Talk:Boeing 737 MAX/Archive 3

This is an archive of past discussions about Boeing 737 MAX. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

2024 shirt allegation

The article cites passengers claiming a shirt was sucked off a child while a mother held him. The article fails to mention that investigation cannot confirm this (as mentioned in the source article). It is more likely that the child was already shirtless, and a passenger saw loose clothing flying out of the opening and made an assumption. One article source contains this claim along with the fact that cell phones were sucked out; however, these are not comparable. There is a significant difference between cell phones that people laid loosely on their laps while they placed their oxygen masks on, and sucking the shirt off a child while the mother held it. It is perhaps the most sensational and evoking claim of the entire event, and has not been verified, and the supposed mother with child has made no appearance. I propose the sensational claim either be removed until confirmed, or an additional clarification that investigation has not confirmed the claim. 2600:1700:343A:9250:509D:EF72:E32B:4483 (talk) 13:43, 25 January 2024 (UTC)

It's all the more surprising as the child was reportedly a teenager (although this also has not been officially confirmed)? I agree that the sucking off of the shirt and the mother holding the child seem, in some ways, slightly contradictory. But the source for the claim is pretty clear. And note: apparently (at some articles at least) we're not allowed to say "sucked off" as "there is no sucking force in physics." Martinevans123 (talk) 14:18, 25 January 2024 (UTC)

There is only a large (sorry) sucking force for a very short time, until the pressure equalizes. (Pressure equalization force? Doesn't sound very physicsy, either.) It is hard to imagine any force pulling a shirt off, and leaving the person otherwise unharmed. There should at least be red marks. Imagine instead, pulling a shirt off with ropes attached somewhere. It has to tear in a few places to come off. There are stories of two iPhones found on the ground, one working and one not. People like to have their phone on the tray table, or even the clip to hold one up for viewing. Could easily escape from those. Gah4 (talk) 19:39, 26 January 2024 (UTC)

I agree with Martinevans123's comment. Items getting "sucked off" is not a proper term in a scientific or academic context (or really much anywhere supposed to deliver information impartially). If I were sharing a beer with friends though, sure.

I think mentioning that the personal items were ejected from the airplane by the pressure differential could be a more fitting description. 2A01:CB04:4AF:1500:E04E:46F9:138C:AB82 (talk) 23:16, 27 January 2024 (UTC)

Not this again. If you have a problem with the wording used by the sources, bring it up with them. Wikipedia is not a place to right great wrongs, even if said wrongs are something as insignificant as scientific vs "beer" semantics. - ZLEA _T\^C 00:18, 28 January 2024 (UTC)

I'm not here for an edit war, but I wanted to add my voice to the conversation because frankly I found it jarring when I was reading the article. Using the same wording as the sources seems hardly mandatory when we are not using direct quotes, especially if, for example, we were using such sources as sensationalist tabloids. I am sure there are other articles who don't use that wording out there.

That said I'll leave it at that, I'm not touching the article and it's frankly not important. Getting sucked off gets the point across either way. 2A01:CB04:4AF:1500:970:510C:1460:5E97 (talk) 08:21, 28 January 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, I was being ironic. I see nothing wrong with "sucked off" if that's how it was described by witnesses. Martinevans123 (talk) 08:51, 28 January 2024 (UTC)

Well, FWIW, there's this--photo shown in website article and also in embedded video of TV news interview with passenger who reportedly took photo: https://katu.com/news/local/woman-helped-teen-who-was-seated-near-blown-out-door-plug-on-alaska-airlines-flight-1282 DonFB (talk) 22:31, 26 January 2024 (UTC)

Hard to know exactly how this happened without knowing what sort of shirt it was and how it was fastened. Martinevans123 (talk) 08:52, 28 January 2024 (UTC)

Infobox image (again)

About a month ago (not sure how I missed this for that long), DReifGalaxyM31 changed the infobox image from File:Ethiopian Airlines ET-AVJ takeoff.jpg to File:United Airlines Boeing 737-9 MAX AN5165061.jpg without discussion. As far as I am aware, this image was never proposed in any of the previous discussions. I've reverted the change, but it's probably worth discussing.

Here's my opinion. The United 737 is of a lower resolution of only 1,024 × 680 pixels (compared to 3,240 × 2,160 of the Ethiopian aircraft), which isn't necessarily bad as the images are scaled down in the infobox. However, the aircraft in the image has its landing gear down, rather than being in a clean configuration, and is backdropped by a dull, cloudy sky. Both of these were reasons for other images being rejected in favor of the Ethiopian image.

Based on the edit summary, it is clear to me that the main reason for the change was because the Ethiopian aircraft was involved in Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. As I have stated in the previous discussions, "it crashed" is not a valid reason to change an infobox image. Any replacement image should be demonstrably better from an encyclopedic point of view. - ZLEA _T\^C 02:47, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Concur, no consensus here for change. BilCat (talk) 03:11, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

I simply suggest File:Boeing 737-8 MAX N8704Q rotated.jpg. It's a perfect picture showing all of the MAX's characteristics (such as the clear view on the winglets and big engines), and since it sports Boeing livery but not any airline's color, it can be considered as a neutral option to represent the 737 MAX. Yes it is a little bit blurred, but it can look fine since it will be scaled down inside the infobox.
And I know...there's no formal regulations or rules preventing us from setting a crashed airframe as the thumbnail, but we should avoid painful memories, aren't we...? Hwi.padam 23:06, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

The Ethiopian image was actually chosen to replace File:Boeing 737-8 MAX N8704Q rotated.jpg in this discussion. "Painful memories" isn't a reason to downgrade the infobox image quality. The aircraft had the same livery as every other Ethiopian Airlines aircraft, so most readers wouldn't even recognize it as an accident aircraft unless they knew to check the registration. - ZLEA _T\^C 01:10, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

To be fair, just let someone make a challenge to all aviation photography sites (forums, comments, etc.) to find a worthy hero image or find another ET-AVJ photo to avoid the duplication with the current at infobox. Licensing included, of course. ～ POKéTalker（═◉═） 00:23, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

If you feel so strongly about it, by all means go ahead. I cannot guarantee that such an endeavor would be successful, especially if the goal is specifically to change the infobox image. I personally do not think it would be worth the trouble to coordinate such a challenge. Trust me, I once tried to coordinate a competition in Commons and I ended up being one of only three users to participate (my Silver Wiki is little more than a participation trophy and a reminder why I never coordinated another Commons competition since). Most likely, a better image will eventually pop up on Commons, but until then consensus is that the Ethiopian image stays. - ZLEA _T\^C 07:27, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

For ET-AVJ, JetPhotos has a few good ones: clean configuration, but facing right and taking off(?) from Boeing Field. Planespotters.net and Airliners.net only have the latter photo. Contacting photographers through the form, let's see how it goes... ～ POKéTalker（═◉═） 01:34, 25 October 2023 (UTC)

I want to point out that a new infobox image does not have to be of any specific MAX, but it just has to be demonstrably better from an encyclopedic point of view at representing the type. I will also say that duplication of the infobox image with the accident article is not a problem, and if a better image is uploaded of ET-AVJ, it likely would be used in both articles anyway. - ZLEA _T\^C 03:17, 25 October 2023 (UTC)

Scoured all the MAX 9s in JetPhotos; here are the potential candidates (in chronological order, oldest to latest): United 1, Turkish, flydubai, United 2, AeroMexico 1, Alaska, and AeroMexico 2. I have already received correspondence from the photographer of the Alaska (Kirk) and he is "more than willing"; however, the first United's pose is exactly like the Ethiopian and fits with your "consensus" requirements...

By the way, how about doing the same for the recently-created Airbus A321neo article? ～ POKéTalker（═◉═） 12:01, 25 October 2023 (UTC)

If the photographer is indeed willing to release the image under a compatible license, then we should have a discussion about the new image. As for Airbus A321neo, I was under the impression that consensus was leaning toward not splitting the A320 family articles, and even merging the "ceo" variant articles back into Airbus A320 family. I don't expect Airbus A321neo to last very long as a standalone article, but if it does, a similar discussion should probably take place. Also, why did you put "consensus" in quotes when it is clearly defined here? - ZLEA _T\^C 13:25, 25 October 2023 (UTC)

Up to page 27 right now for the MAX 200, here's a partial list (have yet to receive replies from photographers yet as of this typing): RyanAir 1, RyanAir 2 (Malta Air), RyanAir 3 (almost like the Ethiopian's pose), and RyanAir 4

If you want to get in touch with Kirk who took the Alaska 73M9 there's the "Contact" button below the photograph. Also got a reply from the photographer of the United 2 (Kevin Cargo) and he is "[h]appy to provide a higher resolution copy if needed as well". Don't know what to do next, so will leave the rest to you and/or your consensus-mates. It's been more than a year since the consensus of the hero image, just haven't the slightest clue; that explains the quotation marks. ～ POKéTalker（═◉═） 13:07, 30 October 2023 (UTC)

I have already contacted the Alaska MAX photographer, and he is indeed willing to allow us to upload the image to Commons regardless of the ultimate consensus of its use here. Be sure to direct any willing copyright holders to WP:PERMISSION, and be sure to clarify that they would have to release the image under a compatable license. I would also ensure that they know that there is no guarentee that their image will be used on this article, as that would be up to the community to decide.

I'm a little worried that you may be going a bit far with your effort to get the image changed. You're not doing anything wrong, but it is unusual to go to such great lengths to get a consensus changed. The fact that the consensus is a year old does not make it any less valid, and it will remain valid until the community decides to change it. Again, there's nothing wrong with what you're doing now, but be careful that this doesn't become disruptive. - ZLEA _T\^C 14:47, 30 October 2023 (UTC)

Alaska Airlines 737 MAX 9

Before I forget again, I will formally propose the replacement of the infobox image with the Alaska Airlines MAX 9 image discussed above. I have uploaded the photo to Commons and the permission has been confirmed by the VRT. I will say that I am slightly in favor of replacing the image, as the Alaska photo is better contrasted with the brighter blue sky and white fuselage, compared to the Ethiopian image's dull blue shy and slightly overexposed fuselage. The aircraft is in a mostly clean configuration, with the flaps being slightly lowered (though the Ethiopian image displays the flaps at around the same angle). I don't think the blue tail against the sky will cause issues with colorblind readers as they are two vastly different shades (though again, I have never experienced colorblindness so I'm not 100% sure about this). The left profile view of the aircraft is not unusual, and is similar to that of the Boeing 737 Next Generation infobox image. My only real complaint about this photo is that the glare on the left nacelle causes it to blend into the fuselage slightly, but the nacelle chevrons and new winglets are still clearly visible so I don't think that's a big issue. Overall, it's slightly better than the Ethiopian image in my opinion, but I want to hear what everyone else thinks. - ZLEA _T\^C 05:47, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

I'll vote for the Alaska Airlines pic. Very frankly, I think the Ethiopian picture is better, but the ghoulishness of prominently displaying it is just...creepy. I realize most people probably won't know what they're seeing, but those who do may well wonder what kind of people would show that picture in a kind of congratulatory context, or wonder if Wikipedia even knows what it's showing. DonFB (talk) 06:06, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

As it's been explained before, "it crashed" is not a valid reason to downgrade the infobox image. The Ethiopian image has been consistently shown to be of greater encyclopedic value than all the other proposed changes, and the purpose of this discussion is to determine whether this new image is better from an encyclopedic point of view. Wikipedia is not censored, not that the image would otherwise be censored in the first place. There were over a hundred aircraft in the Ethiopian fleet at the time, including dozens of 737s, so the chances of any of the crew or passengers who died in the accident being inside the aircraft when the photo was taken is slim. With that said, are there any other reasons that you prefer the new image over the Ethiopian image? - ZLEA _T\^C 15:07, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

No, I don't imagine any victims were on the flight pictured. I didn't take part in the previous debate, but I'll stand by my vote for the reason given. DonFB (talk) 20:24, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

On the issue of censorship, the photo is shown at the top of the crash article, which is entirely appropriate. But here, it's another matter. DonFB (talk) 21:14, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

The reason for me scouring JetPhotos is that the current Ethiopian MAX 8 is used twice in this article: first as the hero (infobox) image, the other under the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 header. As the initiator, naturally accept such a replacement.

By the way, both of you might have overlooked considering Kevin Cargo's United MAX 9 above; if you had contacted him he would also be happy to send you a larger/higher quality photograph. Though this one is dark-blue on blue (latest livery), and the colorblind issue would be taken into account. ～ POKéTalker（═◉═） 04:16, 15 November 2023 (UTC)

I still prefer the Alaska aircraft, the United livery blends with the sky a bit too much, even for me. - ZLEA _T\^C 04:32, 15 November 2023 (UTC)

I prefer the image of the Alaska plane. On its technical merits, IMHO, it's just as good as the Ethiopian image. But I think there are three reasons to swap it out that really push this over the edge for me: 1) It avoids using the same image in the infobox for this page and the infobox for the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 page. 2) It avoids using the same image twice on the same page (in the infobox and the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 section). 3) This issue of "but it's the crash plane" is going to keep coming up. Yes, Wikipedia is not censored, but is it really worth continuing to rehash this discussion every few weeks/months? Let's just change it and be done with it. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 00:06, 16 November 2023 (UTC)

Voting for Alaska Last time I engaged in this discussion I was told it's an editorial decision. I much prefer Alaska for its exposure and framing. The Ethiopian was ~~underexposed~~, as I commented, "a bit overexposed and washed out due to haze maybe", and the supposed fix overexposed it, but I didn't say anything because the discussion was all over the place and going nowhere. PS Thanks for finding a good photo and getting the permission, etc. — zmm ~talk~ 15:51, 16 November 2023 (UTC)

You are welcome, zmm; that was initially my motivation. Now to find a suitable Airbus A321neo replacement image... ～ POKéTalker（═◉═） 05:47, 9 February 2024 (UTC)

Revision to lede

Consensus below is in favor of this proposal. RickyCourtney (talk) 21:43, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Taking the above into account, I'd like to take a stab at revising the lede. This seems to be the section that most people are taking issue with:

The 737 MAX suffered recurring problems with its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), causing two fatal crashes, Lion Air Flight 610 in late 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in early 2019, in which a total of 346 people died. The aircraft was subsequently grounded worldwide from March 2019 to November 2020, with the FAA garnering criticism for being the last major authority to ground it. Investigations found Boeing covered-up known issues with the aircraft and lapses in the FAA's certification of the aircraft for flight.

Here is my proposed revision:

The 737 MAX suffered two fatal crashes, Lion Air Flight 610 in late 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in early 2019, in which a total of 346 people died. Contributing to the accidents was the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which activated unexpectedly due to a faulty angle of attack sensor, and inadequate pilot training. The aircraft was subsequently grounded worldwide from March 2019 to November 2020, with the FAA garnering criticism for being the last major authority to ground it. Investigations found Boeing did not fully inform operators about MCAS and found shortcomings in the FAA's certification process for the aircraft.

Here are my thoughts:

MCAS was not alone in causing the crashes. We do need to acknowledge that.
Instead of blaming the dead pilots for their reactions in the heat of battle, I think we can all agree that training was lacking.
The FAA did receive criticism for not grounding the aircraft sooner. That criticism came from domestic officials, international governments, and the media. Saying that Boeing was criticized is a statement of fact.
We need to mention that Boeing was not entirely forthcoming about MCAS. Calling it a cover-up is too strong, but not saying anything is also not an option.
The FAA has been criticized for its certification process, mainly how it interacted with Boeing. Again, it's not a judgment by us as Wikipedia editors; it's simply another statement of fact.

Open to any suggested revisions on my revision before I publish the changes. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 19:03, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

No objections (although "a faulty angle of attack sensor" might suggest a single aircraft, which it obviously wasn't). Martinevans123 (talk) 19:06, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I also think this is an improvement and agree with your thoughts. I would suggest maybe changing "which activated unexpectedly due to a faulty angle of attack sensor" to something like "which activated unexpectedly due to erroneous angle of attack data", so the implication is not that the sensor was faulty by design or that it was delivered as faulty. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 19:13, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I agree with that suggestion. Martinevans123 (talk) 19:36, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Uncommanded MCAS activation

Would any of the information about recovery from uncommanded MCAS activation in these sources be useful?

[1]https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=11369094&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CERTIFICATION%20SPECIALIST%E2%80%99S%20REPORT-Rel.pdf

[2]https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/Response%20to%20EAIB%20final%20report.pdf

The first mentions (on Page 8) "Failures were able to be countered by using elevator alone. Stabilizer trim was available to offload column forces, and stabilizer cutouts were available but not required to counter failures."

And from the second (on Page 2) "appropriate crew management of the event, per the procedures that existed at the time, would have allowed the crew to recover the airplane" 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 00:56, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

[Response to EAIB] I don't see that quote in this document.

[NTSB Report] These are all the lines that are most applicable from my quick read. Each one is an assumption made by Boeing, but it does abide by the FAA circular.

• "Uncommanded system inputs are readily recognizable and can be counteracted by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense by the flight crew and do not require specific procedures." (page 7)

• "The pilot will take immediate action to reduce or eliminate increased control forces by re-trimming or changing configuration or flight conditions." (page 8)

• "Trained flight crew memory procedures shall be followed to address and eliminate or mitigate the failure." (page 8)

• "This conclusion was based in part on the assumption that each activation would be recognized and immediately trimmed out, which is consistent with the regulatory guidance in AC 25-7C that a pilot will take immediate action to trim out reduce or eliminate high control forces by re-trimming or changing configuration or flight conditions" (page 9)

StalkerFishy (talk) 01:58, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

I see this on Page 8, second paragraph from the bottom -

"When assessing unintended MCAS activation in the simulator for the FHAs, the function was allowed to perform to its authority and beyond before pilot action was taken to recover. Failures were able to be countered by using elevator alone. Stabilizer trim was available to offload column forces, and stabilizer cutouts were available but not required to counter failures. This was true both for the preliminary FHAs performed in 2012 and for the reassessment of the FHAs in 2016."

[3]https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=11369094&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CERTIFICATION%20SPECIALIST%E2%80%99S%20REPORT-Rel.pdf 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 02:18, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

That's the first source, though. I'm talking about your quote from the second source (the Response to EAIB) that's on page 2. I don't see that anywhere.

I've also edited my previous comment to help clarify which source I was talking about. Didn't realize PDFs were numbered like that!

StalkerFishy (talk) 03:26, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

Ah apologies - the quote is actually from the NTSB's response to one of the previous EAIB draft final reports:

[4]https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/US%20comments%20ET302%20Report%20March%202022.pdf 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 03:31, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

Major updates needed

Many of the sources listed throughout the article are from immediately after the Ethiopian accident at the latest, and contain information that is now inaccurate, at best. Even at the time, the articles referenced were highly sensational in nature and contained very little factual information regarding the actual flight recorder data, bulletins and standard procedures from Boeing, and results of investigations from the Lion Air accident.

In 2024 we now know that the angle-of-attack probe on the Lion Air 737 was most likely calibrated incorrectly by Xtra Aerospace, and that the Ethiopian probe was most likely struck by a bird (or some other foreign object) during takeoff. This information is critical in evaluating the series of events that followed; simply stating that MCAS activated "because of false data" misleads readers as to the cause of the actual crashes.

At this point it is undeniable that the pilots did not follow standard procedures for an uncommanded stabilizer movement event that had been published for decades and were the same regardless of the implementation of MCAS. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:24B0:8B9B:BA8A:3A72 (talk) 22:00, 12 February 2024 (UTC)

Per Wikipedia's rules, you'll need to provide reliable, published sources of information before we make those changes.

Furthermore, I'd say that while I understand the point you are trying to make, Boeing's flawed designs is still at the heart of these two issues. MCAS should have never relied on a single AOA sensor to provide information to MCAS, and pilots training on a severe mis-trim condition had not been included since the original 737.

We do go into more detail on these issues on the Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 pages. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 02:15, 13 February 2024 (UTC)

Fair enough, I will gather some sources. But if "reliable" is a condition that sources must meet, many of the current sources are unacceptable. Many are simply Washington Post or New York Times articles that read like opinion pieces.

Whether MCAS "should" have relied on a single sensor is of course a matter for discussion, but at the end of the day, the assumed redundancy for that was a pair of well trained pilots in the cockpit. While training for a severe mis-trim condition may not have been included, Boeing has published a standard procedure for a trim runaway for decades - both crews identified uncommanded nose-down trim without fully implementing this standard procedure, which involves immediately disconnecting autothrottle so as to not exacerbate the issue with overspeed conditions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:4D84:1C9C:B1B1:823D (talk) 15:00, 13 February 2024 (UTC)

Both The Washington Post and The New York Times are considered "generally reliable" by Wikipedia. If you wish to challenge this classification, you should do so at WP:RSN, not here. - ZLEA _T\^C 15:41, 13 February 2024 (UTC)

They may well be, that doesn't change that their reporting on the 737 MAX is highly editorialized. The information that is referenced as source material in their articles from 2019 and 2020, for example, is now verifiably false. If they're going to be used as sources, we should at least be using up-to-date material that includes information about the results of the actual crash investigations. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:EC6B:E4AB:67DD:BA38 (talk) 00:01, 15 February 2024 (UTC)

Do you have suggestions for better reliable sources we should at be using that includes up-to-date material that includes information about the results of the actual crash investigations? RickyCourtney (talk) 00:57, 15 February 2024 (UTC)

Yes, here are references from the NTSB

System Safety and Certification Specialist's Report regarding Lion Air 610: NTSB Docket

Notable information (emphasis added):

(Page 7) As part of the MCAS development phase, in late 2012, Boeing performed a preliminary functional hazard assessment of MCAS using piloted simulations in their full motion Engineering Flight Simulator. Several hazards were assessed at that time, however, this section of the report will focus only on the following two hazards: uncommanded MCAS operation up to its maximum authority (0.6 degrees of airplane nose down stabilizer) and uncommanded MCAS operation equivalent to a three (3) second stabilizer trim runaway. To perform these simulator tests, Boeing induced a stabilizer trim input that would simulate the stabilizer moving at a rate and duration consistent with the MCAS function. Using this method to induce the hazard resulted in the following: motion of the stabilizer trim wheel, increased column forces, and indication that the airplane was moving nose down. Boeing indicated to the NTSB that this evaluation was focused on the pilot response to uncommanded MCAS operation, regardless of underlying cause. Thus, the specific failure modes that could lead to uncommanded MCAS activation, such as an erroneous high AOA input to the MCAS, were not simulated as part of these functional hazard assessment validation tests. As a result, additional flight deck effects (such as IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE alerts and stick shaker activation) resulting from the same underlying failure (for example, erroneous AOA) were not simulated and were not documented in the stabilizer trim and autoflight safety assessment reports reviewed by the NTSB.

(Page 8) When assessing unintended MCAS activation in the simulator for the Functional Hazard Assessments, the function was allowed to perform to its authority and beyond before pilot action was taken to recover. Failures were able to be countered by using elevator alone. Stabilizer trim was available to offload column forces, and stabilizer cutouts were available but not required to counter failures. This was true both for the preliminary FHAs performed in 2012 and for the reassessment of the FHAs in 2016.

In a 2019 presentation to the NTSB, Boeing indicated that the MCAS hazard classification of “major” for uncommanded MCAS function (including up to the new authority limits) in the Normal flight envelope were based on the following conclusions:

• Unintended stabilizer trim inputs are readily recognized by movement of the stab trim wheel, flight path change or increased column forces.

• Aircraft can be returned to steady level flight using available column (elevator) alone or stabilizer trim.

• Continuous unintended nose down stabilizer trim inputs would be recognized as a Stab Trim or Stab Runaway failure and procedure for Stab Runaway would be followed.

(Page 9) Boeing also indicated that as part of the development process, although not formally part of the FHA analysis, engineering personnel and test pilots discussed the scenario of repeated uncommanded MCAS activation due to erroneously high AOA and considered whether a system redesign was necessary to address this issue. As part of this discussion, they discussed the combined flight deck effects (including stick shaker activation, among others), but determined that no redesign was necessary. This conclusion was based in part on the assumption that each activation would be recognized and immediately trimmed out, which is consistent with the regulatory guidance in AC 25-7C that a pilot will take immediate action to trim out reduce or eliminate high control forces by re-trimming or changing configuration or flight conditions.

(Page 23) The review also found that Boeing considered the effects of a single AOA sensor providing “erroneous data” within the lower branches of a fault tree with the “Top Event” titled “Misleading Air Data from the Left and Right ADIRU – Airspeed / Altitude.”

In both the original and revised fault tree, the top event “Misleading Air Data from L & R ADIRU – Airspeed/Altitude” showed that it met the requirement to be extremely improbable.

(Page 24) ...an NTSB review of Boeing internal documents confirmed that the FHAs had in fact been reassessed each time that the MCAS requirements were changed, including the change in authority limit from 0.6 to 2.5 degrees. In all cases, the reassessment found that the FHA categories had not changed.

(Page 29) Uncommanded MCAS was documented as a potential consequence of (Page 30) erroneous AOA, but was not identified as a factor contributing to the catastrophic rating in any of these. The acceptability rationale for these cases noted that these multiple failure events was beyond extremely improbable. The rationale also noted that while the failure event was catastrophic before flight crew recognition, training would support flight crew recognition and drive appropriate flight crew response to the flight deck effects (which, as noted above, included MCAS activation).

(Page 30) Boeing advised that after the accident, they reviewed how the case of single erroneous AOA would have been categorized if included in the original review. Boeing concluded that had the case of “Erroneous AOA from a single source” been included in the S&MF document, the same assumption about pilot response to uncommanded MCAS as used in the FHAs (which was based on regulatory guidance in AC 25-7C) would have been used, and it is unlikely that any design changes would have resulted from including this case in the S&MF analysis. As noted in section E.1, Boeing did conduct a similar, less formal analysis of the effects of erroneously high AOA on MCAS and concluded that no redesign was needed.

Response to Final Aircraft Accident Investigation Report Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Response to EAIB final report.pdf (ntsb.gov)

Notable Information (emphasis added):

(Page 1) According to the EAIB’s final report, electrical problems that existed since the time of the accident airplane’s production caused the left angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor heater to fail, which resulted in the AOA sensor providing erroneous values that caused the MCAS to pitch the nose of the airplane downward, resulting in (Page 2) ground impact. However, the final report does not provide any details to support the EAIB’s statements about the existence of an electrical problem related to the left AOA sensor. The US team found that the erroneous AOA sensor output was caused by the separation of the AOA sensor vane due to impact with a foreign object, which was most likely a bird. During the accident investigation, the NTSB provided the EAIB with the evidence supporting this finding. In fact, each set of NTSB comments detailed this evidence.

(Page 4) Section 1.10.1, Aerodrome Inspection, of the EAIB’s final report stated that “there was no evidence of a bird” in the area searched. However, the report did not mention that the search for bird remains occurred 8 days after the accident and did not include the area surrounding taxiway D, where the airplane would have been positioned when the left AOA sensor output became erroneous.

(Page 4) When the US team compared the behavior (shown by the accident FDR data) of the left AOA sensor resolver output signal with FDR data from previous bird strike events involving AOA (Page 5) sensor vane separations, it was clear that the left AOA sensor on the accident airplane was subjected to an event that resulted in a vane separation.

(Page 5) The NTSB acknowledges that information about the flap position required for MCAS to activate did not appear in Boeing’s FCOM bulletin and the Federal Aviation Administration’s airworthiness directive in response to the Lion Air flight 610 (Page 6) accident. However, Boeing provided that information in a multi-operator message (MOM-MOM-18-0664-01B), which was sent to all “737NG/MAX Customers, Regional Directors, Regional Managers and Boeing Field Service Bases” on November 10, 2018 (after the Lion Air accident but before the Ethiopian Airlines accident). Although the EAIB appended Boeing’s multi-operator message to the final report, the EAIB failed to mention that the flaps information appeared in that document; thus, this finding is misleading.

US Comments on Draft Aircraft Accident Investigation Report Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 US comments ET302 Report March 2022.pdf (ntsb.gov)

(Page 2) We agree that the uncommanded nose-down inputs from the airplane’s MCAS system should be part of the probable cause for this accident. However, the draft probable cause indicates that the MCAS alone caused the airplane to be “unrecoverable,” and we believe that the probable cause also needs to acknowledge that appropriate crew management of the event, per the procedures that existed at the time, would have allowed the crew to recover the airplane even when faced with the uncommanded nose-down inputs.

(Page 2) We propose that the probable cause in the final report present the following causal factors to fully reflect the circumstances of this accident:

• uncommanded airplane-nose-down inputs from the MCAS due to erroneous AOA values and

• the flight crew’s inadequate use of manual electric trim and management of thrust to maintain airplane control.

In addition, we propose that the following contributing factors be included:

• the operator’s failure to ensure that its flight crews were prepared to properly respond to uncommanded stabilizer trim movement in the manner outlined in Boeing’s flight crew operating manual (FCOM) bulletin and the FAA’s emergency airworthiness directive (AD) (both issued 4 months before the accident) and

• the airplane’s impact with a foreign object, which damaged the AOA sensor and caused the erroneous AOA values. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9195:C798:4C57:69B4 (talk) 18:21, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

Additional information from US comments ET302 Report March 2022.pdf (ntsb.gov)

(Page 5) The EAIB draft report incorrectly states (in several locations) that the MCAS made control of the airplane “impossible” but neglects to state that, if the crew had manually reduced thrust and appropriately used the manual electric trim, the airplane would have remained controllable despite uncommanded MCAS input.

• The flight crew’s failure to reduce thrust manually and the excessive airspeed that resulted played a significant role in the accident sequence of events.

o Upon either the activation of the stickshaker or the annunciation of the IAS DISAGREE message, the expected crew response is to turn off the autothrottle. The report could be strengthened if it discussed, from a human performance perspective, possible reasons why the flight crew did not respond as expected to the stickshaker and the IAS DISAGREE message.

o Because the autothrottle remained engaged and responsive to the erroneous AOA inputs, the autothrottle did not transition to N1 mode and remained in the ARM mode with takeoff thrust. The expected crew response is to manually control thrust in this situation; however, the lack of manual control and the absence of flight crew conversation regarding the thrust settings indicate that the crew did not notice the autothrottle’s failure to transition to N1, even when the aural overspeed warning triggered as the airplane accelerated beyond about 340 knots. As airspeed increased, the required control forces increased on both the control column and the manual trim wheel.

• Appropriately countering uncommanded nose-down inputs with manual electric trim nose-up inputs, as was expected per crew procedure described in the FCOM bulletin and the emergency AD, would have resulted (Page 6) in control column forces remaining in a controllable regime during the flight, including when the stabilizer trim cutout switches were in the CUTOUT position. The report could be strengthened if it evaluated, from a human performance perspective, the crew’s failure to apply manual electric trim nose-up inputs.

(Page 6) The EAIB report inaccurately states that the crew performed actions “per the procedure.” Evidence shows that the crew did not appropriately perform non-normal procedures after receiving annunciations relating to unreliable airspeed, stall warning, and runaway stabilizer. The crew also did not respond as expected to the overspeed warning by disconnecting the autothrottle and reducing power.

(Page 6) Even after moving the stabilizer trim cutout switches to the CUTOUT position, the crew decided to return the switches to the NORMAL position, contrary to the FCOM bulletin and the emergency AD, which direct crews to ensure that the switches “stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.” 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9195:C798:4C57:69B4 (talk) 18:34, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

Information from U.S.A. v. The Boeing Company Deferred Prosecution Agreement download (justice.gov)

(Page 6) The Fraud Section determined that an independent compliance monitor was unnecessary based on the following factors, among others: (i) the misconduct was neither pervasive across the organization, nor undertaken by a large number of employees, nor facilitated by senior management; (ii) although two of the Company’s 737 MAX Flight Technical Pilots deceived the FAA AEG about MCAS by way of misleading statements, half-truths, and omissions, others in the Company disclosed MCAS’s expanded operational scope to different FAA personnel who were responsible for determining whether the 737 MAX met U.S. federal airworthiness standards.

Information from European Union Aviation Safety Agency Proposed Airworthiness Directive EASA lays out its proposed conditions for return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX | EASA (europa.eu)

- We also pushed the aircraft to its limits during flight tests, assessed the behaviour of the aircraft in failure scenarios, and could confirm that the aircraft is stable and has no tendency to pitch-up even without the MCAS.

Comments from FAA Administrator Steve Dickson Boeing's MCAS on the 737 Max may not have been needed at all - The Air Current

- FAA Administrator Steve Dickson at a February 2020 media briefing that the regulator had “gone back and looked at the airplane with the stall characteristics with and without the current MCAS system. And the stall characteristics are acceptable in either case."

- Those who have flown the Max in engineering tests tell TAC that much of the differences in handling qualities with MCAS present and not are marginally perceptible “once you know what to look for” and produces a “slightly softer feel” in the aircraft’s control for stall recovery. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9195:C798:4C57:69B4 (talk) 23:14, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

If there had been no MCAS, these two crashes would not have happened and 346 people would not have died. Martinevans123 (talk) 15:37, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

... oh, and, did the pilots even know that MCAS had been fitted? Martinevans123 (talk) 15:38, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

... oh, and, what happened to the "AOA DISAGREE" indication on the flight deck displays? Martinevans123 (talk) 15:40, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

... oh, and, wasn't a main root cause of the Lion Air crash a mis-calibrated AOA sensor, that was then amplified, to a fatal degree, by the MCAS? Martinevans123 (talk) 15:48, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Martin, I understand that many people feel very emotional about these particular crashes but it is inappropriate to inject your emotions into an encyclopedic article. If you examine, carefully, the information I have provided it should help you understand the answers to your questions. Particularly, you might find the information in the very first source, the NTSB Docket regarding Lion Air 610, to be helpful.

MCAS was not originally included in the flight manual because all standard procedures for dealing with a malfunction of it are literally identical for any other stabilizer trim runaway. This is a standard memory item for all 737 pilots, going back decades.

As stated in another one of the sources I provided, the NTSB's response to the EAIB Final Report, MCAS was explicitly mentioned in bulletins sent to all 737 MAX operators after the Lion Air crash (before the Ethiopian crash), and operators were reminded of the appropriate standard procedures to deal with a malfunction.

The AOA sensor you mention was indeed mis-calibrated, but that was the fault of Xtra Aerospace who was repairing it for Lion Air. Lion Air was responsible for verifying the quality of the repair. MCAS did not, however, "amplify" anything "to a fatal degree". Please refer to the NTSB Docket for information regarding the control authority of MCAS. It was specifically designed to act within a range that pilots could overcome.

A very important takeaway from the results of the crash investigations is that the pilots flying the accident aircraft were not familiar with well established standard procedures that would have allowed them to safely fly the planes in the event of a stabilizer trim runaway, regardless of cause. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 15:53, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Fair comment, but the emotion part seems limited to talk pages as far as I can tell. -Fnlayson (talk) 16:03, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
With respect, I believe the continued references throughout the articles to some sort of broad conspiracy between Boeing and the FAA, or that Boeing "should have gone with a clean sheet design but didn't so they could compete with Airbus", are evidence of a more emotional, editorialized approach to writing about the events surrounding the 737 MAX. Implications that Boeing "rushed" development or "hid" things from regulatory bodies are disproven by a very public paper trail demonstrating their deep testing of all systems on the plane. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 16:10, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
You think the two accidents would still have happened if MCAS had not been fitted? Martinevans123 (talk) 16:13, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
The pilots would have received multiple aural, visual and physical notifications related to a disagreement between the AOA sensors whether or not MCAS was present. There are long-established standard procedures that pilots are expected to follow when receiving these warnings, which the pilots of the accident aircraft simply did not do.

It is impossible to say for sure, but since one of the important aspects of the standard procedures is disconnecting autothrottle and manually reducing thrust, it is possible that even without MCAS activation the actions of the pilots could have still resulted in overspeed conditions at low altitude - one of the primary reasons the planes became difficult to control. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 16:22, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
"impossible to say for sure", haha. What an answer. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:24, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
When designing complex modern airliners, it is not possible to account for every single one of the myriad human factors that can contribute to a fatal accident. If you examine the first source I provided above, the NTSB Docket, you will see that in their extensive R&D Boeing calculated the probability of uncommanded MCAS activation due to erroneous AOA data to be "beyond extremely improbable", and they assumed that well-trained pilots would take the appropriate action to counter it.

It was also assumed that professional pilots and maintenance staff would properly document any errors, which the investigations found did not happen. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 17:51, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
Ah, I see. And what probability did Boeing assign to a "mis-calibrated AOA sensor"? That might have made it a bit more than "beyond extremely improbable"? Perhaps I missed that in the NTSB Docket. And what probability to designing out a "AOA DISAGREE" indication? Martinevans123 (talk) 18:14, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
In all fairness I'm still not sure you've actually read the NTSB Docket, because you continue to ask questions that are explained within it. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 18:18, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
I can see plenty of examples of "AOA sensor" in that document, But I still can't see where any probability was "calculated" for a "mis-calibrated AOA sensor". On which page does that appear? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 18:24, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

As far as I can tell, the only editorialising going on is in some of the cited sources; the Wikipedia article scrupulously complies with WP:NPOV. If you can point specifically to any "emotional" or otherwise questionable claims made in Wikivoice, I'm sure we can work out a way to address them. Rosbif73 (talk) 16:25, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
One example is an edit I was banned for today, which brought the discussion to the talk page. The first sentence in the "Grounding and Recertification" section of the 737 MAX article currently reads:

"In 2019, the Boeing 737 MAX was grounded worldwide after a flight control system caused two new aircraft to crash in Indonesia (Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018) and Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019), killing all 346 people on board both flights."

And I simply edited it to read:

"In 2019, the Boeing 737 MAX was grounded worldwide after crashes in Indonesia (Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018) and Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019), killing all 346 people on board both flights."

This edit removes the out-of-date implication that the sole cause of the crashes was MCAS, which is factually inaccurate as per the results of the crash investigations, which very clearly state that pilot error was a contributing factor.

I'm happy to point out further similar examples, but in my opinion anyone who reads through the sources I've provided should be able to compare the current language of the articles and see that the tone is not in fact neutral or factual. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 16:57, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
Ah right, "pilot error". Those pilots had all been fully trained to deal with exactly this type of event, yes? Martinevans123 (talk) 18:17, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
All 737 pilots should be aware of the long-established standard procedures to counter a stabilizer trim runaway, which is what you would call a malfunction of MCAS (even though MCAS was specifically designed to operate within a limit that pilots could override, and would not deflect the horizontal stabilizer to its full limit). It is solely the responsibility of the airlines to properly train their pilots. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 18:21, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
So pilots having to constantly make trim inputs to counter the erroneous MCAS trim inputs, even though the control law regime for the MCAS was twice that for the manual inputs? Were the pilots supposed use the trim switches on the yoke or the manual trim wheels? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 18:31, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
Again, I encourage you to actually read through the sources I've posted above. Specifically, the NTSB determined that, at least in the Ethiopian accident, the pilots in fact did not properly use manual electric trim to counter the inputs from MCAS, which would have allowed them to safely fly the plane.

As previously mentioned, this is detailed on Page 2 [5]https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/US%20comments%20ET302%20Report%20March%202022.pdf 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 18:35, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
I see that page 2 also says "MCAS alone caused the airplane to be “unrecoverable”". So, the crews weren't trained properly by the operators, but in your book that should be classed as "pilot error", yes? Martinevans123 (talk) 18:44, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
Okay so this proves that you are not, in fact, reading the sources I'm referring you to since you've left out the rest of that quote (emphasis added):

"However, the draft probable cause indicates that the MCAS alone caused the airplane to be “unrecoverable,” and we believe that the probable cause also needs to acknowledge that appropriate crew management of the event, per the procedures that existed at the time, would have allowed the crew to recover the airplane even when faced with the uncommanded nose-down inputs. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 18:48, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
Kindly don't assume bad faith on my part. I've read all the material you've linked to. It's my choice which parts, if any, I choose to quote here. I've also requested below that you remove my name from your reply above. But you haven't responded. Martinevans123 (talk) 18:53, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
In a discussion related to the correction of factually inaccurate information and/or non-neutral tone contained within an encyclopedic article, it is completely inappropriate to leave out the context that directly contradicts the portion you've quoted. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 18:59, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
It doesn't contradict it, it qualifies it. Martinevans123 (talk) 19:01, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

When we're building a fact-based enccyclopedia, you can't just pick and choose which parts of a sentence you consider valid. See Lie#Lying by omission and Quote mining. --Ahecht (TALK
PAGE) 15:22, 20 February 2024 (UTC)
When did I propose to add this wording to the article? If you're having a discussion about a topic, in a fact-based encyclopaedia, you can use whichever parts of a sentence you consider provide the required emphasis. And kindly don't accuse other editors of "lying". Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 15:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

346 people dead is a fact, not just an emotion. Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:04, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

p.s. and please could you remove my first name from your reply? You have chosen to remain anonymous and don't even have a Wikipedia account with a name. So we're hardly on first name terms. Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:09, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Convenience break

Perhaps MCAS was not the sole MCAS was not the sole cause of the crashes, but it was certainly determined to be a major contributing factor. Aviation accidents rarely happen for a single cause. Many failures or errors align to create the conditions where the accident can happen. The so-called swiss cheese model. MCAS relying on a single AOA sensor was one hole, the design of MCAS was a hole (as evidenced by the fact that Boeing made it much less aggressive after the crashes), the lack of transparency about MCAS was a hole, the training of the pilots was a hole, and yes, the crew management of the pilots was a hole.

But I also want to point out that John Cox and Chesley Sullenberger, two of the most respected pilots in the U.S., both did flight simulator replications of the flights and commented on how difficult it would be to recover from the situation faced by the pilots of Flight 302. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 18:56, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Wholly agree that aviation accidents rarely happen for a single cause. MCAS was a very major contributor to both crashes, especially if the aircrew were not even aware if its existence? But we have rather traditional terms like "pilot error" still being employed. Martinevans123 (talk) 18:59, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Would you mind posting a source to information regarding their simulations of the accident flights? I can't seem to find anything about Sullenberger flying a simulation, just articles quoting a Facebook post he made in March 2019 after the Ethiopian crash. While he did criticize the MAX, he also commented on the experience level of the pilots, saying:

"A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice. In extreme emergencies, when there is not time for discussion or for the captain to direct every action of the first officer, pilots must be able to intuitively know what to do to work together. They must be able to collaborate wordlessly. Someone with only 200 hours would not know how to do that or even to do that. Someone with that low amount of time would have only flown in a closely supervised, sterile training environment, not the challenging and often ambiguous real world of operational flying, would likely never have experienced a serious aircraft malfunction, would have seen only one cycle of the seasons of the year as a pilot, one spring with gusty crosswinds, one summer of thunderstorms."

This NYT article [6]https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/business/boeing-simulation-error.html, also from March 2019, references comments made by John Cox, saying:

"John Cox, an aviation safety consultant and a former 737 pilot, said pilots are highly likely to use the thumb switch to extend the 40-second window to several minutes. But that may still not be enough time to diagnose and solve the problem, especially if the pilots, like the Lion Air crew, were not informed of the system.“There is a limited window to solve this problem, and this crew didn’t even know that this system existed,” he said."

But it also includes additional context:

"A Boeing spokesman said that existing procedures for flying the 737 Max include how to respond to similar conditions. The spokesman added that Boeing had reinforced those procedures in a bulletin to pilots after the Lion Air crash."

__________________________________________

I think it is important to note that more recent information, as detailed in some of the previously posted sources, indicates that pilots flying the MAX with and without MCAS had no issues whatsoever. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 19:30, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/business/boeing-737-max-hearing.html

In an interview before the hearing, Mr. Sullenberger said he had modeled the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights in the simulator and had been able to gain control both times. But at the hearing he expressed sympathy for the pilots of the two flights, noting that the Lion Air pilots did not even know that the anti-stall software existed.

“Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time and altitude before they could have solved the problems,” he said.

Much of the hearing focused on the issue of whether foreign pilots lack adequate training. Some pilots, and some members of Congress, have suggested that better-trained pilots would have been able to avoid accidents.

But Mr. Sullenberger said he did not believe that better pilot training alone would have prevented the crashes.

“We are all subject to hindsight bias,” he said. “I think it’s unlikely that other crews would have had very different experiences or performed very differently than these flights, certainly prior to the first flight.”

“We shouldn’t be blaming dead pilots,” Mr. Sullenberger added. “We shouldn’t expect pilots to compensate for flawed designs.”

-- RickyCourtney (talk) 19:46, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

That's very useful Those two last words are quite telling. Martinevans123 (talk) 19:59, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Thank you. With all due respect to Sullenberger, I think it is only fair to consider more than one expert opinion when compiling facts for an encyclopedia. To that point, I think it's important to add context to any implications that the "design was inherently flawed". Specifically, in the NTSB Docket [7]https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=11369094&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CERTIFICATION%20SPECIALIST%E2%80%99S%20REPORT-Rel.pdf there is extensive detail regarding the Fault Hazard Assessments conducted, which indicated fault probability percentages of 1E-3 and lower (Page 5, Page 6, Page 9, Page 22, Page 24).

I think it is a mistake to characterize this level of research and development as frivolous or misguided. It is certainly inappropriate to label it as intentionally bad design.

Also, to another one of your points above, is it indeed a fact that Boeing "made MCAS much less aggressive" if it was already not aggressive enough to be overridden by the pilots using elevator alone? (NTSB Docket, Page 8) 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 20:12, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Who has characterized this level of research and development as "frivolous or misguided"? Who has claimed it was "bad design"? Sullenberger suggested it was a flawed design. Are you suggesting it had no flaws? Martinevans123 (talk) 20:17, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Another thought that occurred to me is that this article is in some ways "built on" a number of other contributing articles, particularly: Lion Air Flight 610, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Boeing 737 MAX groundings. These all need to be consistent with this one. But perhaps our new anon editor has already checked those three and has decided that only this one needs attention? Martinevans123 (talk) 20:14, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I have indeed noticed the inconsistencies in the other articles, you bring up a good point. I thought that perhaps the most foundational misunderstandings come from incorrect reporting pertaining to the design of the 737 MAX, so starting here seems appropriate. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 20:21, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Wikipedia isn't supposed to report anything, of course, but merely summarise what other sources have reported. If you think any of the sources used in this article are misguided or incorrect, you need to flag them up. Martinevans123 (talk) 20:30, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I guess I’m getting hung up on this question… do you agree that MCAS was a major contributing factor in these crashes? RickyCourtney (talk) 20:42, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I think it's fair to characterize MCAS as a "major contributing factor" as long as pilot error and airline misconduct are also equally characterized as such. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 20:57, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I might struggle to establish the "equality" of those three factors, especially as we are dealing with two different accident scenarios. But happy to see the views of other editors. And the sizes of the holes in the Swiss Cheese don't have to be equal by any means, they just need to align. Martinevans123 (talk) 21:05, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

To contextualize the severity of the failures on behalf of the pilots and airlines, I think it's important to reference the accident reports from the Ethiopian, Indonesian and American transportation authorities.

For example, in the Final Aircraft Accident Investigation Report from the KNKT on page 179 [8]https://studylib.net/doc/26109698/2018---035---pk-lqp-final-report it is stated by Indonesia's own transportation authority that

"The pitch trim continued decreasing as the following activations of MCAS were not countered by the FO sufficiently trimming the aircraft nose up."

This case study, apparently by a pilot, dissects the Lion Air accident in great detail but I'm not sure if it would qualify as a reliable source here:

https://code7700.com/case_study_lion_air_610.htm 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 21:24, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

As I see it... the facts are as follows:

Boeing made promises to airlines that they would not need to give their pilots simulator training to transition from the NG to the MAX.

In 6/7/13 meeting notes Boeing's engineers knew they'd need MCAS to counteract the differences in flight characteristics at high speeds.

In 7/1/13 meeting notes Boeing's engineers said that they would externally refer to MCAS as a "change to speed trim."

However, once flight testing began, Boeing realized that MCAS would also need to work during low speeds. To enable this change, MCAS was made much more powerful (capable of making larger movements of the horizontal stabilizer).

At an unknown time, Boeing decided to use the input from just one AoA sensor.

None of the above changes were communicated to the FAA.

Internal Boeing documents stated:

"With pilot training to recognize the runaway and use of teamwork, the failure [of MCAS] was found Hazardous, which is the same as the item C finding. A typical reaction time was observed to be approximately 4 seconds. A slow reaction time scenario (> 10 seconds) found the failure to be catastrophic due to the inability to arrest the airplane overspeed.”

In other words, Boeing's engineers felt that pilots trained on the MCAS system should be able to react to a failure within 4 seconds. If they didn't react within 10 seconds, the failure would be catastrophic. The problem was pilots were never trained on MCAS.

In June 6, 2017, Lion Air asked Boeing for simulator training on the MAX. Boeing said there was "absolutely no reason to require simulator training. They then proceeded to mock Lion Air in internal communications.

After the Lion Air crash, the FAA did a TARAM that found that if no changes were made, they expected 15 additional fatal crashes of the MAX. Boeing essentially promised that they could fix the issues with a software fix. The FAA agreed to that. That fix was not made ahead of Ethiopian Air crash.

So to put EQUAL blame on the pilots seems like a mischaracterization. Yes, pilot error, pilot training, and aircraft maintenance were to blame. But Boeing made huge mistakes. Had they not made those mistakes, the pilots would have never been presented the situation to make the wrong decisions. RickyCourtney (talk) 21:37, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I wholly agree with your analysis and summary. Martinevans123 (talk) 21:47, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

"Boeing realized that MCAS would also need to work during low speeds"

What are "low speeds" and can you provide a source for this quote?

"MCAS was made much more powerful"

And according to the NTSB Docket, MCAS was still able to be overridden by elevator alone, correct?

"The problem was pilots were never trained on MCAS."

If the standard procedures were the same on previous 737s without MCAS, was training specifically about MCAS necessary?

"Boeing said there was "absolutely no reason to require simulator training."

If this is factually true, what is the issue?

Regarding the TARAM, the FAA clarified that:

"A TARAM is one of several safety tools regularly used by the FAA to analyze safety issues. The FAA’s Corrective Action Review Board relied on TARAM results — as well as information from the ongoing investigation into the accident of a Boeing 737 MAX in Indonesia — to validate the agency’s immediate decision to issue a Nov. 7, 2018, Emergency Airworthiness Directive. The directive reminded pilots of the important procedures to promptly correct runaway stabilizer trim. On March 12, the agency completed a subsequent TARAM that considered the most likely scenario for the 737 MAX accident in Ethiopia. The accident investigation team also worked overnight to collect and analyze satellite data that might corroborate the hypothesis while investigators provided additional information from the accident site. The FAA acted immediately to ground the aircraft on March 13 after verifying the satellite data, which was reinforced by evidence from the crash site." 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 21:53, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

There was a lot of effort to explain how the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 had happened, using the TARAM tool. Big whoopdee-do. It was a bit late by then? Martinevans123 (talk) 22:02, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

What are "low speeds" and can you provide a source for this quote?

Federal Prosecutors Investigating Whether Boeing Pilot Lied to F.A.A. - The New York Times

And according to the NTSB Docket, MCAS was still able to be overridden by elevator alone, correct?

A later FAA report seems to call that into question.

If the standard procedures were the same on previous 737s without MCAS, was training specifically about MCAS necessary?

Boeing wanted the procedures to be the same, but ultimately, they weren't. Pilots were trained on procedures before the MAX returned to the air.

If this is factually true, what is the issue?

It's not factually true. Boeing wanted it to be true. But ultimately pilots were required to have simulator training before the MAX returned to the air. That's an admission that it wasn't true.

The directive reminded pilots of the important procedures to promptly correct runaway stabilizer trim.

And there's every indication that in the Ethopian crash, the pilots did attempt to correct runaway stabilizer trim as soon as they identified the issue. Per Boeing's recommendations in the event of a stabiliser runaway, pilots activate the stabiliser trim cut-out. They did that. However, they spent the next three minutes fighting to turn the manual trim wheel, but being physically unable to do so, because they were also pulling back on their control columns to prevent the plane from going into a dive. MCAS had lowered the horizontal stabiliser so much that the pilots were physically incapable of returning it back. The leading theory is that the pilots, in a moment of desperation, turned the power trim back on so that they could use the electric motors to move the stabilisers. However, this action also allowed MCAS to order the horizontal stabilisers to go even further down. It was a mistake to switch the speed trim back on, but the pilots were put in a horrible position. RickyCourtney (talk) 22:28, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Yes, I think that's a fair summary of the sequence of events. Martinevans123 (talk) 22:31, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I cannot access the NYT article because I don't pay for their journalism, which is why I don't think it's a great source of information - although I understand the Wikipedia policy. Can you copy and paste anything from it that substantiates the "low speeds" quote?

Can you specifically point to a quote or at least page number in the FAA report that apparently calls the NTSB Docket findings into question?

"Boeing wanted the procedures to be the same, but ultimately, they weren't."

The standard procedures for a stabilizer trim runaway are identical in the 737 MAX and previous generations, as far as I am aware. Maybe you can point to documentation from Boeing stating otherwise?

"And there's every indication that in the Ethopian crash, the pilots did attempt to correct runaway stabilizer trim as soon as they identified the issue."

Please refer to my previous source, [9]https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/Response%20to%20EAIB%20final%20report.pdf, which indicates that the Ethiopian pilots did not, in fact, follow the procedure correctly.

I also think it would be helpful to reference the flight recorder data that shows the manual trim and throttle settings, as well as the aircraft altitude and speed throughout the flight

[10]https://avherald.com/img/ethiopian_b38m_et-avj_190310_7.jpg 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 22:41, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Flight recorder data that shows the manual trim and throttle settings, as well as the aircraft altitude and speed throughout the flight, might be very useful at Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. I'm not sure it belongs here. Not a very long flight, was it. Martinevans123 (talk) 22:45, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

That's fair. I only mention the Ethiopian flight recorder data here to reinforce a factual rejection of the claim that "the Ethiopian pilots followed procedure", because the data very clearly shows that they did not manually reduce thrust or properly apply manual electric trim - findings also substantiated in the NTSB comments on the Ethiopian investigation. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 22:48, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I can't help feeling that this whole, very lengthy, discussion is one we don't need to have at all. It looks to me like an attempt at WP:OR, which is something we don't do. Privately, it may be fascinating to do the research and come to our own conclusions, but WP's job is to summarise the work of others published in reputable articles. Right now, I just don't see those reputable articles appearing that might suggest a change of course for this article. Until that happens, if it ever happens, best to just chill and put our energies into editing something else that has good sources. Wiki principles are good principles; leave the OR to journalists. Ex nihil ^(talk) 22:04, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Publicly available, official accident investigation results from national transportation authorities are not deemed "reputable articles"? 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 22:08, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I think Ex nihil specifically means that they are not WP:Secondary sources. - ZLEA _T\^C 22:11, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

So where does that leave the factual integrity of the Wikipedia article if many of the secondary sources currently cited are out-of-date and inaccurate now that up-to-date primary sources exist, but may not have been reported on by reputable secondary sources? 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 22:21, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

It leaves it waiting for secondary sources. Can you list here all the sources that are now inaccurate? Or maybe just show us one? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 22:29, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

How about this...

Please identify which sentences you would like to see changed.
Propose the changes you would like to see.
Provide reliable secondary sources that support that change.
Other editors will consider your request.

RickyCourtney (talk) 22:34, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

As per the policy stated at Wikipedia:No original research, it seems to me that the sources I've provided are appropriate references even if they are technically primary sources. Especially since the policy specifically refers to common sense being used when issues are discussed on the talk page.

I would hope that we can all agree that assertions from articles written while investigations were still ongoing are unreliable sources now that the investigations have concluded. Is it not our duty to ensure that the Wikipedia article relies on the most accurate information possible, even if a primary source is currently the only option? 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117 (talk) 22:54, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

As I read the policy, I would argue that an official accident investigation reports from national transportation authorities are a reliable, secondary source. They are one step removed from an event and contain analysis, evaluation, interpretation, or synthesis of the facts and evidence taken from primary sources.

However, I would caution that we should still not analyze, evaluate, interpret, or synthesize the material. If interpretation of the reports are required, we would need another reliable, secondary source that offers that information. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:27, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

However, that does not absolve you from the process I suggested above. If you have issues with the article, the onus is on you to identify the sentences you would like to see changed, propose the changes you would like to see, and provide reliable secondary sources that support that change. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:28, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

I also wonder (WP:AGF notwithstanding), given that the IP editor is (a) clearly very familiar with the topic, (b) seeking to paint Boeing and the MAX in a less negative light and (c) posting anonymously, whether they have a WP:COI that ought to be disclosed. Rosbif73 (talk) 16:10, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

It would certainly be helpful if they committed to an account name, although they seem to be here only as a WP:SPA to correct perceived "errors" in the content of this (and other MCAS-related) articles. Some kind of disclosure or explanation of intent would certainly be very welcomed. Just for the record, I can state that I not work for Airbus and have no personal or professional reasons for wanting to paint Boeing or MCAS in a negative way. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:24, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I have absolutely zero relationship with Boeing, the US Government or any regulatory body involved with the 737. None, zilch. I simply choose to remain anonymous.

My intention is not to "paint Boeing and the MAX in a less negative light". I simply have noticed continuous, grossly inaccurate and sensationalized reporting on the 737 MAX saga that involves a revolving door of editorialized articles being used as sources. Just reading through comment sections reveals that the general public is incredibly misinformed, to a degree that affects their desire to travel by air. I think that's sad.

If the information I'm sharing "paints Boeing and the MAX in a less negative light" that should be because the information is accurate and up-to-date, and contradicts inaccurate reporting that was published before any investigations were concluded. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:27, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for making that clear. For the record, I have zero connection to any aviation companies or bodies. Seems like we're all here to improve the encyclopedia, so we ought to be able to work something out. Rosbif73 (talk) 16:41, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

When you say "revolving door of editorialized articles" are you saying that we can't use any editorial opinion from WP:RS sources but only bare "facts" as presented in official reports (whether or not those are considered to be WP:PRIMARY)? Martinevans123 (talk) 16:58, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Being familiar with a topic is not grounds for considering a Wikipedia:COI. I've avoided most of this discussion because there's a clear disconnect between people who are aware of the relevant aircraft systems and their technicalities, and the sources that misrepresent them. I tend to agree with the anon OP that the article should clearly state pilot error was a major contributing factor to the crashes, but the lack of non-OR sources makes it unlikely.

StalkerFishy (talk) 16:46, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I thought we determined above that official accident investigations qualify as reputable secondary sources? 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:48, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

So you don't think that the term "pilot error" is an outdated and clumsy descriptor that fails to differentiate adequately between the multiple causes of most aviation accidents and often seeks to attach blame in a premature and simplistic manner? Martinevans123 (talk) 16:51, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Pilot error is absolutely not "an outdated and clumsy" term. It is commonplace in aviation investigations. I'm not sure why you think otherwise. Just to lay out my thoughts here, both of these things are true.

Malfunction of the MCAS was a major contributing factor to the 737 MAX crashes.
The immediate action items for the malfunction remained the same regardless of if it was caused by the MCAS or some other system. Had the pilots followed these items, the malfunction would have been inconsequential.

StalkerFishy (talk) 17:01, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

In fairness, did MCAS technically "malfunction" or was the actual malfunction contained within the AOA sensors? Maybe this is getting into the weeds but as far as I understand, MCAS did exactly what it was designed to do, it was just receiving erroneous data from miscalibrated/broken sensors. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 17:07, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I would still classify that as a malfunction, but this specific debate is a bit pedantic for me.

StalkerFishy (talk) 17:19, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Would you agree the aircrew may have found it difficult or impossible to understand why the aircraft were behaving in the way they did, because they had never trained for these particular circumstances or were even unware of how the flying characteristics might have been changed by how MCAS would interact with coincidental equipment failures? Martinevans123 (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

All 737 pilots should be aware of the standard procedures to mitigate a stabilizer trim runaway, which are identical regardless of the existence of MCAS. Their hiring airlines are responsible for this standard training. They quite literally did not need to know about MCAS in order to properly follow these procedures - and the Ethiopian crew was even reminded of these procedures and specifically informed of MCAS at least 4 months prior to the crash (or they should have been - the NTSB highlights that Ethiopian Airline officials misrepresented their distribution of Boeing's bulletins after Lion Air 610). 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 17:15, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

The directive reminded them about training they never had or about a system they didn't even need to know about? Or perhaps both? Martinevans123 (talk) 17:18, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

They did receive training on how to mitigate a stabilizer trim runaway. (Or, again, they should have.) Whether the airlines trained them properly, or whether they implemented the training effectively, is an entirely separate issue. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 17:23, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I'm not sure it was "entirely separate issue" as far as aircrew perceptions were concerned in the few minutes of these two fatal flights. Martinevans123 (talk) 17:26, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Unequivocally, no. The immediate action items remained the same. It does not matter what the cause is—whether it be a loose screw, MCAS malfunction, or an act of god. StalkerFishy (talk) 17:17, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I'd tend to disagree, insofar as aircrew tend to create mental models to explain cases of unexpected aircraft behaviour, and even go further, seeking confirmatory evidence for such models. Martinevans123 (talk) 17:21, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

You are promoting a dangerous method for pilots & aircraft control. It is not up to the pilots to investigate and "seek confirmatory evidence" when there is a published immediate action item. These checklist actions are to be completed, as the name suggests, immediately.

StalkerFishy (talk) 17:27, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I'm "promoting" nothing. I'm simply offering my opinion on what aircrew tend to do when faced with unexpected events. Martinevans123 (talk) 22:29, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

What a pilot should do is, unfortunately, not always what they actually do. This is one of, if not the leading cause of pilot error. - ZLEA _T\^C 22:44, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Here is a good source for updated info and analysis:

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/final-report-on-boeing-737-max-crash-disputed-agencies-note-pilot-error-as-a-factor/

From the 5th paragraph: "Both the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and the equivalent French agency identified pilot error as a critical contributing factor."

I recommend the sentence about MCAS as the cause should be modified so it does not imply, without qualification, that all experts say it was the sole cause of both accidents. DonFB (talk) 00:50, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Potential Edits

IP 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:2826:EC6A:8140:2117, could you possibly sign your contribution below, to facilitate replies, and could you possibly also number each proposal (or even put them in a separate subsections) to enable easier responding? Each of these might require a certain amount of discussion not just a simple "agree/disagree"? Many thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:10, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Yes, apologies. I just noticed that it doesn't have my signature. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:29, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Many thanks for your prompt attention. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:36, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Introduction Section

- "The 737 MAX suffered recurring problems with its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), causing two fatal crashes, Lion Air Flight 610 in late 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in early 2019, in which a total of 346 people died."

I suggest that this sentence is modified to reflect that there was not, in fact, a "recurring problem" with MCAS since MCAS technically acted as designed. MCAS would not have activated as it did during the Lion Air flight if the AOA sensor had not been calibrated incorrectly by Xtra Aerospace, and during the Ethiopian flight the AOA sensor was most likely struck by a bird. After the pilots received notifications related to the AOA sensor failures, they verifiably did not follow the appropriate standard procedures to safely fly the planes.

Perhaps the sentence can read: The 737 MAX suffered two fatal crashes, Lion Air Flight 610 in late 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in early 2019, in which a total of 346 people died, after erroneous angle of attack data caused the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) to activate unexpectedly. The accident investigations revealed that the pilots failed to follow standard procedures after the activation of MCAS which would have allowed them to safely fly the planes.

- "The aircraft was subsequently grounded worldwide from March 2019 to November 2020, with the FAA garnering criticism for being the last major authority to ground it."

Is the part about "the FAA garnering criticism" necessary? Criticism from who? Journalists? The Chinese government? This feels like it's edging over the line of being neutral.

- "Investigations found Boeing covered-up known issues with the aircraft and lapses in the FAA's certification of the aircraft for flight."

- "Further investigations also revealed that the FAA and Boeing had colluded on recertification test flights, attempted to cover up important information and that the FAA had retaliated against whistleblowers"

The source referenced for this is a Verge article from December 2020 which even specifically refers to the claims as "accusations". From my understanding, the results of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement in USA v. The Boeing Company note that Boeing, as a whole, did not "cover up known issues" and did in fact disclose MCAS to the FAA throughout development.

2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:30, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Done -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:05, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Flight Testing and Certification Section

- "During the certification process, the FAA delegated many evaluations to Boeing, allowing the manufacturer to review their own product."

This language is misleading as it implies the FAA had minimal involvement in certifying the aircraft, which is factually inaccurate. The primary source for this narrative is the Final Committee Report from the US Senate, published in September 2020, which contains inaccurate evaluations of the accidents, rather sensational language and misleading interpretations of Boeing's Fault Hazard Assessments.

https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf

I suggest removing references to Boeing, as a company, actively deceiving regulators unless we can find some sort of definitive, up-to-date information proving that. If these accusations stem from the narrative that "Boeing concealed MCAS", they are inaccurate since MCAS was not, in fact, concealed from regulators and the decision to not directly inform operators of the specific acronym relates to the fact that all standard procedures to correct an MCAS malfunction are identical to previously published stab trim runaway procedures.

- "It was widely reported that Boeing pushed to expedite approval of the 737 MAX to compete with the Airbus A320neo, which hit the market nine months ahead of Boeing's model."

This is pure speculation, I don't see how this is appropriate for an encyclopedia.

2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:30, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Did you see this article? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 16:45, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

In my view, the entire lead of that article renders it too biased to use as a source. The implication that the clearance was "rushed" is pure speculation and honestly I'm surprised the article isn't designated as an opinion piece. Rep. Peter DeFazio has repeatedly demonstrated a propensity to use sensational language when referring to the 737 MAX accidents, and the report from the senate committee he chaired contains glaring factual inaccuracies. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

But Forbes is considered a WP:RS? You would not allow this as source even if the comment was in quotes and attributed to that author? Martinevans123 (talk) 17:00, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Forbes being WP:RS is fine. It's that particular article I object to, since the language contains overt speculation and continues the inappropriate, misleading narratives we've discussed here in detail. I'm genuinely shocked that Forbes allowed that author to publish those things in their name in 2023. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 17:04, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

@Martinevans123 That article is from a Forbes contributor. Those are absolutely not reliable sources. See WP:FORBESCON. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for clarifying. But vetting authors based on their contributions to Senate committees sounds a bit like WP:OR? Martinevans123 (talk) 17:11, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

If the language contained in the Senate committee report is found to be factually inaccurate when compared to the official accident investigations, it is not reliable. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 17:19, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Does the Senate committee determine what was "factually inaccurate", or is that something that should be taken from WP:RS sources, or is that a judgement for individual Wikipedia editors here? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 13:39, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

All I mean to say is that I think we should be very careful about referencing sources that were published before the conclusion of the actual accident investigations, especially if information in those sources is directly contradicted by the results of the investigations. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:698A:E3:C11E:2138 (talk) 14:28, 22 February 2024 (UTC)

Oh, I see. That seems perfectly fair and I agree. Martinevans123 (talk) 14:39, 22 February 2024 (UTC)

Grounding and Recertification Section

- "In 2019, the Boeing 737 MAX was grounded worldwide after a flight control system caused two new aircraft to crash in Indonesia (Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018) and Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019), killing all 346 people on board both flights."

I suggest this sentence is modified to remove the implication that MCAS was the sole reason for the crashes.

Perhaps it can read: "In 2019, the Boeing 737 MAX was grounded worldwide after crashes in Indonesia (Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018) and Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019), killing all 346 people on board both flights."

Done -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:05, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

- "China became the first air authority to ground the aircraft on March 11, 2019, setting a worldwide precedent as Singapore, India, Turkey, South Korea, the European Union, Australia and Malaysia followed the next day."

If this is mentioned, I think it's only fair to add context pointing out that China has a state aircraft manufacturer that directly competes with Boeing in African and Asian markets.

Not done The European Union also has an aircraft manufacturer with deep ties. I don't think they grounded for any reasons other than legitimate safety terms. The fact is, China was the first to ground the aircraft, and it was followed by the other regulators. I think the part about it setting a worldwide precedent is hyperbolic. I'm going to take that out. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:05, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

- "Investigations faulted a Boeing cover-up of a defect and lapses in the FAA's certification of the aircraft for flight. After being charged with fraud, Boeing settled to pay over US$2.5 billion in penalties and compensation. Further investigations also revealed that the United States Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing had colluded on recertification test flights, attempted to cover up important information and that the FAA had retaliated against whistleblowers."

This is very similar to the text in the Flight Testing and Certification section and therefore also potentially misleading.

Done -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:05, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

- "As Boeing faced layoffs and pressures for cost-cutting, the Boeing's 737 MAX software was reportedly outsourced to temporary workers and subcontractors, often utilizing recent college graduates from countries like India."

This feels like it steps over the line of neutrality by implying that foreign engineers were the reason for software errors - which further implies that MCAS was a software error, which is incorrect. Is this even true? How many engineers were outsourced?

Done Agreed. This was likely added at the moment that the news story came out. It's at least partially factual, but in retrospect, it seems like much ado about nothing. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:05, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

- "In the twenty months during the grounding, Boeing redesigned the computer architecture that supported the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) while investigations faulted aircraft design and certification lapses."

I suggest that this is modified to read: "In the twenty months during the grounding, Boeing redesigned the computer architecture that supported the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) while investigations faulted aircraft design, pilot error and airline misconduct."

Not done However, the part about "while investigations faulted aircraft design and certification lapses" should come out. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:05, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

- "Flawed information from a single external sensor fed into the system caused it to repeatedly push the planes' noses down as pilots struggled to keep them in the air before both crashes."

It is very important to correct this. It is critical to mention that the "flawed information" was due to 1) an improperly calibrated AOA sensor repaired by Xtra Aerospace and 2) a bird strike. It is also critical to modify the language about MCAS "repeatedly pushing the nose down" to ensure that readers understand that the planes did not, in fact, nose dive because of MCAS, and instead this was "nose down trim" which is much more slight. The flight recorder data very clearly shows that the planes did not "dive" until the final seconds, and in fact they maintained altitude most of the flight. It is also critical to mention that the pilots did not follow the appropriate standard procedures to safely fly the planes after uncommanded MCAS activation.

Perhaps it can read "Erroneous data from an angle-of-attack sensor (miscalibrated by Xtra Aerospace in the instance of Lion Air and damaged by a bird strike in the instance of Ethiopian Airlines) fed into flight computers caused repeated uncommanded activation of MCAS, which applied nose down trim to the horizontal stabilizer. Per Boeing's long-standing standard procedure for a stabilizer trim runaway in the 737, the pilots were expected to manually reduce thrust and apply appropriate manual electric trim to safely fly the planes, which investigations determined they did not do properly."

2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:31, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

See below for further discussion about this suggestion. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:17, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Recertification and Return to Service Section

I think it is important to note in this section that during recertification test flight, EASA test pilots commented that they had no issues whatsoever with the MAX, with or without MCAS running.

2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:31, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Aerodynamic Changes Section

- "As a result, the engines were mounted higher on the wings and further forward, changing the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft compared to the 737NG"

I think this should be modified to read "As a result, the engines were mounted higher on the wings and further forward, slightly changing the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft compared to the 737NG" to reflect that the changes in aerodynamics were so insignificant that even test pilots had to be told what to look for.

- "The MCAS software-based flight control law was implemented to account for the undesirable aerodynamic changes."

I think this should be modified to read "The MCAS software-based flight control law was implemented to account for the undesirable aerodynamic changes, which occurred in an exceptionally rare portion of the flight envelope." although this may need additional sources for support

2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:31, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Disagree with both of these. The insignificance and exceptionally rare portion of the flight envelope is debatable. Clearly it was enough that Boeing's test pilots thought it necessary to correct. From the New York Times: "Mr. Wilson (Boeing's Chief Test Pilot) and his co-pilot began noticing that something was off, according to a person with direct knowledge of the flights. The Max wasn’t handling well when nearing stalls at low speeds. In a meeting at Boeing Field in Seattle, Mr. Wilson told engineers that the issue would need to be fixed. He and his co-pilot proposed MCAS." -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:30, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I can't read NYT articles behind a paywall, but I tend to avoid articles that reference vague sources like "according to a person with direct knowledge of the flights". Who? What direct knowledge? Were they in the cockpit or did they just hear secondary details after the fact, and out of context? I think it would be different if it was a direct quote from Boeing's chief test pilot. Also is it true that the origin of MCAS is a proposal from Mr. Wilson and his co-pilot? That doesn't seem accurate to me, as far as I understand MCAS was implemented into the design before actual test flights took place. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 00:50, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

The editorial standards of the New York Times are well known. They have a rigorous and posted policy about using unnamed sources. That's part of what went into declaring them a reliable source for Wikipedia. In the context of the rest of the article, their proposal was to expand the use MCAS to lower-speed flight in addition to the high-speed use they already implemented. Here's a non-paywalled link. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 01:21, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for the non-paywalled link. I notice that the article is from June 1st, 2019 which is before the release of the NTSB docket on Lion Air 610, the official final accident report on Lion Air 610 from the KNKT, and the NTSB's comments on the Ethiopian Airlines 302 accident report. Several of the more critical comments regarding the design and implementation of MCAS are disproven by those sources, particularly the NTSB docket.

Concerning the control regime of MCAS, Boeing's website states: [11]https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-update/737-max-software-updates#overview

"The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was designed and certified for the 737 MAX to enhance the pitch stability of the airplane in a very specific set of unusual flight conditions – so that it feels and flies like other 737s.

MCAS was designed to activate in manual flight, with the airplane's flaps up, at an elevated Angle of Attack (AOA)." 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 02:12, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

Structural and Other Changes Section

- "Compared to STS, MCAS has greater authority and cannot be disengaged with the aft and forward column cutout switches."

This is not true - only the First Officer control column aft cutout switch cannot override MCAS inputs. The Captain's column still retains that authority, as in previous designs.

- "Unlike previous versions of the 737, the automatic stabilizer trim control functions cannot be turned off while retaining electric trim switches functionality."

This is misleading because it does not clarify that this is only true in a certain configuration of the plane (flaps up, high angle of attack, manual control) and that the electronic trim switches override MCAS inputs by design.

- "MCAS was to automatically mitigate the pitch-up tendency of the new flight geometry due to the engines being located farther forward and higher than on previous 737 models."

I think this should be modified to read "MCAS was implemented to automatically modify the feel of the controls when approaching or recovering from a stall, which pilots referred to as "softer" in the MAX compared to previous 737 models."

2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 16:31, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Again, please provide citations for your proposed changes including links to those references, page numbers in the references and the applicable quotations from those references. RickyCourtney (talk) 17:06, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Flying Coffin?

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

I propose adding a nickname section that would include the most common nicknames of the 737 MAX series like : " The Flying Coffin", "Widowmaker" and "The Plane with the Open Doors". 203.181.48.208 (talk) 05:29, 9 January 2024 (UTC)

No. This violates multiple items on WP:NOT, including WP:FORUM. -Fnlayson (talk) 06:06, 9 January 2024 (UTC)

Plenty of other planes have their nicknames on their articles - e.g. the B-52 - why should the 737 MAX be granted an exception? It's a fairly common nickname for the plane - https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-50225025 82.5.152.4 (talk) 09:33, 2 February 2024 (UTC)

That's a nice headline-grabber, used once by Senator Richard Blumenthal? Not sure that qualifies it as "a fairly common nickname." Martinevans123 (talk) 10:43, 2 February 2024 (UTC)

The source you provided is using the term "flying coffin" to describe the aircraft, not as a nickname. Only time will tell whether the 737 MAX goes down in the history books as a "Flying Coffin", but right now, its use in news headlines is not a reliable indicator that the term is or will be a lasting nickname for the type. - ZLEA _T\^C 21:15, 2 February 2024 (UTC)

It is already one of the most cursed airplanes in modern times. I think we can start calling it the Boeing 737 MAX Flying Coffin. It only makes sense, might even save lifes. 203.181.48.208 (talk) 02:16, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

No. Just, no. - ZLEA _T\^C 04:31, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

You sure? 203.181.48.208 (talk) 05:43, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

This attitude is exactly why I'm trying to encourage major updates to this article. The public is grossly misinformed about the 737 MAX. 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 13:22, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

I know. Millions are exposed each day to the dangers of the 737 MAX and decent people voicing their honest concerns are being silenced by obvious Boeing operatives covering up things here! Giovanni893 (talk) 01:38, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

Sure, we're all secret Boeing operatives.^[sarcasm] It is not Wikipedia's place to make up nicknames for aircraft. Since this discussion is going nowhere constructive, I'm going to close it. - ZLEA _T\^C 15:28, 23 February 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Revision to "Grounding and recertification" section

Consensus below is in favor of this proposal. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 20:12, 23 February 2024 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Here's my proposed revision:

In the twenty months the aircraft was grounded, Boeing redesigned the computer architecture that supported the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). As initially designed, data from just one of the aircraft's two angle-of-attack (AoA) sensors was fed into MCAS. When erroneous data from that sensor was fed into flight computers, it caused repeated uncommanded activation of MCAS, which applied nose-down trim to the horizontal stabilizer. The accident investigations revealed that the AoA sensor on Lion Air Flight 610 was miscalibrated, and the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 sensor was likely damaged by a bird strike during takeoff.^[1] Boeing was criticized for using data from just one of the two sensors, representing a single point of failure on a critical flight control system.^[2]

Before the crash of Lion Air Flight 610, pilots were not informed by Boeing of the existence of MCAS and were not required to undergo simulator training on the difference between the 737 MAX.^[1] The FAA would later require simulator training to demonstrate an MCAS activation to pilots.

In the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and France’s Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety identified pilot error and inadequate training by Ethiopian Airlines as critical contributing factors to the crashes.^[1]

References

^ ^a ^b ^c Gates, Dominic (January 6, 2023). "Final report on Boeing 737 MAX crash sparks dispute over pilot error". The Seattle Times. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
^ Nicas, Jack; Kitroeff, Natalie; Gelles, David; Glanz, James (June 1, 2019). "Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change". The New York Times.

Some thoughts...

We need a reference for the miscalibrated AoA sensor on JT610
I think we need to mention that the single AoA sensor represented a single point of failure on a critical flight control system. Boeing later made a change to rely on both, which is a tacit acknowledgement that it should have been included from the start.
Pilots were not informed by Boeing of the existence of MCAS. That's a fact that needs to be included.
Pilots were later required to have sim training on an MCAS activation, which is a tacit acknowledgement that it should have been included from the start.
In addition to calling out pilot error, we need to point out and inadequate training by Ethiopian Airlines.

Open to any suggested revisions on my revision before I publish the changes. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:14, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Reference for the miscalibrated AoA sensor on JT610: [12]https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-shuts-down-revokes-certificate-of-florida-repair-firm-that-supplied-faulty-lion-air-sensor/

I think this is also a good improvement. One thing I might change is the characterization of MCAS as a "critical flight control system". With or without MCAS, the 737 MAX is apparently stable and predictable enough that test pilots have a hard time telling any difference, which is backed up by the comments from the EASA pilots during recertification testing.

Perhaps it can read something like "Boeing was criticized for using data from just one of the two sensors, representing a single point of failure on a flight control system that has the ability to change the configuration of the aircraft without pilot input." 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 23:40, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

How about we just make it simply: "Boeing was criticized for using data from just one of the two sensors, representing a single point of failure on a flight control system." RickyCourtney (talk) 00:00, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

That sounds good to me 2603:6080:5A07:C24C:9D42:2980:6C55:A834 (talk) 00:51, 21 February 2024 (UTC)

I would disagree with 2 and 4 that changes made were a "tactic acknowledgement". It's not our job as editors to hypothesize the underlying motives. However, I don't think it's an issue as you have it articulated well in your revision.

I'll probably get pushback for this since there's no good WP:RS that goes into this much detail, but if we're going to include 3, it should be noted that the existence of MCAS does not affect the existing recovery procedures for runaway stab.

StalkerFishy (talk) 23:51, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

Fair points on 2 and 4, I'm trying to be neutral in my writing in the article and transparent in my thinking on the talk page notes. -- RickyCourtney (talk) 23:59, 20 February 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

[Gates_2023-1] Gates, Dominic (January 6, 2023). "Final report on Boeing 737 MAX crash sparks dispute over pilot error". The Seattle Times. Retrieved February 20, 2024.

[2] Nicas, Jack; Kitroeff, Natalie; Gelles, David; Glanz, James (June 1, 2019). "Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change". The New York Times.

[1]

[2]