Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/September 2017/Op-ed
|
The Anzacs in the Third Ypres Offensive |
- By Hawkeye7
In the wake of the Battle of Messines in June 1917, it looked like the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front had hit upon a formula for winning battles; but given the amount of preparation involved and the amount of ground gained, repeats of Messines seemed unlikely to yield the sort of results required if the Allied coalition was to be kept together, and Britain was to avoid being bankrupted or starved into submission. The possibility of switching the effort to another theatre of war was seriously considered, but the only one regarded as having any prospects was Italy. There is discussion of returning the AIF to the Middle East, which would economise on shipping. The diggers regard the rumours as too good to possibly be true.
In the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, General Sir Hubert Gough attempts to break into the German defensive positions, and then push forward. The planned advance is still a limited one, the final objective about 3,500 yards (3,200 m) distant. This is short of the main German defensive line, the Flandern I line, over 10,000 yards (9,100 m) away, but beyond the range of the British guns. The AIF would have been good at this; it had a more flexible doctrine of command and, importantly, recent training and practical experience in semi-open warfare and dealing with German counterattacks. Although the British and French forces break through the thinly-held German forward positions and penetrate 3,000 yards (2,700 m) or more in places, German counterattacks drive back the British forces on the right flank. Attempts to retrieve the situation literally bog down. The weather turns bad in August, with heavy rains. Flanders is low lying and the drainage system has been damaged by shellfire and fallen into disrepair. In the frontline area, shelling had completely destroyed it and the area started to revert to a swamp.
The BEF commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, decides to revert to a stricter version of the limited attack, known as "bite and hold". The infantry will advance behind a "creeping barrage"—an artillery barrage that moves forward a set amount at pre-determined intervals. The infantry would follow it as closely as possible, eliminating the German strongpoints as they go. As at Messines, the low-lying nature of much of the ground led the Germans to rely on concrete pillboxes rather than trenches or dugouts. When the infantry reach the final objective, a standing barrage will deal with German counterattacks, giving the infantry time to consolidate the newly won positions. Because the advance was limited by the range of the field artillery, which was necessarily positioned some distance behind the front line, the advance will be limited to about 2,000 yards (1,800 m). But attacks—or "steps"—in series could conceivably drive the Germans from the high ground, and possibly prompt a general withdrawal from the coast. Haig places General Sir Herbert Plumer of the British Second Army in charge of the next stage, and brought I Anzac Corps in to spearhead it. This marks the first time that Australian troops are being used to spearhead a major offensive on the Western Front.
When the Australian gunners arrive in the Ypres salient, they find their gun positions are on the crowded Ypres flats, completely open to observation from a great semicircle of high ground held by the Germans, whose guns are on the other side of these heights, concealed from direct British observation. The lighter-calibre German guns frequently move positions. Some guns only fire from temporary positions, while others only fire at night or when operations are in progress. The German guns prefer firing in enfilade, made easy by the salient, which causes difficulties in coordination for the British, as the German guns are in a neighbouring corps' zone. Heavy rains, mists and low clouds mean poor visibility, which grounds aircraft and makes spotting from the ground and the air harder. The sound rangers also have adverse conditions to cope with. To top it off, the Allies have lost the air superiority they once held and German aircraft are again able to observe and raid. Without sound ranging or ground or aerial observation, the German guns cannot be located and cannot be suppressed.
For the first time, the Australians have to face gas on a large scale. Conditions were not favourable for its use on the Somme, and there were only 230 AIF gas casualties in 1916, of which 18 were fatal. In the salient, the Germans start using Yellow Cross (mustard gas). It is a blistering agent that leaves burns on the skin, and can remain dangerous on the ground for up to 72 hours. There is also the lethal Green Cross (phosgene). The Germans have calculated that it will take the Allies up to six months to start making their own gas shells with Yellow Cross and Green Cross and retaliate. In fact, it will take over a year due to production problems. Largely as a result of Yellow Cross, Australian gas casualties soar to 1,675 in October 1917 and 1,086 in November 1917. Of these 501 and 526 respectively are in the artillery.
In the difficult conditions of the Ypres salient, we start hearing of personnel from service units receiving decorations usually associated with the infantry. On 1 September, Sister Rachel Pratt of the 1st Casualty Clearing Station is wounded by bomb splinters but carries on caring for the wounded. She becomes the sixth AIF nurse to be awarded the Military Medal in this campaign. Driver Danks of the 1st Light Railway Operating Company wins the Military Medal for sticking to his post after his train has been set on fire by an enemy shell. Trains could not be left unmanned no matter how heavy the shelling was, and the sound of the locomotive masked that of the gas shells. The 3rd Railway Light Operating Company alone earns two Distinguished Conduct Medals and five Military Medals for gallantry in 1917. Truck drivers and wagon drivers are shelled on the well-known roads and tracks. But the artillery suffers the worst, casualties for the first three weeks in August being equivalent to three months worth of losses on the Somme in 1916. By 24 August, the Major General Royal Artillery (MGRA) at BEF GHQ, Major General Noel Birch, warns of dire consequences if this continues.
The first step is the Battle of Menin Road, on 20 September. The 1st and 2nd Divisions are supported by the field artillery of their own and the two reserve divisions, and 46½ batteries of heavy guns. The barrage is a textbook one; dense and regular, and capable of being followed closely. The assaulting battalions advance on four-company fronts. In the 2nd Division, each company has a platoon in two lines 15 to 20 yards (14 to 18 m) apart. A second platoon follows in "worms", with each section in single file. A third platoon are "moppers up" and move in an extended line like the first platoon. The fourth platoon are "carriers" and move in section columns. Pillboxes, mostly shelters with no loop holes, are captured by infantry rushing them from the flanks. Menin Road is judged a complete success, but it is a hard-fought battle which costs the 1st and 2nd Divisions 5,013 casualties. This was mainly due to overcrowding the forward zone; Plumer employs a troop density almost twice that of Gough. Many of these troops were employed in manning defences against counterattacks that never came, or are defeated by the artillery. The 1,500-yard (1,400 m) advance is too shallow to dislocate the German defence arrangements, and the necessary pause between steps gives the Germans time to rotate front line divisions and consolidate the new front.
The second step is the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September. Owing to difficulties in bringing forward enough guns and ammunition in time, the attack is scaled down in both depth and width so that the density of guns remains the same. The attack is almost dislocated by a German counterattack on 25 September against the 5th Division and the neighbouring British 33rd Division. The Australians manage to hold their ground and establish a defensive flank facing but the British are driven back. Nonetheless, the attack goes forward as planned. That it cannot be modified points to a serious flaw in the command and tactics that the BEF is employing. The 5th Division advances as scheduled. The 33rd Division has a difficult assignment, as the barrage is not where they need it to be. Brigadier General H. E. (Pompey) Elliott of the 15th Infantry Brigade has to cover his flank while capturing his objectives. As the 15th Brigade does so, two British battalions are able to pass through it and attack their first objective from the flank. Elliott is ordered to assist the British in capturing their objectives. He forms a special force and places it under a trusted subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Marshall. Marshall's force turns southward, rolling up the German positions, and capturing the entire British final objective without a barrage. Against the odds, the Battle of Polygon Wood is a success, and all objectives are taken, at a cost of 5,478 Australian casualties. The German high command is shaken by Menin Road and Polygon Wood. Their defence-in-depth scheme does not seem to be working. So they change tack, packing more troops into the frontline in the hope of halting the Allied advance. It is a disastrous error.
The third step is the Battle of Broodseinde on 4 October. Haig brings II Anzac Corps into the line so the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and New Zealand Divisions fight side-by-side. It is the first time that four Anzac divisions are used in one attack. While waiting in no man's land in drizzling rain for the barrage to commence, the 1st and 2nd Divisions came under a German barrage, and the rear waves begin to take heavy casualties. At 06:00 the Australian barrage begins and the German one stops. The diggers rise from their shell holes and move forward. Ahead are waves of Germans with bayonets fixed. Incredibly, both sides have chosen to attack at the same place and the same time. The diggers use their Lewis guns to break up the German attack. The ground ahead is the Flandern I line, the German main defensive position. It is studded with pillboxes, and there is hard fighting. Almost all the I and II Anzac Corps objectives are attained. Broodseinde costs the three Australian divisions involved 6,432 men and the New Zealanders 1,853, but 4,158 German prisoners are processed by the corps cages and casualty-clearing stations.
Broodseinde is a stunning victory, but after a long spell of dry weather, rain falls on eight days out of ten between 4 and 13 October, turning the ground into a quagmire. The 3rd Division Artillery is forced to set up alongside short lengths of plank road far from their intended positions, which cannot be reached. The artillery is also running out of guns. On 12 October, Brigadier General William Burgess, the commander of the 4th Division Artillery, reports that only 80 per cent of the 18-pounders and 75 per cent of the 4.5-inch howitzers of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions are serviceable, the rest being out of action or stuck in the mud somewhere. When the Canadians take over two weeks later, they find only 220 of the 360 field guns taken over from the Australians in working order. The I Anzac Corps Heavy Artillery has to rely on the light rail system because the caterpillar tracks on the tractors cannot negotiate the sharp bends in the road, and guns loaded on 6 October are not in position a week later. The engineers of I Anzac Corps have constructed 18,300 yards (16,700 m) of plank roads and 10 miles (16 km) of metalled roads in 27 days, but it is not enough. I Anzac Corps Heavy Artillery carries out an unusual experiment in having twelve 60-pounders towed into position by tanks. Ammunition becomes coated with mud and is unusable until cleaned. Mule trains are now the backbone of the supply system, hauling rations, water and ammunition. Even the infantry has trouble getting forward, relying on duckboard tracks.
The Battle of Poelcappelle on 9 October, fought mainly by British troops, is a failure. Little ground is captured. Another attack is ordered for 12 October. The weather is bad, and there is only three days to prepare. To make up for the failure on 9 October, Plumer and the commander of II Anzac Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Godley, plan to advance faster and further than hitherto. The commander of I Anzac Corps, Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood is aghast. He urges Plumer to reconsider. So too do Major Generals Andrew Russell of the New Zealand Division and John Monash of the 3rd Division. Gough urges Haig to overrule Plumer and call off, or at least postpone, the attack. In view of Birdwood's opposition, I Anzac Corps' part is scaled back, but the First Battle of Passchendaele goes ahead. Critically, while the Australians have already overrun the Flandern I line in their sector, the New Zealanders are confronted with an intact portion on Bellevue Spur. Godley makes no provision for this, and the New Zealanders are halted in their tracks. The 3rd Division advances with a thin barrage, and even manages to reach Passchendaele; but it comes under enfilade fire from Bellevue Spur, and the position is untenable. The 3rd Division loses 3,199 men, the New Zealand Division 2,735, and the 4th another 1,018. The Medical Corps has difficulty evacuating the wounded, and as a result the ratio of killed to wounded is slightly higher than usual.
Passchendaele is captured by Major General Arthur Currie's Canadian Corps in a series of operations known as the Second Battle of Passchendaele in November but all hope of a major victory is gone. While the British and Australian armies had become accustomed to the occasional disaster on the Western Front, it was—and remains—New Zealand's greatest and most costly military disaster. Unusually, Russell took responsibility, although military historians attribute most of the blame to Godley, followed by Plumer and Haig in that order.
|
