Talk:Operation Barbarossa/Archive 4

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

Archive 6

Archive 7

Time zone

Could anybody please clarify in the text which time zone is meant there. Otherwise such notations as 3:15 AM, 0:30 AM and so on are useless. Colchicum (talk) 12:52, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

A mess

This article seems to have gone downhill since I last looked at it - and it wasn't too good then. Major turning points are briefly referenced and lost amongst a plethora of often unnecessary detail. There is lots of repetition and little structure.

Unfortunately, this is par for the course on Wikipedia where popular subjects are concerned. Everybody wants to have their say and the end result is a dog's breakfast. One day I think we are going to have to implement some sort of system where an article is declared finished, and further additions can only be made by consensus. Gatoclass (talk) 01:02, 8 January 2010 (UTC) --- The map is wrong. The borders of Finland did not look like that 1941( (only after 1945). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.241.9.233 (talk) 19:50, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

Propaganda photo

i wonder how could that photo of german soldiers with soviet villagers be propaganda , when the germans didnt do much on their offensive and only employed the scorched earth policy on their retreat?

Employing the "Scorched earth" policy, given the fact that the real supplies and rations could be found in the soviet villages not cities, in my opinion. 78.39.91.199 (talk) 09:53, 6 February 2010 (UTC) Goshtasp

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.39.91.81 (talk) 13:15, 26 January 2010 (UTC)    13:22, 26 January 2010 (UTC) Posted by goshtasp, the wikipedia noob

Map

The Map is incorrect. The border of Finland was like that only after 1945. The real map look likes this: http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiedosto:Operation_Barbarossa.png —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.247.190.30 (talk) 00:34, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

vichy france

i've added the france flag, actually i wanted the vichy france flag. anyway they were fighting with the tricolore flag and wearing french flag on shoulder patch. the vichy french unit is called LVF Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (638.Infanterieregiment) evidences are pretty easy to find. here's a batch. free and vichy french are overlooked in ww2. i'm actually working to fix that. Cliché Online (talk) 07:14, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Issue Soviet army strength and losses

Here are currently the numbers for the Soviet/German strength and overall losses on the first table of Operation Barbarossa Wikipedia page:

SOVIET STRENGTH : ~3.2 million initial (later 5 million more)
SOVIET OVERALL LOSSES : 7,1 millions (802,191 killed; 3,000,000 wounded; 3,300,000 captured.)
For me it is not consistent (5 millions giving 7.1 millions). Unless you mean 3.2 + 5 millions giving 8.2 millions overall ?

Even if a beginning of explanation is given in the section "Soviet preparations", precisions need to be added on the overall table to avoid an irrational feeling. Maybe a precision can be added on the timeframe of the numbers explaining the addition of different soviet reserves and milices during the operation

GERMAN STRENHTH : ~3.9 million (including reserve)
GERMAN OVERALL LOSSES : 775 000 (250,000 killed; 500,000 wounded; 25,000 missing)
For me it is consistent. A.Frenkel (talk) 15:46, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Alexandre Frenkel—Preceding unsigned comment added by A.Frenkel (talk • contribs) 11:50, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Redundancy

In section Soviet preparations there is some redundancy:

Stalin's distrust of the British led to his ignoring the warnings, believing it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war.

and

Last, he also suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR.

--Mortense (talk) 00:15, 19 June 2010 (UTC)

Two sentences for review

These two sentences did not make sense. What should they be?

"a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other nations. " (Section Soviet preparations)

"Anti-German partisan operations intensified when Red Army units that had dissolved into the country's large uninhabited areas re-emerged as underground forces, and under the German repressive policies." (Section Outcome)

--Mortense (talk) 00:23, 19 June 2010 (UTC)

Inappropriate Information

The second paragraph of the section titled "Soviet preparations" starts by stating some number given in Taylor and Proektor (which, for some reason, is cited in text rather than cited through reference). The paragraph continues by criticizing the accuracy of this source.

Why is this here? Why do we have criticism of some published work in the middle of a paragraph, which I assume is suppose to tell us the number of troops the Soviets had available. Moreover, the "corrected" numbers given here (which are supposed to be far more accurate than the numbers given by Taylor and Proektor) have absolutely no citations to back them up. Was this original research? If someone has a problem with the accuracy of Taylor and Proektor, their criticism should be written elsewhere. This second paragraph should simply contain the most accurate information we have available. Perhaps someone who has spent years studying the subject could cite what he or she believes to be the most accurate source. 76.120.195.191 (talk) 10:46, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

No. of tanks

The "Strength" section in the infobox states that the Soviet Union had "12-15,000 tanks". The subsequent "Casualties and losses" says that the Soviets lost "20,500 tanks lost". Something wrong here? utcursch | talk 05:35, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

12-15.000 tanks at the beginning of the war. 20.500 is a total losses during war. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.190.143.248 (talk) 22:27, 28 October 2010 (UTC)

Concerning the quote of Stalin that war with Germany was inevitable

The source for that quote is given as "N. Lyashchenko, 'O vystuplenii I. V. Stalina v Kremle, 5 maya 1941', Volkogonov Papers, reel no.8, p.1." The contents of the Volkogonov Papers are online. Reel 8 begins in Box 12 which is described as personal papers. They are given date ranges of 1925-1927 and (all others combined) 1985-1995. Further, the bio of Volkogonov says

A prolific writer, Volkogonov wrote numerous books. His biography of Joseph Stalin has been widely translated. His interpretations were often controversial, and in 1985 he was removed from his position of assistant to the director of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet army because of his views on the role of the army. He was reassigned to the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1991, he was relieved of this position following the publication of the first volume of a ten-volume work on World War II in which he commented on the unpreparedness of the Soviet army and Stalin's attitude towards the war.

Similarly, the page Soviet offensive plans controversy puts Volkogonov in the "Soviets were unprepared" camp of historians.

Therefore I think there is reason to be skeptical of that quote. JoshNarins (talk) 12:11, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

Perhaps. But the question is what exactly the Soviets were unprepared for. Was if a defensive war on their own turf that they didn't count on, or were they not prepared to attack Germany at all? At any rate, preparing for either would not have been an instantaneous process. Stalin could have anticipated a war, and in all likelihood did. It is foolish to think that Stalin would trust Hitler so far as to think that the peace would last. But getting everything in order to fight effectively? That would take time. Too much time, as it would turn out. Hence 'unprepared'. That's at least how I see it. Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 13:37, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

In the chapter "Where Was Our Air Force?" in Von Hardesty's Red Phoenix, a book about the Soviet Air Force (VVS) in World War II, Hardesty describes the VVS as being one year away from achieving readiness for offensive operations at the time of Germany invading. Hardesty takes it as fact that Stalin was planning to attack, and that he was surprised by invasion. Binksternet (talk) 14:17, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

Planning for Operation Barbarossa started on 18 December 1940

In English "Planning for Operation Barbarossa started on 18 December 1940" In Russian "Разработка плана «Барбаросса» началась 21 июля 1940 года." - "Planning for Operation Barbarossa started on 21 July 1940"

Which is right? Started on 21 July and approved on 18 December? And when actually it was named Barbarossa?

Mikhail —Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.120.174.26 (talk) 15:49, 14 December 2010 (UTC)

Just Soviet Union?

In the Belligerents it says the Soviet Union was fighting alone, but I was under the impression that it's efforts were aided by Mongolia and Tannu Tuva —Preceding unsigned comment added by 220.239.138.32 (talk) 12:09, 24 December 2010 (UTC)

Purpose of the operation

Should be inserted in opening paragraph: It was the foundation of implementing the Final Solution through the deployment of the Einsatzgruppen in occupied eastern territories, and the culmination of the Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany's struggle against Judeo-Bolshevism.

Should be inserted in closing paragraph of introduction: Politically the events surrounding Barbarossa deciminated Judeo-Bolshevik influence inside the Soviet Union.

Should be inserted in opening paragraph of "1939-1940 Nazi-Soviet relations": Following the Munich Agreement in May 1938, the Soviet Union felt the West was not a reliable ally as once believed and began to change their foreign policy with Nazi Germany to deter hostilities.

Should be inserted as new section in "1939-1940 Nazi-Soviet relations: Soviet pro-Nazi purges In order to appease Hitler during this period, Stalin purged leading Jewish diplomats, including Maxim Litvinov. He was quoted as saying "purge the ministry of Jews" and "clean out the synagogue." Litvinov's replacement, Vyacheslav Molotov, was quoted as responding to Stalin "thank God for these words! Jews formed an absolute majority in the leadership and among the ambassadors. It wasn’t good."

Should be inserted as a new section in "Germany plans the invasion": Einsatzgruppen and the Final Solution The Nazis initiated plans to deploy the Einsatzgruppen behind the invading Wehrmacht into the conquered territories to counter the partisan activity as well as to eradicate Jews. In April 1941 Nazi Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch issued an order that all Jews were to be identified and registered after occupation. By May 1941, verbal commands were given that all Jews in the Soviet Union were to be shot. In July 1941 Reinhard Heydrich issued official policies, including Order No. 8, on execution of Soviet officials, specifically targeting Jews in party and state employment, and for their separation from the rest of Soviet POWs. On the eve of the invasion, the OKW issued "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia" which demanded "...ruthless and energetic action against Bolshevik agitators, partisans, saboteurs, Jews..." Hermann Göring signed an order on July 31, 1941 authorizing the initiation of draft plans for the "solution" to the "Jewish question" in Nazi-occupied territories. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who would participate in the invasion, stated in an order in November 1941 that "the Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all." These orders would lay the foundation for what became known as the Final Solution.

Should be inserted as a new section in "Outcome": Extermination of Jews The extermination of Jews and their communities began immediately with the launch of the invasion. Einsatzgruppe A had executed 136,421 Jews as of November 1941. By February 1942, the figure had reached 229,052. Einsatzgruppe B had executed 45,456 Jews as of November 1941, Einsatzgruppe C 95,600 as of December 1941, and Einsatzgruppe D 92,000 as of April 1942.

Should be inserted as a new section in "Underestimated Soviet potential": Russian nationalists, patriots, and orthodox Russian nationalists, patriots, and orthodox, who bore the brunt of the Judeo-Bolshevik persecution in the preceeding decades in the Soviet Union, played a key role in the resistance and ultimate victory as the Soviets were forced to compromise and sacrifice their ideology with these groups in order to gain their support to win the war. Russian nationalism was revived as a result of the invasion, despite the nationalist's hatred of the Soviet system. The orthodox were brought back into Soviet public life. Soviet propaganda would call their struggle the "Great Patriotic War."

Should be inserted as a new section in "Aftermath": Judeo-Bolshevism Judeo-Bolshevism in the Soviet Union politically was decimated by Operation Barbarossa as their influence was decreased. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed and their communities destroyed during the operation. By the end of the war, an estimated 2.5 million Soviet Jews had perished at the hands of the Nazis. Soviet Jews who escaped the Nazis had local Russians turn against them. Between 1942-1943, many Jewish cultural figures and media editors were sacked by the Soviets. In order to win the war, the traditional internal enemies of Judeo-Bolshevism in Russia were brought back into favor as the invasion forced the Soviet Union to betray the Judeo-Bolshevik establishment.

Should be removed for extreme POV violations and for lack of citation: In "Nazi theory regarding Soviet Union": Accordingly, it was Nazi stated policy to kill, deport, or enslave the Russian and other Slavic populations and repopulate the land with Germanic peoples (see New Order). (Ideas decades before from the youthful ignorance of an angry, oppressed people that found no basis in any of the actual orders given years later or significant realities when the operation commenced.)

"Germany plans the invasion": Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical Lebensraum idea ("Drang nach Osten") for the benefit of future "Aryan" generations. (No it wasn't. It was to destroy the center of global Judeo-Bolshevism)

"Causes of failure of Operation Barbarossa" The Soviet government was never in danger of collapse and remained at all times in tight control of the Soviet war effort. (Yes they were. The Nazis were on the outskirts of Moscow and if the Soviet memory of their near collapse was not real, they'd remove all the barriers and obstacles they built during this period that still exist today.)

The Germans also underestimated Soviet technical and productive capacity. (The Pre-Operation Osoaviakhim Soviet Union largely relied on technical, scientific, and productive capacities from the United States and Western nations. Henry Ford revolutionized Soviet productivity in 1929 in bringing his manufacturing concepts to the country with the construction of a Ford Plant there. Ironically this plant would help defeat the Americans in Cold War theaters later on. Ford was an original financier of Hitler during the 20s, helping finance his revolt in Bavaria. Standard Oil helped develop their modern-energy sector. The United States provided the Soviet Union with a lot of their weapons, as well as technical and scientific assistance. It would be proper to say the Nazis underestimated the allies providing assistance to the Soviet Union, too. )

The Germans treated Soviet prisoners brutally and showed cruelty to overrun Soviet populations. This treatment instilled a deep hatred in the hearts and minds of the Soviet citizens. Hatred of the Germans enabled the Soviet government to extract a level of sacrifice from the Soviet population unheard of in Western nations. (True partially, no worse than the Soviets had treated their own people and Nazi allies. Those who bore the brunt of the Nazi brutality were largely Bolsheviks and their allies. The Soviets even treated their American allies who built their manufacturing capacity up in the worst ways, as Joseph E. Davies and William C. Bullitt sold out the American laborers who went to Russia to work for Ford and other American companies and left them in the gulags to die, some ultimately ending up mining Russian gold being sent back to the American Federal Reserve. The reality is many reports, such as from the American Red Cross, dispute alleged mistreatment by the Nazis. In fact, many Eastern Europeans who were victims of both the Soviets and Nazis have said the Soviet treatment was much worse.)

The Germans underestimated the Soviet people as well. The German High Command viewed Soviet soldiers as incompetent and considered the average citizen as an inferior human being. German soldiers were stunned by the ferocity with which the Red Army fought. German planners were amazed at the level of suffering the Soviet citizens could endure and still work and fight. (The Nazis underestimated the Russian winter, too.)

Addressing distortions of history: Many agenda-based historians repeatedly throw around words from books and other literature from writers of youthful ignorance oppressed at the time by groups who collaborated with the Bolsheviks in order to keep a barrier between those they want in their camp and the other side concerning history. They repeatedly insist actions were based on nationality and ethnicity, not alliance. Operation Barbarossa was not an attempt to implement Hitler's ideas from Mein Kampf except for complete destruction of Judeo-Bolshevism. All credible scholars conclude such. The orders pertaining to the mistreatment of the Russians in occupied territories were predominantly against the Bolsheviks and their allies, not Russians in general and ethnic minorities. Any conquest of Russia would have resulted in the anti-Bolshevik Russians regaining control of their country aligned with Nazi Germany.

The Nazis viewed Bolsheviks and their collaborators in less than flattering ways. True. Their alliance with the Bolsheviks opened them up for such immature rhetoric and treatment. It was not their view of the people in general. In fact, throughout Nazi Germany many championed a Russian-German alliance to fight the common Bolshevik enemy. "Germany-Russia above everything, above everything in the world." The Russian Liberation Army and ethnic minorities fought alongside the Nazis. The Nazis were aligned with diverse ethnic groups from across the world in the war more than the Allies were. Everywhere the Nazis went, those being oppressed by the Bolsheviks collaborated with them, from Ukraine to Poland and elsewhere. Even if some weren't aligned with the Nazis, they still tried to prevent harsh treatment, such as in China.

Some need to drop the notion that Nazi Germany was just all about German supremacy because they fought to liberate peoples across the world and of all ethnicities. Operation Barbarossa was the implementation of Nazi Germany's war against Judeo-Bolshevism, the system they saw enslaving so many around the world and the whole purpose of their existence. From that perspective, Operation Barbarossa was a success because it did provide the final blow to Judeo-Bolshevism in the Soviet Union. The Soviets were forced to bring back the Nationalists and others they had spent decades persecuting in order to win the war. The actions of the Nazis leading up to the invasion and during contributed to just that, nationalist triumph over the Judeo-Bolshevik element in the Soviet Union.

War on NBC Universal (talk) 21:39, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

All this is very interesting in itself but represents an extreme minority view. At least, if I understand your argumentation correctly. Basically you are arguing, not simply that the German anti-Semitic motives should be more emphasized (which could in principle be a valid point) but that if there hadn't been a single Jew present in the Soviet-Union, the entire war wouldn't have happened? So that the suffering of the Slavic peoples was caused by the Jews?--MWAK (talk) 07:53, 24 January 2011 (UTC)

Commanders No mention of Valentin Rokossovsky, strange considering his considerable influence on Russian operations. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.254.147.116 (talk) 14:30, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

Soviet Preperation

There are large paragraph of uncited information that contradicts previously given information, which was cited, under Soviet Preparations. That section is also repetitive in general, repeating various facts 4-5 times, and some even more than that. The section needs a touch up. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.177.141.78 (talk) 00:55, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Germany casualties issue

In given reference (http://www.feldgrau.com/stats.html) written what:

German KIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 1,419,728 German MIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 997.056 German WIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 3,498,060

But in article written:

250,000 killed[3] 500,000 wounded 25,000 missing[3]

So someone trying to do such blatant falsification? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.92.202.18 (talk) 22:59, 8 May 2011 (UTC)

Those are the casualties from 1941 to 1944, you even quoted it. Barbarossa is only until December 1941... StoneProphet (talk) 16:15, 14 May 2011 (UTC)

But MIA and POW numbers for Soviets given for whole Eastern Front (1941-45) 93.92.202.18 (talk) 17:28, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

No, Soviet losses were that high during the first 5 months. There were numerous Soviet armies encircled and captured/destroyed. StoneProphet (talk) 20:19, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Incomplete translation in description of Army Group South

As the text is currently, "Karpat Group" is given as the English translation of the German "Karpat Gruppe." Surely this should be "Carpathian Group." I will make the indicated change in a few days if no one objects.

In addition, the orginal German was probably Karpaten Gruppe or Karpaten-Gruppe; this is how I have always seen this command denominated in all my reading on Barbarossa; but since I don't have access to the source material, I cannot be sure of this, and so do not feel I should make this change. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 166.205.13.108 (talk) 14:57, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Wikipedia inconsistency

"Roughly three million Wehrmacht troops went into action on 22 June, and they faced slightly fewer Soviet troops in the border Military Districts. The contribution of the German allies would generally not make itself felt until later. The surprise was complete: though the Stavka, alarmed by reports that Wehrmacht units were approaching the border, had at 00:30 ordered that the border troops be warned that war was imminent, only a small number of units were alerted in time."

is in conflict with

[[1]] "Stavka of the Soviet Armed Forces during World War II, or the headquarters of the "Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Union of SSR" (Stavka Glavnogo Komandovaniya) (Russian: Ставка Главного Командования Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР), was established on June 23, 1941 by the top secret decree signed by Joseph Stalin in his capacities both as the head of government and as the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Stavka cannot have warned troops on June 22nd 1941 if it was created on June 23rd 1941! 13:30, 25 June 2011 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lastdingo (talk • contribs)

Barbarossa took place on the territory of the USSR

My recent edit has been reverted [2]. Although that is a normal per se, the edit summary does not look convincing. In my opinion, the best way to give a reader a correct impression of the geographical location of the events is to give a name of the country where this event occurred. The name of the country where Barbarossa took place is the USSR. The argument that the acquisition of newly annexed territories had not been recognized by that time does not work, because (i) that acquisition has been recognized both de jure and defacto (for Eastern Poland, North Bukovina and Moldavia) or de facto (the Baltic states), and (ii) a major part of the territory affected by Barbarossa belonged to the USSR even before 1939. Please, provide more adequate rationale, or I restore my edit.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:54, 17 July 2011 (UTC)

Who recognised the Soviet acquisitions of territory in 1941 when Barbarossa commenced? --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 08:34, 17 July 2011 (UTC)

I thought it is not as much as about recognition, but about the very definition of operation which was fought against "BARBAric ROSSiya". Also considering all those references to the M-R pact, didn't Nazi Germany recognize the acquisitions? So since Nazi Germany was the country that devised and executed the operation Barbarossa, I think Germany's opinion is the only one that matters here. (Igny (talk) 11:57, 17 July 2011 (UTC))

I must say you theory of "BARBAric ROSSiya" is extremely fringe. Barbarossa means "red beard" in Italian, and is the name given to the German Frederick I, Holy Roman Emperor. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 00:12, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

Recognition is not approval. The territory is deemed to be a part of the country not since the moment of the recognition (which, by the way, is not granted explicitly, but via the international treaties, which, inter alia, mention the state borders), but by the moment of acquisition, so the recognition acts in retrospect. As I already said, all newly acquired territories had been subsequently recognized as de facto part of the USSR, and most of them (except three Baltic states) were recognized as de jure part of the USSR. In addition, most of territories affected by Barbarossa were the part of the USSR even before 1939, and were internationally recognized as such. Moreover, such a country as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, never existed (except, probably, very short period of time during the Russian civil war, when they had not been recognized by appreciable amount of international states).

In summary, Barbarossa took place on the territory of the USSR (and against the USSR), and that should be written clearly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:56, 17 July 2011 (UTC)

Nope, there is no concept of retrospectivity in international law, that is something you made up. Poland did not formally cede those areas occupied by the Soviet Union until they signed a treaty on August 16, 1945, after it was agreed at the Yalta Conference that the Soviet Union could retain its Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gains of Polish territory. There was no such formal agreement with respect to the Baltic states. In 1941 it remained occupied territory. The claim it was Soviet territory is just Soviet/Nazi POV of 1941. So if you insist on mentioning "Soviet Union" as the location in the infobox, the best description would "Western part of the USSR, Soviet occupied Baltic states and Soviet occupied Poland" --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 00:02, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

No, if you really want the best description, that would be ussr, with a footnote that it includes the newly annexed baltic states and part of poland. (Igny (talk) 00:47, 18 July 2011 (UTC))

The location described in the infobox as it currently stands has been stable for years, you seem to want to change it to represent Soviet/Nazi POV of 1941. The best description is the current one. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 01:09, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

The footnote may be the best compromise option here. Maybe something like "*Including the recently acquired Baltic states and portions of Poland." But I think that the listing of all the various modern territories was intended more to give modern readers an idea of where the conflict unfolded, rather than present the contemporaneous borders. ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 01:16, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

Stability was never a proof of correctness here on WP. I am not trying to represent Nazi/Soviet view, I try to represent the correct political map of Europe of 1941. If you want precise description of the location then it should be Estonian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, etc. If want to list then existing states, then it should be USSR, period. (Igny (talk) 01:21, 18 July 2011 (UTC))

Lothar von Richthofen is correct, the location in the infobox is intended to give readers an idea were the conflict unfolded geographically, hence the current names are used, otherwise referring to defunct entities that ceased to exist years ago is confusing to readers. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 01:27, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

To refer to the entities that didn't exist during that time is even more confusing. I agree with Lothar idea about the footnote. Regarding the modern territories, the list is partially misleading (Barbarossa did not involve the territory of present days Poland). In addition, the explanation about the faith of the USSR hardly belongs to this infobox. --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:29, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

It is more common to refer current names when referring to geographical locations, for example the infobox of Cambodian–Vietnamese War lists the location as Cambodia, southern Vietnam, eastern Thailand despite the fact that fighting took place in Democratic Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. There may be some inconsistencies with the current list of geographical locations, but "Western part of the USSR" is too vague, unless you think Operation Silver Fox was conducted in "Western part of the USSR" too. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 03:48, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

You are partially correct. Probably a combination of both approaches (The USSR - present days Belarus, etc) would be the best solution. In any event, location of Barbarossa had no relation to the present days Poland.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:59, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

Really now, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR through Soviet-occupied territory. Nazi Germany did not simply invade the USSR. Poland was both Nazi- and Soviet-occupied. The Baltics were Soviet-occupied. The "map" of Europe in 1941 was who was occupied by whom, no sovereign territory in Eastern Europe had passed into legal possession of any other sovereign entity. Ergo, there is no "Estonian SSR" et al. to be invaded. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 03:33, 4 August 2011 (UTC)

POW

this line in the first paragraph "The German forces captured 3 million Russian POWs, who did not enjoy the protection stipulated in the Geneva Conventions[24] and some 2/3 of them never returned alive"

is somewhat bias given that an extremely large number of German POW's also never returned

http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w02.htm-186

Not really. The Soviets took few prisoners in the 1941 period, thus the fate of German prisoners in Soviet captivity is not really part of the topic here. 16:32, 7 September 2011 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lastdingo (talk • contribs)

I agree that the above mentioned statement is biased. It was written by an American professor who in another book stated that Germans were "biologically programed" to murder the jews.k84m97 (talk) 17:48, 5 November 2011 (UTC)

Where are the little Nazi flags?

The box in the beginning of the article lists various entities and their national flags except for German nationals. Why is this? Wmt477 (talk) 00:16, 20 September 2011 (UTC) wmt477

What are you talking about? The infobox has all flags in place where they need to be. ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 01:02, 20 September 2011 (UTC)

Casus belli?

I find it illogical that the casus belli for this war was "Lebensraum". Germany had recently annexed and or conquered regions to the East prior to their declaration of war on the Soviet Union. Were these areas filled to the brim with German people and they needed more land? I don't get it. 184.96.230.182 (talk) 02:00, 24 November 2011 (UTC)

The Germans under Hitler had taken only Austria, Czechoslovakia, and part of Poland. Hitler also wanted the large areas governed under Soviet authority, including the rest of Poland, plus Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the vast farmland of the Ukraine, and the oil fields around Maikop (i.e., Maykop) and Grozny, etc. He pretty much wanted everything west of the Ural Mountains, if I recall correctly. Hitler believed that Germany had to have the farmland and the oil -- among other things. See, e.g., William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, p. 909 (Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1959, 1960). Famspear (talk) 02:40, 24 November 2011 (UTC)

PS: I'm talking only about the lands to the East here, of course. As we all know, Hitler had also conquered France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, etc., by the time he invaded the Soviet Union. Famspear (talk) 02:43, 24 November 2011 (UTC)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_Q5AbhMPcM 184.96.236.214 (talk) 17:38, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

The Soviet Union: A Threat?

removed-the Talk Pages are not a Forum, nor to be used for Soapboxing-your comments cited no RS's and were just a personal opinion.

The Soviet reaction to invasion

On 22 June three Directives of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence (NKO) were sent to the Soviet Western military districts:

NKO Directive No. 1

NKO Directive No. I

Concerning the Deployment of Forces in Accordance

with the plan for Covering Mobilization and Strategic Concentration

To: The Military Councils of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western and Kiev Military Districts.

Copy to: The People's Commissar of the Navy.

1. A surprise attack by the Germans on the fronts of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts is possible during the course of 22-23 June 1941.

2. The mission of our forces is to avoid provocative actions of any kind, which might produce major complications. At the same time, the Leningrad, Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts' forces are to be at full combat readiness to meet a surprise blow by the Germans or their allies.

3. I order:

(a) Secretly man the firing points of the fortified regions on the state borders during the night of 22 June 1941

(b) Disperse all aircraft, including military planes among field airfields and thoroughly camouflage them before dawn on 22 June 1941

(c) Bring all forces to a state of combat readiness without the additional call up of conscript personnel. Prepare all measures to black out cities and installations.

Take no other measures without special permission.

[signed] Timoshenko,Zhukov;

Received by the Western Special Military District at 0045 hours 22 June 1941

Dispatched to subordinate forces at 0225-0235 hours 22 June 1941;

NKO Directive No. 2'

NKO Directive No. 2

0715 hours 22 June 1941

To: The Military Councils of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western and Kiev Military Districts.

Copy to: The People's Commissar of the Navy.

On 22 June 1941 at 0400 hours in the morning, without any cause whatsoever, German aircraft carried out flight to our airfields and cities along the western frontier and subjected them to bombing.

Simultaneously, in a number of places German forces opened fire with artillery and crossed our border.

In connection with the unprecedented attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. I ORDER:

1. Troops in full strength and with all the means at their disposal will attack the enemy and destroy him in those regions where lie has violated the Soviet border. In the absence of special authorization, ground troops will not cross the frontier.

2. Reconnaissance and combat aircraft will determine the concentration areas of enemy aircraft and the deployment of his ground forces. Bomber and assault |ground-attack] aircraft will destroy the aircraft on enemy airfields by powerful strikes and will bomb concentrations of his ground forces. Mount aviation strikes on German territory to a depth of 100-150km (60-90 miles).

Bomb Konigsberg and Meniel.

Do not conduct flights over Finland and Rumania without special authorization.

[signed] Timoshenko,Malenkov,Zhukov

NKO Directive No. 3

NKO Directive No. 3 to the Military Councils of the

Northwestern, Western, Southwestern and Southern Fronts

Concerning Force Missions on 23-26 June

2115 hours 22 June 1941

1. Delivering main attacks from the Suvalki salient to Olita and from the Zamost'e region to the Vladimir-Volynskii and Radzekhov front and secondary attacks along the Til'sit, Shatiliai and Sedlits, Volkovysk axes, during the course of 22 June the enemy has achieved considerable success while suffering great losses.

In the remaining sectors of the state border with Germany and on the entire state border with Rumania, the enemy attacks have been beaten off with heavy losses to him.

2. I assign the forces [the following] immediate missions tor 23-24 June:

a) Encircle and destroy the enemy's Suvalki grouping by concentric, concentrated attacks by the Northwestern and Western Fronts and capture the Suvalki region by day's end on 24 June.

b) Encircle and destroy the enemy grouping attacking in the direction of Vladimir-Volynskii and Brody by powerful concentric attacks by mechanized corps, all southwestern Front aircraft and other forces of the 5th and 6th Annies. Capture the Lublin region by day's end on 24 June.

3. I ORDER:

a) The Northern Front's armies to continue to protect the state borders firmly. The left boundary - as exists.

b) While firmly holding on to the coast of the Baltic Sea, the Northwestern Front's armies will deliver a powerful counterstroke from the Kaunas region against the flanks and rear of the enemy's Suvalki grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and capture the Suvalki region by day's end on 24 June.

The left boundary - as exists.

c) While containing the enemy on the Warsaw axis, the Western Front's armies will deliver a powerful counterstroke with a force of no fewer than two mechanized corps and frontal aviation against the flank and rear of the enemy's Suvalki grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Northwestern Front and capture the Suvalki region by day's end on 24 June.

The left boundary - as exists.

d) While holding firmly to the border with Hungary, the Southwestern Front's armies will encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the Vladimir-Volynskii, Krystypol' front with concentric attacks in the general direction of Lublin with the 5th and 6th Armies, no fewer than five mechanized corps and all of the front's aviation, and capture the Lublin region by clay's end on 24 June. Cover yourself reliably along the Krakov axis.

e) The Southern Front's armies will prevent an enemy invasion of our territory. In the event the enemy attacks along the Chernovtsy axis or forces the Prut and Danube Rivers, destroy him by powerful flank attacks by ground forces in cooperation with aviation; concentrate two mechanized corps in the Kishinev region and the forests northwest of Kishinev on the night of 23 June.

4. I authorize crossing of the borders along the front from the Baltic Sea to the state border with Hungary and operations without regard for the borders.

5. The Aviation of the High Command:

a) Support the Northwestern Front with one flight from the 1st Long-range Aviation Corps and the Western Front with one flight from the 3rd Long-range Aviation Corps while they are fulfilling their missions of destroying the enemy's Suvalki grouping

b) Assign the 18th Long-range Aviation Corps to the Southwestern Front and support the Southwestern Front with one flight from the 2nd Long-range Aviation Corps while it is fulfilling its mission of destroying the enemy's Lublin grouping; and

c) Leave the 4th Long-range Aviation corps at my disposal in readiness to assist the Southwestern Front and, with part of its forces, the Black Sea Fleet.

The People’s Commisar of Defence, Member of the Main Military Council

Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko Malenkov

Chief of the Red Army General Staff

Army General Zhukov

Sent at 2115 hours 22 June 1941

(cited from [3])

This is a very important reference, as it shows actual Soviet High Command reaction to the German invasion. While I agree that it is maybe too long to quote the whole text, the content of those Directives should be mentioned in Wikipedia article!

For me, the 3rd Directive in particular is nothing else, but an direct order of aggresion on Nazi occupied territory (Lublin and Suvalki were at that time parts of German occupied Poland), thus proving Victor Suvorov's thesis about pre-Barbarossa Stalin's plans of aggression.

This is however my POW, and I can't add this to Wikipedia, as this would be my OR. I leave the text, and links here. Please someone do something with this text, summarize it, add to article, provide some references (it is referenced in Victor Suvorov and Mark Solonin books.

I have no nerves to deal with sometimes absurd Wikipedia polices.

83.26.75.97 (talk)

I deleted your addition. It is wa-a-ay too long for the article, and is not encyclopedic in nature. An encyclopedia is a summary of the topic, not a complete collection of everything related. Wikisource is the place for primary text such as this. What is more appropriate here is to summarize scholarly analysis of these orders, perhaps by citing Suvorov and Solonin. Binksternet (talk) 21:21, 10 December 2011 (UTC)

Yes - but I have no nerves to engage in some edit wars(and to summarize all discussions about it in a single paragraph). I would prefer if someone would do it for mee 83.26.75.97 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 21:34, 10 December 2011 (UTC).

Nazi ramblings (should we or should we not? That's the question.)

Once again somebody changed or removed "Nazi" terms from the front of Germany. It makes me wonder if we really should be more careful with the use of this term. There were numerous officers even in OKW and OKH who were not Nazis, even more among the other officers and common soldiers. Similarly the large amount of the civil servants were not nazis.

Why are we doing this? Are we creating a perfect villain, which is conveniently separated in the history: It is not related to former or later Germany or any other countries and it's policies do not have anything common with policies used in other countries.

I do consider that we are making a terrible mistake when we create and support this vilified caricature of Nazi Germany. It makes us too confident that it cannot happen again, so we fail to see how the views and policies of that ideology begin to creep into our society. Every neo-Nazi movement uses this caricature to show that they are *not* really a nazi movement.

Just my ramblings... Again. --Whiskey (talk) 08:35, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

"We" shouldn't do anything - we should reflect what the Reliable Sources cited say. HammerFilmFan (talk) 22:14, 14 March 2012 (UTC)

False citation for German casualties

The information in the infobox on German casualties cites http://www.feldgrau.com/stats.html as a source. I checked the source and did not find the data cited.--Toddy1 (talk) 13:00, 13 May 2012 (UTC)

I found this issue has been raised before (Talk:Operation Barbarossa/Archive 4#Germany casualties issue). But neither from that short dismissal nor from the actual source can I see how the numbers in the infobox have been calculated. Feldgrau does not break down the numbers by campaigns and months at the same time, it's either casualties by fronts or overall casualties by time steps. Apart from that, I wonder if Feldgrau.com is actually reliable per WP:RS. De728631 (talk) 13:33, 13 May 2012 (UTC)

I would be perfectly happy to accept it as tolerable if it actually contained the information cited.--Toddy1 (talk) 16:37, 13 May 2012 (UTC)

I added causalties numbers from a reliable source. StoneProphet (talk) 18:35, 14 May 2012 (UTC)

Thanks. Do you have a source for Slovak, Romanian, Finnish and Hungarian casualties?

If I understand it correctly those numbers refer to the whole the Army groups (they are based on the internal 10-Day casualty reports per Army/Army Group). So foreign units which were under German comand are possibly included. If not, casualties are probably a bit higher, but the main fighting was anyway taken by the Germans. StoneProphet (talk) 00:17, 15 May 2012 (UTC)

Need help naming the article in Bulgarian

I apologize in advance for asking this question here. I am from the Bulgarian Wikipedia and we have a huge argument about the name of the article in Bulgarian. Basically everything comes down to the question: is operation part of the name or is it just clarification of the name Barbarossa, in other words which one is a better choice - Operation Barbarossa or Barbarossa (operation)? Thank you very much for your help. --Joyradost 22:14, 28 June 2012 (UTC)

Barbarossa was a former German Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Operation Barbarossa is an english translation of "Unternehmen Barbarossa". "Barbarossa" is the name and "Unternehmen" or "operation" describe what it was, an military operation. However its common to use both words together to describe the name of the militay operation. Strange dispute you have over there... StoneProphet (talk) 22:48, 12 July 2012 (UTC)

Where were the 3.9 Million German Soldiers?

A German Infantry Division was 17,000 men,

The Number of German Infantry Divisions in position were 104 with 8 more in transit on June 22 1941 approx 1.7 Million Soldiers

with 17 German Panzer Divisions and 14 German Motorized Divisions approx 500,000 Men

Net Total of 2.2 Million not 3.2 3.5 or 3.9 Million as commonly quoted.

The entire German Army consisted of 208 Divisions at the time of the Attack with 140 to 150 Divisions in the East on June 22, 1941.

The oft quoted number of over 3 Million does not equate with the number of German Divisions on hand at the time of the attack. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.17.31.2 (talk) 15:59, 2 August 2012 (UTC)

For Wikipedia, the "oft quoted" part matters over "true", as long as the "quoters" are prominent historians like Glantz. --illythr (talk) 17:54, 2 August 2012 (UTC)

The German allies had several hundred thousand troops too. 3+ million also perhaps/probably includes non combat personnel. StoneProphet (talk) 00:43, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

Ach, but if you look at the organization of the Wehrmacht, you will see that there was a significant number of military personnel beyond the divisions - from heavy artillery to supply.Tvoi Ded (talk) 15:58, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

Soviet casualties' citation also wrong

Krivosheev is cited as a source for "802,191 killed". I can't find that number in his 2001 book. Instead, table 141 there provides "2 630 067 irrecoverable" (meaning "killed, captured, missing and wounded and not recovered") and "877 815 sanitary" (meaning wounded, but recovered), noting that these are documented losses only. The figure of three million wounded is not supported but any of the provided sources. --illythr (talk) 20:27, 14 May 2012 (UTC)

To further detalize the Soviet losses from Krivosheev (I have the 2010 edition, from table 139, pp 236-237) - in 1941 - 465 381 KIA, 101 471 DOW (probably double counted in the WIA), 235 339 non-combat irrecoverable (accidents, executions, death from disease, suicides etc), 2 335 482 MIA (sub-total 3 137 673 irrecoverable) as well as 1 256 421 WIA (of which, I assume, 101 471 died), 66 169 sick and 13 557 frostbite (sub-total 1 336 147 sanitary) for a total of 4 473 820 casualties. There are further ~500 000 conscript losses during mobilization, it's arguable if they should be included. But the total for 1941 cannot be more than 5 000 000.

Since we are comparing Soviet losses until 31.12.1941, same should be done with the German losses. Ten days reports for Heer (http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_tow41.html) alone give us 173 722 KIA, 35 873 MIA, 621 308 WIA (830 903). To that we must add German non-combat losses, losses of German allies (Finland, Romania etc). So the overall axis losses would likely be around 900 000 - 1 000 000, and overall ratio would be not 1:10 as is now, but 1:5.

I'm going to fix the infobox in a couple of days if there is no objection. Tvoi Ded (talk) 15:54, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

PS the 802 191 killed is just the sum of kia, dow and non-combat dead. It excludes undocumented dead which were instead counted as mia Tvoi Ded (talk) 04:48, 4 September 2012 (UTC)

Noted Historical quotes of 3.5 Million German Soldiers in Op Barbarossa

Noted Historians and Accounts routinely cite the 3.5 million German Soldiers, Historians and accounts are limited to the amount of either personal accounts or primary archival information avail to them. The use of Various Grand Strategy during War and particularly during WWII is the element of surprise and deception, that either conceals or projects Military Force or the appearance of Military Forces to confuse the opposing sides estimates or expectations of possible attack. This deception of force strength was a consistent factor that was used by the Germans During WWII to Dominate the Tactical aspect of Battle, German Standard Unit Organization was no indicator of actual strengths that could be considerably reinforced at the point of attack, a tactic that would not appear on a Historical German Order of Battle, and apparently is not specifically mentioned by noted Historians in the German Conduct of Military Operations. Two studies briefly address the Germans methods of Military Operations, and it is very brief, the United States Army Study on German Combat Operations against Poland and Col Albert Seatons Account of the Russo-German War 1941-1945. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.17.31.2 (talk) 18:08, 4 August 2012 (UTC)

This is just opinion, not backed up with book-published paper/author for any merit beyond Original Research. The idea that all military historians - the majority of whom are ex-military themselves in some manner - are all "out to lunch" is not tenable, and is of no value to the betterment of the Wiki article. HammerFilmFan (talk) 23:27, 16 September 2012 (UTC)

Infobox

I propose to extend the casualty count to the end of 1941, as Soviet casualties are not available separately for the period until the end of November. I also propose clearing some things up about what is counted and what is not - for example, the axis casualties as we have them now exclude non-German losses (Finland, Romania, etc), German non-combat losses (it would be nice if we could show how many were lost to frostbite, for example) as well as German losses in the North (AOK Norway), German naval losses (as marginal as they were), etc. yet they are present alongside total Soviet losses. In terms of numbers, the difference is between a 1:10 and a 1:5 or so ratio in casualties.

The reason for removal of the Muller citation is that number includes able-bodied male civilians as well as conscripts captured before actually joining the army. At the time his book was written, the Soviet records were unavailable. Since the victims (partially) weren't part of the military, they don't belong here, but instead belong to an article about Nazi war crimes.

Tvoi Ded (talk) 05:15, 4 September 2012 (UTC)

You are aware that the Soviet numbers for 1941 are incomplete, missing several hundred thousand casualties? Yes the 3 million captured include non registered conscripts, but that is no reason for excluding them. Casualties are casualties. The infobox is now a complete mess. StoneProphet (talk) 10:33, 5 September 2012 (UTC)

Perhaps I didn't stress my point strongly enough. The higher number, coming from the German side, includes civilians. The number of lost conscripts, estimated by Kriv at 500 000 is included in the 5,000,000 totals. As for the missing casualties - Kriv claims that units that didn't report were written in to the tally fully as MIA. Who and how estimated those extra several hundred thousand?Tvoi Ded (talk) 11:13, 6 September 2012 (UTC)

Some numbers... Romania fielded 325,685 men on 22 June. ( Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, p. 45)

• 4,112 dead, 12,120 wounded 5,506 missing for the Bessarabia fighting (p. 47)
• 18,730 dead, 67955 wounded, 11471 missing for Odessa (p. 49-56)
• 2,355 dead, 5,924 wounded, 1,913 missing in the Ukraine to October 1941 (p. 67)
• 2,070 dead 4,518 wounded, 399 missing October to 31 december (p. 68)
• overall 27,267 dead, 90,517 wounded 19,289 missing = 137,073 overall

Hungarian casualties are probably negligible, as they had no real significant action and only few participating units. Same for Slovakia and Italy. StoneProphet (talk) 11:32, 5 September 2012 (UTC)

Do you know how the numbers were counted? If they are a compilation of reports like the source I used for the Germans, than the DOW are counted as the wounded (so the German numbers also need to be fixed; perhaps Overmans has the DOW, need to check). Also, are the dead limited to combat loss? Tvoi Ded (talk) 11:24, 6 September 2012 (UTC)

I don't have proper sources at hand but from this article (fi. Vuoden 1941 loppuun mennessä jatkosodassa oli jo kuollut 25 500 suomalaista. Haavoittuneita oli lähes 50 000.; en. 25,500 Finns had been killed in Continuation War already by the end of 1941. Number of wounded was nearly 50 000.) and from table in this page (which uses valid citation) it is apparent that Finns lost roughly 26 000 men KIA/MIA/POW and around 50 000 WIA in 1941. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:54, 5 September 2012 (UTC)

Awesome, so we have Finnish KIA (19,656), DOW (5,513) and MIA (1,186) to add to the totals. Tvoi Ded (talk) 11:26, 6 September 2012 (UTC)

I dont know how the Romanian numbers are counted, it seems they are based on Romanian military archives, the casualties are mentioned in the running text of each operation. The book itself is reliable and is also the only comprehensive one about Romania in ww2. I dont know about DOWs but i have never encountered this issue, as in most works the common KIA/WIA and POW/MIA notation is used. StoneProphet (talk) 22:39, 9 September 2012 (UTC)

I suspect that the Romanian numbers (like the German ones I have) are a collection of casualty reports from the military units, as filed. Hence, the wounded include DOW. Hungarian and Italian losses would not change the picture much, but if we are to give exact numbers, we must clarify that. Spanish losses are probably counted in the German ones (if not, the number is a couple of thousands tops). As for the Finns, the non-combat deaths may or may not be omitted from the tally. So, perhaps, a somewhat plausible upgrade for the infobox would be "220 645 Axis KIA, 5513 Finnish DOW, unknown Axis non-combat dead, 56 348 Axis MIA, 761 825 Axis WIA (including German and possibly Romanian DOW), unknown Axis sick and frostbitten". By the way, that's already around 1 000 000. The DOW problem needs more research. Tvoi Ded (talk) 01:34, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Also, I suggest shortening the huge note in the infobox about the "distinction" and "separateness" of the Finnish participation in the offensive to "Finland was not a member of the Axis". Really, Finland is not particularly important in this conflict. Tvoi Ded (talk) 02:03, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

General improvements

1.Section 4:
-We need frostbite/disease data so we could compare the losses. Also, the 155 000 German dead and wounded in three weeks is not at all supported by the 10-day reports (http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec41.html). Even though this data is incomplete (Overmans gives slightly bigger numbers), but losses of army group Center in december were reported as 41 819 KIA/MIA/WIA (77 938 for the entire Eastern Front); I think it's extremely unlikely that the German combat losses were three times larger than reported.
2.Reasons for initial Soviet defeats.
-I propose fully re-writing this section, which I will do when I time allows, as what we have at present is quite weak. For example, lack of fortifications west of the "Stalin line" and "The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions" are mentioned, while that the Germans were fully mobilized and deployed (much, much more important) is not. The effect of the purges on the quality of the officers is mentioned (with a funny claim that Stalin appointed officers for political reasons (instead of the repressed) - this is true for several high-ranking officers, but surely Stalin didn't appoint leutenants, captains and majors, who form the majority of the officer corps) , but not the effect of three-fold increase of the RKKA in 1939-1941. Etc. Tvoi Ded (talk) 21:34, 4 September 2012 (UTC)

Just to be clear - are you advocating ignoring/discarding the published Reliable Sources and synthesizing new figures, or are you calling for more digging by editors to come up with sources that are more aligned to your point of view? The first is out of the question as that would be Original Research done by utilizing primary data, the second is possible for citing and disputing other cited sources. HammerFilmFan (talk) 23:36, 16 September 2012 (UTC)

If a so-called reliable source claims something ridiculous or omits key details, it's a clear sign we need a better source. For example, one of the big problems with the quality of the RKKA officer core stemmed from the army's huge growth before the war (from jan 1938 to june 1941 - from 1 500 000 to 5 000 000), with a corresponding increase in the number of officers needed. If our source doesn't mention that and just speaks of repressions, I argue that our source is bad and needs to be replaced. Tvoi Ded (talk) 13:05, 22 September 2012 (UTC)

I think the point HammerFilmFan is making is that you need to support your argument with reliable sources before editing.

The quality of the RKKA officer corps did suffer as a result of the 1937 purge, but that is just one perspective. However, did 503 senior officers make that much of a difference considering the size of the RKKA?

Hitler by the way conducted a similar, if less advertised, putsch in the Wehrmacht by removing any officer that was known to be opposed to the Nazis (Catholics, Democrats, Communists, old aristocracy, etc.) which amounted to several thousand, some of whom ended up in concentration camps.

Also, you forget that the RKKA had reserves, some of whom had commanded in the Civil War, and even the Great War, i.e. two decades of accumulated leadership reserves. The Wehrmacht lacked this to the same degree, but expanded just as rapidly, more so in fact in 1941 when the Heer almost doubled and Luftwaffe increased by a third before Barbarossa. Crock81 (talk) 22:48, 3 January 2013 (UTC)

Alas, but if you compare German and Soviet commanders from divisional level and up, the average German commander is far better prepared - he is more educated and has had more experience at his post. Tvoi Ded (talk) 01:40, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

Ne moi ded - how is this possible? The doubling of the number of German divisions in 1940 after France sent most divisional commanders to Corps and AG staff promotion positions, replaced by their brigade and regimental subordinates. By June 1941 these had less than a year of 'experience' in their roles. By comparison, though many RKKA divisional commanders were replaced in 1937-8 with young and presumably inexperienced officers, these would have been in their roles for almost three years by the start of Barbarossa.

As for education, on what basis do you claim RKKA military education system inferior to the Wehrmacht? Crock81 (talk) 02:02, 31 January 2013 (UTC)

Snyder Excerpt Inaccurate

The long excerpt under the section German Intentions from Timothy Snyder's book Bloodlands is inaccurate and goes against the majority of Holocaust scholarship on the subject. He presents what he calls four visions, but then talks about their implementation in a chronological sense, saying the plan was to starve Slavs and Jews and THEN to take surviving Jews to extermination camps as part of the Final Solution. In fact, the two main objectives of Barbarossa were Lebensraum and extermination of the Jews, and there was advanced planning for the extermination of the Jews by mobile Einsatzkommandos with prior arrangement made with local death squads, before the onset of Barbarossa. The Barbarossa plan uses the codeword "Soviet kommisars" as a codeword for exterminating Jews, or "Judeao-Bolsheviks" in Nazi parlance. For the very basics on the Einsatzkommandos being set up BEFORE the onset of Barbarossa, see Martin Gilbert's The Holocaust. I move the Snyder excerpt be removed. Please comment if you support or oppose that move. Hypatea (talk) 16:12, 8 November 2012 (UTC)

Support - this is also evident from various German sources Crock81 (talk) 22:31, 3 January 2013 (UTC)

The excerpt fails WP:NFCC criteria ##1 and 3. That is sufficient for removal.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:57, 3 January 2013 (UTC)

 Done ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 23:03, 3 January 2013 (UTC)

2nd Army or 4th Army?

So I've been slowly eating through Barbarossa Derailed: Battle of Smolensk, Volume 2 (by D. Glantz) and it consistently states that Army Group Centre (specifically as of August and September 1941) was made up of 9th Army, 2nd Army, 2nd Panzer Group (or Army Group Guderian or Panzer Group Guderian), 3rd Panzer Group, and some other secondary Armies. It never mentions of 4th Army, as far as I have read or glanced through. Several Wikipedia articles all agree 4th Army was there. I'm baffled. Not sure, which it is anymore. Glantz or the many Wikipedia articles? Can some other editor dig into this and make any needed changes. EyeTruth (talk) 05:25, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

Ignore the above question. I discovered the answer as I read more from the book. It turns out that there is a big mess and confusion regarding the 4th Army and 2nd Army. The mess spans many wikipedia pages related to Barbarossa, and is often the result of texts without citations or with unreliable citations like the many WW2 websites out there. Well, I'm not yet prepared to undertake the task of reconciling it all.EyeTruth (talk) 18:04, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Please can someone explain my question - Which Day and date has this map - September 1941 ?? - I can not anderstand when the 20 th Panzer-Division goes across the dvina, from June until August 1941 sie fighting in the battle of Minsk, Dnjepr and Welisch, 1942 sie fight near Ghatsk, 1944 20 Pzdiv. was destroyed in Pocket of Minsk .--Kleombrotos (talk) 14:29, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

That would be July 1941, sometime between the 4th and 18th of the month. Battle of Minsk had ended by July 4th and Smolensk had been taken by July 18EyeTruth (talk) 18:04, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Barbarossa

Add Koniev to list of Russian generals — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.229.156.239 (talk) 15:16, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

Not encyclopedic

Regarding:

From now on he was not going to listen to any more of that kind of talk or he was going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind.

Can we make it more encyclopedic? --Mortense (talk) 12:55, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Agree EyeTruth (talk) 19:45, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Unrealistic number of significant figures

Regarding:

the Red Army numbered a total of 5,774,211 troops: 4,605,321 in ground forces, 475,656 in the air force, 353,752 in the navy, 167,582 as border guards and 171,900 in internal troops of the NKVD.

Given the uncertainties, it makes no sense to state such numbers with up seven significant figures (5,774,211 and 4,605,321). Two significant figures should be more than enough. --Mortense (talk) 13:10, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

The problem is not the numbers but how they are presented in Wikipedia's voice. Given the uncertainties, the numbers should not be presented with Wikipedia's voice. In fact IMO war statistics should never be presented in Wikipedia's voice because over the past decades they are continuously being revised. The numbers you noted above are probably originally based on some primary sources or maybe they are just a "precise estimation" by a secondary source. They should be presented in the original source's voice instead of Wikipedia's voice. EyeTruth (talk) 20:04, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Nvm. I checked the article and noticed that the passage was already presented in the source's voice. In which case, there is no problem here. Check out the WP:YESPOV policy. EyeTruth (talk) 20:12, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Causes of soviet defeats

It seems Wikipedia starts to be mistrustful of some of myths of the old Soviet historiography, such as the purge rendering the Red Army incapable of fighting. Good to see, but the principal cause of defeats is strangely ignored. The cause is that the Soviet High Command lost control of its forces in June 1941, due to the surprise of the German attack. If Timoshenko/Zhukov gave 3 completely different orders (don't answer to provocations, repel the enemy but don't cross the border, counterattack on the enemy territory), all in the same day, you can imagine what happened at the lower levels. This led to a massive collapse of morale and discipline among the soviet forces. To evaluate the effects, I'll quote a report from 17 July 1941 of the Chief of Political Propaganda Department on the South-Western Front: "There were many cases of panicking flight from the battlefield of soldiers, groups or units. Often, panic was spread by cowards and scoundrels to other units, misleading the headquarters regarding the real situation on the front, units size and losses. The number of desertors is very high... According to incomplete data, the blocking dettachments detained 54,000 men who got lost from their units and stayed behind, among them 1,300 commanders".

This is why the Red Army lost so badly in the summer of 1941, not because they had obsolete equipment or lacked maintenance. The Soviet High Command understood that perfectly, because from July to September 1941 there was a flurry of orders from Stavka aimed at improving, through propaganda and threats, the discipline in the ranks. The nature of the Stalinist regime was such that it was forced to keep a tight grip on its troops, because many soldiers would simply not want to fight for the soviet power. When that grip weakened, in the confusion caused by the German attack, the fighting ability of the Red Army dropped significantly.

The fairy tales about the "purged army" or "poor logistics" are a myth perpetrated by Cold-war soviet historiography, which obviously could not recognize that a good percent of the soviet troops did not want to fight for the Soviet Union. The last major strategic success of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front occurred at the beginning of October 1941, with the destruction of the Western and Reserve Fronts in the pockets at Viazma and Breansk. From mid-october 1941 up to Kursk, Red Army fought the Wehrmacht on equal terms, so the argument that the Red Army needed 2 years to "improve itself" does not wash. If the traditional causes were true, then the Wehrmacht would have organized the Victory Parade by the end of 1941, because it would have impossible to fix them. It takes several years to prepare even a junior officer, so, for instance, where did the Corps Commander from 1942 or 1943 came from if the lower ranks of divisional commander and colonel were that badly decimated? It was impossible to fix such shortcomings (if they are actually true) in just half a year.

It's a sad sight to see even professional historians never thinking about the implications of their statements: according to them, in 1941 the Red Army was badly led, but at Stalingrad and Kursk it had good leadership - and that good leadership probably came out of thin air. In addition, by refering exclusively to the Red Army, the traditional theory creates a very unbalanced picture - implying that the Germans had it all spiffed up. In fact, the Wehrmacht was suffering from its own problems in the field of logistics, equipment quality and staffing and those problems weren't minor at all. And it couldn't have been any other way, having in mind that the Wehrmacht also increased its number of divisions from 1939 to 1941, from around 50 divisions to almost 200 - both Germans and Soviets were bound to suffer from personnel problems, since those are inherent to any army recently mobilized. 79.112.54.101 (talk) 08:32, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Sentinel79.112.54.101 (talk) 08:32, 21 September 2013 (UTC)

The casualties in the infobox have degraded (yet again). Could anyone tell me, why were Finnish and Romanian losses removed from the Axis tally? Also, why are we simply adding Soviet POW's as per German count to the Soviet archival MIA? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.95.230.40 (talk) 02:42, 8 October 2013 (UTC)

As for your first question, if you have sources that give some credible figures for Finnish and Romanian losses (and other axis losses) in only 1941, then feel free to put them up. As for the second question, that mess has been fixed. It is a consistently recurring "good faith" vandalism for this article. EyeTruth (talk) 17:13, 10 October 2013 (UTC)

Regarding the Finnish casualties from 1941 - I don't have a book at hand but this site marks this book as it's source. However you might not want to include those numbers before some one has verified the numbers directly from the source. Source itself is credible, (translated) History of the Continuation War - part 6, author being what is currently known as the Department of Military History of the (Finnish) National Defence University. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:28, 11 October 2013 (UTC)

Using a figure of "over four million soldiers" for the invading force

"Over four million soldiers" is the highest figure I have ever seen listed when reading about this conflict. Given all the scholarly works on the German offensive, the use of "World War II Chronicle" seems a curious source to select for the size of the invading force. Most conventional works give the size of the German force at 3.2 million men and then separately list the other nations' fighting forces and their limitations. Some of these other invading countries didn't even consider themselves allies with the Germans but instead comrades in arms. I think to state that over four million soldiers invaded the USSR can be misleading because of the restraints placed on some of the countries. For instance, Finland was under heavy pressure from the U.S. to not go beyond their nation's 1940 boundaries and they never did. So it's debatable whether Finland really "invaded" the USSR when they only recaptured territory lost in their recent war with them.TL36 (talk) 01:07, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

Reasons for initial Soviet defeats

This section needs at least the citations/references warning, though considering the sorry shape it currently is I wouldn't mind if it was removed completely. This is below public blog level.

• Red Army was not "surprised" by the German attack. Units received orders to enter combat readiness around midnight of 22nd of June, hours before German invasion.
• The Wehrmacht's "experience" is greatly exaggerated. Like any army Wehrmacht suffered casualties which were replaced with new, inexperienced recruits. Besides, the same could be said of Red Army who fought against Finland in the Winter War of 1939 - didn't they gain "experience" too? Finally, I've never heard a single valid claim that Wehrmacht's training was somehow superior to that of any other army. Their tactics might have been(See Mission-type tactics) but that has little to do with training quality as such.
• Wehrmacht didn't have a doctrine of annihilation, and you can't certainly claim that "Axis" had such a doctrine as a whole.
• How much the purges affected Red Army's leaderships is, at the very least, a subject of debate. On one hand, yes, the cadre was decimated; on the other, it was replaced by new officers straight out of officer schools. Obviously a commander with actual combat experience is better than one without any experience at all, but that doesn't make the unexperienced one a worthless wet rag incapable of doing anything right. Otherwise why even have schools in the first place?
• The concept of an "offensive army"(I guess we have Suvorov to thank for this one?). Offense is a military action an order of magnitude more complicated than defense. To claim that there can be an army(or command) that can attack but not defend is nothing short of ridiculous. And even if it wasn't, then the "offensive army" can simply defend by... attacking.
• The claim that Red Army expected "up to two weeks" before the main forces meet each other can only be treated as a bad joke considering the dislocation of the Red Army right on the German border. And what were the "promising, but untested" weapons of Red Army in June 1941?
• The "conflicting orders" of Timoshenko and Zhukov. These were peace time standing orders, not wartime orders. The moment war starts every commander opens his safe, unseals the red envelope and acts in accord with the orders found inside. What were the orders in the safe? Well if we knew that we wouldn't have the "Soviet offensive plans controversy" article, but it is highly unlikely that they were conflicting with themselves.
• "History alloted us too small a period of peace". Look at that, the cruel History couldn't wait until the biggest standing army in the world, with more tanks than the rest of European countries combined(and almost all of them completely outclassing German ones), got even bigger. I'd love to personally ask Zhukov what else he'd like to see in the Red Army that it didn't have in 1941... what would make the Eastern Front, in eyes of the History?
• Wunderwaffe Luftwaffe - the favourite of many soviet "historians". I have bad news: without guided weaponry, aircrafts are terribly ineffective against tanks. Even dive bombers had troubles hitting bridges, much less a moving, small target such as a tank, and putting a cannon on a plane hardly solves the issue.
• The breakdowns. Curious how soviet tanks seemed to work just fine when invading Finland, Poland or Romania(or, for that matter, when counterattacking against Germany later in the war), yet experienced this horrible epidemic during Barbarossa. Also curious that it was always the tanks that broke and not for example the trucks, even including the legendarily simple and unreliable ZiS-5/6. The reason is very simple: trucks make much better escape vehicles than tanks. Tanks didn't break down; they were simply abandoned by their crews and the "breakdown" was just a bad excuse.

213.216.70.34 (talk) 09:45, 9 December 2013 (UTC)

You've made some interesting points and I may sympathize with many of them, but they are ultimately just your opinions (a quaternary source), until you or someone else can buttress them with better sources. EyeTruth (talk) 06:19, 16 February 2014 (UTC)

Stalingrad?

74.60.161.158 (talk) 08:41, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

About nine months. Still mentioned in "Outcome" and "Aftermath." --illythr (talk) 20:15, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Axis casualties

@Paulinho28: I have reverted your change to over 1,000,000. When "show" is clicked there is a well referenced breakdown showing over 800,000. If you would like to change this, could you cite better, or at least as good, references please? Gog the Mild (talk) 18:44, 13 July 2014 (UTC)

Clausewitzian theory?

Back in April, this edit added info about Hitler and his "more modern" thinking vs. his generals thinking like Clausewitz. It all looks fine, but I've never heard of this before, and it's unsourced. Can we please find some sources for this? Otherwise, I'm afraid we have to remove it. --A D Monroe III (talk) 21:57, 21 August 2014 (UTC)

Well, the difference in thought between Hitler and the OKH is well-attested and easily sourced. However, the usual conclusion is that the OKH had it right and that Hitler squandered the best chance of a German victory, attacking Moscow in August, by redirecting the attack to the Ukraine. So that alone would justify a removal of the text, apart form the rather flippant style :o).--MWAK (talk) 08:02, 22 August 2014 (UTC)

I've read other opinions on that too. Either way, we need a citation. I'll see if I can find anything in the books I have, I seem to remember reading something like that. Martijn Meijering (talk) 09:04, 22 August 2014 (UTC)

The conflict between Hitler and his generals is accepted. The two added points here are (A) Hitler was right, and (B) the conflict was Clausewitzian vs. "modern" thinking. I'd say both of those points need refs, or face deletion as WP:OR. Even if we find refs, we'd still have to reword this to balance with conflicting opinions that are accepted and sourced. --A D Monroe III (talk) 15:16, 22 August 2014 (UTC)

Opinion is divided over whether he was right, so we certainly shouldn't be saying he was. Martijn Meijering (talk) 19:58, 22 August 2014 (UTC)

Elsewhere in the article Glantz is said to support Hitler's view being more modern and correct. I have his book on Barbarossa, and will try to find a citation. Martijn Meijering (talk) 20:11, 22 August 2014 (UTC)

I've checked the e-books by Glantz that I own, but couldn't find a reference. Martijn Meijering (talk) 11:13, 19 September 2014 (UTC)

"According to Clausewitz, wars were won by concentrating your armies at the enemy's focal point, their tactical Schwerpunkt. At the tactical level, this meant that your armies would win a battle by concentrating effort at unexpected locations, then having them converge upon the enemies focal point, leading to a Kesselschlacht, a cauldron battle."

The Schwerpunkt ("focal point" or "weight of effort") to Clausewitz is the strategic object that can be won in order to assure victory in war, and this could be military, political or geographic. This is very different from the concept of Schwerpunkt as it is used in German "Blitzkrieg" doctrine, which is more directly descended from Alfred von Schlieffen, not Clausewitz These are not the same just because they use the same very common German expression to describe them.

Von Schlieffen: Operations and tactics. Clauswitz: Politics and strategy.

Just because Guderian might talk about the "focal point" of an attack or where to place the "weight of effort", does not mean that it is the same as Clausewitz talking about the "focal point" of an enemies base of political and military power.

Quote from Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice: "... his focus was obviously on the strategic, not operational or tactical, level of war,"<ref>http://books.google.ca/books?id=zUP23aBHLOwC&pg=PA29&dq=Clausewitz+Schwerpunkt&hl=en&sa=X&ei=D9MbVI-8D4-2yASIvoLICg&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Clausewitz%20Schwerpunkt&f=false — Preceding unsigned comment added by Livedawg (talk • contribs) 08:47, 19 September 2014 (UTC)

Good point. Beyond that by the XX century it was totally inconceivable winning a war by a stroke at the schwerpunkt in a classic way. PrimeBOT (talk) 00:41, 8 July 2017 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cryfe (talk • contribs) 18:09, 19 September 2014 (UTC)

I think what I am maybe saying is that the reference to Clausewitz ought to be taken out entirely, since it in the context of an article that is basically meant to be an operational level account of the first 5 months of the German invasion of the USSR, and this entry is talking about operations and tactics.

A wider discussion about the "strategic" objectives of the campaign, as conceived by Hitler and his generals, in order to achieve victory (Destruction of the Red Army, or crippling the economy, or capture the seat of power, Moscow) might be a point where one could bring in Clausewitz, not tactics. Clausewitz would probably simply say that given that "war is politics by other means", and Hitler's objective was total defeat of the enemy, because he believed, as did his mentor Luddendorf, that history was an eternal struggle between nations for dominance that Hitler's "object", total defeat of the enemy, was defined by his political view. And is this not true? Did not the Russians several times indicate a desire for an early peace, and an end to the war in exchange for territory?

I am not sure that "Total War" was an absolute necessity, except in that this was Hitler's view. PrimeBOT (talk) 00:41, 8 July 2017 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.196.147.222 (talk) 02:46, 21 September 2014 (UTC)

Operational victory?

I just took a look at the p.24 of the Glantz paper and it says absolutely nothing about the tactical, operational or strategic outcome of the Barbarossa. Nether the rest of the article says anything about this being an operational victory for the Germans. So I suggest changing it into an operational indecisive or other similar term. PrimeBOT (talk) 00:41, 8 July 2017 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cryfe (talk • contribs) 20:09, 3 October 2014 (UTC)

makes sense to me. Hitler himself said not winning the war by winter was going to be a problem. A victory is determined by the standard you set. The standard for this operation was the defeat of the Soviet Union by winter. The Russians won by not losing. That doesn't detract from the fact that it as a) a total military disaster for the Red Army, and b) an incredible military feat for the Wehrmacht PrimeBOT (talk) 00:41, 8 July 2017 (UTC)

As for Glanz, my reading of his material on Smolensk basically seemed to indicate that he supported the Soviet view, which is that this is where they lost the war, or as one German general put it: "Winning ourselves to death", or something along those lines. PrimeBOT (talk) 00:41, 8 July 2017 (UTC)

Germany plans the invasion

This section is getting pretty cluttered with material about the "strategic" case for war with the USSR, not a discussion of "operational plans". Don't people think that the strategic level material about overall German objectives, such as material gain of resources and manpower, would be better placed in the Eastern Front article? The operation Barbarossa article should be more about the conduct of operations, and this segment about the planning for the operation. These things are linked, but the focus should be there, no?

Also this is interesting but is fairly awkward and can be condensed:

In a 1978 essay "Das Russlandbild der führenden deutschen Militärs" ("The Picture of Russia held by the Leadership of the German Military"), the German historian Andreas Hillgruber examined the views about the Soviet Union held by the German military elite in the period June 1940 to June 1941. According to Hillgruber, the following were the case:

• The Wehrmacht was ill-informed about the Soviet Union, especially the military and the economy.
• Because of the paucity of information, Wehrmacht thinking about the Soviet Union was based upon traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country, a "colossus with feet of clay" that lacked the strength to stand up to a superior opponent.
• The leadership of the Wehrmacht viewed war with the Soviet Union from an extremely narrow military viewpoint with little consideration given to politics, the economy, or culture. The industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was not considered at all as a factor that might influence the outcome of a German-Soviet war.
• The average soldier in the Red Army was considered brave and tough, but the Red Army officer corps were held in contempt.
• The Wehrmacht leadership after the victory over France was in a state of hubris with the Wehrmacht being seen as more or less invincible.
• As such, it was assumed that the Soviet Union was destined to be defeated, and that it would take Germany between six to eight weeks to destroy the Soviet Union.

Hillgruber argued that these assumptions about the Soviet Union shared by the entire military elite allowed Hitler to push through a "war of annihilation" against the Soviet Union with the assistance of "several military leaders", even though it was quite clear to the military that such a war would violate all accepted norms of warfare and would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible.

I am going to replace that with this:

{{quotation| In 1978 Andreas Hillgruber made the case that the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were coloured by hubris stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" Wehrmacht and by ignorance tempered by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country -- a colossus with feet of clay. Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid little attention to politics, the economy or culture and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was ignored as a factor, in favour of a very narrow military view. As a result the Wehrmacht was ill-informed about the Soviet military and economic capacity. It was assumed that the Soviet Union was destined to be defeated, and that it would take Germany between six to eight weeks to destroy the Soviet Union.

Hillgruber argued that because these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite, Hitler was able to push through a "war of annihilation" that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible with the complicity of "several military leaders", even though it was quite clear that this would be a violation of all accepted norms of warfare. Livedawg (talk) 15:07, 5 October 2014 (UTC)

What Clausewitz really said about Russia

"it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Kussia would have to be agitated at the very center."

That might be a good place to start for any discussion of grand strategy, Russia and Clausewitz. In a study released in 1955 by the US Army on German planning and operations for Barbarossa the authors said in their forward that "in reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice." Lowercase sigmabot III (talk) 00:09, 19 March 2015 (UTC)