Humanities desk
< October 1	<< Sep \| October \| Nov >>	October 3 >

Welcome to the Wikipedia Humanities Reference Desk Archives
The page you are currently viewing is a transcluded archive page. While you can leave answers for any questions shown below, please ask new questions on one of the current reference desk pages.

October 2

Philip II of Spain and his 1565 decision on theatre

The reputation of Philip II of Spain, an actor of the counter-reformation, for rigor in religious, political and social matters leads me to ask this question: Could you give me the reason why Philip II of Spain decided to authorize in 1565 the creation of permanent brotherhoods with buildings for the representation of comedies? This information appears in various places including this one I am looking for reliable sources. Thank you already for your answer. Égoïté (talk) 08:44, 2 October 2024 (UTC) (sorry for my bad english)[reply]

Don't have an answer, but there seems to be some academic literature on the topic. You might find something in: Suárez García, José Luis. “La licitud del teatro en el reinado de Felipe II. Textos y pretextos”, XXI Jornadas de Teatro Clásico. Almagro, 1998, pp. 219-251. Fut.Perf. ☼ 10:55, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you. A French-speaking Wikipedian gave me some references here. Have a nice day, Égoïté (talk) 13:07, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Égoïté, you may be interested in PHILIP II AND THE ORIGINS OF BAROQUE THEATRE which describes how religious brotherhoods or cofradías de socorro petitioned the king for licences for theatrical performances to increase their income, as charitable donations alone could not fulfil the demand for the hospitals, orphanages and homeless hostels that the brotherhoods provided (p. 20 onwards). Alansplodge (talk) 17:28, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

OK Thanks. I 'll read that this evening or to-morrow. Good night, Égoïté (talk) 18:13, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Military ambulance and rescue ships in WW2

Why were (and still are?) ambulance and rescue ships in WW2 not given Geneva Convention protections? It seems such protections were not even sought. I'm using WW2 Hospital Ships, US Medical Research Centre as a source on ambulance ships being armed, and in part yesterday's reply on a previous thread here by User:Alansplodge, to get me curious that convoy rescue ships were also armed (which seems triply odd to me given their reported war stats).

Our only relevant article to ambulance ships (not hospital ships) seems to be Ambulance § Military use, which does not cover the issue. The armed unmarked ambulance use cases are for modern urban warfare, and ships seem antithetical to that, particularly as hospital ships and coastal rescue are protected classes that exist at the same time and place as ambulance ships. SamuelRiv (talk) 18:10, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

"Introduction (2017 Commentary)". International Humanitarian Law Databases. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949. International Committee of the Red Cross. Commentary of 2017. paragraphs 83-91 might be a good starting point, but don't have time to look further right now. fiveby(zero) 19:56, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, but as a starting point it just raises the same "why not" question. It indicates the last maritime IHL treaty in force for the major powers of WW2 was Hague Convention X 1907, which states plainly in Article 1 that a "military hospital ship" is any ship assigned "specially and solely with a view to assisting the wounded, sick and shipwrecked". (Article 16 further seems to indicate that rescue should be accommodated regardless of ship.) So the specialized rescue and ambulance ships can be protected as such, and the USMRC article indicates that marked hospital ships were honored by U-boats, so I'm again asking why they didn't even try to mark rescue and ambulance ships? SamuelRiv (talk) 22:00, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

(edit conflict) I don't know the answer, but my suspicion is that it's connected with the British policy of shooting down German rescue flying-boats during the Battle of Britain (described at Seenotdienst#World War II), and that consequently the Germans were highly unlikely to respect any claimed immunity from attack and so the ships might as well be defensively armed. Alansplodge (talk) 22:05, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Note also that in the 1982 Falklands War, the survey ship HMS Hecla (A133) was converted into an ambulance ship and was given the appropriate Red Cross livery; so the decision not to do this in WWII must have been peculiar to the circumstances of that conflict, rather than a long-term policy. Alansplodge (talk) 22:14, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Another thought (after re-reading our article) is that there is a requirement in the Hague Convention for a belligerent to advise the location of any hospital ship. As a convoy's route and location was a secret on which the survival of the convoy depended, giving away that information to the enemy would be undesirable, to say the least. Alansplodge (talk) 22:28, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I had pulled up the Hague X text and I don't see where it says anything resembling a rule like "Belligerents will establish the location of a hospital ship". It says that the ships' names must be shared. (The seenotdienst article is interesting, as it indicates that sea rescue of pilots at least was not a high priority for the Brits for quite a while, but ship rescue would still be quite different.) SamuelRiv (talk) 22:52, 2 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think you're right, perhaps we should remove that bullet point from the list? I have added a "dubious" template. Alansplodge (talk) 16:00, 3 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

So not why were rescue ships not afforded protections under the conventions, but why were rescue ships not designated Hospital Ships under the existing conventions?

On "Ambulance Ship" this might just be the usage of the term. There was a need for ships that carried out the same functions of caring for wounded and transporting from the theater of operations to interior zones but were armed and could perform other duties. As the reference you were using pointed out there were no US hospital ships mid-1942. There was at least initially debate on the issues and inter-service rivalry. The army wanted Hospital Ships but in the Pacific the navy was unsure if the Japanese would respect the convention and they wanted ships which could operate tactically with the fleet and were armed for protection. Also remember that there was a critical shortage of Allied shipping, if you designate a hull as a Hospital Ship it cannot perform other functions. Can't find a definitive source here but will keep looking.

For the convoy rescue ships i'll try and get access to Schofield and Hague but one thing that is probably missing from the article is Doenitz' order to specifically target them

To each convoy a so-called rescue ship is generally attached, a special vessel up to 3,000 tons which is designed to take aboard the shipwrecked after U-boat attacks. These ships are in most cases equipped with catapult planes and large motor boats. …They are heavily armed with depth charge throwers and very maneuverable, and are often taken for U-boat traps by commanders. In view of the fact that the annihilation of ships and crews is desired, their sinking is of great importance.
— "The Trial of Admiral Doenitz". Naval History and Heritage Command.

It might be that a calculation was made that a small ship operating at the rear of the convoy was much too valuable for defense of the convoy to designate as a Hospital Ship. Would the Germans believe that such a vessel might not for instance radio other ships if they spotted a submarine, try and salvage ships, or assist the convoy in some other way? If the allies had some ships that were operating as Hospital Ships that the Germans might not consider completely legitimate would it endanger all Hospital Ships or give ammunition for them to claim that the allies were not respecting the conventions? Sorry about the reference free answer, but will look for more later. fiveby(zero) 16:57, 3 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

As far as I can tell, British rescue ships were (despite what Doenitz believed) only fitted with light guns, the same as any other defensively equipped merchant ship.

One Geneva Convention requirement which might be relevant here is the last clause of Article 5:

The ships and boats above mentioned which wish to ensure by night the freedom from interference to which they are entitled, must, subject to the assent of the belligerent they are accompanying, take the necessary measures to render their special painting sufficiently plain.

In other words, designated hospital ships needed to be illuminated at night. As the great majority of U-boat attacks took place after dark, this would be problematic, as it would give away the position of the whole convoy.

Alansplodge (talk) 08:04, 4 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I don't interpret that as that they need to be illuminated at night. Just that if they don't want to be protected at night, they need to be sufficiently visible. It seems to imply that you can be fine as a named hospital ship that is visible and protected by day, and less-visible and unprotected by night. It also is explicit that if you are in a convoy ("the belligerent they are accompanying"), and the convoy tells you to be invisible at night, you need to be invisible, and that will not jeopardize your protection during the daytime either. SamuelRiv (talk) 14:02, 4 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

So there was not much point in seeking protection that would only apply in daylight, because the risk of attack was at night. Alansplodge (talk) 19:31, 6 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

At first sight, it may seem strange that, confronted with the need to inaugurate a Rescue Service for the victims of the German submarine offensive against merchant shipping, the Admiralty did not fit out a number of hospital ships to cruise in the areas where the Uboats were active, ready to pick up survivors. In theory, provided they carried the markings and behaved as required by the Hague Convention of 1907, they should have been perfectly safe, and this would have been an admirable solution to the problem. Larger ships could have been used. These would not have suffered in the same way as the Rescue Ships from the savage buffeting of the elements, and possibly their facilities would have been better. There were, however, several reasons why hospital ships were not used.
In the First World War, Germany had refused to grant immunity from attack to hospital ships in the English Channel, parts of the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, even if their identify had been notified. Similarly, during the Second World War, from the outbreak of hostilities, it was known that Germany, under Hitler’s dictatorship, took little stock of international agreements unless it was to their advantage, illustrated by the occasions when Germany, and later Italy, disregarded the provisions of the Hague Convention: by the middle of 1941 no fewer than 13 hospital ships and carriers had been sunk, although all had been clearly marked as such.
The nine hospital ships were...
The British Government therefore had every reason to distrust the use of hospital ships in dealing with casualties on the high seas. In any case, under the regulations a hospital ship had to be lighted up at night. This meant that she could not keep close touch with a convoy without giving away its position to any U-boats which might be lying in wait. Yet, as we have seen, the speed with which a rescue could be effected was more often than not a matter of life or death. So if the rescuing ship was not in company with the victim of the attack, her usefulness would have been reduced.
Thus the arguments against fitting out and employing hospital ships for use with the convoys were decisive and their use was never given serious consideration. There was, however, a suggestion that fitting the Rescue Ships with HF/DF equipment with which to locate U-boats was perhaps somewhat unethical, having regard to the main purpose for which Rescue Ships were needed. But the ships neither claimed nor received any immunity from attack, so the Admiralty felt perfectly justified in using them for any purpose they had in mind, provided it did not interfere with their primary task of rescuing the survivors of torpedoed vessels. Rescue Ships became, in fact, part and parcel of the anti-submarine effort required to ensure the safety of that merchant shipping so vital to the prosecution of the war, and they accepted – like any other ship of a convoy and its escort – the risk of being sunk.
— Schofield, B.B. (2024) [1968]. The Rescue Ships and the Convoys.

for the Admiralty opinion, or at least Vice-admiral Schofield's. If you are thinking of article content here a warning that Schofield is a pretty scattered account, reads more like a first draft than a careful work. The confusing "nine hospital ships" paragraph i elided was however due to a later editors amendment in my edition. fiveby(zero) 16:09, 4 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Looks like Hague 1998 would require a trip to the stacks at a university library. fiveby(zero) 16:53, 4 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]