Talk:Debt-trap diplomacy/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Promoting an idiot or liar as an expert?

Blocked sockpuppet post

Article has to make it fairly clear that Chellaney's claims were debunked as disinformation. And to stop promoting him as if he is an expert. He is either a liar or a dishonest scholar who makes claims that have been LONG debunked by many credible scholars. In regards to China, there are currently no evidence to prove his claims. Institutions like Chatham House and Rhodium Group have shown there is no hard evidence that indicates China seizes assets after a country defaults. And Brahmam Chellaney also made too many multiple falsehoods on his original claims of Debt trap in Sri lanka like: claiming that Sri Lanka had defaulted on Chinese loans and was forced to give away their port. That is false info. When in fact, Chinese loans made up a small proportion of Sri Lanka debt distress. And Sri Lanka never defaulted on any loans let alone Chinese ones and it was Sri Lanka who solicited China first to lease its port. °https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/06/05/questioning-the-debt-trap-diplomacy-rhetoric-surrounding-hambantota-port/ Chellaney has been criticised by Deborah Brautigum, Chatham house, Maria Adele Carrai, etc for pushing out outright disinformation. Yet the article doesn't even make it clear enough he has been debunked. And treats him as an expert. Nvtuil (talk) 02:57, 31 October 2021 (UTC) Blocked sockpuppet. Kautilya3 (talk) 12:50, 21 December 2021 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 17 May 2021 and 31 July 2021. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): YuLinB. Peer reviewers: Jbuchanan 1, Gaw39938.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 19:53, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 22 January 2019 and 25 May 2019. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Zechengding. Peer reviewers: Csandhu.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 19:53, 17 January 2022 (UTC)

Africa Union's former Ambassador to the USA slams IMF and World Bank loans.

The African Union's former Ambassador to the United States, Arikana Chihombori Quao slams interest rates of loans from the IMF and World Bank. Urges Africa and the diaspora to unite against them.

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H52Nin7_wsM In the longer version she calls upon African nations to immediately stop paying all IMF and World Bank loans.[1]

CaribDigita (talk) 02:55, 25 January 2022 (UTC)

Antigua and Barbuda's opinion of Chinese grants & loans

Antigua and Barbuda's P.M. said it best.Link

Prime Minister Gaston Browne has come out in defence of the Government and people of the Peoples Republic of China.

This is after statements made by the US secretary of State Mike Pompeo calling the Asian nation a predatory lender.([2])

Prime Minister Browne was at the time speaking at the handover ceremony for the recently completed Grays Green Community Centre which was built by the Chinese through **grant** funding.

Browne says he has reached out to the US Secretary of State suggesting that the US should seek to offer better deals to developing countries than those offered by China.

“I can say firmly in the case of Antigua and Barbuda and its relationship with the People’s Republic of China that, that is not so. In fact, I went as far rebutting the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to say to him that it is not so and called upon him and the United States to put a frame[work] in place so that developing countries similar to what the People’s Republic of China is doing. I am pleased to announce that just yesterday there was a release coming from the OPEC organization in which they reckon that they will form this tropical arrangement between OPEC. Canada and the European Union to put together a better developmental paradigm to assist developing countries in the world.” he says.

Browne says the financing rate offered by China cannot be matched by the World Bank who is a developmental lending agency.

He says “they[China] extend loans up to twenty years with a five years moratorium at 2% interest not even the World Bank as a developmental institution [offered] that type of concessional funding. Not even during a disaster because when Barbuda got decimated by Hurricane Irma the World Bank agreed to come to our rescue and we engaged them, they offered us a loan of up to $40 million dollars over 10 years at 4%; we said to them, 'the term is too short interest too high'. They said to us, if we want better terms, we had to get a donor to give-us $20 million dollars so that they can write down their terms probably- maybe- down to 1% over 20 years.”

A number of projects locally that have been made possible through grant funding from China in an effort to demonstrate the willingness of China to assist developing countries globally.

PM Browne says, “this very project for which we are having the handing over ceremony was a grant in excess of $20 million dollars grant- compliments the government of the People’s Republic of China and they have made numerous grants in the past, the Sir Vivian Richards Stadium, that was a $70 million dollars grant from the People’s Republic of China. Currently, there is two clinics being built; one in Villa and one in Wilikies at a cost in excess of USD$10 million dollars, grant monies again and the best is yet to come.”

The Prime Minister also alluded to monies made available to assist the island with its housing challenges.

“The People’s Republic of China has approved a grant of Ninety Million dollars to help us to provide social housing for the people of Antigua and Barbuda so we can build more resilient homes, are those the practices of a predatory government? I say to you, those are the practices of a caring government, a government that understands the needs of the developing countries globally and would have gone the extra mile to help us to build capacity literally in all aspects of our development,” Browne says.

Many islands of the region are beneficiary of loans and other aids offered by the People’s Republic of China.

CaribDigita (talk) 04:02, 7 February 2021 (UTC)

You should add them in. Be bold Someone97816 (talk) 23:34, 6 April 2022 (UTC)

Examples?

Drmies, I don't think this article is dealing with "examples". It is trying to deal with all known (or perhaps imagined) instances of debt-trap diplomacy. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:19, 14 June 2022 (UTC)

• So that's all the examples then. At any rate, the article is ... excessive. One way to handle it is to put notable cases in individual articles, or maybe per country or whatever--but this is way over the top. "Beers" shouldn't describe all the beers in the world either. Drmies (talk) 03:03, 15 June 2022 (UTC)

Questioning the reliability of Trade Finance Global

Info removed:

The creditor is said to extend excessive credit to a debtor country with the intention of extracting economic or political concessions when the debtor country becomes unable to meet its repayment obligations. The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany have been known for attaching conditions to their grants and loans as a means of influencing the political and economic policies of borrowing countries.

Reason:source is considered unreliable

https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/about-us/

is trade finance global (a company) considered an unreliable source? It is a large organization with many credible partners. — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs) 00:38, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

You have been referred to WP:RS. Does it state anywhere that finance companies are supposed to be reliable sources? The website itself is calling the source a "blog" in a pop-up box. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:47, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

References

Kautilya3's removal of content

Diff of content removal

[Transcluded from User talk:Kautilya3] You are being facetious in your arguments. Bräutigam's views are clearly relevant to the topic of debt trap diplomacy and so is the reception and usage of her views, which BBC was clearly party to in the incident described by the content you deleted. I have not engaged in any expression of personal views in the article other than a basic description of the event involved in relation to Bräutigam and BBC's involvement of her views on debt trap diplomacy. Should you find any cases where this was not the case, please explain why that is and how a change should be reflected in the article. This is clearly not a case of WP:UNDUE or WP:NPOV imo and you have not given any evidence of my contravention of the policy other than that you believe it is UNDUE. Qiushufang (talk) 09:39, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Brautigam's views may be relevant to the topic, but whether BBC covered them or not is not relevant. If we were presenting BBC as a source, then a counterpoint may be necessary. Otherwise, this is just puffing up a section on "Counterarguments", which is already way too bloated. I also wonder why you didn't initiate a talk page discussion instead of WP:edit warring. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:01, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

BBC is presented as a source. They themselves posed as a counterpoint to Brautigam's views. Do you consider reverting three times in a single article's history edit warring when you have done so five times over the course of the last two days? I did not go to talk first, which I have done now, because frankly I do not believe you are acting in good faith. Another user also questioned your removal of their content and sources in talk prior to me and you have not responded there, which does not inspire confidence. An admin said similar things you are accusing me of about this article and you questioned their reasoning. If you are so intent on improving the relevance of this article's content, why have you not done so to improve it as the admin had suggested in the template? This seems like a case of you imposing your own views of UNDUE on others based on your biases. Qiushufang (talk) 10:17, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Qiushufang has been WP:COATRACKING on 2019–present Sri Lankan economic crisis and Debt-trap diplomacy, the latter where the external debt section spawned a whole new section on debt trap. In addition I have noticed some newly created accounts like User:LilAhok and User:Simpleshooter99 being extremely aggressive in defending China on the debt-trap argument, including removing material entirely claiming that it is disinformation. FobTown (talk) 03:06, 25 July 2022 (UTC)

Thank you, Kautilya3. You haven't done anything wrong. — Preceding unsigned comment added by BooleanQuackery (talk • contribs) 05:12, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

---

Could @Kautilya3: explain their removal of content justified by them through WP:UNDUE and how Bräutigam's views on debt trap diplomacy, the subject of this article, and its reception and usage by a news organization which resulted in misrepresentation of her views, is not relevant to this article? Qiushufang (talk) 09:55, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

As I said on my user talk (copied above), Brautigam's views are relevant. But that does not mean that BBC's coverage of them is relevant. You claim that BBC is presented as a source. Can you show where? Is that the programme where Brautigam is claimed to have been misrepresented?

The "counter-arguments" subsection is already three times as long as the "arguments" subsection. It looks like the editors have been removing content from the "arguments" section and puffing up the "counter-arguments" section. This is a serious WP:NPOV violation, which states Wikipedia aims to describe disputes, but not engage in them. The aim is to inform, not influence. At the moment, I see the content really arguing the issue. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:45, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Both Brautigam and BBC "claim" that her views were misrepresented. BBC is presented as a source here. Do you consider BBC's coverage of debt trap diplomacy irrelevant? Your involvement in a WP:UNDUE dispute with other users based on the size of two opposing sections is not my problem. I was not party to it. The only contribution I made on this page was back in 15 February 2022 which you removed. Content which does "describe disputes, but not engage in them," but perhaps that is not your definition of WP:NPOV. What do you see about the content "arguing the issue." As far as I can see, the content is accurate to the sources involved, none of which are depreciated or considered generally unreliable, and relevant to the topic, debt trap diplomacy. I can see how you would consider it irrelevant if you believe that BBC's views and portrayal of debt trap diplomacy and the representation of Brautigam's views irrelevant, to which I would disagree. Qiushufang (talk) 11:06, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

It is not "my UNDUE dispute with other users". The imbalance exists in the China section (and has existed for a quite a while as far as I can see), and my first little effort to do something about it was reverted by you. Brautigam's views are already summarised on the page. Whether BBC covered them accurately or not is completely irrelevant to Wikipedia. You haven't yet provided any justification for why the reinstated content is needed in an encyclopaedic article on debt-trap diplomacy. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:40, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

If it is not your dispute, then whose is it? Who else is part of this dispute you have described? Why are you mentioning it to me then when I have barely done anything on this page? You are also moving the goalposts again. You asked where BBC was presented as a source. I have done that. Now you say I have not provided any justification while I have described the relevance above in relation to the article topic. Do you honestly not understand why the portrayal of debt trap diplomacy is relevant on an article about debt trap diplomacy? This has to be a joke right? Qiushufang (talk) 12:44, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

I have proven that BBC is used and presented as a source here. I have also given my justification that the content involving Brautigam and BBC are directly related to the portrayal of debt trap diplomacy. Please stop with the wilful ignorance. Qiushufang (talk) 12:55, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

As of currently you have not been able identify any content in which I misrepresented the source or voiced my own opinion on the subject. Your entire basis for deletion of the content, which directly involves views of debt trap diplomacy and its portrayal, is WP:UNDUE on an article about debt trap diplomacy. You downplay its relevance by representing it as only about BBC and Brautigam and now say that whether not BBC misrepresented someone's views on debt trap diplomacy is irrelevant. How can it be completely irrelevant to a Wikipedia article on debt trap diplomacy? Qiushufang (talk) 13:03, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

I am afraid you are not understanding the question. Is the disputed BBC programme used as a source on this Wikipedia page? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:07, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Yes. BBC issued an apology on the BBC programme as described above. The BBC programme is a tertiary source used by BBC here. Qiushufang (talk) 13:14, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

This is what you mean by "this Wikipedia page"? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:45, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Here is the Wiki page where BBC is used as the source. I don't see how you can miss it but should that genuinely be the case, then there is no point in further discussion since we are clearly talking past each other. I suggest third opinion or dispute resolution noticeboard if that is the case. Qiushufang (talk) 13:50, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

This is the irrelevant content which is being removed. Its relevance can only be established if the said BBC proramme has been used elsewhere on this Wikipedia page. Otherwise, it is irrelevant. I hope that is clear. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:58, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Neither WP:UNDUE or WP:NPOV states that a primary source must be provided first for secondary sources describing it to be of relevance. The secondary sources also involve both debt trap diplomacy and Brautigam, which are of relevance on the article. Again, I suggest third opinion and dispute resolution if you insist on continuing to argue. Qiushufang (talk) 14:04, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Yes, I think we reached a dead end here. I will open a WP:DRN case next week. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:58, 22 July 2022 (UTC)

Verifiability of China-Africa statistics

I've had a glance at a couple of sources used to present Africa-wide data on the article. The "Africa" section uses a chart with data cited to [3], although the primary source is mentioned embedded in the image there to be from the China Africa Research Initiative. I found the data and chart there was published here: [4] - it may be worth adding attribution to that or changing that to the cited source since the table itself is not discussed in-article.

Ignoring any potential NPOV issues, I think some paragraphs in that section and that chart could be updated with newer data - here are a couple of sources that come from a google search: [5][6]. As NPOV issues are mentioned and it sounds like a DRN is opening soon I am not going to make the edits to change it though.

Just to comment as an uninvolved editor and not familiar with the topic, it does also seem strange that the "china" section has a "counterarguments" subsection 4 times larger than the "arguments". As the section reads right now it's fairly difficult for me to read, and I think that the "China" section could be better structured for readability eg. by indicating which institutions/people explicitly support or oppose the concept, and also clearly demarcate between the opinions and the known collected data in due weight. Thanks Darcyisverycute (talk) 11:26, 23 July 2022 (UTC)

How would you separate the section by institutions and people while indicating whether they support or oppose the concept? More subsections under arguments and counterarguments or just listing by institutions without those two subsections? Qiushufang (talk) 19:51, 23 July 2022 (UTC)

See WP:CRIT, specifically WP:CRITS, for MOS-related guidance on writing criticism sections. I also like this essay: WP:CONTROVERSY (note that is an essay, not policy, I just think it would be helpful for improving the article.) There are reliable sources both supporting and opposing the concept, and I think the validity of the concept itself could be established in-article independently of how accurate the term is to describe China. Does the theory or concept itself, independent of China, have validity among economists and political scientists? Is the term actually used to describe anything other than specifically about China's lending practices? The article could more clearly indicate the answers to both of these questions. Thanks Darcyisverycute (talk) 06:01, 24 July 2022 (UTC)

I suppose a start to following WP:CRITS (if that is the solution) would be to rename Counterarguments to Reception and then divide the sections into institutions/individuals and incorporate both supporting and opposing views. I am not sure how one would go about establishing a definition of debt-trap diplomacy independent of China however, since according to the origin and background section, it began as a term to describe behavior associated with China. Are there any sources that develop the term independent of a specific national or institutional context? Imo it would be better to portion out the entire China and IMF sections to individual country sections and consolidate any general information to the origin and background section for the reasons I described below. Qiushufang (talk) 06:27, 24 July 2022 (UTC)

Sounds like a good plan, I agree with those suggestions :) I'd recommend making changes to this effect only after the ongoing/paused DRN is closed, making sure there is a consensus on this change first (I try to give articles a week between proposing and making contentious changes). Darcyisverycute (talk) 06:48, 24 July 2022 (UTC)

I would also pose the question why the China section and even the IMF section are necessary to begin with. All the content in the arguments and counterarugments sections could fit into the origin and background section or any of the other individual country sections without much trouble. Having individual opposing sections is going to be a cause of NPOV arguments regardless of how "balanced" it is due to continuing developments and endless trivia and sources to support either side. If it was me I would delete both sections and distribute their contents to other country and background sections. Qiushufang (talk) 20:11, 23 July 2022 (UTC)

Popular media are more likely to argue for debt trap, but scholastic works less so. If sources use the same set of facts and arguments, they only need to be mentioned once. If a counterargument provides more evidence, that may justify a longer length. This may be the reason for the different lengths of the two positions, but we can look into the details to see if anything needs improvement. CurryCity (talk) 21:23, 23 July 2022 (UTC)

Article direction

Per above I propose removing the China and IMF/World Bank sections and distributing their contents to other sections based on the following reasons:

1. Having two directly opposing sections (Arguments/Counter-arguments) leads to NPOV disputes regardless of how "balanced" they are due to continuing developments and endless trivia and sources from media outlets to support either side.

2. The content already overlaps considerably with the Origins and background section as well as individual country sections. Many of the arguments and counterarguments cite location specific examples and repeat content in other sections.

3. The IMF and the World Bank section does not seem to have any direct relationship with "debt trap diplomacy." The sources used do not contain that term as far as I can tell and in any instance where the IMF and World Bank are brought up where "debt trap diplomacy" is mentioned they are always used in juxtaposition with China. AKA the term "debt trap diplomacy" is actually used specifically for China. The article should make that clearer in the lead as well rather than treat it as a term with universal application.

Related to reason #3, the scope of this article should be pared down to focus on the development of "debt trap diplomacy" as a concept and its application rather than attempt to list a debt related factoid for every country, many of which do not explain how they are examples of debt trap diplomacy. The development in that direction was possibly the result of obfuscation between "debt trap diplomacy" and "debt trap" as well as efforts to fit all debt related exchanges between China and another country into the debt trap paradigm. Some sections do not even fulfill these requirements. For example, none of the sources used in the Debt-trap_diplomacy#Philippines, Debt-trap_diplomacy#Indonesia, Debt-trap_diplomacy#Tajikistan, and Debt-trap_diplomacy#Laos sections mention debt trap diplomacy at all. Neither the Philippines or Indonesia sections contain any info related to China or debt trap diplomacy. In Debt-trap_diplomacy#Malaysia, three sources mention debt trap in passing but not debt trap diplomacy. In Debt-trap_diplomacy#Europe, only SCMP mentions debt trap diplomacy directly in passing. Their foreign relations with China articles are also linked as further information, but none of them mention debt trap diplomacy either. The qualifications to be considered a case of "debt trap diplomacy" are extremely low to the point where this article has become merely a depository for countries that have debt related relationships with either China or the IMF/World Bank without explaining why or how they are cases of debt trap diplomacy.

A major problem is that the article does not clearly define debt trap diplomacy or follow the seemingly colloquial meaning, which is a nefarious debt relationship with China. The lead describes a political finance-related concept applied generally to both China and the IMF. However none of the sources I've seen in this article attributes "debt trap diplomacy" to the IMF, only "debt trap." Debt-trap_diplomacy#Origin_and_background attributes the term entirely to a Chinese context and most of the article follows that line of thought as well, barring sources that concern the IMF/World Bank which do not mention debt trap diplomacy. In many of the cited sources, "debt trap diplomacy" is not mentioned directly and only "debt trap" in combination with China. If that combination suffices as an example of debt trap diplomacy, then the implication is that only examples related to China qualify regardless of whether "debt trap" or "debt trap diplomacy" are used. There should be a section detailing the differences between the older "debt trap" versus "debt trap diplomacy" as applied to China to avoid confusion. However even in such cases where China is part of the equation, the sources usually do a poor job of describing why they are cases of debt trap diplomacy and only mention debt trap in passing. Many of the statements made about debt trap diplomacy are nearly identical and fit into the categories of perception or possibility that could be summed up in one section for all cases rather than having several sections that all describe the same thing. Qiushufang (talk) 19:34, 25 July 2022 (UTC)

I think a difficult here is that the "debt trap diplomacy" theory has been largely shown to be wrong as to China. This means a lot of energy on the page seems focused on refutation. I think a more globally focused direction, including more emphasis on World Bank and IMF would be preferable.

It is a scattered article, and in rough shape. My overall reaction is that this topic would have been better off as a sub-section of a broader article dealing with political or diplomatic ramifications of sovereign debt. But things are very far past that point. JArthur1984 (talk) 15:01, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Regardless of whether or not the theory is right, it is obviously used colloquially to mean something specific to China. Perhaps more content could be included about the IMF/World Bank after a distinction has been made between "debt trap" and "debt trap diplomacy" both of which need further definition to prevent obfuscation between the two. To me, the former is clearly an older term and more generally applied whereas the latter is specific to modern China. Qiushufang (talk) 19:39, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

There is clear lack of NPOV throughout the article

There is heavy pro-China bias for this article. Looking at the edit log, it seems that a small number of users are consistently skewing this article to be pro-China despite pushback from other users. BooleanQuackery (talk) 05:09, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

Boolean's recent deletions illustrate some of the problems I outlined above. Namely that if we were to remove any sources and content which do not explicitly mention "debt trap diplomacy" then a good portion of the article should be deleted. I suppose the only reason they haven't yet is because of inconsistent application of that requirement. It's ironic that Boolean's efforts to make the article less pro-China actually increased the size of the Counter-arguments section by incorporating content from other sections as well, even though that was one of the concerns of Kautilya3, who they voiced support for. Qiushufang (talk) 10:52, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

Sources do not have to explicitly mention debt-trap diplomacy to be included. However, information must pertain to debt-trap diplomacy. WP:NOTEVERYTHING I increased the counter-arguments size because there were counter-arguments incorrectly placed in other sections. That section should still be made shorter. BooleanQuackery (talk) 20:12, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

One of the sources you removed here was a direct argument against debt trap diplomacy and the material was part of their argument. It could easily have reworded it to make it apparent that that was the case, and even a cursory glance at the content would indicate that that was their intention. Qiushufang (talk) 20:29, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

Yes, that's good. Sources that pertain to debt-trap diplomacy should be included with proper wording which also pertains to debt trap diplomacy. BooleanQuackery (talk) 20:47, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

BooleanQuackelry, looking at the article page log, it has been stable with many long time editors not having issues with any of those edits prior. Yet you comes in and mass reverts alot of long stay edits in one day. And a lot of information you removed was essential context like why Africa had such a huge need for infrastructure funding and why it was turning to China, who is scrutinised for such loans. And I find your edits to be very hypocritical. You accused me of not doing proper grammar for this edit.[7] Except I never even edited that Malaysia section. You did and you also made that typo yourself. So you accused me wrongfully.[8] . Also you had claimed that my "grammar" here was poor. Nothing wrong with the grammar. [9] But all it looks to me is that you're attacking and trying to minimise Bloomberg's wordings and vandalize my edit by removing away words like (evidence), simply because you have either been doing unnecessary changes or removing just the real information that states there is no evidence to support debt Trap diplomacy in Africa.Simpleshooter99 (talk) 22:27, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

There is an ongoing official content dispute. No, I did not make a typo. I am clearly not vandalizing anything, WP:DV. I support having information about questioning the legitimacy of debt-trap diplomacy, which is why I did not delete that information from the page. I've deleted irrelevant and POV statements. BooleanQuackery (talk) 23:21, 26 July 2022 (UTC)

Nothing has ever been stable. This article was always infested with POV because NPOV editors don't have the time to spend arguing and walk away after trying for a while. I have looked through BooleanQuackery's individual edits one by one, and they all looked reasonable. I also agree with his general approach of focusing on "debt-trap diplomacy" specifically and cutting out all the glorification of BRI. This is not the place. The term "diplomacy" is also quite important. It is not simply a question of good debt and bad debt. Unfortunately, sources focusing on the diplomatic aspects (international relations and strategic issues) are quite meagre. That, in part, is why the article has been padded up with non-diplomatic aspects. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:39, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

I have only recently edited the article, but the impression I get overall is it suffers because of a lack of global view of the subject, and is instead overly focused on China. The "debt trap" argument about China has been shown to be mostly wrong however, and this means there is a lot of energy focused on refutation. It would be good to take a global view, including by developing the World Bank/IMF section, for example. JArthur1984 (talk) 14:55, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

There is a conflict here in what this article purposes to be. "Debt trap" is a general term and has been used for far longer whereas "debt trap diplomacy" is much newer and contested. However this article makes no distinction between debt trap and debt trap diplomacy. And rather than defining and describing the dimensions of debt trap diplomacy, for which sources are relatively few due to its relative recentness, it lists a slew of economic data attached tenuously to the term, often mentioned only in passing by media outlets and government officials. Currently this article is 90% about Chinese debt trap diplomacy while a small portion is dedicated to the IMF/World Bank. The conflict is that debt trap diplomacy is specifically about China both in its conception and in the way it's used in majority of the article while elements of this article behave as though that were not the case. Why is there a World Bank/IMF section without defining its relevance to debt trap diplomacy or does this article take a global non-China exclusive view of the term? Why did Kautilya3 label a single section "China" when most of the content in this article is about China anyways? I am fine with this article taking either the global or China specific approach, but in its current state it's futile to even argue POV when you can't even agree on what the article is about. Qiushufang (talk) 20:19, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

One solution might be to discuss a move request and thereby re-title the article. For example, what if the title were the more general term "Debt Trap" (currently, the Wiki page for "Debt Trap" merely redirects to "Usury"). Or perhaps "Debt Trap (Sovereign Debt)." In that construct, "China" or "Allegations of Chinese Debt Trap" might be appropriate subsections. Would such a discussion be contentious? JArthur1984 (talk) 20:36, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

It definitely would be imo since many people are very invested in the idea of debt trap diplomacy as a specific and distinctive term in its usage, which it is. There is also a lack of material on "debt trap" outside of debt trap diplomacy. Currently it redirects to Usury, which lacks most of the international focus this article has. Qiushufang (talk) 20:55, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3:, how would you put into practice putting more importance on the "diplomacy" aspect of "debt-trap diplomacy"? As I described above, the difference between debt-trap diplomacy and China + debt trap are nebulous in practice. Articles which do not mention deb-trap diplomacy or even debt trap while still related to China are still included in this article. In some of the Asian sections even China is only mentioned in passing. Both pro and anti debt trap theory stances seem to do this. How would you go about defining whether an article is relevant enough to be kept for its content? Sources which focus on the diplomatic aspects of debt trap diplomacy do seem to be quite meager because there is little concrete evidence in the geopolitical side. As far as I know, there have been no real asset seizures by China, one of the primary concerns of the debt trap diplomacy theory, as a result of debt-trap diplomacy. The closest being the Hambantota port which is why the Sri Lanka section is the largest section. Most of the article has therefore become a list of economic data and studies on possible targets of debt trap diplomacy dealing in conjecture, possibility, and theory because that's all there is so far. Neither pro or anti sides deviate far from this paradigm. Qiushufang (talk) 19:19, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Tajikistan is another great example. "In 2011, Tajikistan's parliament agreed to cede approximately 1,000 km2 (390 sq mi) of land to China in exchange for waiving an outstanding debt amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars." Also, debt-trap diplomacy can result in other things besides land seizures, like increased geopolitical influence, trade negotiations, favorable-for-the-creditor policy implementations, etc. BooleanQuackery (talk) 19:59, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Then what is the difference between debt trap and debt trap diplomacy once taking all those aspects into account? Would you agree then that this article is simply about international China-related debt relationship considering that the Tajikistan article does not even mention debt trap or debt trap diplomacy? Qiushufang (talk) 20:26, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

OR, SYNTHESIS and source misrepresentation

I think the more basic problem than NPOV is the utterly dishonest editing by noob editors with loads and loads of WP:OR and WP:SYNTHESIS, coupled with poor-quality sourcing and then source misrepresentation. Let us just look at one paragraph for example:

Debt-trap diplomacy is an international financial relationship where a creditor country or institution extends debt to a borrowing nation partially, or solely, to increase the lender's political leverage. The creditor country is said to extend excessive credit to a debtor country with the intention of extracting economic or political concessions when the debtor country becomes unable to meet its repayment obligations. The conditions of the loans are often not publicized. The borrowed money commonly pays for contractors and materials sourced from the creditor country.

References

• The first sentence has no citation, but it is written authoritatively as if it can be found any text book on international finance as a deined conecept. But we all know that is hogwash.
• The second sentence cites an article from "ISSAfrica", but gives no indication of what this institution is nor who the author is. One has to dig to find out that the institution publishes an "ISS Today" magazine/newspaper, and the author is a certin Peter Fabricius, an "ISS consultant", whatever that means.
• In this article, we find a one sentence description: "It refers to Beijing reputedly lending large sums to poorer countries, mostly in Africa, to build infrastructure, with the intention of seizing the infrastructure as collateral when the country inevitably defaults on the interest repayment."
  • It doesn't talk about any "creditor countries". It talks about Beijing.
  • It says "large sums" whereas our sentence says "excessive credit".
  • It says "poorer countries, mostly in Africa", whereas our text says "debtor country".
  • It talks about "buidling infrastructure", which has been omitted in our text.
  • It talks about "seizing that infrastructure as collatoral", whereas our text comes up "economic or political concessions".
  • So many mismatches in one sentence. But the problems don't stop here.
• The keyword "refers" has been hot-linked to another article, also from ISSAfrica, which has a more detailed description. We should also worry about whether the one-sentence description of Fabricius is an accurate summary of that article.
  • This article is also very clear that it is about China's debt-trap diplomacy.
  • The article does nothing more than summarise Brahma Chellaney's 2017 article, whom apparenly the authors of our page do not want to cite.
  • It describes debt-trap diplomacy as "a predatory system designed to ensnare countries into a straightjacket of debt servitude", which is probably more accurate than anything we have seen so far. Neither Fabricius nor we like this description.
  • It talks about "collateralised by strategically important natural assets with high long-term value", which has gone missing in Fabricius as well as us.
  • It says, "Typically, Chinese loans assume the form of ‘cash for resources’, which is probably another way of saying the same thing. This is also gone.
  • It says, "China demands favourable access to their natural assets, from mineral resources to ports". Also gone.
  • It says, "China, however, makes financing relatively easily available", without conditionalities. I don't know if "excessive credit" is supposed to mean this, but it certainly doesn't mean it.
  • It summarises by saying, "Through this method China achieves the twin goals of economic penetration and strategic leverage." Nowhere to be found in either Fabricius or us.
• If we go to Chellaney's original article,, the summary paragraph says: "Through its $1 trillion “one belt, one road” initiative, China is supporting infrastructure projects in strategically located developing countries, often by extending huge loans to their governments. As a result, some of these countries are becoming saddled with debt, leaving them even more firmly under China's thumb." This is very very specific that it is talking about China's OBOR initiative (another name for BRI). Other than the issues I have also mentioned above:
  • It mentions "trategically located developing countries". This is nowhere to be found in our article or any of the above articles.
  • It talks about "leaving them even more firmly under China's thumb". In what way?
    • But the projects that China is supporting are often intended not to support the local economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to natural resources, or to open the market for its low-cost and shoddy export goods. In other words, the intent of the infrastructure development is the extraction of natural resources and the opening of markets.
    • Several of the projects that have been completed are now bleeding money. He mentions Rajpaksa International Airport and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar port in Pakistan. (Note that none of these places is in Africa! So much for our ISSAfrica authors.)
    • In a sense, it is even better for China that the projects don’t do well. After all, the heavier the debt burden on smaller countries, the greater China’s own leverage becomes. This is an important point that many later commentators missed or misrepresented. China is there for the long term, or even indefinitely, as long as the raw materials can be supplied, the markets exist, and the strategic location remains strategic. So it is not that important to China that the debtor is able to pay back the money. China is ready to reschedule the payments or lend even more money to "help" the debtor county because its own goals are unaffected.
    • In exchange for rescheduling repayment, China is requiring countries to award it contracts for additional projects. Cambodia and Sri Lanka mentioned as examples. Classic debt-trap. Somebody said it has been proved "false"?
    • By integrating its foreign, economic, and security policies, China is advancing its goal of fashioning a hegemonic sphere of trade, communication, transportation, and security links. This is his summary. Very far from what we say.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:32, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

References

So would it be correct to assume that User:Kautilya3 believes that the article should only be exclusively about China to adhere more strictly to Chellaney's definition of debt trap diplomacy, including emphasis on OBOR/BRI, exclusion of Africa, and exclusion of World Bank/IMF? I appreciate the list of source to content discrepancies, but can you give a TLDR on what you want to see changed in the article, in the lead and in the body? Qiushufang (talk) 20:44, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Yes, China's 'debt-trap diplomacy' is the only thing I ever read about. I don't think IMF/World Bank were engaged in "debt-trap diplomacy". They might have put countries into debt-traps through misguided policies, some of which have now been recognised. But the IMF/World Bank are only interested in getting their money back and leaving the countries alone when that is accomplished. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:57, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

What about aspects of debt-relationships with China in this article that do not fit Chellaney's definition, such as in Africa or cases that do not specifically mention debt trap or debt trap diplomacy? According to the article, the definition was expanded by the United States and possibly other sources to include other geographic contexts. Qiushufang (talk) 21:04, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Can you point to those sources? "Debt-trap diplomacy" may exist even without any asset seizures. There may be particular clauses in the agreements that mandate supplying raw materials at specific prices, which may limit the options of the debtor countries. But, unless some specific allegation of that kind comes into picture, we can ignore those. The most important cases are where the debtor country finds its in a position of default and starts making concessions to China in order to get out of trouble. (These concessions may not solve the problem in the long run, as we have discovered in Sri Lanka's case.) But the Paris Club prohibits those kind of deals. When a country defaults, the debt has to be restructured and the lenders have to take a "hair cut". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:48, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

See the above section on Article direction. Repost:

For example, none of the sources used in the Debt-trap_diplomacy#Philippines, Debt-trap_diplomacy#Indonesia, Debt-trap_diplomacy#Tajikistan, and Debt-trap_diplomacy#Laos sections mention debt trap diplomacy at all. Neither the Philippines or Indonesia sections contain any info related to China or debt trap diplomacy. In Debt-trap_diplomacy#Malaysia, three sources mention debt trap in passing but not debt trap diplomacy. In Debt-trap_diplomacy#Europe, only SCMP mentions debt trap diplomacy directly in passing. Their foreign relations with China articles are also linked as further information, but none of them mention debt trap diplomacy either. The qualifications to be considered a case of "debt trap diplomacy" are extremely low to the point where this article has become merely a depository for countries that have debt related relationships with either China or the IMF/World Bank without explaining why or how they are cases of debt trap diplomacy. Qiushufang (talk) 22:08, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

I agree. I can see the problem. In many of these cases, the potential for debt-trap diplomacy exists in that there are large Chinese loans and the countries have taken unsustainable debt. So there are worries and alarms being raised. But unless and until something resembling "diplomacy" has been exercised, they don't belong here. That would be WP:CRYSTAL. We can tag such sections with {{relevance-inline}} as I have done in some cases, and see if any information comes about. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:36, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

Why are the studies chronologically ordered?

It's a bit odd. I don't see a reason for this, and I haven't seen this done on other articles. Maybe "finding for" or "finding against" sorts of sections could be included if we need to have sections. If there's some point to saying the date that I'm not understanding, then let me know. BooleanQuackery (talk) 20:04, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Also, some of the studies are wrongly categorized. They have the incorrect date for the section they are in. Because of this and the above, I'm going to delete the subheadings but I won't change the order. Make sure to correctly place all studies if it's going to be chronological. (I believe it should be relevance first, not oldest studies first.) BooleanQuackery (talk) 20:07, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

I thought listing the studies in chronological order would better reflect an ongoing debate and because I found it hard to sort which ones were the most relevant and because of possible POV conflicts. Sorting by relevance is harder to quantify and might upset those seeking to have their studies put first imo. Qiushufang (talk) 20:29, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Would you support on sorting by chronology within pro/anti categories?BooleanQuackery (talk) 06:19, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

No because that would defeat the purpose of reducing possible NPOV conflicts to begin with, which was why I wanted to list it by chronology. It's not perfect now but I think it's less likely someone will get upset by one side being bigger than the other. Qiushufang (talk) 06:21, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

In its present form, one side may still be bigger than the other, but users and readers have a more difficult time determining which side that would be. If someone has a concern about one side being bigger, that may or may not be valid and we shouldn't try to obfuscate that information to avoid a potential conflict. BooleanQuackery (talk) 09:44, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

Qiushufang, what you did was not a solution to the NPOV problem. It was pushing the problem under the carpet. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:10, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

It is an in between solution that I had suggested here Talk:Debt-trap_diplomacy#Verifiability_of_China-Africa_statistics and seemed to have the support of at least one editor. My further suggestion was to portion much of the material into their own individual sections as they overlap considerably. There never needed to be a pro or anti side section considering this is a topic that has ballooned to include many geographical contexts that is not served by two sections disputing what is essentially the entire validity of the article. The chronology seemed to be something Amigao was fine with since they reverted to that sorting after I was reverted. Frankly I do not believe there is currently a problem with the content itself due to some bias with the users' editing. Almost all of the content could belong somewhere in the article. It's just that the previous opposing sections focused their attention there, to the detriment of the article. The imbalance between the pro and anti sections may be a reflection that one side is the reacting opposition, and therefore creates more content as a result. I did not notice a concerted attempt by one or more users to inflate the previous Counter-arguments section, as @Kautilya3: suggested. Prior to this dispute, my only contribution was in February, and even at that point the Counter-arguments section was larger. But this is could easily be pushed in either direction under the nebulous headings because as I have noted there are plenty of sources for whoever is dedicated enough to keep adding or deleting them. Is having equally large sections a solution to NPOV disputes? It is not sweeping under the carpet if the problem cannot be solved in its current state because one, the format inherently pushes NPOV disputes, two, there is ample ammo for either side, and three, it is an ongoing topic that does not have a definite body of work that keeps increasing. Qiushufang (talk) 15:20, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

Uganda's airport entry

Moving this here instead of user's talk page.

Is fails to meet notability because it is WP:CRYSTAL Wikipedia doesn't predict future outcomes of non-news. The airport cannot be in default when the loan isn't in re-payment process per the Attorney General of Uganda in the Parliament. Although its fanciful that maybe one day this could happen it isn't news and shouldn't be included as 'fact' when it's not.

(QUOTE)“This contract was signed on 31st March 2015, with a grace period of seven years, the first repayment date is 1st April 2022. Government cannot be in default during the grace period,” Kiryowa said.

On the arbitration process that reportedly favors China, Kiryowa said if Uganda’s rights are violated in the contract, Uganda can defend itself in any part of the world and it doesn’t matter if it is in China.(END QUOTE) Link CaribDigita (talk) 02:35, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

The sub-section is based on a 2021 Reuters report so it was certainly news by a reliable WP:RSP. - Amigao (talk) 03:10, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

At 8 minutes-in WP:RSP Bloomberg also called this claim "unfounded". The Myth of the Chinese Debt Trap in Africa -- Despite the claim. CaribDigita (talk) 03:33, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

@Amigao and @CaribDigita, would it satisfy both of your perspectives with the addition of Parliament's statements regarding the impossibility and the Bloomberg reporting that the claim was unfounded? I remember when this reporting was happening and it was an important example of the rhetoric but lack of substance regarding a Chinese debt trap. It is probably more useful to the reader to include the allegation, and also the responses that have shown the concern to be unfounded. JArthur1984 (talk) 13:23, 28 July 2022 (UTC)

If Amigao is willing to allow the additional press to be presented for true balance. Because as presented it is WP:Crystal. just hoping something will happen but doesn't prove that it will other than a wish. CaribDigita (talk) 02:58, 30 July 2022 (UTC)

Lending agreements that do not have any information related to debt-trap diplomacy should be removed

1. "Samoa has accepted loans as part of the BRI." 2. "China has made loans to Kyrgyzstan, Laos, and Mongolia as part of the BRI." 3. "It also made a $115 million loan to Tonga to redevelop its infrastructure, and $2 billion in loans to Papua New Guinea (almost one-fourth of the country's national debt. China also has ongoing projects in Trinidad and Tobago, including a $500 million Chinese-built dry dock and a $102 million industrial park in La Brea."

Lending agreements that do not have any information related to debt-trap diplomacy should be removed. This article should not turn into a long list of lending agreements. — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs) 10:42, 29 July 2022 (UTC)

China is also building Guyana, South America's largest bridge. "HAILED as the largest public infrastructure project undertaken in Guyana, the government, on Wednesday, signed a US$260 million contract for the construction of the new Demerara River Bridge at the Nandy Park, East Bank Demerara (EBD) site where the eastern end of the bridge will land." Link, Link 2. Of course all this competition has now caused the USA to step-up their game with Caribbean leaders recognizing the USA had no interest until China started investing. China welcomes closer US-Guyana ties, Ramotar said Western Nations’ motive is anti-China, OR PRES ALI LAUDS CHINA’S SUPPORT FOR THE CARIBBEAN SAYS U S NOW REASSERTING ITS PRESENCE. I share this not as another list of lending. But the nations borrowing don't see it as the article claims. CaribDigita (talk) 03:08, 30 July 2022 (UTC)

Yeah I don't get why Samoa is even here. Why is that even here? Can other editors care to explain? Because it's really one sentence saying that Samoa signed up for BRI. But many nations like Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Indonesia and over 160 plus other countries, also signed up for BRI. What even makes Somoa so noteworthy in this article? Must we also similarly add every single country that signed up to Bri? Unless Samoa is a proven case of Chinese debt-Trap diplomacy, it's both presumptous and plain excessive to put that in so I have removed it. If anyone has any complaints or objections, reply to here please. Simpleshooter99 (talk) 18:35, 31 July 2022 (UTC)

Merger proposal

I propose to merge Debt-trap diplomacy into Belt and Road Initiative. I think that the content in this article is in fact centred on the nefarious impact of China's quest for resources and soft power, whereas the BRI article reads like a glossy brochure for China. Debt-trap diplomacy can more easily be explained in the context of the BRI, and that a merged article will provide better and more comprehensive coverage from a global perspective.  Ohc ^¡digame! 08:47, 10 July 2020 (UTC)

Discussion

• I move. -- Ohc ^¡digame! 09:01, 10 July 2020 (UTC)
• Against- This article is about the diplomatic concept of using debt to (in China's case allegedly) achieve diplomatic ends. It is not about, nor is it necessarily connected to, the concept of the BRI. As such I strongly feel it should not be merged. I have not recently read the BRI article so I cant make a judgment on it but it sounds like the better option would be to remove non-NPOV content from it and add some nuance/diversity of sources rather than just merging this article with that one. They are two very different topics although they are both linked by contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Debt-trap diplomacy is not necessarily only committed by China (allegedly) even though they might be the only current example of supposedly doing it. In theory any county is capable of engaging in actions that could fit the definition of it.--Discott (talk) 22:40, 12 July 2020 (UTC)
• Against- The BRI article now has a section discussing accusations of debt-tirp diplomacy and links to this article. This article has a broader focus than the BRI. Arecaceæ2011 (talk) 02:19, 2 November 2021 (UTC)
• Against- Agree with arguments above. Agnerf (talk) 13:28, 21 September 2022 (UTC)
• Against - both topics are connected very slightly — Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.76.81.85 (talk) 18:41, 13 October 2022 (UTC)

Funny enough Sri Lanka owed more money to US firms than to China

No mention that Sri Lanka's default was attributed more to money owed to Blackrock and others of USA than what they owed China?

• [https://www.sundayobserver.lk/2022/08/28/opinion/sri-lanka’s-foreign-debt-–-81-held-west-and-allies Sri Lanka’s foreign debt – 81% held by West and allies]

• [https://towardfreedom.org/story/archives/asia-archives/real-debt-trap-sri-lanka-owes-vast-majority-to-west-not-to-china/Real Debt Trap: Sri Lanka Owes Vast Majority to West, Not to China ]

*[https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/6/22/bondholder-sues-sri-lanka-in-us-court Bondholder sues Sri Lanka in US court]

*[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-07/sri-lanka-faces-wall-of-debt-payments-amid-economic-meltdown Sri Lanka Faces Wall of Debt Payments Amid Economic Meltdown]

*[https://citywire.com/selector/news/bondholder-group-forms-as-sri-lanka-seeks-to-address-debt-defaults/a2390494 Bondholder group forms as Sri Lanka seeks to address debt defaults]

• [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-19/pimco-blackrock-set-to-start-debt-talks-soon-with-sri-lanka Pimco Among Firms Set to Start Debt Talks With Sri Lanka ]

• [https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-blackrock-ashmore-part-sri-lankas-creditor-group-ahead-debt-talks-2022-04-06/ EXCLUSIVE BlackRock, Ashmore part of Sri Lanka's creditor group ahead of debt talks]

• [https://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/opinion/5550-privatizing-sri-lanka-ex-ante-imf-bailout-of-blackrock Privatizing Sri Lanka ex-ante IMF Bailout of BlackRock]

CaribDigita (talk) 01:47, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

Yes. There was another recent study from Johns Hopkins concluding that the idea of a “Chinese debt trap” is a myth. There was a recent SCMP article on it, I am paywalled or I’d add it myself. You may want to do so if you have access. JArthur1984 (talk) 02:26, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

Some paywalls if you disable (temporarily) the javascript in your web-browser you can see behind the paywall. CaribDigita (talk) 07:35, 8 January 2023 (UTC)

I recently added an initial citation to the Johns Hopkins Report itself and the topline conclusions. It's a useful and important source and there's more that would make sense to incorporate from here as well, but I at least started the process. JArthur1984 (talk) 14:59, 8 January 2023 (UTC)

Who coined the term Debt-Trap Diplomacy?

In the article, it says, "The term was coined by Brahma Chellaney in 2017 to describe what he called China's predatory lending practices, which overwhelm poor countries with unsustainable loans and force them to cede strategic leverage to China."

However, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World by Cheryl Payer was published in 1975.

passage from the book: "More specifically, this book is about the efforts of poor nations to gain some control over their own economies, the role of the IMF in frustrating those efforts, and the complicity of their elites in that betrayal. Two introductory chapters sketch a model of payment crises, alternative methods for dealing with crises, and the political and social effects of the "solution" favored by the IMF. An important theme of the book is that the death of democracy in Third World countries, whether through military coups or other means, is due to the contradiction between a government's responsibility to its electorate and to its foreign creditors, represented by the IMF...It shows also how the IMF aided the U.S. war effort in Indochina and helped to divert Yugoslavia's socialist development into the dead end of a market economy."

Who coined the term?

https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Debt_Trap.html?id=jpc4AAAAMAAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y

-- — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs)

See debt trap. And, avoid WP:OR. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:03, 19 March 2023 (UTC)

disagree that this would be considered WP:OR. debt trap is the title of the book, and I copied and pasted the synopsis. Usury is "the illegal action or practice of lending money at unreasonably high rates of interest." This is not Payer's argument. Payer argued that IMF loans have political influence and social effects for the borrowing nation - sometimes to the benefit of other nations.

other editors should offer their opinions. LilAhok (talk) 23:52, 19 March 2023 (UTC)

I think you are making good points, but what is the specific edit you would like to make? JArthur1984 (talk) 01:47, 20 March 2023 (UTC)

"The term was coined by Brahma Chellaney in 2017 to describe what he called China's predatory lending practices, which overwhelm poor countries with unsustainable loans and force them to cede strategic leverage to China."

- should be removed because there seems to be evidence that Chellaney did not coin the term. It could be reworded as how he defines the term.

"In 1975, the term was mentioned in Cheryl Payer's The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World where she explains how the IMF dictates internal economic policies in poor borrowing nations."

"In 2017, Brahma Chellaney used the term to describe what he called China's predatory lending practices, which overwhelm poor countries with unsustainable loans and force them to cede strategic leverage to China."

I would like to add this to the article. LilAhok (talk) 05:17, 23 March 2023 (UTC)

"Debt trap" an "Debt-trap diplomacy" are not the same thing. Trying to remove a well-sourced statement based what you believe are your own discoveries is certainly WP:OR. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:23, 23 March 2023 (UTC)

pulled a few references from the article. the terms, such as debt-trap, Chinese debt-trap, debt-trap diplomacy, are used interchangeably. the info provided is also well-sourced.

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/165818/jamaica-debt-2013-06.pdf

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia/The-Future-of-Asia-2021/Cambodia-s-Hun-Sen-If-I-don-t-rely-on-China-who-will-I-rely-on

https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/

https://www.news24.com/Fin24/da-demands-details-of-r370bn-chinese-loan-warns-of-debt-trap-20180916

https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-17-chinas-r370bn-gift-demands-scrutiny/ LilAhok (talk) 10:16, 28 March 2023 (UTC)

Haiti

Had an edit undone [10] where I had added an entry for Haiti.

Reason for reversion was "not within scope of article", yet it seems to meet the definition of "an international financial relationship where a creditor country or institution extends debt to a borrowing nation partially, or solely, to increase the lender's political leverage".

@Qiushufang

IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 00:15, 21 July 2023 (UTC)

I was under the impression that this article was only about the application of that definition to events related to China. If that is not consensus, feel free to re-add it. Qiushufang (talk) 01:33, 21 July 2023 (UTC)

I view it as within the scope of the article, although perhaps the front part of the edit could be trimmed? Possibly with a main article hatnote to Haiti indemnity controversy? Also you should check that article to see if some of your proposed addition is wise to incorporate there as well. JArthur1984 (talk) 14:41, 21 July 2023 (UTC)

The article is certainly not limited to China.

But I think we should only stick to post-World War II phenomena. The older events are mixed up with colonialism, and we also need WP:HISTRS for their correct interpretation. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:02, 21 July 2023 (UTC)

Senegal President Interview

Senegal's president, Macky Sall explains the 'lies' the western media is saying about him and China in interview. (30mins) INTERVIEW Interesting when he starts talking about interest rates of China V.s. the west and how much debt is owed to Chinese Creditors v.s. non Chinese private lenders. Roughly 19:00 mins into the interview. Interestingly enough he says: Western loans for African nations is higher with about 12% of the financing amount being due to insurance rate based on African nation's credit ratings. China's loans are only at 2.5-2.7% interest rate meaning the west *is* the debt trap taking far more money from African nation's. CaribDigita (talk) 09:44, 12 September 2023 (UTC)

Keeping in mind WP:NOTFORUM, is there a concrete suggestion here to improve the article? Amigao (talk) 03:47, 24 September 2023 (UTC)

I am speaking to the facts or possible biases of the article. Do you have anything to contribute comment wise to the topic? CaribDigita (talk) 20:13, 11 October 2023 (UTC)

On the relevance of the IMF + World Bank material

I went to add a mention of that aspect of the article to the lead, both because it's presented as a major section in the article right now and because I thought it might help the reader understand the full breadth of the term "debt-trap diplomacy" at a glance. However, in actually looking into the sources, I don't really see the IMF or World Bank described as engaging in debt-trap diplomacy per se. The pure phrase "debt trap" definitely does get use in reference to both organizations and has for decades, but since they're not themselves sovereign states I don't think it's surprising that commentators refrain from describing their activity as "diplomacy". I can see that I'm not the first person to raise this issue here, but it doesn't seem like it's gotten any resolution still. I get the feeling that different contributors to this article have had clashing ideas about its scope: some want it to be about "predatory lending to countries generally" so to speak, while others want to stick to sources that specifically discuss the kind of activity Chellaney was commenting on.

My hunch is that if we're going to call the article "Debt-trap diplomacy", the latter framing makes more sense. The phrase "debt trap" is very general—there are plenty of sources that use it just to refer to the activity of loan sharks towards private individuals and so on. "Debt-trap diplomacy" has been framed much more particularly as a (rather hypothetical) geopolitical strategy rather in the vein of "subprime lending between nations", in which a rich country "tricks" a poor country into taking on loans it probably can't repay at attractive-looking interest rates and then seizes its assets or forces it to adopt policies that favor the rich country as a sort of collateral when it falls behind on payments, expanding the rich country's sphere of influence.

Of note, what the IMF and World Bank do is somewhat different from this. They impose (arguably malicious or self-interested) conditions on the borrowing country more at the beginning, as a condition of lending at all; when commentators criticize them, they tend to portray them as foisting a business-friendly, laissez-faire economic ideology on desperate countries that might not want this but can't afford to say no, thus opening up their economy to international corporate plunder from the moment they sign and all that. When trying to explain why a country might fall prey to debt-trap diplomacy, commentators often explicitly contrast it to the approach of IMF and World Bank, explaining that debt-trap diplomacy loans look more attractive up front because borrowing governments imagine or hope they can repay and avoid the bad conditions, and because they tend to come at nicer-looking interest rates than the IMF and World Bank's loans. (Many sources actually paint a picture where Chinese banks, like most private lenders, charge higher interest rates than the IMF and World Bank, but don't impose the same kinds of up-front conditions, making their loans more attractive to some governments.)

Criticism of the IMF and World Bank and criticism of debt-trap diplomacy both concern supposedly-manipulative lending to sovereign states, it's true, but they describe different strategies and couch them in different language, and one is applied specifically to bipolar relations between states only. If we take the initiative to group both types of commentary under the banner of "Debt-trap diplomacy", I think it's a bit WP:SYNTH, because the sources themselves don't really do that. It's not that we shouldn't mention the IMF and World Bank at all, but more that we should capture how the sources we have compare and contrast the approach of the IMF and World Bank with debt-trap diplomacy, since I think that's much more how the IMF and World Bank actually come up in articles that touch on the idea of debt-trap diplomacy directly. I have to say, I'm not sure there's really enough material directly focused on that comparison to justify there being a whole separate "IMF and World Bank" section, although I think they certainly deserve a mention in various places. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 04:44, 10 October 2023 (UTC)

As I continue to read the sources, I want to note, at least as far as China specifically vs. the IMF and World Bank, I'm seeing that sometimes the narrative around interest rates is the opposite—that the interest rates of loans from Chinese state banks are supposedly onerously high, and the IMF and World Bank's interest rates would be more favorable (provided they were willing to lend). I don't think this really changes my overall argument here, though. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 06:57, 10 October 2023 (UTC)

When has an IMF / World Bank loan been cheaper in a non- 'first world' country? The claim is that the debt trap is harming non-developed countries who cannot pay it back. Not first world ones who get the lowest interest rates. The rates are based upon a nation's credit worthiness, which are based upon risk to lender in the capitalist financial model. CaribDigita (talk) 15:13, 10 October 2023 (UTC)

Here's some of what I've read that made me write that addendum:

"The IMF and World Bank say taking losses on their loans would rip up the traditional playbook of dealing with sovereign crises that accords them special treatment because, unlike Chinese banks, they already finance at low rates to help distressed countries get back on their feet."

---

"Sri Lanka's efforts to borrow more have been thwarted by downgraded ratings. Bonds were reduced to junk status...Local analysts believe an agreement with the IMF would help with financial markets, and enable Sri Lanka to borrow again...'An IMF program puts Sri Lanka on a debt-sustainable path, and that creates credibility when you go to the markets,' said Murtaza Jafferjee, managing director of JB Securities, a financial consultancy in Colombo. 'After the Moody's downgrade, and without an IMF program, Sri Lanka will not be able to access the markets.'"

---

"Several organizations have sketched out escape routes from the [Ghanian] debt trap, including more low-cost lending from multilateral banks like the World Bank."

---

"What makes some nations sink deeper into Chinese debt, despite the risks of mortgaging their foreign-policy autonomy to Beijing?...The answer is several factors, including the comparative ease of borrowing from China, with IMF lending normally carrying stringent conditions and oversight. China does not evaluate a borrower state's creditworthiness, unlike the IMF, which will not lend if its assessment indicates that additional loans could drive the country into a serious debt crisis. Indeed, China is happy to lend until nations face a debt crisis because of the greater leverage it gives Beijing....Typically, China starts as an economic partner of another country, only to gradually become its economic master. In fact, the more desperate a borrower country's situation, the higher the interest rates it will likely pay on Chinese loans." (this is Chellaney, of course)

---

"Credit from private capital markets or from Chinese policy banks also allowed governments to avoid the conditions typically attached to funds borrowed from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and various regional development banks. These conditions—some specific to a funded project, others related to macroeconomic policy—often were viewed as constraining debtor governments’ autonomy. Loans from China or international bond issues typically were more expensive, in interest rate terms. But they came without formal conditionality, though they might have included implicit promises to grant favorable market access to China, among other things."

You probably get the picture: a common take seems to be that the IMF and similar organizations actually give loans at lower interest rates than Chinese state banks or private lenders, but they won't lend unless the borrowing country agrees to arguably-onerous terms mean to "fix" their economy, like heavy cuts to public spending or privatization of state-run companies, especially if the country has poor credit. Chinese banks (and private lenders) are portrayed as lending to countries with poor credit without imposing these kinds of conditions, but instead charging higher interest rates and being less cautious about whether the country can repay or not. China in particular of course has been accused of all-but-planning for borrowing countries to default as a way of gaining leverage over them, hence the "debt-trap diplomacy."

That brings me back to my original reason for starting this thread: I don't think what the IMF and World Bank do really fits the idea of debt-trap diplomacy, whether their interest rates are lower or higher or whatever—their approach might be bad for the borrowing countries, arguably, but it doesn't really fit the picture of luring countries into attractive-looking but unrepayable debt and then forcing the country into doing various things afterwards as collateral when they run into trouble with the loan. (At this point people seem to have agreed that China hasn't really had a grand plan like that either, but that's what I understand the idea of debt-trap diplomacy as in any case.) When China has been demanding things of countries that can't repay, they have a different tenor from what the IMF would ask, too—ceding management of public resources to Chinese companies, foreign policy concessions, etc., more just stuff in China's interest. To the extent that the IMF might be self-interested, their policies seem more to favor "global finance"/Chicago School fans/etc. more than any one state. (That was me getting a little distracted...I think the more central point here is just that "diplomacy" implies state-to-state relations and "debt-trap diplomacy" specifically has always been used with regards to China's bilateral relations in the sources, whereas the IMF and World Bank and so on are not even state actors in themselves.) If we really want this article to be about the idea of debt-trap diplomacy in particular, and not just about possibly-malign lending to states in general, I don't really see how the "IMF and World Bank" section in this article belongs given all this, at least not in its current form. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 12:13, 11 October 2023 (UTC) 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 12:13, 11 October 2023 (UTC)

Seems like projecting on what IMF has been guilty of. Britannica explains it aptly, as long as IMF is needed to bail countries out, the borrower will continue harmful policies without reform. Bailouts is what leads to long term dependency. And they sell their policies onto low income countries despite such neoliberal policies later hurts economic growth and sustainability and worsened inequality. Those countries often don't have much choice after IMF has aggravated their debt issues [11], but to continue the IMF policies to get another round of IMF money, instead of refusing policies which as you put it, "open up their economy to international corporate plunder". And that same cycle of worsening their debt and then bailing them out, has persisted for decades. And is why they get criticized because IMF isn't a charity and knows austerity harms the economy, but has not stopped, and has been criticized for continuing that.[12] They get criticized for both worsening and benefiting from a debt crisis and not allowing others to be bailed out without accepting further conditions, and so uses a debt crisis opportunistically to cement a long term dependency on their policies. KirklandWayne (talk) 15:55, 12 October 2023 (UTC)

Sure, I'm not trying to debate any of that, it's just that this article is called "Debt-trap diplomacy", a phrase which first saw use in the late 2010s to describe aspects of China's foreign policy and has never been used in any of the sources cited here for any other purpose. We have articles like IMF and World Bank to detail their sins in. The state of this article at present makes it challenging for the reader to actually understand the life of the phrase "debt-trap diplomacy" over the course of the time it's seen use in the political discourse, partially because a fair amount of the information in it is not actually part of that story, and partially because the over-general scope of the article has lead to parts of that story being somewhat neglected so far.

Our goal here isn't to lambast all the actors ever guilty of trapping countries in debt, it's to fairly and proportionally summarize the eligible sources that touch on the "debt-trap diplomacy" idea, which is something much more specific. Note that neither of the sources you cited use the phrase "debt-trap diplomacy" anywhere, nor do they discuss the idea of one country (always China in the sources) luring another country into bad debt as a way of gaining leverage over them after they approach default. When the sources we have explicitly discuss "debt-trap diplomacy," that's what they're talking about every time. Whether or not this is a meaningful distinction to draw between what China might be doing and what the IMF or World Bank does is just not up to us as Wikipedia editors. The sources we actually have tend to contrast them more than equate them (as you can see from the quotes I cited above). Perhaps they're wrong to do that, their perspective is shallow, etc., but Wikipedia isn't the right place to fight that fight. See WP:NPOV, WP:OR. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 03:46, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

@CaribDigita@Mesocarp Is the article only about diplomatic conduct of China alone, and nobody else when it comes to exploiting debt? If so then they should then make that clearer on the introduction chapter. Because it gives the impression that only China is the one that engages in debt trap diplomacy, and nobody else. You should mention the specific term doesn't refer to others who commit systematic exploitation of debts and should make a note that allegations against IMF to exploit debt traps are not part of this article.

Still, Wikipedia should not be the place to predict things that have not happened. So many chapters created for China on debt trap diplomacy on Africa despite African governments owe three times more debt to Western banks, asset managers and oil traders than to China, and are charged double the interest.[13] And the article is looking more as a propaganda piece by giving the impression that Chinese debt trap diplomacy is real in Africa. Despite no empirical substantiation to prove that it's occuring.

What's not neutral is to create an article that appears to be generally about criticising parties for exploiting debt traps and yet only mention China despite few to none of the examples have been proven cases. But the IMF who has a long history of doing so, is what's to be omitted as if the only major party in the entire world that engages in debt trap diplomacy is China alone. So either specify the article is specifically on China's conduct, or agree it's an article generally about diplomacy that systematically creates and exploits debt. If it's the latter then IMF more than warrants a mention given both qualified allegations and history, and should have much more paragraphs of content dedicated to each historic examples, compared to the paragraphs of China's non existent cases.

Allegations have been made at IMF and World Bank loans, as poor nations are forced to abide to shameful conditions that remove restrictions on capital that flow freely from global south to tax havens run by the richest IMF member states. And along with austerity and preferential treatment of the global rich corporation, it's really no surprise to see capital primarily flowing from the poor nations to the richer ones and that IMF conditional loans and further rounds of finance, is what systematically drives them into debt traps for the last 4 decades. Allegations have been made because the IMF and World Bank has actually used indebtedness to extract political leverage. As when the economy goes bad but debts needs to be repaid. The country typically has to go to the IMF for a bailout despite the IMF conditions for that debt, as well as the bailout, is what leads to increased poverty rates and lower economic growth and a vicious cycle. In this view, China is the only major alternative where global south countries can borrow from, without needing conditions. And they can choose how much to borrow and are not forced. It's offensive to imply they don't know how much to borrow but at least they have an option to escape IMF austerity and choose their own policies. And the parties with a well documented history of repeatedly exploiting debt traps to force policies is the IMF and World Bank and to not mention them in an article that is generally about exploiting debt. But give so much estate to mention Chinese cases where one is really using a Crystal Ball to predict it will occur, but hasn't. That would be not WP:NPOV.

The WB and the IMF have systematically made loans to States as a means of influencing their policies. Foreign indebtedness has been and continues to be used as an instrument for subordinating the borrowers | (The World Bank: a never-ending coup d’état. The hidden agenda of the Washington Consensus, Mumbai: Vikas Adhyayan Kendra, 2007)

KirklandWayne (talk) 09:56, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

To quote directly from WP:NPOV,

Achieving what the Wikipedia community understands as neutrality means carefully and critically analyzing a variety of reliable sources and then attempting to convey to the reader the information contained in them fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without editorial bias. (emphasis mine)

Sometimes this is a frustrating endeavor, to put it lightly, if you personally don't have much respect for how an issue has been framed in the available source material. In that case, though, the right thing to do is to go off Wikipedia into the rest of the world and try to change people's views. If you get far enough, the relevant Wikipedia articles should follow.

Since it sounds like you're concerned about how the article should define "debt-trap diplomacy," let's take a look at a few definitions of debt-trap diplomacy in the sources. Here's one from Current History:

Some critics claim that China is using "debt trap diplomacy"—collateralizing loans with resource revenues or taking control of infrastructure projects after repayment difficulties—to gain strategic footholds, especially in Asia and Africa.

The Associated Press:

China has also pushed back on the idea, popularized in the Trump administration, that it has engaged in “debt trap diplomacy,” leaving countries saddled with loans they cannot afford so that it can seize ports, mines and other strategic assets.

Chellaney himself, who introduced the idea:

China's debt-trap diplomacy, redolent of colonial-era practices, has claimed its latest victim -- the small, resource-rich nation of Laos. Struggling to pay back Chinese loans, Laos has handed China majority control of its national electric grid at a time when its state-owned electricity company's debt has spiraled to 26% of its gross domestic product...Beijing's power to dim all lights in Laos leaves little wiggle room for its tiny neighbor, already reeling under its staggering debt obligations...What makes some nations sink deeper into Chinese debt, despite the risks of mortgaging their foreign-policy autonomy to Beijing?

Given all this, I feel the opening paragraph in the lead rather misleads people (:P) about the precise way the phrase "debt-trap diplomacy" has actually been used in the published political discourse, and I do indeed worry that it's giving editors that newly arrive on this article the wrong idea. It's not just about extending loans to countries "partially, or solely, to increase the lender's political leverage" as the lead currently says. You can see that it's specifically about the concept (whether true or not) of China "collateralizing loans" to "take control of infrastructure projects" or "other strategic assets," leading to borrower countries "mortgaging their foreign-policy autonomy to Beijing" in a manner "redolent of colonial-era practices".

The whole conversation in the academic and popular press has been all about that idea specifically. Whether people have argued that it's a genuine problem, a fake idea, a half-truth, a distraction, or anything else, that's always the topic of discussion, so we're obligated to use that framing. Even if we personally find the whole conversation tiresome, or even intellectually dishonest, we have to put our own feelings aside in our role as Wikipedia editors and follow the sources.

There's no intrinsic reason why the article has to focus on China for all time or anything, but China should naturally feature in the discussion here at this point in history just because that's all that people seem to have ever referred to when they say "debt-trap diplomacy" in the published political discourse. If you can find a reliable source that actually talks about "debt-trap diplomacy" specifically (not just "debt trap") in regards to a country other than China, I would almost certainly support its use here; I just haven't come across one yet.

The only reason I haven't already tried to change the lead is because the lead should summarize the body of the article, and I don't think the article itself really makes all this clear. It sort of does but there's a lot of places where it gets off-track, and if we're going to change the lead, we ought to tighten up the rest of the article too. So, I'm here advocating for tightening up the entire article. There's a story to the phrase "debt-trap diplomacy" that's getting lost in the noise, and it would come through if we would put aside our preconceptions and start from the sources themselves. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 01:42, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Lead in the article defines it as predatory lending and using debts for political leverage. If you are going to use that as a definition then you should understand that accusations "debt trap" and "predatory lending for political gains" is synonymous. Originally as LilAhok had noted in talk discussion above, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World by Cheryl Payer was published in 1975. It is called a debt trap in the old days. But after 2017, a new term has come up but has the meaning is the same. So you can't both claim the word itself now means a general systematic exploitation of debts and then use mental gymnastics to also claim that IMF doesn't qualify because despite it's being accused of the very same action defined in the article lead, [14] people only say systematic predatory lending and debt trap accusations about IMF. The difference between them is too arbitrary. So I reiterate either note in the article introduction to be clear that it doesn't refer to allegations made towards IMF for systematically pushing countries into debt trap and exploiting them and this is specifically for China only. Or keep status quo. But is just not neutral to present the term in lead of article as generally about any country or institution pushing poor countries to debt and then exploiting that debt trap, and exclude the very parties that, in comparison to Chinese lending, have also had allegations of pushing poor countries into debt trap and systematically extracting political power when those countries default.KirklandWayne (talk) 08:32, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

"if we would put aside our preconceptions and start from the sources themselves. 🍉" I am trying to understand your view and seem like someone who really cares for this article in good faith but I do think the sources themselves are an issue as many are more propaganda than showing evidence that China is guilty of it. I know news like AP and NYT have pushed Iraqi WMD style disinformation but have also made certain corrections later on. A lot of disinfo was made in the early years of 2017 and 2018, and it be a grave error to present whatever news say then, with too much weight and have a higher ratio to more recent content that inevitably emerged to disproves the narrative with quality studies, that was absent in the early years.

If you are advocating for tightening up the entire article, you should be reducing and trimming the large amount of unsubstantiated chapters that insist China is committing debt trap diplomacy in Africa, and irrelevant unrelated remarks about bribery in the Pacific islands. it may had been acceptable to make large volumes of content to accuse China of doing debt trap diplomacy in Africa back in the early days of 2017. But in 2023, when there's increasingly more evidence to disprove the allegations, then the article really shouldn't have a mega sized volume of filler content, when major outlets like Bloomberg have to admit the allegations are overblown and without factual basis.

In fact there is not a single information in any of those chapters that proves debt trap diplomacy after all these years and should be trimmed if it is not relevant proof. KirklandWayne (talk) 08:35, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

I think we're talking past each other a bit, maybe. I emphatically don't support the definition used in the first paragraph of the lead as I think it's too general. If this article was just about countries being trapped in debt, it could have been created long before 2017, because as you say that concept is far older and accusations about that have been levelled at many other actors aside from China. However, this article was created specifically to document the political discourse around Chellaney's 2017 thesis, which is why it's called "Debt-trap diplomacy" and not merely "Sovereign debt trap" or something like that.

It's not our place to say whether AP or NYT is publishing disinformation or propaganda. They may be, and certainly they've been wrong in the past as you say, but there's a wide consensus on Wikipedia that those are trusted sources as you can see on the Perennial sources page. If we have other reliable sources that make claims like that towards their articles on this topic, we can cite them as well, but we can't ourselves take sides. As WP:NPOV says, "Wikipedia aims to describe disputes, but not engage in them. The aim is to inform, not influence."

To me, the main things in this article that are filler are things that have no direct bearing on the "debt-trap diplomacy" conversation. The "IMF and World Bank" section reads that way to me, as do some of the passages that just talk about Chinese lending or the BRI without really bringing up anything about "debt-trap diplomacy" per se. I also feel like a lot of the article reads in a rather rambling and hard-to-follow fashion at present even where the information is relevant, because so much of it is just long lists of studies and news articles added by different people over the years without much effort to give it a larger sense of flow or show what interactions and commonalities exist between the sources. I'm gradually trying to do something about those issues.

Likewise, even if some of the material published in 2017–18 seems misguided today, we should definitely still describe it here because it's part of the story. I keep trying to emphasize that perspective because I really think that's part of what this article needs to be more comprehensible to a reader. To the extent that such material is out there, the reader will understand that the political consensus is now against it if we frame things more chronologically, which I really think would help in places.

On that note, I do actually agree that, at this point, the overall consensus in the political discourse seems to be that Chellaney was off the mark in various ways. The article should reflect that, for sure, and it naturally will if we just focus on summarizing everything in a proportional and well-ordered fashion. At the same time, it's still not our place to say outright in wikivoice that he was wrong or that his thesis has no basis. We have to let the sources speak for themselves—when they say he's wrong, we can report that they say that, but we need to stay above the debate ourselves. It's not a self-evident matter like water being wet; it's a complicated and highly controversial political issue and we have to handle it accordingly. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 09:28, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

I don't think I need to tell you that trusted sources doesn't mean they are 100 percent correct. Older sources had used to quote Sri Lanka's port as being forced to be ceded to China and they quoted Brahma. They were incorrect to do so despite being major outlets. But I do appreciate you taking the time to reply to me so quickly. So owe you the courtesy to tell I likely will not respond back promptly for the rest of the year as have certain affairs in real world to really focus on.

And if you really care about integrity of Wikipedia and for the article. Then I leave you with what I had said yesterday, that Wikipedia should not be a page that predicts the future, and use a crystal ball to predict things that have not happened. Turns out there's a page dedicated to that. WP:NOTCRYSTAL Yet the article today exemplify the wp:crystalball problem where it often repeats false claims made by Braham with a very high ratio, where it generates undue bias to that specific point-of-view when you quote him so much. He is the one who started an unprofessional myth that claimed that China forced Sri Lanka to give up a port in exchange for cancelling a billion dollars in Chinese debts which Sri Lanka couldn't pay. He was proven wrong at so many levels.

So as an editor, you should ideally fact check his quotes before adding it in. An example is quoting him say, "When a new government took power, Sri Lanka was on the "brink of default" and the new government had no choice but "to turn around and embrace China again". But that's a very easily disproven opinion, considering Sri Lanka can turn to the IMF anytime, but chose not to.

Some friendly advice is that you had quoted Braham above saying that China doesn't check borrower's ability to pay back. That overgeneralization don't pass the pub test as there's always risk in lending. But China is also proven to assess creditworthiness of Pacific islands, as well as having signed up to G20 guidelines guidelines on financing and have a debt sustainability framework that is virtually identical to the IMF's framework. It shows this Chellaney's overgeneralization as something that should not be in the article for many reasons, even if the major outlets quote him.

So the article really should not be quoting Chellaney given he has a propensity to make up significant propagandistic errors that he helped make famous. People now believe Sri Lanka Port was a debt to equity swap thanks to him alone. But I appreciate your fast reply and when you say reader will understand that the political consensus is now against it if we frame things more chronologically, which I really think would help in places. I hope you can do just that.

As for IMF, maybe a suggestion is that to put in lede that whenever the media uses the term of debt trap diplomacy, they are only referring to Chinese lending. They do not use the same term when criticizing the IMF of predatory lending and debt trap. It's a true distinction and a more accurate lede.KirklandWayne (talk) 10:29, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

References

The lead

I was thinking before that it made sense to wait to do anything with the lead until more of the rest of the article had congealed more thoroughly (if that makes sense :P). At this point, though, since the lead seems like it keeps being a focus of conflict and confusion and so on, I'm putting forward the version I just put in place as a reasonable summary of what I think the article can support right now. I know there are a lot of editors, it seems like at least, that really want it to say in very strong terms that DTD has been totally rebutted and no one sticks to it anymore at all and that sort of thing. I really don't feel like the rest of the article supports that stance at present, at least not so strongly—there are certainly some commentators that have disputed various parts of the idea since it first came around, and at this current time in history I do think there's support for the idea that a bulk of commentators have sided against at least the idea that the BRI has had some sort of secret malicious overarching plan behind it. That's not quite the same as it being totally rebutted universally, and there are still very contemporary news stories that are more written more in line with Chellaney's framing (e.g. this one), so it's really not like the idea has been totally abandoned in the political discourse or anything.

I think it's possible that as the article becomes more highly organized, there might be room to state in the lead that the preponderance of experts is against it at least in certain ways, but I don't feel like the rest of the article makes it clear how that should work right now, since most of it doesn't really add up to any strong conclusions in any direction at present kind of. I do feel like there's enough room to state that there's been a lot of controversy, and a lot of people both for and against it in certain ways—that much is obvious from the article at present—so I think we should just stick to that for the time being. I think we should try to develop the rest of the article more before we say anything more certain than that in the lead—there's a lot of existing sources that are still kind of undercharacterized and I've also had an easy time finding relevant sources that still aren't cited anywhere here, so in a way we still have a lot to find out about how this topic actually comes off in what's been published. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 15:48, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Admirable as the effort to improve this is, the current text best provides a false balance through the notion of "widely endorsed and widely rebutted" and through presenting the theory on its terms but not explaining why it has been rebutted. But perhaps it is best to work from a version like this which is less burdened by prior minutiae and reliance on sources that existed at time when there was less evidence to analyze. JArthur1984 (talk) 16:05, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

I appreciate your consideration. As far as there being a false balance goes, like I said, I don't the article really bears out the conclusion you're coming to, that it's been absolutely rebutted. Most of the article is just long lists of studies and summaries of news stories and things, and the picture you get is pretty heterogenous. The lead has to follow from the body of the article, and what I wrote there is absolutely borne out by the article, that many people have both endorsed and rebutted DTD. When the article is more developed and pulled-together, maybe it will be clearer how we could say something more specific. Given that, I think we should focus on the rest of the article for now and leave further developing the lead for later. In my opinion, the existing lead is "safe" for now, in that it does at least follow from what the rest of the article says.

Plus, it's not such a black-and-white issue of rebutted or not. There are many ways it can be right or wrong. The most solid case, I think, for an expert consensus against any part of it, is in terms of China's intent. Part of the theory is that the BRI represents a kind of grand malicious plan by the Chinese government, and that I have heard a lot of pushback against especially in more recent writing. People will say that the loans and the results have been too varied for that to be true, and that in any case the countries that are in trouble are in debt to a lot of different sources, not just China, etc. That's not really just like, tossing Chellaney's thesis to the ground absolutely or something—it's kind of just presenting a different picture, not one directly opposed but more just different (and what would "directly opposed" look like anyway? it's a complicated, multifaceted idea). But also, to be honest, I don't feel like I've totally explored the contemporary writing on it yet, and I don't think this article does either, so I think we could easily discover that there's more support for it in some sources today than either of us realize right now. We have to let the sources lead the way. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 16:23, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

You know, actually, to give a specific example, the news article I mentioned before (this one) quotes analysts saying things like, "Laos is so heavily indebted to China that their negotiating position is compromised...It's having to borrow just to service the debt. That's the definition of a debt trap," and, "If you see your country becoming a colony of China, you see a government that is totally corrupt, and you cannot speak up because if you do you might be killed - would you want to stay?" I'm sure Chellaney would see all this as in line with his analysis. At the same time, the comments of the experts in the Associated Press article I've used in a couple places, where they say that the loans have come from dozens of banks and can't all have been coordinated "from the top," doesn't exactly conflict with the framing in that BBC article. Chinese banks didn't have to make loans to Laos with "ill intent" per se for things to have worked out the way that article portrays—perhaps that's more just how things went in practice. You could draw a conclusion from these two stories (not that I would necessarily) that Chellaney was wrong about the "geostrategic plan" part but not about the results, at least where Laos is concerned. Of course, also, in different countries, the situation is really different, so it wouldn't be appropriate to generalize from Laos whatever you might decide is going on there. You can kind of see even just from this why I feel like it's hard to characterize the "overall conclusions" analysts have come to, at least in terms of how the picture we have of the issue so far makes things look. We have to be very careful to avoid WP:SYNTH with something this elaborate (not to mention still-evolving). 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 16:42, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

The source given does not mention debt trap diplomacy at all. There was already a slew of deletions from this article because they failed to mention debt trap in any way. If we are going to represent all sources with a reference to debt trap or rather debt trap related to China, then the article is no longer about debt trap diplomacy but rather a "debt trap" in general or perhaps "debt traps related to China" would be a more accurate title. Qiushufang (talk) 21:22, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

I think you are mostly responding to a position that I'm not taking in my edits, so I'm not quite sure how to respond or whether you expect me to. JArthur1984 (talk) 17:06, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Sorry if I wasn't clear. I think you're overemphasizing what you see as the "against" side in the lead. How does the existing article support that degree of emphasis on that "strongly against" framing, the one you're taking in the second paragraph? I tried to explain in detail just now why I don't think that's appropriate. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 17:11, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Ah, and I thought this was fairly lukewarm, actually. This is all drawn from sources already discussed in the body and which I identified in my edit summary. Is it the language of "rebuttal" you're focused on? It could say something like "Critics of applying the theory to China point to..." JArthur1984 (talk) 18:23, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Why should we spend a whole paragraph in the lead just summarizing the positions of "critics" in that manner? Is that really better than just saying "it's controversial" right now? I don't see how the text of the article itself supports that degree of emphasis on the "rebbutal" angle. There are sources cited in the article that endorse Chellaney's picture in various ways, as well as material that isn't clearly for or against or is only for or against certain aspects of the theory. I know that at least some recent sources claim that experts have broadly agreed against at least certain aspects of Chellaney's hypothesis, but it's not like the entire article reads as a systematic refutation of everything anyone has ever put under the DTD umbrella. If we were really going to honestly survey all the sources and give an accurate summary of the positions they take in the lead, I think we would need to do a lot more work than just looking at a few sources as representative of the "rebuttal" side and stopping at that, which is why I think we should focus on the rest of the article for now and not try to overcharacterize the debate in the lead at this point. Simply saying "it's controversial" is plainly true. I think anything else, beyond something detailed and nuanced that really properly surveys the whole debate, is going to give readers the wrong impression. 🍉◜⠢◞ↂ🄜𝚎sₒᶜa𝚛🅟ම𛱘‎🥑《 𔑪‎talk〗⇤ 18:57, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

I disagree on the characterization of the article's contents on Chellaney's views. Yes there are supporters but practically none of them are academic studies, where supporting opinions are a distinct minority, and are mostly relegated to political editorials or news sites. Even news sites such as Bloomberg that had ridiculous anti-China articles like the microscopic spy chips claims without any evidence do not support Chellaney's views. Studies and findings since the genesis of the concept in their majority have characterized debt-trap diplomacy as either complicated or outright false. Qiushufang (talk) 20:57, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

a bulk of commentators have sided against at least the idea that the BRI has had some sort of secret malicious overarching plan behind it. That's not quite the same as it being totally rebutted universally

I disagree. Chellaney's perspective, the debt trap diplomacy, and support for it absolutely does necessitate accusations of an overarching malicious plan to increase diplomatic, political, and material power by the Chinese state. Without that aspect, there is no debt trap diplomacy. It has not been rebutted universally, but it is clearly in the majority within academic studies, which the current lead already reflects. Qiushufang (talk) 21:14, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

there might be room to state in the lead that the preponderance of experts is against it at least in certain ways

This seems rather disingenuous. If we are not depending on the expertise of experts and representing their views, then who should we depend on? Wikipedia allows sources regardless of bias but it's obvious that certain sources are more reliable than others, academic publications ideally being one of them, while random political editorials and news sites being a second or third choice in reliability. Qiushufang (talk) 21:19, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Please do not references which do not substantiate debt trap diplomacy

@Amigao:, you have been adding citations which do not substantiate debt trap diplomacy to the article. They are either cases of WP:CRYSTAL saying that such a circumstance could happen in the future, or they only make mention of a "debt trap" in passing, which is not the same as debt-trap diplomacy. Please back up your additions with direct quotations as they are being challenged. Where in the references do they claim that the situation is a debt trap diplomacy case? Qiushufang (talk) 03:07, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

To be clear, I am talking about this addition. Neither Debt trap nor debt trap diplomacy were mentioned once in the body of the articles. One article says it could become a debt trap while the other one does not mention it at all. The same goes for this addition where it is not mentioned in the body. Note that debt traps and debt trap diplomacy are not the same thing. Qiushufang (talk) 03:18, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

It's fair to say that they are being described as potential debt traps. Amigao (talk) 03:25, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

The economic times article is terrible [15]. The article does not mention any critic. this sounds more like an oped. WSJ doesn't mention the word. WSJ article is a story about a handful of people and their experiences.

Describing it as potential debt trap diplomacy is original research. LilAhok (talk) 08:22, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

WP:OVERCITE - Just read the recent edit. [16]. adding more sources does not improve the quality of the statement. sources are dubious.

WP:ATT if the info is to be included, statements should be attributed. LilAhok (talk) 08:36, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

It also doesn't address that there is a difference between debt trap and debt trap diplomacy and no material has been cited addressing this. Unless @Amigao: can provide a direct quotation substantiating the addition as debt trap diplomacy, it should be removed. Qiushufang (talk) 03:02, 21 October 2023 (UTC)