Jump to content

Bosnia and Herzegovina–Croatia relations

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Croatia relations
Map indicating locations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ZagrebEmbassy of Croatia, Sarajevo

The foreign relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia are bound together by shared history, language, neighboring geography and cultural commonalties. They established diplomatic relations in 1992, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and independence of Croatia. The two countries share a 932-kilometer (579 mi) border – the second longest external land border in the European Union (EU). Modern relations between the two states are functional but remain tense after ineffective 21st-century attempts at détente.

Their roles in the Yugoslav Wars and the Croat–Bosniak War of the 1990s continue to complicate modern foreign relations. Bilateral disputes remain over their shared border, extradition treaties, as well as sovereign ownership of infrastructure and nuclear assets. The complex ethnic makeup of Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to Croatia's financing of their "two schools under one roof" system. Their common geography has complicated immigration, highlighted by Bosnia's limited maritime access to the Adriatic Sea. Croatia agreed to yield the Neum Corridor – 20 kilometres (12 mi) of their 6,400-kilometre coast – to Bosnia in 1991, giving the Bosnian state the second-shortest coastline in the world. Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina (544,780 persons) comprised 15.43% of the country's population in 2013.

Croatian is also one of the official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with Bosnian and Serbian, both of which are also recognized as minority languages of Croatia; the three are fully mutually intelligible standard varieties of Serbo-Croatian. Both countries have similar population sizes and collaborate extensively on economic treaties that mutually benefit their growth. Croatia is a member of the European Union (EU) and Eurozone, while BiH is a candidate for EU accession; both are in the Council of Europe. BiH has an embassy in Zagreb with Croatia maintaining an embassy in Sarajevo and six consulates in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, Livno and Vitez.[1]

Demographics

[edit]

The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina (544,780 persons at the 2013 census) comprise 15.43% of the country's population and 22.4% of the Federation entity, where 91% of them live. Four out of ten Federation's cantons have a Croat majority. According to the Croatian 2021 census, there were 109,352 people with both Croatian and another citizenship, the majority of whom were Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina living in Croatia. Bosniaks of Croatia amounted to 24,131 at the 2021 census (0.6%). There is also a smaller number of Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina working in Croatia.

The two countries do not have an agreement on dual citizenship, and the number of persons with double citizenship is therefore unclear. According to the Croatian Ministry of Interior, 384,631 Croatian citizens had registered residence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2019.[citation needed] 35,547 citizens of Croatia cast their vote at polling stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 2019–20 Croatian presidential election, and 21,898 for the parliamentary elections in July 2020.

Several high-level Croatian politicians have been born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including:

Some of them have been active politically in both countries, including:

  • Božo Ljubić, from Uzarići, BiH Minister of Communication (2007–2009), member of Parliament of Croatia
  • Željana Zovko, from Mostar, ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later Member of the European Parliament from Croatia

Bosnia and Herzegovina's Foreign Affairs Minister Bisera Turković was born in Sisak, Croatia.

Diplomatic relations

[edit]
Bosnian Presidency member Haris Silajdžić (left) and former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (right) in 2010.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Croatia's diplomatic relations started with Croatia recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina on 24 January 1992,[2] which Bosnia and Herzegovina reciprocated on 7 April the same year,[3] and both countries finally signed an agreement of mutual friendship and co-operation on 21 July the same year, during the series of Yugoslav Wars.[4][5] Together, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia have signed 111 various treaties deliminating issues ranging from establishment of diplomatic missions to resolving border disputes.[5]

The Croatian embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is located in Sarajevo and its 6 consulates are located in Sarajevo (consulate-general), Banja Luka, Mostar, Livno, Vitez and Tuzla. The current Croatian ambassador in BiH is Ivan Sabolić.[6] Current BiH ambassador in Croatia is Azra Kalajdžisalihović.[7]

Bosnia and Herzegovina has its embassy in Zagreb. Beside the embassy, there is one consulate-general of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia, also located in Zagreb.[8]

Croatia's role in the Bosnian War

[edit]
Main article: Croat–Bosniak War
The temporary cable bridge following the destruction of Mostar's Old Bridge in November 1993.

Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were engaged in the early-1990s Yugoslav wars. In parallel to its own war of independence, Croatia was involved in the armed conflict on Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory. At first, Bosniaks and Croats fought in an alliance against the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). By the end of 1992, however, tensions in Central Bosnia increased, leading to open conflict by early 1993, when Croats established the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

The Croat–Bosniak War opposed from 18 October 1992 to 23 February 1994 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, supported by Croatia. Most of the fighting took place in Central Bosnia and in the Herzegovina region between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). The most symbolic episode of the conflict was the destruction of Mostar's Old Bridge by the Croat militia's bombing on 9 November 1993. On 23 February 1994, a ceasefire was reached, and the Washington Agreement was signed on 18 March 1994 leading to the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and joint operations against the Serb forces, which helped alter the military balance and bring the Bosnian War to an end.

Croatia was a signatory of the Dayton Peace Agreement, on behalf of itself and of the Croat militias in BiH, thus assuming international obligations. This role is often misrepresented in Croatia as the one of "guarantor" of the agreement.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted 17 HVO and Herzeg-Bosnia officials, six of whom were convicted for participating in a joint criminal enterprise that sought to annex or control Croat-majority parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and two ARBiH officials for war crimes committed during the conflict. The ICTY ruled that Croatia had overall control over the HVO and that the conflict was international in character.

According to the CIA World Factbook, 7,269 Croatian refugees still live in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the country has 131,600 internally displaced persons.[9][10]

Yugoslav succession issues

[edit]
Embassy of Croatia in Sarajevo, 2020

Property restitution

[edit]

The 2001 agreement on Yugoslavia's succession issues foresaw a follow-up bilateral agreement on the restitution of specific properties of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territory of Croatia, which include petrol stations, hotels (such as the Hidrogradnja complex in Baška Voda[11]), and assets at the ports of Šibenik and Ploče, for a total worth estimated at 10 billion euros. 64 such assets have been registered by the Republika Srpska entity, and 78 by the Federation entity; there is no State-level single registry. Negotiations for a bilateral agreement lasted until 2012, when they were discontinued due to Croatia's unwillingness to agree with Republika Srpska's request for a right to perpetual ownership of the properties. In 2018, Croatia adopted a law on state property management, allowing the rental of such properties with concessions for up to 30 years. This raised concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[12][13]

War crimes prosecution

[edit]

The cooperation between the two countries' prosecutors' offices need to be strengthened in order to deliver tangible results in the fight against impunity for war crimes; Croatia has de facto stopped cooperating with BiH on war crimes cases where the accused are Croats.

Extradition

[edit]

In May 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia contested the execution of a treaty of mutual extradition of the countries' citizens, owing to many convicted people fleeing to the other country and attaining dual citizenship to be virtually immune to extradition. These people have included Ognjen Šimić, a surgeon from Rijeka convicted to nine years in prison for accepting bribes; Ante Jelavić, a former president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted in Croatia to 9.5 years for alleged abuse of position at the Bank of Herzegovina in Mostar; and others. According to Bosnia and Herzegovina government, fourteen people sentenced in Bosnia and Herzegovina live self-exiled as Croatian citizens. The two countries secured an agreement that would allow imprisoning such escapees for their sentences within their current country of residence without their consent (the status quo version requires consent of the escapee, which is usually not given).[14][15]

Border issues

[edit]

The two countries have several small disputed sections of the boundary, the most prominent of which is the one related to maritime access.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia agreed on a border demarcation treaty in 1999. The treaty was signed by the two former presidents, Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman, but it was never ratified by the respective parliaments, therefore it never entered into force. Croatia continues to administer areas that the deal assigns to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement foresees a definition of the two countries' territory, in the area of the Pelješac peninsula which is slightly different from what is shown on maps, since Croatia agreed to recognise the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina over two small rock islands (Mali Školj and Veliki Školj) and the tip of the peninsula of Klek near Neum.[16]

Una river

[edit]

Sections of the Una River and villages at the base of Mount Plješevica are in Croatia, while some are in Bosnia, which means that there would have to be nine border crossings on a single route. Lack of action on this problem impedes any serious development in the region. The Zagreb–Bihać–Split railway line is still closed for major traffic due to this issue.[17]

The border on the Una River between Hrvatska Kostajnica on the northern, Croatian side of the river, and Kostajnica on the southern, Bosnian side, is also being discussed. A river island between the two towns is under Croatian control, but is claimed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. A shared border crossing point has been built and has been functioning since 2003, and is used without hindrance by either party.

Neum

[edit]
See also: Neum Agreement
Borders of Bosnia Herzegovina (solid line) near Neum as modified (dashed line) according to the 1999 agreement.

The Herzegovinian municipality of Neum in the south makes the southernmost part of Croatia (Dubrovnik–Neretva County) an exclave. In 1999, a border agreement between former Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović moved the Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina border near Neum from the very coast (during SFR Yugoslavia era and confirmed by the Badinter Arbitration Committee) further into the sea waters of the Mali Ston Bay, placing two Croatian islands (Mali and Veliki Škoj, incidentally translated into English as Little and Big Island) under Bosnia-Herzegovina sovereignty. Six years later, the Croatian government called for the ratification of this agreement; however, as of 2007, it was not ratified.[18][19] The two countries negotiated Neum Agreement and Ploče Agreement defining special arrangements for Croatian transit traffic through Neum and Bosnia and Herzegovina access to the port of Ploče to compensate for non-contiguity of Croatian territory between Ploče and Dubrovnik and lack of a seaport in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[20][21]

Pelješac Bridge and access to the high seas

[edit]
See also: Pelješac Bridge
Pelješac Bridge prior to opening, 2022

Croatia has opted to build a bridge to the Pelješac peninsula to connect the Croatian mainland with the exclave as part of the A1 motorway Zagreb–Dubrovnik. On 7 June 2017, the European Commission approved the Croatian Major Project "Road to South Dalmatia" which aims at connecting the southern Dalmatian peninsula of Peljesac with the mainland and thus connect Dubrovnik-Neretva County with the rest of the country. This territory is now separated from the rest of Croatia by around 9 km large corridor of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The project has a total cost of € 526 million with a total eligible cost of € 420 million and an ERDF co-financing of € 357 million.[citation needed]

Croatia claims that the bridge is located exclusively within Croatian territory and Croatian territorial waters and that it is thus entitled under the international law of the sea to construct the bridge without requiring any consent from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia also expressed commitment to fully respect the international rights enjoyed by other countries in the Pelješac peninsula, including the right of innocent passage enjoyed by all countries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to have unrestricted access to the high seas.[citation needed] Croatia recalled that the foreseen height of the bridge (55 m, 180 ft) will allow the totality of the current Bosnian shipping to use the existing navigational route to transit under the bridge, and that in case any ship taller than 55 meters (180 ft) would need to call on a port in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it could dock instead at the Croatian Ploče port, in line with the 1995 Free Transit agreement.[citation needed]

The construction of the bridge has also been opposed by various political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly Bosniak, as they deem it would complicate the country's access to international waters.[22] Bosnian authorities initially opposed the building of the bridge, originally planned to be only 35 meters (115 feet) high, because it would have made it impossible for large ships to enter the harbor of Neum.[23] Although Neum harbor is not currently fit for commercial traffic, and most of the trade to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina goes through the Croatian port of Ploče, the Bosnian government declared that a new one might be built in the future, and that the construction of the bridge would compromise this ambition.[24][25]

On 17 October 2007, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted an official position stating that "Bosnia and Herzegovina opposes the construction of the [Pelješac] bridge until the issues related to the determination of the sea borderline between the two countries are resolved" and asking Croatia not to undertake any unilateral actions concerning the construction of the bridge. Bosnian MP Halid Genjac has stated that such official position has never been reverted and is thus still in force, while no official Bosnian body has given its express consent to the construction of the bridge. He argued that “the claims that Croatia is building a bridge on its territory are incorrect because the sea waters beneath the Peljesac bridge are not and cannot be Croatian or internal waters, but international waters stretching from the territorial waters of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the open sea,” Genjac argued.[16][26] The bridge and its access roads opened for traffic on 26 July 2022.

Bilateral issues

[edit]

Political relations and status of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina

[edit]

In 2018, Croatia objected to the election of Željko Komšić as Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was elected mainly by the Bosnian Muslim voters. The Croatian Parliament adopted a Resolution on the situation of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This resolution was deemed by the Office of the High Representative as in violation of Croatia's obligations of non-interference under the Dayton Agreement.

Croatia’s conveyed the view that the election of Komsić should never happen again, as it is seen as undermining "the equality of constituent nations" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, between the three main ethnic groups of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Croatia also continues to voice its support for constitutional and electoral reforms that would enable Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to have legitimate representatives in the legislative and executive bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the upper house of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the vast majority of the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina lives, and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Two schools under one roof

[edit]
Main article: Two schools under one roof
Travnik's gymnasium (2018) – right side of the building hosts the Croatian-curriculum high school and was renovated with funds from the Republic of Croatia. The left side of the building hosts the Bosnian-curriculum high school and is dilapidated. The courtyard is separated by a fence.

Croatia is a sponsor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's segregated school system, exemplified by the "two schools under one roof". Children from two ethnic groups, Bosniaks and Croats, attend classes in the same building, but physically separated from each other and taught separate curricula.[27] Children from one ethnic group often enter the school through one door, while children from other ethnic group through another. In the Federation entity of BiH, 57 schools operated in this way in the year 2010.[28] By 2018, 56 such schools remained.[29] This phenomenon of ethnic separation is attributed to the Croat–Bosniak War (1992–1994) and the creation of Herzeg-Bosnia on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia continues to finance the system of separate Croatian-curriculum public schools in BiH.[29]

Migration management

[edit]
See also: European migrant crisis

Since 2018, increased migratory flows has posed challenges at the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular along the region of Una-Sana Canton. Since January 2018, around 32,000 migrants have entered BiH, out of them around 7,200 are estimated be in BiH currently. Civil society and international organisations has reported violent collective expulsion (pushbacks) of migrants and asylum seekers back into Bosnia and Herzegovina.[30] Croatian authorities have rejected these accusations. The Croatian Ombudsman has, however, raised serious concerns on the activities of Croatian police at the border with BiH.

Nuclear waste disposal site in Trgovska Gora

[edit]

Bosnia and Herzegovina objected to Croatia's plans to build a radioactive waste disposal site across the border in Trgovska Gora, Dvor (former Cerkezovac barracks) in 2021.[31]

Pollution from the Brod fuel refinery

[edit]

The Croatian government has raised concerns about the cross-border impact of pollution from the fuel refinery in Brod (BiH), owned by Russian state-owned company Zarubezhneft. After an explosion incident on 9 October 2018 that left one person dead and ten injured, the refinery ceased operations.[32] The company has not announced its shutdown, but the refinery remains closed down as of 2022.[33]

Economic development

[edit]
Building of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina during a visit of the president of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović in 2018.

Transport

[edit]

As Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia each share the largest part of their border with the other (932 kilometers or 579 miles), they have participated in numerous joint ventures aimed at providing a regional economic uplift. One of such projects is the widening of Pan-European Corridor Vc (E73) to freeway standards.[5] Although extending to the Adriatic Sea all the way from Budapest, the capital of Hungary, Corridor Vc (in Bosnia and Herzegovina designated as A1) is purported to bear most importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina as its longest turnpike (at 340 kilometers or 210 miles) and a national project of sorts.[34] It passes through Croatia at two stretches: one in eastern Slavonia near Osijek and Đakovo (A5) and the other at the coast near Ploče and Metković (A10). Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have so far co-operated in building a bridge over Sava River near Svilaj, Croatia, which connects the northern end of Corridor Vc to the southern end of Croatian A5.[5]

Trade

[edit]

Exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina amount to 14.4% of Croatia's total, while as of 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fifth largest trade partner of Croatia. This makes Croatia both the largest importer and exporter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second largest buyer of Croatian goods. With 343 million convertible marks (US$237 million) of invested foreign capital, Croatia is the largest investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, topping nearby Slovenia (BAM 302 million; US$208 million) and neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (BAM 122 million; US$84 million). In 2007, the trade between the two countries amounted to 2,517 million US dollars (BAM 3.64 billion; HRK 13.63 billion), a 32% increase from the past year.[35][36]

HT Eronet ownership

[edit]

The third telecommunication company of Bosnia and Herzegovina, HT Eronet, is owned 50.1% by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 39% by Hrvatski Telekom. Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović had been charged with abuse of power and authority during the privatization of Eronet in 1999, but was acquitted by the FBiH Supreme Court in April 2013. The company is considered to be under heavy political influence by the HDZ BiH party and a source of patronage. A due diligence by international advisors was requested by the IMF as a prior action in 2016,[37] and completed only in early 2019.[38]

Cooperation in the EU accession process of Bosnia and Herzegovina

[edit]

A bilateral agreement on cooperation in the EU accession process was signed in 2016.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ "Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices of Croatia - Bosnia and Herzegovina". Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Archived from the original on 21 July 2011. Retrieved 8 April 2009.
  2. ^ "Date of Recognition and Establishment of Diplomatic Relations". Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia. Archived from the original on 13 August 2010. Retrieved 9 April 2009.
  3. ^ "Dates of Recognition and Establishment of Diplomatic Relations". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Archived from the original on 6 July 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2009.
  4. ^ "Bilateralni odnosi: Politički odnosi". Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 24 January 2009. Retrieved 8 April 2009.
  5. ^ a b c d "Collection of International Treaties". Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Archived from the original on 21 July 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2009.
  6. ^ "MVEP • Veleposlanstva RH u svijetu • Bosna i Hercegovina, Sarajevo". Mvep.hr. Retrieved 4 January 2018.
  7. ^ "MVEP • Veleposlanstva stranih država u RH • Bosna i Hercegovina, Zagreb". Mvep.hr. Retrieved 4 January 2018.
  8. ^ "Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices - Bosnia and Herzegovina". Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Archived from the original on 21 July 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2009.
  9. ^ "Croatia". CIA World Factbook. 9 April 2009. Retrieved 13 April 2009.
  10. ^ "Bosnia and Herzegovina". CIA World Factbook. 9 April 2009. Retrieved 13 April 2009.
  11. ^ N1
  12. ^ Balkan Insight, 30 May 2018
  13. ^ "Total Croatia News". Archived from the original on 14 May 2021. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  14. ^ Duspara, Mario (4 May 2009). "Uskoro kraj zabrani izručivanja građana RH". Poslovni dnevnik (in Croatian). Retrieved 17 May 2009.[permanent dead link‍]
  15. ^ "Family Reports Politician Ante Jelavić Kidnapped". Javno.hr (in Croatian). 9 April 2009. Archived from the original on 10 April 2009. Retrieved 17 May 2009.
  16. ^ a b "Croatia Rejects Bosnian 'Threats' Over Peljesac Bridge". 7 August 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2018.
  17. ^ Milan Cimeša (6 August 2010). "Vlakom prema jugu". Novosti (in Serbian). Retrieved 20 October 2013.
  18. ^ "Predsjednik Vlade RH: Sporazum o granici s BiH nije do kraja pravičan". Croatian Government (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2009.
  19. ^ Soldić, Zdravka; Selimović; Šenol (7 March 2007). "BiH traži na moru granicu s Italijom". Široki.com (in Croatian). Retrieved 12 April 2009.
  20. ^ "Neum Agreement, May 1996" (PDF). Technical annex on a proposed loan to the Republic of Croatia for an emergency transport and mine clearing project. World Bank. 15 October 1996. pp. 45–47. Retrieved 15 August 2011.
  21. ^ "Zbirka međunarodnih ugovora" [Collection of international agreements] (in Croatian). Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (Croatia). Archived from the original on 31 March 2008. Retrieved 15 August 2011.
  22. ^ "Sarajevski ultimatum: Bosna do Italije". Globus (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 13 September 2012. Retrieved 5 November 2012.
  23. ^ "BiH protiv nižeg Pelješkog mosta" (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 15 October 2012. Retrieved 5 November 2012.
  24. ^ "Akcija bh. parlamentaraca: Hrvatska ne smije graditi Pelješki most". 2 August 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2018.
  25. ^ "Bh. parlamentarci spremaju pismo EU: Lažirana saglasnost BiH za gradnju Pelješkog mosta". Novinska agencija Patria. 3 August 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2018.
  26. ^ "Bosnia Determined to Stop Pelješac Bridge Construction". Archived from the original on 5 December 2021. Retrieved 26 March 2018.
  27. ^ Lowen, Mark (1 April 2010). "Balkan divisions survive in Bosnian schools". BBC.
  28. ^ "Bosnia: No End to 'Two Schools Under One Roof'". Balkan Insight. 18 February 2010.
  29. ^ a b "OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina launches report on 'two schools under one roof' concept as most visible example of discrimination in education". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 3 December 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2023.
  30. ^ "There are reports of violent collective expulsion of migrants and asylum seekers back into Bosnia and Herzegovina". European Commission 2019 analytical report on BiH, p. 64
  31. ^ Sarajevo Times, BalkanEU, Emerging Europe
  32. ^ "Eksplozija Rafinerije: Predsjednica upoznata sa stanjem na Savi". Dnevnik.hr. 10 October 2018. Retrieved 12 May 2022.
  33. ^ "Ugašena Rafinerija u Brodu bit će 2020. plinoficirana". energetika-net.com. 23 October 2019.
  34. ^ "Motorway on Corridor Vc: Pre-feasibility study" (PDF). IPSA Institute. October 2005. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 September 2007. Retrieved 12 April 2009.
  35. ^ "Bilateralni odnosi". Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integrations of the Republic of Croatia (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 16 November 2008. Retrieved 17 May 2009.
  36. ^ "Bilateralni odnosi". Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 21 July 2011. Retrieved 17 May 2009.
  37. ^ Sarajevo Times
  38. ^ Telecom Paper
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bosnia_and_Herzegovina–Croatia_relations&oldid=1256730380"