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Archive 1Archive 2Archive 3Archive 4

Public domain photos - US Navy?

I don't wish to challenge the public domain status of certain photos, but I would like something clarified. My concern is with photos taken by Japanese photographers in the course of their duties with the Imperial Japanese Navy during hostilities with the US. For example, the copyright/public domain statement for the photo used in this article of the Hiryu just before sinking says, "This file is a work of a sailor or employee of the U.S. Navy, taken or made during the course of the person's official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image is in the public domain."

Clearly this photo was taken by a Japanese naval photographer, not a sailor or employee of the US Navy. It says so in the photo's description. As this photo is a work of a Japanese naval photographer, how can we claim that it is a work of a sailor or employee of the US Navy? Maybe because the US won the war by unconditional surrender the copyright became property of the US, but if that's the case, and if that's the reason for it being in the public domain, shouldn't that be said on the photo description page's copyright/public domain statement? I wish I knew more about copyright law, but intuitively this seems wrong - crediting the US Navy for a photo taken by the (then enemy) Imperial Japanese Navy. Does that need to be changed, and if not, can someone offer an explanation? Thanks all. Dcs002 (talk) 23:51, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

Which images specifically are you referring to? NW (Talk) 21:42, 8 December 2011 (UTC)
The Author credit reads:

U.S. Navy (Donation of Kazutoshi Hando, 1970)" so this photo falls under U.S copyright, even though it was taken by a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which no longer exists: this same photo is shown in Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword (p. 356.) and is credited to the U.S Naval Historical Center. ◆Min✪rhist✪rian◆MTalk 21:21, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

Henderson Squadron : SBDs or SB2Us ?

The article says that Henderson's squadron was flying a SB2U, but [1] reports SBD... can anyone confirm which plane it was ? Rob1bureau (talk) 12:57, 30 December 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for pointing that out, should read SBD...◆Min✪rhist✪rian◆MTalk 19:34, 30 December 2011 (UTC)

June 5th Time Skip

The section "American counterattack" describes the goings on during the night of June 4/5 and then suddenly says "the night of June 5/6". Were the Japanese still retreating all day during the 5th? Apparently not, since at the last their 4 cruisers were still hanging around on 6th, but all this is just implied. Statalyzer (talk) 18:54, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

Incompr.

This does not make sense:

... 18 Aichi D3A2 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.

--Mortense (talk) 21:27, 26 February 2012 (UTC)

Read the whole sentence: "the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A2 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft". Which is to say, the 36 D3As & assorted A6Ms at ready (not yet launched for CAP) were all Nagumo had immediately ready to launch. Perfectly clear. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:41, 27 February 2012 (UTC)

US casualty contradiction

I removed a new paragraph about US casualties so that we can discuss it:

At the conclusion of the battle, a total of 383 US servicemen had died between June 4-7. Broken down into the three services which took part in the battle, they were US Navy-310, US Marine Corps-40 and US Army Air-Force-33. (http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq11-1.htm) These included 65 members of the crew of the US carrier USS Yorktown, 81 crew of the destroyer USS Hammann, five crew who were killed in a landing mishap on the carrier USS Hornet (Lundstrom, John D. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Naval Institute Press, 2005. p 387-388.) and ten men killed on the ground during the June 4 morning air attack on Midway island. (Bicheno, Hugh. Midway. Cassell, Great Britain 2001. p214-215.) Aircraft losses totalled 150, including 109 lost on the US carriers of Task Forces 16/17 and another 41 aircraft serving with land-based units on Midway atoll. (This includes 2 PBYs, 2 B-17s and 1 B-24 lost due to fuel starvation during June 4-7)(http://www.immf-midway.com/midwaylosses.html)

I replaced the ref tags with parentheses so you can see the sources without a reflist.

First, this paragraph contradicts the casualty totals listed in the infobox. We must apply casualty figures coherently across the article! Second, the paragraph was written in telegraphic form, but this is a Featured Article and should have fine prose. Finally, we should compare these sources with the sources used previously to come up with a casualty range if the sources don't agree. Binksternet (talk) 18:41, 10 May 2012 (UTC)

Hi! The causalities of USS Hornet were: 45 from VT-8 (including 16 death from TBF detachment operating from Midway - http://www.rockymountainwingcaf.org/tbm_midway.asp?menuID=16~16~17~17~19~19), VF-8: ENS Stephen W. Groves (F-17, BuNo 5089 or 5118) schoot down over Yorktown and 2 more (Hill & Kelly) from 1st attack wave eskort. 5 man killed on board of Hornet by Sheedy's Wildcat. On June 5: 2 men from VB-8 (ENS Donald T. Griswold and his radioman). --Sceadugenga (talk) 20:18, 10 May 2012 (UTC)

G'Day! I wrote the original paragraph but I realise now that I should have phrased it more clearly. The 'traditional' casualty totals I have read in older books on Midway usually give the figure on US losses as 307 men killed. However more recent sources quote a total that is marginally higher. The figures for lives lost on three US vessels that I quoted refer to non-aviator members of the ship's crews. Those figures don't include air-crew losses on the Hornet and Yorktown. Sorry, I should have made that clearer. The five men who were lost on the USS Hornet that I mentioned were sailors killed in a friendly-fire accident on June 4th when an F4F piloted by ensign Daniel Sheedy of the Yorktown's Fighting-3 was forced to make an emergency landing on the Hornet. Sheedy, who had been one of the detachment of six F-3 pilots sent to escort the torpedo & dive-bombing squadrons of the Yorktown in their attack on Nagumo's carriers, was wounded in both legs and his instrument panel and electrics of his aircraft damaged. The safety circuits failed to work and he made a deck-landing with live weaponry, the heavy impact causing the wing guns to spontaneously fire, killing five men on the flightdeck and wounding another 20. The sources I studied gave the overall US total of lives lost as 310 men of the US Navy and 40 of the Marine Corps but did not give a figure for the US Army air-force. Regarding the latter, I gave the figure for Army losses as 33 men killed. Namely, the crews of the two B-26s that were shot down (12), members of the crews of the two B-17s that were lost due to flak damage/fuel starvation on 5th June following the attack on the Japanese destroyer Tanikaze (11), and a B-24 that failed to return from an abortive attack on Wake Island on June 7th (10). (12+11+10= 33). Hill9868 (talk) 02:34, 18 May 2012 (UTC) G'day again. Regarding the figures for US aircraft losses, the figures from the sources I have read can be arranged as thus:-

US Task Forces 16 & 17:-

  • Lost between May 29th & June 3rd (non-combat causes)- 1 TBD, 1 SBD, 2 F4Fs
  • Lost in morning strike on enemy fleet June 4th- 38 TBDs, 23 SBDs, 13 F4Fs- These figures include 19 SBDs, 3 TBDs and 10 F4Fs that were forced to ditch due to fuel starvation and/or battle damage, two damaged SBDs that landed on the USS Yorktown and were lost with the ship and 2 F4Fs and 1 TBD that returned to their carriers but were damaged beyond repair.
  • Lost on CAP defending USS Yorktown June 4th- 6 F4Fs- This figure includes two F4Fs that was most likely destroyed by friendly AA fire and one that was lost to fuel starvation.
  • Lost in afternoon strike on enemy fleet June 4th- 6 SBDs- This includes 3 SBDs that successfully returned to their carrier but were jettisoned overboard due to being damaged beyond repair.
  • Lost on board USS Yorktown- 3 TBDs, 3 SBDs, 9 F4Fs- These figures include 3 TBDs of Torpedo-3 that were non-operational. Most or all of these aircraft were jettisoned overboard during salvage operations on June 6th
  • Lost on bombing attack on IJN destroyer Tanikaze June 5th- 2 SBDs- Includes 1 aircraft lost to fuel starvation
  • Lost on bombing attack on IJN cruiser force June 6th- 2 SBDs
  • Total- 109 aircraft.

Midway Island:-

  • Lost on CAP against enemy air attack on Midway June 4th- 14 F2As, 2 F4Fs
  • Lost on morning air-attacks against enemy fleet June 4th- 5 TBFs, 2 B-26s, 6 SBDs, 4 SB2s
  • Lost on abortive attack on IJN carrier Hiryu evening of June 4th- 1 SB2
  • Lost on attack on IJN cruiser force June 5th- 1 SB2
  • Lost on attack on IJN destroyer Tanikaze June 5th- 2 B-17s
  • Lost on abortive attack on Wake Island June 7th- 1 B-24
  • Lost on reconaissance duties 3rd-7th June- 3 PBYs
  • Total- 41 aircraft.
 Hill9868 (talk) 03:37, 18 May 2012 (UTC)

Midway = turning point

Good wiki entry, but I have to take issue with one major conclusion:

"The battle has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific".[124] However, the Japanese continued to try to advance in the South Pacific, and it was many more months before the U.S. moved from a state of naval parity to one of increasingly clear supremacy.[125] Thus, although Midway was the Allies' first major victory against the Japanese, it did not change the course of the war in the same sense as Salamis; instead, it was the cumulative attrition of Midway, combined with that of the inconclusive Coral Sea battle, which reduced Japan's ability to undertake major offensives"

In my view, if there WAS a turning point in the war on Japan, Midway has to be it. While the Japanese had been stopped at Coral Sea, they still had the initiative; but not after Midway! It was, after all, THEY that launched the Midway/Aleutians attacks, and THEY that were then rocked back on their heels. While they DID attempt some more offensive action (notably by trying to take Port Moresby, again, this time over land via the Kokoda Trail in the 2nd half of 1942), this was relatively minor, and ultimately unsuccessful. They never again tried the kind of massive, seaborne, combined arms operation that had swept then across most of the Pacific in a just a few months. Then just 2 months after Midway the US landed on Guadalcanal, and clearly the initiative was theirs, and Japan was in defensive mode. Thus the Guadalcanal can't be considered the actual turning point either.

I realize this whole idea of a turning point is rather subjective, but I really think if there was one in the South Pacific, it has to be Midway.

I also have to take some issue with the idea that the Japanese aircrew losses were fairly minor. To Japan, ANY losses of highly skilled personnel was a serious blow (as the author correctly points out, the losses of hundreds of aircraft carrier crew was also a blow to them), since they could not replace them nearly as easily as the US could. Here it not clear that there was a single starting point to the decline of Japan's military capabilities. Instead, right from the beginning of the war Japan's forces began to decline. They could not replace personnel OR equipment, whether lost to combat, accident or wear-and-tear. In fact they didn't even try to compete with the US, productivity-wise; it was clear to their planners that in the long run they would lose. Thus their plans went: 1. start the war from as strong a positionas possible (hence their attempt to sink the US carriers at Pearl Harbor), 2. Race across the Pacific before the US could gear up for war, 3. go over to the defensive and repel the US counterattack. In fact Yamamoto had PREDICTED that Japan would have only about 6 months to accomplish it's territorial ambitions before growing US strength would halt them.Sure enough, 6 months to the day after Pearl Harbor most of Japan's carriers were sunken, and the rest of there ships fleeing westward.... Ferrocephalus (talk) 20:53, 20 July 2012 (UTC)Ferrocephalus,(talk) 21:51, 20 July 2012

Check out previous discussion on the same topic: Talk:Pacific War#Midway or Guadalcanal the turning point?
The best argument you can bring here would be based on a wide survey of historians' opinions rather than any sort of argument involving the facts of the Pacific War. Wikipedia respects mainstream thought, giving greater prominence to the consensus of mainstream historians. Binksternet (talk) 21:21, 20 July 2012 (UTC)
The problem here is unrelated to which is "The" turning point. The article states its case too strongly in this section (that Midway didn't win the war all by itself) and makes it sound like it was just sort of nice but wasn't all that big of a deal in the long run. Statalyzer (talk) 18:51, 9 August 2012 (UTC)
The popular view, of Midway changing everything, isn't necessarily the correct one. Could it be better worded? Maybe... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 19:47, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

A questionable statement

This was the fatal flaw of Yamamoto's dispositions: they followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine.[73] Would someone please explain how Nagumo's decision to launch coordinated attack of torpedo planes and bombers could result from battleship doctrine? Victorkkd 20:13 17th June 2012. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Victorkkd (talk • contribs) 12:13, 17 June 2012 (UTC)

It has nothing to do with Nagumo. As the passage says, it has to do with Yamamoto's faulty dispositions: CVs in front, BBs behind, & so insufficient number of VSs in the van (where Nagumo needed them...) & so inadequate recce before Nagumo even began launching, which meant it made no difference if Nagumo delayed: Fletcher's birds were already on their way. All of that has been explained on the page. There's also an operational issue, namely IJN doing inadequate recce before attacking, which appears pervasive. (It also pertained at Pearl Harbor, where it was less significant...). I'd add that to the page, too, but I can't recall where I saw it... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 14:59, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
Then said comment shouldn't go right there where it's talking about Nagumo delaying. Especially, since him launching a half-strike earlier might have made some difference since those planes would have gotten used instead of being destroyed while still on the carriers. Launching earlier couldn't have saved Akagi, Kaga, or Soryu, but it might have sunk American ships and thus saved Hiryu. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Statalyzer (talk • contribs) 18:47, 9 August 2012 (UTC)
You still don't understand. For Akagi, Soryu, & Kaga to survive, Nagumo had to find, attack, & sink Fletcher's carriers before Fletcher launched. The only way to do that was with his first strike. Nagumo did not have the recce birds to accomplish it, & the plan made his priority Midway, not Fletcher (who wasn't expected to arrive for days). In short, it was impossible. You might be right about placing the comment, but it's addressing the issue of Nagumo's delay, which made no difference because of the faulty dispositions & planning. Could it be better worded? Maybe... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 19:43, 9 August 2012 (UTC)
While you are correct in pointing out that the lack of scouting aircraft may have been a factor, the way it is written is confusing, because in that paragraph you do not explicitly state that the lack of scout planes was the problem. Simply stating that it was a fault of Yamamoto's dispositions does not cut to the heart of the issue. Then again, even if Nagumo had more scouts, he still launched them too late to prevent Fletcher's attack. Dallan007 (talk) 08:36, 10 April 2013 (UTC)
♠Which is precisely why it's Yamamoto's dispositions that are the problem. Nagumo didn't have the VSs to find Fletcher before Fletcher launched, because Yamamoto had denied him. If the aim was to bring the U.S. to battle (& it was, not actually to occupy Midway), anything interfering with the primary objective is a mistake on the part of the senior commander--namely, Yamamoto.
♠As for not cutting to the heart of the issue, the problem of lack of scouts is well covered by the page; the passage at issue is a summary, not a recapitulation. Nor IMO is recapitulation necessary or desirable. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 07:12, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

Aftermath, Spruance

I removed this new text twice:

It should be remembered that Nimitz had ordered Spruance and Fletcher to be governed by the principle of calculated risk and not to engage a superior force without inflicting more damage than would be received. Spruance was well aware of the capacity the Japanese navy had for night fighting, and acted with prudence in not exposing the small operational American carrier force, at the time the only defense of the Pacific. Nimitz put Spruance in commands at the Battle of the Philippine Sea/Saipan and Okinawa after Midway - appointments that demonstrated Nimitz's faith in his abilities, and the head of the Navy, Admiral King, personally told Spruance he had done "exactly the right thing" at Saipan, where Spruance followed his orders to protect the soldier's transports and landings instead of charging off after the Japanese navy after another American carrier victory, which was similarly criticized by some elements of the Navy as a missed opportunity. See also [[2]].

  • John Toland, THE RISING SUN-The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 Volume I & II, Random House, NY, 1970. p.409, 426, 631, 848

One concern I have is that the text is not written well enough for a Featured Article. The reference also needs to be tweaked to match article style.

More importantly, the text repeats some of what is said previously, especially by Clay Blair who says that Spruance was wise not to pursue. This bit from John Toland should be massaged into place with an eye to retaining the good reading flow of the article. Binksternet (talk) 21:23, 17 February 2013 (UTC)

And I TOTALLY disagree. I am a historian, the summary is succinct and to the point, there's nothing wrong at all with reinforcing a previous point, and I'm restoring it. If you have another RS that disputes Toland's (excellent) work, then add it to the article to better the article. I remind you of WP:OWN. HammerFilmFan (talk) 01:05, 18 February 2013 (UTC)
You have incorrectly connected King's praise to Spruance with the Battle of Midway and its aftermath. King said Spruance "had done exactly the right thing" after his actions during the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944, not following any of his 1942 or 1943 command decisions. Even in 1944, King pulled Spruance's chief of staff Captain Carl Moore two weeks after the "exactly the right thing" remark, because Moore was a surface action man and King thought Spruance needed the objective viewpoint of an aviator among his 100% gunnery staff. King tapped aviator Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis from his own staff to replace Moore. At any rate, the "exactly the right thing" comment is completely out of place in this article.
Basically, a long section of text praising Spruance is out of proportion with the existing balance of criticism and praise given to the actions of Spruance at Midway. What we had before your addition was quite suitable: criticism from Samuel E. Morison, and rebuttal from Clay Blair. Binksternet (talk) 01:46, 18 February 2013 (UTC)
1. The edit CLEARLY states the King's comment was after BotPS, it makes no such claim that the statement was made after Midway. It's completely relevant in that this is the AFTERMATH section - Spruance had made the correct decision at Midway, and showed the same prudence at BotPS. I don't see how "aftermath" can be any more clearly shown. 2. The paragraph is hardly "long" but it also isn't a "praise" of Spruance, it is there to show that criticism of his decision at Midway in the view of most historians, Toland being one, is that he acted correctly, also providing some proper background that the short edit by Blair doesn't cover.HammerFilmFan (talk) 09:44, 18 February 2013 (UTC)
  • (e/c) The material has been challenged, and the appropriate step is now to determine a consensus about the material. See WP:BRD.
My problem with the material is it goes too far afield. The relevant question for the article is whether Spruance should have continued pursuit. Morrison says yes, Blair says no, and Toland says no. Including Toland's comments about Spruance's orders is appropriate. Including Toland on Spruance's assessment is appropriate. The remaining comments stray.
AFAIK, Nimitz did not criticize Spruance for disengaging; there's no evidence that Nimitz was unhappy with Spruance's performance at Midway.
King/Saipan is off topic. King could believe Spruance did the right thing at Saipan and the wrong thing at Midway. IIRC, King didn't like Nimitz' Midway gambit.
Nimitz did not replace Halsey despite repeated failures, so Nimitz's keeping Spruance would not be a ringing endorsement. (Did Nimitz consider relieving Halsey for sailing the fleet into a typhoon?) Halsey abandoning Leyte Gulf has nothing to do with Midway -- unless there's some unspoken notion that some criticism of Spruance at Midway somehow encouraged Halsey to be more aggressive and fall for NagumoOzawa's feint.
If Halsey is raised, then why not the Japanese Leyte battle fleet's missed opportunity when it overestimated its opposition and retreated?
My sense of the paragraph is that it wants to cover a much bigger topic about speculative command failures rather than just Toland agrees that Spruance made an appropriate/prudent/correct decision to abandon pursuit. Glrx (talk) 02:05, 18 February 2013 (UTC)
♠The praise is for something not at all related to Midway. Put it on Spruance's page.
♠As far as King liking Nimitz's approach, IIRC it was out of fear the attack would fall on the West Coast more than anything: less confidence in Rochefort's read on "AF".
♠Any connection to Halsey whatever belongs on Spruance's page, &/or Halsey's, because that's about their careers & actions. It's so OT it's barely in sight. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 03:30, 18 February 2013 (UTC)
Trek, I don't see your POV of the edit as "praise." RS statements, accurately summarized from a very neutral historian, is perfectly valid. The link to Halsey is provided because that section of the Halsey article mentions Spruance and showed what happened when Halsey disobeyed his directives and left the landings at Leyte in a terrible situation. It's a link, for further READER INTEREST, and is not discussed in the paragraph I added. Nor is this unusual at all in Wikipedia, which is full of such related links, for good reason. Finally, the decision of Spruance not to attempt to attack the remainder of the Japanese fleet is one of the significant points of the battle, and is very relevant here.HammerFilmFan (talk) 09:44, 18 February 2013 (UTC)
♠"RS statements, accurately summarized" On topic, yes. This isn't. It's about Spruance, not about Midway.
♠"The link to Halsey is provided" And it has even less to do with Midway; Halsey wasn't even present.
♠"the decision of Spruance not to attempt to attack the remainder" It's given the weight deserved. Connecting it to Halsey &/or Leyte is way, way OT. Which is why I said to put it on Spruance's page, not this one.
♠What you're doing is akin to my including Murphy's fate after the battle. It's OT, so it's not here. (It's not even strictly on-point for Tambor.) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 19:45 & 19:49, 19 February 2013 (UTC)
I agree with Trekphiler and Binksternet. This material is out of place here as written. And I don't give a crude metaphor whether you claim to be a historian. --Yaush (talk) 16:49, 3 February 2014 (UTC)

Admiral Halsey

The article attributes psoriasis as the cause of Admiral Halsey's replacement. Other references (not immediately available to me) cite shingles as the affliction. This is makes more sense; typically psoriasis is disfiguring and annoying but not generally disabling. On the other hand, shingles can cause non-ending pain and disabling of the patient.173.2.32.36 (talk) 05:08, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

There are a wide range of comments in various sources on the skin condition that Halsey suffered from. Clearly it waxed and waned, was present throughout his adult life, could be very painful, caused loss of sleep and significantly debilitated his health. This is definitely not a description of psoriasis. It is not a description of shingles either. An atopic dermititis exacerbated by stress is the best answer from the description available. We should not claim it to be shingles or psoriasis without a very reliable source that understands medicine. I would think that describing it as a debilitating skin condition is the best answer and is what is used on the Halsey page. See discussion here and article here. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:42, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

Nagumo's critical decision

It seems odd that the section header describes a 'critical decision' but the section concludes by saying that 'it made no difference'. I take it it wasn't a critical decision then? Not sure what the proper heading should be, but the current one seems contradictory. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.117.31.2 (talk) 15:12, 1 July 2014 (UTC)

That's a good point. I went ahead and changed the section title to Nagumo's dilemma. Gunbirddriver (talk) 16:36, 2 July 2014 (UTC)

Featured article status

The article is currently in three cleanup categories: Wikipedia articles needing page number citations (tagged September 2010, June 2013, July 2013, October 2014, June 2015), Articles with unsourced statements (tagged March 2015), and Articles with dead external links (tagged July 2015), with the oldest tag dating from September 2010. Consequently, at present it does not meet the featured article criteria. I note the original nominator has not edited for over a year; is anyone else willing and able to address these problems? DrKay (talk) 16:59, 6 July 2015 (UTC)

Improbable victory

I'm inclined to del the Parshall & Tully cmt on "probable victory". Japan had no prayer of invading successfully, & even presuming all 3 of Fletcher's CVs were sunk, his birds could readily have recovered to Midway. Nagumo did not have that option. These things being true, Japanese success is a phantasm. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:52, 24 July 2015 (UTC)

Parshall and Tully are only referring to a victory in the naval engagement(i.e. if all six aircraft carriers of the Kido Butai had been available during the battle, it is probable that the American carriers would have been defeated). However, this does not mean that the planned invasion of Midway would have been successful. In fact, Parshall and Tully make a convincing case in Shattered Sword that had Japanese ground forces tried to invade Midway, they would likely have been wiped out.(Hyperionsteel (talk) 12:11, 24 July 2015 (UTC))
Agreed. There was a huge disconnect between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy in regards to the next phase of the war. The Army wasn't supportive of the Midway campaign and therefore, provided a minimal invasion force for the island. Hobbamock (talk) 13:11, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
Even on the naval side alone, it's a bit strong. Nagumo's recce was so bad, he didn't even know Fletcher had 3 CVs. Beyond that, how does IJN put 6 CVs on scene? It's fringing into AH, IMO. I'm not dead opposed, tho... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 14:09, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
Please read the section on Battle_of_Midway#Japanese_shortcomings. At the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, two of Japan's fleet carriers were effectively put out of action (Shōkaku was damaged and Zuikaku lost half its air group). Thus, neither was available for the Battle of Midway - as was originally intended. Parshall and Tully believe that, despite the many shortcomings of the Japanese plans, it would have been difficult for Nagumo to have lost the naval engagement if all six of Japan's fleet carriers had participated in the battle (6 Japanese carriers vs. 3 American carriers + Midway would have put the Americans at a serious disadvantage). They certainly don't rule out the likelihood of the Japanese sustaining serious losses, but the end result of the battle would have been a tactical (although not necessarily a strategic) victory for the Japan.(Hyperionsteel (talk) 22:19, 24 July 2015 (UTC))
"Please read the section" I'm well aware of IJN shortcomings. Which is why I find this so unlikely. IJN had damn all chance of adding 2 CVs, & a notional inclusion that's so far from reality IMO is borderline AH (or borderline fiction), it's so speculative. Even allowing Zuikaku & Shokaku were present & at full strength, without good recce beforehand (& with Yamamoto's lousy dispositions, that's unlikely in the extreme; nor AFAIK do Parshall & Tully propose changing that, too), the outcome is very likely to be much the same: loss of all Japan's CVs. Is it possible adding two costs the U.S. more? Maybe. It might mean loss of either Hornet or Enterprise. (IMO, the odds of it being both are vanishingly small.) And even loss of both, in the long run, is not a "victory" for Japan: it's at best a draw, for the U.S. still holds Midway, & that was the prize. (More to the point, I'm not clear how losing 6 fleet CVs, IJN's entire striking force, against 3 U.S., is a "win" by any description...) So... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:25, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
Well, you are entitled to your opinion, but Parshall and Tully believe that if Nagumo had all six of Japan's fleet carriers at Midway, the result would have been, at the very least, a tactical victory of Japan in the naval engagement (again, the naval engagement and the planned invasion of Midway are treated as two separate issues). I'd have to agree (6 carriers vs. 3 + Midway isn't a recipe for an American victory, especially given the problems with American torpedoes), This certainly doesn't rule out the likelihood of Japan still losing several of its own carriers in the battle and being forced to retreat.
To clarify - Parshall and Tully never suggested that Japan losing all six of its carriers along with sinking all three American carriers could be considered a Japanese victory. Rather, they are stating that Japan sinking all of the American carriers (even without taking Midway), with the loss of several of its own, would have been tactical victory for Japan - this is the outcome they believe would have occurred. In strategic terms of course, even this outcome would still have been a strategic American victory - since the United States' industrial capacity meant it could build (and thus replace) its lost carriers much quicker than Japan could ever hope too.(Hyperionsteel (talk) 17:05, 25 July 2015 (UTC))
Okay, let me put it this way. Do you think Japan deliberately went to Midway with less than the most she could muster? I don't think so. If Shokaku & Zuikaku & their air wings could have been ready, they would have gone. It was impossible. That being true, their notional appearance is about as germane as giving them radar, nuclear weapons, or Romulan battlecruisers. They had no chance of having those, either. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:07, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
Yes. That is exactly what happened. While Nimitz moved Heaven and Earth to get Yorktown ready, no real effort was made to get the much less heavily damaged Zuikaku ready. It just wasn't considered necessary. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:44, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
♠It still changes nothing. What does Japan achieve? A draw? More ships & aircraft & aircrew she can never replace lost? That's not a victory. It presupposes the two additional carriers find & sink the two surviving U.S. carriers, which is a long shot in the conditions, for reasons having nothing to do with how many carriers Nagumo had & everything to do with Yamamoto's stupid starting dispositions. Even attacking the other two, attacking either of them, requires both knowing they are present (which Nagumo didn't, & wouldn't anyhow) & locating them for attack (which Nagumo didn't, & I see slim chance he would); it then requires successfully attacking and sinking both of them. This is so outside what Japan's carriers were capable of... Not least because Fletcher had better intelligence, both from Hypo & the PBYs, & because, no matter what happened to his CVs, he had Midway. Nagumo's sole chance, 4 carriers or 6 or 20, is to strike Fletcher before Fletcher launched. After that, it's moot, because now, Nagumo is bound by his orders & his preconceptions: he expects the U.S. won't arrive for hours or days, & his orders are, deal with Midway first. He does. It bites him. Having 2 more carriers doesn't mean he doesn't still get bit.
♠Your point about "not seeing the need" is the other factor. What might have happened had Zuikaku and Shokaku been present is moot, too, precisely because IJN saw no need. Unless you have a reason to see a need, & accelerate repairs & working up to put them at Midway, it is pure speculation. Putting it in as anything else is misleading. Now, if you want to explain why there was no perceived need, & why they weren't present, along with the proposition of what might have been if they were, that's a different matter. It's also, IMO, getting into AH territory; not offering the context most surely is. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:26, 26 July 2015 (UTC)
You are wrong in that respect. Parshall and Tully believe that had Zuikaku and Shokaku been available, they would have participated in Midway, and that it was originally planned for the attack to involve all six carriers. However, because of damage and losses suffered at the Battle of the Coral Sea, both of these carriers were out of action (and it was decided that trying to equip Zuikaku with a composite airgroup was too cumbersome as it violated Japanese carrier doctrine). The point here is that Parshall and Tully argue that had these two carriers and their airgroups been operational, they would have participated in Midway (as the Japanese plan initially intended them too) and that if they had been present, it would have been difficult for Nagumo to have lost (Clearly, you disagree with them on this point). However, since they are well-respected historians who have studied the Battle of Midway extensively, their opinion about Nagumo's chances had he had the carrier force he was initially promised do belong in this article. If you have a source that disputes Parshall and Tully on this point, please feel free to provide it. Otherwise, there is no reason to remove this information.(Hyperionsteel (talk) 00:31, 27 July 2015 (UTC))
♠And by putting it in, without the context, you've unbalanced the narrative. It is pure speculation on their part; sourced speculation is still only speculation, & however expert they are, it should stay out. (Otherwise, all manner of junk could go in on any number of pages as "expert opinion".) All I want is for it to be kept in context if it's going to stay in...& since you want it in, IMO, you ought to be providing context, too.
♠BTW, calling them "experts" & me therefore wrong is logically fallacious. In this case, their expertise does not mean their proposition is any less speculative for being based on extensive study, since it didn't happen. Appeal to authority is no basis for argument. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:54 & 00:57, 27 July 2015 (UTC)
I hardly feel that a single sentence in the notes section constitutes "junk" given the expertise that these author have to their credit (I would argue there are few historians who are more knowledgeable about the Battle of Midway then these too gentlemen). Also, this note is makes it clear that this is the opinion of Parshall and Tully, and not a fact.
As for calling you "wrong", I meant no disrespect, and as for your claim that I was engaging in ad verecundiam, I believe you may have misinterpreted my intentions. When I stated you were incorrect, I was expressing my disagreement with your statement that the "IJN saw no need" for Shokaku and Zuikaku to be present because at the battle. According to the sources I've read (including Parshall and Tully), the Japanese plan for Midway initially involved the participation of all six carriers of the Kido Butai. It is true that after it became clear that Shokaku and Zuikaku would be unavailable, the Japanese decided that four carriers would be sufficient, and that they were confident enough of this assessment that they saw no need to try to get Zuikaku ready for the battle. However, had Shokaku and Zuikaku been available with fully equipped airgroups, there is little doubt (again, based on the sources that I have read) that they would have participated in the battle as originally intended. There is no ad verecundiam argument here: I was not stating that they are right and you are wrong regarding the possible outcome of the battle had all six carriers participated. On this point, I simply pointed out that you disagree with them.
My other point was that, based on their knowledge of the dynamics and circumstances of the battle, that their opinion on this is notable enough to be included in this article, even if it is speculation. This is not ad verecundiam either, because I am not trying to establish a fact - rather I am stating that the opinion of these authors should be mentioned in this article. (This is the issue that you and I disagree about.)
Regarding your concern that the information, as it is currently presented, does not provide sufficient context, I'd have to disagree. This note states that Parshall and Tully believe that had Japan had all six carriers present, it would have been difficult for Nagumo to have lost at Midway (although, after double checking the wording these authors use, it can be interpreted that this does not rule out the possibility of the outcome being a draw as opposed to an American victory).
Finally, you seem to be claiming that any speculation by historians is banned in Wikipedia. I have not come across this rule during my editing in Wikipedia, so if you could direct me to the source, I would appreciate it.(Hyperionsteel (talk) 22:45, 27 July 2015 (UTC))

"page needed" battle of midway stanhope 263 degrees

  • That would be page 113, but the source cited (dawn like thunder) says 265 degrees, whereas other sources (and our article) say 263. Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 10:01, 29 September 2015 (UTC)
    @Lingzhi: I don't have Mrazek, but I do have Parshall and Tully. They source Lundstrom, which I also have here. They say 265° too; so who says 263° ? Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:26, 29 September 2015 (UTC)
    • @Hawkeye7: This article said so, before someone (probably you) updated it. Our article on Marc Mitscher cites paschall and Tully p. 174 as the source for 263 degrees. Same number found in Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century' ISBN 0297867636 by Alistair Horne. I'm not saying these are correct. I'm not trying to make any point at all. I'm just noting a discrepancy.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 07:45, 1 October 2015 (UTC)
      Yes I changed it. I have Paschall and Tully, and it is not on p. 174. I'm going with 265. Hawkeye7 (talk) 08:15, 1 October 2015 (UTC)

Japanese vessel(s) Akebono Maru

In the paragraph about early morning activity on June 4, 1942, near the Chronology of early events in the battle, an attack on a vessel called the AKEBONO MARU is given. There is a link to another article about the AKEBONO MARU, that seems to be the wrong AKEBONO MARU, because the link article relates to "a Japanese fishing trawler that capsized on January 5, 1982." The "Maru" of the Battle of Midway article is a Japanese oil tanker which American aircraft struck, at on the morning of June 4.

I feel certain that the link should be deleted, and something done to distinguish between what appears to be two Japanese vessels of different class and vintage, but with the same name.

Zahcregrach (talk) 10:52, 7 January 2016 (UTC) Charles A. Bencik, January 7, 2016

I have added a new header to separate your post from the previous one, but will leave an answer to the topic experts watchlisting this page. GermanJoe (talk) 11:57, 7 January 2016 (UTC)
Agree that the link is wrong and that the correct Akebono Maru is probably not notable enough to ever have its own article. Link removed. --Yaush (talk) 18:16, 7 January 2016 (UTC)
@Yaush:
The linked article, Akebono Maru (Akebono Maru No. 28), states:
The Akebono Maru was also the name of a Japanese oil tanker damaged on June 3, 1942 during the Battle of Midway[1][2] and sunk on March 30, 1944 off Ngeruktabel, Palau.[3]
A search also turns up a modern LNG tanker.
The WWII tanker is Akatsuki Maru Class according to http://www.combinedfleet.com/Akebono_t.htm.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/AkatsukiM_c.htm states Akebono Maru was converted in 1941.
WP has an image of the Akatsuki Maru (with copyright issues): File:Akatsuki Maru.jpg
That file links to Kawasaki-type oiler which includes the Akatsuki Maru Class
The link should be [[Kawasaki-type oiler#Akatsuki Maru class|Akebono Maru]]
Or [[Akebono Maru (1939)|Akegono Maru]] to match the red link in the Kawasaki article.
-- Glrx (talk • contribs) 18:57, 10 January 2016

References

  1. ^ "Battle of Midway". Naval Historical Center (NHC). Archived from the original on 12 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-05. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ "Interrogations of Japanese Officers". HyperWar Foundation. Retrieved 2007-12-05.
  3. ^ http://www.combinedfleet.com/Akebono_t.htm

I do not really have an interest in the battle of midway, but found some things that might relate to other work I am doing. I was wondering what was thought about the following two books listed in further reading:

  • Fuchida, Mitsuo; Masatake Okumiya (1955). Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-372-5. A Japanese account; numerous assertions in this work have been challenged by more recent sources.
  • Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-27894-1. First-hand account by Japanese captain, often inaccurate.

The editors are pointing out problems in the accounts provided, but they still have listed them. Is this because these two books provide the reader the opportunity to examine the event from the Japanese point of view, or are they historically important works of themselves? Also the website Combined Fleet appears to be a well researched web site. If what is in the site is accurate and presented in a neutral fashion, would the editors feel such a web site is appropriate to list in External links or no, and would they ever use it as a source? Is there a policy or manual of style that would address this? Thanks for responding. AliciaZag13 (talk) 23:36, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just added archive links to 2 external links on Battle of Midway. Please take a moment to review my edit. You may add {{cbignore}} after the link to keep me from modifying it, if I keep adding bad data, but formatting bugs should be reported instead. Alternatively, you can add {{nobots|deny=InternetArchiveBot}} to keep me off the page altogether, but should be used as a last resort. I made the following changes:

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Needed this link for the use of Midway after the battle and this link on the memorial. AliciaZag13 (talk) 02:17, 30 March 2016 (UTC)

Why nothing about the faulty electrical arming switches?

See

https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=v8KnCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=%22SBD%22+%22electrical+arming+switches%22+%22midway%22&source=bl&ots=lehYhRF2L8&sig=YuxBQTRUcLps5dtC0askBkIIk6Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiwzbSf6IvNAhULRY8KHVyjDicQ6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=%22electrical%20arming%20switches%22&f=false

Cantab1985 (talk) 12:05, 3 June 2016 (UTC)

*Was* it 2LT Muri who attempted to crash-dive Akagi in the Battle of Midway??

Didn't that B-26 crash into the sea?

FOX NEWS was the source given.  :-)

Let's not give Muri credit for an anonymous someone else's bravery.

Here is Muri's account from another source which clearly indicates that plane wasn't his:

"As he pulled out of his attack on Akagi, Jim Muri caught a fleeting glimpse of a B-26 that narrowly missed colliding with the island structure of Akagi before plunging into the sea. No one saw what happened to the fourth B-26. There was no time to look. As soon as they had cleared the flight deck of Akagi, the Zeros swooped again, riddling the B-26 with bullets in each firing pass. Once clear of the Japanese fleet, the Zeros disappeared, and Jim Muri now had time to assess the damage. His radio and hydraulic system had been knocked out. The leakproof fuel tanks of the B-26 had been repeatedly pierced by Zero bullets. Although wounded and bloodied himself, Corporal Frank L. Mello, Jr. crawled up to the cockpit from the waist gun turret to report that the plane was on fire and that all three gunners had been wounded. Lieutenant Moore left his co-pilot's seat and made his way quickly to the site of the fire. After putting it out, he treated the worst wounds, and then manned a gun."

http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/USArmy_at_Midway.html 

 — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lou Coatney (talk • contribs) 10:08, 1 May 2016 (UTC)
Hardly "anonymous". The B-26 (40-1424) was flown by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mayes, identified in the very source you linked. Whether he was attempting to "crash-dive" the Akagi is purely your conjecture; far more likely is that he like Muri and Collins was attempting to pull up, after launching his torpedo at wave-top level, in order to avoid a crash and save himself, his crew, and his airplane. As depicted in Roy Grinnell's painting, on the same link, Muri overflew the deck in evasive action but did not crash into the sea. Jack Fellows also painted the incident. The crews of all four B-26s, two from the 22nd BG's 18th Recon Squadron and two from the 38th BG's 69th Bomb Squadron, attacked in formation at low altitude and credit is due to all as equally brave, and as valorous as their more renowned Navy counterparts.Reedmalloy (talk) 21:47, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Four B-26s, not eight

I think we have an error regarding the number of B-26s sent to Midway. Every source I have ever read, from Lord, to Prange, to Lindstrom, Parshall and Tully, Caidin, give the number as four, not eight. All four were sent against Nagumo's force, and one, Lt. Muri's, survived. The paragraph has a footnote to Parshall & Tully, but I think that's incorrect. Do we have a specific reference for that number?

Best regards, theBaron0530

TheBaron0530 (talk) 20:22, 10 June 2016 (UTC)theBaron0530

Four attacked but more than that were deployed. The 69th Bomb Squadron, at Hickam Field en route to New Caledonia, sent a flight of three to Midway on June 2 (Capt. James F Collins, 1st Lt. Lewis C. Long, and 2nd Lt. William Stapleton Watson). They had been the first of the 69th to arrive in Hawaii and had trained for ten days practicing torpedo runs. Long did not fly the torpedo mission, his aircraft held in reserve. The Navy's account of the battle mentions that the air complement on Midway changed from day to day, so the figure of 8 may reflect the total number deployed, not the number used in the attack on the carriers, two of which (1st Lt. James P. Muri and Collins) made it back to Midway, two of which (Watson and 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mayes) were shot down.Reedmalloy (talk) 21:54, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Whats about the Tech issues?

The battle of Midway is one of the popular IIWW topics of Tv-films shown the last years, and some of them are quite interesting in its details. But such are not included here. However I have no references not remembering what TV-film I saw, I might remember some details wrong.

The main issue I learned from it was that the tech issues had a huge importance for the battle.

  • The intelligence issue, code breaking (could be cover spying to protect sources though), made the US forces know what was going on in general
  • The flight radar system on the US carriers (that the Japanese did not have) made that the US forces knew when the Japanese attacks were on its way, the Japanese obviously did not know when the US planes were approaching. This allowing the UIS defensive protection actions and the Japanese did not, very obviously
  • The US carriers had fire extinguish control systems including protecting carrier fuel pipes by filling them with fire protecting gas (at least Yorktown did have it) and that's why the Japanese believed they attacked different carriers when the actually attacked the same over and over again. Leaving the other US carriers in peace to attack the Japanese.
  • The Japanese carriers had wooden decks and the US of steel making Japanese carriers much more vulnerable of being hit

Not limiting the efforts of the troops and officers the tech issues are told to be of significant importance to the outcome of the battle.

Or is that just TV-tales?Zzalpha (talk) 12:35, 5 June 2016 (UTC)

Your third bullet wasn't a system, but rather a procedure, to empty the avgas lines and fill them with CO2. But you're correct, it was developed aboard the Yorktown. I don't recall if it was first considered during the raids in March and April, but the Lexington's loss at Coral Sea, after gasoline vapor exploded and started fires that blazed out of control, underscored the need for such a preventive measure. What made the Japanese think that they attacked a different carrier in the second strike against the Yorktown was the success of her damage control teams in repairing the damage from the dive-bombing attack. The most serious hit ruptured the exhaust venting and intakes for her boilers, which resulted in a lot of smoke, but the fires caused by the bomb hits were controlled very quickly. Damage control teams repaired the holes in the flight deck in short order, and the boiler gang was also able to repair the damage to the stack and several of the boilers relatively quickly. By the time the torpedo attack arrived, Yorktown was back up to around 25 knots, and from the air, she looked like an undamaged warship. Admiral Yamaguchi and his staff couldn't believe that any carrier damaged as badly as their fliers reported the first one to be, could be repaired that quickly.

Also, your fourth bullet is not valid, I'm afraid. Our carriers absolutely had wooden decks. They were made of Douglas fir timbers, plated over with steel. The bombs that did the most damage to the Yorktown actually penetrated the flight deck (which was not considered an armored deck) and penetrated several decks down to the boilers and the base of the stack, where it exploded. What made the Japanese carriers so vulnerable to destruction was their design--enclosed hangars contained within the ship, similar to the British designs, with flammables like fuel and ammunition within reach. If an explosion occurred, the enclosed space was likely to magnify the effect, rather than to allow it to dissipate, as could happen with explosions or fires in the hangars of American carriers. Our carrier design treated the hangar deck as the strength deck, the armored deck, and the flight deck was superstructure erected over this. Our hangars had numerous large openings, which were usually left open for ventilation, but could be closed with rolling shutters. This open deck had a damage control advantage, too, in that ships assisting in fighting a fire aboard a carrier could direct water from hoses in through those openings.

Also, Japanese fire-fighting capabilities were relatively rudimentary, and vulnerable to damage. The single bomb that hit the Akagi, for example, damaged the fire curtains and water mains in the center of the ship, preventing their use. In 1942, the Japanese had a different doctrine regarding damage control, compared to the US Navy. The Japanese trained a small number of officers and petty officers as damage control specialists, but didn't extend this to the rest of the crew, who were simply recruited as manpower in an emergency. We trained nearly every member of a ship's crew, assigning roles in case of emergency. The amount of damage that the four Japanese carriers received overwhelmed the Japanese damage control system, and within a few hours of the hits, the Kaga and the Soryu were beyond saving, with fires burning out of control. The crew of the Akagi were able to stave off the disaster a little longer, but they, too, were fighting a losing battle. And the same fate befell the Hiryu around 5PM. She took enough severe hits that damage control procedures were just overwhelmed. Later in the war, after disasters such as Midway, the Japanese began to rethink their damage-control doctrine, but it was too late to have any helpful effect.

I recommend Parshall & Tully's "Shattered Sword" for an excellent recounting of the battle on the Japanese side. And I also recommend John Lundstrom's "First Team" series of books on the US Navy during the first year of the war in the Pacific.

Best regards, theBaron0530

TheBaron0530 (talk) 20:17, 10 June 2016 (UTC)theBaron0530

The first steel deck carrier in the US Navy, curiously enough, was the USS Midway, commissioned just after WWII.Reedmalloy (talk) 23:28, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Counterfactual: we know this how?

"It was fortunate Spruance did not pursue, for had he come in contact with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including Yamato, in the dark and considering the Japanese Navy's superiority in night-attack tactics at the time, his cruisers would have been overwhelmed and his carriers sunk.[122]"

This sentence jarred me when I read it, and I see it was edited and then reverted back to the original. As a counterfactual, it is speculation; granted it is well-founded and sourced. It is nevertheless a probabilistic statement. Shouldn't we consider tweaking the language to reflect that? Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:14, 13 December 2016 (UTC)

I agree; the remark in question assumes a greater likelihood of an end result than the available evidence warrants. Its certainty should be toned down since it's bombastic as it stands. 70.210.141.43 (talk) 12:20, 18 February 2017 (UTC) (by EPischedda)
I've edited that sentence to make it clearer that it is a matter of conjecture--"...very possible that his cruisers could have been overwhelmed..." It is very possible, but I agree, it's purely conjecture. Best regardsTheBaron0530 (talk) 16:26, 6 June 2017 (UTC)
It's a virtual certainty. The cruisers were outgunned, could not damage Yamato at any reasonable range, could be pounded to junk by her main battery beyond their ability to respond, & would be less capable of fighting a night action than Yamamoto's force (which was better trained & equipped at that time, as witness actions in the Solomons), while Fletcher's carriers were practically sitting ducks at night. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 01:20, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
Thank goodness you know this with certainty. Outnumbered and outgunned units everywhere will take heart now knowing their cause is indeed hopeless......someone grab a time machine and tell Sprague's men before they attempt to fight off Kurita. Warn the 101st Airborne not to attempt a defense of Bastogne. Tell Audie Murphy to stay on the farm.... DMorpheus2 (talk) 11:04, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
Boy, you're so funny. You should take it on the road, 'cause I'm sure not laughing. I'm pretty sure the crew Hood wouldn't be, either, nor the men in all the ships sunk in the Java Sea & New Georgia Straight by an IJN which was better trained & better equipped to fight at night. And for all the courage of the 101st, Wacht am Rhein was buggered before the jump-off, so... Marty McFly I'll be right back 14:36, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
I was trying to use humor to make a point; guess it misfired since you've dug in deeper. Nothing in history is determined in advance; everything is contingent. It's nuts for us to write any counterfactual as anything other than speculation, no matter how well-researched and solidly-based that speculation may be. By *any professional or amateur estimate*, taffy 3 was doomed, the 101st was doomed, and Audie Murphy was doomed. And yet they prevailed, somehow. You never know. The text in the article now, which caveats the estimate, is how it should stay. DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:48, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
I'm not going to say it should be changed to suggest certainty, either. The thing is, at that time & place, had the encounter actually happened (& the chance of that was slim), the chance of IJN victory is unusually high, unlike at Leyte (& unlike with the 101st): USN competence was much lower than IJN & USN confidence much lower. 101st was a comparatively elite outfit, so high on both counts, so better chance of holding & winning; Taffy 3 by that point was in a USN fairly certain of USN superiority, against a timid IJN CO, & backed into a corner; that didn't obtain at Midway. USN 1942 was mediocre compared to IJN, especially at night. (That said, it's also possible Spruance would simply have disengaged when he realized what he was up against, sacrificing his cruisers & running...) What I'm suggesting is changing "very possibly" to "it is highly probable", if only because "very possibly" sounds like a weasel to me. I'm hoping to cleave a fine line between certainty (which we can't have) & high confidence in the prediction. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 16:28, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
"probable" is fine with me. As I wrote waaay above, this is a probabilistic statement. I was opposing stating it as fact (per the initial entry above). Your "near certainty" formulation was never suggested as an edit but I think that connotes something even stronger than 'probable'. DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:43, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
The "certainty" was based on Blair's expectation of the outcome (IIRC), likely based on conversations with people who know more about it than either of us, & "virtual certainty" is my view, but not one I'm qualified to advance beyond this talk page (as opinion). If you're fine with "highly probable", I'll change it. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:32, 7 June 2017 (UTC)

Tinker attacked Wake, not the Japanese fleet

The statement that General Tinker took off to attack the Japanese fleet is wrong. Tinker planned to attack Wake Island, even months before the Battle of Midway. He led his for LB-40s from the West Coast to Hawaii specifically for that purpose. Best regardsTheBaron0530 (talk) 16:28, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

Fixed.TH1980 (talk) 23:21, 13 June 2017 (UTC)

It was not a turning point

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Japan did not have the industrial capacity to wage war against the United States, China and the British Empire. (86.142.36.102 (talk) 11:40, 30 June 2016 (UTC))

True. But they waged war anyway, picking up much territory in the first six months. Binksternet (talk) 14:40, 30 June 2016 (UTC)
Japan lost the war when it attacked Pearl Harbor. It's misleading to say Midway was a turning-point because there was only ever going to be one outcome. (109.159.10.246 (talk) 11:54, 1 July 2016 (UTC))
If there are reliable sources stating it was not a turning point, we're interested. Even if Japan losing was actually a forgone conclusion, few people thought so until after this battle. --A D Monroe III (talk) 20:59, 1 July 2016 (UTC)
All modern historians state the battle was not a turning point. It was only heralded as a great victory for propaganda purposes. The Roosevelt administration made clear at the time that Japan was always destined to lose the war due to the US economic and industrial advantage. (165.120.184.14 (talk) 10:24, 2 July 2016 (UTC))
That's utter rubbish, IP 165. You are not being constructive. 50.111.25.178 (talk) 04:53, 15 September 2016 (UTC)
Stating "All modern historians" is not an RS. --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:21, 2 July 2016 (UTC)
This article argues Guadalcanal was the real turning-point: http://www.combinedfleet.com/turningp.htm (15:58, 2 July 2016 (UTC)) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.133.85.205 (talk)
Thanks for providing a source; that's how things work here. However, in that source, the last paragraph in the "Conclusion" states "The arguments presented ... are not final or definitive." It doesn't claim Midway wasn't the turning point, only that it's hard to choose one over the other. The current article doesn't claim it was "the" turning point, but only "a" turning point. I think this is in line with the sources and statements in the Battle of Midway#Impact section. I think we'd need more conclusive RSs to begin to counter the sources there. --A D Monroe III (talk) 21:06, 2 July 2016 (UTC)
Many, many sources say that the Battle of Midway was the turning point. The sources that say otherwise are fewer. That's why we are sticking with the mainstream assessment of the battle being the turning point. That balance is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, so it's useless to argue here against it. Should we mention the various other conclusions which contradict the mainstream view? Certainly, yes. But we don't change the overall assessment. Binksternet (talk) 06:39, 15 September 2016 (UTC)
Japan's intent and war strategy in the beginning was to acquire as much territory as quickly as possible before then negotiating a ceasefire and an end to (what they hoped would be) a short war. They famously didn't count on the outrage of the overall American population. Thus, the idea that this battle was a turning point has validity; it clearly ended Japanese hopes of a quick victory, although that may also have been true of the Battle of Coral Sea. Frunobulax (talk) 13:33, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
The Japanese won the Battle of the Coral Sea, but they never had any chance of either defeating the United States or forcing a negotiated end to the war. Japan was never in a position to win so Midway was not a turning point. (86.150.207.25 (talk) 10:20, 21 June 2017 (UTC))
IMO, it's about how you define "turning point". No, Japan was never going to win; in that sense, Pearl Harbor was the turning point. Guadalcanal was the first major U.S. counterattack, so a turning point in that sense. Midway was the high water mark for Japan's ambitions, so a turning point. Pick your favorite. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 11:04, 21 June 2017 (UTC)
Agree with TREKphiler. Also the Battle of the Coral Sea was only a victory for the Japanese in the strictest sense of the word. It is more correctly termed a strategic victory for the US as the Japanese continued to lose tonnage & front-line pilots that they could not replace.Ckruschke (talk) 18:48, 21 June 2017 (UTC)Ckruschke
The "Japan was never in a position to win..." argument is philosophical, not historical. It's also and not well reasoned in my opinion. Midway qualifies as a turning point, even the turning point, both in terms of its repercussions in its immediate historical context (halting further Japanese expansion into the West Pacific) and, even more so, through the lens of history; from mid-1942 onward, Japan would fight battles of consolidation and defense (including Guadalcanal), rather than those of conquest. Abishai 300 (talk) 23:23, 21 June 2017 (UTC)
"The 'Japan was never in a position to win...' argument is philosophical, not historical. " Wrong. Once Japan attacked Pearl Harbor the way she did, she cannot win. The U.S. has more industrial power than all the Axis combined (& most of the Allies, too). Moreover, her determination is next to boundless (despite what FDR & others seemed to believe); if the country was willing to accept the appalling losses of the American Civil War in a justifiable war, they'd be prepared to accept far less appalling losses in this one, provided FDR could sell it well enough--& provided he had the nerve to hang on, as Lincoln did (or provided Truman did, if it went so long; it wouldn't). The duration of the war is an indicator you're wrong: it was 44mo, with the U.S. essentially fighting Japan one-handed for most of it. And Japan had no real grasp of how to fight an enemy capable of blue-water combat, let alone one with enough industrial capacity to dwarf Japan's. (Hell, California could just about defeat Japan, while the other 47 states sat by with popcorn.) Japan's 1944 & 1945 dreams of a negotiated peace after inflicting crippling losses are just that, pipedreams. The U.S. was, by 1945, burning Japan's cities with impunity, & Japan was on the brink of famine; it would not have taken any great U.S. effort to induce that, & then ensure it continued until the militarists (IJA loons) in charge realized surrender was the only acceptable option. That presupposes the U.S. doesn't use the Bomb even once; it wasn't necessary, IMO. However, we've gotten rather far afield from "turning point"... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:21, 22 June 2017 (UTC)
Any edits intended here or is this just a forum? DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:41, 22 June 2017 (UTC)
The attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic victory for the US, as Japan had no way of winning the Pacific War. It's debatable whether the US or Japan won the Battle of the Coral Sea, but by the early summer of 1942 it was already obvious to everyone that Japan was losing the war. Germany and Italy were too far away to help Japan, and allies like Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam were too weak. With hindsight it is obvious the Axis Powers should have focused on the Soviet Union in 1941. (86.133.254.61 (talk) 11:51, 1 July 2017 (UTC))
Talk pages aren't forums. Closing Talk thread. Ckruschke (talk) 17:32, 5 July 2017 (UTC)Ckruschke
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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Look out for the gooney bird

The importance of air superiority I don't dispute. However, when you lead with Mitchell, IMO, you undermine the relevance to Midway. Indeed, what you describe seems better placed on fighter aircraft or an air superiority page, where the impact of Midway can be discussed. If the battle did, indeed, redefine the matter, a single line (suitably cited), rather than a history of the theory of airpower, is all that's warranted--& that belongs at the end of the "impact" section, not the 2d graph. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 22:25, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

Agree on a one-line (sourced) conclusion, only, probably at end of section. --A D Monroe III (talk) 00:08, 7 September 2017 (UTC)
Reducing to a 1-2 sentence summary of Midway redefining centrality of air superiority for the rest of the war and adding to end of Impact section. Dropping reference to Mitchell as discussed. ManKnowsInfinity (talk) 14:39, 7 September 2017 (UTC)

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Forces committed to the Aleutians

The forces committed to Operation AL in the Aleutians should not be counted as not participating in Operation MI as they were two separate operations.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 16:51, 16 April 2018 (UTC)

Not a decisive victory

Midway was not a decisive victory for the USA at all. The war still went on for another three years. The Japanese did not occupy Midway islands but inflicted significant destruction on the US fleet - one of its aims. 90.212.243.178 (talk) 09:43, 26 July 2018 (UTC)

It is decisive in sink 4 fleet carriers and shooting down key IJN planes. Decisive does not mean war ends. Sammartinlai (talk) 09:55, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
Midway was not decisive to the course of the war against Japan, which this article is clearly putting across. There was still over 3 years to go of fighting with the Japanese fighting near the Soviet and Indian borders. Decisive is that the direction of the war is only in one direction. There was still naval and land battles to go, which could have gone the Japanese way. This all smells of being wise in hindsight. Midway was important but not decisive, or strong enough by itself, in the run of the war. Decisive is POV in this article. It should be removed. 90.212.243.178 (talk) 10:38, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
It seems to me that historical analysis is all about being "wise in hindsight" so I really don't understand what your grievance is there. It is commonly held by historians that Midway was decisive, particularly in that it both checked Japanese advancement in the Pacific and also allowed the general momentum to shift toward the Allies.[1][2] If you want to present some reliable, compelling scholarship to the contrary feel free to do so, but in the absence of that, this view is a minority one and deserves little if any treatment in the article. Abishai 300 (talk) 17:51, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
Wilmot makes the point in The Barrier and the Javelin none of the battles were decisive in the sense of "war ending", but in a wargamre's sense of "clear & unequivocal", Midway certainly was. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:36, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
It is a violation of Template:Infobox military conflict/doc. Considering there is a dispute about this, the obvious answer would be to remove it per extensive discussion with User:Cinderella157 on Talk:Battle of the Coral Sea#Japanese Tactical Victory? and User:Roger 8 Roger on Module talk:Infobox military conflict/Archive 4#Request for comment. I also currently see no sources in this article about it being decisive or a reasoning of why, but I could be wrong. EtherealGate (talk) 01:03, 2 September 2018 (UTC)
This discussion is pointless. Base on all this, all victories are not decisive at all.Sammartinlai (talk) 05:06, 2 September 2018 (UTC)
I don’t think the question is whether Midway was “decisive”. We already have a (sourced) statement that it is often labeled “a turning point”. If we want a source that backs up the statement that it is often labeled “decisive”, there are plenty. One example would be from Parshall & Tully’s Shattered Sword. The only question we should be asking is if it belongs in the infobox. I think the rfc mentioned above makes clear no such qualifiers belong in any infobox. Work permit (talk) 06:11, 2 September 2018 (UTC)
Yep, and the Battle of Britain and Battle of France have already followed this example. EtherealGate (talk) 19:59, 3 September 2018 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ James M. D’Angelo (15 December 2017). Victory at Midway: The Battle That Changed the Course of World War II. McFarland. p. 5. ISBN 978-1-4766-2995-7.
  2. ^ Craig L. Symonds (5 October 2011). The Battle of Midway. Oxford University Press, USA. p. xi. ISBN 978-0-19-539793-2.

The fate of the Akagi

This article and Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi contradict each other, somewhat. In this article, it says that the American warplane intentionally made a suicide run and nearly hit the bridge. ("Making no attempt to pull out of its run") However, in the Akagi article, it is more ambiguous, stating instead "Another, either attempting a suicide ramming, or out of control due to battle damage or an incapacitated pilot". Does any source state with certainty what the pilot's intention was? hbdragon88 (talk) 02:20, 14 September 2018 (UTC)

Any conclusion is purely speculative as there were no survivors from the aircraft.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 02:31, 14 September 2018 (UTC)
So should we edit this article to make it sound less definitive and open to interpretation? hbdragon88 (talk) 04:20, 14 September 2018 (UTC)

The Second Vinson Act

In the Impact section, it is stated that the Second Vinson Act was "intended to make the navy larger than all the Axis navies combined, plus the British and French navies". I unfortunately do not have access to the citation provided, but I'm not sure the statement is reasonable. Nothing I can find on the Act corroborates the statements, and it seems to pale in comparison to other US naval procurement bills of the era (eg, the Two-Ocean Navy Act). A revision to the statement might be advisable. Benjamin Fulton (talk) 02:44, 3 May 2019 (UTC)

Yes, I agree -- I saw this statement a week or so ago and I simply don't believe that it is true. That would mandate a Navy so large as to be beyond comprehension. Or at least beyond reason. I think either someone should provide the EXACT wording from the Vinson Act to justify this or it should be revised. Hayford Peirce (talk) 04:16, 3 May 2019 (UTC)
I have done some additional searching and there is NOTHING I can find anywhere that supports this statement. It apparently it is only that ONE source that states it. And even books published by the Naval Press or whatever it is can have errors in them. I think that we ought to revise this statement and then wait to see if someone else will give us a citation that can be considered definitive: such as an actual paragraph or page from the Second Vinson Act itself. One more thing to consider: the Second Vinson Act was, I think, circa 1938 -- that was BEFORE the defeat of France and before war itself had even broken out. There was no REASON to consider that the British or French navies might be captured by the Germans. Hayford Peirce (talk) 19:11, 4 May 2019 (UTC)
It's been around since July 2015 or so, but I agree that it's wrong and will take care of it now.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 01:32, 5 May 2019 (UTC)
Great -- have at it, lad! Hayford Peirce (talk) 02:57, 5 May 2019 (UTC)
That's a perfect edit -- I was thinking of a much more complicated one, but here simplicity is the key virtue. Hayford Peirce (talk) 02:59, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

Shattered Sword

It seems likely that this article needs updating in light of the book "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway". Unfortunately, I don't have that source. But my understanding is that it argues that prior Western accounts were based on a self-serving Japanese account. I don't pretend to know which version is correct, or even what the new version is. But ideally, the article would describe the controversy.Adoring nanny (talk) 23:19, 30 May 2019 (UTC)

I have the book and it's a wonderful one, with a ton of new research and info from Japanese sources. I THINK that much of the present article is derived from it -- at least, there are sure a lot of footnotes referencing it. As you say, apparently a LOT of earlier "info" came from a single Japanese source that was widely disseminated and then used as "fact" for years and years in secondary and third-hand accounts. Shattered Sword pretty well demonstrates where all of the false info came from. I would have to spend hours and hours rereading the book and then writing the equivalent of a college paper in order to do what you are asking for. Unless I just wrote a one- or two-sentence summary, saying, "The Japanese aviator, who was present at the Battle, later wrote, and widely publicized a book called So And So, that contained an enormous amount of either misremembered "facts" or outright mistakes, whether intentional or not. Shattered Sword corrects a number of these, which, in turn, has created a certain amount of controversy." Hayford Peirce (talk) 23:33, 30 May 2019 (UTC)
From the Amazon blurb about the book: "It also corrects the many errors of Mitsuo Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, an uncritical reliance upon which has tainted every previous Western account." Hayford Peirce (talk) 23:39, 30 May 2019 (UTC)
Here is some of the controversies about him: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mitsuo_Fuchida&action=edit&section=8 Hayford Peirce (talk) 23:46, 30 May 2019 (UTC)

Attack on the Japanese Fleet section

Lead in with a Question - US losses were 150 aircraft. US Carrier aircraft strength starting the battle was 88 fighters F4F Wildcat, 129 Dauntless Dive bombers, and 44 Devastator torpedo bombers. Very few of the Devastator torpedo bombers returned from their attacks. Per the page only 7 of 41 survived the attack. How many if any of the Wildcats fighter or Dauntless Dive Bombers were lost shot down by the Japanese ? - No information provided.

Wfoj3 (talk) 14:20, 14 September 2019 (UTC)

Wfoj3, Probably about 1 or 2 is my approximation. The torpedo bombers mostly would be self-destroyed, not by the Japanese. {{31}}{{25A (talk)}} 16:45, 20 June 2020 (UTC)

Repeated attempts to characterize the type of victory

I've reverted more than a few attempt to reinstate "decisive" victory in the infobox, contrary to Template:Infobox military conflict/doc as editors haven't grasped the fact that we're not disputing its decisive nature, but simply what goes in the infobox. As many of these are IP editors, I'll refer them here in my reverts as well attempting to engage them on their talk pages. However, I'm quite likely to exceed 3RR in the process.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 05:49, 13 November 2018 (UTC)

You won't be the only one rv'g, if it's any consolation. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 20:11, 23 November 2018 (UTC)
Appreciate it.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 20:15, 23 November 2018 (UTC)

You seem to be gatekeeping this page. I would call your attempts trolling, especially since it contradicts what is presented by historians in the article itself. From what I have noticed, you are the only editor here that has voiced any dissent in it being labeled a decisive victory. —2600:1700:b450:3700:5166:56f0:f6bd:f111 (talk • contribs) 02:30, 26 May 2020‎ (UTC)

Editors here follow the Wikipedia guidelines for Infobox military conflict, which state that the results should be only "X victory" or "indecisive". It doesn't help readers to give terse yet subjective evaluations of degrees of victory stated as a simple fact; the full nuanced information (including why it is seen as decisive) fits in the article text, but not the infobox. --A D Monroe III(talk) 03:32, 26 May 2020 (UTC)
I'm another long-term editor who has reverted this "decisive" stuff at least three or four times. So it's not only Sturmvogel, who is the furthest thing in the world from being a troll. He is a very experienced, very knowledgeable editor. You yourself seem to have made absolutely no contributions at all to Wikipedia except for this "decisive" stuff. Hayford Peirce (talk) 04:01, 26 May 2020 (UTC)
Why argue that "decisive" shouldn't be included when you don't dispute the nature of the battle.
To act as a gate keeper here when there are dozens of other battles that have "Decisive" in their outcome box.
You're arguing it here only to be controversial and its not universal. You dont have the consensus to not state it as decisive but that's enough for your arbitrary decision to not call it that.
We need all pages to reflect this and not only here. JuliusPilsudski (talk) 14:47, 10 September 2020 (UTC)
As outlined above, its not about gatekeeping. Its about following Wiki Infobox guidelines. Therefore your argument about whether it is "decisive" or not, is a moot point. Ckruschke (talk) 18:11, 10 September 2020 (UTC)Ckruschke

Correcting possible mistake

Under the section American counterattack there is this sentence:

"At 02:15 on the night of 5/6 June, Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying 90 nautical miles (170 km; 100 mi) west of Midway, made the second of the submarine force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome, although its impact was heavily blunted by Murphy himself."

That this is on the night between 5/6 June seems strange, if one relate it to the dating of the rest of the section, so i checked with the article on USS Tambor. This is what it says about the incident:

"At 02:15 on 5 June, Tambor radioed sighting "four large ships" 90 nmi (100 mi; 170 km) north of Midway,[16] at a range of 3 nmi (3.5 mi; 5.6 km)."

From the above, it seems to me that the night of 4/5 June would be correct. Ulflarsen (talk) 13:34, 20 October 2020 (UTC)

Distance of Japanese carriers from Midway.

The text says, "Midway's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles,..." Isn't that supposed to be "a distance of several hundred miles,..."? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 73.55.213.25 (talk) 04:43, 26 October 2020 (UTC)

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