Talk:Tire-pressure monitoring system

Security discussion

The security discussion seems far from being a hoax. Here is more information I found that at least partially corroborates the security argument:

• Freescale Rolls Out Tire Pressure Monitoring System Built on Industry-Leading Sensor Technology, Business Wire, Sept 11, 2007
• White Paper from a sensor manufacturer
• FAQ entry talking about registering your sensors

These links verify much of the security data, including details as to how each individual tire is identified and registered.

This clearly allows for someone to specifically register our cars for identification even if the car companies aren't bothering to track serial numbers (and why would they since they are likely just pulled out of a bin and the car learns the numbers dynamically). All you would need to do is stand next to the car you wanted to identify and read the signals coming from the tires to get a "signature" for that car. The newer sensors with accelerometers can be set to only be on when the tires are rotating at a certain rate. This would make the process of "learning" a person's car more difficult, but not impossible.

So, while some of the particulars (the doom saying, specifically) may be wrong, the base information seems valid, so he may be incorrect about it happening, but the possibility is not a myth. Does the low likelihood of an event's occurring mean it should't be listed on the article? - S. Gartner ^talk 00:46, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

The worst thing is the possibility for assassination use. The sensor emits radio signal, so the car's proximity to a road-side IED can be detected with high precision, allowing for most effectively timed explosion. Other "benefit" is the unique ID emitted by the TPMS sensor allows for singling out the victim's vehicle, so the IED can be left at the planned scene without any human supervison, as it will not go off at random passer-by car, just the pre-selected target vehicle.

Assassination by bombing cars on the road is quite common in Iraq. Italian investigative judge Falcone was blown up by the maffia using a half ton of TNT hidden under the autobahn, the godfather personally pressed the big red button. The top german banker was also killed in his armoured car in 1989, using a photosensor-triggered shaped charge device (obvious secret sevice kind of job). The use of simple and cheap "made in china" TMPS-sensing radio chips would make these kinds of assassination methods straighforward and available for the masses, not just the wealthy and resourceful and thus nobody would be safe on the road anymore.

Shall I mention pakistani military dictator Pervert Mustafa has already survived three massive IED bombings against his motorcade, including one where a bridge was blown up, solely because of two crates of high-tech jammer kit installed in his car by his US allies. 82.131.210.162 (talk) 09:00, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

The very low power output of the RF signal on direct TPMS sensors would require a following vehicle to be within a few feet of the target vehicle.

Removed tons of citation needed claims since all of them are covered by the reference at the end of the paragraph. User:Teutonic Tamer could have read that before spending so much time inserting faulty citation needed markers. If the referenced document itself is disputed, come here and let us know what is wrong about it, but claiming that something isn't a reference when in fact it is, is like saying the bible doesn't mention God. Trivial to disprove. --lynX (talk) 14:47, 9 April 2008 (UTC)

This Subaru website states that the sensors only transmit about once every minute. If the low power signal is detectable 50 feet away, it would take 105.6 sensors every mile to keep track of my car. It would be more efficient to observe the make, model, and plate number of the target vehicle and follow at a discreet distance. No tinfoil hats or black helicopters are needed. --Tarantulas (talk) 22:39, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

All sensors respond exactly within a specified time frame. Some of them respond within miliseconds of activation. The trick is to generate the proper Low Frequency (LF) datagram required to activate the sensor. A continuous wave Schrader style OEM part requires a large amount of LF in a continuous wave for several seconds, while the Ford Corporate or Chrysler Corporate sensors respond within miliseconds of activation. Anyone with an oscilloscope, can reverse engineer the activation tools on the market to determine what will wake up each sensor type. Detectible distance is relitive to background noise. Most TPM's transmit many frames of data making it easy to filter out background. Many TPM's can be activated, read and detected from hundreds of feet away. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.212.36.88 (talk) 13:16, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

From personal experience, I have yet to receive a decent read from a TPMS sensor outside of a 12' range on a stationary vehicle. The sensors themselves transmit a unique ID, but unless you are close enough to the vehicle to read the VIN the sensor data alone doesn't account for much...Sarge62436 (talk) 03:19, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

I suppose so, but it seems to me that license plate readers are getting more common. I was recently at a parking garage that remembers license plates so that you don't have to insert your ticket in the reader. I suspect it is common in other places. Gah4 (talk) 18:16, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

A colleague playing with an SDR wondered what would be visible by plugging into the rooftop yagi, and got TPMS from the road below.

So either TPMS sensors have significantly increased in power since then... or the poster above didn't consider the possibility of using a high-gain antenna. 178.51.26.172 (talk) 12:00, 26 July 2022 (UTC)