Talk:Kashmir conflict/Archive 4

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90,000 Muslims killed by Indian regime

Link to edits, reverted, and another round of reverts

I take it you are referring to the death toll. Here are the Congressional records where the speaker mentions this figure. [3]. Furthermore in my edit this view is attributed to the Hon. Edolphus Towns. If a view is attributed to a neutral party there should be no problem in including it as long as that view has been attributed to them specifically, as I have done. In fact Dr Singh has said this to Hon. Ban Ki Moon (its from the same source) that the regime has killed more than 90,000 Kashmiri Muslims. And Amnesty International Report was cited.

Try this link to read it. [4] Kashmir Media News Service is a completely reliable Kashmiri source which keeps track of killings etc. And your allegation of it having roots in a 'neighbouring country' are thus far unsourced.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 09:12, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

@TalhaZubairButt: please include URL also, the next time you will add refrence in any article. If you need guidance on referencing, please see the referencing for beginners. And, as i said, Kashmir media service is no Human Right organisation, and had its root in the neighbouring country. It's own website states- News stories and links about Kashmir with an anti-Indian slant. MBlaze Lightning (talk) 09:30, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

I would advise both of you to avoid making this a private battle. If edit warring continues, I will ask the admins to impose 1RR. Talha Zubair, I think you might want to use your sandbox to experiment with edits and polish them before putting them into articles. I am also not sure why this battle is being fought here. This section is supposed to be a summary of Human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir. Please debate it on that page. - Kautilya3 (talk) 11:55, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Well, I only suggested him to add URL as I was having problem finding his sources to verify claims he mentioned. MBlaze Lightning (talk) 12:08, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

The Rotarian source

@MBlaze Lightning [5]. The page number is 60. It is a source from 1951. It mentions the examples of both Hyderabad and Junagadh. I have only mentioned Junagadh in the article.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 09:23, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

1951 newspaper article? Other than the fact that it violates WP:NEWSORG and WP:HISTRS, your edit still misrepresents it because it claims that India "annexed" Junagadh, which is not found on the page, or anywhere in this volume of the newspaper. And, why you are referencing Benegal Rau (India's ambassador to the UN) as support for "Pakistance's stance"? Please provide a quote that you believe supports your claims.

Note also that India offered Plebiscite on 1 November 1947, as already mentioned in the article, and that Jinnah rejected the offer. If I were you, I would try to go and find out why Jinnah rejected it. - Kautilya3 (talk) 11:44, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautliya3, I strongly disagree. In this Rotorian article on page 60 it is said that India marched its troops into Junagadh and held a plebiscite there with the territory in its own control. The article further makes a point that the same principle of India's actions would entitle Pakistan to do the same in Kashmir. Yes Jinnah's reasons for rejection should also be included if not already included, but subsequent details should also be included. Krishnan Menon's explicit words come from a news source of that time. I don't see any reason for its exclusion.

Furthermore more details about the UN mediation are included in the Rotarian. -- TalhaZubairButt (talk) 12:14, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

You can disagree how ever you want. The consensus on Wikpedia is to use WP:HISTRS, and this is not HISTRS. Nobody's "words" are important. In an article like this, facts are what need to be stated. - Kautilya3 (talk) 12:26, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

Note: User is currently under investigation at Wikipedia:Sockpuppet investigations/TripWire- MBlaze Lightning (talk) 12:35, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3

So what you want is a modern day source which explicitly gives the Pakistani perspective via Junagadh and Kashmir?

This is one article which gives the Pakistani perspective that Junagadh was a case of double standards:Junagadh Nawab raises some valid questions.

And here is Christopher Snedden's writing: [6] -- TalhaZubairButt (talk) 21:49, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

Well, the Nawab of Junagadh is not a reliable source for anything. Snedden clearly says that the Indian forces entered the State at the "request by the Junagadh Executive Council." Our page on Indian integration of Junagadh explains everything quite clearly. This happened on the 9th November 1947, a full week after India offered to Jinnah to hold plebiscites in all the three states, an offer that Jinnah rejected. (Snedden's dates are woefully wrong for some reason.) So the only space left for you is to figure out why Jinnah rejected the offer. We should stop wasting time over all kinds of useless propaganda stories. - Kautilya3 (talk) 22:17, 19 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: This section is information about each side's perspectives, not on who's right or wrong. So the sections on Indian and Pakistani views are meant to outline what each side thinks. Not on historical accuracy. If strict measures of historical and factual investigation are applied then some points in the Indian section could be removed.

Secondly how about a change of wording and change of state? Replace Junagadh with Hyderabad. This wording is from an old revision.

'However, Pakistan believes a double standard by India regarding the decisions of independent rulers as the Nizam of Hyderabad, another princely state, had not acceded to India, but the kingdom was forcibly incorporated with a police action on the grounds that he did not represent the majority population.'

As for Jinnah's refusal could you please provide me with the reference? Thanks.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 00:36, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

If you want to present the "Pakistan perspective," then you need to find a Pakistan government source (or a source that quotes Pakistan government), not Benegal Rau or Chirstopher Snedden. And, you can be sure that I will add footnotes that contradict any claims that are factually inaccurate.

Hyderabad is not comparable to Kashmir. It is landlocked inside India and it never acceded to Pakistan. Junagadh is the right comparison. But India didn't send in the army to occupy or coerce Junagadh. The local people revolted and the Bhutto saheb couldn't hold it together. If Pakistan did the same thing in Kashmir as India did in Junagadh, there would be no cause for complaint. Having failed to instigate the local people, it could have accepted a plebiscite. But it didn't.

The source for the Jinnah's rejection is Noorani's book that is mentioned in our article, under the 1947 war section. Any book on Mountbatten would also cover it. - Kautilya3 (talk) 01:22, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: But didn't India apply some pressure, a sort of 'coercion' if you could call it, on Junagadh? Such as closing transport and effecting communications? And sending troops to the frontier? Thus contributing to the deteriorating situation in the state and fear of imminent Indian attack which led to Shahnawaz Bhutto inviting Indian and handing over the administration to India? And later Pakistan insisted that after the legal accession no one except the Pakistani government had the authorisation to invite any party to Junagadh.

So this is a wikipedia article on Indian integration of Junagadh.

1. REDIRECT [[7]]TalhaZubairButt (talk) 09:53, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Could you please provide page numbers and a link to Noorani's book? Also I searched up A.G. Noorani and found that he is an Indian lawyer, thus that incorporates a potential for bias. But If you could also provide a reference to a non-Indian//non-Pakistani source to back up Noorani's words, that would be better.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 10:17, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

As I said, if Pakistan did in Kashmir the same thing that India did in Junagadh, there would be no cause for complaint. Then we could say there was a mirror image situation. But the comparisons break down because:

• India implemented a blockade of Junagadh to demonstrate its dependence on India. This was an allowed form of coercion. Pakistan tried to implement a similar blockade in Kashmir, but it was dishonourable because it had already signed a Standstill Agreement with Kashmir, which promised that it would continue to maintain all the former trade links. Kashmir could also circumvent the blockade by getting its emergency supplies from India. (In reality, the blockade was counterproductive because it brought the Maharaja and India closer together, even though they formerly hated each other.)
• Junagadh people were firmly in favour of India, with an active wing of the Congress part in the State. In contrast, the Kashmiri people (in the Valley - National Conference and in Jammu - Praja Parishad) had no interest in Pakistan.
• Pakistan did not accept the plebiscite offer in Kashmir because it knew that it would lose it. In contrast, India held a plebiscite in Junagadh and won it.
• If Pakistan really believed that Junagadh joined them, it failed to follow through and defend Junagadh. In contrast, India sent in the army to Kashmir to take control soon after the accession.

So Junagadh vs. Kashmir is a false equivalence.

The Noorani book is not available on Google Books. I will try to see if I can find other books online that cover the topic, but there is no guarantee. Note that, as per WP:BIASED, you can't argue that reliable sources should be discounted on the basis of imagined bias. You can look for alternative reliable sources that contradict it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:55, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: You are correct in that Kashmir Valley's Muslims, under the influence of the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah (and being someone whose family was from Baramulla I agree with you on this point) would have voted to join India (although the Valley itself would decide to follow whatever Sheikh Abdullah wanted, even if he miraculously opted for Pakistan and sentiments of Muslims in other, and less populous, parts of the State were more firmly aligned with Pakistan) but the sources do indicate that Jinnah's refusal was due to his fear that the plebiscite would be sabotaged under the Indian troops stationed in Kashmir, which was a basic part of Mountbatten's proposals in the November 1947 talks.

1. REDIRECT [[8]]TalhaZubairButt (talk) 11:36, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

Just another point I would like to add, from precursory reading of some sources, Jinnah was hoping that Sheikh Abdullah would somehow be removed so that he could stand a greater chance in advertising Pakistan as an option to Kashmir Valley Muslims. In NWFP, after all, when Ghaffar Khan boycotted the plebiscite, the (low) turnout voted predominantly in favour of joining Pakistan, despite the province having voted in a Conreess government in the 1946 elections. So Pakistan stood as much chance in Kashmir as it did in NWFP.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 12:07, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

Yeah, thanks for accepting the point. Likewise, India wanted the `Azad Army' disbanded before a plebiscite. Since the Maharaja's army was basically decimated, if India was going to withdraw the majority of its troops, there was nothing to stop the `Azad Army' running amok throughout the J&K causing fear and intimidation among the populace. From Pakistan's point of view, it was much more important to retain Azad Kashmir than to gain the Valley. So the risk to Pakistan from losing a plebiscite was far greater (in its own perception) than it was for India. So I believe the plebiscite didn't happen basically because Pakistan didn't want it to happen. - Kautilya3 (talk) 15:37, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kauilya2: Can you bring up a reliable source to show that the Indian coercion on Junagadh is an allowed form of coercion? Pakistani government's stance was that after the accession, which was a legal document, Mr Bhutto had no authorisation to invite the government. After the signing only Pakistan had the right to invite anyone over it. Mr Bhutto simply had no legal standing to do what he did (which was under duress anyway). As far as Standstill Agreements are concerned, didn't India also sign one (and then violate) with Hyderabad? As far as Kashmir Valley's populace is concerned, I have already mentioned that Kashmir Valley's people would vote for whoever Sheikh Abdullah asked them to vote for, they themselves had no interest in either India or Pakistan (and we know from NWFP's case that despite popular pro-Congress leadership, the province still ended up voting for Pakistan). And why did the Indian foreign Minister, Mr Menon, say in 1964 that the fear of losing to Pakistan is the reason India is unwilling to hold a vote in Kashmir? He could have given legal and constitutional reasons, but he didn't. He instead explicitly said that India would lose the plebiscite, so India won't hold one.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 01:09, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

• Jinnah's views can be stated wherever they are relevant. But we are talking here about how far Junagadh and Kashmir were comparable. The fact that Pakistan failed to enforce its rights in Junagadh and India enforced them in Kashmir is a very significant difference. Again, the fact that Pakistan had no support among the populace in Junagadh whereas India had support in the Kashmir Valley is also an important difference. For these reasons, we can't make statements like "just as it happened in Junagadh... so also in Kashmir." Hyderabad is again of no relevance here. All the princely states were protectorates of the British India, they were not sovereign states. They did not suddenly become sovereign as a result of Indian independence. They had to act responsibly, introduce popular governments in line with the rest of India and Pakistan, negotiate their relations with the Dominions etc. Both India and Pakistan had the right to enforce such good behaviour on the states within their territories. Kashmir, being a state that straddled between the two Dominions, it would have been best for India and Pakistan to enforce such behaviour jointly. Both of them should have also realized that forcing the accession of Kashmir to one Dominion was impossible in the situation.
• The Maharaja was basically trying to play off India and Pakistan against each other so that he could retain independence. But Pakistan's coercion, i.e., the economic blockade and support for the Poonch uprising, drove the Maharaja to India. Until then, India had no influence on him. Once he asked for help, India applied pressure on him to release the political prisoners and introduce political reforms. (Of course, he only released the pro-India prisoners and not the pro-Pakistan prisoners, which indicates that Pakistan lost its influence on the Maharaja through its own actions.)
• I don't know about Menon in 1964. I don't worry about isolated statements from personalities. But, an important development was that Nehru withdrew the plebiscite offer in 1957 and declared that the accession was now irrevocable. This needs to be covered in the article with proper analysis. (I intend to to do so when the time permits.) So what people said after 1957 is quite different from what they said before. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:36, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

Good discussion. I just want to add one point. To Nehru or Congress or even India, giving independence to Kashmir means the acceptance of Two- Nation Theory publicly which can never be done. Partition was accepted by Congress not on the basis of TNT, but on the practical ground, as told officially, to "stop the civil war". Hence, a free Kashmir not only will shatter the "Idea of India" but will damage the secular fabrics of India. It will turn Indian Muslims into eternal 'Mir Jafars' who would like to 'stab the Hindus at the earliest opportunity'. So, retaining Kashmir is also a test for "Indian Secularism". Ghatus (talk) 11:05, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

I don't entirely buy that argument. Giving independence to Kashmir can also be a practical matter rather than an ideological one. The two-nation theory is not the only game in town.

But, on the larger front, covering what Kashmir means to India is also necessary in this article. The article by Ashutosh Varshney is a good one for that. Likewise, we also need to cover what Kashmir means to Pakistan. - Kautilya3 (talk) 17:36, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

Okay but could we please have a section about what Kashmir means to Kashmiris (of all religious and ethnic groups). Being of Kashmiri origin myself it feels quote overwhelming that most information here is either India-centric or Pakistan-centric. I have been trying to change this by updating and adding information from reputable opinion polls in Kashmir which cut across all socio-ethnic and religious aspects of society. And I also want further information added about the post 1947 and pre 1987 period. That is highly relevant. Most of the article seems to be devoted to the legal and constitutional complexities. Kashmiri demands, views and aspirations also ought to be given a higher emphasis since they are an integral part of this.

@Ghatus: Indian Muslims have nothing to do with Kashmir dispute and conflict, anymore than Pakistani Hindus. Also if retaining Kashmir is a test for Indian secularism then it can be regarded as a failed test due to India's unpopularity amongst ethnic Kashmiri Muslims.

As for what Kashmir purportedly means to Pakistan, then I'd like to point out that Pakistan's identity is no longer based on secular Muslim nationalism as it was before Zia ul Haq's era. I believe that the separation of East Pakistan (before which most South Asian Muslims were Pakistani citizens) ended the age of the liberals and their idea of Pakistan as the secular homeland of South Asia's Muslims. So the modern Pakistani identity is now based on an entirely religious, non-secular, Islamic identity. Its based on the idea that Pakistan is the home of the practising Muslims who believe in the Quranic principle of Muslim nationhood (the liberals never referred to religious texts to support their idea of Muslim nationhood and the TNT, while the religious elements do so as to make the concept of Muslim nationhood 'infallibe' and so that the Muslim detractors of TNT can be labelled as 'non-practising'). So the un-incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan will have no effect on Pakistani identity. Pakistan's demand for Kashmir is now based on what it thinks will be just to it (based on the division of territory in 1947), so its demand is now unrooted from any sense of Kashmir's importance to Pakistani identity.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 00:49, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Hi Talha Zubair, yes absolutely, for covering Kashmiris. My current plan is to retitle the current "Timeline" section to something like "Indo-Pakistan conflict," and stop it at the 1971 Shimla agreement. This is to be followed by a new section called "Internal conflict," covering Kashmiri politics 1947-1987. Then a third section on "Insurgency" picks up both the strands in the "modern" era.

The "Reasons behind the dispute" section is to be reworked using Ashutosh Varshney article, which is quite excellent. It covers all three angles, including all the internal complexities of Kashmir.

As for what Kashmir means to Pakistan, there are several theories:

• It is first of all a fixation. I imagine that many Pakistanis think of Kashmir as the missing piece of their country, and the rhetoric over the years has reinforced it. Indians remember well the "100 years of war for Kashmir" rhetoric of Benazir Bhutto.
• Pakistan also regards it as its business to take care of their Muslim brethren in Kashmir, since everybody knows that a Hindu India will never cede power to Muslim-majority state (I am being fictitious). But Pakistan's lack of concern for the other Muslim brethren in the rest of India is paradoxical. This might mean that Pakistan's real interest is in Muslim power, not Muslim welfare.
• For the Pakistani military, Kashmir is almost the raison d'etra of its existence.
• And, there are deeper theories, long mentioned by Indian analysts, but now confirmed by Christine Fair who has read a lot of the Pakistani military literature. This says that Pakistan (i.e., the political-military establishment) regards the very existence of India as a threat. It would be far more comfortable with a diminished India, one broken up into several pieces. The removal of Kashmir from India will initiate such dismemberment. So, in this theory, Kashmir is merely an instrument in the larger game of breaking India.

The biggest mistake India makes is to treat Pakistan as a party to the dispute. It isn't. When Pakistan refused to withdraw from Azad Kashmir to facilitate a plebiscite, India should have said Pakistan got what it wanted, leave them alone. Let us just focus on Kashmir and do what is best for them and best for us. If Nehru had this clarity of vision, he should have announced a plebiscite in Indian-held Kashmir as soon as he said good by to McNamara. That would have settled the matter once for all. But he was caught up in India-Pakistan dispute and regarded any concession to Kashmir as a concession to Pakistan. It doesn't make sense. It is understandable if Pakistan is obsessed with India. But it is not understandable for India to be obsessed with Pakistan. The sad fact is that it is. And, so the Kashmiris are stuck. - Kautilya3 (talk) 02:27, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: The 'missing piece' argument makes the most sense. As for the Muslims of India, I do believe that Pakistan's population does indeed care about them, hence the outrage over Gujarat massacre and Babri Mosque etc, but the government of Pakistan barely cares for its own citizens, so it can't be expected to care about the Muslim population in India (remember that many Pakistanis, especially from Urban Sindh, still have relatives in India so there are close familial and emotional ties). The civilian governments still hang on to the Kashmir dispute due to fear of a backlash from its citizens as well as the army.

Benazir Bhutto was not really interested in Kashmir or Kashmiris, her rhetoric was merely to pacify the hardliners and religious parties such as Jamaat e Islami (which I believe does have a genuine interest in Kashmiri as well as Indian Muslim welfare, in fact it expresses concerns about Muslims worldwide-including Palestine etc). After all, Benazir was on board with Musharraf and his 4 point formula-which common Kashmiri Muslims saw as a betrayal of their cause to obtain independence- and that solution in essence accepted Indian 'sovereignty' in Kashmir.

But the most rational explanation for Pakistan's desire to obtain Kashmir is to pacify the sense of injustice it feels. Pakistanis believe that they were shortchanged in the division of assets and muslim majority districts such as Gurdaspur and Firozpur were given to India unfairly and that Kashmir is the same.

Of course in Bengal, Hindu majority districts such as Khulna were also unfairly given to Pakistan, but now that East Pakistan is long gone, its not part of anyone's memory anymore. So most either don't know that or don't remember.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 02:47, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 28 March 2016

If you we can add this informational video link to the page - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMgijhexkqE

Wikiank (talk) 20:18, 28 March 2016 (UTC)

 Done I added the link. You need to stay around to answer any questions or objections. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:56, 28 March 2016 (UTC)

Christine Fair vs Victoria Schofield

@TalhaZubairButt: you have replaced sourced content by Christine Fair, calling it UNDUE, and replaced by content sourced to Victoria Schofield, which dates back to year 2000. Why is one content UNDUE and another DUE? Please explain. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:33, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Schofiield's account of pakistan's reasons to send forces into Kashmir was relevant to that paragraph. I don't see how Fair's statement is relevant to that particular paragraph and section. It would perhaps fit somewhere else. Doesn't seem to fit here.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 11:35, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

"Doesn't fit" is what you claimed in the edit summary. Simply repeating it is not a discussion. Why doesn't it fit? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:39, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Sorry, thats what I meant by its being UNDUE. That paragraph is supposed to be simply about Pakistani forces entry into Kashmir. Whereas Fair has made an analysis of the long term picture. Such long term analysis should be included elsewhere, perhaps as a note.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 11:43, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Christine Fair is saying that what happened in 1947 is the first instance of this `irregular warfare' syndrome. That theme will continue throughout the article because Kashmir conflict is where this irregular warfare is being practised, all the way till the latest Pathankot attack. Please don't expect us to brush this under the carpet.

Secondly, Victoria Schofield's analysis is badly out of date. Her being a close friend of Benazir Bhutto also dilutes the value of her assessments. She can never be used to override Christine Fair's analysis, which has more than a dozen favourable reviews from all parts of the world. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:06, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Being a friend of Bhutto does not make an academic's assessments weaker or less reliable. If this was the case, them many academic, including Christine Fair, could be seen in a less serious light due to their purported anti-Muslim biases, (which is very apparent from Christine's works).

And before pointing fingers, lets not forget India's role in guerilla (read: terrorist) warfare in Sri Lanka (LTTE) and East Pakistan (Mukti Bahini). Its easy to point fingers without introspection.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 13:22, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

[Thanks for using indentation, apparently for the first time. But please do indent every paragraph, not just the first one.]

The extent to which the source is independent of the subject determines WP:THIRDPARTY. I am not saying that everything sourced to Schofield should be thrown out. But, clearly, when she makes statements that go against evidence, those statements must be thrown out.

And, you should avoid WP:SOAPBOX and WP:FORUMy debates. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:33, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

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Jinnah-Mountbatten talks

In the section on Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, there was a passage that covered the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks. It read as follows [9]:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the offer, thereby "squandering his leverage" according to the scholar A. G. Noorani. Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (142 words)

TalhaZubairButt expanded to the following, which I tagged after review:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the ofer, thereby "squandering his leverage" according to the Indian scholar A. G. Noorani.

From the perspective of many authors, Jinnah was also convinced that a plebiscite under the supervision of the Indian Army would be sabotaged. Instead, he proposed an immediate and simultaneous withdrawal on both sides, including the Pakistani military and their allies, Pathan tribesmen, and the Indian troops. Afterwards, he suggested that the leaders of India and Pakistan should take control of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and sort out all matters including the arrangement of a free and fair plebiscite. Hearing the proposal, Mountbatten told Jinnah that he needed the consent of Nehru and Patel. Thus the talks ended and the dispute remained unresolved.

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (303 words)

After finding a better source, I rewrote the problematic passage as follows [10]:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the ofer, thereby "squandering his leverage" according to the Indian scholar A. G. Noorani.

Jinnah felt that with the Indian troops in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah in control, people would not have the courage to vote for Pakistan. When Mountbatten countered that the plebiscite could be conducted by the United Nations, Jinnah again rejected the proposal, saying the two Governors General (Mountbatten and Jinnah) should conduct it instead. However, this was not constitutionally tenable. According to Sir George Cunningham, the governor of N.W.F.P., Jinnah rejected UN-governed plebiscite because he was optimistic about the invasion succeeding and he felt that Pakistan was likely to lose the plebiscite in the prevailing circumstances.

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (283 words)

However, TalhaZubairButt expanded it again as follows [11]:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the offer. According to Indian scholar A. G. Noorani Jinnah ended up squandering his leverage.

According to Jinnah a plebiscite was unnecessary when it was quite clear that states should accede according to their majority population. Jinnah was willing to urge Junagadh to accede to India if India gave him Kashmir. Mountbatten refused to forego Kashmir's accession to India unless decreed by the people. Jinnah, on the other hand, refused to accept any formula if it included Hyderabad; which was the state which wanted to accede to neither Dominion. According to Jinnah, he could not be party to coercion.

Jinnah demanded that both sides withdraw their troops simultaneously. Jinnah felt that with the Indian troops in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah in control, 'the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan'. When Mountbatten countered that the plebiscite could be conducted by the United Nations, Jinnah again rejected the proposal, saying the two Governors General (Mountbatten and Jinnah) should conduct it instead. Mountbatten said this would not be tenable according to his Constitutional position. Jinnah's rejection of a plebiscite was driven by two considerations. Jinnah hoped that the tribal invasion may still succeed and he could then be able to swap Junagadh for Kashmir and also secure Hyderabad's independence. This proved to be a major miscalculation. According to Sir George Cunningham, the governor of N.W.F.P., Jinnah rejected UN-governed plebiscite because he feared that Pakistan might lose the plebiscite in the prevailing circumstances due to the Pathan invasion. Jinnah was determined that if a plebiscite was to be held at all it should be held in circumstances favourable to Pakistan. Thus, Jinnah wanted Indian troops to withdraw and Sheikh Abdullah to be unseated. India did not accept Jinnah's demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah, because India feared that its own political base in Kashmir would shrink rapidly.

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (638 words)

I think this is rather too much coverage for 4 hours of failed talks, in an article covering 60 years of history! The basic facts are still the same. India offered Plebiscite. Pakistan rejected it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:27, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

References

Discussion

@Kautilya3: If you leave your natural bias aside, you'll realise upon close reading that Pakisan did not completely reject a plebiscite in itself. It simply wanted it to be held in circumstances most favourable to it. Or, as an alternate option, exchange Junagadh for Kashmir whilst securing Hyderabad's independence (Jinnah wanted no part in Hyderabad's coercion, where we know India invaded in violation of the StandStill Agreement). India also rejected Jinnah's proposals of troops/Shk. Abdullah removal because India knew that if Sheikh Abdulllah was removed, India would also stand no chance in a plebiscite.

Take this from a Kashmiri, Kautilya, India would have lost a plebisite with Sheikh Abdullah out of the picture. He was vital to any support India could have from Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmiri Muslims blindly loved Sheikh Abdullah due to his fighting for our rights against the Dogra regime and we would have blindly obeyed him. However, if he was not in the picture, Kashmiri desire would either be for Pakistan or our own independent country (this would be the first option for most). And it didn't take long after his death for our desire to be expressed. He was the anchor that kept Kashmiris from rebellion for decades. As soon as he died, Kashmiris became more and more active in plebiscite movements. Finally leading up to the 1987 elections.

And personally I don't see how Jinnah's 'refusal' for plebiscite gives any moral authority to India. Even till the 1950s, Nehru claimed he was committed to a plebiscite until Pakistan joined CENTO. He used Pakistan's entry into CENTO as an excuse to backtrack from his words. I don't think Nehru was sincere in the first place. The first chance he got, he took it, by calling Pakistan's CENTO membership an act of hostility and an expression of insincerity in resolving the Kashmir probllem.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 21:36, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for that lesson in Kashmiri politics (and I mean that sincerely). But the problem on hand is that you have expanded 142 words into 638 words, and the resulting text is completely unwieldy and loses focuses. This is not the way to write an encyclopedia. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:34, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

@TalhaZubairButt: No response for several days. I will reset the text back to the 283 words version. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:24, 15 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kauilya3: I have to say, I didn't take your preceding question as an unrhetorical question. So that is my reason of not responding. As for why it deserves expansion, then we could ask many questions. Like why do the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks need mentioning at all under the 1947 war section? Were the talks previously part on this section?

All in all, if Jinnah's refusal of plebiscite is going to be mentioned due to his fear of losing the plebiscite, then as per WP:BALANCE India's refusal of his conditions for a plebiscite also count, as India also feared losing the plebiscite if Jinnah's conditions for accepting Mountbatten's offer were followed.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 05:07, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

My original 142 word text never talked about why Jinnah refused plebiscite. I don't think it is necessary in a high-level summary. Facts need to be covered, not interpretations. (If interpretations need to be given, George Cunningham's interpretation, who knew all the discussions first-hand, should take priority.) Jinnah's objection about Sheikh Abdullah had been countered by Mountbatten that the plebiscite could be supervised by the UN. Jinnah still refused. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:18, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

I am not sure why you think I am engaging in rhetoric. I have raised an objection to your edit, which I thought you would address. But your solution seems to be to edit-war [12]. This is not the way to go. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:04, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: 1. Jinnah made a counter-proposal to Mountbatten which would have resulted in a plebiscite had India accepted it, but India refused because it knew that without Sheikh Abdullah, it had no leg to stand on in Kashmir. If you are so keen on including Jinnah's refusal of plebiscite, then its only fair that India's behaviour at the time also be mentioned. Its against Wiki's balance policy to just mention that Jinnah refused a plebisciteTowns_Hill 06:01, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

2. You do now WP:OWN wikipedia or this article. I can expand this article andmake three separate relevant sections if I want. In any case, I will be looking into the issue of whether some sections like 'Problems before Plebiscite' and 'US Presidents on Conflict' are WP:UNDUE. They seem irrelevant to me and more like some kind of propaganda explaining India's failure to take Kashmiri self-determination into account. As this is abt Kashmir, this page should give the highest priority to the dominant Kashmiri version of events, not the Indian one. Kashmiris aren't interested in India's fascinating reasons for not holding a plebiscite. And its the Kashmiri opinion which matters the most. Towns_Hill 06:01, 28 April 2016 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by TalhaZubairButt (talk • contribs) Towns_Hill 06:04, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 what seems to be the problem? I thought TZB's points are valid enough for an edit, why are u not even debating/countering them? FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 06:21, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

I believe I have stated the problem quite clearly at the outset, almost a month ago. To repeat, I think this is rather too much coverage for 4 hours of failed talks, in an article covering 60 years of history!

To move towards resolution, Talha Zubar needs to at least state, what length of coverage he thinks is acceptable for the topic, what are the salient facts to be mentioned etc. Instead, he is engaging in WP:OR and WP:BATTLEGROUND comments, such as "would have resulted in a plebiscite had India accepted it", "India refused because...", "it had no leg to stand on", "You do not own Wikipedia" and what not. Such discussion is simply not productive. I almost felt like taking this to WP:AE this morning. For now, I have asked RegentsPark to advise him. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:49, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

There is also a full article on Jinnah-Mountbatten Talks (which I was surprised to hear about). So, enough detail can be added there. This article is not the place for it. We are talking about one round of talks that lasted 4 hours. This, compared to at least 3 meetings between the Prime Ministers in 1947, and almost a decade of talks with UN mediation etc. Talha Zubair's coverage is simply out of proportion. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:04, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: It is not out of proportion if I expand this article and create 3 separate sections. They thus become devoted to the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks and provide extensive coverage on them and the reasons for their failure. My version of the article then moves on to the Referral to the Security Council. And these are all important parts of the conflict's origins.Towns_Hill 12:41, 2 May 2016 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by TalhaZubairButt (talk • contribs)

We are not making much headway in finding common ground. I am thinking of taking this to WP:DRN. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:42, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

SheriffIsInTown intervention

@SheriffIsInTown: I don't think your intervention is helping. The WP:STATUSQUO is this version, before any of this expansion happened. I marked it right at the beginning of this discussion, which I opened on 5 April. Anyway, I don't particularly care what version is put up for the moment. What I want is for meaningful discussion to happen. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:36, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 you do not like to debate, you do not intervention. How would you like this article to be edited? FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 16:08, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

@SheriffIsInTown: You haven't replied. You reinstated TalhaZubairButt's version that I have objected to. That is not the statusquo. In effect, you are edit-warring. I have reverted it back to the true statusquo. Everybody, please discuss the issue I have raised above. As per RegentsPark edit restriction, consensus should be reached before touching this section.-- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:58, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

Proposed Compromise

regentspark I am adding this text to the article. The single concern raised about the previous text is that "it was too much text for such a small event", therefore I have reduced the size of the text by almost half, and tried to keep the relevant information in place.
According to Jinnah a plebiscite was unnecessary and states should accede according to their majority population. He was willing to urge Junagadh to accede to India in return for Kashmir, however he rejected involving Hyderabad and refused to be “party to coercion”. Jinnah demanded simultaneous troop withdrawal for he felt that 'the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan' in the presence of Indian troops and with Sheikh Abdullah in power. Mountbatten proposed that the plebiscite be conducted by the United Nations, but Jinnah; hoping that the invasion will succeed and he will be able to swap Junagadh for Kashmir then secure Hyderabad's independence, again rejected the proposal; stating that the Governors Generals should conduct it instead. However, Mountbatten deemed it untenable according to his Constitutional position and India did not accept Jinnah's demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah, because she feared that her own political base in Kashmir would shrink rapidly. FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 15:05, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

FreeatlastChitchat, you can add anything to the page provided you post an explanation on the talk page (as you do above) and stick to 1 revert so no worries.--regentspark (comment) 15:21, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

He didn't "add" new text. He replaced the statusquo text without achieving consensus first. As far as I am concerned, it is a partial revert. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:27, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 so you have no problem with my addition except that it is a partial revert? Well I have not reverted in the last 36 hours I think and I am allowed to revert as per 1PR. So problem solved I guess. @regentspark feel free to take down that 1PR etc as it was mainly due to this problematic text, OR you can keep it in place "just in case". FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 15:57, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

I have lots of problems with it, but I am not getting into it yet. The edit restrictions that RegentsPark impose are in addition to the normal processes of discussion and resolution as in WP:BRD. Your effort to revert before reaching consensus contravenes WP:BRD. It is a continuation of the edit-war. I am glad that you tried to make progress, but you should not make mainspace edits until consensus is reached. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:05, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 The admin says the edit is Ok. So it is ok. Yous claim that Your effort to revert before reaching consensus contravenes WP:BRD. It is a continuation of the edit-war. is pretty much exactly what regentspark has forbidden, so please do not assume bad faith again. Now what problems do you have with the actual text? FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 16:11, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

Kautilya3, reading through the comments above, the new text is addressing a concern (length) expressed in the discussion and that's a reasonably way to proceed forward. The reality of Wikipedia is that we move forward with content only when there is content to discuss, so I'm not keen to put a stop to all movement on the page. Unless there is a previous edit that is substantially the same as this one (in content as well as in length), this is fine. Of course, conversely, that should not stop you from discussing the nature of this content, suggesting wording changes or giving reasons why you think it should be reverted. --regentspark (comment) 16:22, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

RegentsPark I have started a proper discussion without making any reverts almost a month ago. The questions I have raised haven't yet been aswered. The way to make progress in the dispute to first answer the questions and issues I have raised here, which are still unaswered. The editors need to first state what length of the text is appropriate and explain why. As per WP:BALASPS, no aspect of the subject should be made look more important than it is. They also need to state what are the salient points that need to be mentioned and explain why. We can have a discussion about each of them. It is premature to be making mainspace edits.

The paragraph that I had added (the 283 word version) is already a compromise. My preference would be not have this paragraph at all. So, proposing yet another version and calling it a "compromise" doesn't address the concerns. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:30, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

Where is the 283 word version? On the talk page or in the article?--regentspark (comment) 16:35, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 you are saying coverage is out of proportion and that you added a 283 word version. Well first of all the text I added is only 151 words, and secondly if I look at your revert even then there are only 50 more words added. So you are basically giving arguments over 50 words. Now if you can please tell me how you can claim that mere 50 words in an article of more than 17 Thousand words are undue then we can move forward. Furthermore your claim that a mere "four hour talk" should not be given "this much space" (fifty extra words) is not understandable, for we write about the gravity of events not there temporal occurrence. There is a Huge article on the Hiroshima attack, but it occured within a matter of hours. So just as the Hiroshima article covers various aspects eg planning etc, these 50 extra words give the readers the reasons why Jinnah was doing what he did. FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 16:43, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

@RegentsPark: I have put the four versions being discussed at the top of the section above titled Talk:Kashmir conflict#Jinnah-Mountbatten talks. The 283 word version is the 3rd one. This is also the version I reverted to in the mainspace this morning. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:54, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

A question:

• What is the gravity of the events that warrants extended coverage?

and a point:

• Length is not the only concern. It also matters whether the issues are stated keeping mind their relative importance. This goes again to WP:BALASPS. You have omitted, for instance, the fact that Jinnah thought he would lose a plebiscite in the prevailing circumstances, which is one of the two factors mentioned prominently in the source. On the other hand, you have added repeated mention of Junagadh and Hyderabad, giving them undue prominence. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 06:55, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

Comments on the proposed text

Given that we are already stretching the discussion of these talks beyond what is acceptable, let us look at point mentioned and see what its importance is.

• According to Jinnah a plebiscite was unnecessary and states should accede according to their majority population.

This was a position taken at that point in time, but the world has seen the worth of a plebiscite. So, in the long run, this position is not important at all.

• He was willing to urge Junagadh to accede to India in return for Kashmir, however he rejected involving Hyderabad and refused to be “party to coercion”.

India proposed a general principle, which wasn't accepted by Jinnah. I don't think there is need to go into the details.

• Jinnah demanded simultaneous troop withdrawal for he felt that 'the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan' in the presence of Indian troops and with Sheikh Abdullah in power.

Simultaneous withdrawal is a useful point because it represented the Pakistan position for a long time. But this and the Sheikh Abdullah issue shouldn't be clubbed together in this confusing manner.

• Mountbatten proposed that the plebiscite be conducted by the United Nations,

Important point and should stay.

• but Jinnah; hoping that the invasion will succeed and he will be able to swap Junagadh for Kashmir then secure Hyderabad's independence, again rejected the proposal; stating that the Governors Generals should conduct it instead.

Can stay.

• However, Mountbatten deemed it untenable according to his Constitutional position

Can be shortened. The fact that the Governor General doesn't have executive powers in the Westminister model is well-established.

• India did not accept Jinnah's demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah, because she feared that her own political base in Kashmir would shrink rapidly.

This is OR. Jinnah neither demanded Sheikh Abdullah's removal nor did India reject it. This sentence should go.

I am stating my comments in good faith. But this discussion doesn't override the more important issue of deciding what length is acceptable. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:52, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 Allow me to respond to the five issues that you have raised.

1. You say about the plebiscite that "This was a position taken at that point in time, but the world has seen the worth of a plebiscite. So, in the long run, this position is not important at all". I fail to see any solid "argument" in this. The "world" has seen the worthiness and unworthiness of a lot of things, removing them from Wikipedia just because the "world has seen their true worthiness/unworthiness" goes against our core policies. We never ever remove something just becasue the "world" found out its worthiness. Can you quote which policy you are following here? Be kind enough to quote the exact phrases which support the argument that "if the world has found a statement to be unworthy, it will be removed from wikipedia".
2. You say about the proposal that "India proposed a general principle, which wasn't accepted by Jinnah. I don't think there is need to go into the details.". There are two very basic problems with this. Firstly this is POV. As per NPOV we mention both sides that India wanted to keep things focused on Kashmir, Jinnah wanted to include others. The second, and the bigger, problem is that there was no "general principle" proposed by India, as the very definition of a general' principle means that it will cover more than one state, however India was actually against the general principle, it was Jinnah who wanted the general principle.
3. You say that simultaneous withdrawal and Shiekh abdullah should not be "clubbed together". To be frank I cannot make head or tail of this argument of yours. Why exactly should they not be "clubbed together" when Jinnah mentioned them together and we have an RS that mentions them together? What exactly is confusing in their being mentioned together?
4. You say that the sentence However, Mountbatten deemed it untenable according to his Constitutional position should be shortened because The fact that the Governor General doesn't have executive powers in the Westminister model is well-established. I disagree on grounds of common sense. It is common sense to assume that the average wikipedia reader has not read about the intricacies of the Westminister model. And even if he has, why can't we include it just for those who have not? When did we get so picky about including new things?
5. Your comments about the sentence India did not accept Jinnah's demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah, because she feared that her own political base in Kashmir would shrink rapidly. are beyond me as well. I would like to direct you towards the policy at WP:OR. You can clearly read that if an opinion is presented in a WP:RS then merely reporting that opinion with the change of a couple of words is never WP:OR. So this is what I did. The sentence in the book is Sidelining Abdullah would be a self confounding move. Not only did he command the greatest following in the valley, he had all along supported accession to India. If he was removed at Pakistan's demand, India's political base in Kashmir would rapidly shrink .

Please be kind enough to reply to these counter arguments when u have time. FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 18:02, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

The basic problem is that the proposed paragraph is too long and violates WP:BALASPS. So we need to pick the most important bits from the coverage. When negotiations are carried out, all kinds of points are raised and demands made. Most of them fall by the wayside. The points that we mention in a summary are the points of lasting value.

1. Jinnah's argument that a plebiscite was unnecessary is not of lasting value. So it should be dropped. (This is not an article on Jinnah, it is on Kashmir.)
2. I have no idea what you are trying to say. The general principle is reproduced on page 110 of Raghavan's book (which is on Google Books) and the entire document is reproduced in Noorani's book. But Jinnah didn't want to include Hyderabad. So the discussion moved on. Why Jinnah didn't want to include Hyderabad is not relevant to this article. So out it goes.
3. "Simulateneous withdrawal" was a demand made by Jinnah. The Sheikh Abdullah issue is an explanation he offered as to why he didn't want a Plebiscite. The two should not be confused. There was no demand regarding Sheikh Abdullah, at least at this stage. There was such a demand later.
4. "Mountbatten deemed" makes it appear as if it is his personal opinion. It was the constitutional position.
5. The sentence in the book talking about "self-confounding move" etc. is the author's own observation. It represents neither a demand, nor a response. I notice that the author uses the term "demand" here, but he never states that such a demand had been made. I think "wish" would have been better term to use than "demand" here. (That paragraph cites a communication-footnote 33-from the UK High Commission to the Commonwealth Relations Office. So it is possible that these ideas were discussed with the British Government. They are not part of the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks.) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:08, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 You have replied to none of the points I raised and have made some more arguments on your own, when you are arguing about something plz do not change your position again and again it causes the debate to become cyclic with no resolution. @regentspark can you be kind enough to give your input in the debate as well, it is kinda frustrating that every time one argument is broken another one is presented. Why can't all arguments be presented at once? Anyway, KT I will just give you two positions which you have chosen please pick one, or confirm that you are using both, but this should be it. If every single time your argument is broken you come up with another argument, the debate will continue to infinity. So please make your position clear about the following.

1. The statement about plebiscite. You first said that this was not needed because "world" had found out that the plebiscite was worthwhile. I countered by saying that we at wikipedia never remove information just because the world thinks that it is "worthy" or "unworthy". Now instead of debating my comment you have changed your position to state that this fails WP:LASTING. To counter this I present two arguments. First of all this does have lasting value as Jinnah's refusal to hold a plebiscite was the catalyst for further events. This is exactly what lasting effect means, that one event acts as a catalyst for another and so on and so forth. My second argument is that even if we, for the sake of argument, accept your surmise, even then this statement cannot be removed as WP:LASTING is a secondary policy and the first and foremost policy is WP:GNG which this event/statement satisfies to the fullest. Now please debate on these points only before moving on, for if we just move on to "the next" point before one point is decided we will not be doing anything, anytime soon.
2. The "General principle". You said that there was no need to "go into details". I countered by saying that the very phrase "general principle" means a "principle" that covers more than one area. For example you can say that the general principle is "Plebiscite should be arranged to ascertain the wishes of a populace", but the "general principle" can never ever mean that "plebiscite should be arranged in Kashmir only and not in other areas". Now instead of providing any argument to counter this and instead of giving any proof a "general principle" can pinpoint one specific thing, you have changed your claim to say that "The general principle is reproduced on page 110 of Raghavan's book". Well the page 110 does not contain the words general principle so it is your WP:OR to call it a general principle. Now in your next reply please choose which of these arguments you are going to go with. Either pick both or pick one, and we go from there.
3. Troop withdrawal and Sheikh Abdullah. You first said that they should not be clubbed together, I responded by saying that the Book has clubbed them together and Jinnah mentioned them together". Now instead of countering my argument and saying anything about why we should not follow a reliable source you have changed your opinion to state that "Simultaneous withdrawal" was a demand made by Jinnah. The Sheikh Abdullah issue is an explanation he offered as to why he didn't want a Plebiscite. I would like to say that what you are saying is your take and your opinion. It is therefore WP:OR. Yes it may be a fact that troop withdrawal and demand for Abdullah resignation were some days apart but the WP:RS has spoken of them together so they should stay together. Furthermore you have not given any insight as to how you want to "separate" them seeing that you are the one complaining about the paragraph being too long. So here too, please pick one argument, or pick both, but do not change your argument again and again.
4. Mountbatten. You first said that this should be removed as "The fact that the Governor General doesn't have executive powers in the Westminister model is well-established." I countered by saying that the average reader may not know this and that wikipedia should not be that stingy about giving out information. Now instead of countering my argument you have taken up a new position that ""Mountbatten deemed" makes it appear as if it is his personal opinion." So does this mean that you are in favour of inclusion of the text, and the issue is not purely semantic? For we can change deemed to a thousand other words to satisfy semantic issues. Next time you reply please pick one of the arguments or both. Are you against inclusion or in favour with purely semantic changes? Why are you against changes? The complete sentence is Mountbatten deemed it untenable according to his Constitutional position, so it does show that the decision was constitutional in nature by mentioning the word constitution. However feel free to present any alternative that you have.
5. India's position. First you called this WP:OR, I showed you that it was an exact quote from the book with minimal copy edit to remove any copy vio issues. Now you have changed your position to say that "it is the author's own observation". then you say "I think "wish" would have been better term to use than "demand" here". This is a very hard to understand position for me. You are commenting on the authorship of a book instead of commenting on inclusion. If you want to argue what the author "should have written" the forum to use ought to be the editorial board of his book, not wikipedia. We have accepted that the book is reliable so we accept that whatever he wrote is also reliable. Just when did wikipedians start nitpicking reliable sources? I mean I can say that Shakespeare should have killed Macbeth in this and that scene, but the forum for such commentary is not wikipedia. So I am afraid I cannot see any argument in your reply, just commentary on the book, which you should communicate to the editorial board. You are basically saying, "This would have looked better" but he has "already" written and published the book, we cannot change his words.

@regentspark and Kautilya3 I would like to say again that if we keep changing our arguments every time we reply there will be no resolution to this. FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 03:56, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

Quick response. I have some new ideas, which I will write about in a while. But I think you need to relax. Focus on the issues rather than rules of the debate or what not. There are no rules, other than being polite and assuming good faith. If we can't resolve it here, we can go to WP:DRN. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 06:39, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 without rules there will be no debate, anytime a person will see that their argument has been bested they will change position. Why are you asking me to relax btw? Please do not make snide remarks like this during our debate, it just generates bad faith. To be frank many of the issues have been accepted by you in your earlier statements with only 30-40 words remaining, so even if you want to go to DRN for those 30-40 words I will be happy to repeat my arguments at that forum. But please be kind enough to make your position clear the next time you reply. It is impossible to debate with you if you keep changing your position and your arguments everytime you comment/reply FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 07:03, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

@@Kautilya3 Sir please comment about your changing position and other issues whenever you are ready to discus this. You were quite vociferous about this issue a week ago but the minute a debate has started you have not bothered to reply much. If you are not reddy plz tell me so I can edit the article and if you are ready to discuss plz reply here. FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 03:34, 8 May 2016 (UTC)

• Comment @regentspark it has been ten days since Kautilya3 was requested to reply to the issue of His ever changing position and was requested to make his position clear. However despite being active in other pages he has not replied here. I will kindly request you that you mark this issue as resolved and archive this discussion so that the edits that were being debated could go through. I will not move to the Baluchistan conflict article and I will request KT that if he is going to debate me there, he at least replies to comments and issues raised. I am not assuming bad faith, just commenting on the fact that it is a very odd practice on KT's part to ask an admin to "block" editing of an article and then not even bother to reply to a debate going on at the TP FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 07:02, 11 May 2016 (UTC)

FreeatlastChitchat I agree. Discretionary sanctions can also be used against individual editors who repeatedly or seriously fail to adhere to the purpose of Wikipedia, any expected standards of behaviour, or any Wikipedia policy and editorial norm. Pprcgi (talk) 07:43, 11 May 2016 (UTC)

This discussion is deadlocked because you are stuck at the bottom of the disagreement pyramid. WP:TALK#USE advises you to Communicate, Stay on topic, No meta, Be positive, Stay objective, Deal with facts etc. Your posts are too long and meandering. You seem more interested in accusations and recriminations than in achieving consensus. If you want to restart the discussion by collapsing all this meta-level discussion and striking out chaff from your previous post to highlight the real points, we can proceed. Otherwise, it seems we will have to go for a mediated discussion at WP:DRN. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:25, 11 May 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 I think regentspark warned you not to engage in assuming bad faith? I think he also said that such will lead to a block. But Anyway, if you want to go to DRN feel free to open up a request. To be frank you are the one who changes his position the second he thinks his argument is broken, and the minute he realizes that his excuse will not work. I am not going to restart this discussion becauase there is no reason to do so. Furthermore there is no meta discussion here as you claim. You seemed to think that some text should be deleted, you had your reasons, when regentspark put in the restrictions there was no one debating you, I decided to debate you on the reasons that you had. I provided counter arguments, then instead of either accepting my reasons or debating them, you changed your position and came up with new excuses some of which were simply not true (like saying that the book does not contain India's position when en exact quote is present in it). So now I have asked you to pick a certain position and stick to it and you seem to be unable to comply. But as it is your right to ask for DRN I will be happy to repeat my arguments at DRN, do inform me when u open up a request, but please DO open up a request, you seem to conveniently forget to reply here even when you are replying on other Talk pages. FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 11:27, 11 May 2016 (UTC)

Lead revisions

@MalikAttaRasool:, Please see MOS:LEAD. The lead should be a summary of the article, and should not normally contain any extra material or claims. The current lead is already too long, and it will need to be pared down eventually. If you want to add new content, please do so in the body. Cheers, Kautilya3 (talk) 08:20, 18 May 2016 (UTC)

Secondly, the book chapter you have cited has sections called "Indian view" and "Pakistani view." These sections are thus only useful for the corresponding sections of our article, not for the lead or anywhere else. Please see WP:NPOV. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:06, 18 May 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 24 May 2016

Kashmir is Pakistani not chinese or Indian 65.175.134.44 (talk) 15:53, 24 May 2016 (UTC)

 Not done Please provide a reliable source. --regentspark (comment) 15:55, 24 May 2016 (UTC)

Removing WP:OR

I have removed the passage "Before this time, Kashmir was proud of its tolerant, multicultural society. The longstanding conflicts have divided the society" added today by Parkwells because it is clearly WP:OR. It is also simplistic and quite debatable. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:28, 30 June 2016 (UTC)

Errors in the very foundation of the article.

QUOTE: The Kashmir conflict is a territorial conflict primarily between India and Pakistan, having started just after the partition of India in 1947. END OF QUOTE.

The above sentence has a lot of erroneous imputations, hints and allusions.

The first word 'India'. There was no India involved in this issue in 1947. What was then available was British-India which was mainly centred in three very specific locations. viz. Bombay, Madras and Calcutta Presidencies.

Outside this British-India, there were actually a number of independent kingdoms, who were accorded protection by the British Crown. However, their independence and right to sovereignty was never in question. For instance, in the very minor issue of a right to arrest British citizens, the kingdom of Travancore stated this very clearly. Check Travancore State Manual in this link [Page no: 554]

The below given text is the argument presented by the Travancore Kingdom with regard to its rights to sovereignty

QUOTE:

1) The jurisdiction in question is an inherent right of sovereignty:

(2 The Travancore State being one ruled by its own Ruler possesses that right

(3 It has not been shown on behalf of the British Government that the Travancore State ever ceded this right because it was never ceded, and

(4 The Governor-General’s notification did not deprive Travancore of this right, but only distributed what right

END OF QUOTE

From the above quote, it is amply clear that even though in Britain there was a common feeling that the whole of the South Asian peninsular region was British-India, in fact, British-India was confined to just the three Presidencies. Beyond that the rest of the locations were similar to Japan or UAE being under US military protection. Even though the US can handover Japan to any other nation or nations, without much demur, as an ethical fact, the US has no right to do so.

However, this is what the British Labour Party did.

The complete administration of British-India was handed over to certain rich natives of the peninsula who had lived or studied in England, and had pretended to be the ‘leaders’ of the peoples of the peninsular. There was never any evidence that they enjoyed any such leadership over the millions in the peninsula.

British-Indian army was divided into two, and given to Jinnah and Nehru. Both of them immediately started using the armies in their command to intimidate all the kingdoms around British-India. Travancore king is reported to have insisted that Travancore was an independent Kingdom with a population more than that of New Zealand. However, the British-Indian (now changed into Indian) army local headquarters (actually a military station meant to protect the kingdom) was just a few kilometres from his palace. Nehru simply informed him to surrender his kingdom or face immediate occupation by the ‘Indian’ army.

Travancore King tried to appeal to Britain. However, the old political leadership had vanished. There was no location to appeal.

He surrendered. This is what happened in all similar kingdoms. This kind of occupation by India and Pakistan has continued for years. Sikkim was taken over by the Indian forces in the 1980s, I think. Goa was surrounded and captured in the 1960s.

There has been freedom struggles or rebellions in many locations in India as well as in Pakistan. In India, a revolt in Punjab had to be crushed using terrible military power in the 1980s, in which hundreds were killed. Ongoing rebellions are there in the north-eastern states of India. Freedom fighters are dubbed as terrorists. Each locality had its own colloquial variation in the way it happens. In the far South, there had been insistence of equal status by the Tamilians, which has been cunningly denied by the insertion of Hindi as the national language. The insertion of Hindi imperialism has not been accepted without protest in most non-Hindi states.

What happened in Kashmir was on similar lines. Both Pakistan as well as India had occupied Kashmir, the moment Jinnah and Nehru got command over the British-Indian army. Both occupations are illegal to the extent that the people are not willing to concede. Both sides did not allow or conduct a referendum.

In the case of most of the other kingdoms, the mass education more or less induced the idea of a greater India extending from some 7000 years back. However, in some location like Kashmir, this indoctrination has not been successful.

The liberation movement in Kashmir is not a conflict between India and Pakistan. It is simply an occupation by outside forces after the sudden withdrawal of the British protection to the kingdoms in the South Asian Peninsular region.

Taking the first quote from the Main article, it might be mentioned again that there was no ‘partition of India’. What Britain could lawfully partition was only British-India (the three Presidencies) . However, in the senseless melee that was commenced by the British Labour Party, every independent kingdom in the region was left without protection. And the go-ahead was given to Jinnah and Nehru to use their newly acquired military might to simply occupy whatever kingdoms that came their way.

The actual culprit of the Kashmir issue is not India or Pakistan. It is the British Labour Party. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 117.204.80.39 (talk) 04:51, 13 July 2016 (UTC)

I think the first sentence should be edited to avoid cnnfusion between the two uses of "India." The rest of the argumentation is WP:OR, which should be avoided on Wikipedia. Please see British Paramountcy where the issues are discussed with reliable sources. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:01, 13 July 2016 (UTC)

The exact route to the formation of this issue had to be mentioned. However, there is no intention to argue with Wikipedia Indian administrators. It would be like arguing with some toilet cleaners. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 117.214.17.178 (talk) 02:50, 14 July 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 13 July 2016

Please adjust this text with JUly 2016 as it is relevent to understand the article from beggining to present situation.

File:Burhan Wani.png

Burhan wani also known as the Robin Hood of Kashmir

The three regions: Jammu(Blue outside brown boundary), the Kashmir valley(Blue inside brown boundary) and Ladakh(Pink). The Muslim dominated Kashmir Valley was the area which saw most of the strikes, protests and stone pelting riots.

The 2016 Kashmir unrest also known as Burhan Aftermath refers to a series of violent protests in the Muslim majority Kashmir Region in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir(J&K). It started with the killing of Burhan Wani, who was a militant commander of Kashmiri-based Hizbul Mujahideen on 8 July 2016, with Indian security forces.After his killing, 10 districts of Kashmir Region in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir(J&K) came under under curfew, as more than 30 protesters were killed and 300 injured within four days by the Indian security forces. Kashmir is still under Curfew on 12 July, 2016 from 8 July, 2016

Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format.  ^B E _C K ^Y _S A ^{Y L} E _S  03:24, 14 July 2016 (UTC)

i wash to add the above text in the article after ==July 2016== which is at the end of this article as it is importnant to understand the present situation — Preceding unsigned comment added by Support2016 (talk • contribs) 10:38, 14 July 2016 (UTC)

Main article: 2016 Kashmir unrest

This information is timely and important. I will add some version of it to the article after reviewing. Please note that we definitely will not copy the entire 2016 Kashmir unrest article here. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:26, 14 July 2016 (UTC)

References

Update needed 16 July 2016

The current death toll in Kashmir is reported to be 41.

I am new here and don't know how to summarize or cite in the proper format. For example, embedded references from Greater Kashmir and Rising Kashmir are included in the article quoted below. Other details were not clearly cited in the article, but are reflected in the websites for Greater Kashmir and Rising Kashmir. Hindustan Times adds a newer detail that the newspaper ban is for 3 days. But the Times of India is outdated by 2 days.

I don't want to take responsibility for summarizing and editing, so the following is a verbatim quote from NDTV: Srinagar: One more person died in firing by security forces after clashes in Kashmir on Saturday, taking the number of deaths in the violence triggered by the killing of terrorist Burhan Wani to 41. Cable TV services were suspended for more than 12 hours and newspapers have alleged a media gag. Here are the top 10 developments in the story:

   One person was killed and two injured after security forces opened fire on a crowd when they attacked a police post in Kupwara district of north Kashmir.
   Small protests were reported in some parts of the Valley but the protesters were chased away by security personnel who resorted to baton charge, an official said.
   Journalists and editors sat on a protest in Srinagar after being told not to publish newspapers by authorities. From tomorrow, newspapers will not be sold on newsstands but online editions will continue, they said.
   Newspapers in Kashmir reported raids by police on their offices, arrest of employees and seizure of printing plates. Greater Kashmir, the largest circulated daily in the Valley, said around 50,000 copies of their newspaper were confiscated today.
   "This is a press emergency in Kashmir. This kind of gag is not the first but this time the government has formally banned us from publishing newspapers. We don't know when it will be lifted," said Shujat Bukhari, editor of Rising Kashmir.
   Senior government sources told NDTV that the gag was ordered because the distribution of the newspapers would mean movement of vehicles in violation of the eight-day long curfew in all 10 districts.
   Cellphone and internet services remained disabled in large parts of Kashmir to prevent the spread of rumours that could provoke violence. All telecom operators had been asked to suspend services yesterday.
   Cable operators said that they had been allowed to restore their services but warned not to carry Pakistani channels. "We have not received anything in writing but we were told to shut the operations. Police didn't given us any reason but we had to follow the order," Rufail Shafi, a cable operator, told NDTV.
   Amarnath Yatra, suspended amid the violence, resumed from Jammu today under tight security.
   More than 2,000 have been injured in violent protests that broke out after the killing of Burhan Wani, poster boy of Kashmir's new-age militancy, last Friday.

Some clarifying facts I am searching for are: how many of the 41 reported dead are authorities, and how many are civilians; and of the civilians, how many are protestors and how many are uninvolved bystanders; similarly, how many of the 2000 reported injured are authorities, and how many are civilians; and of the civilians, how many are protestors and how many are uninvolved bystanders. I am a nuetral foreigner located in Kashmir, currently with access to internet through broadband, but affected by extended curfews and strikes and lack of mobile service. My only access to news now is through neighborhood rumors (of both separatist sentiment and fear-of-separatist sentiment) and online news, so I am eager to see the facts collected here.Nomadshepherdess (talk) 17:43, 16 July 2016 (UTC)

Please refer to 2016 Kashmir unrest for the current unrest. I am copying your message there. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:04, 17 July 2016 (UTC)

References

Repeated sentence in section 5.1

Delete one of the occurrences of this sentence: Human rights organisations have also asked the Indian government to repeal[247] the Public Safety Act, since "a detainee may be held in administrative detention for a maximum of two years without a court order."[238] Nomadshepherdess (talk) 17:30, 22 July 2016 (UTC)

 Done EvergreenFir (talk) 17:53, 22 July 2016 (UTC)

Edit restrictions in effect from September 2016

Copied from Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee/Discretionary sanctions/Log/2016#India-Pakistan

• A 1 RR restriction. Any attempt, even if made in good faith, to do more than one revert in a 24 hour period will lead to an immediate block.
• A second revert without discussion restriction. A second revert of any edit, however minor, that is done without an explanation on the talk page will lead to an immediate block.
• A civility restriction. Any suggestion that any editor is not editing in good faith will lead to an immediate block.
• An ethnicity claim restriction Any attempt to bring the purported or deduced or imagined ethnic or nationality identities of any users will lead to an immediate block. This includes an editor's own stated ethnic identity or nationality. Wikipedia uses reliable sources and the weighting of those sources to decide what to include, what not to include, and how the content should be stated in an article. Please stick to arguments based on those factors.

--regentspark (comment) 13:10, 9 May 2016 (UTC)

New edits

@Fenir77: I see the following problems with your edits of today:

• Updating the census data is fine, but you need to add the sources for the new data.
• You have made several wording changes to the existing content, without providing reliable sources, e.g., the replacement of "local autonomy" with a reference to the UN resolution.
• Your reference to the Sumantra Bose also involves a high degree of WP:SYNTHESIS.
• The 2016 Kashmir unrest should be covered in its subsection, not in the lead. The section should again be a summary of the full article. Please add your new material to the main article and make sure that your additions here summarise the main article in a fair way.

Cheers, Kautilya3 (talk) 15:47, 31 July 2016 (UTC)

Edit restrictions in effect from September 2016 (copied from archive)

Copied from Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee/Discretionary sanctions/Log/2016#India-Pakistan

• A 1 RR restriction. Any attempt, even if made in good faith, to do more than one revert in a 24 hour period will lead to an immediate block.
• A second revert without discussion restriction. A second revert of any edit, however minor, that is done without an explanation on the talk page will lead to an immediate block.
• A civility restriction. Any suggestion that any editor is not editing in good faith will lead to an immediate block.
• An ethnicity claim restriction Any attempt to bring the purported or deduced or imagined ethnic or nationality identities of any users will lead to an immediate block. This includes an editor's own stated ethnic identity or nationality. Wikipedia uses reliable sources and the weighting of those sources to decide what to include, what not to include, and how the content should be stated in an article. Please stick to arguments based on those factors.

--regentspark (comment) 13:10, 9 May 2016 (UTC)

Simla Agreement

@Mar4d: please note that there are editing restrictions for this page and all other Kashmir conflict pages. Even though your edit [13] isn't technically a "revert," it is partly deleting or altering my content. So it would be advisable to explain the issues on the talk page. Coming to the changes you have made:

• You deleted the sentence India emerged as a clear regional power in South Asia. This is witnessed by ample reliable sources [14]. I am adding one and reinstating it.
• You deleted the phrasing where India pushed for peace in South Asia. This was actually in Dixit, p.228, even though it wasn't stated explicitly. You can also see Ganguly, p.62 that I am adding now. (Indira Gandhi overrode all her advisers to make a major concession in the interest of achieving peace. In India, she is accused of having gone "soft." So you can't take this away.)
• You removed my phrasing However Pakistan reinterpreted the wording (of the Simla Agreement). This was obvious to me when I wrote it, but now that you have contested it, I have had to think about it.

• I haven't found anybody that agrees with Pakistan's interpretation, neither any governments nor any reliable sources.
• Pakistan's interpretation is a stretch, to claim that "UN charter" means UN resolutions or UN mediation.
• The cited source (Lavoy, actually Cheema) says "as a consequence" in trying to explain it, which suggests a reinterpretation.

So I am reinstating my wording. If you bring in any reliable sources that agree with Pakistan's interpretation, we can revisit the issue.

• Your wording says differences later arose. The sources say they arose pretty much immediately.
• You deleted the sentence Pakistan claims that it could still approach the UN. This is directly supporte by evidence given in Roberts & Welsh.
• You deleted The United States and most Western governments agree with India's interpretation. Can't see why. There have been a dozen or more US government announcements that say that they support bilateral negotiations in line with the Simla Agreement.

Incidentally, so that we are on the same page, please note that WP:NPOV means all the views in reliable sources proportionately. Cheers, Kautilya3 (talk) 22:14, 20 August 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Noting the editing restrictions, I don't think you should have reverted immediately. Especially as the edits were an improvement of the text, as I found a few source inconsistencies in the section you wrote.

• The text "India pushed for peace in South Asia" or "emerged as a clear regional power in South Asia" seems vague and out of context; it doesn't establish for the reader what significance, if any, that immediately has on the Kashmir conflict, or if Pakistan took any counter-measures as an opposing power to balance the geopolitical equation (for example, it aggressively pursued its nuclear weapons project later). India did have leverage during the talks in the form of land it occupied and POWs but that is already mentioned. So what is the relevance? Context?
• Your text on India and Pakistan's interpretation of Simla Agreement isn't consistent with the source. Both the Lavoy and Roberts sources agree Islamabad and New Delhi disagreed over the pact's interpretation after it. Roberts: "while India perceived the agreement's focus on bilateralism as superseding the internationalization of the Kashmir dispute through Security Council resolutions, Pakistan disagreed. Pakistan mantained that the Simla Agreement noted that "the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries". Here is what Lavoy says: "India and Pakistan started to disagree on the interpretation of the Simla Agreement before its ink could dry... India asserts that it's relations with Pakistan are governed through a bilateral framework envisioned in the Simla Agreement... This argument is derived from Article 1(ii) of the Simla Agreement." Here is the full quote of Pakistan's viewpoint: "Pakistan, however points to Article 1(i) of the Simla Agreement, which states: "That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the countries. As a consequence [a consequence of Pakistan's viewpoint, not Pakistan's "reinterpretation" as your text claimed], "Pakistan claims that article 1(ii) does not annul the relevant UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to Kashmir." The source is rather clear Pakistan does not agree with India's dependence on Article 1(ii) and vice versa. It mentions nothing about a "reinterpretation". A reference to the UN charter governing Indo-Pakistan relations within the agreement itself (and therefore, UN's role in Kashmir), is an interpretation, not a reinterpretation. Just as India's reference to Article 1(ii) overriding Artice 1(i) is an interpretation. Please note that WP:NPOV requires accurately and fairly representing the viewpoints using what is embedded in the source. My revised text does exactly that. This has to be restored.
• I went over the text The United States and most Western governments agree with India's interpretation when I edited, and the source does not back this up at all. Lavoy says the United States and most Western governments recognize the validity of the Simla Agreement as a "main point of reference for resolving Indo-Pakistani disputes", but nothing about an agreement over India's interpretation of Article 1(ii) concerning Kashmir. So as you can see, this is misleadingly worded and WP:SYNTH. Mar4d (talk) 06:11, 21 August 2016 (UTC)

I will respond in detail later this evening (UTC). We are not limited to the sources originally cited. Please look through the new sources I added [15]. And there are more that I am yet to add:

• Lal, Deepak (2006), "The Status Quo in Kashmir?" (PDF), in Richard N. Rosecrance; Arthur A. Stein (eds.), No More States?: Globalization, National Self-determination, and Terrorism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 145–160, ISBN 978-1-4616-4037-0
• * James P. Sterba, News Analysis: Simla Accord: Behind the progress report there is possibility of a secret agreement, The New York Times, 3 July 1972.

Cheers, Kautilya3 (talk) 08:36, 21 August 2016 (UTC)

Those edits by Kautilya seem pretty POV they need to be worded in NPOV language or an edit war in this minefield of a topic will erupt. Kautilya please be more careful when phrasing as it seems you are pushing a very pointy pov. Rotunga (talk) 08:43, 21 August 2016 (UTC)

Ok, I am making subsections for the issues so that we can keep things focused. Rotunga, you haven't substantiated any of your assertions. So they fall into WP:ASPERSIONS category. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:25, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

Clear regional power

I took the original edit from the Subrahmaniam source: India emerged as the clear regional power in South Asia after the 1971 war with Pakistan by demonstrating significant national will to tackle a crisis of enormous proportions.

As I mentioned earlier, similar wording is present in many reliable sources. For example, Ganguly: The outcome of the 1971 war had significant consequences for the Kashmir dispute. After the war, India emerged as the dominant power on the subcontinent, now populated by an additional state, the newly created Bangladesh. I can provide more if you need them. You call it "vague and out of context." But, obviously, the RS don't think so. The power perception had an important role in how the Simla agreement shaped up. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:45, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

Please refer to my comment below. This discusses India gaining leverage from the 1971 war. But what the potential reader would question is how that context links to Kashmir. What leverage did it give in terms of the Kashmir dispute? Mar4d (talk) 17:38, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for raising the questions, and I will think about them. But, obviously, as Wikipedians, we can't provide our own answers. We can only provide answers that are stated by reliable sources. When they are not available, I think it is fine to leave it to the readers to make their own inferences. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:04, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

India pushed for peace

Again, as I said, my original text was based on Dixit, p. 221-222. This discussion tells you that there were two strands of opinion among Indira Gandhi's advisers. One strand, call them "hawks", sought to take full advantage of the military victory. The second strand, call them "doves," wanted to structure an agreement that encouraged "peaceful relations" with India. The head of the doves, P. N. Haksar, eventually took charge of the entire Indian delegation. More details about it in P. N. Dhar's memoirs.

K. Subrahmanyam states: Mr Bhutto himself has acknowledged in his death cell testimony that at Simla in 1972 he was able to get back the occupied territory as well as the release of prisoners of war without making any significant concessions. He was right; but he could do it because Mrs Gandhi decided to be generous in order to establish durable peace in the subcontinent. "Durable peace" remained a catch phrase in Indian lexicon and it was even used in the Simla Agreement. The Simla Agreement wasn't a full establishment of durable peace, but it represented a movement towards it, a "small beginning" in Indira Gandhi's terminology. I have made no tall claims for the Simla Agreement; I make no tall claims now. All I say is that it is beginning; it is a small beginning perhaps, but it is a good beginning. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:27, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

This one comes across as somewhat ambiguous. When it says India wanted to establish peace, is it referring to India seeking a rapprochement with Pakistan vis-a-vis 1971? Or seeking to resolve the Kashmir dispute? If the reference to POWs and occupied land is noted, then it appears that text is not relevant to the Kashmir dispute but rather the aftermath of the 1971 war. Mar4d (talk) 17:32, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

No, "peace" means peace, absence of conflict. We all know what it means. Perhaps absence of conflict is a bit too ambitious, but at least absence of armed conflict. You ask in what context. The default meaning is in all contexts. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:57, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

Thanks, I would specifically like to know the context in terms of Kashmir. As this article is on the Kashmir dispute, not overall Indo-Pakistani relations (or the 71 war), this is a valid question. If the context is not being established, I suggest we should leave it out. The following text is currently in that section: A bilateral summit was held at Simla as a follow-up to the war, where India pushed for peace in South Asia. - The sources I have read till now establish Simla Agreement was a bilateral pact to establish peace. Is this text implying the opposite, that India unilaterally sought to establish peace? Mar4d (talk) 05:20, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

Pakistan's objectives in the negotiations were primarily the immediate ones: the return of captured territory and the release of POWs. It knew that it had to make concessions to obtain them. The concession India wanted was peace. Did Pakistan also want peace? The evidence is not clear. The talks basically broke down. After everybody dispersed and started packing their bags, Bhutto met Indira Gandhi in the last minute and agreed to the deal. This doesn't indicate to me that Pakistan was pushing for peace. It agreed to it extremely reluctantly. Dixit also covers quite a bit of Bhutto's actions before and after the summit. None of them indicates pushing for peace.

As for whether it should be "peace in South Asia" or "peace between India and Pakistan," I am not too fussed about it. But the summit did cover other issues like POWs and Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. If the Simla summit had failed the other issues would have become more intractable. Having helped Bangladesh come into being, India also had an interest in rehabilitating Bangladesh in the community of nations, enabling harmonious relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh etc. Bhutto's actions again indicate a contrary position. When he visited Bangladesh a few months later, he started promoting it as an "Islamic" country, and later issued statements like "India now has two Pakistans to deal with." [16].

Let me end with another quote:

When determining India's motivation and level of toleration vis-a-vis Pakistan we have also to look back at Simla, when India, only ten years after its humiliating defeat by China, had inflicted a crushing defeat on Pakistan over Bangladesh. Had Indira Gandhi insisted that the then President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, openly recognise the line of control as the international border, the issue between India and Pakistan (although not necessarily for the Kashmiris) might have been resolved. ... Yet, in what appears to have been a generous gesture towards Pakistan, Gandhi chose not to force the issue, instead leaving future historians to analyse whether or not she and Bhutto had reached some secret agreement or understanding over Kashmir, which could be denied by future Pakistanis once the country had regained its strength.

If you want to make the case that Pakistan was shooting for peace, please make your case. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:32, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

Interpretation

It is clear that India and Pakistan disagreed on the interpretation, and frankly, it doesn't surprise anybody. But, what the Simla Agreement means is fairly clear. Steve Cohen: There, after a long and complicated negotiation, they committed their countries to a bilateral settlement of all outstanding disputes. Presumably, this included Kashmir (which was mentioned only in the last paragraph of the text). The Simla Agreement did not rule out mediation or multilateral diplomacy, if both sides agreed. (emphasis added)

Vernon Hewitt: Central to the Simla process were two convictions: that the LOC would be a 'soft' border, facilitating trade and cultural interaction and in effect reuniting the old territories of the Dogra kingdom, and that the Simla Accord removed any basis for maintaining the need to hold a referendum on the issue of the Instrument of Accession, superseding the United Nation Resolutions (38, 39, 47 and 51 respectively). Both of these convictions failed to bear fruit. (emphasis added)

Note that these statements are made independent of India or Pakistan or their "interpretations." Dennis Kux also tells us the US interpretation, which corresponds to what you call the "Indian interpretation":

Gates and Kelly also made clear that Washington no longer backed a UN plebiscite as the preferred way to solve the Kashmir dispute, but instead supported bilateral India-Pakistan tallks in accord with the 1972 Simla agreement between the two countries. US Kashmir policy thus corresponded with India's own strongly held preference for bilateral negotiations and was at odds with Pakistan's traditional desire to involve outsiders in settling the dispute. The United States had, in fact, favored this approach ever since the 1972 Simla accord. Because the Kashmir dispute remained quiet until the 1990 flare-up, the shift in the US position had attracted little attention. (emphasis added)

The Pakistani interpretation states that the reference to the "UN charter" means "UN resolutions". If you produce a reliable source that agrees with that meaning, we can discuss further. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:51, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for the references. Please note that in reference to the Simla Agreement, the Pakistani perspective does not find a contradiction between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. This ought to be emphasised. It is naive and inaccurate to say Pakistan gave up its UN commitment vis-a-vis Simla. India wanted that, but not Pakistan. The following articulates the bilateral-multilateral approach:

Ref: In Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's words, "There is nothing wrong in the Simla Agreement to prevent Pakistan from taking the dispute to the United Nations. The Kashmir dispute has been before the United Nations for the past thirty years... The PPP Government therefore wanted to exhaust the bilateral avenues fully before returning to the United Nations (emphasis added). Bhutto's daughter, former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, characterizes her father's position as follows: "There was a desire on the part of my father's government ... to pursue peaceful bilateral means to resolve the Kashmir issue. Nonetheless, Pakistan felt strongly that it could not bargain away the rights that the Kashmiri people had gained under the United Nations... In the Pakistani view, the presence of the Article 1(i) means that the Simla Agreement did not in fact commit India and Pakistan to strictly bilateral dispute resolution... In the Pakistani view, Simla was a temporary solution (emphasis added) to the Kashmir dispute, which in no way compromised Pakistan's long standing position on the issue...

Ref: Pakistan rejects this interpretation of the Simla Agreement, and contends that the agreement in no way contradicts or supersedes the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir or limits Pakistan's right to avail itself of various international mechanisms to resolve disputes - for example through appeal to the United Nations under the UN Charter and UN resolutions. In this context references to self-determination or to UN resolutions indicate support for Pakistan... (emphasis on Kashmir resolutions passed under the UN charter) -- Mar4d (talk) 17:14, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

I am not sure what we are talking about any more. I have reproduced above what the reliable sources say. Are you claiming that Pakistan government is a reliable source? If so, I say no, and you can take it to WP:RSN.

Assuming that you are not saying that (and finding it hard to imagine how an experienced editor like you would say such a thing), if there is evidence that Bhutto had "exhausted bilateral means", please present it and we can add it in. That doesn't change what the Simla Agreement means, but it would at least provide some support to his position.

Let me also point you to a recent commentary in a Pakistani newspaper that says that Pakistanis haven't read the Simla Agreement. They probably have no idea what is in it. (I am sure the Bhuttos did of course. But politicians say hundreds of things. What they really mean and what they are saying out of expediency, nobody knows.)

Speaking "off the record" (in the interest of peace on Wikipedia) I would say that Pakistan is entirely within its rights to raise the "self-determination" for Kashmir, as per the UN charter, bilaterally, or in the presence of third parties agreed by mutual consent. It can do so, and it needs to be prepared for India to raise its own issues as per the UN charter. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:42, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

Thanks. I will respond soon. Meanwhile, here is another explanation of the Pakistani interpretation: India has also been saying that with the passage of time the UN resolutions on Kashmir have lost their relevance. Legally and politically, this claim is not correct. No UN Security Council resolution can lose its relevance unless the council adopts another resolution calling for its supercession for whatever reasons. This has been confirmed by the UN secretary general in a statement on 6 January 1994... Pakistan's view is that, coming as it did after a war, the Simla Agreement merely emphasized the two countries' commitment top opt for peaceful means - bilateral negotiations, for one - instead of resorting to force of arms. It did not expressly exclude other means, such as the UN. On the contrary, the agreement specifically provides that "the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries"

It is important to note that the Simla Agreement was signed in 1972. The violence and human rights issues in Kashmir didn't escalate until the 1980s/early 1990s. This undoubtedly played a significant role in appeals for UN negotiations or intervention. Also, what complicates the issue is the current status quo. Pakistan claims the entire territory as disputed pending a final resolution, which is in line with both the bilateral and multilateral viewpoint. India, in contrast, has sought to internalise Kashmir and lays claim on all of it as an integral part, therefore denying that it is a disputed territory. Will expand on this further -- Mar4d (talk) 06:35, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

Yes, this is an explanation of the Pakistani interpretation, as you have correctly described. It is not an independent viewpoint. Moreover, even this article is not attempting to establish an equation between the "UN charter" (the wording in the agreement) and "UN resolutions" (claimed). Whether the UN resolutions continue to have relevance or not is a separate issue. It is not an issue of interpretation of the wording in the agreement. The fact that Pakistan claims this is already in my text. The UN mediation section already explains why the UN resolutions made no headway in solving the dispute. Nothing in that has changed. So, there is no need to rehash it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:15, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

Sources

I would suggest we dont use too many Indian authors as they are inherently pov when it comes to this conflict. Converselt If that is not possible we could use Pakistani sources and give balance to the view points. Rotunga (talk) 19:20, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

@Rotunga: I am afraid you are toying with the ethnicity claim restriction placed by RegentsPark above. More generally, sources are decided based on their reliability, not nationality. See WP:RS. If you think sources are WP:BIASED, you need to bring other sources that contradict them. Here is a "Pakistani" scholar that echoes pretty much everything I have said above:

Bhutto not only espoused the military’s hawkish views on India but also lent them a populist touch that resonated well with his constituents in Punjab. ... Bhutto’s meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Simla in July 1972, the first since the Indo-Pakistan War the previous year, was a potential opening for placing relations between the two countries on a new footing. Wary of popular opinion in Punjab, Bhutto used the opportunity primarily to negotiate the return of the prisoners of war and Pakistani territory occupied by India. Both sides agreed to honor the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which was renamed the Line of Control (LOC). There was no softening of the official rhetoric against India, far less a major rethinking of the state’s security imperatives after the dramatic shift in the subcontinental balance of power stemming from the loss of Pakistan’s eastern wing. (emphasis added)

Hawkish, failed to use the opening, no softening of the rhetoric. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:01, 24 August 2016 (UTC)

References

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Nehru's promise

I have reverted an insertion of "Nehru's promise" into the lead. Other than the fact it was unsourced, we should note that Nehru's promise was made in the context of an India-Pakistan dispute over princely states, as a strategy for peace. He actually proposed plebiscite on 30 September 1947, almost a month before the Kashmir invasion. Pakistan ignored it and invaded the state. Subsequently, Nehru repeated the promise in the United Nations and it was fully incorporated into the United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 and the subsequent UNCIP elaborations. Thus it is misleading to talk of "Nehru's promise" outside of the United Nations process.

Given Pakistan's reluctance to withdraw from the parts that it controlled, Nehru proposed in the 1950s to leave these parts alone (as well as Jammu and Ladakh), and limit the plebiscite to the Kashmir Valley. This proposal got incorporated into what is known as the Dixon Plan. Nehru regarded this as a concession to Pakistan. It is this concession that he withdrew after Pakistan entered into a Mutual Defence Treaty with the US. There is nothing on record that says that Nehru ever withdrew from the UN Resolution 47.

I personally regret the fact that Nehru withdrew from the Dixon Plan. But evidence indicates that he did so because he recognised that peace with Pakistan was unachievable. All this will go into the article when I revise the 1950s section.-- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:58, 22 January 2017 (UTC)

References

Correct and/or replace reference to Hinzbul Mujahideen

This is misspelled, and should refer to Hizb-ul-MujahideenNomadshepherdess (talk) 15:47, 19 January 2017 (UTC)

 Done. Thanks for pointing it out. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:56, 22 January 2017 (UTC)

New content in the lead

@Owais Khursheed: I am sorry, this content is not proper. The citation is incomplete. You need to give the authors, title, the work and the publisher (presumably Oxford University). Assuming this is the article by Tahir Amin and Victoria Schofield that I am able to find at this url, the conclusions made here are squarely contradicted by Schofield's own book (Kashmir in Conflict, pp.130–136). There she narrates that the people were fairly content in 1983 and that the political developments between 1983–87 gave rise to dissatisfaction. Contrary to the claim here that Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir became popular, we know that they won no seats in 1983 and only four in 1987. Granted there was election rigging in 1987, but Schofield herself is on record having said that they might have won four (more?) seats if there was no rigging. This doesn't indicate a great deal of popularity. All said and done, I think this source is highly unsatisfactory. Moreover,

• You have copied text verbatim, and so it is WP:COPYVIO.
• The lead must be a summary of the article body. So, you can't insert it in the lead without discussing it in detail in the body.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:38, 28 January 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 (talk) I have done it, check it now. Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 09:47, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

No, this content is not ready for the lead yet. It has to be WP:NPOV. Verifiability is not enough. If it is the consensus of all the reliable sources, there would be no problem. But it is contradicted by one of the authors herself in a book-length work. It is also contradicted by Sumantra Bose's book. Both of them gave testimony to the British Parliament committee, cited below. I would encourage you to read what they say in their testimonies. The vast majority of the scholars studying the Kashmir issue agree that the political developments between 1983–1987 gave rise to the Kashmir insurgency. The old lead reflected that consensus.

There is no evidence that Kashmiris were clamouring for self-determination before these developments. Here is quote from Schofield's book:

Tavleen Singh, who was covering the [1983] elections for the Indian press, witnessed the extraordinary interest the [Indian] prime minister took in the campaign. ... During her interviews in the valley, Tavleen Singh asked whether the plebiscite was an issue. 'Almost everywhere the answer was an emphatic no. People said that the past was dead and they were participating in this election as Indians.'

Between 1983 and 1987, the Indian prime minister interfered a lot with Kashmiri politics, which put off the Kashmiris and provided support for the JKLF calls for azadi. But what is meant by azadi varies widely within the Kashmiri populace. It cannot be equated with "self-determination". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:28, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

@ Kautilya3 (talk) 12:28, 29 January 2017 (UTC) Engaging in original research is not allowed as per wikipedia policies and an encyclopedic content should suffice that too of an Oxford encyclopedia. It is not your job to determine what scholarly consensus is.Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 12:56, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

Kashmiri leaders have made it clear that they want right to self determination and that is the root cause of conflict, you can check Yasin Malik on India Tv on 27 August 2014, He is one the greatest leaders of all time in Kashmir, He made it clear on that show in front of millions that "we want self determination". U can check it.Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 13:07, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

I am afraid you are confusing between original research and WP:NPOV. Original research (i.e., making unverifiable claims) is prohibited. But NPOV is a requirement, whereby we are required to find out the consensus among all reliable sources. Disregarding NPOV and pushing particular sources and view points is called WP:POV pushing.

Yasin Malik is a WP:PRIMARY source and what he says is quite irrelevant to this discussion.

I am asking you to demonstrate that the content you have added meets WP:NPOV, represents consensus among the reliable sources. Please focus on that issue. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:04, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

Where it doesn't meet WP:NPOV? It is from reliable sources and is unbiased based on facts.Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 15:58, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

Have you looked at the WP:NPOV page? Where exactly does it say it should be "from reliable sources and is unbiased based on facts"? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:31, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

You say that it is "unbiased". Is it really? The lead author of the article is Tahir Amin, a Pakistani scholar. He seems to have impressive credentials, but he also seems to be strongly associated with the Institute of Policy Studies, an organisation owned and operated by Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, the same organisation that is behind the Kashmir insurgency, and is the parent organisation of Hizbul Mujahideen. Does it still seem like "unbiased"?

I look at his article on the "Kashmir question". On the issue of 1947 Jammu massacres, it says this:

The scale of the killing of the Muslims can be seen from the fact that 200,000 Muslims were massacred by the Maharaja’s forces in Jammu alone, converting the Jammu from a Muslim majority province to a Muslim minority province.[17]

with a citation to Alistair Lamb, a journalist with notorious biases. Contrast that with what we write in 1947 Jammu massacres, by using truly reliable sources. Jammu didn't become a "Muslim minority province" because of killings. It became so because the Muslim majority districts of Poonch and Mirpur split off, leaving only the Hindu majority districts in the original state. And, 200,000 Muslims weren't massacred. A total of 237,000 Muslims went missing, of which 200,000 are said to have arrived in Pakistan. That leaves a balance of 37,000. And you can compare that with the 20,000 Hindus and Sikhs massacred in Mirpur "alone" (to parallel the POV phrasing that this author is fond of). Still seems "unbiased"? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:22, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 (talk) 18:22, 29 January 2017 (UTC) . I have another old is gold source (http://www.csmonitor.com/­1983/0610/061054.html), .Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 04:07, 30 January 2017 (UTC)

Also why is Yasin Malik, WP Primary, and whatever he says why is it irrelevant to the discussion, Original research is "The phrase "original research" (OR) is used on Wikipedia to refer to material—such as facts, allegations, and ideas—for which no reliable, published sources exist. This includes any analysis or synthesis of published material that serves to reach or imply a conclusion not stated by the sources." We don't have such kind of problem with Yasin Malik and what he has said on India TV is reliable published source, he is the leader of Kashmir,he represents the whole nation of Kashmir,he made it crystal clear that he wanted right to self determination. What better scholars do we have on Kashmir than Yasin Malik, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, that's your scholarly concensus. They all agree that they want right to self determination.Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 04:20, 30 January 2017 (UTC)

Here are some other scholarly sources [17] and another one [18]. -- — Preceding unsigned comment added by Owais Khursheed (talk • contribs)

All your links didn't work for me. Please provide full citations if you wish to pursue them further.

Yasin Malik etc. are political leaders. They are not called scholars. (See WP:SCHOLARSHIP) You are welcome to add their views by creating a section on Kashmiri views (similar to the Indian views/Pakistani views sections that are present already). But views have to be stated as such and given WP:In-text attribution. They cannot be presented as facts. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:27, 1 February 2017 (UTC)

Just a quick comment. Owais Khursheed— If you want to add text to an article, the WP:ONUS is on you to explain why it should be added.

In the first place, None of the citations you added have working links. You must be able to provide working links. Because there isn't consensus for your changes. I've reverted you. —MBlaze Lightning ^T 06:15, 1 February 2017 (UTC)

Thanks for joining MBlaze. Please note that I have only raised objections to the content added to the lead. The content in the body is ok. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:07, 1 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Muslim Conference

I have removed the phrasing "reigned supreme" added by Owais Khursheed. It is WP:PEACOCK. The term is indeed used by Zutshi, but the text around it makes clear that she is saying that the support for Muslim Conference in comparison to National Conference was overwhelming in the Jammu province. (The separate mention of Poonch is because she is not treating Poonch as part of the Jammu province; formally it was an autonomous jagir. But it is treated as part of the Jammu province by Snedden and others.)

The more substantive part of her narrative is that the Valley Kashmiris were divided, but Muslim Conference failed to capture their support. This was in fact true from the beginning. Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, their luminary in the Valley, only had a base among the middle classes. He was never able to build support among the "masses". In 1947, it was in "shambles", as confirmed by K. H. Khurshid to Jinnah. (see the Khurshid page for details.) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:31, 1 February 2017 (UTC)