Talk:Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction

Let's Go Deeper! 9.20.17

• Can someone take on the collection of non-Tsongkhapa or non-Gelugpa lineage Tibetan sources of information regarding the distinction?
• Can someone take on expanding the section on Modern Scholarship for this article?
• Can someone add a section on Tantra and this distinction?
• Can someone add more meat to the bones of the Criticism section?
• Can someone add a section on Zen and other forms of asian buddhism and this distinction, (if they exist)?

Dienekles (talk) 01:45, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

Some requests

I suspect the current Jonang comment should be tempered or extended based on the content on the Jonang article. Also, how about the three natures contrasted with the two truths, this seems like a good place to make that comparison of view. I've always read the svatantrika view as more of a three natures presentation: though a slightly different one than the later yogacara usage. Might be worth separating an entire three natures article out that describes the evolution of that view as presented in the doxology. Right now it's just discussed on the yogacara article but comparing the svatantrika and sautrantika take on the three natures could occur there. Anyone have thoughts on that? or counter arguments? - Owlmonkey (talk) 08:16, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

One editor has been especially interested in associating Jonang with Svatatrika. Is there any good evidence (read: published scholarly material) to support this identification? I am by no means an expert, and might well be ignorant of some important research in this area. On the other hand, if no such citations are forthcoming, then we should assume this to be speculation.

I tried to relegate Jonang material into a section marked "parallel debates," but it seems to have crept back into the introduction. --Dawud —Preceding unsigned comment added by 218.167.175.248 (talk) 08:35, 1 June 2008 (UTC)

I tried to believe this sentence: "The preferred Gelugpa approach, Prāsangika, was represented chiefly by Candrakirti. Classical Indian commenters did not acknowledge Candrakirti as an important Nāgārjuna commentator, but the Tibetan tradition after the 14th century considers his commentary critical."

However, it seems my knowledge about the history of Tib Budd still against this "belief"!!! Please giving bullet proof using good enough ref, or delete the BIAS.

I believe this has been done. Dienekles (talk)

Move & merger

I've moved the "Svatantrika"-page to "Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction," in order to merge some of the contents from Prasaṅgika to this page (after clean-up), since they are closely related. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 08:14, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

I've merged the Prasaṅgika page into this page. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 12:58, 2 August 2017 (UTC)

Sources, and info to be added

@Dienekles: The article gives alot of attention to Tsongkhapa, but misses the following:

• Candrakirti: his ideas, and the context of his ideas: what was he responding to, and why?
• Ju Mipham and the Rime-movement: Mipham criticised Tsongkhapa; the Rime-movement was influential in the reshaping of Tibetan Buddhism
• The 14th Dalai Lama: head of the Gelugpa, but also trained in Dzogchen, with views which differ from orthodox Gelugpa ("the Buddha-nature is the basis for enlightenment (Jeffrey Hopkins).

Here are some sources:

General

• Georges B.J. Dreyfus & L. Sara McClintock (eds.) (2015), Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?, Simon and Schuster
• Kevin A. Vose (2015), Resurrecting Candrakirti: Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prasangika, Simon and Schuster. Insight into the rise to prominence of Candrakirti in Tibet.
• Kodo Yotsuya (1999), The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prasangika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet, Franz Steiner Verlag

Object of negation

• Jay L. Garfield (2011), Identifying the Object of Negation and the Status of Conventional Truth: Why the dGag Bya Matters So Much to Tibetan Mādhyamikas. In: Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford University Press
• Thupten Jinpa (2006), negation, identyfying its object, Encylopedia of Asian Philosophy, ed. Oliver Leaman, Routledge
• Dalai Lama XIV Bstan-ʼdzin-rgya-mtsho (1999), Opening the Eye of New Awareness, Simon and Schuster, p.69 ff

Alternate views

• Karl Brunnholzl, The object of negation. In: The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, pp. 562 ff.
• D. S. Duckworth (2010), Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika, Journal of Indian Philosophy, August 2010, Volume 38, Issue 4, pp 431–439:

Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition.

• Ju Mipham, The Adronment of the Middle Way, translators introduction

Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 08:16, 31 July 2017 (UTC) / update: Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 06:16, 20 October 2017 (UTC)

Ju Mipham

Would love to see a whole subsection called "According to Ju Mipham" and perhaps an expansion of thoughts by the Dalai Lama under the heading of modern scholarship... unless you feel he is too close to the subject. Dienekles (talk) 07:53, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

If you have the knowledge and sources required.. perhaps under "svatantrika obeject of negation" a section using Ju Mipham's interpretation of Svatantrika to describe emptiness would be appropriate. "Svatantrika - Ultimate Truth." What do you think?Dienekles (talk) 22:32, 26 September 2017 (UTC)

I think tjat the Svatantrika needs to be re-organized; Bhavaviveka, Candrakirti, and Tsonghkhapa's interpretation should be separated. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:45, 27 September 2017 (UTC)

Recent changes

Explanations

Please keep in mind that this is an encyclopedia for a general audience; keep it readable and understandable.

• Lead: I've re-inserted a piece of sourced info on the Sakya and Nyingma, and added a break. Keep in mind that Tsongkhapa is not the only person who has written about this topic.
• Source-tags: I've re-inserted this source-tag again, for the second time. don't remove, but add sources. They're remove two times now; that's unconstructive editing.
• I've moved this quote into a note, again. The quote is too long, and distracts. Also, I'd formatted the reference; this was undone by simply re-inserting the previous format.
• I've changed back

Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth or reality, conventional truth and ultimate truth, to make clear that it does make sense to speak of inherent existence on any level.

into

Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth or reality, conventional truth and ultimate truth, to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence.

Two sentences later, this paragraph says

Ultimately, we realize that all phenomena are sunyata, empty of inherent existence.

See the logical impossibility, of speaking of "inherent existence on any level"? (Ah, to speak about Prasangika...) If you want to change this paragraph, please read the source, instead of relying on your own understanding.

• I've moved this quote into a note too, again; also formatted the reference, again.

• But, at third thought, I've moved it out of the note again, down to the next paragraph...

• This is really sloppy editing: I've added two source-tags; broken a quote in two, to make clear who says what; and added a reference. Don't expect me to wait for references if you work in this way; unacceptable sloppy editing. And Rigpawiki is not considerd to be WP:RS.
• I've moved this text into a note too: too long. And unsourced.
• I've formatted the Chen Mo references; several of them need page-numbers. Beware of reliance on a single, primary source!

In summary: don't use examples and quotes which are too long (WP:QUOTEFARM), and don't remove the source-tags if you don't provide a source. And beware of sloppy editing!

References

Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:45, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

JKJ: Josh, as I stated yesterday, I am in the process of a major edit for this article. Unfortunately, that means that from time to time, I don't have time to gather the reference material. I also don't have time to place the reference material in exactly the way that I would like. That being said, I had planned to come back today and continue my work, and you have completely derailed the set of arguments I was fleshing out. Please, with sugar and a cherry on top, stop editing my changes IMMEDIATELY after they go up. It takes weeks to flesh out this material. If you're unclear about a source, want to make minor changes to content for style etc, I appreciate that. But when you dramatically restructure arguments and paragraphs, I can't start from where I left off.

In regards to "making it understandable." Both of my teachers for this subject, in particular, warned me about dumbing it down. If you dumb it down, you lose the meaning of Prasangika Emptiness. What we are talking about is an incredibly subtle" position of philosophy. There is no way to dumb this "more understandable." We have to show the full integrity of the arguments. If we do not, first of all, it is irresponsible as writers and secondly, those genuinely seeking to gain a deeper understanding will not be able to deepen that understanding. Dienekles (talk) 14:36, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

Well, if it takes that much time, prepare your edits at User:Dienekles/Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction. But please do take serious my comments. NB: you can use {{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002}} for a quick reference to The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment: Volume 3.

I understand that Tsongkhapa isn't the only proponent of this thought. However, his work Ocean of Reasoning is the seminal text on the subject. He is the primary proponent of this distinction. He also addressed all of the modern criticisms of his work that I've encountered in his original text and in the Lamrim Chenmo. Literally, they are listed under the sections on rebuttals after each chapter. Ironically, western scholars didn't or haven't read the source materials very carefully. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs) 17:31, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

And which secondary source says that "Ocean of Reasoning is the seminal text on the subject"? This sounds like a Gelugpa point of view, or your personal interpretation. The article as you're reshaping it may as well be called "Tsongkhapa on the Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction." You're building-up an argument, with phrases like "This is further supported by Jamgon Mipham, in Introduction to the Middle Way." This is supposed to be an encyclopedia, not a Tibetan-style religious text. The way you dismiss western scholarship is a violation of WP:RNPOV. Other sources are needed, like Georges B.J. Dreyfus & L. Sara McClintock (eds.) (2015), Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?, Simon and Schuster. @Ogress:, what do you think? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:48, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

I don't dismiss Western Scholarship entirely, but most of the Western texts on the subject don't treat the source material with enough care, in my humble opinion, especially prior to 2000. That being said, I'd love to see an expasion of the section "Modern Scholarship" or "Western Scholarship." I don't see it as appropriate to mix the interpretation of the person who - in terms of the history of this subject - formalized this discussion in a logically conspicuos manner, with the views and oppinions of those adding to the disscussion 700 years later, without decades of oral teachings via a living religious scholarly tradition. Just give the western scholars their own heading and give their interpretations of the issue their own air time.

Building-Up an Argument

@Dienekles: as noted above, you're building-up an argument. In this section, you give a long (and selectiev) quote from Jamgon Mipham (1846–1912), starting with "This is further supported by." In the next paragraph you state "Lama Tsongkhapa takes this argument even further." This is WP:OR, c.q. WP:SYNTHESIS. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:55, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

@Joshua Jonathan: Please see note on your personal talk-page. Also, with regards to "intrinsic" debate on two truth's, please see full quote on your source in the section below. Seems cut and dry to me. The term "existets" needs a modifying phrase.

Inherent existence

At Talk:Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction#Recent changes, I noted the following:

• I've changed back

Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth or reality, conventional truth and ultimate truth, to make clear that it does make sense to speak of inherent existence on any level.

into

Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth or reality, conventional truth and ultimate truth, to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence.

Two sentences later, this paragraph says

Ultimately, we realize that all phenomena are sunyata, empty of inherent existence.

See the logical impossibility, of speaking of "inherent existence on any level"? (Ah, to speak about Prasangika...) If you want to change this paragraph, please read the source, instead of relying on your own understanding.

References

Now, this sentence has again (second time? third time?) been changed into "to make clear that it does make sense to speak of inherent existence." Please read the talkpage, and discuss changes. This is what brunnholzl says at p.73:

In Centrism, reality is understood in an experiential or perceptual sense and not ontologically as some hard-and-fast “real existence” in a substantial, independent, or absolute manner. Rather, this notion of real existence is precisely what Centrists keep denying.

Read the sources, instead of giving wrong interpretations. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:36, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

Josh, this is the third day in a row that I have put hours of my time into building arguments and providing source material, only to wake up and find that it has been significantly kneecapped. Please, stop coming behind my work and immediately making changes. For the fourth time, I can't gain momentum if I have to spend hours undoing the things you've done in order to get back on track. It's a waste of both our time. Please allow me to complete the work that I've started, then we can discuss more. Thank you.Dienekles (talk) 15:23, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

In Centrism, reality is understood in an experiential or perceptual sense and not ontologically as some hard-and-fast“real existence” in a substantial, independent, or absolute manner. Rather, this notion of real existence is precisely what Centrists keep denying. So for them, “realities” refer to different types of experiences of individual beings, without there being some independent reality somewhere. In other words, Centrists would not say, “The truth is out there.” This means that seeming reality does not exist apart from the minds of the ordinary sentient beings whose experience it is. Likewise, ultimate reality is not some absolute or transcendent given. It does not exist anywhere other than in the minds of noble ones who rest in meditative equipoise within the nature of phenomena.

It's clear that even your own source is saying things exist in a relationship with the minds of beings. Verbatum. Further, that the perception of ultimate reality exists in the minds of the realized. Verbatum. Your author is saying "Things exist." Nowhere does he say that the position is that we can't talk about "existents."He says that we can't talk about "real" existents in the sense that they cannot be seen to be "substantial, independent, or absolute" existents. However, the do exist relative to the minds of beings who have those experiences. Subject-object. Hence, those objects are not self-existent, self-arising, self-creating, self-sustaining, inherent, independent, absolute, or intrinsic. I don't like the term substaintial for various reasons. Can we agree on any modifying phrase here?

To say that any Buddhist school won't posit "existents" is to say that they posit nothing exists. That is incorrect. Your interpretation and re-wording of the Western scholar is incorrect.Dienekles (talk) 16:10, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

I have reverted your interpretation per WP:INTEGRITY: "Editors should exercise caution when rearranging or inserting material to ensure that text–source relationships are maintained." JimRenge (talk) 17:41, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

@JimRenge:@Joshua Jonathan: I think the latest compromise will make all parties happy. To simply state that any Buddhist philosophy, much less the Prasangika of Tsongkhapa, states that we cant "posit existents." Is gross scholarly misconduct. If you're determined to keep the sentence as it is, please consider the latest modification in which I have pulled directly from your own source.

No. You're contradicting yourself: "it does make sense to speak of "substantial, independent, or absolute" existence." "This perceived reality is an experiential reality, not an ontologically independent reality". Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:25, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

I have removed the disputed part; the sentence can do without it. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:34, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Critiques, Western Scholarship, & Modern Rebuttals

@Joshua Jonathan:Josh, if you'd like to expand the sections on modern scholarship and critiques, with western writers and modern thinkers, please feel free. Again, I don't see it as appropriate to mix those thinkers with Tsongkhapa, given that he is the primary source of this distinction. It would be like using Derrida to talk about Hume or Kant, before allowing the words and position of Hume or Kant to fully flesh out their own position.Dienekles (talk) 15:29, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

The object to be negated: extensive quotes

I've moved a set of quotes into notes. I'm sorry, but for most readers this technical Tibetan philosophical jargon will be too much, and distract from the flow of the article. not everyone who wants to know soemthing about Tibetan Buddhism wants to read all of the Tibetan arguments - rather the contrary, actually... Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:48, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

And if you don't believe me: read the notes-section on it's own. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:52, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Wrong Conceptions of Ignorance (According to Prasangika) - Four Tenets System, Hinayana & Theravada

I have literally provided the reference in full form immediately after the statement.Dienekles (talk) 06:12, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

No, you haven't. Tibetan Buddhism had no knowledge of Theravada; you're mixing-up schools. And see my repeated comments on the over-usage of quotes; you're simply refusing to work together on this article. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:37, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Nearly every Lamrim and general guide to the path - every one which I've ever encountered - from every school of thought in Tibet includes a huge section on those of "middling motivation" ... those of the "small boat vehicle" ... those of the "lesser vehicle" ... explicitly using the derogitory term "Hinayana" etc. You're just incredibly misinformed or uninformed about this:

"Qualm: Although it is appropriate in the Hinayana to cultivate disenchantment with cyclic existence, it is inappropriate for bodhisattvas, for, if bodhisattvas were to cultivate intense disgust and disenchantment with cyclic existence..." etc

From Lamrim Chenmo V1 Pg 328. Both the Indian commentators and the Tibetan commentators like Tsongkhapa were aware of the historical context in which their views existed.

Please see my repeated request that you not make extensive edits until I complete my overhaul of the section on Tsongkhapa & Prasangika. I have asked over and over. Why won't you relax for a week or so and let me finish this work unimpeded. After that time, we can re-join the chat and start hammering out the need for more citations, changes in style, etc? Dienekles (talk) 06:16, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Please also note from the style of other articles on Buddhism on WP(for example Four_Noble_Truths make use of extensive citations, large blocks of citations, and extensive verification followed by re-verification. This is endemic to the scholarship of classical Buddhist thought. I am not out of the norm. So, again, I ask that you wait patiently, allow me to finsih my work, without interjecting extensive non-constructive changes.Dienekles (talk) 06:21, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Hinayana in this regard does not refer to Theravada; you're wrong here. Read my repeated requests and warnings not to use too many quotes. Wikipedia is not a solo-project; when objections arise, you discuss them at the talkpage, and do not continue as if nothing happened. See also WP:QUOTEFARM and WP:OTHERSTUFFEXISTS. Also note that those quotes af FNT are from western scholars, not from Tibetann primary sources. You seem to try to write like a Tibetan scholar; that's not the aim of Wikipedia. Start your own blog, if you're not able to follow Wiki-guidelines. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:25, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

No offense intended, but you seem to be dramatically misinformed about the information Tibetan commentators had access to and the generally accepted meanings among the big four lineages of Tibetan Buddhism for the subject at hand. I am specifically writing in the section concerning Tsongkhapa's interpretation, citing sources from within his tradition spanning 700 years of classical commentators that have been looking at his work, in addition to modern thinkers. In my humble opinion, the works of critics of Tsonkhapa both within and without his own lineage of thinkers should have their own sub-headings and sections, where their critiques and other lines of thinking are fleshed out. Once again, I don't see the section entitled "The Heart of the Distinction According to Tsongkhapa" as the place for those thoughts

In regards to quotations, I will eventually par these down and relegate a number of them to comments. In regards to teamwork, this is an area which I evidently hold a broader and deeper knowledge than most. My specialty is Tsongkhapa and Prasangika. That's where I can make my contribution. When I get the full idea written up, we will be in a better position to make edits together. There's still at least a week's worth of information that needs to be compiled, if not two.Dienekles (talk) 07:42, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinayana#Opinions_of_scholars This might help. Dienekles (talk) 07:49, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

You have not given a reference fot the statement "Lama Tsongkhapa and Chandrakirti agree that the object of negation is different for the Madhyamika-Prāsaṅgika than it is for the Theravada Buddhists." It seems to be your personal interpretation of the Tsongkhapa-quote in note 13. Philippe Cornu, in an afterword in the Dutch translation of Guy Newland's "Appearnce and reality," explains that the vaibhashikapsystem, the first of the four tenets, does not refer to all of the "eightteen" classical schools of Indian Buddhism, but to the Sarvastivada (Cornu 1999 p.134). Cornu further notes that the Tibetan scholars never had direct contact with the Theravadins (p.135-136). So, sources please, or I'll remove that section as being WP:OR and WP:UNDUE. And by the way, read WP:CONCENCUS. Claims of personal authority are irrelevant here; WP:RS is. Your claim "this is an area which I evidently hold a broader and deeper knowledge than most" is arrogant and misplaced, and smacks of a disregard for teamwork and the basic values of Wikipedia. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 17:27, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Joshua Jonathan Out of curiosity, are you saying that extant Buddhist Theravada schools do not claim that selflessness is established on the basis of impermanence and the related idea of being a "composed" phenomenon in which those parts are dependent upon non-self? If not, on what basis do they establish selflessness? I have added the modifying phrase "some" to the statements, and added a reference to Alex Berzin as to which specific schools of Theravada thought Lama Tsongkhapa had direct scriptural access to. Again, my statement is "according to Lama Tsongkhapa & Chandrakirti" and I am referencing the source material in a direct quote immediately following the statement, along with notes of a supporting nature. I didn't realize the notion that Prasangika does not see "permanence of the self" or the "non-composed nature of the self" as the correct object of negation was such a controversial point... Dienekles (talk) 18:22, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Joshua JonathanAlso, I would be happy to remove the reference specifically to Theravada, if you'd like to propose a suitable change. It seems to be the most appropriate modern term for those now non-extant schools of thought, rather than Hinayana.

I suggest you read my comment above again, and the source you just added yourself, to understand what's suitable here. For someone with such superior knowledge on the topic, you're writing pretty dumb things on Theravada, equating them with other Indian schools of Buddhism. But maybe that's what happens when you rely too much on primary sources which don't have an accurate knowledge of the complete range of Indian Buddhism... Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 18:45, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Hey Josh, I did read your comment above. Out of curiosity, are you saying that extant Buddhist Theravada schools do not claim that selflessness is established on the basis of impermanence and the related idea of being a "composed" phenomenon in which those parts are dependent upon non-self? If not, on what basis do they establish selflessness? Also, as mentioned, I have added the modifying phrase "some" and clarified the meaning of the term being used. Am I incorrect in saying that it is common nomenclature in modern scholarship to refer to all the early schools of Buddhism as "Theravada?" Further, when the source being cited is referring to "-Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools-" and using the term "Hinayana," to talk about the views of Sarvastivada, what alternative term is most appropriate here in your opinion? The term "Sarvastivada"?

I don't know what exactly to answer to your question about Theravadins & selflessness, and I don't care either; what I care about is your superior stance & the stupid remarks you make about Theravada; and, in this regard, the display of ignorance about the four tenets system of Tibetan Buddhism also.

The note you added:

Specifically, the Tibetan traditions had access to the the Pali Cannon and tenent systems according to the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, which are both schools of the Sarvastivada. (source: Berzin, Alexander. The Two Truths: Vaibhashika and Sautrantika</ref>

This is what Berzin writes:

Within the eighteen Hinayana schools, the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika belong to Sarvastivada (thams-cad yod-par smra-ba), a Sanskrit tradition, different from the Pali Theravada tradition (gnas-brtan smra-ba).

So, no, Theravada is not Vaibhashika and Sautrantika. If you would read the sources you add, you would know that. Berzin doesn't even write that "the Tibetan traditions had access to the the Pali Cannon [sic]." And the four tenets system, to my best knowledge, is a Tibetan device, not Chandrakirti. That's why you need sources; not only primary, but also secondary. See also Geshe Tenzin Zopa, Buddhist Tenets, p.4-5:

It was recently brought to our attntion that the term “Hinayana” is regarded by the Theravadans today as an inappropriate term to use for their tradition. The late Chief Reverend of Brickfild’s Vihara K.Sri Dhammananda and Ven Dr Walpola Rahula, a well-known Theravada scholar highlight: “We must not confuse Hīnayāna (“Lesser vehicle”) with Theravāda (“Path of the Elders”) because the terms are not synonymous. The term Hīnayāna Buddhism is used by scholars for a group of 18 early Buddhist schools, which none exist today. Theravāda as it appears today is usually traced back to the 3rd century BCE in Sri Lanka [...]"

Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 20:03, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

@Joshua Jonathan: I propose we change the term to then Hinayana, as well as a number of other more neutral terms that are more consistent with my quoted text. This subsection is important when trying to distinguish the object of analysis to which Lama Tsongkhapa and others are referring.

Hilariously, 5 minutes into reading Buddhist Tenets:

"In this text, the study of each of the 4 schools is divided in 7 headings –
• Divisions (e.g. in Vaibashika school, there are 3 divisions and 18 subschools, one of which is the Theravadan school)" Pg 21

Two minutes later

So there are 3 criteria to be a Vaibashika follower:
• Propounds the Hinayana/Theravadan tenets Pg23

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs) 00:07, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

30 seconds later

Kashimiris were those from northern India/Kashmir area; Aparantakas resided in the eastern India; Magadhas were those who lived near central India, near Bodhgaya. They follow one teaching of the Buddha called the “Great Detailed Explanation” taught to Theravadans and assert the 3 times (past, present and future) as “instances of substance” can be explained in the present existence. Pg 24

And so, you conclude that Berzin, Cornu, and Walpola Rahula can be disregarded, and that the wrong statements you just quoted can be presented as fact? See WP:BATTLEFIELD, for this particular sentence: "Most relevant to the Theravada branch of Buddhism still existing today, he states: "From Vaibashka school,". That's incorrect, as explained above, yet you deliberately added it. Doesn't it dawn on you why Geshe Tenzin Zopa quoted Walopa Rahula?... Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:29, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

There seems to be a non-consensus among the scholarship here. I'm not convinced. Can you find other Gelugpa based scholars in the tradition of Tsongkhapa stating they are not referring to Theravada, or some such equivalent statement? As a side note, I do appreciate your genuine effort work with me rather than against me on this article. I feel like it's really coming along! CheersDienekles (talk) 06:02, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

I've given two citations, you've given one; that suffices. Especially since the Geshe Tenzin Zopa text amends it's own classification with the Walpola Rahula quote. But alas, I'll try to find some more. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 06:51, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

History of Theravada There does actually appear to be a consensus that the Modern Theravada is a sub-school of the historical Sarvāstivāda:

The Theravādins of Sri Lanka were Sthavira-Vibhajyavādins, differing somewhat from the main Sthavira school in their doctrinal interpretations, although the Theravādin Kathāvatthu does not contain any reference to a Vibhajyavāda school. The Sammatīyas (Pudgapala) also do mention the Vibhajyavādins. According to the Sammatīya sect, the Vibhajyavādins developed from the Sarvāstivāda school. The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra describes the Vibhajyavādins as being the type of heretics who "make objections, who uphold harmful doctrines and attack those who follow the authentic Dharma". The Mahāsāṃghika saw the Vibhajyavādins as being offshoots from the root schism in Buddhism, which according to them produced three sects: the Sthaviras, the Mahāsāṃghikas, and the Vibhajyavādins. The Mahāsāṃghikas list the Mahīśāsaka, Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya, and Tāmraparnīya (Theravada) sects as having descended from the Vibhajyavādins. The Mahāsāṃghika branch itself, together with the Prajñaptivāda, preferred to be called Bahuśrutiya-Vibhajyavādins.

References

Based on the above are you alright with changing both the note in that section and the sentence before that section back to "Theravada"? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs)

No, of course not! See WP:OR, and the references given above that the Buddhist four tenets system does not refer to Theravada. If you think otherwise, you'll need WP:RS (scholarly, not Tibetan) which say so. So far, this is your personal interpretation, ignoring WP:RS. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:36, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

See also Early Buddhist schools, and the template at that page: Theravada belongs to Vibhajyavāda (as noted above), which belongs to the Sthaviras. The Sarvāstivāda is another group of sub-schools, or off-shoots, from the Sthaviras. Your quote above also shows that there were different overviews of the various schools within the various schools. I don't see how there is "a consensus that the Modern Theravada is a sub-school of the historical Sarvāstivāda"; that's your personal (mis)interpretation. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:03, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

@CFynn and Javierfv1212: could you take a look at the contents of this dispute. And Ms Sarah Welch: could you take a look at the way the sources are being used and interpreted here? Thanks. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 09:45, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

@Joshua Jonathan:, @Dienekles: There are problems, serious problems, with selected sources and how are they being interpreted. The use of wikipedia voice, instead of attributing a view to a specific author, raises NPOV issues. The reliance on primary Tibetan sources and universalizing/OR on them is inappropriate (universalizing/OR: where a Lama's views are universalized and projected to be accepted by or true for Theravada, other Mahayana sub-schools, etc with or without new conclusions). Please reconsider and revise this article, keeping in mind the reader and the wikipedia content guidelines. Consider trimming down heavily the primary sources, and relying on secondary and tertiary high-quality scholarly RS instead. Ms Sarah Welch (talk) 15:45, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

@Joshua Jonathan:, @Dienekles: I concur with Ms Sarah Welch that there are serious issues here. I want to focus though on the problems of using Theravada as equivalent to Hinayana, which is incorrect. Also, the sources being brought to bear here are not neutral. From my understanding of the historical trajectory of Buddhist schools, the Theravada and the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika veered off from each other way before the development of North Indian Mahayana scholasticism, not to speak of Tibetan philosophy. The sources being used by Tibetans are clearly Sarvastivada and Sautrantika texts, like the Abhidharmakosha, and there is no mention of Pali Abhidhamma or Theravada thinkers like Buddhaghosa. So clearly, what Indian Mahayana scholasticism and thus later Tibetan scholasticism was critiquing as "Hinayana" was not the Theravada tradition per se because they were not in contact with them. Also we must keep in mind that Theravada is not a "yana" but a lineage, and that there were Mahayana Theravadins in monasteries like Abhayagiri vihara. However this does not mean that Mahayana thinkers like Tsongkhapa etc would not have included what we know as Theravada today in the Hinayana, they most likely would have, since most modern Theravadins do not accept the Mahayana sutras as canonical. And we know that Mahayanists like the Chinese pilgrims Xuangzang used it to refer to all Buddhist schools that were not practicing Mahayana. However, this still does not mean we should use these two terms as equivalent, especially in a neutral encyclopedia article, because the term 'hinayana' has negative and pejorative connotations of "lesser" and "inferior" (see Encyclopedia of Buddhism), and was thus used as a sectarian weapon by Mahayanists. Not only that but even if we accept this, Hinayana is a general category which would include many different schools and thus is not equivalent in this sense either, since modern Theravada would be a single element of this category. Event his is false though, because in modern Theravada there is also the acceptance of the Bodhisattva path by some and of paramitas (10 of them), though it is not emphasized (see Walpola Rahula, Bodhisattva Ideal in Buddhism). This just goes to show that using Theravada as equivalent to or even as a part of "Hinayana" is just not correct and should not be accepted. A better argument about this is made in Analayo's paper "The Hinayana fallacy", see: http://www.documentshare.org/religion-and-belief-systems/the-hinayana-fallacy/ Javierfv1212 (talk) 16:39, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

Please allow me to par this the reference down and make it more specific, so as not to distract from the main point of the sub-section, which is the negation of "permanence," "unitariness," and "dependence upon causes and conditions" as being the correct of object of negation from within the Gelug approach to the Prasangika viewpoint. Does this seem agreeable to all? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs)

Almost Done With Major Revision

I am basically done with this article now, just minor juggling of subject headings and refining of verbiage remains, besides the section on "Karma being carried on the mere'I'". I am much more mentally available to assist in parring things down and editing for flow. Dienekles (talk) 20:11, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

Too Close To Source Material

@Joshua Jonathan:@JimRenge: Do you object to the removal of this tag? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs)

Yes. Not the first time that you remove maintenance-tags. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:43, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

Yes I do, and I oppose your flooding of the article with more text referenced to historical religious sources which are are not independent - although the tag already stated that there was a serious problem. JimRenge (talk) 11:47, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

Gentlemen, this subject is a religious and philosophical subject. The primary (and often secondary) sources are the religious historical and religious living textual tradition within the Gelug, Kagyu, and other Tibetan Buddhist schools. Again, this distinction is one which was drawn by a religious figure, about the teachings within his religion, and those of other parallel traditions. To not extensively cite his work when he founded the distinction would be like not citing Descartes work when talking about Dualism. That being said, Tsongkhapa himself was a secondary source within his own tradition. He was primarily responsible for the writing of extensive commentaries on the work of former Buddhist teachers, in which he is often citing primary sources like Nagarjuna... and secondary sources who are commenting on his work like Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita, and Bavavikeka. Therefore, he is a tertiary source in himself. My fourth tier sources are those which (often) are part of the living tradition still tied to his commentaries and views by lineage, which are now publishing commentaries on his commentary. We have four levels of references, not including the western academics scattered throughout. What specifically do you want to see? Dienekles (talk) 04:18, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Desperate need for discussion

@Joshua Jonathan: I like a lot of the new changes! You're making things much more succinct and readable. I'm impressed. However, can we agree that from here we should form a consensus before making further extensive content changes? Kind Regards Dienekles (talk) 20:54, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

You mean: "I have superior knowledge on this topic, so I have to consent before you make changes"? See WP:OWN. See also the tag at the top of the article. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 03:02, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

You seem to hold a very superior stance on your own views and opinions, frequently following many of your "deletes and reverts" on dozens of unrelated subjects with "that's bullshit" or "nonsense" etc etc. Either you are a specialist in every single subject related to eastern thought, western mysticism, and all types of philosophy (which I find hard to believe), or you are a generalist who likes editing unrelated spiritual articles on wikipedia because it gives you sense of self-meaning and self-importance. The evidence seems to be bearing out as the latter. That being said, you do have a great eye for detail which has raised the bar for my scholarship in this article considerably... I sincerely appreciate your collaboration and assistance. This article is turning out to be much more meaningful than I had anticipated. Thank you again. Dienekles (talk) 04:27, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Josh, you need to discuss these changes with me. Both of our opinions have weight. Some of your edits are brilliant and other edits are utterly inexplicable and terrible. Please discuss changes and we will make them together.Dienekles (talk) 05:15, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Thupten Jinpa

I do see this as a useful lead-in to the discussion of Tsongkhapa. Thupten Jinpa represents both the living tradition of Tsongkhapa as a Geshe Lharam (and the translator for the Dalai Lama since 1985) and a more balanced perspective, as he has provided a number of criticisms of Tsongkhapa's work within the context of Western Academia... he also has a PhD in Religious Studies and an honorary degree in Western Philosophy both from Cambridge University. He is in a good position to point out to a western audience that Lama Tsongkhapa's view on this is an important one, within the context of Tibetan Buddhism:

According to Thupten Jinpa, Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka's key tenets is to be regarded as an important lineage within the Buddhist religious and philosophical milieu, sharing the basic soteriological concerns of the Buddhist path.

References

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs)

You're referring to my removal of that line. What you mean to say is that it's relevant to explain why Tsongkhapa is relevant for this topic. The quote above does not make that clear; basically, it sounds like WP:PUFFERY. What you need is something like the introduction to "What difference does a difference make?", which states that Tsongkhapa is an important voice on this topic - but also states that he is not the only voice. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 02:58, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

That seems like a fair assessment. On the other hand, this is the section which is meant to capture Lama Tsongkhapa's point of view on this subject, not the point of view of other authors. i.e. "The heart of the distinction according to Tsongkhapa." That being said, if you see my note above LETS GO DEEPER!, I would love to see other headings being developed for the different schools of Tibetan buddhism.. from the point of view of tantra.. other forms of asian buddhism.. and modern western scholarship. Thoughts? Dienekles (talk) 04:04, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Tags at "Causes & Conditions are merely designated"

I inserted two tags at "Causes & Conditions are merely designated": a request for clarification, and a request for sources. This is what happened in response:

• "According to Tsongkhapa by way of Chandrakirti and Buddhapalita," was changed into "According to Tsongkhapa by way of Nagarjuna". What does that sentence mean?
• "the most pervasive relationship of co-dependent arising is the third relationship, dependent designation" was amended with another extensive quote from a primary source, which does not state that "the most pervasive relationship of co-dependent arising is the third relationship, dependent designation." Take a look at at the tag at the top of the article again,a nd at the warnings at your talkpage. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 03:06, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Svatantrika-Prasa%E1%B9%85gika_distinction&type=revision&diff=801967538&oldid=801904757

Josh, if I was to say, "This idea applies to everything." Doesn't that mean that it is all-pervasive? In a context where the alternatives are cause and effect, impermanence, and parts-whole, the other three alternatives do not apply to everything. I have cited about six or seven sources throughout the article to this effect, as well as showing extensively throughout the articles very structure itself that this is the deliberate intention of Tsongkhapa, which he claims he is pulling from Nagarjuna, Chandrakiriti, and Buddhapalita. Rather than confuse the point, I shortened it to "Nagarjuna." Are you more comfortable using Nagarjuna's direct quote of:

states that all the various phenomena are in reality designated.

i.e. "most pervasive" or "applies to everything." Or Tsongkhapa:

[T]he meaing of 'conventional existence' [...][is] understood to be established as existent merely through the force of nominal convention.

Or perhaps Chandrakirti:

'Without depending on another' does not mean not depending on causes and conditions. Instead, 'other' refers to a subject, i.e., a conventional consciousness, and something is said not to depend on another due to not being posited through the force of that conventional consciousness."

Maybe the Dalai Lama..?

When the issue of how do ultimately unfindable things actually exist becomes unbearable and we have to say something, the bottom line is that their existence is established by virtue simply of names.

Or wait.. the 1st Panchen Lama... one of Tsongkhapa's direct students?

Before the face of proper, total absorption on the actual nature of reality, there is just the severance of fantasized, impossible extremes - namely, inherent, findable existence or total non-existence - with respect to everything of samsara and nirvana. Yet, after you arise, when you inspect, you see that your mind still gives rise to the appearance of things that dependently arise, which do function and can only exist as simply what can be labeled by names.

Buddhapalita laughs at those who think the ultimate truth itself is essentially existent:

There is no way to overcome the misconceptions of those who think that emptiness is a real thing. For example, if you tell someone, 'I have nothing.' and that person says, 'Give me that nothing.' How could you make that person understand that you have nothing?<ref>Lama TsongkhapaLamrim ChenmoPg 192

There is literally an entire section where Tsongkhapa is talking about conventional existence as being just that which exists due to a conventional designation. What more do you want here? Dienekles (talk) 04:37, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

In use

When there is a tag "In use" at the top of an article, you just stay away. You're not editing in-between, and you certainly are not going to revert in-between, as you did here:

• diff "Undid revision 801975921 by Joshua Jonathan) COMPLETELY UNDUE!!! Are you kidding??"
• diff "Undid revision 801978627 please discus.. this represents about 100 hours of research, referencing, etc. COMPLETELY UNDUE."

No, I'm not kidding. Read Jim's comments again, about flooding this article with extensive quotes from primary sources; read my comments again, an the way you misunderstand sources; read MSW's and Javier's comments again: your edits are helpfull in pointing the way, but you have created a text which is unreadable and ununderstandable. I don't care about "100 hours of research, referencing, etc." when it results in a hobby-project which is below Wiki-standards. Now it's your turn to see how this can be changed. You've had ample opportunity to discuss, but you clearly want only one thing: your way. It doesn't work. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:41, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

If you won't discuss, then your edits are disruptive WP:DISRUPT. We have not reached a consensus. To quote the manual:

Any substantive edit to this page should reflect consensus. When in doubt, discuss first on the talk page..

Again, some of these new edits are fantastic, and others are dramatic and wasteful of time and energy. I like the direction you are going, but you can be much more careful and tasteful in the parring down of this material. The work you did on the Dependent Designation is 'simply brilliant!!!!!! I love it. Please cautiously par down this material with scholarly care and discuss major revisions rather than applying a "major revisions" tag and just taking over. That's not what a consensus is about.Dienekles (talk) 05:44, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

"When in doubt, discuss first on the talk page"... I wonder what would make you doubt, if all the warnings don't help. Your edits are being doubted. Don't you get it? I have been discussing, to no avail. See WP:OWN, read it, and take it to heart. Read also WP:DONTGETIT. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:52, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Third time... Incredible. @JimRenge: could you weight in here? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:55, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Josh, my preference would be to talk-out, between each other without getting outside help involved. There are reasons why I've included various points which I've included... and each of the points you've had questions about, we have either resolved in your favor (Theravada-Hinayana discussion, dependent designation, etc) or resolved in my favor (mind-object inseparability, etc). I agree that we need to figure out a way in which to par this down for the sake of the readership. But I request that you focus on the content, realize we both have good intentions, and temper your approach, rather than emphasizing my novice errors in procedure. Let's figure out a solution that is agreeable to both of us. We're both reasonable gentlemen. I'm entirely willing to help figure out how to make the article more streamlined, but care must be taken in doing so. If you are not unwilling to talk it out, however, I will submit this to mediation and have a third party help us talk it out. Kind Regards, Dienekles (talk) 14:38, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

@Joshua Jonathan: You have an incredible ability to strike at the heart of the matter. This most recent round of edits is very much an improvement! Thank you for your more deliberate and tempered approach to this round of edits. Kind Regards 2601:741:8000:959A:ED2E:C8D6:F70:9BE6 (talk) 04:19, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

@Dienekles: well, thank you! Most of your text is still preserved, in the notes; at Prasaṅgika according to Tsongkhapa you can find the full text. I hope that page offers you ample room to present the additional info you deem necessary. And don't forget that you pointed to the importance of mind & and it's 'creating of reality' in Tsongkhapa's view! Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:33, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

@Joshua Jonathan: Sorry! Did realize you were still editing. The only chunk - in my humble opinion - you might add back in as "one liner" with the note attatched is the section on the importance of logical reasoning. This round of edits is, as I said, pure gold. I'm genuinely impessed. You're a truly talented editor, sir. Cheers 2601:741:8000:959A:ED2E:C8D6:F70:9BE6 (talk) 04:38, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

Rational analysis

The only chunk - in my humble opinion - you might add back in as "one liner" with the note attatched is the section on the importance of logical reasoning. 2601:741:8000:959A:ED2E:C8D6:F70:9BE6 (talk) 04:38, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

@Dienekles: could you specify? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:42, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

This part? "Refuting that rational analysis is not required"? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:34, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

Yes that's the one. I didn't see where that was linked in... what subheading is that under now? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • conteribs)

@Dienekles: sorry, the Wiki-tags inferred with each other. I've removed the whole section; let's see what we can do. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:34, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

I see this as an important point. Work your magic on it and see how we might make it fit somewhere. Dienekles (talk) 05:49, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

Permanence - Obj of Neg

@Joshua Jonathan: For your consideration, I think we should draw a little more attention to the distinction between selflessness as impermanence and selflessness as lack of inherence in this section. Most people have the pre-conceived notion that when Buddhists are talking about selflessness, they are talking about a "non-concrete" and "impermanent" and "changing" self. I think it's critical to draw the distinction here to elucidate the intention of Je Tsongkhapa. Dienekles (talk) 06:43, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

And some asides

Yochacara influence?

In the section Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction#Designation & "Conventional Truth", it is stated that "phenomena only come into existence relative to conscious observers who are applying conceptual and nominal conventions to mere experiences." Is this a Yochacara influence? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:37, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

NB: I think that it is an improvement, the insistence on this point. At least, it makes me understand more of Tsongkhapa. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:48, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

JKJ: No, this you can find directly in his writings all over the place. Look at Chenmo V3 and Ocean of Reasoning. When Tsongkhapa talks about co-dependent arising, he is talking about dependent designation. The analysis of cause and effect is a stepping stone to a deeper understanding. Dependent designation applies to all possible phenomenon in all possible worlds (including abstract phenomenon like space, emptiness, persons), whereas cause-effect and parts-whole only apply to the relationships in which we find causality or entity.

However, Tsongkhapa and arguably Nagarjuna (by way of "apoha" theory) argue that all things and phenomena come into existence ONLY relative to a designating mind. Nagarjuna is making a point to the Buddhists who think interdependence or co-dependent arising is cause and effect by deconstructing cause and effect first in his arguments in the Mula. He's directly saying, "Nothing arises and nothing ceases, so how can you call this interdependence?" Sentiments echoed all over the place by Tsongkhapa in Ocean of Reasoning.

That being said, they are not mind-only proponents. They do not accept that mind and object inherently arise from one seed. In the simplest of terms, if mind and object are actually both mind, we run into all the classical problems of Solipsism, along with "new" philosophical errors related to seeing that mind as inherent or the buddha-nature as inherent. This is why Tsongkhapa spends so much time on valid designation. There must be a basis of designation otherwise, what are you designating upon? That designation must occur with a socio-linguistic context in which the term-concept applied has an agreed upon meaning, etc. Dienekles (talk) 14:18, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

Thanks for your reply. I'm not convinced, though. It's clear that Tsongkhapa rejects Yogacra absolutism, but the statement that "phenomena only come into existence relative to conscious observers who are applying conceptual and nominal conventions to mere experiences" comes very close to Yogacara, I think. But, that's nice; a good topic to reflect on, and try to find more info. Thanks. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 14:34, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

Yes, they are very close. Prasangika and Svtantrika ave very close. The viewpoint of a non-concrete self versus non-inherent self are very close. As philosophers, it is our responsibility to go deeper than the face value of the statements being made. They are close, but they don't touch. You need to read a Gelugpa book on Tenets. This is why I continually remove the word "concrete" from various edits to this page and other Mahayana pages. The selflessness of the Mahayana does not have to do with the non-concrete nature of the person. It has, instead, to do with the non-inherent nature, non-true nature, non-dual nature, or bliss-emptiness nature of the person, depending on the philosophical ecosystem in which we are thriving. Dienekles (talk) 14:42, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

On third thought, a section on Yogacara influence might be useful. It is generally viewed that Tsongkhapa's early years of scholarship were dominated by Yogacara, and that later he formed his own unique ideas. Ideas which were so distinct from Yogacara and orthodox sakya views (the school of which he was a part), that some called him "a nihilist who is possessed by demons." That being said, one could really go either way on this. Perhaps changing the "Criticism" section to "Objections" and including a subsection on "Yogacara in disguise?" If such a reference can be found... Thoughts? Dienekles (talk) 14:46, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Chittamatra/Yogacara & Tsongkhapa

@Joshua Jonathan: You might find it interesting that there is a famous story of Manjushri appearing to Tsongkhapa and accusing him of being a Chittamatra by view, while still propounding Prasangika. Related to that story, much of Tsongkhapa's writings explicitly teach against the idea of what he thought were "provisional viewpoints." To justify this, pg 274 of Essence of True Eloquence he paraphrases Avalokitavrata's commentary on Wisdom Lamp:

It is better to teach realitylessness from the beginning rather than first presenting one with the reality of (pure) consciousness [Chittamatra/Yogacara] and later refuting such reality. This view that the realitylessness of consciousness should be realized just as is the unreality of external things clearly negates the idea of certain Centrists that a disciple must necessarily be taught in stages.

And a moment before quotes Wisdom Lamp itself:

It would be better to stay far away from the mud, rather than getting soiled and having to wash yourself off.

He has a similar treatment for Svatantrika and Sautantrika viewpoints.

"Emptiness" and "nothing" in Dutch sign-language

Dutch sign-language has an interesting distinction between "emptiness" and "nothing."

• For emptiness, put your hands infront of you, close to your belly, palms up, as if you're holding a bowl. Then move your hands 'outside', as if you're following the belly of the bowl.
• For "nothing," put your hands in front of you, as if you're going to clap. Then put the tip of your thumb against the tops of your index finger and middel finger (both hands, but separate), andd then thrust them forward, while opneing your hand completely, as if you're throwoing away something (some fine stardust, so to speak).

Unfortuanetly, I can't upload images, due to copy-rights; I also can't find a book or pictures. But try this at home; it's nice. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:04, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

Interesting... I'm not sure if that content would add to the positions (either modern or classical) which are presented on this page. However, I'd love a link to see it myself!Dienekles (talk) 21:37, 19 September 2017 (UTC)

"the conventionally appearing table itself" - the construction of the "I"

This line, "the conventionally appearing table itself," if I understand correctly, is about our cognition of the table, the 'mental images' that we create and perceive as real. Is that correct? I find this interesting, because of this quote: "When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self, but we do not consider this to be the basis of the conception of "I."" What, then, is the basis of the conception of "I"? And again, are they referring here to the whole fabricate of our cognition? Is there a way to explain this a little bit better than with the technical phrase "the conventionally appearing table itself"? Compare social constructionism, the cognitive science of religion, and related approaches which say that we create our own world. Or maybe Kant and his categories, who states that our brain/mind has an inquired set of categories with which our "reality" is created from our perceptions. Are Tsongkhapa and other Tibetans sort of referring to the workings of the mind, when they speak of the notion of " inherent existence"? Is this notion inherent to the workings of the mind, preparatory to more fleshed-out notions of permanent selfs which can be deconstructed - but a deconstruction which does not touch on this preparatory 'category'? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 06:02, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

"What, then, is the basis of the conception of "I,"" ... The mere lack of obstruction to the valid designation of the term. The valid designation of the term to mere experience is the valid "I" ... The incorrect, naive conception of the "I" is to see it as established somehow intrinsically in the basis of the term: through characteristics that the basis possess (in reality it possesses none, in this system) or through an identity which the basis possesses (in reality it possesses none, in this system)... or through an essence, a divine will, or some unknowable force (which in reality, cannot be found upon analysis according to this system). Even when the term is validly applied and the self is conventionally existing, there is no "self itself" established in the basis of designation for the term. Hence, in reality, there is absolutely nothing to cling onto with attachment or aversion, karma does not arise, and so on.

"Are Tsongkhapa and other Tibetans sort of referring to the workings of the mind, when they speak of the notion of " inherent existence"?" ... They are speaking of the workings of the mind in the sense that the mind is misattributing some form of self-identity, essence, a primordial set of characteristics, or intrinsic properties to the objects of experience, which can not be established by analysis as actually existing. Those things just aren't there, at all. Those sorts of things don't exist, even conventionally. There is no conventional "pre-existent set of characteristics" upon which the term "I" or "table" is being designated. If one were to posit such a thing, then that thing - existing apart from a dependent relationship with a mind that cognizes it - would be self-established, self-created, self-sustaining, intrinsic, inherent, and ultimately non-functional.

This is the brilliance of Tsongkhapa (and arguably the Prasangika school) in my humble opinion. The conventionally appearing table is a co-dependent phenomenon. It depends upon the mental imputation which establishes it as "real" in the sense that is it validly experienced and known by a being. That mind which also arises as "table as the object of experience" is dependent upon the basis of designation, which is a mere lack of obstruction for the table to occur (emptiness) or just an uncharacterized mere experience (also emptiness). This is why the two terms conventional-ultimate are synonymous in this system. This is related to the idea of "the play of mind" in Prasangika Mahamudra. There is a bliss-emptiness inseparability: the mind's ability to create is co-dependent arisen with an absence of obstruction to those creations. Subject and object are inseparable, and therefore, both are empty of inhering within themselves. Since the self and the object lack intrinsic properties, what basis is there in reality for attachment or aversion? Without the klesha's, what basis is there for karma, and so on?

"Is this notion inherent to the workings of the mind, preparatory to more fleshed-out notions of permanent selfs which can be deconstructed - but a deconstruction which does not touch on this preparatory 'category'?" ... The reason impermanence is a stepping stone understanding within this system is that one is deconstructing experience using "tools" which are still seen to be inherently existent (namely, causes and conditions, parts-whole, dependent origination, impermanence) in order to arrive - mainly - at an absence of stasis of the person... and in some cases the absence of stasis in objects. Clearly, one's clinging to inherence has been damaged by that analysis, but the argument here is that it hasn't been fully destroyed. Why? It hasn't been destroyed because the object of negation "a permanent, unitary, or independent self" and therefore its result "an impermanent, composed, and cause-condition dependent self" still retain various elements of perception that include inherent existence. Namely, causes and conditions, part-whole, certain types of minds, the realization of selflessness itself, nirvana, buddhas, and so on are left intact and intrinsically existent. There is still misknowledge of various things comprising elements of both personal and phenomenal reality, seeing them as intrinsic, self-established, and self-sustaining, so therefore, there must be attachment and aversion with regards to those. Therefore, there will be karma, and so on.

If we recognize the object of negation clearly and realize it in special insight meditation, according to Prasangika, we will eliminate the perception of inherence from all levels of our conscious and subconscious mind. Therefore, we will eliminate even the possibility of clinging or aversion with regards to all things of samsara and nirvana. Even things as subtle as non-obstructive contact (space), absence of inherence (emptiness), luminosity-knowing (mind), relationships (entity and cause-effect), and "inseparabilities" are merely dependent designations, and therefore empty of an inherent, intrinsic self. Once we have realized that the mind which is realizing emptiness is empty, the emptiness being realized empty, and the relationship of inseparability between the two is empty, what could we possibly cling onto or reject in our experience? We have thoroughly eliminated an "inherent, intrinsic self" from all phenomenon, both personal and phenomenal. What could possibly act as the basis of delusive emotions, on any level? What could possibly act as the basis for a karmic action? We have also established their conventional existence and functionality though applying nominal conventions, and hence avoid the extreme of nihilism. Things do exist, but nothing - at any level - possess an inherent self. This is the key point, in my humble opinion... backed up by numerous credible and diverse sources from various Tibetan lineages.

Interestingly, this is why Gelugpa scholars are often anti-Mahamudra. They do not see a mind which know's it's own nature as being a mind. If it knows itself in a state of non-construction, non-naming, non-characterization... then that mind has no properties. An object which has no properties is not an object. Therefore, the mind which knows mind has no object. A mind without an object, by definition (within Gelugpa) is both impossible and not considered to be a mind. Therefore, if it were somehow possible, this mind-with-no-object needs a different term other than "mind" to characterize it because it falls outside the definition of mind as an "object possessor" according to Prasangika Pramana (references can be provided) Dienekles (talk) 06:57, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

The use of the word "itself" here is a bit of misnomer. To say the conventionally appearing table "itself," is to imply that the table has a conventional existence apart from the nominal designation. Even when the nominal designation is being applied, the basis of designation is no more a table than it is a duck. This is the classic Tibetan rope-snake example. The validly designated rope is no more a rope at the material level than it is a snake, even when the nominal convention of "rope" is validly applied. The basis of designation is completely free of characterization even when validly designated with characteristics. Hence the quote: Before the face of proper, total absorption on the actual nature of reality, there is just the severance of fantasized, impossible extremes - namely, inherent, findable existence or total non-existence - with respect to everything of samsara and nirvana. Yet, after you arise, when you inspect, you see that your mind still gives rise to the appearance of things that dependently arise, which do function and can only exist as simply what can be labeled by names. (emphasis mine) It is unmistakable that such things still naturally dawn, yet they are like dreams, mirages, reflections of the moon in water, and illusions.[22] — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs) 07:07, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

As a final thought before I pass out, the term "itself" here might not directly imply inherence, but it is implying that the basis of designation - the constituents of what will be labeled as a table, for example - exists according to characteristics. The mind is reaching out asking, "Well, there must be something that I'm designating upon." The Prasangika argument is that if such a table or basis of a table existed with any sort of primordial or pre-existing characteristics what-so-ever (i.e. "even an atom of essence"), then those characteristics would have to be inherent to the object. Why? Because they are not a dependent designation. They pre-exist the dependent designation. And the Prasanga begin to formulate themselves... therefore, therefore, therefore... The table would either not need to be designated because it would already be a table, or, it would be impossible to designate because it would intrinsically be the constituents. Or, absurdly, the table would be something entirely other than the constituents, because the constituents are in-and-of-themselves constituents, and not a table, etc. Therefore, tables could not exist if there were even an atom of characteristics on the part of the basis of designation for the term. Hence, the Prasangika-Svatantrika position is born. Enter the Heart Sutra ... paraphrase, everything of samsara and nirvana exists like this, with no characteristics, but appearing co-dependently none-the-less with the minds that nominally designate them within various socio-linguistic contexts (conventions). Enter the classic Tibetan example of the glass of liquid which is pus and blood to the hungry ghost, water to the human, and bliss-nectar to the gods. Enter Apoha theory positing that mind designates the table on the basis of the absence of non-table and not the presence of characteristics. Given that there are no findable characteristics, the designation itself is a mere absence of obstruction to the designation of the term. Hope this helps. Kind Regards — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs) 07:26, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

I have to read your response yet (thanks), but a quick Google-search on "object to be negated" gave me Identifying the Object of Negation (emphasis mine):

“Object of negation” refers to the way you experience the self: as though it exists from its own side, without depending on the mind and body, the five psychophyscial aggregates. It is, in other words, an instinctive sense that the self exists from its own side. Such a self does not exist at all.<br.
Lama Tsongkhapa explains in his Concise Instructions how this “self” that is the object of negation arises and appears experientially. It is not something that arises due to analysis. It spontaneously appears as though it exists from its own side, without having to depend on its basis of imputation – the five aggregates. Lama Tsongkhapa says that experientially, this self appears solidly. He uses the analogy of walking in pitch darkness, reaching out your hand, and suddenly touching a pillar. At such a moment, the pillar appears very solid to you.

"Instinctive sense": yes, indeed. The analogy offered here is *wow!* I sometimes use a similar analogy to explain how we create our own reality. I'd like to see this (or something similar) into the article, as an elusication of the "conventionally appearing table." Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 15:23, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

He actually goes on to use the same sets of terms which I have included in the article when he offers to talk about the subject "nakedly." By which, I'm assuming he means "not softening or qualifying the discussion for the sake of beginning or intermediate students."

Kalden Gyatso concludes his discussion of the object of negation by offering to reveal the object of negation nakedly, just as it is. He then says that everything that appears to you is the object of negation! Your own body and mind as well as all external things appear to you as truly, inherently existent, and you then grasp and cling to that false mode of appearance. Although things do exist conventionally in mere name, ordinary beings have not yet realized emptiness and so cannot differentiate experientially between what’s conventionally existent and what’s the object of negation. Ordinary beings are always mistaken in actually believing in the false appearance of things existing from their own side. When you negate this false appearance, that simple negation induces the experience of emptiness.

That being said, I do find myself being attracted to the terms "innate" and "instinctive" when describing the object of ignorance, given that we do them automatically from birth, without the need to be taught to do so... We can add this in a few places if you think it will make it more understandable for the reader. If you'd like to find a place to put the pillar in a dark room quote (perhaps as a note in the section on OON?), I think it adds something to the discussion. I agree!

Hey Josh! Hmm. Where would you like to place that? Dienekles (talk) 20:11, 20 September 2017 (UTC)

I also like the terms "innate" and "instinctive"; it seems we're on the same track here. It's not only the perceptions to which coherent mental structures are added; it's those mental structures (I always forget the proper terms from cognitive psychology) themselves, whcih are related to, yet somehow also indepenent from, those perceptions. But I'd like to have good secondary sources for this explanation. If we've figured this out, established scholars will have done so too. Currently Google-searching for prasangika "cognitive psychology". See also I Am a Strange Loop. And see also, maybe, The mythology of anatta. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:05, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

I love this! I Am a Strange Loop My main instructor - who is a westerner - has often compared Tsongkhapa's analysis to "Strange Loops." I think this could warrant a whole section under "modern scholarship" perhaps something like... "Parallels in Western Thought?" I aslo see parallels in Greek thought like the Ship of Theseus, which the Greeks view as "unsolved" but which Tsongkhapa and Chandrakirti would view as "solved" in the example of the Chariot. I also see a parallel in thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Phenomenology. A great example of this is Intentionality, which is the idea that mind must always have an object, "consciousness is always conscious of something." — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs) 20:27, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

You said:

It's not only the perceptions to which coherent mental structures are added; it's those mental structures (I always forget the proper terms from cognitive psychology) themselves, whcih are related to, yet somehow also indepenent from, those perceptions.

But in this system, "Signs only refer to other signs" (Sign_(semiotics)) they never refer to an external, independent perception. References can be provided... but I think that should be clear-ish from the material in the article. Emptiness and dependent designation are inseparable, so the sign "term-concept-mental image" never refers to something eternally findable, established in the basis of designation. It only ever refers to an internal network of other signs... ie a Convention_(norm) within the mind and socio-linguistic context of the person applying the term to mere undesignated experience. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs)

Theravada & Tsongkhapa

You wrote:

Out of curiosity, are you saying that extant Buddhist Theravada schools do not claim that selflessness is established on the basis of impermanence and the related idea of being a "composed" phenomenon in which those parts are dependent upon non-self? If not, on what basis do they establish selflessness?

As far as I know, Theravadins, in Vipassana meditation, observe the floatingness of phenomena, to attain insight into non-permanence, thereby becoming a "stream-enterer." This is the first stage of the Four stages of enlightenment; seven more rebirths are needed to attain full enlightenment. The contemporary Vipassana movement has this as its main goal, arguing that we live in a degenerate age, in which full Buddhahood is impossible; but becoming a stream-enterer guarantees the survival of the dharma unto better times (this is a response to western colonialism, and the invasive western culture which threatens indigenous cultures). I hope this answers your question somewhat. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 06:59, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

I have not seen this terminology before.

floatingness of phenomena

Where are you seeing this terminology? From the page on "no-self":

In Buddhism, the term anattā (Pali) or anātman (Sanskrit) refers to the doctrine of "non-self", that there is no unchanging, permanent self, soul or essence in living beings.

In one, it directly denies that there is anything called a self or soul in a human being that is a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical (proto-Hindu) traditions.

From Theravada#Teachings:

Anatta (not-self): all dhammas lack a fixed, unchanging 'essence'; there is no permanent, essential ātta (self). A living being is a composite of the five aggregates (khandhas), which are the physical forms (rupa), feelings or sensations (vedana), perception (sanna), mental formations (sankhara), and consciousness (vinnana), none of which can be identified as one's Self. From the moment of conception, all entities (including all living beings) are subject to a process of continuous change. A practitioner should, on the other hand, develop and refine his or her mind to a state so as to see through this phenomenon

Hence my statement, that they "claim that selflessness is established on the basis of impermanence and the related idea of being a "composed" phenomenon in which those parts are" themselves non-self. It's clear to me, based on the above, that Lama Tsongkhapa and Chandrakirti are speaking directly about the views of the living Theravada tradition, despite the fact that they only had access to a Sanskrit translation of the Pali Cannon (tripitaka &shastra) and that there is no historical evidence of an encounter between the Sri Lankan Theravada and the Gelugpa. Chandrakiriti:

When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self,[note 24] but we do not consider this to be the basis of the conception of "I." It is therefore astonishing to claim that knowing this selflessness expunges and uproots the view of the self.

Lama Tsongkhapa:

If you do not understand this and fail to eradicate the perspective of innate ignorance, then, when you refute a personal self, you will only refute a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent.[note 25][...] Even if you actualized such a selflessness in meditation and consummated your cultivation of it, nothing would come of it. It would be extremely absurd to claim that you can overcome innate afflictions by seeing as nonexistent the two selves imputed by acquired misconceptions.

Thoughts? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dienekles (talk • contribs)

"Floatingness" is my term; the literature probably uses other terms. Regarding Tsongkhapa: he seems to take texts and quotes too literal. As tghe 14th Dalai Lama said, as quoted by you: the various positions akk lead to the same result. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:47, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

Split-off

I suggest we split-off to a separate page, as it was before, and present a succint summary here. As it is not, it's unreadable and unintelligible for most readers. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:34, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

I disagree. There is an introduction, a summary, and then a thorough explanation, and then even deeper notes placed throughout the thorough explanation. For those with a cursory interest, they can read the introduction and summary, if they want to know more, they can dive into the next set of sections. Again, look at articles like this: Phenomenology_(philosophy) and Existentialism and Critique_of_Pure_Reason. This subject is no less precise and involves a certain amount of technical jargon.Dienekles (talk) 16:05, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

On second thought, perhaps this would be a good idea. Either that, or to take some of the more technical aspects of this thought - like this Daniel Cozart's 8 unique tenets and 13 distinguishing features - under a new page called "Prasanika according to Tsongkhapa," where each point is talked about in greater depth. What do you think?

Good. See Prasaṅgika according to Tsongkhapa. I copied the info prior to my edits from yesterday. Succes! Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:42, 24 September 2017 (UTC)

New Edits

Be careful that citations are not getting lost with the new edits. It seems that some citations have been jumbled in the process of making the information more succinct.Dienekles (talk) 22:32, 26 September 2017 (UTC)

I'll have another look at it. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:44, 27 September 2017 (UTC)

I checked the reference for Padmakara Translation group; it seels to work fine. Did you mean that the specific reference to "Section "Mipham Rinpoche and the Prasangika-Svatantrika Distinction"" was lost? Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 04:59, 27 September 2017 (UTC)

Awful Article

The lede is way too long, it should be a one-para summary

The article is OR, I believe. The body of the article is essentially a crowd-sourced commentary on the foundations of madhyamaka, so I think that makes it an original religious teaching.

Little of the prose in either the lede or the main body will make any sense to someone who has no prior exposure to this kind of stuff. The prose needs to be more down-to-earth; perhaps it might sound better if it were not composed by a True Believer.

I have a problem with the history on this article: one or two people have made so many minute changes that the history is now swamped - I have to page back x 5 to see an edit that wasn't you guys; and that was just a month ago.

I request that you both use a private sandbox, please - when you are done, you can post your single update with a sensible description.

Wikipedia is not to be used as a platform for teachers of The True Religion.

(Like, I'm not into no-platform stuff; I just mean, if religious teaching is now allowed on wikipedia pages, then I'll be leaving) MrDemeanour (talk) 21:04, 14 November 2017 (UTC)

Have a look at Prasaṅgika according to Tsongkhapa... Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 10:07, 30 November 2017 (UTC)

Svatantrika and prasangika as approaches to practice

The article presents this distinction as if it were between two approaches to logical reasoning. That is indeed how it is traditionally presented; but it is possible to approach the subject from the point-of-view of practice. See Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, Ven. Geshe Kelsang Gyatso Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoche, ISBN 0 9511477 0 6.

This is possibly relevant to the question of whether the two approaches produce the same realisation.

After all, logical reasoning as such is unlikely ever to result in any kind of realisation, unless it is combined with practice; and ultimately neither svatantrika nor prasangika was devised primarily as a method for defeating opponents in debate - they were created as tools for achieving realisation. At least that's my understanding; I'm not aware that this is particularly controversial.

(Note that if one wanted to actually use that book as a guide to practice, one ought be introduced to the text by a qualified instructor, as if it were a tantric practice - probably because the final stage discussed in the text is Shentong, a controversial view that is sometimes associated with tantra).

I am reluctant to attempt editing this article while there appears to be an ownership dispute between other editors underway. MrDemeanour (talk) 13:46, 29 November 2017 (UTC)

I think you're right. Too much emphasis has been given too Tsongkhapa's views, while for example Mipham has a view on the topic which is more moderate and more inclusive. But to include his and other views asks for a balnced approach, with a good eye for details and sources. I've been reading the introductions to two of his works, and his "General introduction" to Shantarakshita's text; very inforative; it has broadened my understanding of Buddhism in general.

Regarding realisation: Mipham, ans also the Dalai lama, if I recall correctly, both state that both approaches lead to the same realisation.

Mipham, or the Padma Translation Group in their introduction to Mipham's commentary on Shantaraksita, explains that conventional truth can be seen as an epistemological view on reality, while ultimate truth is an ontological view on reality. Within conventional truth, various stances or approaches can be taken; svatantrikas take a savastivadin approach, granting substance c.q. reality to material reality as consisting of atomic particles, whereas Yogacara approaches see conventional reality as a construct, raised by the mind. The PTG also comments that Shantarakshita weaves various Buddhist approaches into his texts, building up insight in steps, going from a realistic approach to a Yogacara-Madhyama approach. Mipham stands in this tradition, giving a lucid presentation of conventional and ultimate truth which is quite accessible. He also seems to comment on Tsongkhapa as someone who uses a lot of words and reasonings, but keeps stuck in a rational emptiness, missing the point of the lucid nature of awareness. More from Mipham should be added, as well as from Kagyu scholars. Karl Brunhölzl of course is an interesting and relevaktpractitioner-scholar in this respect. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 06:24, 30 November 2017 (UTC)

Regarding Geshe Kelsang Gyatso vs. Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoche: those are quite different teachers... Gelugpa hardcore orthodoxy, versus Buddha-nature proponents. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 06:31, 30 November 2017 (UTC)

Indeed. They stand in direct opposition to one another. I have confused their names before, I think. Odd, because I have received teachings from the Khenpo, and I'm aware that followers of the Geshe consider the followers of the Khenpo to be heretics (the charming phrase 'hypostasising an absolute' has been used; 'hypostasy' would be falling into belief, by analogy with 'apostasy', or falling away from belief). (FWIW I am no longer a buddhist) MrDemeanour (talk) 10:51, 2 December 2017 (UTC)