Talk:Battle of Midway/Archive 4

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Absurd "analysis"

Under "Nagumo's dilemma":

Japanese carrier doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 08:20), Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[85] In addition, the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes.[86]

"In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 (with Enterprise and Hornet having completed launching by 07:55, but Yorktown not until 09:08), so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier doctrine, he could not have prevented the launch of the American attack.[87]"

In the final analysis, it made no difference? Gees, I wonder how Admiral Yamaguchi would respond to that if he had survived. Despite Japanese "doctrine,” he risked his very career (if he survived, of course) in the heat of battle to urge his superior Nagumo to launch at once regardless of how planes were armed. As far as it made no difference, well, for one thing when the American planes arrived there wouldn’t have been planes and bombs all over the Japanese carriers' flight decks rendering them floating powder kegs! Also, the Japanese attack might have succeeded in sinking the American carriers and not just ultimately Yorktown which, of course, meant no further American carrier air attacks! That, of course, could have changed the entire course of the battle and war; you know, little things like that.

Seriously, this inane section needs to be reworked! HistoryBuff14 (talk) 14:26, 26 June 2020 (UTC)

I agree. Path-x21 (talk) 14:34, 26 June 2020 (UTC)

Late to the party, but the key issue here is that a second strike force was never (despite some claims to the contrary and popularized by Fuchida) spotted on the Japanese carriers. By the time they might have launched a strike, the Midway strike was returning and they needed to recover those aircraft. Yamaguchi urges an attack right when that recovery would be starting. Unless Tomonaga's strike is to land in the sea, it's hard to see how that strike could have been launched. Shattered Sword does an excellent job clearing up the timeline. Mackensen (talk) 03:12, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

No one argues that there would not be any sacrifices for spotting and launching the strikes. Like Parshall & Tully pointed out, some or even most of Tomonaga's strike would have to be ditched. Now yes, ditching is bad, but it happened regularly during the Guadalcanal Campaign in a planned way, e.g., the commanders at Rabaul basically sacrificed/ditched the whole squadron of dive bombers from 2nd Air Group already on the first day of campaign. The problem with the current statement in the article (i.e., "In the final analysis, it made no difference") is that it denies that there was an alternative option at all just because it would take a sacrifice (we should not forget that Yamaguchi was willing to take that sacrifice), and more importantly, it denies that choosing the alternative option would make any difference, which is indeed an absurd. First, there was an alternative option, i.e., to spot and launch the strikes (at the expense of Tomonaga's strike). Secondly, that alternative option would have most likely made a difference in the end (i.e., it would have cleared the Japanese carrier of fuelled and armed aircraft and it would have potentially disabled other US carriers beyond Yorktown). Saying that "it made no difference" is a huge "what if", and is basically the other extreme of saying that "Japanese would have won if the strikes had been launched". Finally, while the current statement has Parshall & Tully reference attached to it, I do not remember the book explicitly saying "it made no difference". It says that it would not have prevented the US strikes, but it certainly does not say it would have made no difference in the big picture. So in a sense it seems like a misuse of the reference to me. I think we need a more realistic, neutral and balanced statement. Path-x21 (talk) 10:07, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

@Path-x21Not quite in those words, but they do say this: "Nevertheless, by around 0800, the fates of Nagumo and Kido Butai were already sealed to a certain degree." They go on to analyze the fact that by the time the Japanese search found the Yorktown, the American strike was already en route. Yes, ditching Tomonaga's strike in order to spot and launch a new strike was possible, but difficult to justify. It would mean throwing away close to half the force's aircraft. There was also the matter of the constant churn of CAP fighters because of the repeated raids from Midway, and then eventually the US carrier aircraft. Mackensen (talk) 12:35, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Well we have to be precise when using references. "Nevertheless, by around 0800, the fates of Nagumo and Kido Butai were already sealed to a certain degree" has a very different meaning from "In the final analysis, it made no difference". The former states that Kido Butai would have been hit in any case (to which I completely agree), while the latter states that there would have been no difference in the big picture if the strikes had been launched. If the strikes had been launched, they could have potentially crippled more US carriers, regardless of Kido Butai being hit or not. Not to mention the difference in the degree of damage to Kido Butai (especially Akagi), if fuelled and armed aircraft had not been on the carriers. So I would say that "in the final analysis" there could have been a big difference to the other events in the battle (i.e., besides Kido Butai being hit). This case seems like a misuse of the reference to me and should be fixed. Path-x21 (talk) 13:23, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Indeed, and there's been some rot. This is the original insertion of the phrase, way back in 2007 (!): [1]. It's not sourced to Shattered Sword at all, but to two older works. I agree that it should be rewritten. Mackensen (talk) 17:58, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

I have corrected this a while ago in the article, so perhaps this topic can be considered as resolved. Path-x21 (talk) 09:29, 9 April 2021 (UTC)

@Path-x21 Not quite. Firstly thank you so much for following up on my original lament. Although I have an adequate general grasp of this epic battle, I lack your apparent expertise of the subject. Therefore, regarding what I am going to suggest, I shall defer to your judgement with absolutely no question of an edit war.

“Had Nagumo elected to launch the available aircraft around 07:45 and risked the ditching of Tomonaga's strike force, they would have formed a powerful and well-balanced strike package that had the potential to sink two American carriers.[90]”

Could the following be added?

“…two American carriers [proposed addition] and cleared the desks of fully fueled and armed aircraft which rendered the ships hazardous in the event of enemy bombing attacks.”

I think this defensive consideration is at least as important as the offensive one. However, as I said I shall defer to your judgement, and I thank you again for the already vast improvement over the previous rendering.HistoryBuff14 (talk) 19:15, 18 May 2021 (UTC)

My pleasure! Thank you for starting this topic. I certainly share the analysis that fuelled and armed aircraft on carriers presented a significant additional hazard and the damage without them could have been much different (especially in case of Akagi that was hit only by one bomb), as I already mentioned in my augments above. I would have added it in my first edit but I could not remember any specific paragraph/page in the sources that I am familiar with, which I could cite to back up the analysis. Now I remembered that I can cite a paragraph from page 170 of Parshall & Tully 2005. I made another edit now to include the aspect of hazard related to fuelled and armed aircraft on the decks. Please see the article. Note that I had to write it in way to fit the the cited source. Path-x21 (talk) 20:14, 18 May 2021 (UTC)

@Path-x21Just perfect! Thank you so very much! I believe the now completed revision is a good compromise that makes both points: Yes, too late to have prevented the American carrier attacks but would have had very possible beneficial effects for the Japanese. Your verbiage is superior to my own as well! You, sir, are a gentleman and an asset to Wikipedia regarding the Pacific theater of WW II and I'm sure other areas of interest as well! Very best regards!HistoryBuff14 (talk) 21:03, 18 May 2021 (UTC)

Japanese Plan - why no slow boats not in Kido Butai ??

The section on the Japanese plan states that the battleships and light carriers couldn't keep pace with the main carriers and so therefore could not have sailed with them yet no reason is given as to why the main carriers needed to sail at top speed.Firestar47 (talk) 17:56, 6 April 2021 (UTC)

No slow boats so that the Kido Butai would sail into range at best speed so as to increase the chance of surprise, and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the enemy toward it. Also the Kido Butai would obliterate US aircraft in its attack, and then be available to speed off to protect the battleship and transport fleets. Yet the transports would not have attention attracted to them by having the capital ships (battleships, air craft carriers) with them... 27.96.199.11 (talk) 14:24, 26 May 2021 (UTC)

Spruance's running away at night

Seems to me a given that the carriers ran away at night, being no use for a night battle .. they would retreat at night and yet be back to the same place at dawn, ready to defense Midway and attack IJN, stragglers, a new carrier attack,etc.

And spruance had no battleships, because Pearl Harbour. So the only thing for Spruance would be , send the cruisers and destroyers to hunt the IJN at night ? But of course, with IJN battleships and heavy cruisers out there, he knew that they would be much more useful as screens/AA platforms at day... if the IJN didn't leave at night, or even began a naval barrage or land invasion, or something, they could, do so, damage to Midway would just have to be left to chance, he would let the IJN wait around at night and find out what a mistake that was at dawn.

27.96.199.11 (talk) 14:51, 26 May 2021 (UTC)

O'Flaherty and Gaido

The section on American prisoners discusses three murdered, but while with regards to one it discusses the fate of his captors ("The execution of Osmus in this manner was apparently ordered by Arashi's captain, Watanabe Yasumasa. Yasumasa died when the destroyer Numakaze sank in December 1943 but had he survived, he would have likely been tried as a war criminal") it does not do so with regards to O'F and Gaido. I was reading a pl wiki article which stated those responsible for their murder were never brought to justice. This is sourced to.the Polish translation of this book: https://books.google.pl/books?id=yWTNDwAAQBAJ Given this is a FA, I think this should be verified and added to the article; otherwise this creates a weird inconsistency. Interestingly, there is :pl:Bruno Gaido but no en wiki article yet? _{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 19:12, 30 October 2021 (UTC)