example, and knows certain tensed facts. But Craig holds that this is impossible: given that time is tensed (a claim he defends elsewhere--see above), he thinks that a timeless being cannot stand in such relations to temporal events. He therefore opts for the idea that there are two phases to divine existence, a phase prior to creation in which God existed timelessly, and another phase, beginning with creation, in which God is temporal. Of course "prior to" here is not intended to express temporal succession, since there is no time "prior to" the first moment of time. Making sense of this notion of priority has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account. References Adding a new draft. Some important points: I realize that this is a lot shorter than the last draft; that's primarily because I'm proposing that we write a separate section on Craig's work on the A-theory. The "two arguments" mentioned in the last draft are not arguments for Craig's overall view. Rather, they are arguments that, if the tenseless theory of time is false, then God is not timeless "with creation". I've tried to make this clearer. In the process, the draft I've proposed makes reference to our discussion of Craig's arguments for the tensed theory (the A-theory). I think we should have a separate section for that, and that it should come just before this section; then my use of "(see above)" will make sense. I think that the material about his interpretation of relativity should occur in the proposed section--not yet drafted--on his A-theory view of time. The stuff about relativity is a standard objection to the A-theory; his reply to that objection is a particular approach to that objection on behalf of A-theory more than really a defense of his particular view of divine eternity. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:26, 19 January 2020 (UTC) I like the length, but the prose is impenetrable. Is there any way to make it clearer? I'm having a hard time imagining a reader is going to understand what Craig thinks or why it is important from reading this paragraph. jps (talk) 03:34, 24 January 2020 (UTC) Draft 3a Divine Eternity Craig believes that God was timeless until the creation of time and the universe when he became part of the progression of time. Since logically there can be no time "prior to" the first moment of time, making sense of that has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account. References Based on Shine's work above. Removing a lot of redundancy and argumentation that is simply not necessary and only serves to confuse, I think. jps (talk) 03:41, 24 January 2020 (UTC) This draft: Doesn't explain why and in what sense Craig thinks God must be temporal subsequent to creation (he's related to temporal events by causing them and by knowing about them, and couldn't be if he were timeless after creation) Inappropriately asserts that 'prior to' must be interpreted in a temporal sense (obviously false, since, for example, when we say that 2 is prior to 3, we don't mean temporally) Does not reflect all the relevant information in the four cited sources Strikes a dismissive editorial tone toward Craig Fails to say "what Craig thinks or why it is important". So this is not a helpful draft in my opinion, though I do agree that perhaps the proposal I made above can be written more clearly or accessibly to the beginner. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:51, 24 January 2020 (UTC) I'll respond to each: Why does it matter in what sense Craig thinks one thing or another? All that matters are the main assertions. The added explanations are just a slog that do not contribute any content that is of note to anyone except those who are interested in Craig's frame of mind. I didn't mean to imply that. Actually quite the opposite. Let's try to reword so that this is avoided. Please explain how it is "dismissive". I think we both say what Craig thinks. I don't think your version explains "why it's important" any more than this one. So, if you have further exploration of these, I'm happy. I don't much appreciate your rudeness about whether the draft is "helpful" or not. Keep your snide remarks to yourself and let's try to get to a place where we have a good explanation of what Craig believes vis-a-vis what third-party sources think is important. We can inform the readers and move forward. jps (talk) 19:48, 24 January 2020 (UTC) Draft 4 Divine Eternity Craig holds that time itself had a beginning (see above). But Craig does not think that God began to exist. Thus, Craig thinks that, prior to the beginning of time, God existed in a timeless state. However, Craig argues that, given his tensed view of time (see above), God cannot be timeless once he has created, since, after that point, he is related to time both by causing events in time and by having knowledge of events in time. As a result, Craig concludes that there are two phases to divine existence, a phase prior to creation in which God existed timelessly, and another phase, beginning with creation, in which God is temporal. Of course "prior to" here is not intended to express temporal succession, since there is no time "prior to" the first moment of time. Making sense of this notion of priority has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account. References This new draft attempts to improve the accessibility to beginners. Shinealittlelight (talk) 04:43, 25 January 2020 (UTC) Appreciate. Still a bit wordy and needlessly drawn out. See below. Also, can we get direct links to the sources? Thanks. jps (talk) 12:35, 26 January 2020 (UTC) Draft 4a Divine Eternity While Craig holds that time itself had a beginning, he does not think that God began to exist. Thus, Craig thinks that, prior to the beginning of time, God existed in a timeless state. In this way, Craig argues that there are two phases to divine existence, a phase prior to creation in which God existed timelessly, and another phase, beginning with creation, in which God is temporal. Craig insists that "prior to" does not express temporal succession, since there is no time "prior to" the first moment of time. Making sense of this notion of priority has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account. References I think this does a better job. jps (talk) 12:09, 26 January 2020 (UTC) Draft 5 Divine Eternity Craig argues that God existed in a timeless state causally prior to creation, but has existed in a temporal manner since. He gives two arguments in support of that view. First, he says that, given his tensed view of time (see above), God cannot be timeless once he has created a temporal universe, since, after that point, he is related to time through his interactions and through causing events in time. Second, Craig says that as a feature of of his omniscience, God must know the truth related to tensed facts about the world, such as whether the statement "Today is January 15th" is true or not. Some philosophers have pressed Craig's account for a lack of clarity between his discussion of God existing "causally prior" to the universe and his account of God's act of creation as being temporal. References I appreciate the attempt to clarify Shine, but I think that the structure is causing it to be a bit more confusing. I like the structure we used earlier with "summary of position" followed by "Arguments made and discussion." I've restructured it back to that format so that it reads consistently with our earlier sections, but hopefully also includes some of the more accessible language you were looking for. I'm also not sure I accept the last sentence on criticism. Logical or order priority isn't really controversial, ordering via causality or logical structure are common place. The only places I seem to find this kind of criticism are on lay sites. When we look at the Helm article for example he makes no such criticism, but discusses logical priority as a given. Squatch347 (talk) 13:37, 27 January 2020 (UTC) I'm ok with this for the most part. The thing I'm struggling with is that Craig's "two arguments in support" both depend on his tensed view of time, and that's not super clear in this draft (or maybe any draft). Also, neither of us has said why the tensed theory of time is relevant here (in short, it's because the tensed theory of time is committed to irreducible tensed events or facts, and Craig thinks that God can't cause or know about such events or facts without being temporal). As for the question of whether people have struggled with his notion of priority, here are some quotes. Here is Deng: What can it mean to say God underwent a change at the end of which God was temporal? Craig’s answer seems to be that there is timelessness before time’s beginning, or rather, “before” time’s beginning. And here is Helm: The chief problem with this hybrid view is over the way in which the argument is set up, the coming into existence of the world being represented as an A-series temporal event for God. Craig has the idea that it is possible that God exists in a timelessly eternal fashion and then enters time upon creating a temporal universe. But this seems confused. There can be no temporal ‘and then’ for a timelessly eternal God. Even if the universe is created in time, and even if a timelessly eternal God eternally creates the universe by willing a temporal succession of events without changing his will, he has a timeless relation to each of these. Hasker writes, Craig also finds himself led to the perplexing assertion that the eternal and the temporal phases of God's life 'are not related to each other as earlier to later. He then goes on to raise some specific worries about this "perplexing assertion". Finally, Swinburne writes: What is the difference between God (causally prior to the universe) being timeless and unchanging, and being temporal and unchanging? I cannot see that Craig has given any content to this difference. So I think it's fair to say that this has been a significant worry about his view in our best sources. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:30, 27 January 2020 (UTC) Good collaboration, folx! Here are a few notes on this draft: @Shine: Can you give a precise citation to where you are pulling these quotes? Can we not cite "Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society"? I think that's too much of a walled garden. We need to find some sources that show this position is noticed beyond Evangelical theologians. I think the wording "timeless state causally prior to creation" is too overloaded. No reader is going to understand what that means and, instead, I think we should be simpler. To that end, I think the Shine wording is a bit better. This is just a lot of jargon. "but has existed in a temporal manner since" is also needlessly wordy and peculiar. Again, I like the previous version that points out that Craig believed in two different phases for his deity. I am not convinced that using the jargon "tensed theory" is at all reasonable. We can refer to A-theory or B-theory, but the cul-du-sac of "tensed" theory is just too far into the weeds. "God cannot be timeless once he has created a temporal universe, since, after that point, he is related to time through his interactions with temporal beings and by causing events in time." is a good starting point for a sentence, I think, but there are still some jargony terms that are weird. What is a "temporal being", for example -- isn't think just any ol' thing in the universe? I also think it is needlessly wordy. I might reword as "God cannot be timeless once he has created time, since, after that point, he interacts with time by, for example, causing events." Still wordy, but at least less in the weeds. "Second, Craig says that as a feature of of his omniscience, God must know tensed facts about the world, such as what is happening now, which requires him to be in time." This is completely opaque, probably because it is using the jargon "tensed". I would prefer rewriting it more simply: "Craig says God's omniscience means that he knows temporal facts that require him to be in time, such as what is happening right now." I am not convinced that this argument has received as much notice as the other argument. I agree with Shine that the issue of priority is a relevant one having been mentioned by third-party sources. Indeed, it is something I noticed in doing research on this subject. However, I also think we need better citations. jps (talk) 15:52, 27 January 2020 (UTC) @Shinealittlelight, That's a good point that we don't reference the dependence on a tensed view of time. Going back to the original version before all of this there was some of that language in there. It starts with Craig's defense of a tensed view then moves into this discussion. Perhaps we could add it as a transition sentence to the very end of the section. Something like "Craig's positions are dependent on a "tensed theory of time" which he defends in his broader work on the philosophy of time" which then goes straight into the next section "Philosophy of Time." Ah, ok, thanks for the quotes. I initially read the comment as meaning that there was a lack of understanding of what "causally prior" meant. This makes more sense. Their concerns are more on the transition from causal to temporal priority in ordering. Maybe a comment like: "Some philosophers have pressed Craig's account for a lack of clarity between his discussion of God existing "causally prior" to the universe and his account of God's act of creation as being temporal." Then add the Deng and Helm quotes? I changed the language from critics to philosophers to give them a bit more weight, though if you like critics better no heartburn on my side to change it back. @jps I'm not sure I agree with the concern about the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society source. It seems to be a WP:RS by any standard we could adopt. You make a good point with the "temporal being" comment, that does seem overly complex. Maybe just strip that part and say "through his interactions and through causing events in time?" I'm not sure some of the other phrasing can be simplified without introducing a lot of confusion. Referencing the two states as "phases" has too much of a temporal connotation which is only going to confuse the reader more. I'm not sure that the phrase "temporal facts" is less opaque than "tensed facts" I can search for tensed facts and find explanations. I can't searched for temporal facts and get an explanation. This feels a bit more like us substituting our own invented piece of jargon for an accepted piece of jargon. Squatch347 (talk) 12:56, 28 January 2020 (UTC) That sounds good to me, Squatch347. I guess two issues still are on my mind. First, should actually say why his tensed view of time is important for his argument? Second, how sure are you that the notion of priority that Craig wants is merely "causal priority"? I think there are probably a lot of different notions of priority he could appeal to here, and I'm not clear on which one he does appeal to. Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:11, 28 January 2020 (UTC) That's a good question. It would make sense to connect the dots a bit. Maybe we include some of that in the philosophy of time section and then make that section precede this one? I'm just worried about this section getting out of control. I feel pretty confident that this is what Craig is talking about. The Stanford Plato source cited describes his views as referring to causally prior. Craig makes a long distinction about the possible meanings of prior here,[80] , and sums with a quote: "God must be causally, but not temporally, prior to the Big Bang." He also seems pretty consistent in reference to priority being causal in the quick search I did of his site, nor do I think I've seen him reference a different priority structure in any other work that we've reviewed. [81], [82], [83]. Squatch347 (talk) 14:43, 29 January 2020 (UTC) @Squatch347: In terms of I'm not sure I agree with the concern about the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society source. It seems to be a WP:RS by any standard we could adopt. My concern is not that it isn't a reliable source for what Evangelicals are interested in, my concern is that we are tasked to find out what is most prominent in Craig's arguments and focusing on the material that Evangelicals noticed is perhaps not ideal. Rather, it would be good to find notice of Craig's arguments in sources that are outside that epistemic community. through his interactions and through causing events in time is clunky, but an improvement. I would like to see wording like that used instead, indeed. If referencing two "phases" is problematic, I wonder if there is an acceptable synonym: "states" or "conditions" perhaps? Agreed that "temporal facts" may be just as clunky. Aren't we just trying to say "facts about events"? Perhaps that's an easy way of saying it that doesn't require head scratching? I'm afraid any reference to "tensed" anything needs explanation that it probably too far into the weeds. jps (talk) 19:29, 28 January 2020 (UTC) States is pretty good term, so is conditions. I think either of those would be fine, good call. I think simply referring to them as 'facts about events' misses the distinction being referenced. Essentially, they are discussing two different types of coordinate or reference systems. It would by like saying Japan is west of the US versus Japan is at 139 easting. The distinction here isn't about where Japan is per se (analogous to events), but about the reference system used to describe it. I agree that it isn't super clear what is being referenced in the current writing. I suggested to Shine that maybe we cover that difference in the theory of time section and either link it or reference it in this section. We could also reference A series and B series as it has some discussion on it as well. Thoughts? Squatch347 (talk) 14:43, 29 January 2020 (UTC) The subtlety about reference systems in reference to omniscience needs much more clarity because I thought the point was much simpler (to know about what is happening "right now", an omniscient being needs to be contained within a timeline). If that's not the point being made, it needs to be clarified because that's how your text reads. jps (talk) 11:57, 30 January 2020 (UTC) I think that is fair. I wonder if explaining the tensed facts concept in the philosophy of time section makes more sense. It is definitely a central point there and would flow more naturally than putting it here. I see your point about it sounding a bit simple given the examples. I think we should consider changing those to something a bit more specific like "about the world, such as: "today is January 15, 1980," the truth of which would depend on his presence in the timeline." It could use some wordsmithing if you have some time, but does that example make the distinction a bit clearer (paired of course with a more robust explanation in the philosophy of time section)? Squatch347 (talk) 13:32, 30 January 2020 (UTC) Added some of the comments to my draft. Squatch347 (talk) 13:42, 30 January 2020 (UTC) Draft 6 Divine Eternity While Craig holds that time had a beginning, he does not think that God began to exist. Thus, Craig thinks that, prior to the beginning of time, God existed in a timeless state. Now proponents of the tenseless or B-theoretic view of time hold that facts about what is happening now, like the fact that it is lunchtime right now, are identical to tenseless facts like the fact that it is lunchtime at time t. On this view, Craig thinks, God could know and cause such facts without being temporal. However, if facts of this sort are not identical to tenseless facts, but instead constitute a separate category of tensed facts, then, because God knows and causes such facts, Craig thinks that God himself must be temporal. Since Craig is a proponent of the tensed theory of time, then, he concludes that there are two phases to divine existence, a phase prior to creation in which God existed timelessly, and another phase, beginning with creation, in which God is temporal by virtue of his relationship with tensed facts. Of course "prior to" here is not intended to express temporal succession, since there is no time "prior to" the first moment of time. Making sense of this notion of priority has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account. References Added reference to Ganssle's IEP article, which can be found here to support my attempt to elaborate the role of tensed facts in Craig's view. Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:00, 30 January 2020 (UTC) I think the explanation of tensed facts is promising here. But it seems to make hard reading with the other sections. I would recommend taking everything from "now proponents..." to "must be temporal" and putting it in the philosophy of time section. It will flow much better there since we will be discussing A and B theory time (which we haven't explained either yet without that section) there as well. Squatch347 (talk) 13:36, 30 January 2020 (UTC) Makes sense. It seems like we need to draft the time section alongside this one. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:09, 30 January 2020 (UTC) I think this is closer, but it is suffering from TLDR exhaustion, I think. I would summarize it more simply: "An omniscient deity knows what is happening right now, and, as an adherent to the A-theory of time, this implies to Craig that the deity today is not timeless." (Incidentally, I have no idea how someone who believes in tensed facts handles the relativity of simultaneity, but this is just my own idle curiosity and is irrelevant to our task at hand. If anyone wants to explain this to me, feel free to stop by on my User Talk page.) jps (talk) 21:03, 30 January 2020 (UTC) I agree, I don't think we can close out this section without also having the separate theory of time section done. IMO, draft 5 reads a bit more clearly, but I think we can compare the two when we have a full theory of time section to read in conjunction. I'm happy to take an initial stab on it based on the text you have here in draft 6 and some of the original material. Shine, I know you also suggested two separate sections, so I could defer to you if you want to take the first stab. Up to you. jps, I like that summary. Incidentally, there is a lot of discussion on that topic in the sources I initially added to draft 1. I won't summarize here since this isn't a forum. Squatch347 (talk) 15:08, 3 February 2020 (UTC) Draft 7 Philosophy of Time Craig has published extensively on the theory of time. His work has focused variously on the ontology of temporal passing including analyses of presentism, and the ontology of spacetime matrices. He argues that spacetime matrices, while useful constructs, are not ontologically meaningful and thus should not be conceived of as literally representing how space and time interact. Rather, Craig adopts a variant of philosophic presentism which maintains that only the present exists and that the experience of temporal passage represents an ontologically real phenomenon. These positions are summarized in different theories of time, sometimes referred to as A-Theory and B-theory of time. Craig supports an A-Theory interpretation in which tensed facts and the passage of time are ontologically real. In The Tensed Theory of Time (2000) Craig examines arguments for and against a tensed understanding of time, commonly called the A-Theory of time. In The Tenseless Theory of Time (2000), Craig conducts a similar review of arguments for a tenseless construct or B-Theory of time. Elements of Craig's philosophy of time differentiates between time itself and our measures of it (a classical Newtonian theme), and includes an analysis of spatial "tenses" to the location of the "I-now", his defense of presentism, his analysis of McTaggart's paradox as an instance of the problem of temporary intrinsics, and his formulation of a tensed possible worlds semantics. Now proponents of the tenseless or B-theoretic view of time hold that facts about what is happening now, like the fact that it is lunchtime right now, are identical to tenseless facts like the fact that it is lunchtime at time t. On this view, Craig thinks, God could know and cause such facts without being temporal. [84] However, Craig argues that these are a separate category of facts and because God knows and causes such facts, God himself must be temporal. Divine Eternity Craig argues that God existed in a timeless state causally prior to creation, but has existed in a temporal manner since. He gives two arguments in support of that view. First, he says that, given his tensed view of time (see above), God cannot be timeless once he has created a temporal universe, since, after that point, he is related to time through his interactions and through causing events in time. Second, Craig says that as a feature of of his omniscience, God must know the truth related to tensed facts about the world, such as whether the statement "Today is January 15th" is true or not or what is happening right now. Some philosophers have pressed Craig's account for a lack of clarity between his discussion of God existing "causally prior" to the universe and his account of God's act of creation as being temporal. References I took a stab at the Philosophy of time section. There is still some work that needs to be done. 1) I need to maybe reread/wordsmith that last paragraph in the Philosophy of Time section to makes sure it is covering the bases. 2) I need to go back through the sources and make sure that I'm not missing anything and address Shine's concern about source for the ontological reality of spacetimes. Squatch347 (talk) 12:02, 5 February 2020 (UTC) Draft 8 Philosophy of Time Craig has published on the theory of time. His work has focused variously on what it means for time to pass, including analyses of presentism, and the philosophical implication of the physical concept of spacetime. He disagrees with the proposal that spacetime as it is defined by physicists literally represents how space and time interact. Rather, Craig believes in presentism which proposes that only the present exists and that the experience of time is ontologically real. As such, Craig is a proponet of A-Theory of time and thus believes that facts relating to time (so-called "tensed facts") are not relative. In The Tensed Theory of Time (2000) Craig examines arguments for and against both the A-Theory and B-Theory of time. Craig differentiates between time itself and our measures of it (a classical Newtonian theme), and includes an analysis of spatial "tenses" to the location of the "I-now", his defense of presentism, his analysis of McTaggart's paradox References Yikes. It seems pretty clear to me that Craig is opposed to the theory of relativity in a way that is dramatic. I just read the book he wrote with the other A-theorists and it seems an impossible-to-escape conclusion. Issue is, physicists haven't really noticed this issue because philosophy doesn't really deal with the fundamental measurements (or believe they are irrelevant). Be that as it may, we cannot start arguing in favor of Craig's arguments if they haven't been noticed by the relevant experts. We're going to run into similar problems that we did with the cosmology stuff above, only worse because I don't think any relativity experts have noticed Craig's denail of relativity. So I began the process of rewriting the stuff that squatch wrote above. I'm not happy with it, but if we're going to go in this direction we're going to run into some problems, I fear. jps (talk) 19:45, 8 February 2020 (UTC) Actually, I'm at a loss on how you came to the conclusion that Craig is opposed to relativity (specifically, the Special Theory of Relativity). Can you please elaborate? Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 05:25, 10 February 2020 (UTC) I was surprised myself, but it seems the more charitable conclusion from what I had read of his work on A-theory of time cited here. Essentially, the argument is that relativity theory is a construct that helps with calculations, but the practical claims that are made by relativists (e.g. that there is no absolute time such that all clocks no matter their origin really do run differently in different reference frames) has to be incorrect. The less charitable conclusion is that the A-theorists actually don't understand the implications of relativity or, at least, the way they are treated by those who work with the theory for a living, e.g. jps (talk) 16:14, 10 February 2020 (UTC) I'd also appreciate a bit more detail on why so much is stripped out in this draft? I might be reading your statement wrong, but it almost seems to read as: "if a physicist didn't sign off on it, it isn't a source" which seems a bit odd, especially for discussion about the philosophy of science. On another note, this draft has a lot of editorializing; "as it is defined by physicists..." is a bold statement, physicists use a variety of models and approaches to understanding and representing space and time so implications that there is one, universally accepted framework are incorrect. The sentence itself seems designed to imply Craig is out of touch, and that inference is strengthened by the editor's comments, which highlights the feeling of editorializing in this draft. Additionally, the implied opposition of presentism to the physics community is wholly unwarranted, so we would need to rewrite that. I don't think this represents an improvement to Draft 7 and the structure doesn't give us much to iterate on I think. It is structured as a "this is why Craig is wrong" paragraph rather than a neutral assessment of his work. I recommend we go back to Draft 7 and iterate from there. Squatch347 (talk) 13:30, 10 February 2020 (UTC) Oh, no, I don't mean at all that "if a physicist didn't sign off on it it isn't a source". I agree that "as it is defined by physicists" is a bold statement, but it is accurate. It simply is incorrect that there are a variety of approaches to spacetime within the community. There is one approach and it is the one that uses relativity theory. I'm not trying to design a statement to say Craig is out of touch. In fact, I think what is more likely is that it is the physicists who are out of touch with Craig's beliefs. Craig, if I am correct in explaining the sources we have and you offered, believes that the mathematical formalism of relativity does not apply to the actual experience of time. Relativists (which is to say people who work within the physics community) categorically reject such arguments and have since about the time of Herbert Dingle or so, and this is the "universal approach" (inasmuch as there is such a thing) in physics. If there is editorializing there, it is unintentional. My goal is to summarize according to the accurate accounting of what Craig believes and with respect to the WP:PROMINENCE of how his views have been received. I'm not sure that the physics community is opposed to presentism on the whole, but it is absolutely opposed to absolute reference frames and, as such, any presentism has to be associated with each proper time worldline (which are different depending on the reference frame). The spacetime interval is invariant, but that does not mean that each individual cannot experience a single present (but Closed timelike curves present a consistency check issue, I suppose). The ideas that Craig is presenting, at least as I read them and as you presented them and the sources seem to indicate, are at the very least peculiar in context of the way questions of spacetime are handled. We need to be honest about this as much as we can be. If no physicist has remarked on Craig's approach (or, indeed, the general question of A-theory), we might need to scale back any explanations and just leave the bare wikilinks. I want to reiterate, I'm not arguing that Craig is "wrong". I'm trying to contextualize Craig's claims in the same fashion you were doing in Draft 7 with reference to explanations from relativity. Draft 7 is unacceptable in my mind because there are misconceptions and errors baked in to the discussion. Previous versions were somewhat better in that regard. jps (talk) 16:14, 10 February 2020 (UTC) Draft 9 Philosophy of Time Craig defends a presentist version of the A-theory of time. According to this theory, the present is real, but the past and future are not, and there are tensed facts, such as the fact that it is now lunchtime, which cannot be reduced to or identified with tenseless facts of the form it is lunchtime at time t. According to this theory, presentness is a real aspect of time, and not merely a projection of our thought and talk about time. Craig defends this view in a number of different ways; here we will mention the two most notable defenses. First, he criticizes McTaggart's argument that the A-theory is incoherent, suggesting that McTaggart's argument begs the question by covertly presupposing the B-theory. Second, he defends the A-theory from empirical challenges arising from the standard interpretation of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (SR). He responds to this challenge by advocating a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR which is empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation, and which is consistent with the A-theory and with absolute simultaneity. Craig criticizes the standard theory favored by Einstein on the grounds that it is based on discredited positivist epistemology that, he claims, is inconsistent with the appeal to SR made by proponents of the SR-based empirical challenge to the A-theory. Divine Eternity Craig holds that there have been two phases to divine existence: a phase prior to creation in which God existed timelessly, and another phase, beginning with creation, in which God is temporal by virtue of his relationship with tensed facts.. Craig advocates this view by claiming that God must be temporal in order to cause tensed fats, and in order to know such facts, such as facts about what is happening right now. Of course, when Craig says that God was timeless "prior to" the creation of time, the notion of priority is not intended to express temporal succession, since there is no time temporally prior to the first moment of time. However, making sense of this notion of priority has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account. References Trying a new draft. A few points: I thought the Helm 2002 review was the strongest and most useful summary of what Craig says about SR. I wasn't sure whether to reserve SR for Einstein's own favored interpretation of relativity, or whether to say that SR is the theory that is being interpreted in more than one way. Sources seem to go either way on this. I don't see 'causal priority' in the sources, Squatch. If you can point me to where that is, we can put it back in. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:21, 11 February 2020 (UTC) This version is better, but I still see some problems: According to this theory, the present is real, but the past and future are not I think uses the wrong word. Does he really think the past is not real? I don't get that at all. I like the discussion of tensed facts, but I think we need to choose a counter-example instead of it is lunchtime at time t. Why not, "It is lunchtime at noon?" not merely a projection of our thought and talk about time seems to be a strawman. I don't know that anyone really says that this is what the present is. Unless you are referring to a "projection" as a kind of "relativity". If that's the case, the sentence needs to be rewritten. First, he criticizes McTaggart's argument that the A-theory is incoherent Why does McTaggart argue this? We need to let the reader know if we're going to include the argument against it. a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR which is empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation this is impenetrable to me and I think I know the subject fairly well. What is a "neo-Lorentzian" interpretation? If it is empirically equivalent, how is it different? This is not at all clear. it is based on discredited positivist epistemology I think Craig does argue this, but he does so in a way that I cannot follow. I suppose Craig reads Einstein as a positivist because he disagrees with positivism and he disagrees with Einstein, but I do not see the connection myself. Can we explain this in a succinct way? inconsistent with the appeal to SR made by proponents of the SR-based empirical challenge to the A-theory. Again, impenetrable. How is it inconsistent? If I cannot understand it just by reading the sentence, it's hard for me to imagine a reader understanding it. I hope you will indulge me in not engaging with the next section. There is just so much to fix in this first one for right now. I do wish to say that I find this version at least slightly better than Draft 8, but I still prefer previous drafts, I think. jps (talk) 03:27, 11 February 2020 (UTC) Point by point: Yes, I think he believes that the past is not real. Of course it was real (past tense). But it is gone, no longer making up a part of reality. The issues here are subtle, and there is much to say about them that we are not going to say. But I think this is a standard way to gloss presentism in a venue like Wikipedia. I guess 'lunchtime at noon' is ok. Better would be 'lunchtime at noon on February 10, 2020' since 'it's lunchtime at noon' could be read in an unintended way to express a generalization about when lunch is each day. I'm compressing a lot with that talk of tensed facts; its hard to make it clear and short at the same time, but all of this is pretty standard stuff in philosophy of time. The idea of those who reject the A-theory is that a word like 'now' is like 'here' in that it doesn't mark a special feature of the time to which it is applied, but just expresses the perspective of the speaker. A theorists like Craig disagree and think that 'now' gets at a real feature of the world. I'm open to other formulations; is the idea clear to you from what I just said? I thought the wikilink to McT was enough on that subject. Do we really want to elaborate on his famous argument against the A-theory? The sources I'm relying on do not elaborate, as McT's argument is famous and well-known. I think that lots of physicists and philosophers of physics regard different interpretations of QM as empirically equivalent even though they present pretty different pictures of the nature of the world. I take it that something similar is being said to go on here. The sources I'm looking at don't elaborate on the details of his Neo-Lorentzian theory beyond what I said. More sourcing would be needed to elaborate. Do you really want more details on that? I don't see how we can elaborate on Craig's argument that Einstein is a positivist, since I don't see secondary sourcing that elaborates this. I do not think that Craig's argument is as you state it fwiw. You're asking for a lot more detail that isn't in the sources. The lack of detail doesn't make it unclear, just lacking in detail. Craig thinks that the positivism required for Einstein's interpretation is inconsistent with the use that objectors to the A-theory are making of SR. I don't know why he thinks this, and sources don't say. We should just summarize at the level of detail in the sources in my view. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:55, 11 February 2020 (UTC) I found this regarding relativity and Craig. It's clear to me that Craig is in no way denying relativity, unless I'm reading it wrong. It's a short article but very subtle (I had to read it twice to make sure I wasn't misinterpreting it). Let me know what you all think. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 05:03, 11 February 2020 (UTC) Thanks, that will hopefully be helpful in answering some of the questions jps was asking, but it is a primary source, and so I assume we don't want to rely on it in adding to what I wrote. Shinealittlelight (talk) 11:56, 11 February 2020 (UTC) It aligns essentially with what I've been reading before and I still think it represents a soft denial of relativity as described above and essentially argued for throughout. Craig is not saying he disagrees with the empirical results and the mathematical formalism of relativity, but he categorically rejects the idea that there is more than one "present" in the universe. The reference here is to a kind of Lorentz ether theory which indeed relies on the following "the existence of an undetectable aether is assumed and the validity of the relativity principle seems to be only coincidental". jps (talk) 16:38, 11 February 2020 (UTC) Craig does not deny more than one "present", just the opposite, based on frame of reference : Again, I feel constrained to say that God's "frame of reference" is not literally a reference frame; there is no reference frame in which all events are present and actual, since there are in every frame space-time regions designated absolute future or absolute past as determined by the light-cone structure at any event. Keep in mind that Craig is not arguing against relativity, but rather how it is being used: In conclusion, then, I think we can agree that there are reasons to doubt the legitimacy of the appeal to Relativity Theory to support the crucial theses (i) that temporal things exist in time and in timeless eternity and (ii) that the timeless presence of all things to God is compatible with objective temporal becoming. (Emphasis added.) Does this assuage your concerns? Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 01:31, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Well, I wasn't "concerned", at least not in the sense that would matter to our editorial purpose. However, I think you've missed the point that A-theory of time has but one present moment. I don't think Craig disagrees with that, but I will admit that I find his simultaneous rejection of a literal frame of reference for his deity while also somehow proclaiming a universal present for all events to be impenetrable -- but perhaps that is his point. If Craig isn't "arguing against relativity, but rather how it is being used." that's a distinction without a difference when it comes to scientific theories, not unlike the way creationists say that they aren't opposed to evolution, just macroevolution. And, anyway, I think the final quote you are including doesn't really get to the point of how Craig is opposed to relativity (which does not come from his descriptions of deities but rather at the point of his explanations of why A-theory is correct). jps (talk) 01:51, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I think this version is pretty good. It offers a good explanation of tensed facts and some of the discussion around his defense of A-theory. I have a couple of suggestions, but I don't think any of them are too major. I agree with jps that the word "real" is probably incorrect or at least adds some implications I don't think we are making. I would substitute "According to this theory, only the present exists, but the past and future do not. There are also tensed facts, such as..." I like the "lunchtime at noon on..." language Shine recommends based on jps' feedback. I think that gets the distinction across pretty clearly. Agree with Shine that the language about "projection of our thought" is correct. This does seem to be a common objection and viewpoint among B-theorists and I agree that this is probably the most coherent this complex subject is going to get short of a dramatically long section. I think the phrase "standard theory favored by Einstein" isn't quite correct either. The distinction isn't so much about Einstein's theory as it is about the physical world interpretation of that theory. And I think Craig's point is that some of the interpretations of that theory are based in archaic positivist philosophy. I would recommend this; "Craig criticizes some of the physical world interpretations of Special Relativity used by critics of A-theory as based in a discredited positivist epistemology." I disagree a bit with JPS on the Neo-Lorentzian distinction made here. Though I don't think Craig actually makes that argument any more. To elaborate (just so we are clear), one interpretation of Lorentzian invariance is that spacetime is altered, the other is that the physical objects themselves are altered. Both make the same empirical predictions because the underlying Lorentzian invariance equations are the same, but how those equations are expressed in the physical world differ. This discussion could go on for pages and pages. I mean it has been going on, in one form or another for more than a hundred years. We probably should handle it lightly as Shine as done here. I think we still need to add in a brief reference to the two books referenced in Draft 7, since it is where much of this is discussed and they are heavily cited works of his. The rest is probably more or less covered in this draft I think. Here is my most substantive concern, I still don't think the Divine Eternity version is quite suitable. The inclusion of the Philosophy of Time context does resolve the tensed facts issue, but it still has the other issues I referenced back a couple of drafts ago. I think the divine eternity section from Draft 5 should be used rather than this structure. Squatch347 (talk) 12:46, 11 February 2020 (UTC) Thanks for the responses. Here are some of my comments: Shine: Yes, I think he believes that the past is not real. Of course it was real (past tense). Squatch: I agree with jps that the word "real" is probably incorrect or at least adds some implications I don't think we are making. I would substitute "According to this theory, only the present exists, but the past and future do not. There are also tensed facts, such as..." Craig seems himself to prefer the term "exist" rather than real. I think this is perhaps too subtle for us to spend any time on. Linking to presentism (philosophy) should be enough here. Readers can delve into the implications of "reality" and "existence" on their own time as I believe such arguments are largely incidental to the overall point we need to make (that Craig believes in presentism and A-theory). Shine: I guess 'lunchtime at noon' is ok. Better would be 'lunchtime at noon on February 10, 2020' since 'it's lunchtime at noon' could be read in an unintended way to express a generalization about when lunch is each day. If the fact is meant to indicate a particular time for an event, the best thing to say would be the date-time of an actual event. For example, the moon landing. Or the end of World War I. I'm still completely unclear why this matters at all. The idea of those who reject the A-theory is that a word like 'now' is like 'here' in that it doesn't mark a special feature of the time to which it is applied, but just expresses the perspective of the speaker. A theorists like Craig disagree and think that 'now' gets at a real feature of the world. I am trying to figure out exactly how to put this. I agree that those who reject A-theory consider "now" and "here" to be (interconnected -- if they understand relativity) coordinates. Craig does not agree that this is the right way to think of tensed facts, but as Craig also accepts relativity there is problematic aspect that my "now" is only true for me and comparing notes in the future with a relativistically moving counterpart, we would not agree as to when the different nows of the past coincided. For Craig, this is irrelevant because he is only interested in the "now" of the worldline and refuses to say how this can hold up consistently from worldline to worldline except, perhaps, to allow for a neo-Lorentzian interpretation. This is tricky because the idea of a spacetime event is baked into such discussions without a care in the world for A-theory or B-theory. That B-theory requires less preference is perhaps the way to put this, but I think it incorrect to attribute it to a "thought". Shine: I thought the wikilink to McT was enough on that subject. Do we really want to elaborate on his famous argument against the A-theory? I think so, but I'm also not convinced that Craig's answer to McT is actually noticed by all that many. Do we have sources indicating that this is an important rejoinder? Squatch: Craig criticizes some of the physical world interpretations of Special Relativity used by critics of A-theory as based in a discredited positivist epistemology. This uses the word "some" in a way that makes me uncomfortable. Which physical world interpretations does Craig disagree with? Crucially, I think that Craig is often vague about this, whether intentionally or not. Also, we would need to be clear that is is Craig who thinks positivist epistemology is discredited, but I've not really seen that much notice of how he discredits positivism. I fear that this is getting way too far into the weeds for what our purposes are here. There are lots of critiques of positivism to be had, and Craig's critique, as far as I can tell, is at once opaque and unique to him. Shine: I think that lots of physicists and philosophers of physics regard different interpretations of QM as empirically equivalent even though they present pretty different pictures of the nature of the world. I take it that something similar is being said to go on here. Yeah, but while there is legitimate disagreement about interpretations of QM, the number of scientists who support Neo-Lorentzian interpretations is vanishingly small. The best you can do is say that if you redefine what was meant by aether you can have your aether. But that's rather like saying "If you redefine what you mean by static, you can have a universe that is static." There is a bit more to it than that, but this is the WP:MAINSTREAM perspective when it comes to this subject (and it is also why Craig is a soft relativity denialist, e.g.) The sources I'm looking at don't elaborate on the details of his Neo-Lorentzian theory beyond what I said. More sourcing would be needed to elaborate. Do you really want more details on that? I think it may be necessary. The Neo-Lorentzian approach is obviously where Craig goes out on a limb. If this hasn't been noticed, we may need to scale back his take on all this and just leave the sentences simpler with "He's an presentist A-theorist" and move on? I don't see how we can elaborate on Craig's argument that Einstein is a positivist, since I don't see secondary sourcing that elaborates this. So, with this point made, I think we may need to take the claims about Einstein's perspective out, then. If the sources do not have detail enough to make something clear to the reader, then to include it in our article becomes very problematic. jps (talk) 16:38, 11 February 2020 (UTC) There's nothing unclear about the claim that Craig argues that Einstein's interpretation of SR is based on positivism. My view is that lack of detail is not the same as lack of clarity, and we should follow the level of detail given in the sources. The sources do not give a lot of detail on his argument about Einstein's positivism, or on his favored interpretation of SR. But they do mention these things repeatedly. And they are mainstream, reliable sources. So my view--and I thought WP policy--is that it isn't our place to question their judgment about what's notable or the level of detail they choose to present. Would be nice if Steven Crossin could weigh in here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 20:23, 11 February 2020 (UTC) There's nothing unclear about the claim that Craig argues that Einstein's interpretation of SR is based on positivism. I think that Craig has argued that is clear. How and why Craig has argued that is not clear to me, at least, and I fear that we don't have any sources explaining this in a fashion that would allow us to explain it to a reader without some WP:NOR breach. In my experience, when that happens, it typically means we've gone too far afield and need to consider excising text. One of the key aspects that sometimes is missed in WP:V discussions is that just because something is verifiable does not mean there is a categorical imperative to include it in an article. WP:V is a necessary but not sufficient criteria for inclusion. jps (talk) 22:26, 11 February 2020 (UTC) So if a variety of RS find it notable that Craig believes p, you think that we can't include that fact in the article on Craig unless our sources also find the details of his argument for p to be notable. That seems to me not what WP policy says, and not what WP policy should say, since it seems to me obvious that a guy's view could be notable even though the argument he gives for that view is not. I would welcome input from others on this point. Shinealittlelight (talk) 22:58, 11 February 2020 (UTC) That's really not what I'm saying. I think the point of articles is to convey information. Right now, I have a hard time understanding what precisely the information is. Perhaps a different example might help? Imagine an article on a person who verifiably declared that the reported p-value from an experiment was too low to be believable. Imagine reference to what the p-value was, what was "too low" about it, or why that indicated disbelief was not to be found. I could imagine lots of reasons why such statements might be made, but if I don't know why that particular statement was made, it does me almost no good to know it is made except perhaps as a bald quote. Imagine that there were a number of sources which repeated this claim. Should Wikipedia report this claim was made? I think it depends on whether it conveys useful information in the context of the article. If the context is "Person said this" but no one can say why, in my mind that starts to bring into doubt whether the quote is worthy of inclusion per WP:NPOV, WP:WEIGHT among other principles. jps (talk) 23:21, 11 February 2020 (UTC) Or to put this another way, the idea you are proposing we include is essentially a claim that Craig criticized no one less than Einstein. This is a dramatic thing to do for anyone (in fact, criticism of Einstein is one of the checkboxes on the crackpot index), so there is a WP:BLP concern that it get contextualized correctly so as to not mislead the reader into thinking Craig is advocating something he is not. I'm not sure that the sources we have are adequate to do that. jps (talk) 23:24, 11 February 2020 (UTC) I don't agree that the information is hard to understand. Craig thinks that Einstein's interpretation of SR is based on positivist epistemology, and he has argued for this claim. This is not a hard claim to understand. The claim does not tell us what the argument is. The sources establish that the claim is notable. I do not agree that saying someone disagrees with Einstein about a non-empirical issue raises BLP concerns. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:32, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I don't think it surprising that you disagree, but it's impenetrable to me because it is not explained and functions almost as a non-sequitor. "John Doe thinks that Jane Doe's interpretation of XXX is based on YYY, and has argued for this claim." Why do we care? Maybe there is a point here to including this line, but I don't understand what it is. Try explaining it? jps (talk) 02:39, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Also, to claim that this is a non-empirical issue is at least . I would argue, in fact, that you're just incorrect about that. jps (talk) 02:43, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I think the main reason to include it is that it is well-sourced, and we should depend on RS to establish what is notable. I should note that what I said before was slightly incomplete: Craig says not only that E's interp was based on positivism, but also that positivism is discredited, and also that the positivist basis is inconsistent with the philosophical attack on A-theory that appeals to E's interp. All interesting to me. But my opinion doesn't matter: it's well sourced, and we follow the sources. As for "non-empirical" I'm sure we do disagree. But set that aside: it's not a BLP concern to attribute to Craig a disagreement with E about what Craig and several of our sources regard as a non-empirical issue. Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:51, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Again, just because something is sourced doesn't mean we include it. I am also interested in this, but that's not the argument we need to make. We need to include text that will allow a reader to understand the information attempting to be conveyed. First of all, what is the precise interpretation Craig is attacking? Einstein had a lot of descriptive interpretations he offered of his theory and obviously Craig doesn't disagree with all of them, but a reader could come away being misled this way. The further explanations you offer just further muddy the waters, as far as I'm concerned to the tune of, "this is wrong, but even if it isn't wrong, it is used inconsistently." I am concerned with making sure that readers do not come away from reading a section thinking, for example, that Craig disagrees with Einstein in general. This is one interpretation of your text. jps (talk) 03:07, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I agree that personal interest isn't the issue; I said as much already. I understand that being sourced doesn't guarantee inclusion, you don't need to repeat that. As stated above, I do not think that the claims attributed to Craig in my draft are hard to understand. They leave out details that are not in sourcing, but they're easy to understand as far as they go. You seem to think that the missing details are required but are not in sourcing, and on that basis, it seems, you oppose inclusion. This seems to me at odds with our sources, which include the information without the details. I side with our sources about this matter. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:21, 12 February 2020 *S(UTC) Right. I'm trying to break the juggernaut, however, and see if we can't come up with an explanation of what is going on that might allow us see through the disagreement towards text that everyone agrees to and explains what you think the sources are trying to convey. I don't understand what the sentences about Einstein mean. You do. I am wondering if you can offer some additional clues to allow me to understand. If the answer is "no", then the impasse, I suppose, has to remain. jps (talk) 11:39, 12 February 2020 (UTC) It seems that the details you're asking for can be found in this primary source: [85]. I've been trying to avoid relying on primary sources, though. Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:10, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Not really. What I'm asking for is any notice that Craig has simply mentioned positivism as a feature without explaining how it is a feature. Craig thinks that Einstein should have not "redefined" simultaneity in SR (which is relativity denial, but that's a different matter). This discussion was resolved in the physics community long about Herbert Dingle, but this seems to be missed not only by Craig but anyone who has made off-hand mention of Craig's criticism of Einstein. Lacking the proper notice, I think, is an indication that the idea (which is profoundly WP:FRINGE in physics if not in philosophy) is difficult to include. So what I'm asking is, has anybody looked into Craig's criticism of Einstein beyond simply mentioning it? If the answer is "no", then we, indeed, cannot explain it in the same way we could not explain his peculiar interpretation of the cosmological theorem in the previous section. jps (talk) 12:17, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Reading through this I think the breakdown come across as jps arguing that we shouldn't include some sourced material because he doesn't fully understand the argument being presented by Craig (or thinks its nonsensical or bad, or as "fringe"). But I think that misses the point. It doesn't really matter if any of us or none of us fully get the argument or agree with it. What matters is that it was published and noted by RS standards and we are faithfully including what those standards say. Squatch347 (talk) 12:44, 12 February 2020 (UTC) WP:FRINGE arguments are fine, but they must be noticed for us to include them. I don't think the passing mention of these arguments constitutes notice. jps (talk) 19:26, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I do not understand what jps has written in his last comment. What does "mentioned positivism as a feature" mean? Is the fourth sentence of the comment grammatical? I can't parse it. So I really don't follow. But the problem with the previous section was that there was no coverage in secondary sources, but only a discussion in a co-authored book with Sean Carroll. That's not the case here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:49, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I am referring to Craig mentioning positivism as a feature of Einstein's interpretations. Feel free to quote the sentence you think is ungrammatical. Unsurprisingly, the comment parses fine for me. jps (talk) 19:26, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Shine, I was curious if you had any feedback on my comments above? I think most of the comments I made are small grammatical ones (replace real with exist and a slight rewrite of the positivist sentence). If we can get consensus on the philosophy of time section, I'd like to discuss a bit with you the Divine Eternity section you proposed. Squatch347 (talk) 12:44, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I'm fine with all the suggested changes you mentioned, Squatch. Thanks. Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:49, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Well, it's not okay to declare a consensus for this draft which is, in some ways, a step in the wrong direction compared to other previous versions. jps (talk) 19:26, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Draft 10 Philosophy of Time and the Divine Craig defends a presentist version of the A-theory of time. He believes the things happening in the present are tensed facts that are fundamental descriptions of existence (it is lunchtime now) and are not equivalent to tenseless facts that describe the time that things occur (World War I ended on November 11, 1918). Craig rejects the B-theory of time and defends the A-theory from empirical challenges arising from the standard interpretation of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (SR). He instead adopts a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR which is empirically equivalent to relativity but Craig believes is consistent with the A-theory. Craig argues that that there have been two states of divine existence: a state prior to creation in which God existed timelessly and a state after where God exists in a temporal manner. He gives two arguments in support of that view. First, he says that, given his tensed view of time, God cannot be timeless once he has created a temporal universe, since, after that point, he is related to time through his interactions and through causing events. Second, Craig says that as a feature of his omniscience, God must know the truth related to tensed facts about the present world which means he is contained in time. Some philosophers have pressed Craig's account for a lack of clarity in his discussion of God existing "causally prior" to creation since there can be no time prior to any first moment. References I tried to use Shine's version to include what is important and easily verifiable. I removed the Evangelical journal and tried to link to the alternative relativity approach Craig likes. jps (talk) 03:02, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I added the divine existence material as a mishmash of squatch and shine trying to take on-board as much discussion as I could in the criticisms of the previous drafts. jps (talk) 12:05, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Prefer Draft 9 to this. This cuts out a lot of relevant material and doesn't resolve any of the issues that were in Draft 9. 12:37, 12 February 2020 (UTC) The "relevant material" was all poorly considered or impenetrable. This version is understandable according to the sources I read. jps (talk) 19:28, 12 February 2020 (UTC) I agree with Squatch. Also, the sentence "the things happening in the present are tensed facts that are fundamental descriptions of existence ..." does not seem to be an accurate statement of his view.Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:54, 12 February 2020 (UTC) How would you change the sentence? jps (talk) 19:28, 12 February 2020 (UTC) Draft 11 Philosophy of Time Craig defends a presentist version of the A-theory of time. According to this theory, the present exists, but the past and future do not. Additionally, he holds that there are tensed facts, such as it is now lunchtime, which cannot be reduced to or identified with tenseless facts of the form it is lunchtime at noon on February 10, 2020. According to this theory, presentness is a real aspect of time, and not merely a projection of our thought and talk about time. Craig defends this view in a number of different ways; here we will mention the two most notable defenses. First, he criticizes McTaggart's argument that the A-theory is incoherent, suggesting that McTaggart's argument begs the question by covertly presupposing the B-theory. Second, he defends the A-theory from empirical challenges arising from the standard interpretation of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (SR). He responds to this challenge by advocating a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR which is empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation, and which is consistent with the A-theory and with absolute simultaneity. Craig criticizes the standard physical-world interpretation of SR on the grounds that it is based on a discredited positivist epistemology. Moreover, he claims that positivism is inconsistent with the appeal to SR made by these opponents of the A-theory. Divine Eternity Craig argues that God existed in a timeless state causally prior to creation, but has existed in a temporal state beginning with creation, by virtue of his relationship with tensed facts and his interactions with events.. He gives two arguments in support of that view. First, he says that, given his tensed view of time, God cannot be timeless once he has created a temporal universe, since, after that point, he is related to time through his interactions and through causing events in time. Second, Craig says that as a feature of of his omniscience, God must know the truth related to tensed facts about the world, such as whether the statement "Today is January 15th" is true or not or what is happening right now.α Notes ^α When Craig says that God is timeless "prior to" the creation of time, the relevant notion of priority is not supposed to be temporal, as there is no time temporally prior to the first moment of time. Rather, Craig means to suggest that God is prior to time in some non-temporal sense that is difficult to specify, and which involves the idea that God was the cause of the universe. Several philosophers have argued that Craig's notion of non-temporal priority is not clear. References Ok, I've used Shine's draft 9 and included the edits I proposed. I then used Draft 7 as the basis for the Divine Eternity section, but merged in some of Draft 9's language which I think was clearer than mine. Squatch347 (talk) 12:14, 13 February 2020 (UTC) I'm pretty happy with the time part of this. One reservation: you say "Craig criticizes some of the physical world interpretations of Special Relativity..." It's fine with me if we don't refer to E by name here, but I'd prefer something like this: Craig criticizes the standard interpretation of SR on the grounds that it is based on a discredited positivist epistemology. Moreover, he claims that positivism is inconsistent with the appeal to SR made by these opponents of the A-theory. As for the divine eternity section, I'm still not seeing "causally prior" in sources. Can you point me to where you're getting that? That's my main concern at this point. I also don't see that this mediation is likely to produce consensus among the three of us without a mediator, and without the other editors. Perhaps we'll have to wait for Steven to return. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:51, 13 February 2020 (UTC) I tend to agree that we need a mediator. There are some issues here where we seem to be at a standstill. I will briefly point out that "noon on February 10, 2020" is still a relative time and not an absolute time (noon in which timezone, e.g.?) jps (talk) 11:12, 14 February 2020 (UTC) Actually, I like SALL's suggestion. I have to ask, however, how many different interpretations of SR are there? More than two? Thanks. I'm fine with that suggestion Shine, I've updated this draft with that language. The only mod I made to your language was to add the physical world phrasing, I think we should be clear it is the philosophic application of SR that Craig is disputing, not the underlying model. I'd point back to the quote you offered from swinburne which references the priority as causal: "What is the difference between God (causally prior to the universe) being timeless and unchanging, and being temporal and unchanging? I cannot see that Craig has given any content to this difference." And, though a primary source, it is a statement "God must be causally, but not temporally, prior to the Big Bang." One of the referenced earlier, though I think didn't make it here describes this causal priority, though not in as clear a manner. Starting on page 43 (I'm linking the non-paygated thesis version not the published version so you can read it), it does a good job of describing God existing causally prior to creation. You might be right that we will need some moderator intervention to get a final version. It might be helpful for him if we list out (as best as is possible) our disputes so he can process it without having to read all the long text that might help. Squatch347 (talk) 15:12, 18 February 2020 (UTC) Thanks for the reply. I read the relevant parts of Craig's book, Time and Eternity. I agree that Craig does think that God was causally, but not temporally, prior to creation. But that's not enough here: you want to claim not only that he holds this, but that this idea of causal priority is exhaustive of the sense in which Craig wants to say that God existed timelessly prior to creation. And that's a stronger claim--a claim about which I'm in doubt after having read his chapter. For he says "If time began to exist--say, for simplicity's sake, at the Big Bang--then in some difficult-to-articulate sense God must exist beyond the Big Bang, alone without the universe" (p. 233, emphasis mine). But 'causally prior', as he uses it, just means that God caused the universe (see here). It is therefore doubtful that this is all he means to say by saying that God was timeless prior to creation, since he does not seem to regard "God caused the universe" as a particularly difficult-to-articulate idea at all. Moreover, aside from my own doubts about interpreting the primary source in the way you suggest, I think the offered secondary sources--the sources that, in my view, we would need to rely on--aren't very clear. I'd be comfortable relying on the Swinburne source to establish that Craig does indeed believe that God was causally prior, but not to establish that this is all Craig means by saying that God was timeless prior to creation. The other secondary source is far more murky vis-a-vis Craig, and I don't see how to rely on it at all. So I stand by my concerns about interpreting Craig along the lines of "causal priority". I think, rather, that (to use his words!) he has a difficult-to-articulate sense of priority in mind--one that has not been fully embraced by his interlocutors in the literature, despite Craig's efforts to explain it in various ways. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:12, 19 February 2020 (UTC) Ah, I get what you are saying, sorry I didn't grasp that earlier. I didn't mean to imply in this language that Craig maintains causal priority as the only relationship between God and Universe. The paragraph you quote would seem to be about the larger description of God's existence apart from creation. I think it would be fair to summarize Craig's description of this existence as 1)timeless, 2)causally prior, and 3)having other features that are "difficult-to-articulate." Since this section was about Craig's position on God's relationship to time, I didn't think to include a larger, broader description of what Craig thinks God's existence is like. No objection to including something of that nature, it just seemed a little off topic. Perhaps something like: "Craig argues that, causally prior to creation, God existed in a "difficult to articulate" state that included being spaceless and timeless, but has existed..." Squatch347 (talk) 14:04, 19 February 2020 (UTC) Ok, good. So it sounds like we mostly agree. But I think that what he regards as difficult to articulate is the relevant notion of priority when he says that God existed timelessly prior to creation. So I do think that the question of what this notion of priority amounts to is central to his view of God's relationship to time. The key is that the relevant notion of priority entails causal priority, and isn't temporal. But that's not a full explanation. Here's what I wrote before, and I still sort of like it: "Of course, when Craig says that God was timeless "prior to" the creation of time, the notion of priority is not intended to express temporal succession, since there is no time temporally prior to the first moment of time. However, making sense of this notion of priority has been one of the main challenges that critics have pressed against Craig's account." If you want to take a different stab at it, be my guest. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:35, 19 February 2020 (UTC) I think my issue with that phrasing is that it comes across when I read it as a bit too much like we are attempting to educate the reader rather than providing a neutral encyclopedic summary. Maybe its just tone (equally probable, it is just me). I think there is a chance of us going down a rabbit hole attempting to clarify a concept that professional philosophers are debating. Maybe a better tack would be to leave the first sentence as is, but then expand the last bit with more of your clarification (which I think is how you did it originally, so maybe I'm coming around ;-) ). Something like: "Craig's reference to God as timeless "causally prior to" the creation of time is not intended to express temporal succession (there being no time temporally prior to the first moment of time), but rather how God exists absent the creation event as the cause of that event. Making sense of this notion of priority has been the aim of some philosophers critical to Craig's account, who press Craig's description as unclear." Thoughts? Squatch347 (talk) 13:58, 20 February 2020 (UTC) This proposal again strongly suggests the idea that, for Craig, God is "prior" to creation only causally. But that plausibly isn't his view. It also isn't clear to me that his critics have made clarification of the notion their "aim". So if I were going to reword your version minimally, I'd suggest: "Craig's reference to God as timeless "prior to" the creation of time is not intended to express temporal succession (there being no time temporally prior to the first moment of time), but rather how God existed prior in some non-temporal sense that is difficult to specify, and which involves the idea that God was the cause of the universe. Several philosophers have argued that Craig's notion of non-temporal priority is not clear." If I were to edit for style, I'd write: "When Craig says that God is timeless "prior to" the creation of time, the relevant notion of priority is not supposed to be temporal, as there is no time temporally prior to the first moment of time. Rather, Craig means to suggest that God is prior to time in some non-temporal sense that is difficult to specify, and which involves the idea that God was the cause of the universe. Several philosophers have argued that Craig's notion of non-temporal priority is not clear." Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:43, 21 February 2020 (UTC) I think that that is a fair rewrite. I updated Draft 11 with your proposed stylistic version for review. Squatch347 (talk) 12:43, 24 February 2020 (UTC) I'm pretty happy with this. I'd drop 'causally' in the first sentence as slightly misleading, but I can let that go if you prefer it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:57, 24 February 2020 (UTC) If possible I think it should remain. It is the language used when Craig states it and connects the first sentence with our later clarification. If you are happy with it as is, I'll ping @GretLomborg: and @Bill the Cat 7: since they were active, but haven't participated recently. Squatch347 (talk) 12:23, 25 February 2020 (UTC) If that's how Craig states it, we should keep it. Can we add SALL's second "style" as a note that the reader can mouse over? It's a well-written clarification. If both can't be incorporated as I suggest, I would have to go with SALL's suggestion. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 03:44, 26 February 2020 (UTC) I like the idea of keeping Craig's original language and adding a clarifying note. GretLomborg (talk) 05:31, 10 March 2020 (UTC) I think the suggestion that this is how Craig states "it" or that this is Craig's "original language" is misleading. Craig thinks that God is causally prior to the universe. But all he means by that is that God caused the universe. And he clearly thinks that there's more to God's priority than just this. I think this gets obscured if we just leave it at "he thinks God is causally but not temporally prior". How about something like "Craig thinks that God is prior to the universe in some sense that includes his causing the universe, but that God is not temporally prior to the universe, since Craig thinks that time came into existence with the universe." Shinealittlelight (talk) 10:40, 10 March 2020 (UTC) I think this might go a bit too far the other way and imply that the position is vaguer or that Craig is less certain or incoherent. "In some sense" implies (imo) that the position he holds is somewhat undefined. But the quote offered wasn't quite like that, it was more that a full description of God's state absent the universe was difficult to convey, in part because it is so different from our experience, not that God's relationship to the universe was undefined. Given that we are talking specifically about Craig's discussion of God's temporal nature here I think we are fine with simply discussing the temporal aspects of that description here with the clarifier that "before" refers to causation. I like the idea of adding the more expansive version as a note. Shine, if you are ok with that full formulation, I think we are good to move on. Squatch347 (talk) 10:26, 11 March 2020 (UTC) I'm not clear on the proposal. I like the current draft. What specifically are you proposing to change? Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:09, 11 March 2020 (UTC) The proposal is that we keep Craig's original language and then add the following mouse-over note: When Craig says that God is timeless "prior to" the creation of time, the relevant notion of priority is not supposed to be temporal, as there is no time temporally prior to the first moment of time. Rather, Craig means to suggest that God is prior to time in some non-temporal sense that is difficult to specify, and which involves the idea that God was the cause of the universe. Several philosophers have argued that Craig's notion of non-temporal priority is not clear. I like it, although I think the last sentence should be sourced. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 03:04, 14 March 2020 (UTC) Ok, I took a stab at it, but as I've noted, Wiki formatting is not my forte. If anyone could improve upon it, that would be helpful. Additionally, Shine if you have the full references for the citations, I'll update with those as well. Once that is done, I think we are ready for Steven review. Squatch347 (talk) 11:55, 19 March 2020 (UTC) Good Morning everyone, I hope you had a good Easter and are surviving the quarantine. I'd like to see if anyone had issues with this version and ask @Steven Crossin: for a review/incorporation if not. Squatch347 (talk) 10:41, 13 April 2020 (UTC) Looks good to me. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 03:10, 15 April 2020 (UTC) Published Squatch347 (talk) 11:02, 22 April 2020 (UTC)

Resurrection of Jesus

Draft 1 Implemented

Draft 1 Resurrection of Jesus Craig has written two volumes arguing for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus (1985) and Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (3rd ed., 2002). In the former volume, Craig describes the history of the discussion, including David Hume's arguments against the identification of miracles. The latter volume is an exegetical study of the New Testament material pertinent to the resurrection. Craig structures his arguments for the historicity of the resurrection under 3 headings: The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his female followers on the Sunday after his crucifixion. Various individuals and groups experienced appearances of Jesus alive after his death. The earliest disciples came to believe that God had raised Jesus from the dead despite strong predispositions to the contrary. Craig argues that the best explanation of these three events is a literal resurrection He applies an evaluative framework developed by philosopher of history C. Behan McCullagh to examine various theoretical explanations proposed for these events. From that frame work, he rejects alternative theories such as Gerd Lüdemann's hallucination hypothesis, the conspiracy hypothesis, and Heinrich Paulus or Friedrich Schleiermacher’s apparent death hypothesis as lacking explanatory scope, explanatory power, and sufficient historical knowledge. References I began with the preferred version draft and cut out some of the fluff. I've added a source and referenced a more accurate list of the alternative hypotheses discussed. Squatch347 (talk) 13:28, 30 April 2020 (UTC) Hello all. I was invited to contribute to this mediation workshop by Squatch347 after my contributions to the main talk page. As far as I know, that's all that's needed for me to comment here, but please correct me on this if I've missed something out. I quite like Draft 1 and prefer it to the current version. One improvement I can think of is to set a clearer boundary between paragraphs 1 and 2. The section beginning, "Craig summarizes the relevant evidence ...", may be misconstrued as an elaboration of the preceding paragraph, whereas it actually references different sources. How about: "Craig structures his arguments for the historicity of the resurrection under 3 headings."? Instead of "stated facts", perhaps more encyclopedically neutral terminology could be used. The sentence could be written: "He applies an evaluative framework developed by philosopher of history C. Behan McCullagh[8] to examine various theoretical explanations proposed for these events." Watchman21 (talk) 20:34, 30 April 2020 (UTC) Good suggestions, updated. Squatch347 (talk) 12:57, 1 May 2020 (UTC) Implemented Squatch347 (talk) 10:55, 13 May 2020 (UTC)

Draft 1

Divine Aseity Craig has published on the challenge posed by platonism to divine aseity or self-existence. Craig rejects both the view that God creates abstract objects and that they exist independently of God. Rather, he defends a nominalistic perspective that abstract objects are concepts rather than ontologically real objects. Stating that the Quine–Putnam indispensability thesis is the chief support of platonism, Craig criticizes Willard Van Orman Quine's naturalized epistemology and confirmational holism, rejecting the idea that using a concept like the number “1” commits you to believing that a thing called “1” actually exists independent of the objects you are referencing. Craig favors a more neutral interpretation of the use of concepts like formal quantifiers of first-order logic where a statement can be true, even if there isn’t an object it is referencing. Craig gives the example of the statement “the price of the ticket is ten dollars” which he argues can still be a true statement even if there isn’t an actual object called a “price.” <He defines these references as a speech act rather than a word-world relation, so that singular terms may be used in true sentences without commitment to corresponding objects in the world. Craig has additionally argued that even if one were to grant that these references were being used as in a word-world relation, that fictionalism is a more coherent explanation of their use; in particular pretense theory, according to which statements about abstract objects are expressions of make-believe, imagined to be true, though literally false.

References

• I've tried to make this section more approachable. I think the current version is far to full of jargon and reliance on external wiki references to understand the sentences. Hopefully I've made this entry a bit more accessible without losing any relevant meaning. I've also added a couple of secondary sources to provide a bit more balance. Squatch347 (talk) 10:45, 17 June 2020 (UTC)

• Hey all, I’ve been AWOL for some time and am now back. Have seen you have all been making some good progress without me, which is really positive. How are things going? Steven Crossin ^{Help resolve disputes!} 21:42, 19 June 2020 (UTC)

Hi Steven, hope everything is going well. While you've been out we added a member who was interested from the talk page. I thought that would be ok since there was only light activity here. Luckily, I think we are into the least controversial sections so that might have prompted the drop off. Glad you are back, looking forward to your input. Squatch347 (talk) 12:05, 22 June 2020 (UTC)

Pending any thoughts on this, I'd like to post it this week. Squatch347 (talk) 11:57, 6 July 2020 (UTC)