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Archive 1Archive 4Archive 5Archive 6Archive 7

Flag Listing on the table

The flags of belligerents in wars and battles on Wikipedia are listed by their country's significance in that operation. In Operation Barbarossa, Romania had more men, machines etc. than Italy and Hungary. They also launched their own offensives. Irondome, I'm sorry my respond took so long, I'm still new to Wikipedia and I'm still learning to navigate my way through here. Best regards, Thank you.

That's fine SF. I appreciate you coming to the page to discuss it. Regards Irondome (talk) 18:27, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

So how are we going to come to an agreement? Will we keep the page the way it is or will we change the flag listings? SiegerFlieger (talk) 01:03, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

We must wait for other editors input, SF. We will go with majority consensus and quality of argument. Irondome (talk) 00:17, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
Just looking at some other articles, here's what I see:

-- Norwegian Campaign: organized by prominence. -- Operation Overlord: unclear. -- Operation Uranus: most likely organized by prominence. -- Battle of the Bulge: organized by prominence. -- Battle of France: organized by prominence. -- Italian Campaign (World War II): organized by prominence.

Based on this (albeit limited) survey of WWII military articles, I would support listing them by prominence. It seems misleading, for example, in Tunisia Campaign, to put "Free France" as the first belligerent, just as placing Albania as the top belligerent in Balkan Campaign (World War II) might convey the wrong message. Just my two cents, let's see what others think. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 01:59, 19 May 2015 (UTC)

Also, it would definitely be a bit confusing if Finland was placed (in alphabetical order) ahead of Germany. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 02:00, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
Germany should obviously be listed first. Absolutely no doubt or question about that. I think we should list it per the countries who participated, both military and economically, the most. Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 21:46, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
No strong feelings either way. This subject has caused some controversy over at World War 2 though, I believe. Jonas and GAB may have a logical point here however. Irondome (talk) 22:04, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
I agree, not a very important factor overall. Frankly, I see no problem in just leaving it as it is. Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 00:02, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

I still support listing them by prominence. GeneralizationsAreBad made an excellent point. SiegerFlieger (talk) 13:06 May 2015 (UTC)

Hmmn, I don't see a problem in listing them by prominence. But how do we objectively measure their prominence? Number of troops contributed? Number of tanks and tankettes contributed? Number of casualties incurred? Farthest depth of penetration by end of 1941? The order of flags will change depending on which criteria we use. Personally I would say number of tanks is a good criteria, which will give the following order: Germany, Hungary, Romania, Finland, and the rest. Or number of personnel contributed, which will give: Germany, Romania, Finland, Hungary and the rest. EyeTruth (talk) 10:22, 25 May 2015 (UTC)
Very good point, EyeTruth. Tanks and personnel are both possible criteria, but the ranking is inherently subjective. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 12:38, 25 May 2015 (UTC)
If we are going to rearranged them, I suggest adding the countries in the order Nazi Germany defined their importance to Barbarossa. In that case, Romania would be second (after Germany itself) for their massive oil productions, Finland third for their military support, then Hungary and finally Slovakia. I'm sure you get the idea, what yall think? Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 18:52, 25 May 2015 (UTC)
I think that could work, providing we can source statements regarding how Germany saw its allies. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:26, 26 May 2015 (UTC)
Support that approach. Agree that good sources would reinforce that logic of ordering. Suggest we garner the sources here for discussion. The sound approach that Jonas suggests would be devalued without backup out there however, as it may be challenged as WP:OR by pedants. Irondome (talk) 00:35, 26 May 2015 (UTC)
The Hitler Strikes East source would support this order: Germany (1), Romania (2), Finland (3), Italy (4), Hungary (5), Slovakia (6). Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 11:24, 26 May 2015 (UTC)
Like Irondome already pointed out, it's a sound approach but very vulnerable to WP:OR. One of the reasons is that defining importance is very subjective. For example, by who's definition of importance do we follow? Hitler's? Himmler's? OKH's? OKW's? Because it can't be a generic "Nazi government", which was a collage of departments and individuals who sometimes can't even agree on what time of the day it is; unless we're talking of some official documents sanctioned by ministries or major offices in the Nazi government. I think it's a sound approach but its nitty-gritty may be far thicker than you think. EyeTruth (talk) 22:11, 26 May 2015 (UTC)
Well, like I said earlier, I would be okay with just leaving it as it is as I don't think it's of any real importance (notice GeneralizationsAreBad pointed out other articles have completely diverse ways of listing countries) and now per the points made in your recent message. If, however, there is a majority in favor of listing them by some sort of system, I would be happy to share my thoughts, but even in such a case, I believe my suggestion would be best, but then we're back to the same problem currently faced! Basically what I'm saying is if my suggestion (and source) is rejected per WP:OR, someone else has to come up with a new idea of listing the countries. Cheers, Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 23:47, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

If we do list them by prominence. I think we should list them by the country's support in the campaign. By that I mean which country launched separate offensives during Operation Barbarossa. Finland, and Romania had offensives where their Generals planned attacks. Therefore I would list it as Germany (1), Romania (2), Finland (3), Italy(4), Hungary(5), Slovakia(6). SiegerFlieger 12:51, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

Sounds good to me, what yall think? Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 13:46, 28 May 2015 (UTC)
I would place Finland at the bottom as a cobelligerent. Guidaw (talk) 17:38, 28 May 2015 (UTC)
I would use a more tenable criteria, one that doesn't require original synthesis or research. EyeTruth (talk) 17:54, 28 May 2015 (UTC)
Yeah, I would agree with User:EyeTruth on that. One only has to look at the endless debates and occasional bursts of edit-warring that World War II suffers from on the ordering of belligerents. If nothing else an agreed criteria that can be sourced will help keep the article stable. GA status can be lost through instability as we all know. Irondome (talk) 18:00, 28 May 2015 (UTC)
EyeTruth, in regard to your latest comment and proposal, do you have a suggested flag listing order? Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 12:22, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
No, none in particular. As I mentioned earlier, there are several easily quantifiable (and verifiable) criteria that can be used. Any of them will do, or some other that can do the job. EyeTruth (talk) 22:17, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
At least Romania should be behind Germany. Guidaw (talk) 22:40, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

I'd agree with Romania being behind Germany. I wouldn't put Finland as a co-belligerent though. Since even though they weren't part of the axis, they were pretty active in the operation. Also I agree with Guidaw. Romania should definitely be behind Germany. They were Germany's actual strongest European ally when you look at it. [[User:SiegerFlieger(talk) 14:49, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

Sorry I haven't contributed much recently, I've been over at No Gun Ri Massacre, trying to moderate that sticky situation. I have no really strong feelings about this, but I don't know if Finland's operations are considered as prominent as Romania's or Hungary's. We could always just use men and materiel to quantify, though. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 00:53, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
If we start listing non-Axis co-belligerents with Nazi Germany here then we need to list the USSR as a co-belligerent in starting WWII, no double standard exempting the USSR because Hitler attacked it later. Historically, Hitler maintained Stalin broke the alliance pact with his invasion of the Baltic states and Romania, but a different discussion. VєсrumЬаTALK 02:55, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
This is the article on Operation Barbarossa, in which the USSR was very much not Germany's co-belligerent. Nick-D (talk) 08:05, 2 June 2015 (UTC)
It would be quite funny, though, to see it displayed that way. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 18:48, 2 June 2015 (UTC)

I just looked at the Eastern Front wiki page and I liked the order used there. I think its misleading to see Germany, Romania, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the NDH for the whole front then see Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Finland for one operation, need I say it was the first operation. I think we should use the same order used for the Eastern Front wiki page. The axis countries all were consistent in troop numbers, tanks, planes and other equipment throughout the Eastern Front, therefore all countries were consistent in their significance in the Eastern Front. Also, when I say they were consistent I mean that a ratio was maintained. Germany always was the most committed, followed by Romania, Hungary etc. SiegerFlieger (talk) 07:16, 7 June 2015 (UTC)

Have We come to a conclusion for this yet gents? SiegerFlieger (talk) 10:19, 21 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.100.193.36 (talk)

Go ahead and rearrange it. If there is still a disagreement, then discussion will resume and more changes can still be made anytime. EyeTruth (talk) 17:32, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

Barnstar for You! EVERYONE!

The Good Article Barnstar
For your joint contributions and brilliant copyediting efforts in bringing this article to GA-status, I award you, EyeTruth, Delldot, GeneralizationsAreBad, Nick-D, Irondome, Hashi0707, P. S. Burton, MisterBee1966, Obenritter, and everyone else I forgot to mention this Barnstar! Awesome job, keep it up. :) Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 18:58, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
That is very kind of you Jonas, you have a generosity of spirit and a cheerful enthusiasm that has certainly not gone unnoticed by myself and I am sure others. Keep up the good work my friend! Simon or Irondome (talk) 19:12, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
Thank you very much Simon. Can only say I've also had a great deal of fun working with you too. Enjoy the rest of your weekend. :) Jonas Vinther • (speak to me!) 19:14, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
Thanks! It's been an absolute pleasure working with you all. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:56, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
Thanks man. Your fervour really rubbed off on us all. Keep doing your good work. EyeTruth (talk) 02:14, 17 May 2015 (UTC)
Vielen herzlichen Dank. Bleib ermutigt und....mach weiter so!--Obenritter (talk) 01:31, 25 June 2015 (UTC)

New caption image

In an effort to get this article featured, I've created a new collage for the caption image. Please fix any errors with the image. KevinNinja (talk) 01:27, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

They look great. Since you're also interested in getting the article to FA, you should check out the last A-Class Review and help out with some of the issues raised there wherever possible. EyeTruth (talk) 02:11, 19 October 2015 (UTC)
Will do, thanks.---- KevinNinja (talk) 10:56, 19 October 2015 (UTC)
As I mentioned on KevinNinja's talk page, the image is really nice and gives the article a better look. Good job. :) Jonas Vinther • (Click here to collect your price!) 17:32, 14 November 2015 (UTC)

Missing Army Group Center Army

The order of battle for Army Group Center is missing 2nd Army.

[1]

References

  1. ^ Slaughterhouse: The Handbook of the Eastern Front, Keith E. Bonn Editor, The Aberjona Press, 2005. Page 150, Armies.

Keith A. Peregrine98.228.56.2 (talk) 20:44, 21 November 2015 (UTC)

2nd Army went into action in July. EyeTruth (talk) 02:57, 23 November 2015 (UTC)

What the hell makes a good article?

Wikipedia: it's a joke right? I mean this is a good article? Yeah? yet it doesn't even mention that Erich Marcks did most of the ground work for the invasion. This is about as much as an encyclopedia as a collection of copy pastes stolen from books written by experts. However if the contributors are not clever this is the mess you get. 81.132.175.33 (talk) 19:45, 27 November 2015 (UTC)

Information icon Thank you for your suggestion. When you believe an article needs improvement, please feel free to make those changes. Wikipedia is a wiki, so anyone can edit almost any article by simply following the edit this page link at the top.
The Wikipedia community encourages you to be bold in updating pages. Don't worry too much about making honest mistakes—they're likely to be found and corrected quickly. If you're not sure how editing works, check out how to edit a page, or use the sandbox to try out your editing skills. New contributors are always welcome. You don't even need to log in (although there are many reasons why you might want to). Nick-D (talk) 21:02, 27 November 2015 (UTC)

Barbarossa

I once heard (can't name the source) the code name was also chosen cause Barbarossa means "red beard": Red Army = Barbarians. Reasonable to presume. There's no English Wiki of https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decknamen_deutscher_Milit%C3%A4roperationen_im_Zweiten_Weltkrieg — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.241.196.227 (talk) 13:40, 3 December 2015 (UTC)

Lead-in to War crimes section

Hi, I'd like to review the opening copy of this section. From the archive notes (e.g. Einsatzgruppen inclusion or Operation Barbarossa GA1), I see that Jonas Vinters had a hand in crafting some of these statements. He had now been banned from all topics related to Nazi Germany, so I'd like to revisit.

Original statement:

War crimes
The Soviet Union had not participated in the Geneva Conventions and therefore their troops could not rely on the protection the Conventions guaranteed soldiers during times of war.[1] Hitler called for the battle against the Soviet Union to be a "struggle for existence" and accordingly authorized crimes against Soviet prisoners of war. A Nazi memorandum from 16 July 1941, recorded by Martin Bormann, quotes Hitler saying, "The giant [occupied] area must naturally be pacified as quickly as possible; this will happen at best if anyone who just looks funny should be shot".[2][3]
Hitler issued the notorious Commissar Order, which called for all Soviet political commissars taken prisoner at the front to be shot immediately without trial.[1] German soldiers both willingly and unwillingly participated in these mass killings.[1]

Some of my concerns:

  • The Geneva ref is a book on Keitel - need something stronger or directly related to the topic of Barbarossa regulations re: POWs
  • Germany was a signatory to the 1929 convention, article 82 which states: "In case, in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall nevertheless remain in force as between the belligerents who are parties thereto." Scholars today seem to lean towards the binding interpretation in re treatment of Soviet POWs.
  • Even if we assume that Geneva convention did not apply, there were further international laws that protected the POWs. See War crimes of the Wehrmacht:
In September 1941, both Helmuth James von Moltke and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris wrote memos pointing out to the OKW that the order of July 17, 1941 was illegal under international law. In particular, both Moltke and Admiral Canaris noted that the German claim that Soviet POWs had no rights because the Soviet Union had not ratified the Geneva Convention was invalid as Germany had ratified the Geneva Convention and thus under international law was obliged to provide humane treatment for the POWs in its care.[4] In response, Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel wrote: "These scruples accord with the soldierly concepts of a chivalrous war! Here we are concerned with the extermination of an ideology. That is why I approve and defend this measure".[5]
  • Subtle word choices result in 'responsibility-minimizing'. For example, it was OKW that issued the Commissar Order, not Hitler (and both OKW and OKH had a hand in drafting and reviewing). "Struggle for existence" language was followed by "war of annihilation / extermination" (not included here).

Here's some of the content I contributed to the Commissar Order article:

The Commissar Order was an order issued by the German High Command (OKW) on 6 June 1941 before Operation Barbarossa. Its official name was Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars (Richtlinien für die Behandlung politischer Kommissare). [...]
The starting point was Hitler's address to his closest military advisers on March 3, 1941. Until that time, no discussion of the ideological exigencies in the war against the Soviet Union had taken place. Hitler explained how the war of annihilation was to be waged. On that same day, instructions incorporating Hitler's demands went to Section L of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) (under Deputy Chief Walter Warlimont); these provided the basis for the "Guidelines in Special Areas to Instructions No. 21 (Case Barbarossa)" discussing, among other matters, the interaction of the army and SS in the theater of operations, deriving from the 'need to neutralize at once leading bolsheviks and commissars.'[6]
Discussions proceeded on March 17 during a situation conference, where Chief of the OKH General Staff Franz Halder, Quartermaster-General Eduard Wagner and Chief of Operational Department of the OKH Adolf Heusinger were present. Hilter declared: "The intelligentsia established by Stalin must be exterminated. The most brutal violence is to be used in the Great Russian Empire" (quoted from Halder's War Diary entry of March 17).[7]
On March 30, Hitler addressed over 200 senior officers in the Reich Chancellery. Among those present was Halder, who recorded the key points of the speech. Hitler stipulated the "annihilation of the Bolshevik commissars and the Communist intelligentsia" (thus laying the foundation for the Commissar Order), dismissed the idea of the court marshals for felonies committed by the German troops, and emphasized the different nature of the war in the East with the war in the West.[8]

References

  1. ^ a b c General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey, 1998.
  2. ^ Holocaust Denial on Trial, by Charles Gray.
  3. ^ Browning 1998, p. 10.
  4. ^ Förster, Jürgen (1989). "The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination Against the Soviet Union (pages 492–520)". In Michael Marrus. The Nazi Holocaust Part 3 The "Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder Volume 2. Westpoint, Connecticut: Meckler Press. ISBN 978-0-88736-255-2, page 505"
  5. ^ Förster 1989, page 505"
  6. ^ Manfred Messerschmidt, Forward Defence (as included in War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II 1941-1945, edited by Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (2000); page 388
  7. ^ Messerschmidt; page 389
  8. ^ Alex J. Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political And Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941 (2006); page 72. ISBN 978-1845451868

Can some of these references be used in this section? K.e.coffman (talk) 02:41, 21 November 2015 (UTC)

Something that blew up in Hitler's face. Because the order was intercepted by Soviet spies and made Stalin, fighting a losing war at the moment (August 1941) change tactics and raise morale (which was below zero because of the purges, the losing war and bad field commanders or rather inexperienced field commanders because the capable had been purged). Stalin knew than that surrender or retreat was not an option since it meant certain death anyway. Brutal, but logical orders were given that made surrender an act of treason and you were than put in a penal battalion (who were used for the most dangerous missions or as first wave assault, remember Saving Private Ryan and how when guys who first in line on those landing craft all got shot, yeah, those guys were just unlucky to the first guy on the first landing ship, the penal battalions were used for that. They also used prisoners, join and get a pardon. Most died. Penal battalions were cannon fodder, a cynic would say that the Soviets instead of executing themselves they let they German do it for them. Take a bunch of them with an destroy German morale as well. The Germans were so indoctrinated they were the master race fighting subhumans Soviets. And they get attacked wave after wave by Soviets with the choice of dying a hero killing as many Nazi's as possible and receive a government pension (for his wife/children) or dying a traitor (no government pension for family). That alone is an easy choice, but also not a death sentence. Casualties were very high, but not 100%. But to the Germans, the illusion they were fighting subhumans was shattered. They were taught to think of themselves as wolves praying on Soviet sheep, instead the met bears, very angry bears with with lust for blood and retreat not an option.

Commanders were forbidden to surrender and may by arrested or shot on the spot (by a commissar) and commissars, who received an even harsher treatment when taken alive (Hitler had realised his blunder and cancelled the order, not executing prisoners on sight but "officially" take them as POW but in reality they were like cattle put in a fenced off area, like a concentration camp without any buildings whatsover those that did froze to dead, starved to dead. Ironically, a human would die after 2 or 3 days without water. However the torturing cold provided snow, keeping the soldiers (and civilians, woman and children) alive much longer (those children and women who weren't raped and beaten to dead at least). A human can live without food between 30 to 60 days. Also if they retreated they face "block brigades" who had orders to shoot or arrest retreating troops during the Battle of Stalingrad. While brutal it's seen as essential to the victory of USSR Of the — Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.23.197.184 (talk) 00:25, 9 December 2015 (UTC)

German Intelligence of Soviet Forces

There doesn't seem to be any mention of the assessment by German high-command of the strength of the Russian forces as part of Operation Barbarossa and prior to the invasion, with the exception of the comment "If I had known about the Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not have attacked". I feel this is a gaping hole in the article. I don't really have any good sources handy, but my recollection from study of the Operation is this was significant shortfall in the development of the Operation Barbarossa plan. Any thoughts on this? Aeonx (talk) 12:10, 14 February 2016 (UTC)

Well, the fact is that Hitler set the date for Barbarossa, not the military, so it's not like they waited until their ducks were in a row and then launched the attack. They got whatever intelligence they could in the very short period of time between when Hitler told them the attack was going to happen, and the actual jumping off date.
That doesn't actually excuse the German Army, it was their job to be ready for any eventuality, but Hitler had early on assured them that there would be no two-front war, as in World War I, so when he suddenly reversed himself, they were caught with their pants down. BMK (talk) 16:44, 14 February 2016 (UTC)
Copy-paste from Erich Marcks:

In the summer of 1940, Franz Halder, chief of OKH General Staff, directed Marcks to draft an initial operational plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Marcks produced a report entitled "Operation Draft East". Citing the need to "protect Germany against enemy bombers (no other reason was given)", the report advocated the A-A line as the operational objective of the invasion of "Russia" (sic). This goal was a line from Arkhangelsk on the Arctic Sea through Gorky and Rostov to the port city of Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga on the Caspian Sea. Marcks envisioned that the campaign, including the capture of Moscow and beyond, would require between nine to seventeen weeks to complete.[1]

My reading of this is that the planning started at least a year in advance. Is this not sufficient time for the military intelligence to arrive at accurate estimate of enemy forces and capabilities? K.e.coffman (talk) 20:18, 14 February 2016 (UTC)e
It really depends on what kind of sources they had, what assets they had in place in rhe Soviet Union, and whether they penetrated past the caoital(s) region of Moscow/Petrograd back beyond the Urals, where Stalin's reinforcements were eventually to come from, once he got over the profound shock that Hitler has actually attacked, something that didn't come about for a significant time after the attack began. My impression is that German intelligence did a pretty good job at the tactical level, but never really had an adequate idea of what kind of resources and manpower the USSR had in its interior, nor were they aware that the Soviets were moving factories lock-stock-and-barrel out of harm's way past the Urals, where they churned out tanks and planes galore, all possible because other resources -such as trucks, uniforms, helmets, rations etc -- were being provided by the US on Lend-Lease, allowing the Russians to concentrate on the front-line material they needed. That's another factor Hitler and the Wehrmacht missed - I think they believed that the US would never supply the Soiviets to the degree thet did the British because of the fundamental clash between their political systems.
So, no, the German Army did not go an especially good job overall, but when they did they were rewarded by tactical victory after victory. Perhaps the one factor they most severly misspprciated was effect of the rains followed by the freeze, which bogged them down, and which they were toally unprepared for -- but at Hitler's specific order, since he was convinced that the battle would be over before there would be any need for winter clothing.
So, I guess what I'm saying here is that it was a system, and most parts of the system malperformed, but primarily the Fuehrer himself, so it seems a bit unfair to blame the army per se for what was not entirely their fault. BMK (talk) 21:29, 14 February 2016 (UTC)
I think this is pretty accurate, although I associate the failure to consider the Russian winter a consequence of the bigger problem being they underestimated the size, equipment, rate of reinforcement and dispositions of the Russian forces as a failure of intelligence preparation which of consequence meant a significant delay and ultimate halt to the advance. Where they were then trapped in the winter without adequate clothing and supply lines. I'm sure this historical pov is cited in one my books...somewhere. Aeonx (talk) 04:30, 16 February 2016 (UTC)


Victory?

In the infobox it says the Germans won tactically, but the lede says it failed. Which one? Burklemore1 (talk) 09:06, 22 January 2016 (UTC)

Good call. This is one of the stuff that changed/vanished during a bout of vandalism that occurred last month. Fixed. EyeTruth (talk) 07:48, 23 January 2016 (UTC)
Ah so I see. Thanks for the fix, I knew something was up when there was a sudden change saying they won. Burklemore1 (talk) 08:27, 23 January 2016 (UTC)


I don't want to get into an edit/revert/edit cycle but this is the article about Operation barbarossa, which ended in 1941. It is not the WW2 article or the Eastern Front article. The result statement must be confined to what happened directly as a result of Barbarossa, not things that happened years later and were contingent on all sorts of factors. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:23, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

I just reverted again in the info box. I think the box needs to confine itself to things that happened directly as a result of Barbarossa, not events that happened years later that were not 100% determined by this operation. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 13:58, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

Why don't just Operation failure, seems more obvious. Eleutheure (talk) 14:51, 22 February 2016 (UTC)
Because it is far more complex than that. The Wehrmacht essentially defeated the pre-war Red Army and took incredible amounts of territory.....yet the USSR survived and stayed in the fight, which created a gigantic strategic problem for the Germans and frankly the best strategic opportunity the allies had. Still, it's a long way from Dec 1941 to May 1945. DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:56, 22 February 2016 (UTC)
It's pretty complex, and that complexity will never get into a one line citation. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Eleutheure (talkcontribs) 15:01, 22 February 2016 (UTC)
I think operation failure is appropriate. The goal of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army and the Soviet state, none of which occurred. K.e.coffman (talk) 17:29, 22 February 2016 (UTC)
This has come up again and again; see archived talk 2 and 3 from 2008, for example, when many of the same arguments were made. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 20:26, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

Pre-emptive strike

Closing discussion resulting from edit warring by a HarveyCarter sockpuppet

The article should mention the fact that Hitler publicly claimed the operation was a pre-emptive strike, before Stalin was ready for war against the European Axis Powers. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 22:25, 25 March 2016 (UTC))

Agreed. It's not as if we are saying this claim was true. Martijn Meijering (talk) 22:31, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
It's already in the article: see the first para of Operation Barbarossa#German invasion plans and a discussion of the relevant historiography in the last para of Operation Barbarossa#Soviet preparations. Nick-D (talk) 22:40, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
Exactly. This is not the place to expand on the Icebreaker crap. It has it's own article. What is said as Nick indicates, is enough. Irondome (talk) 22:42, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
It should be mentioned in the previous section because it is relevant there. We know Stalin was preparing for war with the European Axis, and Hitler could not allow this to continue otherwise the Soviets would have been too powerful. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 22:44, 25 March 2016 (UTC))
We "know" no such thing, and such a view is long-discredited. Please see the final para of Operation Barbarossa#Soviet preparations. Please stop edit warring as well - you (rightly) started this discussion after your changes were reverted, and need to now see if a consensus supporting your position develops. Nick-D (talk) 22:51, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
It was confirmed when the Cold War ended that Stalin was preparing for war against Germany and Italy in 1941. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 23:00, 25 March 2016 (UTC))
By whom? Nick, my socks are itching.Irondome (talk) 23:07, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
By the documents that were released by the Kremlin. Historians have dismissed the theory that Stalin was about to attack German forces in the summer of 1941, but all historians agree he was preparing for war. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 23:09, 25 March 2016 (UTC))

Result, again

Result was reverted to 2015 version on May 5th? Why USSR victory? There was a German failure to complete their objectives. But USSR failed to achive it's devensive objectives as well. There was loss at battle of Moscow, but overall it was a loss for USSR and failure of Germans. Can't this article follow the footsteps of First_Battle_of_El_Alamein#Aftermath? Very similar situation where neither side reached it's objectives? To say that it was USSR victory, or German, is very weak. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 139.88.52.143 (talk) 21:04, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

This article has gone through numerous changes to the "Result" section of the info box over the years.

May I suggest we discuss? The major outcomes of Operation Barbarossa are: axis failure to defeat the USSR in a single campaign, and, because the USSR continued fighting, the creation of the eastern front. I personally think that is enough for the info box. Everything else is details that can be described in the article. In particular, 'failure to reach the A-A line' is (I mean no disrespect here but) merely a terrain metric for staff officers. The real goal was to crush the USSR militarily; reaching the A-A line was one terminal terrain objective that is a part of that goal. Likewise, results such as "eventual defeat of the Axis' are results, not of barbarossa, but of WW2.

Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:25, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

I hear what you are saying DMorpheus, but equally the a-a line was no mere staff metric. It was the specific end goal of the operation as written by Hitler himself Full text

I would like to see "axis failure to achieve operation objectives" with Directive 21 linked, and "creation of eastern front". It gives readers the opportunity to examine it. Irondome (talk) 17:47, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

I agree with DMorpheus2 about A-A line, this was just one of the many sub-failures under main failure to defeat USSR. On other hand, I personally don't see much point in listing "creation of the eastern front" as result. Not to mention that if feels a bit awkward as "result", considering that Eastern Front started on 22.06.2016 and Barbarossa with formed a very substantial part of it.--Staberinde (talk) 17:48, 6 April 2016 (UTC)
I understand your points too Staberinde, just it's that I feel a bit more detail, ideally a link to Dir. 21 may be instructive to our readers. It really sums it up. Creation of eastern front is perhaps too obvious to state. Irondome (talk) 17:52, 6 April 2016 (UTC)
Not too obvious, IMO. After all, the failure to knock the USSR out in a single campaign is arguably the biggest strategic consequence of the operation.
Regarding the A-A line, again, I think we're mistaking the means with the ends. The goal was to eliminate the USSR's warmaking ability. The objective was the Red Army itself, not any terrain objective.
Again we're talking about the info box here, not the full article, which of course should deal with this in much greater detail.
Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:03, 6 April 2016 (UTC)
Then I would suggest keeping the points we have, and removing the a-a line mention, as it has its own link in mainspace, but re-positioning it. I think the a-a line concept is important in terms of understanding the full implications of Barbarossa, just as is Generalplan Ost and the Hunger Plan. This was not just a conventional military campaign but the prelude to an unprecedented -and still arguably poorly understood racial/colonial onslaught on the world. Irondome (talk) 19:41, 6 April 2016 (UTC)
Failure to knock out USSR is already covered by other points, I don't really see what "Opening of the Eastern Front" adds to it.--Staberinde (talk) 14:49, 7 April 2016 (UTC)

"Nazi invasion" or "Axis invasion"

Another HarveyCarter sock

It was an Axis invasion, involving troops from many different countries. To call it a German invasion is just Nazi propaganda. (86.133.255.131 (talk) 17:28, 10 May 2016 (UTC))

Here and on Burl Ives, the above editor is replacing "Nazi invasion" with "Axis invasion". I believe this is an error. Although the editor is correct when he points out that many other countries were involved, factually, it was totally a Nazi show. It was Hitler's idea, he outlined to his generals what he wanted them to do, when they took decisions in the field, he personally took over command responsibility numerous times. The overwhelming number of troops involved were German. It was clearly a Nazi invasion with Axis assistance, not an Axis invasion, which implies that the Axis was run the same way the Allies were, with coordination and consensus between them. This is not the case. Hitler planned what he wanted and then largely dragooned the other countries into it. "Axis invasion", gives totally the wrong impression, and is essentially inaccurate. BMK (talk) 17:33, 10 May 2016 (UTC)

the caption "result" in the infobox

On request of user:Irondome. Result seems to me to be the outcome. I'm pretty sure the Soviets won in the end and gained (not lost) large tracts of land. What do we take Operation Barbarossa to be? Everything before it started to go bad for the Germans or just the stuff that happened before that? Gerard von Hebel (talk) 16:55, 29 May 2016 (UTC)

A reasonable question. Now let's see if any colleagues turn up with comments. I am sure they will. Irondome (talk) 16:58, 29 May 2016 (UTC)
I think the whole part should be reworded as:
  • "Axis forces push deep into Soviet territory but fail to break Soviet defense near Moscow due to Soviet counteroffensives in December 1941"
  • "Devastating blow to Soviet millitary and economy"
Operation Barbarossa ended in late 1941. It is more of an Axis failure rather than a Soviet loss. I am sure someone with more knowlege can tweak my suggestion and maybe (or probably) suggest something better.--Bolter21 (talk to me) 17:28, 29 May 2016 (UTC)
Hebel, you're not supposed to reinsert an edit you've made after someone has reverted it before gaining consensus for your change. See WP:BRD. As for the ending of Barbarossa, the article puts it at December 5 1941. I think the description of the result should talk about the situation around that date, not the situation years later. Barbarossa is not the whole of the German-Soviet war. Do sources generally consider Barbarossa a Soviet defensive victory? It seems all right to describe it at least as an Axis failure, despite the large gains, as it failed to take any of its three major geographical objectives and failed to achieve its main goal of knocking the Soviet Union out of the war. After Barbarossa both sides were in a very difficult position, with the war still being undecided. Martijn Meijering (talk) 18:33, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
Indeed, Barbarossa is generally understood to have ended either before the attack on Moscow (Typhoon) or just after. Either way we're dealing with late 1941.
This has been argued over and over again - please see the older, archived talk pages. I can't think of another page for which the result infobox gets changed so frequently.
Two opinions I'll share (again): one, the 'result' should report on the result of Operation Barbarossa, not the result of WW2 or of the Soviet-German front. The failure of Barbarossa did not 100% determine the entire outcome of the war. Therefore, to speak of 'gained' territory is nonsensical. The situation at the end of 1941 was that the USSR had lost an epic amount of territory and essentially their entire prewar army. Two, the reason that territorial loss is a significant fact that belongs in the infobox is that the territory contained a very high percentage of the nation's population, and an even higher percentage of prewar industrial centers and ore/mineral sources. Losing land mattered. But losing that particular land mattered a lot.
Barbarossa is certainly not a Soviet 'loss', not should it be viewed as merely a German 'failure' as if the Red Army didn't exist. The Germans mounted a strategic offensive with quite specific objectives. They did not achieve those objectives. That's the bottom line. They failed despite inflicting massive casualties and taking enormous amounts of productive land from their opponents. They failed partly through their own mistakes, of course, but obviously they also had the Red Army stopping them. The Red Army stayed in the fight despite fantastically large losses. And the end result was, at the end of 1941, an exceptionally difficult strategic situation for the Germans....even though it was not yet promising for the Soviets.
Now we need to fit something like that in an infobox ;)
Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 18:19, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

Since the article is about Operation Barbarossa, then the main result is that it failed. It failed for several reasons: strategic underestimation of the Red Army and Soviet Union’s capacity to fight; setting fantastical goals which were likely not achievable in the first place; not having any Plan B in case the operation did not go as planned (i.e. not preparing for a war of attrition and expecting to defeat the Soviet Union in a single summer campaign).

Could it be considered a Soviet victory? Battle of Moscow certainly was, but not sure if Barbarossa is being described in the sources as a “Soviet victory”.

Perhaps this option might work:

  • Axis strategic failure
  • Soviet victory at the Battle of Moscow
  • Stalemate on the Eastern front (the last item is debatable, and possibly optional)

K.e.coffman (talk) 18:37, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

I don't disagree with your first two bullets.
From the archived talk page: "A look at the archived discussion will show that this ground has been fought over many times; go have a look at the rubble. DMorpheus 13:13, 25 September 2007 (UTC)"
But by all means let's continue this argument fellas. ;) Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 18:52, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

Options

So, this option may work?

Currently, the infobox has:

  • Soviet victory
  • Failure of the Axis to reach the A-A line
  • Soviet victory, despite huge losses in men and materiel

Which seems a bit confused. K.e.coffman (talk) 19:02, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

I'd add 'despite huge Soviet losses in men, materiel and territory' to the first point. Martijn Meijering (talk) 19:09, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
Huge --> catastrophic, as more encyclopedic:
  • Axis strategic failure despite catastrophic Soviet losses in men, materiel and territory
  • Soviet victory at the Battle of Moscow
Feedback? K.e.coffman (talk) 19:15, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
* Opening of the Eastern Front
* Axis strategic defeat, failure of Axis to reach the A-A line
* Soviet defensive victory, despite catastrophic losses in men, material and territory.
It opened the Eastern front, which was a disaster for the Axis. It was an Axis strategic defeat, because the specific objectives laid down in Dir.21 (The A-A line) was not achieved. It was a Red Army defensive victory, despite huge loss. I would argue Typhoon was not part of Barbarossa. Irondome (talk) 19:23, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
I'm not a fan of the "defensive victory" term as it has a whiff of Nazi propaganda to me—possibly due to too much exposure to Waffen-SS content on wikipedia :-) . K.e.coffman (talk) 19:28, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
I hear you on that. But this a Red Army victory. We can discuss precise terminology. Can we all agree that the above captures the essential and critical outcomes? Irondome (talk) 19:33, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
Not just in my head; see: "In the second defensive battle in Courland, units of the army and Germanic volunteers of the Waffen SS under the command of Colonel General Schörner, again won a full defensive victory, from the OKW propaganda report, the Wehrmachtbericht. In Ferdinand Schörner. K.e.coffman (talk) 19:54, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
Opening the Eastern front is a bit vague, but it's a good point. The failure to knock the Soviet Union out of the war quickly locked Germany into a lengthy two-front war it could ill afford and which Barbarossa was intended to prevent. As for Typhoon, if you don't include that, then you can hardly say Barbarossa was a failure, because it wasn't clear at that point that Germany would fail to achieve its objectives in 1941, though it was already looking uncertain. Martijn Meijering (talk) 19:49, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
Many scholars, David Glantz and David Stahel, at the top of my head, consider that Barbarossa had failed by the end of summer 1941. Glantz’s book on the topic is Barbarossa Derailed which is about the Battle of Smolensk (1941). The reason that the counter-offensive at Moscow was so successful was that the Wehrmacht had "bled itself white" ( to use another of the Nazi terms) desperately trying to get to Moscow and Leningrad in the autumn of 1941. The units that got close to Moscow were not the “divisions” as we understand them, but “light elements” of these divisions, lacking tanks or heavy artillery. The rest of the units were strung out for tens and even hundred of kilometers to the rear. Good discussion here: "Operation Typhoon": Video on YouTube, lecture by David Stahel, author of Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (2013) and The Battle for Moscow (2015); via the official channel of USS Silversides Museum K.e.coffman (talk) 20:14, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
I've seen seemingly serious criticism of Glantz and/or Stahel, specifically the lack of understanding of the difference between recoverable and irrecoverable tank losses. I'm not sure the scholarly consensus is that Barbarossa had failed by the end of summer, though there was already great concern among the generals and their staffs. Martijn Meijering (talk) 20:27, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
My suggestion:
  • German failure
  • Soviet defensive success
  • Opening of the Eastern Front
Just because the Germans abused the term 'defensive victory' doesn't mean we can't take it back from them. Hitler liked dogs....that doesn't make all dog lovers nazis.
Simply saying "Soviet Victory" will, I think, confuse the casual reader.
Some reference to the creation of the eastern front is key, IMO. The fact that Germany was now stuck in a two-front, long-term war was strategically disastrous for them. They were aligned for a short war and could not win a long one.
The question of territorial or personnel losses is best covered in other fields of the info box and the narrative.
Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 20:10, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
I would be comfortable with the above, with one caveat; that we have German strategic failure and failure to reach the A-A Line as this was the explicit operational goal of Barbarossa. It also helps the reader orientate themselves with the (possibly) vague statement "German.. (strategic)..failure". Irondome (talk) 20:31, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
Opening of the Eastern front self-explanatory IMO; where else would be Wehrmacht be fighting the Soviet Union? K.e.coffman (talk) 20:22, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
K.e, by itself it is a critical statement. It was arguably the most catastrophic blunder on so many levels, and it doomed the nazi regime. Thanks for interesting vid links B.T.W. Irondome (talk) 20:34, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
I prefer the "Axis strategic failure despite catastrophic Soviet losses in men, materiel and territory" + Soviet victory at the Battle of Moscow, to which we can add the failure to reach the A-A line and the opening of the eastern front. The latter needs to be formulated better though, because as K.e.coffman says it look like self-evident and irrelevant addition. The reason we're having difficulty describing the outcome is because to the naive observer Barbarossa looks like a succession of spectacular tactical and operational victories, followed by one big defeat before Moscow and a failure to take the final objectives for the campaign, while the Germans did manage to hold on to large areas of Soviet territory. In other words, it looks like a success even though it didn't achieve its overly ambitious final objectives. But in reality it was a strategic failure (not yet a strategic defeat) that left Germany in a very difficult strategic position, and we need to explain why. Soviet defensive victory or German strategic defeat sounds too simplistic. The reason Barbarossa was a strategic failure was not that it opened the Eastern front, but that it failed to avoid a lengthy two front war. Martijn Meijering (talk) 20:50, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
As I understand from sources, the core consequence of Barbarossa was its failure to defeat the Soviet Union in one strategic campaign.
This left Germany with very bad options for the rest of the war because the whole campaign was predicated on a quick victory: there were no reservists, no total war footing for the economy, etc. The German high command did not envision a failure to begin with, and had no plan B.
In other words, Hitler had started the war against the Soviet Union as a gamble, and when that misfired, the did not really have any options of concluding the war. That’s why Barbarossa was such a failure, despite literally catastrophic consequences for the Soviet army, industry and civilian population. BTW, was the A-A line the actual objective written into the planning documents somewhere? It seems that the German planning was rather vague — “Let’s hit them and the whole thing will collapse. Then we would deploy the occupational force, drive the population beyond the Urals, etc.” It seems it was as precise as this. K.e.coffman (talk) 21:34, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
The A-A Line is explicitly described as the operational final goal of Barbarossa. See Fuhrer Directive no. 21 for full text. Also type in Goal of Barbarossa A-A Line on Google books and you will see it can be richly sourced as a concrete outcome in the planning stage. Irondome (talk) 21:42, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

Ah, it’s coming back to me now. From Directive 21:

  • The German Armed Forces must be prepared, even before the conclusion of the war against England, to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign ('Case Barbarossa'). The Air Force will [support the army so that it] will be able to bring land operations to a speedy conclusion.
  • The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in Western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armoured spearheads. Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be prevented from withdrawing into the depths of Russia. The enemy will then be energetically pursued and a line will be reached from which the Russian Air Force can no longer attack German territory. The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

…The commentary that I’ve seen on this suggests that even if the Wehrmacht reached this hypothetical line, the Soviet Union would not have been crushed, as the German high command planned for. As experience showed, the Soviet state did not collapse and exhibited extraordinary capacity for force generation. I e. by the time of the battle of Moscow, the Red Army strength was higher than it was on 21 June 1941. (The quality of people and equipment may have been lower vs those units that were lost, but nonetheless, despite horrendous losses, the Red Army was forming and fielding new formations at extraordinary rate. Stahel argues that the lack of appreciation of these facts was one of the reasons that the Wehrmacht was continuing to press towards Moscow: the army intelligence failed to determine the growing strength of the Red Army, and the German commanders kept thinking: “Just one more push, and the Russian will be defeated.” That's why the Dec counter-offensive came as such surprise.)

These two factors (resilience of both the state and the armed forces) had not been taken into account by the German high command. Therefore, any specific line that the Wehrmacht failed to reach was not meaningful to success or failure of Barbarossa. That’s why I’m disinclined to have this put in the Infobox. As this would predispose the reader to think: “if only the Germans had reached the A-A line …" , in the same vein as “if only the Germans took Moscow, the war would have been won”, similar to the Wehrmacht memoir narrative: "That idiot Hitler prevented us from taking Moscow".

That's the gist of my current understanding of sources; I could look up some concrete sourcing if needed. K.e.coffman (talk) 22:17, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

  • Which amply indicates the utter futility of the invasion of The Soviet Union. Here we are entering the world of the deranged. The entire nazi project, the "resettlement" of the East, the autobahns to Moscow, the giant Railways to the Crimea, all this was dependent on reaching the A-A Line and creating an "Eastern Wall" behind which the unimaginable would have happened. The reality was bad enough and that was "just" the territory the Nazis temporarily held. Please do not underestimate the importance of the "A-A Line" K.e. The Nazi planners, military and civil, were deadly serious about it. It cannot be just brushed aside, and I do not understand the comment "that if only the Germans had reached the A-A line.." Our readers are not neo-nazis, the vast majority are here for knowledge. We must give them the truth. Irondome (talk) 22:25, 31 May 2016 (UTC)
As I understand it there was no way for the Germans to take the A-A line without crushing the Soviet Union and no way for the Soviet Union to survive without the Ural industries so there isn't really much of a difference between the two in practice. While Barbarossa failed to achieve all of its objectives and the Germans very clearly lost the Battle of Moscow and were in a very dangerous strategic position, it wasn't clear yet that Germany could not achieve its goals in 1942 or 1943. In fact, a Soviet general commented after the war that if the Germans had stuck to their original plan for Fall Blau in 1942 instead of dividing their forces there wasn't much that the Soviets could have done to stop it. In that case it seems likely that Germany would have crushed the Soviet Union by 1943 at the latest and won the war. So strategic defeat for Germany would be too strong a term. Martijn Meijering (talk) 09:59, 1 June 2016 (UTC)

Was it pre-emptive?

HarveyCarter sock BMK (talk) 17:08, 4 June 2016 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.

Multiple sources say the operation was a pre-emptive strike before Stalin had rearmed for war against the Axis. (165.120.240.166 (talk) 16:33, 4 June 2016 (UTC))

Please cite them. Gog the Mild (talk) 16:58, 4 June 2016 (UTC)

Please "vote" on this suggested wording

This is a suggested outcome from what I am taking from the discussion so far:

I am quite confident that each of the above points can be reliably sourced, with the exception of point 1 which is WP:BLUESKY.. so, yes or no on this provisional proposal? Please comment below. Irondome (talk) 23:20, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

  • Comment: Not a fan of piping in this situation; for example, Axis strategic failure above links to A-A line. In addition to failure to (1) reach the A-A line, Nazi Germany also failed to (2) destroy the Soviet state; (3) destroy the Red Army, as outlined in the FD 21.

My suggestions for the options would be:

  • Opening of the Eastern Front
  • Option 1: Axis strategic failure (...if adding A-A line here, should also list the other two failures...)
  • Option 2: Axis strategic failure despite catastrophic Soviet losses in men, materiel, and territory
  • Soviet defensive victory, despite catastrophic losses in men, materiel, and territory
  • Severe attrition of Axis forces
  • Soviet victory in the Battle of Moscow

Sorry to complicate things, but these seem to be more representative of the options put forth so far. K.e.coffman (talk) 00:07, 1 June 2016 (UTC)

No, it is more or less the same as my original proposal. I have no issue with cutting the piping either. In that case, I would support the addition of option 1, A-A line, failure of destruction of the USSR, failure of destruction of Red Army, as these are concrete and favourable to sourcing. Option 2 is too vague, and is abundantly made clear in mainspace, and bulletpoint 4 covers it anyway. Would colleagues be comfortable with this? As the largest offensive in recorded history, I think we can get away with 5 bulletpointed outcomes ;} Irondome (talk) 00:17, 1 June 2016 (UTC)

I'm not sure about the voting process -- as is with up and down votes? Then I have two, the first one being "defensive victory". Suggest portraying the victory angle as: "Soviet victory in the Battle of Moscow", as I mentioned above.
I also vote down the "Opening of the Eastern Front" bullet as being either (1) too literal, i.e. another way to say "Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union" (that's what the article is about). (2) It's clear that another interpretation is possible, from a strategic balance of power, as Irondome explained above. I now get it. But for semantic/prospective reasons, I find it somewhat problematic. I.e. when the Allies opened the Western Front in 1944, it was of their choosing, and generally a positive development for mankind, despite the hardships. When the Eastern front "opened", the Soviet Union had no choice in it, and it was a catastrophe for the country. My 2 cents.
I'm okay with the rest. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:53, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
I think the proposal is good enough.
On the first bullet, "opening the Eastern Front" sounds redundant, but there is something to stated here in the context of staring a front that lasted for years and was the biggest in WW2. There's a case to be made that this decided WW2. "Opening" the front doesn't really cover this. But I'm not sure what simple phrase would. --A D Monroe III (talk) 02:48, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
AD makes a very good point that we should keep in mind: it was not just a military conflict, but the evolution of warfare into a new type of total, genocidal war, which (I believe the sources say) had been unprecedented to that date. The Holocaust started behind (and at) the front lines in the summer of 1941; also the war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg [de]) aspect of things: the murder through neglect, shootings, exposure of millions of POWs, orchestrated starvation of millions of civilians, etc—the new type of warfare unleashed by Nazi Germany in the East. Not sure how to best summarise it. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:06, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
The current results in the infobox look OK to me: Barbarossa was a disastrous failure for the Axis in that it did not achieve its goals, and was the opening move in a war which led or played a key role in the complete and utter defeat of virtually all the countries which launched it (only Finland survived in anything resembling its pre-war state, albeit with heavy losses in territory, massive payments to the USSR and reduced sovereignty until the 1990s). The results could be summerised as "Soviet victory, despite huge casualties and losses in materiel and territory". Nick-D (talk) 09:20, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
I disagree with that summary. I think all or most of the elements mentioned should remain, while 'opening the Eastern front' should be replaced by wording that makes the point more clearly. Unless we have reliable sources calling Barbarossa a Soviet defensive victory I'd be opposed to calling it that. I doubt the Soviets felt victorious at the end of Barbarossa as it took them two more years to drive the Germans back beyond the border. Martijn Meijering (talk) 09:47, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
That's a good point. A quick survey of some of the books I have handy on the war produces the following:
  • David Glantz Before Stalingrad: describes the overall results of Barbarossa as a "German defeat" (pages 204 and 205), but notes the severe Soviet losses
  • The Oxford Companion to World War II: the entry on Barbarossa describes the operation as a failure (page 89)
  • Second volume of Ian Kershaw's biography of Hitler: doesn't make a firm statement, but basically concludes that the war wasn't decided by Barbarossa
  • Richard Evans Nazi Germany at War states that Barbarossa failed to achieve any of its objectives (page 403), but doesn't drawn stronger conclusions.
This partial survey seems to support something along the lines of "German/Axis defeat". I'd be interested to see what other books say. Nick-D (talk) 10:31, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
It would seem to me that the use of the 'failure' argument to end up with 'defeat' result opens a rather nasty can of worms though. For example in the Winter War the Soviet objective was to conquer the whole of Finland. Per the argument provided the failure to achieve that would imply a result of 'Soviet defeat'. So i would steer clear from that if at all possible. It seem to me that either 'opening of the Eastern Front' or some such would probably be the best choice - alternatively using 'German/Axis failure'. - Wanderer602 (talk) 11:55, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
There's a very strong case for 'Axis failure', but much less so for 'Axis defeat' or 'Soviet victory'. Martijn Meijering (talk) 13:56, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
Im pleased with what Irondome suggested. Given that we take it that Operation Barbarossa doesn't equal the entire war but just the initial German attack on the USSR. Gerard von Hebel (talk) 16:32, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
I see little wrong with having just the existing first bullet point: "Soviet victory, despite huge losses in men, materiel and territory". If we have to have a second point - I would vote against it - can we please change the existing one to something like "Failure of the Axis to reach their objectives". The info box is meant to give a quick summary; mention of "the A-A line" is unintelligible to all but aficionados. Five bullet points! Some in code. Please. If readers want that level of detail they can read the introduction - which is barely longer than the proposals above ;-) . (And makes no mention of the A_A line.) I agree with NickD and vote for "None of the above". Gog the Mild (talk) 17:36, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
Right. Now I've recovered, and if a minimalist approach is preferred, I would suggest that we simply link Aftermath, with see aftermath. We could expand or adjust aftermath accordingly so it gives a decent and punchy overview. I do think that Barbarossa is so much more than the opening of a military front. It was the Nazi reality in action. So many still do not "get" Barbarossa. I think we should somehow capture this aspect for our readers, in a short form. Precisely how, I'm still stumped by. Irondome (talk) 18:35, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
I think linking "Aftermath" to the Aftermath section is a good idea. BMK (talk) 18:45, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
Linking to the "Aftermath" section is a simple and elegant solution. Fully support. K.e.coffman (talk) 18:53, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
I agree. After 9 years of back-and-forth on this a new solution may be the best approach. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:21, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
Please don't cry Irondome. A sensible suggestion. Gog the Mild (talk) 21:49, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
Agreed. That solution should work nicely. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:10, 2 June 2016 (UTC)
Just to pile on, I also agree with this proposal Nick-D (talk) 08:04, 2 June 2016 (UTC)
Result now linked to Aftermath section, as per above broad agreement as to this being the optimum solution. Thanks all for invaluable input. Irondome (talk) 04:49, 5 June 2016 (UTC)

Nuanced wording

I remember this article use to have very good wording in the infobox result section. Looking at the edit history, it use to say:

"Axis conquers vast areas of the Soviet Union and inflicts heavy losses on the Red Army, but fails in its overall strategic goal of defeating the USSR in a Blitzkrieg campaign"

For a complex operation, I think this wording is excellent. It's brief but not oversimplified and it's nuanced enough without being too long. This was done in June 2009 and remained unchanged for 3 years! That was until someone made this edit, which I think ruined it and opened the door to constant changes because the wording was getting more simplistic. I propose going back to the above wording. Spellcast (talk) 12:09, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

I also feel like the current results ("see x") are a defeat for WP; we couldn't agree, so we gave up and removed all infobox information. All that can be said for it is it leaves everyone equally unsatisfied, including the infobox readers. I would agree with either of the wordings before or after the linked edit.
But, are we really going to go through this again so soon? --A D Monroe III (talk) 13:03, 22 June 2016 (UTC)
I like minimalism but I believe having something is better than nothing here. I understand the desire to not oversimplify things, but I think linking it to the Aftermath section implies that it's not possible to have a brief nuanced explanation, which isn't the case. Spellcast (talk) 15:04, 22 June 2016 (UTC)
The text we have now is a good interim solution. We can certainly continue talking about it. Martijn Meijering (talk) 19:09, 22 June 2016 (UTC)
The fact that this has been frequently discussed and changed, over and over for many years, is good evidence that we will not agree again. At least not for more than a few months.  ;( DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:19, 22 June 2016 (UTC)
The edit I linked was stable for 3 years and only became an issue again when people tried simplifying it further. To me that's good evidence of the effectiveness of the original wording. Spellcast (talk) 19:48, 22 June 2016 (UTC)
I think that the current solution solves an issue (i.e. the disagreement) by introducing another (i.e. no summary of results). I too agree with the old wording that you quoted above. EyeTruth (talk) 23:53, 22 June 2016 (UTC)
If by summary of results you mean phrases like 'x tactical victory' or 'y strategic defeat', it's not like black and white labels should always be required. For a complex operation, surely we can agree to allow a little more elaboration. Spellcast (talk) 00:30, 23 June 2016 (UTC)

I've been bold and restored and old stable wording, which I hope is fine. I don't believe this introduces a new problem as EyeTruth said because not every result has to be written in a black and white 'x victory' or 'y failure' way. Spellcast (talk) 15:52, 25 June 2016 (UTC)

Please see above: "Result now linked to Aftermath section, as per above broad agreement as to this being the optimum solution." I suggest restoring to "linked to..." version, as Barbarossa was much more than a military campaign. K.e.coffman (talk) 16:12, 25 June 2016 (UTC)
I have reverted Spellcast's Bold edit and restored the version which has a broad consensus on this page. BMK (talk) 17:19, 25 June 2016 (UTC)
Sigh. --A D Monroe III (talk) 17:24, 25 June 2016 (UTC)

Army Group Center course in the initial stages

From Guderian's memoir (Guderian, Heinz (tr. Constantine Fitzgibbon). Panzer Leader. Da Capo Press (2nd ed.; 2002), ISBN: 978-0-306-81101-2 p.146), after Smolensk, it seems he was almost sent North!:

"Preliminary orders as issued by the OKH indicated that the plan was then probably to switch Hoth's 3rd and my 2nd Panzer Groups due north to capture Leningrad." Cornelius (talk) 22:33, 22 September 2016 (UTC)

Recent edit: Black Sea Operations

I reverted this additions as I believe there's a strong likelyhood that they were done by an IP address belonging to Romanian-and-proud, who has been topic banned from this area. K.e.coffman (talk) 16:05, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

I apologize, I did not know that. Although, if he would be true to his/her name, I doubt he/she would have included the Germans. I simply wanted to add the naval front of the Operation. 86.123.123.192 (talk) 16:20, 14 October 2016 (UTC)
Then I would recommend registering for an account so that the edits can be done under a user name. Please see this extensive ANI thread re: the disruptions caused by IP editors in the same topic area: Disruptive IP editor. K.e.coffman (talk) 16:32, 14 October 2016 (UTC)
I honestly was reluctant to, because I already have plenty of accounts that I have to memorize passwords for, and in some cases the username. I will think about it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.123.123.192 (talk) 16:34, 14 October 2016 (UTC)
Yes, that would be best as some of the earlier tagged addresses are close to your range: 86.123.121.21 & 86.123.123.74, for example. K.e.coffman (talk) 16:37, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

Phase two

The section "Phase two" relies far too much on TV documentaries and needs to be carefully edited with scholarly texts. There are some discrepancies with some of the dates and units mentioned when contrasted against sources. Since I do not have many of the detailed works from Glantz (probably the foremost expert on Barbarossa), somebody who does should clear out these TV references with better citations. The same applies to parts of "Phase four".--Obenritter (talk) 02:45, 6 November 2016 (UTC)

I cleaned up Phase 1 a while back, but I haven't had the chance to proceed to the others, as I've been prepping Battle of Prokhorovka for FA. But I'll get around to them eventually. In the meantime, it would be lovely if others can start chipping away at it. I have a number of Glantz' works, and I'll be glad to provide numbers or specific details if requested. EyeTruth (talk) 02:59, 6 November 2016 (UTC)
No worries mate -- just thought it worth mentioning since this article gets so many hits given the topic. I've tried to clean up a bit myself as well and will continue to do so when the time permits.--Obenritter (talk) 03:48, 6 November 2016 (UTC)

Hitler's aims

Closing discussion initiated by banned User:HarveyCarter.
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.

His main aims in invading the Soviet Union were to destroy the USSR as a world power, and Communism as a political ideology. All of this was clearly outlined in "Mein Kampf". (2A00:23C4:6388:7300:B1DC:2A75:2D28:B504 (talk) 15:42, 30 November 2016 (UTC))

Just read the "Background" section for reason for revert; as has been pointed out before, "this wasn't limited to Hitler" or his manifesto. Your addition has WP:UNDUE weight. Kierzek (talk) 15:47, 30 November 2016 (UTC)
True, but Hitler was a dictator like Stalin and therefore his decision was the final one. He also needed the natural resources of the Soviet Union as the UK had refused to end the war in the West. (2A00:23C4:6388:7300:B1DC:2A75:2D28:B504 (talk) 15:52, 30 November 2016 (UTC))
This aspect probably deserves some more attention. In Müller's 'Der Feind steht im Osten' (which I unfortunately only have in its English translation) it is suggested that Halder and the OKH had a much greater influence on the decision to invade Russia than is traditionally assumed. Surprisingly (at least to me), at a very late stage there was still talk of splitting the USSR into several socialist vassal states under German suzerainty rather than the Generalplan Ost as we know it from 1942. Even Rosenberg was apparently not yet going that far. Müller's views seem not to have gained wide acceptance as far as I can tell, but as the former head of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt and editor-in-chief of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg he is certainly a notable source. Martijn Meijering (talk) 18:40, 30 November 2016 (UTC)
I've just reverted this stuff. It was awkwardly written, and the level of detail was confusing. The lead should note the main factors which drove the decision to launch the attack, of which the Nazi Government's desire to conquer the Soviet Union so that it could be repopulated over the long run was they key factor from what I've seen (the short term military and economic reasons were second order at best) - this is certainly what's set out in the "Background" section, which of course the lead should reflect. Nick-D (talk) 10:50, 2 December 2016 (UTC)
The primary reason for the invasion was the need to seize the Soviet resources so the Axis could continue the war in the West. The Germans began planning Barbarossa in July 1940 after the UK refused to negotiate. Germany did not have enough resources like oil to continue the war. After their failure in the Battle of Britain there was nowhere else the Germans could go other than east. I will put back the line about needing the resources because it is easily sourced. (109.146.224.119 (talk) 11:53, 2 December 2016 (UTC))
I've just reread the chapter about the decision to invade the USSR in Stephen Fritz's Ostkrieg (already cited in our article). From that it is apparent that Müller is not the only person who thinks Hitler's reasons were more diverse and more complicated than the traditional view first(?) stressed by Hillgruber. In Fritz's analysis (and that of people he cites, like Jürgen Förster), Hitler's desire for control of the natural resources needed to be able to withstand a naval blockade and to wage an intercontinental war remains the overriding long term driver. The belief that a racially and culturally homogeneous population was necessary to retain control over these resources led to plans for genocide. Anti-Bolshevism, virulent anti-Semitism and a belief in a world-wide Jewish conspiracy remain crucial factors. But the timing of the invasion was heavily influenced by many other factors. Hitler had really wanted to avoid a two front war, something he had considered a major error of Germany's military leadership in WWI. And even when, shortly after his victory in France, he still believed the UK was going to reach an accommodation with him, he still believed the long-sought confrontation with the USSR might be ten years away, and that he might even have to leave it to his successor. In addition he was worried that after a victory over the UK he might not be able to get the German people to get behind an invasion of the USSR. As it became clear that Britain would not give in, he was therefore confronted with a strategic dilemma. In the run-up to Barbarossa Hitler was considering several options, an invasion of the UK, an invasion of the USSR, a Mediterranean strategy and even inviting the USSR to join the Axis powers. For various reasons these alternatives turned out to be unworkable in Hitler's opinion. In addition he feared the USA might intervene from 1942 onward and that the strength of the USSR and its leverage over Germany would also continue to increase. Because of this he thought that the only hope he had of ever conquering the Western Soviet Union and its resources in order to establish Germany as a global power was to attack and destroy the USSR in 1941. Fritz agrees with Förster that Hitler decided to invade the USSR "not as a result of England's intransigence, but despite it." (Fritz, pg. 75) Martijn Meijering (talk) 13:23, 2 December 2016 (UTC)
The debate, if I'm not mistaken, regarding the article lead is whether we stay with the single main reason (i.e. "The operation was driven primarily by an ideological desire to conquer the Western Soviet Union so that it could be repopulated by Germans") or to list multiple short term and long term goals. I prefer the older version since there is not a detailed discussion of motivations in the body of the article in what is primarily a military article. In any event the various IPs involved should quit reverting until a consensus is reached. Tom (North Shoreman) (talk) 02:46, 5 December 2016 (UTC)
Agreed on both points, I'm only saying that the reasons and constraints influencing the timing deserve more attention further down in the article. Martijn Meijering (talk) 11:39, 5 December 2016 (UTC)
You probably are right about the need for adding the info in your last post in the body of the article. I assumed it was probably covered elsewhere in related articles but I couldn't find that it was. Tom (North Shoreman) (talk) 04:13, 8 December 2016 (UTC)

Reason for operation

The invasion was launched to destroy the Soviet Union before Stalin modernized the Red Army in 1942, and so the Axis could use resources from the USSR in the war in the West (as Churchill had rejected Hitler's peace offer in May 1941). Repopulating the western part of the Soviet Union with Germans was just the underlying aim. (Ghasmws (talk) 07:59, 29 December 2016 (UTC))

To amp up their stakes against Britain is not a primary reason (arguably not even a secondary reason) for the invasion of the USSR. It is a reason, but absolutely not worthy of mention in lede. Here is a simple question that makes that all too clear: would have Hitler invaded the USSR if Britain had surrendered in 1940? The answer is yes. Also, if the Axis had defeated the USSR, they would have used the resources that they obtained to fight any remaining enemies, be it Britain or United States or any other country. Britain was not a uniquely specific reason for invading the USSR. EyeTruth (talk) 10:14, 29 December 2016 (UTC)
Also, please update the reference style for consistency as per Wikipedia's policy/guideline WP:CITE. EyeTruth (talk) 10:19, 29 December 2016 (UTC)
Thank you, Eyetruth, that needed to be said. We have an inbalance in the article now which almost seems to argue that the *real* reason for the invasion of the USSR was to defeat Britain. In fact, invading the USSR was absolutely a core part of Nazism. We need to adjust the language here. DMorpheus2 (talk) 13:49, 29 December 2016 (UTC)
Apologies; I see the needed edits have been made. Well done guys. DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:18, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

Vandalism

Right-wing trolls from 4chan are vandalizing this page. You should lock it down. http://imgur.com/a/rjeUy91.226.113.141 (talk) 22:56, 4 January 2017 (UTC)

Aftermath portion

Would like to review this passage, which I'm moving here for discussion:

  • Instead of profiting the German people, Operation Barbarossa's failure also triggered additional suffering when an estimated 1.4 million ethnic Germans died as a result of their forced flight from the East to the West, whether during the German retreat or later following the surrender.[1] Another often overlooked consequence of Hitler's massive attack on the Soviet Union, was that it provoked the greatest displacement and migration of German people in human history; by 1950 for example, nearly 7.7 million ethnic Germans migrated from their former homelands in the East to what was West Germany, while another 4.1 million of them arrived in the former DDR.[2][a]

References

  1. ^ Hartmann 2013, p. 158.
  2. ^ Hartmann 2013, pp. 161–163.

I suggest this be removed. This may be appropriate discussion in the overall WW2 article, but with four years of the war still to come, this seems premature. This passage also reads subtly POV, as in "the Germans were victims of Barbarossa, too". Feedback? K.e.coffman (talk) 00:12, 5 January 2017 (UTC)

That passage has caught my attention before. It shouldn't exist in this article. EyeTruth (talk) 01:32, 5 January 2017 (UTC)
The post-war realignment of power is sufficiently covered in the previous paragraph so I agree with the removal. However, I don't see it as just accounting for victimhood since the ostensible long-term goals of the invasion (racial lebensraum and increased standard of living) were in stark contrast to its end result. Qzd (talk) 01:51, 5 January 2017 (UTC)
I'd rather see the wording improved than the text itself removed. Martijn Meijering (talk) 19:37, 5 January 2017 (UTC)
If someone were to propose a good, brief alternative I might support it. But on a yes or no vote then it should go. Gog the Mild (talk) 22:13, 5 January 2017 (UTC)
I don't know how rewording will help. The subject of that paragraph has nothing to do with the aftermath of Operation Barbarossa. EyeTruth (talk) 01:15, 6 January 2017 (UTC)
Well, Barbarossa was launched to conquer more territory (Lebensraum) for the German people, and it ended up doing the exact opposite. That seems worth noting. Martijn Meijering (talk) 15:23, 6 January 2017 (UTC)
With respect, I disagree. Barbarossa ended in 1941. Not every consequence of the German-Soviet war can be laid at the feet of Operation Barbarossa. History isn't overdetermined that way. DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:27, 6 January 2017 (UTC)
It seems that the current consensus is not to return the passage to the article. Let's keep it out. K.e.coffman (talk) 19:31, 6 January 2017 (UTC)
I'm getting in a bit late here, but agree that this is beyond the article's scope. It's relevant to articles on the overall German-Soviet war, the late-war campaigns, etc, but not this particular campaign given that these events were not pre-ordained. Nick-D (talk) 21:32, 6 January 2017 (UTC)
Even later :) I would concur that the paragraph is looking far too forward, and colleague Martijn Meijering's point seems to be a little over-ambitious. Also take on board K.E's point that the point of the paragraph could be distorted and used as a magnet for "revisionist" socks and banned users playing the equivalance game. Best to err on the side of caution here and dispense with it. Irondome (talk) 23:36, 6 January 2017 (UTC)

Distance retreated from Moscow

Part of the Phase Four section reads "by 13 December, the Red Army had pushed the Germans to over 100 miles westwards", citing Baker and Fritz. However, a glance at any map of the battle suggests that this is not accurate. I don't have access to either Baker or Fritz to check what they actually say, but Glantz and House mention "100–250 km" (62–155 mi); this is used in the Wikipedia Battle of Moscow article. Clark (dated, I know, and not a "proper" historian) states "territorial gains were limited to a 40 mile belt at the approaches to Moscow".

I have tidied the grammar a little, but am still not happy. I am inclined to replace the current phraseology with that from The Battle of Moscow. Thoughts? Gog the Mild (talk) 19:52, 8 January 2017 (UTC)

I don't know who added the sentence cited to Baker & Fritz, I don't have them either. Maybe someone else has them. I would be inclined to go with Glantz & House. Kierzek (talk) 20:13, 8 January 2017 (UTC)
"...to over 100 miles westwards" could be read as "up to 100 miles and farther"; this may not be incorrect but it's quite vague. Going with Glantz & House sounds like a good idea. K.e.coffman (talk) 20:19, 8 January 2017 (UTC)

Boldly edited. Gog the Mild (talk) 23:34, 8 January 2017 (UTC)

Finland

Is there a reason the article completely ignores the Finnish front? The article lists the relevant units - Army of Norway, the Finnish Army and the Soviet Northern Front - but the significant fighting which happened there is not even mentioned once. Dead Mary (talk) 17:30, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

If you have sources, please go ahead. A summary of the continuation war is needed. EyeTruth (talk) 19:21, 31 December 2016 (UTC)
Ok, sure, I have sources and could easily write something if nobody objects. However I am not quite sure about the size and where to place it. Should the Finnish theatre get its own dedicated section in the article, independent of the current "phase 1-4" structure? If so, I would place it after "Phase 4"? Dead Mary (talk) 21:47, 31 December 2016 (UTC)
In terms of placement, I would suggest putting it in phase one, immediately after "Air war". Then we have a panorama of the entire front from the extreme north to the centre and south. I would also swap the sections "Ukraine and Moldavia" and "Belorussia" from their present order. It would seem more logical. Irondome (talk) 22:13, 31 December 2016 (UTC)
Given that the action - apart from certain rather low-key events excluding the Soviet air attacks - started in mid July it might be a tad misleading to put it that early. - Wanderer602 (talk) 00:23, 1 January 2017 (UTC)
I agree it is early. A section in phase 2 would be then more appropriate. It encompasses the July period. It gives an opportunity to split phase 2 into regional sections also. I like the way phase 1 is organised. Phase 2 is a wall of text and not as reader - friendly. Irondome (talk) 01:23, 1 January 2017 (UTC)
Ok, I will see what I can do. I will write something on the next weekend.`Dead Mary (talk) 20:14, 2 January 2017 (UTC)

I added some part about the development in Finland during Barbarossa. However I am not quite sure of the size. I tried to keep it short, but since I had to mention 4 separate fronts it is still some text in phase 1, 2 and 3; despite being just a side-show. So if someone thinks this should be changed, sized down, or even presented in an entirely different way; I am open for changes. Dead Mary (talk) 18:32, 6 January 2017 (UTC)

I would add a correction to what you wrote that statement you made "German aircraft used Finnish air bases to attack Soviet positions" is actually technically false. German bombers used a Finnish air base to refuel on the return trip from bombing (or dropping naval mines, can't remember which) the Soviet positions but the Finns did not allow the use of its territory or air bases for directly attacking Soviet positions. The refueling was in accordance to pre-war agreements which allowed German military aircraft to refuel on certain Finnish air bases. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:15, 7 January 2017 (UTC)
More broadly, the implication in this material that Finland intended to remain neutral is not at all correct. Finland was involved in the planning for Barbarossa, and always intended to be involved - which is why very substantial German forces were in the far north of Finland on 22 June, and attacked the USSR a week later. The Finns pretended that they were fighting a defensive war, but this was essentially propaganda. Nick-D (talk) 07:23, 7 January 2017 (UTC)
Be that as it may but without the Soviet attack it would have been quite difficult to get the Parliament's approval for a war (which is required for both war and peace). Without parliament's (with left wing, anti-war, social democrat lead) approval the president or the government couldn't do that regardless of their intentions. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:25, 7 January 2017 (UTC)
The two things aren't mutually exclusive: the Finnish government prepared with the Germans to invade the USSR, then obtained parliamentary agreement for the war. Nick-D (talk) 09:20, 7 January 2017 (UTC)
Without the Soviet attack it would have been. Parliament wasn't keen on war. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:36, 7 January 2017 (UTC)
You are both right, but the obvious problem is that German-Finnish diplomacy pre-Barbarossa fills books. This article deals mainly with the operational side of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Presenting all the diplomatic nuances and the inner-Finnish governments workings during the rundown to the invasion is quite hard with limited space. @Wanderer602: Regarding that airfield I changed so now it is similar to the other articles. The airfields in question were the "Malmi and Utti airports" which were granted to the Luftwaffe. Dead Mary (talk) 19:37, 7 January 2017 (UTC)

@Dead Mary: Good work on the new Finnish section; I like it. I have tidied up some areas of it. People, especially Dead Mary, may want to cast an eye over the changes. Gog the Mild (talk) 20:20, 10 January 2017 (UTC)
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