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The Second Italo-Senussi War, also known as the Pacification of Libya and in Italian as the Riconquista ('Reconquest'), was an armed conflict during the Italian colonisation of Libya between the Kingdom of Italy, predominantly under Fascist rule, and the variegated forces of the Libyan Resistance, most prominently the Senussi Order.

Rest of lead:

• Italy conquers in Italo-Turkish War
• Control weak, accords made with locals under liberal govts
• Accords break down, Volpi assigned, rise of fascism
• Reconquest initiated 1922
• Tripolitania fell quickly (1925), but stiff resistance in Fezzan and particularly Cyrenaica led to prolonged conflict
• Characterised by extreme brutality and asymmetric guerrilla warfare on the part of the Libyans. Extensive atrocities committed by the Italians, including the mass deportation of approx. 100,000 Cyrenaicans into concentration camps where tens of thousands died; these actions are commonly classed as a genocide.
• War ended in 1931 with the capture and execution of rebel leader Omar al-Mukhtar. Typical estimates of Libyans were killed during the conflict range between 40,000 and 70,000.
• Victory and pacification allowed Italy to intensify colonial efforts under Italo Balbo, 100,000 Italians had settled in the colony by 1940.
• Colony would remain until Italian defeat during the Western Desert campaign of World War Two.

Background

Wright is good here. Check Ryan before 128. Generally avoid Ahmida Making of Modern Libya due to factual issues (wright, le gall)

Ottoman Libya

• Regency of Tripolitania
• the Senussi and other regional actors/groups. General landscape of Libyan people. (Ebner 199-200 in DN)
• General ottoman decline

Italian colonial aspirations

• Italian inferiority complex, "the least great power", Third Rome, prestige (gentile la grande italia)
• Initial colonial ambitions, talk about Mazzini and other early imperialists (origins of Libyan nation p. 31, Pergher 37-38. Mazzini in Mack Smith Mazzini 218-21). Conflict due to "national self-determination" as an ideal. (bit in Pergher 33, Choate 5)
• Destination for large surplus emigration (Segre fourth shore, Ebner in DN 208-210, evolved substantially during fascist period Labanca in Palumbo 49-)

Economic interests in Italy, such as the Banco di Roma, also had financial incentives to support Fascist imperialism, and aligned strongly with state policy. - maybe add this to "Italian Colonisation of Libya" instead?

• Gains Eritrea and Somalia, but rebuked by France in Tunisia and by Ethiopia at Adwa (Tunisia: Pergher 39, also check Choate)
• Attention moves to Libya, efforts at economic penetration (Origins of Libyan Nation p. 34-35) (no where else to settle, Ebner 200 in Dwyer, Nettelbeck)
• Imperialist rhetoric: D'Annunzio, Marinetti, the ANI and other imperialists/nationalists (e.g. Antonio Labriola - Ballinger 822). Italian divisions, e.g. Giolitti, Salvemini. (Pergher 38)
• Ottoman empire was falling apart, Italians expected the Libyans to hate their overlords.
• Italo-Turkish War begins

The Italo-Turkish War and World War One

• Describe the course of the war
• Italy struggles in Libya, makes gains in the Aegean, treaty as the Balkan Wars commence
• Occupation was a pain in the arse, they controlled little. Two colonies—don't be anachronistic. Make sure to delineate Tripolitania (and Fezzan) & Cyrenaica.
• Poor colonial governance, directives from Rome followed little by colonial governors. Quotes here? politici del capi
• Notables of resistance: al-Bahruni, al-Suwayhli, Ahmed al-Senussi, etc
• Note Shari al-Shatt and deportations/internment on Islands (Ustica, Tremiti, etc). Foreshadowing. (origins of the libyan nation 36-39)
• As consequence of the invasion, Libyan population already dropping due to crop failures, disease, starvation (Ebner 201 in Dwyer, Nettelbeck) - this can just be one sentence.

As consequence of the war, the Libyan population was already declining due to crop failures, disease, and starvation brought on by the conflict.

• WW1 starts, everything explodes
• Ottoman & central powers involvement, Jihad
• Italy needs help in the North vs Austria.
• Tripolitanian campaign poor, Misrata not controlled at all, bombed only 1918. Embarrassing. (Pergher 40-41)
• Defeats: British swoop in as Senussi are attacking in Egypt too. Summarise British policy towards the Senussi
• Senussi Campaign, Italy saved, Idris, Acroma

Italy, long seeking colonies to affirm its status as a great power, to avenge the humiliation of the Battle of Adwa, and to provide a destination for its large number of emigres[Segre, the Fourth Shore, pp. 3-6, 18], had invaded and occupied Libya during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912. They struggled to maintain control of the province against local guerrillas, however, and by 1915 controlled only the coastal strip. Conflict between Italy and the Libyans, especially the Senussi–a Muslim political-religious tariqa based in Libya–erupted into major violence during World War I, when the Libyans, supported materially by the Central Powers and encouraged by Caliph Mehmed V's declaration of jihad, began collaborating with the Ottomans against Italian troops. The Libyan Senussis also escalated the conflict by attacking British forces stationed in Egypt. Conflict between the British and the Senussis, known as the Senussi campaign, continued until 1917. (BETTER SOURCE NEEDED)

Resistance against the Italians was split, and had been since the start of the Italo-Turkish War[Origins of the Libyan Nation p. 39]: the Senussi operated in Cyrenaica, and various Tripolitanian and Fezzanese forces operated in the west of the country.[cite] The two groups frequently fought, and disagreements between them would inhibit effective opposition to Italian colonialism throughout both the Liberal and Fascist periods.[History of Modern Libya, p. 28]

(hmm, reserve this for the more detailed part?)Alongside the Senussi, who predominantly operated in Cyrenaica, resistance to Italian occupation also occurred widely in the western regions of Tripolitania and Fezzan. Though Italian control had briefly extended into Fezzan thanks to a campaign by General NAME during the Italo-Turkish War, it had shrank severely due to anti-Italian guerrilla action and support from the Central Powers. Confined only the coastal town of Tripoli, Tripolitanian forces controlled almost all of the region. Humiliatingly, a radio tower in Misrata had broadcasted anti-Italian propaganda uninterrupted since 1914, with the Italians unwilling and unable to stop it; it was eventually and reluctantly destroyed by Italian bombing in 1918.

The period of accords

Idris al-Senussi (centre, with glasses) saluted by Italian soldiers, 1919.

St John Continuity and Change 21-26

• Tripolitanian Republic founded by al-Suwayhli , others, and Azzam Pasha. Talk about treaties, in theory and in practice. Legge Fondamentale (fundamental laws).
• Cyrenaica treaties, autonomy. Idris, the Emir. (Pergher 40-42) (baldinetti 43-45) (dotolo 171-172)
• confused colonial policy (Pergher 42-44; again, maybe leave for Italian Colonisation of Libya)
• Name-drop Wilsonianism (Pergher 33, her footnote (Manela) doesn't mention libya)

By 1917, the Senussi, having suffered a string of defeats during the Senussi campaign that had prompted a change in leadership from Ahmed Sharif as-Senussi to his more diplomatically-inclined cousin Idris al-Senussi,[Empires at War p. 42] and Italy, still with very little control of the colony and desperately wanting troops for the Italian front, signed the modus vivendi of Acroma. It agreed a truce between the Senussi and the colonial powers and granted autonomy to the Senussi in exchange for disbanding their armies.

In Tripolitania, meanwhile, local leaders including Ramadan al-Suwayhli, Sulayman al-Baruni, and Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam founded the Tripolitanian Republic in 1918, the first republic in the Arab world.

The modus vivendi of Acroma marked the start of a period of conciliatory policy towards the Libyans, and several agreements were made that (on paper) granted significant concessions and representation to the population of Libya. This 'period of agreements' would last until the Fascist seizure of power in the 1922 March on Rome. Following a

In 1918, Tripolitanian rebels founded the Tripolitanian Republic, though the rest of the country remained under nominal Italian rule.

~treaties~

End of the accords

Gharyan Conference. Vandewalle 28-29

Despite the treaties, violence continued throughout the territory: the Berbers, largely disarmed during World War One, frequently clashed with Arabs; other armed gangs operating from Misrata roamed throughout the territory where Italian troops were not available. Among the victims of the extensive internecine conflict was al-Suwayhli, killed in an ambush in August 1920; his death further escalated the breakdown of order, which now approached the pitch of full-scale rebellion. The Italian government decided that a change in colonial policy was necessary.

Giuseppe Volpi, 1925

Giuseppe Volpi was appointed governor of Tripolitania in July 1921. (a sentence on who volpi was)had made a vast banking fortune in the Balkans. Finding the awkward situation of negotiations intolerable and damaging to Italian sovereignty in Libya, he planned to occupy Misrata in order to assert Italy's power in the colony and to destroy a major source of smuggled weapons involved in the increasing violence. He knew that this would cause a resumption of hostilities, but was determined to send a clear message that the period of accords was over.

Initially, the Italian government saw Volpi's plan to re-annex Misrata as excessively risky and refused to support it. The presence in Rome of a group of Libyan dignitaries from Sirte, Gharyan, and Tarhuna, pressed the Italian government not to intervene. However, continued violence between Arabs and Berbers—including an incident at Nalut where an attack by Arab raiders forced the local Berbers to flee the town—and the support of Prince Umberto convinced Rome that intervention was required. Finally receiving approval, Volpi gathered a force of 1,500 troops centred around two Eritrean divisions and departed Tripoli for Misrata on 24 January 1922.

end this section here, straight into the campaign.

• Things are going wrong
• Volpi appointed by nationalist liberal colonial minister Amendola, takes a harsher line
• Low-level violence even before "official" declaration following arrival of Volpi, both vs italy and internecine (Dotolo 168-169)
• Fascism arrives, Amendola replaced by Federzoni. Initial policy (Del Boca Fekini 100-101), Ryan 135-143; blackshirts sent in 143-149 (dont need to spend long here)
• Fascist colonial rhetoric (okay a lot of the fascism and imperialism stuff can actually go in aftermath, or in a non-chronological part of the "background" section. otherwise it disturbs the nice order of things)
• Discuss fascist imperialist policy in general (NOT SPECIFIC LIBYA POLICY-BROAD STROKES). (ebner 201-203 in DN, Pergher 47-54 (notes that large-scale settlement was not initially an important component of policy, 49-50, but would become one later, 50-54; difference from regular settler colonialism 73-74), )

The advent of the Fascist regime marked a significant divergence with the colonial policy of the previous Liberal governments. ...

The Blackshirt militia was sent to the colony in 1923 by Federzoni in order to reduce their power and violence at home in Italy—offensive to Federzoni's conservative-monarchist sensibilities during the delicate first years of Fascism—and to support to colonial military administration who had long complained about a lack of troops. Despite Federzoni initiating this plan, he was forced to condemn the extensive violence that the militias wrecked against local businesses, persons, and even askari of the Italian army, all of which disturbed the pre-existing colonial chain of command.

Many Italian settlers in Libya were enthusiastic supporters of Fascism, and party branches were formed throughout the colony as early as December 1922. They quickly became very active in attempting to steer local colonial policy, frequently clashing with officials such as Ernesto Mombelli, governor of Cyrenaica. These colonial branches were incorporated into the National Fascist Party proper in 1926, which alongside the arrival of the Blackshirts were signs of increasing efforts to bring the colony closer to metropolitan Italy.

Campaign

• riconquista declared by Volpi (Del Boca Fekini 101-102)
• Wright Modern History 31-33
• Certain amount of collaboration Ahmida (in Ben-Ghiat)

Del Boca Fekini 110 onwards

• Ryan 128-134
• Federzoni returns from ministry of interior in 1926. (Ryan 149-150). power-sharing viewed as freemasonry, superiority of the catholic church (Ryan 159-161)

(fekini fight to free libya Sirte conference occupation of Misrata 104-107).

Mention the ethnic composition in here somewhere, can't find the cite atm. Mostly East African troops and some Libyans, few white troops used. Arielli plus some other bits somewhere. There's something about Christian-Islam rivalry.

1921-1927

Tripolitania

• DONE Vandewalle 29-30
• DONE Wright MH 33
• DONE Baldinetti 45-46
• DONE Ebner in DN, 203-204. Includes a death toll.
• DONE Mostly complete by 1925 (Mack Smith 36-37), Ballinger (818-819)
• DONE Dotolo 169-171
• DONE Gooch 1007-1011
• DONE Del Boca 109-121

make my own—one for each time period?

Volpi's troops landed in Misrata on 26 January 1922, the first action of what he would term the Riconquista. The port itself was seized quickly, but further gains in the town were slow. Idris offered to negotiate a peaceful resolution with the Italians, but was refused; Volpi was wary of further increasing Idris's prestige given his influence among the Bedouin tribes as leader of the Senussi Order. Peace talks were also attempted between Volpi and local leaders from 25 March to 5 April under a truce, though as neither side was willing to compromise the talks went nowhere. Likewise, Giovanni Amendola, the Minister of the Colonies from 26 February until the beginning of the Fascist period in October 1922, made appeals to peace. His proposal, which promised a renewal of the statues and the halting of Italy's policy of encouraging of intertribal rivalry in exchange for an end to the tribes' pursuit of independence and armed struggle, was futile: Tripolitanian demands had evolved from a return to the 1919 statues to full independence, and the chiefs—after years of Italian intrigues—refused to trust that Italy would uphold its end of the deal. The negotiating truce expired on 10 April and violence would resume four days later.

The reaction to Italian occupation occurred as Volpi anticipated: attacks by more than 8,000 rebels, including on Tripoli, were extensive; towns such as Aziziya were besieged and railway lines were sabotaged. In response, on the orders of Volpi, Italian troops throughout the colony began offensives against the rebels, supported by armoured cars, aircraft, and the Regia Marina. Included in these troops was a band of Ibadi Berber auxillaries led by Yusuf Cherbisc, who would remain in the service of the Italians and in 1937 presented Mussolini with the Sword of Islam in tribute. These offensives were successful, and within weeks had established a 19–32 kilometres (12–20 miles) buffer around Tripoli, inflicted heavy casualties against the enemy mahallas led by Ahmed el-Mraied and opened a path to the Jebel Nafusa highlands. Initial resistance took the form of conventional warfare, where the technological and numerical superiority of Italian forces proved decisive; from mid-1923, the resistance transitioned to irregular guerrilla warfare in order to leverage their mobility, knowledge of the local terrain, and ability to hide amongst the largely-supportive civilian population following combat.

Amid this sudden pressure, Tripolitanian notables turned to Idris for leadership, offering him the role of Emir of Libya. Idris hesitated to accept the title, knowing that it would be strongly opposed by both Italy—who saw a united Libya as catastrophic for their interests—and by many Cyrenaican Bedouin tribes, who would likely suffer the most casualties from renewed hostilities with Italy. Though he received this offer in April 1922, he did not accept it until November by which point it was without purpose: Volpi's reconquest was well underway and all Libyan offers of negotiated settlements were being rejected. The accession of Benito Mussolini, leader of the National Fascist Party, as Prime Minister of Italy following the March on Rome of October 1922 cemented the new era of intransigent Italian imperialism. Idris would go into Egyptian exile in December 1922, leaving command of the order to his brother, Sheikh Muhammad ar-Reda.

Rodolfo Graziani, photographed 1940.

Then-Colonel Rodolfo Graziani, deployed to the colony in October 1921, was placed in charge of Italian military operations. He would gain much fame from his exploits during the war thanks to his daring, ruthlessness, and aggressive deployment of his troops—made up of Libyan or East African soldiers commanded by Italian officers—and aerial support from modified Caproni Ca.3 bombers and Ansaldo SVA reconnaissance aircraft.

Pushing into the highlands, Graziani would capture Jadu, Kabaw, and Nalut by 18 June. Offensives by the Italians—barring occasional raids—ceased for the rest of mid-late 1922 so that a large operation to occupy the rest of Tripolitania could be prepared; a state of siege was declared and military law applied. This operation commenced on 28 October 1922, the same date as the March on Rome: under Fascism—and thus with anti-colonial criticism in Rome muzzled—the reconquest grew in both intensity and scale. Graziani would conquer Yafran on 31 October and Gharyan on 17 November, before preparing, in February 1923, to attack the rebel stronghold of Tarhuna—the origin of the committee that had attempted to delay Italy's initial aggression against Misrata in 1921. With 6,000 troops he surrounded and then, on 6-7 February, assaulted the town: 1,500 rebels were captured as prisoners of war with the rest fleeing to Misrata. Pursued by Graziani and another Italian column of 8,000 departing from Al-Khums, the defenders of the Misrata were surprised by the sudden encirclement by Italian forces and the city quickly fell.

The capture of Misrata on 26 February was a major defeat for the rebels. Beyond the occupied territories, to the south and east, Italian military operations became both more difficult and more violent. Despite rebel counter-offensives aided by the Senussi, further Italian campaigns able to extend their control to Bani Walid in the south, Ghadames in the west, and Sirte in the east, which were captured 27 December 1923, 16 February 1924, and 23 November 1924 respectively. These multi-column offensives—able to effectively defeat piecemeal attacks by small rebel groups and then converge against a single target, destroying enemy villages, crops, and livestock as they passed—were a hallmark of Italy's military campaign to re-conquer Tripolitania. Most surviving Tripolitanian rebel leaders would either flee to Egypt, Tunisia, or to Murzuk in the Fezzan.

Benito Mussolini meeting local notables in Sabratha, Tripolitania, during an official visit in 1926.

The reconquest of Tripolitania was accomplished relatively quickly. Helped by minimal resistance and the continued Arab-Berber conflict, most of Tripolitania and Fezzan—and approximately four-fifths of their population—was under Italian control by 1924, and was generally complete by 1925. Confidence in the totality of the pacification was such that Volpi recommended to Luigi Federzoni, the Minister of the Colonies, that extensive settlement of the province could begin. This was overconfidence: in May 1925, 125 Italians were killed or wounded by an attack at Bir Tarsin during a visit by Federzoni's successor at the Ministry of the Colonies, Pietro Lanza di Scalea; Volpi would be replaced as governor by Emilio De Bono following this incident, under whom phosgene gas was approved for use against rebellious tribes.

Though not all of the tribes had been conquered, the Italian army would not repeat its earlier mistakes of 1913-1914 by marching blindly into southern Fezzan in order to pacify them while other rebels remained on their flanks; these unconquered tribes would be slowly brought under Italian rule over the next three years. Indeed, Pietro Badoglio, as Army Chief of Staff, refused to authorise further attacks to the south. The Italians recognised the importance of political control of the tribes, and endeavoured to keep them aligned instead of uniting in opposition against Italy. Frequent Italian troop columns were sent out to maintain order and fend off rebel attacks, designed to reassure the tribes of the usefullness of Italy's protection and rule. Collaborators were recruited from the nomadic tribes, to be used for the campaign into Fezzan, and loyalty to Italy was strictly enforced: the chiefs were made keenly aware that any sign of treachery would be quickly punished.

Previously conciliatory colonial policies from the Liberal era were abandoned by Volpi. Instead, a hard-line stance was taken against the local population, who were made to labour on public works without pay; conquered tribes were treated under the principle of collective responsibility. Mass executions of those suspected of being rebels were common, as were large-scale confiscations of property. The amount of land belonging to the public domain swelled due to these confiscations, as well as a 1921 law that brought all land not being farmed under government control. Those tribes who submitted—known as sottomessi—were taught by the Fascists "to love Italy and to take pride in subjection to our country." Can put any other info about sottomessi here e.g. main source of support for the resistance.

Civilian casualties were significant and surrendering populations would frequently be placed in concentration camps. By the end of the reconquest of Tripolitania under Volpi, approximately 6,500 Tripolitanians had been killed, with 620 Italians killed, 1,924 wounded, and 38 missing.

Cyrenaica

• Gooch 1011-1015 (1922-1928)
• Wright 32-34 (1922-1928)
• Dotolo 171-175
• Baldinetti 46-47
• Vandewalle 30
• Mack Smith 37-38
• Ebner in DN, 204-205
• Ryan 150-155 (includes some interesting stuff on colonial negotiations, the move away from power sharing, and the italian images of the Senussi) (155-158 will be good for italian colonisation of libya)
• Brief peace in 1929 (anderson) (baldinetti 46-47)

initial senussi troop count 2,000-6,000 (plus 8,000 in tripolitania, see above) italian troop count 27,600 (1921–22)–43,400 (november 1928)

Italian control of the territory was weak—confined only to the coastal areas—and anti-Italian violence by armed irregulars was widespread. Serious military attempts to pacify the region would not begin until the Prime Ministership of Mussolini and his appointment of Luigi Bongiovanni as Governor of Cyrenaica. Unlike in Tripolitania, where tribal factionalism undermined resistance, the influence and prestige of the Senussi Order in Cyrenaica allowed for more cohesive leadership of the struggle against the Italians.

A Senussi centre in Ajdabiya.

Action began on 6 March 1923 when Bongiovanni launched a surprise attack against five joint Italo-Senussi guard posts near Benghazi. These attacks—only partially successful—were followed by an Italian offensive against Ajdabiya, the seat of the Emirate of Cyrenaica. The town was captured on 21 April 1923.

Combined operations (1927-1932)

Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east initially had separate military commands, but by November 1927 efforts were being made to unify them both militarily and territorially. Federzoni, now returned as Minister of the Colonies, collaborated with governors De Bono and Attilio Teruzzi, and colonel Ottorino Mezzetti, in orchestrating a campaign to conquer the coast of the Gulf of Sidra and a string of oases along the 29th parallel north meant to link the two colonies. The operation also aimed to expel rebels in the area who, according to Federzoni, had successfully repelled occupation of the region with repeated raids behind Italian lines. The advancing columns were instructed to respect the property and people of tribes they encountered in order to encourage their peaceful submission, while no such limits were placed on tribes who resisted the Italian advance—their chiefs were described as "good prey". In reality these restrictions were almost completely ignored. Aircraft were used extensively by the Italians, variously for medical, reconnaissance, aerial photography, troop co-ordination, and ground support operations. While these methods were effective in cowing the local population, the rebels were able to see the planes approaching, ascertain the direction of the oncoming Italian attack, and then hide in caves of the wadis. CHECK DOTOLO HERE 174-175.

The Italian flag flies over Murzuk, Fezzan, 1930

The campaign along the 29th parallel was complete by late 1928 and resistance against Italian occupation was largely under control, though small raids by rebel groups based in Fezzan persisted. A final campaign by Graziani against the remaining resistance, begun in November 1929, succeeded in capturing Murzuk on 21 January 1930, and reached Tumu, the southernmost point of Fezzan, in March 1930. Graziani was unable to prosecute a decisive battle against the rebels and, frustrated, ordered three days of bombing against the fleeing mahallas.

cyrenaica (delete this heading later)

try and split these up perhaps?

Menacing Badoglio quote (de Grand 131)

• Gooch 1015-1021
• Wright 34-36
• Baldinetti 47-48
• Mack Smith 38-42
• Vandewalle 30-32
• Ebner in DN, 206-208
• Death of al-Mukhtar (Duggan 496-498)

1930 leaders of the Senussi zawayas were deported to Ustica.

Atrocities

• Deportations, concentration camps, mass executions. Ahmida (duh); Labanca (in Ben-Ghiat) 27-; Finaldi (23-24); Ebner in DN, 206-208, 211-215. Internments not just in period 1929-31 - Ryan 150-151, 161-163. St John Libya from colony to revolution 71-73.
• Gas attacks, bombing (many, incl. Ebner in DN)
• Neither side took prisoners (original article source is just a reference to sciara sciat)

Death tolls

• basically can copy from previous on Libyan Genocide
• Large exile population. Substantially varying estimates. Baldinetti 53-54, 62-68;
• Total deaths in colonial period: 175-250-300-500-750.

this might not actually be necessary?

Original Gooch Mussolini's War reference is only tripolitania (pg. 1)—can replace with Ebner in DN 203-204. Haven't found an Italian death toll for Cyrenaica yet—check the DE wiki cite (Gooch Mussolini's War p. 7). Labanca Oltremare doesn't say either.

Aftermath

Colonisation intensifies

Main article: Italian colonisation of Libya

re-check everything here for relevance to Italian Colonisation of Libya article

• land appropriations etc. Pergher 53-54. St John Libya C2R 74 (decent for pre-balbo colonisation; balbo period is 75-78)
• change of tone towards muslims and the arab world following end of resistance (which effectively ended after al-Mukhtar's death, Wright Libya pp.35-36; Sword of islam, french, etc. Arielli 27-29; Wright (in Ben-Ghiat); Ryan 163-164
• Libya unified into a single colony by new governor Balbo. fascist projects in libya. Litoranea Balbo, population settlement. Segre Balbo 293-295; Baldinetti 48-52 Segre Fourth Shore and Balbo a Fascist Life (295 onwards); Pergher (in Albanese); Anderson 216-221; Wright 36-41; Cresti (in Ben-Ghiat); Pergher 83-96 (initially a mostly private enterprise, became state-driven in late 20s. ECC founded 1932. radical changes in management from mid-1930s (87). Balbo details 93-94.). see also sources in "fascist imperial policy in general" bullet point
• Ethnic replacement. Ebner in DN 198-199, 210-215 (also population settlement above)

Families sent to colonise Libya were meant to meet a stringent set of criteria, such as membership of the Fascist Party, clean criminal records, and previously being engaged in farming, in order to properly Italianise the colony in the manner the regime saw fit; in practice these criteria were rarely fully met. All settlers were required to work their land and not find other employment, nor could they hire local Arabs to work on the farms. Life was overseen by employees of the state colonial agencies, who frequently despaired at settlers ignoring the requirements set out by the state. Lots of this can go in Italian Colonisation of Libya, actually. Pergher chapter "Divided by a Common Language" (up to p. 137) details a lot of the wonky-ness in the settlement schemes. Need to be precise and not include too much stuff—one useful point is the relationship between Italians and Arabs post-war.

• Colonial villages were meant to be self-sufficient, again to italianise and fascistise the land. Italians and Arabs occupied "separate spheres". Some interaction, necessarily distant. Pergher 133-137, also the chapter Other Subjects Other People 161 onwards

• place of Libya in the national myth of Fascist Italy post-conquest. Pergher, as above.
• Italy would engage in another brutal imperialist war against Ethiopia 3 years later.

World War Two and independence

During World War Two, Libyans, especially those living in exile, debated the best course of action with the aim of eventual independence. Idris, an Anglophile, quickly sided with the United Kingdom who reciprocated in kind. Other Libyan nationalists—especially those from Tripolitania who chafed at Senussi primacy—were unconvinced; Britain and France were unwelcome colonial powers, and many thought it unwise to antagonise Italy, who seemed at the time certain to win the war. This hesitance was not helped by Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who was unwilling to make any concrete guarantees of independence after the war was won, and neglected to even mention the Tripolitanians in his assurances against continued Italian rule. Eventually Britain set up the Libyan Arab Force, which operated mainly as gendarmes and saw little fighting, fulfilling important roles behind the British lines.

Also Baldinetti 107-109, more on split between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica

• poverty of Libya, total lack of intellectuals, collapse of trans-saharan trade routes, sad stuff Wright A Modern History 48, 71-73. Jerary (in Ben-Ghiat)-surprisingly, not actually useful. St John C2R 80-83.
• Libyan exile politics (Baldinetti 82 onwards)
• transition to independence. (some useful details in Ryan, 165-170). (Also St. John 84-96, though too much detail for this article: leave for allied admin of libya or whatever)

Despite attempts by Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi to retain Italy's colonies, the country would renounce its claims in the post-war Treaty of Paris, and Libya would continue under the control of the Allied administration until the great powers and the United Nations could decide on a course of action; the country would gain independence as the United Kingdom of Libya under Idris in 1951.

Legacy

• Nazi inspiration for Generalplan Ost (berhard, various)
• Gaddafi's vision of the resistance (Ryan 170-171, also check George Joffe, "Qadhafi’s Islam in Local Historical Perspective," in Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969–1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle), Lion of the Desert etc (Clo, Palumbo), Libyan Studies Centre (Ryan Religion as Resistance Essay on Sources, Le Gall)
• Italian relations and memory from the end of colonisation (Ballinger), Labanca, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2010.504627 https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_126121_smxx.pdf , Del Boca (in Palumbo)
• Myth of the Italiani brava gente (Ben-Ghiat in Dubiel & Motkin is mostly Italy in general and very little on Libya itself); Ahmida; Fuller; Fogu (in Lebow, Kansteiner - not actually great)
• Lots in Ben-Ghiat (in Ben-Ghiat)

References

• Anderson, Lisa (1986). The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-05462-9.
• Arielli, Nir (2015). "Colonial Soldiers in Italian Counter-Insurgency Operations in Libya, 1922–32". British Journal for Military History. 1 (2). ISSN 2057-0422.
• Atkinson, David (2000). "Nomadic strategies and colonial governance: domination and resistance in Cyrenaica, 1923–1932". In Sharp, Joanne P.; Paul, Routledge; Chris, Philo; Ronan, Paddison (eds.). Entanglements of Power: Geographies of domination/resistance. London; New York, NY: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203011270. ISBN 978-0-415-18435-9.
• Baldinetti, Anna (2013). The Origins of the Libyan Nation. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-84562-5.
• Ballinger, Pamela (2016). "Colonial Twilight: Italian Settlers and the Long Decolonization of Libya". Journal of Contemporary History. 51 (4). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 813–838. ISSN 0022-0094. JSTOR 26416470.
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