Talk:2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive/Archive 5

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Tom Cooper is a reliable source, and should be referenced on this page.

Tom Cooper is an Austrian military analyst who has published over 30 books and 1,000 articles on various military topics, such as the Cold War, the Six-Day War, the Iran-Iraq war, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He currently publishes semi-daily updates about the Russo-Ukrainian War, and in each of them he has multiple sources that back up his statements, so he’s not just making it up (unlike, for example, Sergei Shoigu, who claimed that Russia had destroyed many times more Western vehicles than Ukraine has even received, let alone lost). He’s even been recognized by the Ukrainian World Congress as an official source all the way back in June of last year. In addition, he has published casualties figures that refer just to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive, as opposed to both Russian and Ukrainian claims on this page, which refer to all areas of fighting since June 2023, including Russia’s own offensive. The other sources I provided are Donald Hill, who currently works as a U.S. intelligence agent, and Forbes, both of which were published by other outlets. This isn’t a case of just a third-party post on social media, I think this is more than enough to warrant inclusion on this page.

Links: https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/analyst-tom-cooper-on-military-plans/

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/09/16/an-elite-ukrainian-brigade-just-annihilated-a-russian-brigade-near-bakhmut/?sh=dcd710c51956

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-9-september-2023-short?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/dons-weekly-18-september-2023-part Tomissonneil (talk) 00:18, 27 September 2023 (UTC)

Regarding Tom Cooper, first of all I don't think it supports what you wrote: According to Western analysts, the Russians had suffered 15,000 casualties per month during the counteroffensive. On the other hand, he wrote that Along Kyiv's reporting, the ZSU is (literally) shooting away at least some 15,000 per month (emphasis mine).

So he's simply using the Ukrainian numbers which are already mentioned in the article. I don't see what additional information this gives us. When he talks about BARS units' casulaties he doesn't provide sources at all which is not a good sign.

Judging by his books he's a bit of an expert in everything, so I don't think that he can be considered an expert in this conflict. Alaexis_¿question? 07:25, 27 September 2023 (UTC)

The casualty information he gives is different from the daily updates given by the Ukrainian MoD, because he’s referring only to the counteroffensive, as opposed to all areas of the fighting, which is well beyond the scope of this page. In addition, he makes it clear that when he says “shooting away”, he means both killed and wounded, as opposed to just killed, which is what is currently says on the page. The Ukrainians have also published semi-daily updates on Russian losses in the Tavria, Donetsk and Bakhmut sectors, which includes both wounded and prisoners in addition to those killed, which is where this figures must come from. Also, I don’t understand why him being an expert in “everything” means he can’t also be an expert on this war, especially when he’s been commenting on it since it started. If anything, it adds to his credibility, since this is something he’s done for many other armed conflicts. Tomissonneil (talk) 00:00, 30 September 2023 (UTC)

My point was that he explicitly said that the numbers come from the ZSU. You cannot attribute them to "western analysts" just because he quotes them.

By the way, are you in any way affiliated with Tom Cooper? Alaexis_¿question? 07:15, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

If that’s your issue with them, then simply changing the language used (“the Ukrainians claimed to have inflicted 15,000 casualties on the Russians per month”) shouldn’t be an issue, and that was a mistake on my part. And no I am not affiliated with him whatsoever. The similarities between my username and his name are a coincidence, and I’d never even heard of him until very recently. Tomissonneil (talk) 08:30, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

I have nothing against mentioning Ukrainian (or Russian, for that matter) numbers with proper attribution. Alaexis_¿question? 08:51, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

@Tomissonneil: Regarding your recent removal of casualty estimates, I think it's much better to have them then not have anything, even if they are partially outside the scope of the article. Remember that Russia's actions in Luhansk and Marinka are positional, thus casualties are much lower overall. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 04:19, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

There’s no way of knowing that they’d be lower. In July, the Russians had 120,000 troops in Luhansk, with the Ukrainians reporting that the battle was one of the most intense of the war. And in Marinka, almost no casualty figures have been released at all, so there’s way to compare them to the battles being fought elsewhere in Ukraine. Tomissonneil (talk) 05:56, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

I'm pretty sure that that 120,000 figure is widely inflated and the battle being so intense just an exaggeration. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 15:10, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

There’s no proof of that. You’d need to have a source that backs that up. Tomissonneil (talk) 18:16, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

Isn't the obvious lack of activity there enough? You aren't telling me that most of those 120,000 are dead/injured, right? Alexiscoutinho (talk) 19:58, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

When did I say anything like that? I never even implied anything of the sort. And lack of activity? The Russians just deployed the 25th Combined Arms Army, with 17,000 men, to the Kupiansk-Lyman front. Tomissonneil (talk) 23:38, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

That's still very far off from 120,000. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 04:45, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Because that figure was from July, before the 25th CAA was deployed. I don’t understand why you’re arguing about this. The Luhansk Front is a major war area. In July, the Ukrainians claimed the Russians had 120,000 men there, and while they withdrew some to be sent to other fronts, they recently sent a newly-formed army there. It’s also not part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the main parts of which are focused in the Tavria and Bakhmut areas. It’s beyond the scope of this page, and a number of the losses that were again added back for some reason have occurred there. Unless you have reliable sources that the casualties suffered there are so minuscule that they may as well not count, or that the Russians have barely any troops in the area, there’s no point in continuing this discussion. Tomissonneil (talk) 05:22, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

What exactly do you propose to add or change in the article? I'm not sure I understand what the argument is about. Alaexis_¿question? 07:11, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

The argument is about him not believing that the Luhansk Front was a major front, and that the casualties claims published by both Russia and Ukraine, which refer to all areas of fighting since June, wouldn’t at all be affected by the fighting there. This makes no sense, as both sides claim that there are heavy battles in the region, which the user doesn’t believe because the front line hasn’t moved much, which also doesn’t make sense, as there are plenty of wars (such as WWI and the Iran-Iraq War) in which there is little frontline movement and disproportionately heavy casualties. Tomissonneil (talk) 08:26, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Well, I think that we should follow the sources. If we have a source that mentions these numbers when discussing the counteroffensive we can mention them. Alaexis_¿question? 09:11, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Marinka

It says on the page that Maliar stated that Russian forces had withdrawn from Marinka. How reliable could her statement be if there's footage of Russian forces near the outskirts of Western Marinka hitting Ukrainian positions with artillery? Magellan Fan (talk) 03:00, 20 September 2023 (UTC)

That was a distortion of the articles. Removed it. In fact, the article needs a cleanup again to remove all the unbacked claims. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 14:45, 20 September 2023 (UTC)

That's a great way to form consensus, remove the information before anyone can respond. Scu ba (talk) 18:22, 23 September 2023 (UTC)

those two statements aren't contradictory. Russian forces could have withdrawn from parts of the settlement. Scu ba (talk) 18:02, 23 September 2023 (UTC)

But the original wording was misleading as it implied the Russians lost control over it to Ukraine. If you plan to reintroduce the statement, please make it clear that the withdrawal was either only partial or temporary and that control wasn't effectively lost to Ukraine. After all, this kind of activity happens all the time in the frontline, troops leave the areas that are most vulnerable in the ruins, but keep fire control over them. It's kinda what's been happening in Andriivka, Novoselivske and Piatykhatky: power projection. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:26, 24 September 2023 (UTC)

Again, those two statements aren't contradictory, Russia could have lost total control over the settlement. If there are no Russian forces present, only "fire control" from artillery, then it makes no sense to say that Russia "controls" the settlement, especially if Ukrainian forces are present within the settlement. Scu ba (talk) 02:10, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Scope

Should we even be including the Luhansk campaign in this article? By definition, it is not part of Ukraine's counteroffensive - instead, it's Russia's counteroffensive. The southern campaign is overwhelmingly the main focus, with Bakhmut as a pinning operation and distraction for Russian forces. It might be a good idea to remove or drastically reduce the detail of this article's coverage of less relevant fronts now that it's clear the main effort is the south and southeast. HappyWith (talk) 22:55, 18 September 2023 (UTC)

That makes sense. But where would the Luhansk info go? Alexiscoutinho (talk) 02:41, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

It has its own article at Luhansk Oblast campaign. HappyWith (talk) 02:45, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

👍 Alexiscoutinho (talk) 02:47, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

Honestly, I don’t think that it should be. The Russian offensive operations should be considered separate actions to the Ukrainian ones, and unless the Ukrainians do launch a major counterattack effort there, or shouldn’t be counted as part of the overall counteroffensive. Similarly, both the Ukrainian and Russian claims of casualties refer to all areas of fighting since June, and both sides’ respective offensives (to say nothing of Putin inadvertently contradicting the Russian MoD’s claims by further inflating alleged Ukrainian losses, which is quite an achievement given Shoigu’s ridiculous numbers). As such, I don’t think that these should be included either, to be frank. Tomissonneil (talk) 03:16, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

In that case, the scope should probably also exclude Kherson Oblast and the northeastern international border, unless and until major action occurs there. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 07:15, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

What about the areas around Donetsk? Alexiscoutinho (talk) 14:54, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

Has anything of note even happened there? IIRC, it's just been extremely minor frontline shifts around Avdiivka. HappyWith (talk) 18:14, 19 September 2023 (UTC)

There was that fiasco around Opotye two weeks ago. Scu ba (talk) 00:28, 20 September 2023 (UTC)

There was also Russian progress in Marinka. But I guess such info could go in a Battle for Marinka article instead. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 01:17, 20 September 2023 (UTC)

Yeah. We wouldn’t consider the actions to be part of "the counteroffensive". I’m going to wait a day or two more to make sure no one has objections, then Ill start working on moving the content out. HappyWith (talk) 02:41, 20 September 2023 (UTC)

👍 Alexiscoutinho (talk) 14:30, 20 September 2023 (UTC)

@Salfanto: I've recently moved all content relating to the Luhansk Oblast to its respective article as that info falls outside the scope of this article. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:23, 27 September 2023 (UTC)

ok thats good to know Salfanto (talk) 18:15, 27 September 2023 (UTC)

We should still cover it a little, even if only in a sentence or two. Eg: “Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its attacks on the Luhansk front to divert Ukrainian forces from the counteroffensive” HappyWith (talk) 18:23, 27 September 2023 (UTC)

👍 Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:52, 28 September 2023 (UTC)

@HappyWithWhatYouHaveToBeHappyWith: Regarding your recent edit summary that talked about the Kherson direction scope, well, it's not within the scope of the counteroffensive yet. However, if Ukraine manages to break through the fortified Russian lines in Zaphorizhzhia, a major push from Kherson becomes viable and advantageous. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 04:54, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Yes, which is why we shouldn’t remove it entirely - but I think we should give it less focus, since it’s become apparent it’s still only a minor sector of the front. We can briefly summarize the most relevant events here, and put the details in its own article, like with the Luhansk stuff. I haven’t had the time to go find the sources necessary and do the rewrite myself yet, but I’ll try to get to it sometime in the next day or so.

Btw, the Luhansk stuff is currently completely unmentioned in the article. We should try sometime soon to make a brief mention of it in the article, since it is relevant, in the sense that Russia is doing its offensive there to distract Ukraine. HappyWith (talk) 13:07, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

I agree, even if it is a sentence or two. Scu ba (talk) 02:11, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Incorrect weaponry mentioned in lead

In the lead, it is claimed that "at that time" (Feb-May 2023?), Ukraine was "integrating" Leopard 1 and M1 Abrams tanks to prepare for something.

This is not supported. Firstly, Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 are completely different tanks. Later in the article it is correctly mentioned that the German tanks Ukraine was anticipating in early 2023 were Leopard 2 tanks. Olaf Scholz said back then that Germany would be providing specifically Leopard 2A6 models (other countries have delivered I believe mostly 2A4's).

M1 Abrams tanks were first seen in Ukraine only in September, as per reports. But not yet in combat.

Leopard 1 tanks were also promised to be delivered, but not in February 2023. It was much later that it was reported 100 of them would be refurbished and eventually delivered.

This part of the lead should be reformulated, for starters it should specify what time is it talking about when it says "during that time". And before the counteroffensive (June 2023-) there were no Abrams or Leopard 1's, there were Challenger 2's and Leopard 2's. Plus of course the many hundreds of perfectly adequate Soviet/Ukrainian/Russian tanks and other armour Ukraine still uses. ShouldIHide (talk) 12:21, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Should the lead even dedicate so much time to discussing the Leopard 2A4, Leopard 2A6, challenger 2 and other western MBTs? Because i have the impression that the T-64BV, T-64BV zr 2017, T-72M1, T-72EA, T-72AMT, T-72AMT zr 2022, PT-91, T-80BV and other T-series tanks still saw more combat than those western MBTs did and are more relevant to the offensive D1d2d3d29 (talk) 16:42, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Good point. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:08, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

I tend to agree, it's not necessary to do that in the lead. Unless someone can find a source that would warrant that.

My impression is also that any of the western tanks are in very limited use. Also mainstream (especially US) media, that's most often used as sources on here, tends to blow out of proportion the difference between western vs. soviet/russian equipment, regardless of whether there's actually that big of a difference in how effective they are in actual combat. From CNN etc. and what they have their experts say, you get the impression that if you were hit by a Russian munition, you would be at least 50% less dead compared to the astronomically superior American/"NATO" weaponry. ShouldIHide (talk) 07:02, 8 October 2023 (UTC)

To whomever has credentials to do this:

Remove "During that time, Ukraine had begun amassing their military resources while also integrating crucial Western resources, including Bradley, Leopard 1, and M1 Abrams tanks, to prepare for the counteroffensive." This is not supported in the body or is not sourced or sourced correctly. See above, Leopard 1 and M1 Abrams were not involved in anything at the time in question. ShouldIHide (talk) 06:52, 8 October 2023 (UTC)

 Done Alexiscoutinho (talk) 22:33, 9 October 2023 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 7 October 2023

Ru forces made gains toward kupyansk in addition novoselivske is under ru control. Ru forces also made ground over the river between makiivka and raihorodka. Ru counter attacks north of pryiutne retook some ground lost to Ukraine in august. (Sources) Deepstate UA Daily map ua Rybar ru Syuriac maps 2001:8003:209A:D201:44A7:E52A:206A:9178 (talk) 10:24, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. —TechnoSquirrel69 (sigh) 15:23, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

Please also provide a link to these sources so the information can be verified. Thanks! —TechnoSquirrel69 (sigh) 15:24, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

Yes, it makes our lifes so much easier if we can simply copy and paste your changes after verifying them. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 22:54, 9 October 2023 (UTC)

The stuff about Luhansk Oblast should be requested in the Luhansk campaign page. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 21:13, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

Ukraine gained more ground than Russia in 2023?

The article's claim "Since the beginning, they have made incremental gains by capturing over 282 km2 of territory, more than Russia had in all of 2023" is outdated if it was ever true. This is currently contradicted by the New York Times, which makes the opposite claim, stating"When both sides’ gains are added up, Russia now controls nearly 200 square miles more territory in Ukraine compared with the start of the year, a net gain." Redro7203 (talk) 12:12, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Yeah, it is indeed contradictory. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 23:06, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Which NYT article is this? Scu ba (talk) 02:09, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

This article talks about it. [1]https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html entropyandvodka | talk 03:27, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

I would like to see the reality of this reflected in the infobox field for Territorial changes. Currently, it says "Ukraine recaptures 14 settlements in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts". It seems misleading to describe that alone as the territorial change, when they've lost ~188 square miles of territory. entropyandvodka | talk 03:31, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

My mistake, looking again at their graph, it appears most of the territorial change occurred before the counteroffensive began, after which it looks more like a stalemate. I'll see if I can get better numbers specific to those months. entropyandvodka | talk 04:01, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

Russia gained more ground in the Bakhmut offensive. Perhaps it could be added in the infobox this notion of progression. Show a sequence of major offensives: this southern counteroffensive, being preceded by the Bakhmut offensive, being preceded by the Kherson counteroffensive... Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:13, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

That would be good. Anything to give a brief sense of the overall change. Listing a handful of settlements with no other info doesn't seem to capture the essence of it, especially with the huge swings of square miles changing hands through the year. entropyandvodka | talk 18:10, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

Sadly, this infobox template doesn't support this. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 23:59, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

 Fixed Alexiscoutinho (talk) 23:28, 9 October 2023 (UTC)

References

Why does this article treat the institute for the study of war as a credible source?

Correct me if i am wrong since i didn't follow their articles much so my memory on them is hazy but didn't they spend weeks talking about a non-existing Ukrainian bridgehead in Kherson at the beginning of 2023? I think every major twitter account i was following at the time was asking why they were declaring a bridgehead when the only evidence for it's existance was Russian shelling in the area, which could have easily been just targettining recon forces D1d2d3d29 (talk) 17:59, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

And this is not even mentioning their recent comment talking about how the Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia are not trading space for time and thus fighting to an unreasonable degree for unstrategic terrain, meaning that despite Ukraine not capturing much territory Russia is sustaining very high and unsustainable losses

This comment should singlehandedly ruin any credibility the institute for the study of war has, not only does it seem to contradict (from what i've seen) widely agreed information that Russia still has a notable amount of reserves in the area (if they were sustaining unsustainable casualties you'd think they would be rushing reserves but if anything Ukraine seems to have been the side to commit major reserves first when the 82th brigade was sent in), so that statement doesn't appear to be based on any information that i am aware of and is just blatant "coping" D1d2d3d29 (talk) 18:08, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

Their analyses are quite biased and I personally just skip them. I'm not going against editors citing these in the article since I'm not putting in the time to look for less biased but still reliable analyses. For me, the most valuable information from the ISW reports is their coverage of territorial changes since they fairly and accurately represent claims and confirmed/geolocated advances on their maps. They also explicitly cite their sources from both sides. So I treat them as a consistent source of good enough information on territorial changes. Feel free to debate and counter analyses though. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 20:13, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

How are their analyses biased if you don't mind me asking? Scu ba (talk) 02:08, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Have you ever read a single one of their articles? Even their wording when talking about the problems or positives of the Russian military is noticebly harsher than when doing the same with the Ukrainian one D1d2d3d29 (talk) 14:19, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

This ^^. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 16:17, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

The main thing about the maps is sometimes they lag and for some reason ISW seems to be unaware of certain sources and aggregators of footage. So they’re not perfect or anything. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 16:08, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Do you have a source? Scu ba (talk) 02:04, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Reliable mainstream media sources consistently say that they're one of the most reliable outlets when it comes to reporting facts on the ground. Regardless, these "major twitter accounts" are completely unusable on WP, per WP:SPS. HappyWith (talk) 20:33, 3 October 2023 (UTC)

They do report the facts well. We just need to be careful to not fall for their overly optimistic opinion analyses sometimes. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 04:47, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Which reliable sources? It seems to be mostly Anglo-American outlets which 1) look at the ethos/personal credentials of the ISW team and its members and decide they and their methodology must be as great as they claim 2) are somewhat biased themselves so don’t care 3) really like the pretty maps. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 16:11, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

👍 Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:07, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

@HappyWithWhatYouHaveToBeHappyWith, were you aware that a large portion of ISW's reporting (especially "Russian sources claimed" type stuff) is literally just aggregation and at best synthesis of those Twitter snd Telegram accounts? RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 16:16, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

^^^this^^^

I don't get why wikipedia is against using some historically reliable twitter or telegram accounts as a source when many websites wikipedia accepts as a source are mainly aggregates/synthesis of those twitter and telegram accounts. Oryx blog is an example when it comes to their equipment losses list D1d2d3d29 (talk) 16:36, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

The bridgehead is real. there are countless articles. Here are three examples:

[2] [3] [4]

Using that as a way to discredit the ISW is actually nonsensical. Do you have a legitimate gripe with the ISW that can't be dispelled by a simple google search? Scu ba (talk) 02:07, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

There is an actual bridgehead there now, but i am talking about their claims about there being one even much before summer D1d2d3d29 (talk) 14:20, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Link? Manyareasexpert (talk) 14:34, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

I will have to look through their old articles, which will be hard given that they post them so often... but if you look at their old maps, many of them marked some parts of Kherson on the other side of the river not just as contested, but as controlled by Ukraine even before summer 2023, and i think many at the time including Rob Lee criticized them for it D1d2d3d29 (talk) 14:39, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Who’s Rob Lee? RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 16:14, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Rob Lee is a member of the Foreign Policy Research Institute think tank and a former US marine. To me personally he is one of the most respected journalists/bloggers in the field, he has been right much more often than not and he is very unbiased in comparison to some... other journalists/bloggers covering the Ukrainian war D1d2d3d29 (talk) 16:32, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Again, this is very easily dispelled with a simple google search:

[5] [6] [7]

the bridgehead around Dachi has existed since April. Again. Do you have anything concrete to criticize the ISW for that can't be dispelled in 30 seconds? Scu ba (talk) 00:43, 11 October 2023 (UTC)

I am not talking about late spring/summer 2023, i am talking about their claims of Ukrainian controlled territory on the other side of the river before that timeframe D1d2d3d29 (talk) 12:54, 11 October 2023 (UTC)

Yeah I don’t know why OP gave this as an example.

Regardless, ISW does have a clear bias, as has been discussed elsewhere.

Editors, like the media, tend to use it out of convenience. They seem to have the most comprehensive daily updates outside social media. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 16:13, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

👍 Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:06, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

The Counteroffensive is over

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/ukraine-gegenoffensive-israel-waffen-reisner-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html

Lieutenant Colonel Markus Reisner of the Austrian Armed Forces (already mentioned in the Wikipedia article) says: Andreax2014 (talk) 04:39, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

"And you actually have to say: it failed, especially from an operational perspective.

Markus Reisner, military expert" Andreax2014 (talk) 04:39, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

Is there a specific change to the article you want to suggest? HappyWith (talk) 05:29, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

Including this statement, with the statement that the counteroffensive has failed officially :) Andreax2014 (talk) 06:33, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

 Done Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:35, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

Russian officials are starting to openly admit it aswell https://www.rt.com/russia/584853-ukraine-offensive-failed-nebenzia/. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 04:08, 14 October 2023 (UTC)

RT is not the greatest source out there. Super Dromaeosaurus (talk) 08:56, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

That's not my point though. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 13:15, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

We cannot use RT as a source here and I personally cannot even access it to verify whether this is true or not. Super Dromaeosaurus (talk) 18:58, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

U can use e.g. Tor to access  ☆☆☆—Pietadè^Talk 20:02, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

I think Internet Archive also works. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 20:53, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Yet we can use some bs Ukrainian sources? Where is it written that we can't use Russian sources to cite facts? I'm not even talking about citing their analyses, just the quotes and hard information. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 20:51, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Reliable_sources/Perennial_sources?useskin=vector 72.229.242.36 (talk) 21:51, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

👍 Finally found it. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 21:59, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

why are Ukrainian sources thought as reliable??? Andreax2014 (talk) 07:39, 16 October 2023 (UTC)

Because they are. Super Dromaeosaurus (talk) 12:06, 16 October 2023 (UTC)

xD Alexiscoutinho (talk) 15:31, 16 October 2023 (UTC)

Based on? Andreax2014 (talk) 04:54, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

Yet we can use some bs Ukrainian sources? such as? Super Dromaeosaurus (talk) 12:06, 16 October 2023 (UTC)

You literally tried to use DeepState in the past. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:22, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

Because Russia does not have free media. Mainstream Russian sources are heavily censored and directed by the government. We do, however, use some independent outlets from Russia, like Meduza, since those aren't compromised by the state. HappyWith (talk) 23:19, 16 October 2023 (UTC)

Ukrainian media isn't free either. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:19, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

It's much more free than its Russian equivalent. HappyWith (talk) 00:20, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

But regardless, this discussion has nothing to do with the counteroffensive. If you have further questions or objections, bring them to the proper reliable sources noticeboard. HappyWith (talk) 00:21, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

Yeah, I also didn't want to start this discussion. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:24, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

preamble for "Russian information space and milbloggers"?

Should we add a preamble to the section Russian information space and milbloggers so that readers can know what a milblogger, especially in the Russia information space is? or should we just assume that if they've read that far into the article they know what a milblogger is? Scu ba (talk) 01:51, 18 October 2023 (UTC)

"Bottom" line

My bottom, that has spent (after (kind of compulsory) 11 yrs of secondary education) 13 yrs carrying me as a host through several educational institutions, and specialis(z)ations, mainly (general) history (incl. translating and commenting Machiavelli's Il Principe), tells me that every («special») action (on an international level) is usually followed by counter|action, and, after some decades, is named as a WAR, pure and simple; thus the 1st part of the the word in the heading (counter-) is kind of offensive?, anyway, not unbiased at least...;-) ☆☆☆—Pietadè^Talk 17:30, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

? Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:21, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

Huh? Scu ba (talk) 01:59, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Should the article be renamed?

Because isn't what Ukraine doing right now an offensive, not a counter offensive? Russia currently isn't conducting an offensive in the areas were Ukraine is trying to advance

Though maybe it should stay as a placeholder until the offensive is finished and it can be given a proper name with the context of the whole thing D1d2d3d29 (talk) 16:45, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

It is a counteroffensive to Russia's initial offensive in southern Ukraine. Though there was still a minor failed Russian offensive around Lobkove and Orikhiv a while ago. Rogov claimed to have captured Shcherbaky, for example, at the time. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:12, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

I am not sure this is how it works, the Russian offensive in southern Ukraine has been over since spring, wasn't it? Ukraine is right now launching an offensive of it's own to retake the south

By your logic the battle of the bulge and operation Bagration were counter-offensives D1d2d3d29 (talk) 17:36, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Sorry, I don't know about those battles. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:47, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

In my opinion everything that Ukraine does in its sovereign territory should be called a counteroffensive. But it doesn't matter what we think because most sources overwhelmingly refer to it as such, a move is highly unlikely. Super Dromaeosaurus (talk) 09:22, 7 October 2023 (UTC)

The articles here should be objective, not based on subjective opinion. As per Wikipedia a counter offensive "is executed after exhausting the enemy's frontline troops and after the enemy reserves had been committed to combat and proven incapable of breaching defenses, but before the enemy has had the opportunity to assume new defensive positions". Russia clearly had the opportunity to set new defensive positions, so this is not a counteroffensive, but an offensive. So by having this is a counteroffensive we are clearly being inconsistent with our own definition. 142.189.134.194 (talk) 15:42, 9 October 2023 (UTC)

Then let's rename the article, maybe to the "2023 major Ukrainian offensive"? D1d2d3d29 (talk) 17:19, 9 October 2023 (UTC)

Good argument. Then we would also need to rename the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensive articles. Such a big change would surely require something like WP:RM. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 22:51, 9 October 2023 (UTC)

Kharkov may not be neccesary, while the russians werent attacking actively, they had just exhausted their forces, lacked reserves, and had proved to be incapable of breaching defenses, as well as didnt assume new and effective defensive positions.

Kharkov and fighting in the North can be counted as counteroffensives, since the russians had recently stopped attacking and had exhausted their offensive forces, not having prepared defenses.

In Kherson the russians had gone on the defensive already, after the first counterattacks in summer. By the time they left kherson, they had built defenses and the autumn attacks by ukraine were purely offensives. Franfran2424 (talk) 11:45, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

I already proposed some time ago calling it "Ukrainian 2023 Summer Offensive", since the offensive clearly took place during summer, being stopped in mid-late september.

And I also believe the current russian operations towards Avdiivka and other areas (see ISW: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2023 and https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2023) should be called "Russian 2023 <Detail> Offensive", where <detail> is the time/season of the offensive.

Its just more consistent to define things as offensives unless they clearly exploit an overextension of the enemy. Franfran2424 (talk) 11:39, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Why are you saying that it stopped in mid-late september? As far as i know UA forces are still conducting offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia D1d2d3d29 (talk) 11:48, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Their combat potential is quite exhausted and they're mostly doing positional attacks and trying to consolidate their positions. While they still intend to attack elsewhere, this is normal stuff that we see all year round and shouldn't be attributed to the offensive, especially when it failed (you don't want to indefinitely drag on a failing endeavour). Unless Ukraine does a "last ditch" effort to push in Kherson or Zaporizhzhia, the main phase of the offensive is indeed over. Therefore, I think it's better to play safe and wait a few more weeks to change the "Ongoing" status. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 13:14, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Even if it did stop in late september that still means it's not purely a summer offensive

Also i wouldn't put it past Ukraine to do a "last ditch" effort to push in Zaporizhzhia, so to early to say if it's over D1d2d3d29 (talk) 13:17, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

They stopped serious advances in velika novosilka area after taking some villages in july, in bakhmut after taking andreevka and klescheevka in august-september, in orekhov direction after taking robotyne and some trenchlines near verbove in august-september.

They keep doing some small scale attacks taking maybe a treeline or two, but they have been doing that all the war, calling it part of the offensive is a bit incoherent considering the scale of previous attacks. Franfran2424 (talk) 14:44, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Eh, Ukraine might still do a "last ditch" push if they move in some fresh units to the frontline, let's wait until winter before making a judgement on wheter or not the offensive is definitively over D1d2d3d29 (talk) 16:57, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

I agree with you. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 13:01, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

If that's the reason why sources prefer to use "counteroffensive", then it just shows their bias and Wikipedia does not have to reflect the sources' bias (as was done with the "liberated" issue). The most correct decision would be to use the neutral military definition of an offensive/counteroffensive. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 00:16, 17 October 2023 (UTC)

Alternatively, we could add a note to the first use of the word "counteroffensive" in the article to explain why the military definition of offensives wasn't used by sources, despite it being the less biased one. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 15:10, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

 Not done

Zahirne, Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Marked liberated. That's 15th settlement. Berobalkan (talk) 07:47, 18 October 2023 (UTC)

Can you provide a source? after a google search the only article talking about the village mentions it back in July of 2022 as being under Ukrainian control. I don't think Russian forces ever captured the village and therefore it can't have been liberated. Scu ba (talk) 15:18, 18 October 2023 (UTC)

https://www.google.com/mymaps/viewer?mid=1lscRK6ehG0l2V-XvJ16nsyblMsQ&hl=en_US. Also, Dachi should also be marked as liberated because of recent UA activity. Berobalkan (talk) 08:43, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

It's not an official settlement. See #Dachi, Kherson oblast. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 14:57, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Someone's google maps markups isn't an acceptable source. Additionally, as @Alexiscoutinho stated, it doesn't look like Zahirne is an incorporated settlement. Scu ba (talk) 02:14, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

Krynok

This doesn’t seem to be the name of any Ukrainian village - at least not any I could find on Wikidata. Is this a typo by the Kyiv Post article? HappyWith (talk) 03:29, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

There's a nearby village named "Krynky", which is similar enough to transpose via translation screwery and conjugations. It has a page on ukwiki, uk:Кринки (Херсонський район). HappyWith (talk) 03:34, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

Agree, it is either a typo or some weird rare alternate spelling for Krynky, there has been no other reference to Krynok, and the only settlement on the Dnipro with a similar name is Krynky. Scu ba (talk) 02:15, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

Krynky Revert

@Alexiscoutinho Here is the exact quote from what I cited. not sure why you needed to revert it and ask me to quote it directly in the talk page when you could've just read the citation:

BBC Russia Service reported on October 21 that Ukrainian personnel involved in ground operations on the east bank stated that they are fighting to take full control of Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krynky, but disagreed about the extent of these positions.[9] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to almost two kilometers south of Kyrnky.[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control all of Krynky, although a different milblogger directly refuted this claim and claimed that Russian forces pushed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group out of positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement.

Scu ba (talk) 13:42, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

Thanks, though I am indeed not seeing things. Ukrainian personnel involved in ground operations on the east bank stated that they are fighting to take full control of Krynky is completely different from Ukrainian forces of the 46th Airmobile Brigade involved with the offensive actions on the east bank of the Dnipro told BBC that they had fully liberated the village of Krynky. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to almost two kilometers south of Kyrnky.[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control all of Krynky, although a different milblogger directly refuted this claim is quite different from Some Russian sources supported this statement while also saying that Ukrainian forces had advanced some 2km south of the settlement, note the big difference in tone. This isn't the first time, so be careful as this could be interpreted as trying to 'distort/manipulate sources'. It's more likely though that these incidents happened in good faith and that you were simply trying to condense multiple sentences into one and trying to use an alternative wording to the original 😉. Thus, I let/suggest you to rewrite that with this in mind. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 15:00, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

That was in the BBC article, the other citation:

Ukrainian fighters on the frontline say troops have not only crossed into Russian occupied territory but held a position, apparently for the first time, on the fiercely defended east (or left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson region.

The development is potentially significant. Ukraine's counteroffensive aims to slice through Russian occupied territory, severing a land corridor to the Crimean peninsula which Moscow annexed - illegally - in 2014.

In a text exchange, the 46th brigade told the BBC that troops were engaged in heavy fighting as they try to take full control of the village of Krynky.

If successful, the force said, the settlement would give advanced units a base from which to launch a larger offensive aimed at dividing Russian troops and cutting off their supply lines.

infact I think the BBC article, unless it is a different one, is the citation in the ISW report ([8]) No idea how you are claiming this is a distortion.

also you ignored this bit of the ISW report: A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to almost two kilometers south of Kyrnky.[10]

Scu ba (talk) 15:23, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

Read again the new quotes. Is it mentioned anywhere that they fully liberated Krynky? They even said If successful, the force said, the settlement would give advanced units a base and as they try to take full control. Besides, held a position means the settlement is contested, which is indeed the current understanding. The Russian BBC article was cited by ISW. I didn't ignore the quote you marked in bold. In fact it's even highlighted in green in my original reply. What I meant there was that the milblogger that talked about the 2 km is a different one from the one that claimed "Ukrainian forces control all of Krynky". The tone is completely different especially considering that romanov_92 was directly refuted/contested by another milblogger. You said that some Russian sources, so more than one, supported this statement, which was that Krynky was fully liberated (which the 46th didn't make), and not only that, that these (more than one) sources reported that they went 2km past the settlement. This is a completely different picture from what the sources actually tried to say. In fact, the ISW still doesn't mark any part of Krynky blue at all. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 15:55, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

Again, this is why we can combine sources about the same event! It's a nifty little tool.

BBC said the 46th was in Kyrnky.

ISW said Ukrainian troops involved in Kyrnky stated the village is fully liberated.

As such, we can say, the 46th stated that they liberated Kyrnky.

The only qualm would be if there are more than one division present in Kyrnky, which no source has stated so far. I am not stating that the village is liberated, nor is the ISW, that is why I included the statements from Russian bloggers and the disclaimer that the Ukrainian ministry of defense hasn't said anything yet. And great for you actually opening up some bloggers blog, but when the ISW starts talking about more than one blogger, I will refer to them collectively as "several" or "some" Scu ba (talk) 16:02, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

BBC said the 46th was in Kyrnky. Yes.

ISW said Ukrainian troops involved in Kyrnky stated the village is fully liberated. No!

when the ISW starts talking about more than one blogger, I will refer to them collectively as "several" or "some" Each milblogger said a specific and different thing. You can't simply bunch them together and claim they said what only one of them said. I've been very clear about my points so far and this kind of discussion is getting frustrating once again. My assumption of WP:GF is starting to fade unfortunately. Do you prefer to elevate this discussion, by pinging others? Alexiscoutinho (talk) 19:34, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

Oleksii Arestovych citation

The Oleksii Arestovych citation recently reverted by Smeagol 17 seems to be a similar situation. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 21:14, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

If one can read Russian, then yeah, this is the definition of "improper synthesis". (Also, wrong.) Smeagol 17 (talk) 21:35, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

ISW is now a rather frequently used source. Therefore, shouldn't there be a discussion about its usage which results in it being listed in WP:RSP?

CtlF Institute for the Study of War gives 66 results and CtlF ISW gives 22 results (for a total of 88 results) just in this article.

That is more than better sources (with less vacuous analysis in my opinion) such as - Atlantic Council [2 references in this article] - The Drive | The War Zone [1 reference] - Oryx Blog [1 reference] - The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) [0 references] - Breaking Defence [0 references] - Interviews with experts on Military History Visualized and Military History Not Visualized YouTube channels [0 references] - Janes defence news [0 references] - Stratfor [0 references] - The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) [0 references] - The RUSI aviation expert Justin Bronk [0 references] - UK Defence Journal [0 references] - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [0 references]

I think a source such as ISW which has become so influential on Wikipedia can be categorized on the Perennial Sources page (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Reliable_sources/Perennial_sources) and guidelines on its usage applied. Has there been an RfC to discuss this? I personally think that where they claim to "assess" something to be the case it can often be treated as opinion, and ideally a better source should be sought to make the point (perhaps one of the sources above). The same for any of their disputable analysis (other than when they make undisputed factual statements). In my opinion they are mainly useful for their maps and statements about recent changes to the position of the frontline in the Ukraine war. Just to be clear I am not for outlawing usage of the ISW, but I think it would be nice if the total usage of sources like the ones I listed exceeds usage of the ISW on a Wikipedia page like this one. 94.235.39.227 (talk) 11:02, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

I think this is the wrong place to discuss this. Try the talk page for Wikipedia:Reliable sources. Also, the reason why ISW is used so frequently is because it is used the most by other sources as well. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 15:38, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

Good points. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 16:57, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

I think it's also important to talk about the widespread usage of questionable Ukrainian sources in various articles. Given that the Russian news space is mostly covered in that page, it's only adequate to analyse the Ukrainian news space to avoid having to do major rewrites in the future. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:30, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

The 14 villages in the lede

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

This could be interpreted as presenting Ukraine as having been more successful by the metric of number of villages liberated than in terms of square kilometers liberated, as a sort of redeeming feature of the counteroffensive. However, 14 villages is still only 2.8% of the 500 settlements liberated during the Kharkov offensive. (The 370 square kilometers are 3% of the 12,000 square kilometers liberated during the Kharkiv offensive). Point is, I do not see that the number of of villages liberated make the offensive look any better in the grand scheme of things, but for some reason where we say that Russia captured a little bit more territory than Ukraine in 2023 the number of villages captured by Ukraine is included as an addendum.

I propose either saying Ukraine captured this many settlements and square kilometers in 2023 while Russia captured that many settlements and square kilometers in 2023. If we don't know how many settlements Russia captured in 2023 then just leave it out, because I don't see that the number of settlements Ukraine captured is particularly high considering the area liberated. 176.220.47.156 (talk) 13:48, 10 October 2023 (UTC)

My intention wasn't to "redeem" the counteroffensive, but simply to make the "least astonishing" edit to the previous write-up. It talked about recapturing a "string of villages" and I didn't wan't to remove this notion of number of villages (which is being used as the main metric in the infobox). I don't know if anyone has counted the number of villages and cities Russia captured this year, therefore I'll comment out that "14 villages" part for now. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 16:48, 10 October 2023 (UTC)

I've written the count in another sentence to avoid this problem. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:46, 13 October 2023 (UTC)

I am just going to add that I don't think "settlements" or "villages" (much like other often arbitrary units like "hamlets" or "municipalities") are a good unit of military progress at all, regardless of whether it is the unit used by some sources which are above the threshold of reliability (but which are probably not the best sources available). The 14 settlements amount to a population of perhaps 5,000, which is less than 2% of the population of Kherson which was perhaps the last major settlement recaptured by Ukraine. Assuming there is no source mentioning the number of Russian settlements captured in 2023 (to at least compare/contrast), is there no source which at least mentions the aggregate pre-war population of the municipalities containing the 14 settlements? Because as it is the term '14 settlements' omits that they are really quite small.

As to the question of whether the counteroffensive has ended, Al Jazeera English believes it is still ongoing. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/russia-attempts-to-seize-military-diplomatic-initiative-against-ukraine

On another side note, the real progress which Ukraine has been making my be in terms of their progress in degrading Russian air defences or infrastructure in Crimea.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-counteroffensive-is-making-real-progress-on-the-crimean-front/

In comparison with the progress in the air war described by the Atlantic Council, I don't think these 14 settlements would be strategically or operationally significant. (If the air war could be described as part of the 2023 counteroffensive that is.)

I don't think these 14 settlewouldtbe s are strategically or operationally significant. 85.105.254.184 (talk) 10:28, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

I've added the populations of the settlements and included it in the phrase. Maybe that NYT article comparing the territorial changes counted settlements captured by Russia. Otherwise we could manually count them. It wouldn't be too difficult I think. Comparing settlements and cities is still quite convenient. Capturing Bakhmut for example was much more significant than the 14 villages.

The air war isn't an independent goal for Ukraine though. The attacks on Crimea and rear areas could only be viewed as success if Ukraine capitalized on them, i.e. by recapturing more territory, which wasn't the case. Just striking some military targets in the rear and not quickly advancing isn't really useful considering Russia could replenish those more reliably than Ukraine could. Furthermore, the recent ATACMS strikes might have come a bit late for the offensive. We'll have to wait a bit more and see if there was a significant impact on the frontline. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 15:33, 19 October 2023 (UTC)

I’d say that the strikes against Crimea are more to disrupt Russian logistics than anything else. Also, forcing the entire Black Sea fleet to relocate isn’t nothing. 174.244.129.180 (talk) 00:48, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

These attacks can be done at any time. They can only be tied to the offensive's goals if it actually affects the situation on the ground. We shouldn't call the offensive a partial success just because some random thing/event was a success. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 01:48, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

You don't understand this counter offensive, it is no longer about taking back territory like it was at the start, but putting asymmetrical attrition on Russian forces, like in Kherson and the strikes in Crimea help to maintain that pressure on Russian resources since Crimea is a key logistical hub for Russia. In fact, a Russian milblogger even points out that this is the case (if you can read russian that is): https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2861;%C2%A0https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2860;%C2%A0https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2865 72.229.242.36 (talk) 03:06, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

Changing core goals in the middle/end of the offensive is just an excuse to not admit failure. This argument can be abused both ways. At most, this air war could be a caveat of success. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 05:10, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

Have you heard the saying "No plan survives first contact with the enemy"? It doesn't matter that the initial plan failed, what matters is the final outcome, which the only way that Russia can avert this is by a full mobilization, which Putin will never do. Also, they changed plans very early on in the counter offensive, the earliest being around late June/early July. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 05:28, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

You are mixing things up and jumping to extreme conclusions. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 14:36, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

I'm looking at what is said in the article, as Russia has basically zero reserves and cannot cycle troops on the frontlines while Ukraine can. It'll only be a matter of time until the Russians run out of soldiers, with the only way that Putin can avert this is by calling a full mobilization, which he will never do because that would mean the end of his rule over Russia. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 15:42, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

🤦‍♂️ Alexiscoutinho (talk) 17:51, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

People used to say that the Kherson counteroffensive was a failure before it had ended, and we all know how that turned out. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 18:39, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

Keep on dreaming. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 19:08, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

I don't dream, I know: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/20/ukraine-crimea-black-sea-counteroffensive-russia-fleet-navy-drones-war/ 72.229.242.36 (talk) 23:23, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

WP:FORUM HappyWith (talk) 23:54, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

Okay, you can just lock the discussion now if you want. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 23:56, 20 October 2023 (UTC)

You don't need a "counteroffensive" to fire at the enemy. Smeagol 17 (talk) 09:11, 24 October 2023 (UTC)

Not unless you want to maintain pressure on the enemy. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 15:34, 24 October 2023 (UTC)

Why? Just fire more. (But this is probably not a place for such discussions). Smeagol 17 (talk) 16:06, 24 October 2023 (UTC)

It helps lower morale of the enemy and such. (Now let's drop it for now) 72.229.242.36 (talk) 16:36, 24 October 2023 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 30 October 2023

Replace “this year” with “2023” at the end of the lead. TheCorrectPanda (talk) 00:32, 30 October 2023 (UTC)

 Done Alexiscoutinho (talk) 03:42, 30 October 2023 (UTC)

Not a counteroffensive

Sorry for being pedantic, but to my understanding, this was a Ukrainian offensive, not a counteroffensive. I understand the desire to call it a counteroffensive to underline that Ukraine is fighting a defensive war against Russian invasion, but a counteroffensive is an offensive launched into an ongoing enemy offensive, and the Ukrainian offensive was launched into defensive positions. The Russians were not attacking in that area at the time, as far as I know.

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/counteroffensive

2A02:AA7:400C:E400:1:1:4786:DBB0 (talk) 22:29, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

We could mix the terms a bit more in the article (I'm doing my part), but at leat the title should remain counteroffensive as it's a better index. Alexiscoutinho (talk) 01:13, 15 November 2023 (UTC)

Yeah I agree while it might not be the correct terminology this could be said within the article saying that "Ukraine launched an Offensive against Russian forces". Changing the name of the article could very well lead to confusion because Ukraine and the Media have repeatedly named this Offensive as a Counteroffensive. While Ukraine is in a defensive war I also don't think it warrants counting every Offensive operation they do as a Counteroffensive like brought up in a previous talk with that precedent set there would be a change needed in almost all defensive war offensives. Alex.Wajoe (talk) 08:19, 15 November 2023 (UTC)