Talk:Operation Cyclone

Violation of NPOV in background

The first link cited in the "Background" section is to a Christopher Hitchens article titled: "The latest absurdities to emerge from Jimmy Carter's big, smug mouth." Hardly an NPOV, authoratative source. --82.32.130.14 (talk) 07:29, 12 September 2012 (UTC)

broken link

the link for the first footnote does not work

Repaired. --Fastboy (talk) 12:59, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

See 2409:40F2:2044:CDAC:8000:0:0:0 (talk) 16:17, 24 October 2024 (UTC)

Not enough about Charlie's contributions...

It looks like from this article that it was Carter and Brzezinski were responsible for the funding and getting the Israeli's involved. Whereas it was really Charlie Wilson who was mainly responsible for increasing the funding 100 fold by 1987 and for getting the Israelis, Egyptians, and Pakistanis to facilitate the arms sales/movement. Yeah, Carter and Brzezinski got the ball rolling in '79, but after that, they had really nothing to do with the escalating conflict. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.83.247.217 (talk) 03:19, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Agree. Some details with sources are given in the article Charles Wilson (Texas politician).--Fastboy (talk) 05:48, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Do not know if you can use 2007 Movie "Charlie Wilson's War" or not, that would give you some basic information.Nakamuradavid (talk) 09:53, 2 November 2017 (UTC)

Not enough (nothing) about Reagan's contributions...

There is absolutely no mention of Reagan in this article, which I find odd. He was President during a majority of Operation: Cyclone's duration, so he would have had to sign off on most of this. O:C is mentioned in the Reagan Doctrine wiki article; Reagan is mentioned in "blowback" and how his funding of Afghani fighters helped create the Taliban.

But no mention here.

Then again, there was no mention of Charlie Wilson in this article unil a week or so after the Tom Hanks movie came out. Maybe we just need a movie about (not starring) Reagan before this article will get up to speed. Ynot4tony2 (talk) 17:29, 3 December 2008 (UTC)

No source about the codename Cyclone

I'm troubled that there is virtually no source about the codename "Cyclone". I have read some documentation about the CIA covert program (such as Milt Bearden The Main enemy, Steve Coll Ghost Wars), I never came across this name. Are you sure it is not a big hoax ? Rob1bureau (talk) 23:53, 6 August 2010 (UTC)

Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2013). The Secret War in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, China and the Role of Anglo-American Intelligence. New York: I.B. Tauris. p. 153. ISBN 978-1-78076-419-1.

The programme of aid to the Mujahedeen, code-named ‘Operation Cyclone’, continued until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Jo1971 (talk) 15:09, 12 September 2020 (UTC)

The name CIA Operation Cyclone was Random (somebody selected a nice sounding name). Just like 2001 CIA Operation Hotel California (named after the Eagles 1977 Song); as also random the 2002 U.S. Military Operation Hotel California (also named after the Eagles 1977 Song); confusing considering I was involved with both.

In later years, 2009 after Democrat President Obama became U.S. President in order to attempt to embarrass the Republican President G.W. Bush Administration, Democrat President Obama as Commander In Chief Ordered the U.S. Department of Defense to do the President Obama "Transparency" as the Democrat President Obama Political Appointees to the U.S. Department of Defense started marking everything "Declassified", without even Redacting the Personal Information (Names, Ranks/Grades, Social Security Numbers, Home of Record Addresses, etc.). Doing this only did the opposite as proved that Democrat President Clinton's Actions caused the Osama Bin Laden 1993 World Trade Center Bombings; and the Osama Bin Laden second attack of the World Trade Center as the 9/11 2001 Attacks. Democrat President Clinton's 1993 to 2001 Destruction of the U.S. Defense left the U.S. Deaf and Blind to the Events leading up to the First World Trade Center Attacks, lost Osama Bin Laden after the First Attack 1993, as there were no longer any U.S. Funded Local Intelligence Assets Worldwide, the U.S. was Deaf and Blind to the Events leading up to the Second Osama Bin Laden World Trade Center Attacks as there were no U.S. Funded Local Afghan Intelligence Assets at the Taliban's Afghanistan.

My Name, Rank/Grade, Social Security Number, etc. were all available under the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) pertaining to my involvement with the U.S. Military Teams sent to the Iran Iraq Wars; and later rotated to CIA Operation Cyclone; after Democrat President Obama's minions Declassified the After Action Reports. I stopped this as a Violation of the U.S. Law, Personal Information Protection Act. Nakamuradavid (talk) 04:44, 31 March 2017 (UTC)

Need a Reference

This section at the end, under "Criticism":

"(It is estimated that 35,000 foreign Muslims from 43 Islamic countries participated in the war). Additionally, the close relationships and cooperation established during the 1980s between the mujahideen and Pakistan's intelligence and military services, as well as the presence of mujahideen training bases on Pakistani soil, ultimately led to the infiltration of the Pakistani security services by militant Islamic elements as well as the de facto takeover of northwest Pakistan by pro-Taliban rebels."

Where is/are the reference(s) for this? This very much needs to be accurately footnoted.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.219.187.126 (talk) 22:24, 26 September 2010 (UTC)

The actual numbers of Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen was 20,000 to 50,000. After the U.S. Abandoned the U.S. Ally Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen about 5 Million Pro U.S.S.R. Afghans returned from the U.S.S.R. backed Muslim Nation of Iran, became the 1990s Afghan Taliban Fully Supported by the U.S.S.R. Muslim Nation of Iran and easily massacred most of the 1980s Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen abandoned by the U.S.. Democrat Congressman, Charlie Wilson would state, "We Fucked Up the End Game"; as the U.S. since the 1950s had built up U.S. Ally Afghanistan into a 20th Century Nation and then after CIA Operation Cyclone U.S. Congress refused to assist our U.S. Ally the Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen Rebuild War Torn Afghanistan; leaving Afghanistan ready for the Pro U.S.S.R. Afghans to Return after being "Radicalized" at the Muslim Nation of Iran and Take Power of Afghanistan; massacred about a Million Afghans as "Collaborators to the Christians, Jews, Unbelievers"; started destroying anything not Islamic.

In 2001 shortly after the 9/11 2001 Attacks, Republican President Bush sent Teams of CIA with attached U.S. Special Warfare to attempt CIA Operation Neptune Spear as Locate and Capture Osama Bin Laden. This is when it was found out that most of the 20,000 to 50,000 Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen were massacred along with their Families, Relatives, Friends, etc. during the 1990s Afghan Taliban Purges. The First attempt of Republican President G.W. Bush's CIA Operation Neptune Spear Failed, as the Democrat President Clinton 1993 to 2001 Destruction of the U.S. Defense left the U.S. without any U.S. Funded Local Intelligence Assets Worldwide, so there were no Afghan Intelligence Assets to assist the CIA Teams to get to safe locations while evading the Millions of Afghan Taliban, assist in locating Osama Bin Laden, provide Logistics Support and On the Ground Real Time Intelligence. With this Failure, the Mission was then changed to the Overthrow of the Afghan Taliban Government, Eliminate those Responsible or had Supported the 9/11 2001 Attacks, later discussed and written about by Doug Stanton "Horse Soldiers of 9/11".

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=arxKhJIjIiY

A Documentary would be later made by Alex Quad as

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p7YD5KVszRY

Some other criticisms I have, After the U.S.S.R. 40th Army found out about the use of the U.S. FIM 92 "Stinger" Anti Aircraft Missiles the U.S.S.R. equipped all of their Aircraft (including Mi-24 Attack Helicopters) with an Electronic Counter Measure (E.C.M.) Pod that broadcasted the "Friendly" Signal to the FIM-92 Stinger Missiles Identification Friend or Foe (I.F.F.) rendering the FIM-92 Stinger Missile Useless, it was later on that a cheap fix was attempted of installing a automotive (weatherproof) switch from Radio Shack to allow the FIM-92 to still engage and launch. Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence Agency did NOT train the 1980s Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen, U.S. Army Special Forces (Foreign Internal Defense Mission, and Insurgency Warfare) attached to the CIA's SAD and SOG at the Afghan Refugee Camps at Pakistan did, handed out Motorola Radios, used new Zenith Laptop Computers using MS DOS and a DB (Data Base) to record all personal data of all trained, Polaroid Photos, after training and arming them, they would go across the border to Afghanistan, then they would kill each other due to decades long feuds and revenge, so we ended up leading them into Afghanistan to do small unit tactics, rally into larger units to conduct coordinated ambushes, raids. One of the successful raids resulted in us getting 100s of U.S.S.R. SA-7 Anti Aircraft Missiles, we then placed explosives while taking lots of U.S.S.R. plastic explosives with us, that U.S.S.R. Depot blew up killed about 47 U.S.S.R. and continued exploding for over 25 minutes. The SA-7s we took did not have a IFF to stop a launch, were more like the U.S. FIM-43. Ironically, the U.S. President at the time announced on Television that U.S. Military were not actively participating in the Afghan Conflict (we were disavowed). To completely negate the FIM-92 Anti Aircraft Missiles the U.S.S.R. used lots of aircraft flares, their Attack Helicopter (Mi-24s) flew near Nap Of the Earth at high speed.

During CIA Operation Cyclone, our Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen constructed inside mountain cities, some even had a full sized mosque. Ever since the days of the Egyptian Pharaohs, everybody was doing lots of Mining to get precious gems, gold, silver, from Afghanistan, this left hundreds of thousands of miles of mining tunnels with airshafts, we used these during CIA Operation Cyclone. The Afghan Civilians during the U.S.S.R.'s 40th Army's Total War, used these thousands of miles of tunnels (NOT "Caves") to live in, there were very deep underground lakes with fast moving streams (that eventually led to the interconnected Afghan water wells).

Not mentioned in the Near Arctic Afghan Winters especially at the High Altitude Hindu Kush and Pamir Mountain Ranges, the Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen were mostly "Warm Weather Fighters", just before Winter they gathered up lots of food, animal food, and stopped fighting and went into "Winter Quarters" at Afghan Villages. This made it very easy for the U.S.S.R.'s Special Forces Spetsnaz to hunt them down and kill them, they then started living in the thousands of miles of mining tunnels that from the outside look like "caves". http://archive.defense.gov/dodcmsshare/photoessay/2013-05/hires_130514-D-NI589-010.jpg

https://www.amazon.com/Afghanistan-Cave-Complexes-1979-2004-strongholds/dp/184176776X

https://farm4.staticflickr.com/3420/3251341692_bcfd2779bd.jpg

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/images/ik_darunta_tunnels1_an.jpg

Built during the Pro U.S. Afghan Muhajeen, later occupied by Osama Bin Laden

http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/2002image/netherpopup.gif

Yes, my life sucked being involved with the above Nakamuradavid (talk) 05:12, 31 March 2017 (UTC)

NPOV, References and Writing Styled for an Encyclopedia

"Moreover, U.S. support for the mujahideen enabled and prolonged their resistance to the Soviet presence, ultimately resulting in thousands of battle-hardened, radicalized, non-Afghan veterans returning to their home countries and forming the core of what is now referred to as Al Qaeda..." Who let prisonplanet forum commenter edit this? Rhetorical, as it comes with being a wiki. I am not saying that style and writing is to be completely dry and monolithic, but stuff like this is what the title of this discussion section decribes perfectly. Fixing it. 68.193.125.131 (talk) 18:03, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Agree. this article is a good example of when an attempt to "make a point" gets in the way of telling the story in a clear and concise manner. however it would take an enormous amount of work to de-tangle and fix it. Decora (talk) 19:44, 22 April 2012 (UTC)

Interview by Le Nouvel Observateur

Based on information from here: The Brzezinski Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur (1998):

Original interview:

• "Les Révélations d'un Ancien Conseilleur de Carter: 'Oui, la CIA est Entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes...'". Le Nouvel Observateur (in French). Paris: 76. January 15–21, 1998.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)

Translation into English by William Blum and David N. Gibbs:

• Gibbs, David N (2000). "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect" (PDF). International Politics. 37 (2). Palgrave Macmillan: 233–245. doi:10.1023/A:1009810614470.

On-line version:

• Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. President Carter's National Security Adviser

Brzezinski discussing interview:

• Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2. The Real News. Jan 15, 2010.

-- Petri Krohn (talk) 03:44, 29 March 2012 (UTC)

@Timesarechanging:- Your use of the The Real News Brzezinski interview is problematic. In the interview, the Real news interviewer misquotes the original Brzezinski interview stating "there's a famous interview you gave to a French paper where you talked about the decision to advise Jimmy Carter to arm the jihadists in Afghanistan against the communist government of Afghanistan. And you're quoted as saying that this would help induce or would lead to the Soviets intervening in Afghanistan, which might lead to their Vietnam." - Which is not an accurate reflection of the what Brzezinski says in the original interview. He responds by saying (rightly) that the quote put to him is not accurate: "there are two different aspects here that are kind of connected..."

The Real news interviewer is conflating several issues. Firstly Carter's decision in July 1979 was officially not to arm the mujahadin, it was to support them financially. Second, If you look at the original interview the comment about inducing a Soviet intervention is made in relation to Carter's July 1979 decision to support the Mujahedin, the "Soviet Vietnam" remark is made in relation to the December 1979 invasion. Brzezinski is quite right that the Real news interviewer has not quoted the original interview correctly, but you are using it in the article to claim that the original interview itself is not accurate (the admission of the misquote by the real news interviewer is discussed in the postscript of the the interview: "We took up Dr. Brzezinski’s challenge and first went to back to his interview with the French paper “Le Nouvel Observateur”, and sure enough, Dr. Brzezinski is correct, he didn’t make his Vietnam comment until after the Soviets invaded: The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.”"

I have to say your approach here seems odd. first you delete a high quality academic secondary source with the claim that it is "primary". Then, when the source is restored you add a primary source, using an interpretation of that primary source not supported by the source itself. I'm going to remove the source and material because firstly it is a primary source (history articles should be based on academic secondary literature) and secondly your interpretation of the source is not supported by the source itself Dlv999 (talk) 06:49, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Your focus on this alleged quote from a minor official is wildly undue, completely misleading, and shockingly ahistorical. First of all, nobody who has ever spoken with Carter administration officials gives this ludicrous Machiavellian conspiracy theory the slightest consideration. Moreover, Brzezinski's actual memos to the President at the time--which are declassified and publicly available--do not celebrate the Soviet intervention as a stroke of good fortune, but rather convey a sense of general alarm and panic at the thought of further Soviet incursions throughout the region. The claim that Brzezinski sought to "induce" a Soviet intervention is the product of sheer fantasy, a grotesque ideological invention Brzezinski explicitly disavows at the start of the Real News interview. And Brzezinski has repudiated the fake quote numerous times. See, for example, The Strategic Mind of Zbigniew Brzezinski: "For the record, Brzezinski later denied that he ever claimed that he had sent a note to Carter on July 3, 1979 stating that the aid would induce an intervention and has vehemently maintained that the French reporter did not accurately record that specific statement...In total, the presidential finding authorized only a little more than a half-million dollars to conduct these operations—-a paltry amount of money and assistance to charge that the administration intentionally attempted to "suck the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire." Nor is there any record to be found substantiating Le Nouvel Observateur's claim that Brzezinski had sent a note to the president on July 3 stating that the "aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention"....As Robert Gates would later recall, "No one in the Carter Administration wanted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan and no one, as I can recall atleast, ever advocated attempting to induce them to invade....Only after the Soviet invasion did some advocate making the Soviets 'bleed' in their own Vietnam."....Throughout 1979 it is clear that Zbigniew Brzezinski did not attempt to induce a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, at every conceivable turn he pressed Carter to be more forceful and assertive with Moscow to prevent an invasion, but his concerns obviously went unheeded....When Gates was later asked if he had any idea that disclosing this information in From the Shadows would create doubts as to the administration's true objectives, he responded: "No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily."....In reality, if the French reporter did not commit a journalistic error or plan a media ambush, most likely Brzezinski was practicing some type of audience-based ambiguity. Here, he could have made the decision to tell this one reporter that the administration set an "Afghan trap" for the Kremlin, with hopes that the story would serve to bolster his own role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The theory in this case, though, would have one believe that Brzezinski intentionally clouded the historical truth—-for one interview-—to reap the rewards, yet planned to later deny the whole story to insulate his reputation from the dark aspects associated with the millions of casualties that were incurred by the Afghani people. To be sure, this is highly unlikely....The Brzezinski memos to the president were almost certainly written in good faith and prove that Brzezinski did not want the Soviets to invade Afghanistan, although he was fairly certain that Moscow had made the decision to do so anyway." U.S. officials like Zbigniew Brzezinski, Walt Slocombe, David Aaron, Robert Gates, Leslie Gelb, Bob Shrum, Dennis Ross, Jim Mowrer, and Hedrick Smith have all dismissed the conspiracy myth, as have experts like Sir Lawrence Freedman, Steve Coll, and David Gibbs. It's simply not encyclopedic to allow one misquotation in a foreign paper to dominate the entire historiography of the war.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:36, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

I am simply accurately reporting what academic historians have published under established academic imprint on the topic of the article - that is standard practice for writing historical articles in Wikipedia. If you have sources of similar quality (academic historians published under academic imprint or in peer reviewed journals) that say something different then we should certainly add that as well. What you have produced so far does not merit inclusion. The Real News interview is a primary source and the interpretation you have made in the article is highly problematic as explained above. Brzezinski does not disavow the Le Nouvel Observateur quote, he disavows what the real news interviewer puts to him, which is a misquote of the Le Nouvel Observateur interview on two accounts: First the interviewer talks about arming the Muhjahadin in July 1979 (which does appear in the LNO interview) second he talks about the "Soviet Vietnam" comment in July 1979 (which is a misquote of the LNO interviewer). The Real News acknowledge the error in the post script of the article: "We took up Dr. Brzezinski’s challenge and first went to back to his interview with the French paper “Le Nouvel Observateur”, and sure enough, Dr. Brzezinski is correct, he didn’t make his Vietnam comment until after the Soviets invaded: The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.”" Brzezinski disavows what is said to him by the Real News interviewer, you are using it to claim that he disavows the original LNO interview - this is original research based on a primary source.

Master's thesis are not regarded as RS in Wikipedia so the only other source you have provided is not fit for inclusion. As for the list of names you say support your position you need to provide proper citations (date, publisher, page number) if you want them to be considered in this discussion. Dlv999 (talk) 06:36, 27 April 2013 (UTC)

At the start of the interview, Brzezinski is asked if he sought to "induce" the Soviets to intervene. He replied "No, that's not an accurate quote. I don't know what yours is based on." When asked about the LNO interview specifically, he stated: "As far as the French interview is concerned, it was not an interview but excerpts from an interview that was originally supposed to be published in full but which they never checked with me for approval in the form that it did appear." There's no OR involved. It's not a surprise that the translation process, coupled with the language barrier, produced this misquotation. Brzezinski never said anything even remotely comparable in any other interview, in his personal diary, or in his memos to the President. "Moreover, NIO Horelick, in his memo to DCI Tuner on April 5, had warned that there was a "risk that a substantial U.S. covert aid program could raise the stakes and induce the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended," and the administration followed his advice, approving on July 3 what can be characterized as the smallest acceptable package—-void of any lethal provisions." The thesis is useful because the author spoke with those officials. Finally, TRN interview should be used because no secondary source should ascribe false claims to a primary source.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 15:15, 27 April 2013 (UTC)

John Bernell White, Jr. interviewed Slocombe for his thesis. Here is what Slocombe said about the "Soviet Vietnam" quote: "Well, the whole idea was that if the Soviets decided to strike at this tar baby (Afghanistan) we had every interest in making sure that they got stuck. It would be costly to them. The Soviets would get a little sense of what it was like to be propping up an unpopular regime in the face of local opposition. Yes, it would be costly to them. It might discourage them from getting into anything in the future."TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 15:22, 27 April 2013 (UTC)

• Look at WP:RS: "Masters dissertations and theses are only considered reliable if they can be shown to have had significant scholarly influence." There is no evidence of this being cited by any other scholars. It is not RS and needs to be removed.
• Your interpretation of the Real News interview is highly problematic. Brzezinski is correct that what is put to him by the Real News interviewer is not an accurate quote of the Le Nouvel Observateur interview. But you are interpreting this as meaning the original Le Nouvel Observateur is not an accurate quote. It's WP:OR based on a primary source and it needs to go. Dlv999 (talk) 17:01, 27 April 2013 (UTC)

I'm open to expanding on the different motivations for arming the Mujahadeen. I am open to explaining the different interpretations historians have made of the Brzezinski interview. But please stop trying to introduce material from the master thesis (which is not RS) or the primary source interview (which is not RS for historical articles and involves a tenuous interpretations). Please find serious historical scholarship on the topic and cite that. Cheers, Dlv999 (talk) 22:08, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

As an attempt to try to come to some consensus, I suggest breaking the Brzezinski quote out of the background section, into a newly created section covering the motivation for support of the Mujahadin. There has been a lot published by both notable participants and by historians on the decision process and reasons behind it, so I think it would warrant a small section covering all significant views. My main concern is that we maintain sourcing standards for historical articles (see WP:HISTRS). Dlv999 (talk) 09:45, 10 May 2013 (UTC)

Here Brzezinski unambiguously states "I didn't say it was designed to prompt a Soviet invasion. That was a very sensationalized and abbreviated version of an interview."TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 23:56, 6 January 2014 (UTC)

A 2020 source from Oxford University Press definitively debunks this myth:

The French interview has had a major impact on the historiography, being used as the almost sole basis to prove the existence of a concerted effort to lure Moscow into the "Afghan trap." There are, however, significant problems with it as an historical source. First, the title is deceptive. It reads (in translation): "The revelations of a former adviser to Carter: 'Yes, the CIA came into Afghanistan before the Russians ...'" Quotation marks and ellipsis indicate that this is a direct quote from Brzezinski and implies CIA operations inside Afghanistan before December 1979, which does not fit with the historical record. Although insisting on the accuracy of the interview, the journalist has since conceded that the quote in the title was not actually from Brzezinski but was "invented" by the editors, which casts doubt on the subsequent text. Secondly, the published remarks were heavily edited and Brzezinski has denied the article's accuracy on numerous occasions, asserting that it was "not an interview, but excerpts from an interview that was originally supposed to be published in full but which they never checked with me for approval in the form that it did appear." It is also likely a casualty of translation—being conducted in English, translated and printed in French, and reconverted to English—with the original statements becoming skewed and distorted in their edited and translated form. Additionally, many of the interview's claims are unsupported by documentary evidence. For example, Brzezinski has denied he ever sent a note claiming the covert aid would "lead to a Soviet military intervention," and no such note, nor references to it, has ever been found. Nowhere else has Brzezinski ever referred to a systematic plan for the "Afghan trap" and neither in his subsequent actions, writings, interviews, or public remarks on the topic has he shown any satisfaction that his strategy had worked. It is highly questionable that Brzezinski would attempt to bolster his reputation and disclose information on a secret plan to ensnare Moscow in an Afghan quagmire in just one foreign interview and then subsequently and repeatedly deny it. The editing, translation, inventions, and lack of final approval and corroborating documentation generates doubts on the accuracy of the words attributed to Brzezinski and, ultimately, if this one unreliable interview is discounted there is very little legitimate evidence to back up the "trap" thesis.

See: Tobin, Conor (April 2020). "The Myth of the "Afghan Trap": Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979". Diplomatic History. 44 (2). Oxford University Press: 238–239. doi:10.1093/dh/dhz065.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 23:59, 5 January 2022 (UTC)

link doesn't work

The link for citation 41 doesn't work anymore. I don't think the page exists anymore because I couldn't even get to usinfo.state.gov (the link goes to an archived article there). --100.0.38.136 (talk) 03:31, 5 December 2014 (UTC)

False flag operations

TheTimesAreAChanging it was a False flag operations, why did you reverted the edit?--Setareh1990 (talk) 07:05, 6 July 2015 (UTC)

Honestly, I guess it depends on how broad the definition of "false flag" is. That the Afghan rebels received external assistance was widely known at the time, not a closely-guarded secret.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 16:07, 6 July 2015 (UTC)

Orphaned references in Operation Cyclone

I check pages listed in Category:Pages with incorrect ref formatting to try to fix reference errors. One of the things I do is look for content for orphaned references in wikilinked articles. I have found content for some of Operation Cyclone's orphans, the problem is that I found more than one version. I can't determine which (if any) is correct for this article, so I am asking for a sentient editor to look it over and copy the correct ref content into this article.

Reference named "nsarchive.gwu.edu":

• From Bay of Pigs Invasion: "Top Secret CIA 'Official History' of the Bay of Pigs: Revelations". Archived from the original on 16 April 2016. Retrieved 2016-07-15. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
• From Soviet–Afghan War: Steve Galster "AFGHANISTAN: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1973-1990" National Security Archive, October 9, 2001

I apologize if any of the above are effectively identical; I am just a simple computer program, so I can't determine whether minor differences are significant or not. AnomieBOT⚡ 02:23, 24 January 2017 (UTC)

Reasons for Carter's response & the Stinger effect

Some minor comments regarding the article:

• The article refers to the reasons for the Carter administration to start the operation in the first place only superficially. From my perspective the article should include some sentences regarding the detorating US-Soviet relationship in the 1970s, mainly about the interventions in Angola and on the Horn of Africa and the effect on the US perception on Soviet intensions. See for instance:

Mitchell, Nancy (2010). Leffler, Melvyn P.; Westad, Odd Arne (eds.). The Cold War and Jimmy Carter. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 87–88. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521837217.005. ISBN 978-110760231-1.

• It's highly contested if the delivery of the Stingers really was decisive for the Soviet withdrawal. Gorbachev mentioned in an interview, the Stinger did not influence the decision. For more details see section The Reagan administration's offensive in the German article: https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=de&tl=en&u=https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone (translation is not perfect though) and https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2002-01-01/stinging-rebukes.

Jo1971 (talk) 21:23, 28 June 2021 (UTC)

End Year

I think the end year of the operation should be 1991 not 1989.

Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2013). The Secret War in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, China and the Role of Anglo-American Intelligence. New York: I.B. Tauris. p. 153. ISBN 978-1-78076-419-1.

The programme of aid to the Mujahedeen, code-named ‘Operation Cyclone’, continued until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Coll, Steve (2005). Ghost Wars. The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Books. p. 233. ISBN 978-0-14-303466-7.

The CIA’s legal authority to conduct covert action in Afghanistan effectively ended on January 1, 1992.

Kalinovsky, Artemy M. (2011). A Long Goodbye. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. p. 201. ISBN 978-0-674-05866-8.

The failure of the August coup in Moscow, whose plotters sought to arrest the USSR’s disintegration by sidelining the reformers, had immediate repercussions for the Afghan problem. Only days before, Nikolai Kozyrev, who had been Moscow’s chief negotiator at the Geneva talks and was still active in Afghan matters as an ambassador-at-large, had restated the Soviet position for “negative symmetry plus”—a guarantee that not only the United States but other parties like Saudi Arabia would cease supplying arms to the resistance. Then on September 13, 1991, after a meeting between James Baker and the new Soviet foreign minister, Boris Pankin, the United States and the USSR signed an agreement to halt arms supplies to the belligerents and issued a statement confirming the right of the Afghan people to decide their own destiny without outside interference.

Plokhy, Serhii (2014). The Last Empire. The Final Days of the Soviet Union. New York: Basic Books. pp. 202–203. ISBN 978-0-465-04671-3.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin were as friendly to the American visitor as their subordinates and the leaders of the republics were. Baker was eager to return to the American precoup agenda and push for things that President Bush had not managed to obtain from Gorbachev at the Moscow summit. With the Baltics finally free, these included canceling Soviet aid to the Moscow-backed regimes in Afghanistan and Cuba. “Given the highly uncertain Soviet future,” recalled Baker, “we were in even more of a hurry to ‘lock in’ gains then and there.” He made it apparent to Gorbachev and Yeltsin that American economic aid depended on the withdrawal of Soviet support for Cuba and Afghanistan. “They jumped at my offer, and indeed were almost competitive in trying to be cooperative,” wrote Baker in his memoirs. Gorbachev, who no longer represented the Communist Party, told the American secretary of state, “Yes, we spent eighty-two billion dollars on ideology.” Baker was amazed when Gorbachev agreed not only to terminate Soviet aid to Cuba but also to announce his decision at the joint press conference they were about to hold in the Kremlin. This was done without consulting Fidel Castro. It was a major coup for American foreign policy: all Soviet army servicemen were to be withdrawn from Cuba, and aid would be cut off as of January 1, 1992. The same deadline was set for the ending of Soviet aid to Afghanistan. Upon hearing Baker’s request, Yeltsin responded, “I will tell Gorbachev to do it.” 

If nobody complains, I would change it. --Jo1971 (talk) 15:10, 5 January 2022 (UTC)

Carter July 1979 Findings

According to historian Conor Tobin, Carter signed on July 3, 1979 two findings with an amount of up to $695,000. I guess Conor Tobin is here more up to date. His information is based on the 2018 release of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan. So I would suggest to update the information in this article (probably removing the other references?).

Tobin, Conor (April 2020). "The Myth of the "Afghan Trap": Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979". Diplomatic History. 44 (2): 248–249. doi:10.1093/dh/dhz065.

On July 3, Carter signed two findings. The first provided authorization to “support insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establish radio access to the Afghan population through third country facilities”; and “provide unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to Afghan insurgents, either in the form of cash or nonmilitary supplies.” The second authorized the tasking or encouragement of “the network of agents or other contacts in foreign countries to provide nonattributable propaganda, or related actions” to “expose the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its leadership as despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union,” and to “publicize efforts by the Afghan insurgents to regain their country’s sovereignty.” The CIA was authorized to expend up to $695,000, of which $575,000 was drawn by mid-August. Officers from the Near East South Asia Division imported cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), who then distributed them to the insurgents. Unilateral assets also separately transferred funds into Afghanistan and to exiles abroad.

And Carter signed another finding on November 7. pp 250–251:

On October 4 Brzezinski and Turner “discussed the Afghan situation.” Noting that the funds authorized in July had been dispersed, Brzezinski “suggested we come in for more.” Turner countered that “all the signs were that only arms were really wanted at this point.” Nonetheless, Turner urged the Directorate of Operations to “get moving in providing more financial support, communications and other help to the insurgents,” and requested proposals for supplementary aid. They responded with “several enhancement options” that “followed . . . naturally on the actions that had already been undertaken as a result” of the July findings. These included an approach to Saudi intelligence to provide coordinated support and funding for the insurgency; tactical military communications equipment (transceivers and walkie-talkies) for the insurgents via Pakistan or Saudi Arabia; $772,000 in funds for the Pakistanis to purchase lethal military equipment for the insurgents; and a comparable amount of lethal equipment provided directly from CIA stocks for distribution to insurgents via Pakistan. These options were taken up by the SCC on October 23. [...] Carter’s “preference” was to “have the consultations with the Saudis (& perhaps Paks) first” before committing to a finding, and Brzezinski directed Turner to “take soundings with Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies on their intentions for covert action.” [...] As a result, Turner recommended Carter sign the amended finding and that the CIA be authorized to inform Riyadh that Washington expects “them to put up at least as much.” Carter did so on November 7.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan, eds. David Zierler (Washington: Government Publishing Office, 2018), Document 76.

A 3 July 1979 Presidential Finding authorized CIA to expend up to $695,000 to support the Afghan insurgents, either unilaterally or through third countries, by providing cash or non-military supplies; and also authorized CIA propaganda operations in support of the insurgency. At the time the SCC discussed this proposal, it was agreed that consideration would be given in the future to increased support should circumstances indicate additional funds were warranted.

--Jo1971 (talk) 16:30, 5 January 2022 (UTC)

Wrong date?

"In the mid-1970s, Pakistani intelligence officials began privately lobbying the U.S. and its allies to send material assistance to the Islamist insurgents. " The Saur Revolution didn't occur until 1978, so what insurgents were to be supplied in the "mid 1970s"? Is this a typo, or is this a claim that the Islamist insurgency pre-dated the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and had originally been against the Republic of Afghanistan? Iapetus (talk) 14:41, 7 March 2022 (UTC)

As explained at Inter-Services Intelligence activities in Afghanistan#The beginnings : a response to Afghan interference: The ISI backed a failed revolt against Daoud in 1975, which was supported by Bhutto at the time and led by Massoud and Hekmatyar, in response to Daoud's support for Pashtun and Balochi separatists in Pakistan and his irredentist claims to territory defined as Pakistani under the Durand Line. However, I am not aware of any evidence that Pakistan solicited (much less received) U.S. support in this endeavor, nor that it continued to foment insurgency after Daoud backed down and recognized the Durand Line in 1976. While there is obvious continuity between the failed 1975 rebellion and later ISI operations in Afghanistan, for the purposes of this article I believe that the vague language intends to convey something closer to "late 1970s".TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 19:00, 7 March 2022 (UTC)

Amin a CIA agent?

User Skornezy removed an edit based on an academic source about U.S.-Afghan relations with the argument "Declassified documents substantiate the relationship between Amin and US officials, including Blood". Ah what? That's a non-argument. Of course, it is relevant when Amin fueled Soviet fears by falsely telling them that Archer Blood had offered aid if Soviet troops were withdrawn. If you don't provide a better argument I will reinstate my edit. --Jo1971 (talk) 19:30, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you mean by "non-argument." That Amin secretly met with U.S. officials, sought to improve relations with the U.S. and, and distance himself from the USSR is all substantiated by publicly available U.S. documents, the testimony of contemporary Soviet officials, and scholarly commentary. There's nothing "false" about it.

In a later interview, Archer Blood, the U.S. chargé d'affaires who met with Amin, said that he told Amin that "he couldn't expect any resumption of aid until he could satisfy us about their role in [Ambassador Adolph Dubs's] death," i.e., the U.S. could resume aid to Afghanistan should Amin fulfill a few qualifiers. Regardless of whether or not the U.S. actually planned on resuming aid to the Amin government, it did tacitly offer to. Skornezy (talk) 20:19, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

You did not comment on why you think the fact that Amin falsely told the Soviets that the U.S. promised aid when Soviet troops were withdrawn fueling Soviet suspicions is irrelevant. --Jo1971 (talk) 20:36, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Is English your second language? I'm not exactly sure what you're trying to say. The U.S. did tacitly offer aid to Amin, that's not "false." Skornezy (talk) 21:01, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Did they offer aid on the condition of Soviet troop removal as Amin told the Soviets? --Jo1971 (talk) 21:08, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

References

Number of foreign fighters

The article says that "as many as 35,000 'Arab-Afghans' may have received military training in Pakistan". When I add another estimate of the number of foreign fighters deviating significantly (10,000), user Skornezy removes this as "not relevant". Seriously? --Jo1971 (talk) 22:15, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Receiving training is different than taking part in the fighting. The number of Afghan Arabs who fought in the war is not relevant to "Allegations of CIA assistance to bin Laden," but is relevant to Afghan Arabs. Skornezy (talk) 22:21, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

It's not the number of fighters taking part in the fighting. It's an estimate of all foreign fighters and is of course relevant. --Jo1971 (talk) 22:26, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

"Foreign fighters" = "the number of fighters taking part in the fighting" ≠ the number "Receiving training."

Hope that helps. Skornezy (talk) 22:31, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Read the source. 10,000 is an estimate of the overall number of foreign fighters (the estimates of fighters really fighting are very low at 300 to 400 at the same time). And when he estimates 10,000 foreign fighters overall, a maximum of 10,000 foreign fighters could receive training in this estimate. Hope that helps. And most of the "fighters" never saw combat, so "Foreign fighters" = "the number of fighters taking part in the fighting" is completely wrong. --Jo1971 (talk) 22:38, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

This is circular. I reiterate my previous points. This is not relevant to "Allegations of CIA assistance to bin Laden." Skornezy (talk) 22:43, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

So you think if the overall estimate is at max. 10,000, more than 10,000 fighters could have received training? --Jo1971 (talk) 22:46, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

I think the number of 35,000 in the article is quite misleading when we compare it with more recent research by Thomas Hegghammer (he published a 500+ pages book about the Afghan Arabs in 2020). This is his estimate of the overall number of foreign fighters:

Author’s Best Estimate of the Number of Foreign Fighters in 1980s Afghanistan

	1979–1989	1979–1992
Arabs only	4,000	7,000
All foreign fighters	5,000	10,000

Most of the "fighters" did not have any military experience and the mujahideen were not particularly interested in people without military experience.

Part of the problem was Azzam’s insistence that any Arab military activity should occur under the supervision of the Afghan Mujahidin. He clung firmly to this principle, which made sense in theory. The Afghans were already waging war; surely the Arabs could just join them. In practice, however, the Afghans were not that interested in including Arabs, because the latter were few in number and poorly trained. In the accounts of Arab attempts to join the battlefield, there is a palpable reluctance on the Afghan side. As a result, some Arabs felt excluded, and in 1985 and early 1986 there was mounting dissatisfaction over the lack offi ghting opportunities.

The mujahideen even rejected the foreign "fighers".

However, because the Arabs were untrained, the Afghans did not let them participate. Azzam and his men were left waiting in Miranshah for the two days it took for Haqqani to retake the base. Usama Bin Ladin later said, “ We wanted to move, but they told us: we have sent brothers who are more qualifi ed than you, and who know the situation better, and they are physicallyfi ttofi nd out what the situation is like inside.”

So in reality, only a fraction took place in the fights.

In reality, the Arab role in evicting the Soviet Union was minuscule. It suffices to look at the numbers. The Afghan Mujahidin counted between 175,000 and 250,000 men, while the number of Arabs who arrived before the announcement of the Soviet withdrawal (February 1988) was at most 2,000. The Arabs were thus 1 percent of the fighting force at most, and that is being generous, because only a minority of those 2,000 Arabs ever fought. Abdallah Anas says only 300 people were permanently fighting in Afghanistan, and a former British intelligence officer put the number at 300–400.

And especially revealing are the casualties figures. Only 150 Arabs have been killed during the war (and most of them only at the end).

When we look at casualty figures, the contrast is even starker. Afghan Mujahidin deaths from 1979 through 1987 were in the order of 50,000–100,000. The number of Arabs killed in the same period was approximately fifty, that is, at most 0.06 percent of the combat deaths on the resistance side. If we include civilians, an estimated 875,000 Afghans lost their lives between 1978 and 1987 as a consequence of the war. To be sure, if we include the years 1988 and 1989, then the total number of Afghan Arabs rises to 7,000 and number of Arab deaths to around 150, but in this last phase the war was already won. Thus the claim that Afghan Arabs helped liberate Afghanistan borders on the preposterous.

Abdullah Anas later said “the truth requires that we admit that the Arabs … played a minor role; they were a drop in the ocean compared with the effort of the Afghans.”

So you think this is all irrelevant and we should stick with the pretty old estimate of 35,000 fighters being trained? --Jo1971 (talk) 23:30, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Right, that's all fascinating information, but none of those excerpts address "Allegations of CIA assistance to bin Laden." On the other hand, Ewens, writes that "it has been reckoned that as many as 35,000 'Arab-Afghans'" had "benefited indirectly from the CIA's funding, through the ISI and resistance organizations"; Ewens is directly addressing the topic of "Allegations of CIA assistance to bin Laden" and states that this is just the maximum number that has been suggested. Besides, Ewens and Hegghammer's contrasting conclusions are already addressed, and you're more than welcome to include Hegghammer's digits over at Afghan Arabs. Skornezy (talk) 23:51, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

So only Ewens old estimate is relevant, other numbers are irrelevant? --Jo1971 (talk) 23:54, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

References

Missing Washington Post article about US school-children indoctrination

Sorry, I do not have the time and abiity to check this and find the place where to integrate this. Hopefully someone familar with wikipedia can do this:

[Washington Post, 23 March 2002: “The United States spent millions of dollars to supply Afghan schoolchildren with textbooks filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings….The primers, which were filled with talk of jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as the Afghan school system’s core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the American-produced books,..”, (

“Advertisements, paid for from CIA funds, were placed in newspapers and newsletters around the world offering inducements and motivations to join the [Islamic] Jihad.” (Pervez Hoodbhoy, Peace Research, 1 May 2005) The CIA’s Islamist Terrorist Network http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/09/12/the-cia-islamist-terrorist-network.html http://www.zimbio.com/War+on+Terrorism/articles/KvQnCVIpzAH/Genesis+Islamic+Radicalism+Textbook+Project Mocvd (talk) 10:19, 15 November 2024 (UTC)