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July 14

Why was the Tulsa Ports placed at Catoosa?

I was looking at various maps of Oklahoma, and the question came to me of why does the Tulsa Port of Catoosa even exist. Tulsa lies on the Arkansas River, which is considerably larger than the Verdigris River on which the Tulsa Port of Catoosa lies. Also Tulsa was a vastly larger city than Catoosa (by about 2 orders of magnitude before Catoosa began growing after the port was placed there). Wouldn't it be more efficient to transport goods directly from/to Tulsa via the Arkansas River than to move goods from Tulsa to Catoosa to then be transported via the Verdigris River, which in fact is a tributary of the Arkansas and flows into the Arkansas anyway? This seems like a pointless diversion of goods that makes the entire transportation process longer and more inefficient. Why was the decision made in the 1960s to develop a port in Catoosa on the Verdigris River instead of developing the banks of Tulsa that lie directly on the Arkansas River? —SeekingAnswers (reply) 04:33, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

It is not only a transportation centre, but also a large industrial park, mostly built in the 1970s and later, also served by served by both the BNSF Railroad and the South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad. Much of the goods transported has the park as origin or destination. I assume the location was selected as being the most suitable, given an array of criteria (such as: not occupying prime real estate like downtown Tulsa, accessibility by railroad), along the waterways of the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System. --Lambiam 07:53, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

That doesn't answer my question, though. As you said, the industrial park was built in the 1970s or later, and it was only built around the port placed at Catoosa -- my point is, why place that port at Catoosa in the first place, an inconvenient distance away from Tulsa, when Tulsa is already lying on the Arkansas? —SeekingAnswers (reply) 12:48, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

If the first commercial shipment arrived in the port in 1971, there cannot have been much of a port before. My understanding is that even though the port was built first, port and park were conceived from the start as a unified project. --Lambiam 19:27, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Wild guess: People don’t like to live really close to ports and industrial parks. DOR (HK) (talk) 14:30, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Another wild guess: is the Arkansas River prone to flooding or droughts? If so it would make sens to use a nearby smaller but more predictable or controllable river as the port. Xuxl (talk) 14:38, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

We're guessing now? I think the motto of the Ref Desks should be "Whereof one cannot speak with references, thereof one must remain silent" (apologies to Wittgenstein). -- Jack of Oz ^{[pleasantries]} 20:03, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Shame upon us - the history stack exchange beat us to the right answer. Something about gradients and locks, supported by this reference. Alansplodge (talk) 22:16, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Full siblings preferred to half-siblings in fief inheritance

I have come across some vague references to full siblings being preferred to half-siblings in succession to fiefs under the principle of proximity of blood. The Coutumes de Beauvaisis do not mention this. Can someone shed some light on this, please? Surtsicna (talk) 10:10, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I think it's implied by the rules of primogeniture collating with monogamy. The "Coutumes" are not excluding explicitly any arrangement if I'm reading them right :

466. Se vilenages vient a enfans en descendant ou en eschoite, il n'i a point d'ainsneece, ains en porte autant li mainsnés comme li ainsnés

The standard interpretation (https://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/ainesse) is not suggesting I'm right, or maybe it's suggestive of some ambiguity. Askedonty (talk) 20:06, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, Askedonty. The issue is that a person might be succeeded in their fief by their only son, born of a second marriage, but if that son died childless, the claimants could be an elder half-sister, from the parent's first marriage, and a younger full sister. Primogeniture would favor the half-sister but, if I am correct in understanding how proximity of blood worked in the Outremer, the full sister might have been considered a closer relative. Surtsicna (talk) 12:52, 17 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Family of Nabonidus and Belshazzar in ancient Babylon

It says in our page for Lucifer in the section Christian Folklore, background that Belshazzar is the son of Nebuchadnezzar II. I'm not sure this is right, as I thought Belshazzar was the son of Nabonidus. Indeed our page for Belshazzar has him as the son of Nabonidus. Does this need correcting or am I missing something?95.150.44.185 (talk) 15:30, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Here is the edit that introduced this text: [1]. I can't see the text of Laney's book to check whether it actually says this. It's possible that either Laney or the 2016 IP editor is following the book of Daniel, which does appear to make Belshazzar the son of Nebuchadnezzar. In either case, the Laney book seems most relevant to Christian beliefs about the Isaiah passage, rather than to the historical relationships of the Babylonian rulers. --Amble (talk) 16:51, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Perhaps inserting "according to the Book of Daniel" in the text would put things to right? Alansplodge (talk) 22:09, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

We really need to find out what the Laney book actually says. The 2016 edit I linked inserts new text in between the citation and the shorter text that went with it. That might be further information based on the book, or it might be the IP editor's explanation of the earlier text based on their own understanding. (It's also not universally accepted that the book of Daniel really does mean to make Belshazzar the son of Nebuchadnezzar.) --Amble (talk) 23:00, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

can employers legally ban employees from having certain apps installed on their personal phones while in the workplace

suppose this employer abhors tik tok because it is complicit with ethnic cleansing of millions of Uyghurs and also concerned about its national security and eavesdropping risk. could an employer or medical provider legally ban employees from having tiktok installed on their phone while within the building where it theoretically could eavesdrop on private patient conversations (they could always reinstall it once clocked out), or terminate employees who refuse to do so Yanping Nora Soong (talk) 16:34, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

That could depend on the laws of a given region. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 17:23, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Per WP:RD "Note: Legal or medical advice is prohibited." Consult a local lawyer if you want to know what is or is not legally allowed. RudolfRed (talk) 18:25, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Not only may this be different in different jurisdictions, but this is also unlikely to have been codified in such detail in existing legislation. So a typical scenario may unfold as follows (simplified): (1) Employer forbids the employees to do something. (2) Employee ignores the ban. (3) Employer fires employee. (4) Employee sues employer. The lawyers on both sides (and ultimately the judges) will examine existing case law for similar cases to see if there are generally applicable principles. One rather general principle that is applied in many jurisdictions is that the employer needs to have a legitimate interest in maintaining the ban, an interest that has more weight than the interest of the employer of not having their private choices intruded upon. So it is likely that the employer needs an argument that is strong and work-related. If they claim the ban is to protect the privacy of customers (work-related) while their actual motivation is political (not work-related), the party fighting the ban in court will probably try to prove that the stated argument is fake. --Lambiam 19:13, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The trump card might be, what has any particular cellphone app got to do with the work the employee is being paid to do? ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 23:46, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Well...sort of? There are some roughly accurate observations in there, but assuming you are referring to the current state of American common law, as several details in your post seem to establish), you have misconstrued the breadth of grounds under which such suits can be brought and the burden-shifting under which they operate, especially if we are applying the manner in which these laws and principles operate to the OP's hypothetical. In truth, throughout the U.S., employers enjoy substantial latitude for dismissing at-will employees for completely arbitrary reasons. Unless terms of an employment contract dictate otherwise, most privately employers have no obligation to establish just cause before a termination.

As you correctly note, there are some not-insubstantial variations between jurisdictions: there are federal statutes and a substantial body of case law which prohibit termination where it is based on certain forms of recognized discrimination of what are known as protected classes (sex, age, national origin, religion, disability, ect.) and some other more marginal protections under labour and civil rights law. These protections are often described as the "floor" of U.S. labour protections, because they are jurisdictionally broad (applying to causes of action arising in any U.S. state), but extremely narrow in the protections they afford in terms of restricting at-will terminations, beyond protecting individuals from being sacked for no other cause than belonging to an afore-mentioned protected classes. However, on top of this, states are largely at liberty to raise the "ceiling" on these protections by statutorily (or by judicial expansion of said state-level statutes) establishing additional protections, with a fair deal of variance in how aggressively the state legislatures have pursued this prerogative in the interest of worker's rights.

However the most critical distinction to be made here (and the crux of why I think your response perhaps paints a more open-ended interpretation of the worker's legal recourse in the OP's scenario than is realistic) is that the employee here is going to bear the burden of establishing a cause of action under either federal or state law in order to survive summary dismissal of the suit. In other words, this plaintiff will need to articulate that the employer violated the letter of a specific law offering them a more particularized protection--or in extremely rare occasions, some fundamental constitutional right--before they can even proceed to attempting to make their case. It is only after that threshold has been passed that a court will take such a suit to the trial phase and ultimately weigh the relative importance of the rights, interests, and reasonable expectations of the private parties--and there's a strong tradition in the American judiciary of regarding both parties in an at-will arrangement as being free to terminate the relationship on completely arbitrary grounds, unless the statutory protection is very express.

Now, of course I don't know the entirety of the labour rights carve-outs of the civil code of every state in the U.S., but I've never heard of a statute for any state which carves out the kind of protection for possessing an app at work, nor even any common law carve-out close enough to be leveraged as particularly useful persuasive authority in such a case. And the options under federal law are even more dubious: suits charging illegal dismissal under federal law are typically brought under the provenience of civil rights violations or violations of the National Labor Relations Act, and in both cases I think you would struggle to find a cause of action under the circumstances presented by the OP, since the former are concerned largely with protected classes and the latter with rights regarding labour organization. For example, the National Labor Relations Board has already ruled that employers can ban cell phones in work spaces in their entirety (let alone specific apps which they might suspect could be used for surveillance), provided that their reason in doing so is not an attempt to interfere with labor organization and bargaining rights protected under Section 7 of the NLRA. In fact, that same case recognized rather substantial interests for employers in restricting employee conduct, in what is now known as the Boeing Standard. (see here).

So, at the end of the day, when it comes to termination of employment in the U.S., it's not really a simple head-to-head analysis of the relative rights of the parties, because under U.S. law (in most jurisdictions and circumstances), there is a general presumption that both employer and employee have a right to go their own way, at-will, without penalty or regulation, unless they have contracted for another arrangement, with only a relatively small handful of established scenarios where federal, state, and local governments are recognized as having standing to interfere with those rights, meaning the courts are typically not empowered to intercede on either party's behalf, and thus generally would never even get to the stage of weighing more particularized interests. Of course this analysis is strictly directed at the American context: very different principles apply throughout much of the rest of the world.

Note that I went back and forth on whether to provide this analysis at all, given our prohibition on providing legal advice, but the OP's inquiry seems abstract and since others had already responded in terms which I felt had confused the factual issues (forgive my saying so Lambiam--I generally find you to be a fine contributor, but I think you presented an at best incomplete answer here), I thought this information appropriate. If the OP is in fact inquiring because of a situation directly relevant to them, they should now that I am not an expert qualified to provide advice on labour law, U.S. or otherwise, that I am only pointing to some general principles here, and that they should absolutely not be relying (even as a first step) on information garnered from random persons online and should instead consult with with an attorney or other legal expert experienced in labour law as it applies to their locality. Furthermore, if any contributor here believes that the OP's question may be fairly interpreted to be likely to be a request for legal advice, I empower you to delete this post in its entirety, knowing that you will get no gripe or push-back for me. I have been very eager to encourage adherence to our WP:RD rules and sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Snow ^{let's rap} 07:35, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I could and should have been clearer, but note that the issue in the putative litigation was not the legality of the firing, but of the ban, which can be claimed to be a privacy intrusion. When hiring, a US employer may have more leeway to impose arbitrary obligations on hopeful employees under the legal fiction that they are free not to accept the terms of employment as offered but can choose to starve instead. But can employers arbitrarily change these terms and unilaterally impose new obligations on employees during their employment? --Lambiam 22:25, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Unfortunately (at least from the perspective of the average at-will employee) they can. Of course such an employer would not frame any such new rules as an abrogation of the existing terms of employment, but at the end of the day, the burden is upon the employee bringing suit to demonstrate that such terms existed as a contractual matter: if they can make a good-faith argument that the ban violates some agreed upon feature of a contractual relationship, then the suit can be brought on that argument alone, and there is no need to argue about the relative rights or restrictions of the parties, beyond those they contracted for.

But if no such contractual provision exists on the issue (which is probable to be the case for the majority of at-will employees--and indeed, even the average employee with an in-depth contract probably may not have a provision in there which protects their rights to their apps), options are limited. If the suit can't be brought under contract law, the employee really only has recourse to the courts if there is some violation of some sort of express black letter law protecting the employee's right to refuse the employer's requirement in question (if such refusal was the immediate cause for the termination). You and I may agree that, as an abstract matter, that a rule such as the OP proposes might be considered a privacy intrusion in the abstract sense, but the plaintiff here would need to show a more particularized harm as recognized by some statute or labour board ruling: it just won't suffice to simply point out that this is an invasion of privacy in the general sense, because employers actually have pretty broad freedom in that respect: they can drug test employees under many circumstances, generally can film or record them throughout the work day so long as the monitoring is disclosed, scrutinize social media accounts, review just about any communication made on company equipment (or potentially just made on the company network), inquire into many aspects of their background and some non-workhour conduct, and a bevy of other activities I think that (putting aside the legal considerations) can be fairly described as intrusions of privacy in the general sense.

As discussed above, I don't think there are any federal statutes which would apply in this case--of course the federal protections, while applying to the largest number of persons and being fairly robust for the area they do cover are quite narrow in application. As for state level protections, I can't say with any degree of certainty that no state has a statute or administrative rule that wouldn't apply to the OP's scenario, but personally I am unaware of any that would--and some (admittedly quick and slapdash) research when first answering the OPs question didn't turn up anything I hadn't previously heard of. For good or for ill (and I'm trying to be somewhat neutral and just present the law as it stands here, but I'm sure you get the sense of which way I lean), the current framework of privacy protections for employees as against employers is just not very robust in the U.S., or at least not as robust as people would tend to presume. Of course, elsewhere in western democratized nations, the analysis might be very different: EU law, for example, has substantially broader privacy rights in general, including some with respect to employment relationships. But to be fair to the U.S., the standards in America are still a lot better than in much of the world and, when it comes to free speech protections in these contexts, they are actually pretty substantial, so that's something. Snow ^{let's rap} 05:39, 17 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Supposing the employer did have such a rule, how would they know that an employee had that app on their cellphone? ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 09:49, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Spotchecking à la the 45th president, sort of like drug testing and having to prove the app is not installed. It was just a hypothetical. If employers are permitted to ban personal cell phone use, do they have leave to permit personal cell use while preventing certain apps from being installed on a personal cell phone while in use at the workplace. There is no directly relevant situation currently, the question is a conceptual one of technology, employment law in the US and personal privacy. Yanping Nora Soong (talk) 15:19, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

That's good know--it reduces the concern I had about my initial response. To answer your follow up question, if I presume your meaning to be "Can an employer terminate an at-will employee for refusal to abide by a rule banning a certain app being brought into the workspace, even if they do not have a rule banning smart phones entirely?" then the answer is very likely yes. Unless the state where the employment relationship rests has a specific protection in place to prevent this (I know of no such statute anywhere in the U.S., but would not go as far as to say it's outside the realm of possibility for some states with a more robust worker's rights framework--California, for example), then the employee is unlikely to be able to make out a cause of action to get into court, since (as discussed above), federal restrictions on the right of an employer to terminate an at-will employee are quite narrow.

A little ironically, though, (given the focus of your question) if the app in question was a program allowing the employee to make recordings for their own personal use, there's a good chance the employer could not interfere with that app, since the NLRB has previously ruled that employees are entitled to record certain interactions in a work environment. But the employer could still substantially restrict when the phone and the recording app can be used or even when they can be in the employee's possession. Or to again use the more precise phrasing, an employer can terminate an employee for failure to abide by such rules.

The other situation in which an employer could very possibly be restricted in their rights to terminate is if such was a provision of the employment contract. One of the stated jurisprudential underpinnings of the whole laissez-faire approach courts take to at-will employment is that the parties were free to set the terms of employment via contract if they wanted to, so the letter of these contracts tends to be treated very respectfully--as indeed are the provisions of most contracts under American law.

There's also some grey area with regard to independent contractors: often when a business employs independent contractors, as opposed to at-will employees, it has some practical reasons for wanting to do so (the major reasons being decreased benefits requirements, decreased liability in tort under vicarious liability principles, and sometimes tax benefits). However, under the tort and agency laws of most states, one of the tests that helps determine whether an independent contractor relationship is valid is the question of how much direct control the employer has over how the contractor goes about performing their job. So even though am employer technically tends to have even fewer statutory restrictions on how they can terminate an independent contractor (absent a contract) than even they do with regard to at-will employees, they might find themselves unable to enforce the app rule on the subcontractor for indirect reasons (for example, they don't want to be seen treating their independent contractor like an at-will employee, because if that employee does something foolish that leads to a law suit, they might have increased vulnerability under vicarious liability--that is to say, the employer can potentially be made a party to suits resulting from the employee's bad acts).

However, even that situation is very context sensitive. For example, if you are, say, Boeing, you probably have every right as an employer to demand that your independent contractors do not bring their phones into a worksite, that would contain trade secrets--and insisting upon as much probably would not abrogate your independent contractor relationship with the worker, because you can point to an independent, cognizable, and legitimate reason for the rule (protection of your intellectual property) other than micromanaging the worker. On the other hand, if you are a flower delivery service that uses independent contractors for your local deliveries, and you dictate what apps your contractors are using while they are working (say, to borrow your hypothetical above where they have a moral objection to tik tok), then in that scenario you are potentially eroding their argument that the delivery is an independent contractor. But it's not like the independent contractor has better protections from arbitrary termination under the black letter law than does the at-will employee--actually, it tends to be the opposite. Rather it is other (rather more indirect) legal considerations forcing the employer to take a slightly more hands-off approach to the contractor, and generally avoid any extraneous rules not absolutely necessary for a compelling, practical purpose. Snow ^{let's rap} 17:59, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Is it common for 1's to look like 7's??

Look at this image:

It's supposed to say 2010, but it looks like it says 2070. Does this happen a lot?? Georgia guy (talk) 16:37, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

AFAIK it has long been a problem. I remember science classes where I was required to put a line through the seven. Oddly I can't remember any math classes that used this though that could be due to dust on the memory banks. MarnetteD|Talk 16:42, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

MarnetteD, my high school math teacher, back in the 70s, crossed his sevens, and also the zeros. He didn't require the students to do so, but some of us copied him anyway. Cannot recall if the science teachers, who were much younger, did so. Tribe of Tiger ^{Let's Purrfect!} 22:21, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Interesting Tribe of Tiger. Thanks for sharing your experience. MarnetteD|Talk 22:26, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

In some parts of the world, including Europe and the Far East (in both of which I've lived), 'ones' are often written with even longer serifs than this, generally angled down to make an acute angle, so resembling a mirrored Laguz. For this reason I (a Brit) spontaneously adopted the 'crossed seven' in my handwriting around age 10. {The poster formerly known as 87.81.230.195} 2.122.177.31 (talk) 17:26, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Note that in the UK, "Europe" is often a synonym for "Continental Europe" (where crossed sevens are almost universal). The number seven is generally uncrossed in British handwriting, but is used here by a sizeable minority.

In my first job before desktop computers, data input was handwritten on forms and then sent off to be typed by people who had no idea what they were typing. Crossed sevens were mandatory, but always seemed a bit foreign to me and I reverted to the uncrossed form later. Alansplodge (talk) 22:05, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

WHAAOE. See Regional handwriting variation, which specifically deals with differences in handwritten numerals with specific images. --Jayron 32 13:50, 16 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
In the particular image linked, I suspect the resemblance to the number "7" in the patch is less an intentional choice of script and more so an artifact of the machine stitching of the patch (i.e. the continuation of the dark brown stitching from the first "0" through to the "1"). See this slightly higher resolution image, which shows a similar effect between much of the other dark brown lettering around the patch's perimeter. Tyrol5 [Talk] 00:11, 18 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Agree with User:Tyrol5. Also could be a kerning problem; embroidery isn't exactly pixel-perfect. Maybe we could invent a new unit; a stitchel. Mathglot (talk) 01:56, 18 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Almanach de Gotha (French edition)

I always imagined that the famed compendium was made up of self-generated information, rather like Who's Who (ie "You tell us what you want the world to believe, and we'll print it.") Said tomes had more resonance for me as a passing mention in "East Coker" than as an actual reference work I might ever need to consult. Nevertheless, my first tussle with it left me bemused as to why it might have been at odds with more recent accounts of Edwina Mountbatten's birthplace (see above). Our article says that its archives were destroyed in 1945, but would anyone know how the content of any entry was arrived at in the 'old days', other than personal contributions ? MinorProphet (talk) 17:21, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, I know I got the Eliot quotation back to front... MinorProphet (talk) 17:40, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

My understanding is that it was more akin to (the mid-20th century) Burke's Peerage, in that although people could and did submit material, it was checked by one or more competent editors.

Since "From 1763–1944 it was the ultimate authority on the reigning and formerly reigning houses of Europe. It was meticulous in charting genealogical detail . . . ." (John Kennedy, Editor and Publisher of, and writer of the Introduction to, the 1999 Edition which, from elsewhere in the Introduction, utilised a Research Committee), its contents would have been scrutinised by a great many readers who, between them, had personal knowledge of most of the facts presented, and who would surely have been quick to point out any bogus claims. ("I am the King of Prussia and I certainly did not enoble any "Graf von Chanzer" in 1843.") {The poster formerly known as 87.81.230.195} 2.122.177.31 (talk) 17:43, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I agree completely. I imagine every entry would have been subject to considerable "tut, tut"-type scrutiny, rather like the behaviour of the England football team <seeks approval from the gallery>: but whence the disconnect as noticed above? Would not the discrepancy have been noticed by 1937? MinorProphet (talk) 18:35, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

That does seem odd, though if it's actually an error, it might only have been introduced in that 1937(?) edition. Broadlands was of course her family's country seat, so her being born there is perfectly plausible, and it may be that the Encyclopedia.com entry currently used as a reference is, for one reason or another, in error. Perhaps we should give both alternatives until one or the other can be corroborated by further sources.

If the place was accessible I'd pop over and ask (I live close enough to hear their firework displays when the wind's in the right direction), but I gather it's rarely open to the public and generally rather unwelcoming. {The poster formerly known as 87.81.230.195} 2.122.177.31 (talk) 23:21, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

re Graf von Chanzer: "Who do you think you are, Stirling Moss?" MinorProphet (talk) 18:40, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Where can I read declassified primary sources about defectors that used unusual methods?

Like those who came in their bloc's best plane or survived a Berlin Wall or DMZ crossing or the high capacity homemade balloon or the troop who long jumped the initial Berlin Roll Or Two Of Barbed Wire or the first land plane to land on an aircraft carrier. The bloc defected to must've made report(s) with lots of interesting info like Chuck Yeager's conversations if they came in a military plane, some are probably declassified by now? Sagittarian Milky Way (talk) 23:44, 14 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Sagittarian Milky Way and Future Perfect at Sunrise: My take on this query is that what you asking here is, in essence, "May I be partial-blocked from the reference desks again, for typing in whatever random thought pops into my head as if the previous block never happened?" It won't be me, as I'm generally busy either looking at speedy deletion requests or actually writing content. Pete AU aka --Shirt58 (talk) 09:47, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Well try Googling ones like Franciszek Jarecki or No Kum-sok/Kenneth Rowe who's MIGs are the oldest, it's not easy to find the text of the original military documents like you assume. No links on the articles either. Sagittarian Milky Way (talk) 14:05, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Erm... isn't the Reference Desk a place to ask for references? Answering the questions is optional. Alansplodge (talk) 11:55, 15 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

You could look over List of Soviet and Eastern Bloc defectors to find interesting defections, and go from there. 2601:648:8202:350:0:0:0:2B99 (talk) 03:55, 17 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]