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August 31

President Trump's pardon of Sheriff Joe Arpaio

Sheriff Joe Arpaio was convicted of a crime on July 31, 2017. He was pardoned by President Trump on August 25, 2017 (before he had been sentenced). His sentencing date was scheduled for October 5, 2017. Will the Court -- as a formality -- still go forward and sentence Arpaio, even though he has been pardoned? Or will the Court simply dispense with that formality? Is there any (legal) reason to actually go through with the sentencing matter, even though it has been made moot by the pardon? Thanks. Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 04:28, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The judge cancelled the sentencing hearing and told the lawyers not to bother filing briefs, but is still hearing arguments about vacating Arpaio's convictions, or at least the criminal contempt conviction. This is in the usual news outlets. 173.228.123.121 (talk) 08:14, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Indeed. [1] [2] --Viennese Waltz 08:36, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Infact this contains some remarkable Irony! [Redacted. Please refrain from personal editorializing about living persons. Unsourced judgmental comments about WP:BLP's are not allowed anywhere in wikispace. μηδείς (talk) 15:20, 31 August 2017 (UTC)] --Kharon (talk) 14:45, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks. I am still interested to know: Is there any (legal) reason to actually go through with the sentencing matter, even though it has been made moot by the pardon? Which brings up a related question: once issued, can a President rescind a pardon? Thanks. Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 15:57, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

You might want to compare the matter with commutation (law), which does not expunge the conviction. Pardons are considered to expunge the conviction (from our article "a pardon is a government decision to allow a person who has been convicted of a crime to be free and absolved of that conviction, as if they were never convicted") so at that point there would be (in my non-legal layman's understanding) nothing to sentence. μηδείς (talk) 16:03, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Good point. A pardon "erases" the crime/conviction. So, once "erased", there is no crime to be sentenced. I never thought of it that way. Thanks. But, I was also wondering: Can a President "change his mind" and rescind a pardon? I am guessing that the answer is "no". But, who knows? Perhaps, some new information may come to light subsequent to a pardon, which might make a President "change his mind" and want to rescind a pardon? (I doubt that's legally possible. But, again, who knows?) In that odd event -- where the President changes his mind and rescinds a pardon -- then, perhaps the sentencing matter does retain some important, practical, and useful purpose. (I guess.) Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 16:14, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

No, the pardon does not erase the crime. See below. The acceptance of a pardon is a confession of guilt. The crime happened; what the pardon does is remove the penalty for the crime. The conviction and crime still stand, but the pardon removes the penalty imposed by the state for said crime. --Jayron 32 16:27, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The general thinking is that once a pardon has been delivered and accepted, it can't be revoked, but as a matter of law this is largely untested. There is a history of a few pardons being signed and then revoked before being officially delivered. It is also possible for a pardon to be refused, which happens occasionally if someone wants to continue to argue their innocence in court. Dragons flight (talk) 16:08, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Also, very important, is that a pardon implies guilt. If a person accepts a pardon, they are essentially confessing to what they were charged with. People will sometimes refuse a pardon because the pardon only removes the criminal penalty for the crime and does not remove any civil penalties or tort suits which may arise from the act; indeed accepting a pardon may open a person up to liabilities which refusing a pardon may not. See Burdick v. United States and www.no lo.com/legal-encyclopedia/pardons.html this article (blacklisted site), to wit, "A pardon doesn’t affect any civil consequences that might flow from the crime. So, even someone who receives a pardon for murder may still be subject to a lawsuit for wrongful death." So, if Arpaio accepts Trump's pardon of him, he is legally admitting and confessing that he violated people's civil rights (a substantive point of the crime he was convicted of) which then means that those people have grounds to sue (and likely win) civil damages from him. --Jayron 32 16:27, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I am not arguing the point of "erasure of the crime" but the "as if they were never convicted" quote in my response above comes from the lead of our pardon article, Jayron, so you may want to take it up there. Also, the admission of guilt is usually a part of the US Presidential pardon application process, but the president's power is unconditional, and the US Constitution does not require that the pardonee admit guilt. μηδείς (talk) 17:26, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Well, the Supreme Court does, and that's good enough. From Burdick v. United States, in the words of Justice Joseph McKenna, speaking for a unanimous court (one abstention), citing the earlier United States v. Wilson "This brings us to the differences between legislative immunity and a pardon. They are substantial. The latter carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it." (bold mine) According to the Supreme Court, the highest adjudication of Constitutional principles in the U.S., stated in no uncertain terms that "a pardon...carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it".[3] In simpler terms, to offer a pardon, the president is claiming the pardonee is actually guilty of what they were accused of, and in accepting a pardon, the pardonee is confessing to their own guilt. It is plain language and very straightforward. The pardon comes in two parts, the offer and the acceptance, and BOTH contain the elements of guilt: The offer of a pardon is also accusation of guilt, and the acceptance of a pardon must also be a confession of that guilt. The Constitution does not require a previous admission of guilt for the President to be allowed to pardon a person, but the ACT of the pardon and acceptance thereof is a legal admission of guilt. Arpaio didn't have to admit guilt before Trump could offer a pardon, but in accepting the pardon, Arpaio is legally confessing to the crime, and all of it's substantive parts, that he was convicted for. It may be a semantic argument about timing, and we may be talking past each other, since you're talking about the offer of a pardon, and I am talking about the acceptance of a pardon, but in the end, if Arpaio takes the pardon, he confesses to the crime. --Jayron 32 17:44, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I think McKenna's view here is obiter dicta. Honestly it doesn't make a whole lot of sense. Pardons are sometimes granted on the basis of factual innocence, so how can acceptance be admission of guilt? --Trovatore (talk) 18:15, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

If what you say is true, then why does every opinion by every legal scholar I can find think that acceptance of a pardon does include a confession of guilt? I literally cannot find a single source that says otherwise. If you can find one, I'd be glad to read it; though the preponderance of sources which explicitly and unambiguously say exactly what I said is overwhelming. But sure, go ahead, produce some. --Jayron 32 18:28, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

On the first page of hits for that search, there aren't actually very many attributed opinions by legal scholars; there are lay and anonymous opinions going both ways. Those are not worth much, though their reasoning is still of interest in some cases.

One hit that does have some attributed opinions by people who ought to know is the Vox article, here. There are three law professors who opine on the question, and they're all over the map. Harvard's Mark Tushnet agrees with you, although not for prospective pardons. Georgetown's Paul Butler says flatly: "Being pardoned is not an admission of guilt." [Emphasis mine] And Ohio State's Ric Simmons equivocates: "it is unclear whether a defendant who accepts a pardon is somehow admitting guilt."

Those are the three opinions that used the word "guilt". I haven't read the other ones yet. --Trovatore (talk) 18:42, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you. --Jayron 32 19:19, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

OK. So, the conviction still stands. (You say.) We can put aside Arpaio for now and just speak in general terms. After I receive my pardon, I am still a "convicted felon"? If the conviction stands, and the pardon only removes the criminal penalty, then a pardonee will still be a "convicted" felon, when all is said and done? Right? But isn't that the whole purpose of the pardon, to make him not a convicted felon? I am getting totally confused. Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 18:00, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

A pardon does erase the conviction. That's the difference between a pardon and a commutation, and the reason that people still want pardons even after the sentence is complete (sometimes even when the directly interested party is dead). --Trovatore (talk) 18:17, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Jayron is simply wrong. First, Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_1:_Executive_Power says

The President, furthermore, may grant pardon or reprieves, except in cases of impeachment. Originally, as ruled by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson (1833), the pardon could be rejected by the convict. In Biddle v. Perovich 274 U.S. 480 (1927), the Supreme Court reversed the doctrine, ruling that "[a] pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed."^[1]

Biddle (1927) explicitly overturns the words of Burdick (1915) and obviously abrogates Wilson (1833)

References

^ Biddle, at 486

Second, the Congress has indeed set up the Office of the Pardon Attorney which assists the president in evaluating pardons, but its recommendations to applicants (a 5-year waiting period; pardon officials take into account the petitioner's acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and atonement for the offense) are non-binding, as Congress cannot place any restrictions on them[4]:

The U.S. constitution provides powers to grant pardon exclusively to the President[v]. This power cannot be modified, curtailed, or diminished by the Congress or any other legislative enactments[vi]. The President’s pardoning power can be limited only by the U.S. constitution. (Bradford v. Cardoza, 195 Cal. App. 3d 361 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1987))

Only overturned law and a conflation of the recommendations of a non-binding advisory board with the presidents sole discression lead to the false conclusion that acceptance of a pardon is necessarily an admission of guilt. μηδείς (talk) 19:32, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Biddle doesn't apply in this case because in the case it was adjudicating, no additional guilt was decided. The convicted had their sentence modified from death to life imprisonment, in both outcomes (death OR life imprisonment) the matter of his guilt was not up for discussion, his acceptance or non-acceptance of the pardon had no material effect on the state of his guilt. He was already adjudged to be guilty. Secondly, as noted in in the text of the decision: [5] "that the reasoning of Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79, is not to be extended to the present case." (bold mine) It did not say that Burdick was invalid, rather it stated that the Burdick did not apply to the one case. Also, as noted "So far as a pardon legitimately cuts down a penalty..." (Holmes's own words). Pardons cut down a penalty they do not remove a state of guilt. So, at best, all you've done is shown that a pardon need not be accepted to make the person guilty; thus according to your argument, the pardon merely removes the penalty, not the state of guilt (which is exactly what I have said) but the pardoned person is restricted from refusing said pardon. Even moreso, that just means that Trumps offer of the pardon is sufficient to make Arpiao guilty, since according to you he can't even refuse if he doesn't want to be guilty. He's forced to be guilty merely by the offer of the pardon, because he doesn't have a right to appeal his guilt once the pardon was offered. "A" for effort Medeis, but keep trying. --Jayron 32 19:48, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I was addressing James, not you, who asked a general follow-up question about admission of guilt in general. You have been entirely wrong on this above, cherry-picked cases and advised us of your ignorance of counterexamples, and now you want to change the goalpost back to one you already went wide of? TLWR. James has his answer. μηδείς (talk) 20:11, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

If you weren't addressing me, you'd have not used my name. Trovatore, unlike you, was actually useful by providing sources that show that the law is murky and uncertain on this. Which is an excellent way to answer the question rather than to speak in absolutes over which legal experts can't agree exist as absolutes. Thanks again to Trovatore for doing so. --Jayron 32 20:47, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Incidentally Medeis, who is James? Did you mean Joseph? Nil Einne (talk) 16:07, 2 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, I caught that, too. I think they meant "Joseph" (i.e., me). There is no one named "James" in this discussion thread. Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 17:44, 4 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Here is a timely piece by the indispensable Eugene Volokh: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/26/is-accepting-a-pardon-an-admission-of-guilt. Short version is that the question is murky; Burdick has not been directly overturned, but its importance is unclear. --Trovatore (talk) 20:35, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you again, Trovatore. That's a very useful source. --Jayron 32 20:44, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"A pardon implies guilt" and yet one occasionally hears from England that someone long dead has been pardoned because his conviction was wrongful (e.g. Timothy Evans), or because he was a celebrated victim of a law since repealed and considered barbaric (e.g. Alan Turing; cf Alan Turing law). —Tamfang (talk) 17:19, 2 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

FYI, some people are trying to challenge the constitutionality of the pardon. [6] Sounds like a long-shot to me, but sometimes the courts surprise you. Dragons flight (talk) 20:56, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

When Ford pardoned Nixon, wasn't a "big deal" made out of the "fact" that the pardon imputed guilt to Nixon (guilt that Nixon confirmed/accepted by accepting the pardon)? Or was that just political rhetoric and bluster -- as opposed to sound legal analysis -- to placate the nation? Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 00:46, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

There's no reason it couldn't have been both. Being propaganda doesn't also mean it isn't true... --Jayron 32 01:20, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Perhaps. But if something is genuinely, sincerely, truly true and accurate and valid, one does not generally need to resort to political rhetoric and bluster to indicate that true fact. The public might need/want to consume the political rhetoric and bluster of Obama convincing us that Obamacare is a great plan; or of Al Gore convincing us of the dangers of global warming. But, the general public does not need/want political rhetoric and bluster to be convinced that "Tuesday follows Monday" or that "one plus one is two" or that "the sky is blue". Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 03:28, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

People using that rhetoric may not care much about the truth of it; people can be (and often are) accidentally correct; even a blind dog can hit the tree once in a while. Furthermore, there's a reason why most politicians are lawyers. Matters of the application of the law are so contextually dependent that it is often hard to make universal statements about legal concepts which are immutably true. --Jayron 32 12:08, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, perhaps true. My point is that it may not be 100% absolutely true or accurate that a pardon (or, specifically, Nixon's pardon) imputes guilt to the pardon recipient. Apparently -- from the above discussion -- this is somewhat ambiguous, unclear, unsettled, contentious, and controversial. It is certainly not an "absolute". Nonetheless, then-President Gerald Ford and his "PR machine" wanted the nation to believe it to be true, in order to make his controversial Nixon pardon more palatable to the nation. The nation is comprised of mostly non-lawyers. And, certainly, mostly non-legal scholars. So, to the general Joe Blow and "man on the street" ... when they hear "oh, this statement comes from the Supreme Court", they pretty much assume that the statement being quoted is absolute and immutable. (And always applicable, without legal distinction.) Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 15:02, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Some of the above topics are, briefly, discussed in this article: Federal pardons in the United States. Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 03:52, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, all. Very helpful discussion of the topic. Thanks! Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 17:49, 4 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The word "wherefore" in Shakespeare

Shakespeare often uses the word "wherefore" in his plays. The word "wherefore" means -- in today's common language -- the same as the word "why". There are times when Shakespeare uses both "wherefore" and "why" (even in the same sentence or the same line of a character). So, is there any subtle distinction between the two words? Or do they mean the same exact thing? I assume that Shakespeare used one form of the word or the other ("wherefore" versus "why") to accommodate his poetic "needs" for correct rhyme or verse; or to accrue the desired number of syllables; or to fit into a correct iambic pentameter scheme; and so forth. But, aside from Shakespeare's poetic "requirements", do the words carry any subtle distinction or nuances in their meanings? Thanks. Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 04:34, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Not an answer to your question, but early in the first episode of Upstart Crow (it´s on youtube), Shakespeare discuss this word with his family. Gråbergs Gråa Sång (talk) 06:21, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Joseph A. Spadaro -- in older English, there was a pattern in which the words "it" and "what" didn't usually occur directly after prepositions. Instead PREPOSITION + "it" was replaced by "there" + PREPOSITION, while PREPOSITION + "what" was replaced by "where" + PREPOSITION. So instead of saying "after it", they'd say "thereafter", and instead of "for what" they'd say "wherefor" (now spelled "wherefore"). Some of those old words are still in use in legal terminology, and analogous usage can still be observed in the modern Dutch and German languages. Also, in modern English, we ask "What for?" as well as "Why?". "Wherefore" was the Shakespearean English equivalent of "What for"... AnonMoos (talk) 09:00, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@AnonMoos: Interesting. I never knew that. But, it does make perfect sense. Thanks! Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 00:50, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Of course orthography was not very standardized in Shakespeare's day, but nowadays I think there is a distinction between therefore, meaning "and thus if follows", and therefor, meaning "for that". There are a few people who have a habit of writing "therefor" when they mean "therefore", and it rubs me the wrong way. --Trovatore (talk) 09:36, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Quotations by William Shakespeare 1564 - 1616

“O Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo? Deny thy father refuse thy name, thou art thyself thou not a montegue, what is montegue? tis nor hand nor foot nor any other part belonging to a man. What is in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet" - Romeo and Juliet

“O Romeo, Romeo! Wherefore art thou Romeo? Deny thy father and refuse thy name, or if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love, and I'll no longer be a Capulet.” - Romeo and Juliet

“Wherefore was I to this keen mockery born? When at your hands did I deserve this scorn?" - A Midsummer Night's Dream

“I have of late--but wherefore I know not--lost all my mirth" - Hamlet

“There are occasions and causes, why and wherefore in all things.”

“How darkly and how deadly dost thou speak! Your eyes do menace me. Why look you pale? Who sent you hither? Wherefore do you come?”

“Alack, I love myself. Wherefore? For any good That I myself have done unto myself? O, no! Alas, I rather hate myself For hateful deeds committed by myself." - Richard III

Blooteuth (talk) 11:36, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Regarding use of Why? and Wherefore? in Shakespeare: In Shakespeare's time, as today, as in every language in every part of the world ever, there is more than one way to express something, and choosing which word to choose among a set of near-synonyms is not arbitrary. Writers choose specific words among a set of similar words intentionally and with forethought, depending on the tone they wish to set. Shakespeare was no different, and just because he had the word "wherefore" doesn't mean he wouldn't also choose "why" even though they carry similar meanings. Just as a writer may choose between "big" and "large" for very specific reasons, and just as both words exist and are available in modern English, so both "why" and "wherefore" were available for Shakespeare. This shouldn't be surprising given that we still do this, and have always done this, and always will do this sort of thing. --Jayron 32 12:28, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Well, yes, but that's exactly what the OP is asking - what is the subtle distinction? "Big" and "large" are near perfect synonyms, but mean different things when used in combination with other words ("big man" vs. "large man") as "big" tends to have more connotative meanings than "large", which is usually only related to physical measurement. The question before us is what those distinctions were for "why" and "wherefore" in Shakespeare's time. I do not know the answer to that question. Matt Deres (talk) 14:17, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Well stated, Matt Deres. Thanks. From reading this discussion, what I am gathering is that "why" means "why". And "wherefore" means "for what". And, to me, both phrases mean very much the same thing. I believe. I guess there is some tiny nuance of difference in meaning, but hardly any that I can see. To me, "why" basically means "for what reason?". And "wherefore" or "for what" also basically means "for what reason?" So, I guess that the ultimate answer is that Shakespeare had to satisfy certain poetic needs, and he used the two different words at his disposal as they accommodated (or not) his poetic needs (e.g., number of syllables, scansion of iambic pentameter, etc.). Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 16:18, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

This is rather simple. "Why" is the Old English instrumental case form hwi of "what" (hwæt), while wherefore is simply an archaic postpositional variation of "for what". The latter is still current in German, warum, wobei. The choice of alternative is almost certainly governed by S.'s use of iambic pentameter. μηδείς (talk) 15:32, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with that last one. He needed to maintain the meter. Clarityfiend (talk) 23:30, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

To me, "what for" means "to what end". It's a question about purpose rather than cause. — Kpalion^(talk) 11:54, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, I see your point. Interesting distinction and nuance. "What for" can mean "to what end". But, "what for" can also mean "for what"; or, in other words, "for what reason"; or, in other words, "why". Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 16:46, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

However, "What did you do that for?" and "Why did you do that?" are often synonymous in practice... AnonMoos (talk) 12:52, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry, but this cause=efficient cause equivocation is nonsense. Why did the Bismarck sink? Efficient cause: it was attacked. Final cause: it was a British war goal. Material cause: it was heavier than water. Formal cause: its ruptured form did not displace enough water to stay afloat. See Aristotle. μηδείς (talk) 22:06, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, all. Very helpful! Thanks! Joseph A. Spadaro (talk) 17:51, 4 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Philosophy Institute identification on Sergio Cotta article.

Hi, What is the top institute for philosophy article on Wikipedia. I found this on German WP: [7], which is this: IIP. Is there any equivalent on en WP, is there an article on this institute on en WP.

I'm working on this article: Sergio Cotta. The Italian version is here: [8]. Do you reckon the Institut International de Philosophie Politique which is spoken of in the academic career section, is this, i.e. the IIP institute.?

Thanks scope_creep (talk) 11:12, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

There is the Italian Institure for Philosophic Study in Naples - [9] Wymspen (talk) 13:37, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hi Wymspen, I don't think it is that, although it is a good try. The Italian version has International in its name. An article is also on WP needed for that ref. I can't see a WP article for it. scope_creep (talk) 23:01, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The "Institut international de philosophie politique" was founded at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1953; Georges Davy was President from then until 1967. Other founders included Jean-Jacques Chevallier, Raymond Polin, w:fr:Charles Eisenmann, and Bertrand de Jouvenel. It produced 12 volumes of Annales de philosophie politique, conference proceedings, from 1956 to 1980, in which latter year Julien Freund was President. See Revue européenne des sciences sociales Vol.18 No.52 p.6 and p.7; and Revue française de sociologie Vol.17 No.2 p.158. The latest evidence of its existence I found was that Janine Chanteur was secretary-general in 1989. jnestorius^(talk) 00:08, 2 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Excellent work. Excellent work. Cool it needs an article as well, I guess I will be doing them. Thanks jnestorius. scope_creep (talk) 22:04, 2 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I found it: CIPPA - Centre International de Philosophie Politique Appliquée]. Simple when you know where to look. Its curious, that you think you can find every piece, or bit, or corner of the web, but its not all immediately visible. It vast and byzantine. Weird. Thanks for that. scope_creep (talk) 22:13, 2 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

[1] Biddle, at 486

[1]