Talk:Reason/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Jan 09

I re-wrote the intro by re-arranging the elements that were already present into a more coherent whole and adding a little glue to hold it together.

It would be good to add a line which summarizes what the contexts of this page are in contrast to the page on 'reasoning'. (speaking of which - perhaps the section on first principles should be to (inductive) reasoning page??) Cathalwoods (talk) 01:44, 29 January 2009 (UTC)

Proposed merge of Reason (argument) into Reason

Although I am not the proposer of the merge I see in Reason (argument), I SUPPORT the merge. Rationale: Reason (argument) has not a single reference. N2e (talk) 05:06, 17 May 2009 (UTC)

"Reason" and "A Reason"

I am responsible for the recent changes which distinguish, from reason as a mental faculty, reasons as considerations which explain or count in favor (explanatory and normative reasons). Those are such a different topic that perhaps they merit a separate article. Those (unlike myself) outside professional philosophy might be surprised to find that these things are so different. However, it becomes clear upon reflection that reason as a mental faculty is quite different from considerations which explain or count in favor. That's why it's not enough simply to say that there are many different uses for the term, "reason", but rather we must say that Reason and reasons are very different types of thing. That is why it seems that there need to be two bold entries, one for Reason, and the other for reasons. Again, perhaps "Reasons" deserve a separate article. Whoistheroach (talk) 05:54, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

Logos (logic) derivation

I have problems with this, as I believe it over-generalizes:

"logos", the root of logic, which translated into Latin became "ratio"

The Wictionary entry for logos gives the following string: “speech, oration, discourse, quote, story, study, ratio, word, calculation, reason”

This covers most types of thought and its associated communication(emotional and conceptual are missing). The Latin term "ratio" tends towards mathematical thinking, or calculation. I cannot say if ancient Rome deliberately split up "thought" into various definitions, but different from the Latin "ratio" is "sense," which is the flip side of thought (from Proto-Indo-European culture). Sense tends towards seeking, making rational thought myopic. I put some writing on the talk page of Rational Wiktionary that I am also extending into a Wikiversity article that asks why "sense" has been superseded by "calculation" in sophisticated thought.

My gut sense is that information from antiquity is missing; that Plato's school so dominated discussion that other approaches got lost, perhaps even before getting documented. This in turn may have influenced what we think of as "rational thought" to produce thought that is nearly purely causal, and hence often unreasonable (especially here on the Wikipedia). I am asking from the psychological perspective, and attempting to support my inquiry with recent neurological material.--John Bessa (talk) 21:25, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

Hard to see your point? The modern meanings of ratio and logos are obviously not a great place to start concerning the etymology. Ancient Greek and Ancient Latin are not lost languages and you can look up what the terms originally meant. For this article the only relevant point however is that one was used to translate the other in discussions about human nature and what is today called reason or rationality. No one is saying the words have an identical history and this article is not really about these words as such.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:36, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters --- WONDERFUL!!!

I would like to highly commend the inclusion of this etching with its motif. The metaphor is highly apt and I would like to see this one _FOREVER_ included in this article. GREAT GREAT work people! I enjoyed it immensely indeed, Many Thanks, Regards, 122.148.41.172 (talk) 09:15, 19 April 2010 (UTC)

proposal: move all discussion of reasons (as opposed to reason) to Reason (argument)

I think that the above proposal is a no brainer. The article has become very confused because it is now discussing two quite separate subjects as if they are one. In the meantime Reason (argument) is a stub and needs the material which is messing this article up.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:12, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

Strongly agree. Rick Norwood (talk) 12:03, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

No reason without humans?

The Wikipedia term "Reason" starts with the following sentence: "Reason is one of the human mental faculty that is able to generate conclusions from assumptions or premises." This definition is simply wrong. It could stand for the definition of reasoning, but definitely not for that of reason. If we accept the above definition, then we make a statemt: there was no reason before humans came about. I guess we can agree that such statement would be silly. The reason why I find important to make this note is because too many places on Wikipaedia pages one can see such arrogance. If we want to approach reality, we must be able to do it by assuming that we are not even here. One of the thesaurus definitions of reason (actually the No. 1 definition) is "cause". This must be considered when one wants to sum up a page on "Reason". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.139.8.160 (talk) 05:02, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Here is the difficulty we face: The clearest definition of what reason is, or at least the historical and logical starting point for ALL proposed definitions in reliable sources is that it is what makes human thinking special. That is where the concept comes from. All the other meanings, such as when we wonder whether aliens, dolphins or super natural beings might think like us, are derivative. When people argue in the way above, claiming that we should not ignore the possibility that other things have reason than humans, then all they are saying is that other things might think like humans. There is no other agreed way to define what people are talking about when they claim that gods or dolphins have reason. For example what do people talking about experiments with mirrors mean to say that a dolphin has reason apart from that they seem to think more like humans than was previously known? Or do they define reason as something to do with mirrors? And what do people mean when they say that nature appears to show signs of having a creator with reason, apart from that it looks like the work of a human-like mind? Or do they define reason as the ability to create organized looking things? Don't think you'll find a source for such definitions.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:38, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Have in any case adjusted that opening sentence so that it does not allow for the possibility of non human reason, as well as the possibility of other human faculties which can come to conclusions. Both these openings are justifiable enough, but further discussion should of course not be over done in the opening lines. By the way the sentence was clearly broken anyway.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:42, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

"well founded" vs. "consciously thought through"

By well founded, I meant that reason operates within a context of specific cultures of facticity. Thus for example, if the current LHC results don't provide evidence for the Higgs, then a completely new theory may end up supplanting the current so-called standard model of physics. That new model would have to be more than just well thought through, it will have to actually work better, be a better next step for human scientific culture. The important contrast though of course is with the other of reason so not contesting current text. 72.228.177.92 (talk) 20:50, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I think I get what you mean, but the sentence you were adjusting, which did need adjusting no doubt, was about the link between consciousness and reason.

• On that subject, I see no reason to remove it. That reason involves a particular type of consciousness, (let's call it "human style consciousness", in order to show we do not just mean being awake, but some people define consciousness strictly this way) is a property of reason sometimes discussed in reliable sources. For example, coming to know the facts, for example when you act by reflex, does not require reason. Coming consciously to a conclusion does. (Or if you prefer, having a real conclusion means coming consciously to a conclusion, knowing at some level that you are thinking through a chain of logic.) Consciousness and reason and language are inseparable.
• On the subject you are raising, the key question I would have is whether it is not already in the text. The second concern I would raise is that we want to make sure we do not over-jargonize. If we can make the point in such a way that most readers can understand it, that is best.

Hope that makes sense.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:40, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Acknowledging response without further comment. Lycurgus (talk) 14:14, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

separate reasoning article?

Could I ask editors of this article to go have a look at reasoning and consider whether that article should exist, or whether there is any material in it that should be here?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 20:55, 14 November 2010 (UTC)

Have merged in material today. Hopefully I missed nothing good, and hopefully I have not created any redundancy in the merged article. But comments welcome, and let's try to fix any problems. The article is still <50,000bytes. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:20, 6 December 2010 (UTC)

The Bad faith article needs help from available editors

The Bad faith article needs help from available editors. HkFnsNGA (talk) 06:22, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

habit or intuition…

"being capacities that humans share with other animals"

This really doesn't tell us anything about reason, only about habit and intuition. Whether they are or not animal-like will presumably not change their relationship to reason (which some think, but don't know for certain, is exclusive to humans). Walkinxyz (talk) 22:40, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

See above. Using humans and other animals is a way to explain the difference between reason and things like reason. Saying that some human thinking is not reason is important. How to explain which human thought? See Hume.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:42, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

:: I agree with you, but the point is that habit and intuition aren't like reason, which makes it irrelevant to bring up those things in animals. We still need to compare reason to habit and intuition, but who cares if animals have those things or not? We're talking about human reason. Walkinxyz (talk) 23:21, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

Lede

Earlier today

At this moment

Reason is a mental faculty or ability found in humans, that is able to generate non-intuitive conclusions from assumptions or premises. It is amongst other things the means by which rational beings propose specific reasons, or explanations of cause and effect. Therefore, in contrast to reason as an abstract noun, a reason is a consideration which explains or justifies.

Reason is a term for diverse mental faculties or abilities found in human beings, associated with the ability to make inquiries, test evidence and problem-solve. Amongst other things, the application of reason is a way to generate rules and insights through interpretation, discussion and argument. It is also the means by which rational beings propose reasons, i.e. explanations of (a) themselves and their behaviour; or (b) cause and effect. In contrast to reason as an abstract noun, a reason is a consideration which explains or justifies some behaviour, event or phenomenon. The practices of aesthetic and critical reasoning are important ways in which human beings engage in reflection about their lives and practices. Reason is also connected to the flexible transformation of beliefs, attitudess, traditions and institutions and, in this sense, it is thought to be closely connected to the capacity for freedom and self-determination.

• I think that calling reason a plural in the first sentence, before any other explanation, is a difficult way to begin an article on anything. If it were really necessary for a subject, then the next subject would normally have to be about this plurality?
• The bit about non-intuitive in the old version was compressed from longer explanations in older versions. I think that instead of removing it altogether we should remember that this is the beginning of the whole article, where some readers don't yet even have a basic definition in their mind. So the first thing to do is distinguish reason from the things it would most easily be confused with and in older versions of this article these were knowledge and (I think more importantly) intuitive thinking. That has now been moved to the new Introduction section, but actually it is "the basics" and a starting point. So in other words if "non intuitive" was too compressed and jargonistic, maybe instead of removing intuition completely, we should spell it out?
• Maybe some of what is now in the lead would be better in sub-sections somewhere, because it is getting ever more complex. I do not think we can say the lead now has less jargon?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:24, 23 February 2011 (UTC)
• Is there a good reason to be distinguishing cause and effect from the cause and effect of human bahavior right up front in the beginning of the article (with the a and b distinction)? Why not just keep sentences short and simple? Don't forget people editing this article know a lot more than most people who'll read it.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:36, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

Just on this edit I want to explain that this bit of the introduction was from the lead. Contrasting reason with intuitive thinking, and comparing intuitive thinking to the thinking of non human animals is a classic approach found for example in Hume. It has the beauty, for leading in sections, of being fairly easy to explain in normal English. I believe this basic contrast should be somewhere right at the beginning of the article.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:36, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I think the present version is easier to understand than my earlier revisions. The problem with the page as I saw it before I started, is that reason is not just one thing, and certainly not just the ability to generate conclusions. To define it in the negative, as "non-intuitive" doesn't help, either. But it could be singular, as in "Reason is a mental faculty or ability found in human beings, that is used to question, compare, and problem-solve. It is often contrasted with knowledge and intuition." etc. That would be fine.

The distinction between cause and effect, and human reasons is significant. You don't "justify' why a tree fell, but you do justify why you took the last danish. It has to with human accountability. The reason (not the cause) that this is important, is alluded to the picture which illustrates our article.

(The sleep of explanations about why trees fall doesn't produce monsters, does it? :-)

I agree that there should be a philosophy of reason section that could absorb some of the introduction.

Walkinxyz (talk) 23:56, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

• I am thinking that the intro is becoming a "philosophical definitions" section which perhaps sits most logically just after the little etymological section.
• Concerning the difference between humans cause and effect and other effect, yes, I already knew the difference, but why is it being mentioned as one of the only things now being mentioned, in this stripped down lead.
• In general, we need to avoid that the intention of any sentence in the lead requires a reader to already have read something in the body of the article further down.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:56, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

OK, I agree with you about the intro. As for the lead, I don't understand what you're proposing… a reason is just as much a cause-and-effect explanation as a this-is-a-good-motive explanation. Are you suggesting we do away with both?

The last things that I took out of the lead were the bits about interpretation, argument and dialogue. Should we put them back in? I also took out the bits about critical reasoning and aesthetic reasoning. All these things are important, but important enough to be in the lead? What do you think?

I also wanted to point out the philosophical history section I just wrote, after the overview. Do you mind giving it a proof?

Walkinxyz (talk) 08:09, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

I think what you were doing with the lead was stripping it to a minimum, moving complex stuff to specialized sub-sections, and then building it up only cautiously. To me that seems a good approach, but it just seems you've strayed a bit in directions that interest you. The basic problem I have for example with discussing the different types of reasons, is that this article is about reason, and reasons are only mentioned to help readers find the right article.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:27, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

Three major views of reason

The last sentence of the lead is intended to lend balance, in order that the lead reflect three major strains of thought on "reason" in Western philosophy:

• The "cognitive-instrumental" view associated with Thomas Hobbes and others (i.e. the ability to make sense of cause and effect, predict and control events, revise one's beliefs based on evidence, and intervene in the world; this is also the basis of science)
• The view of reason as a form of public justification and moral-political autonomy, associated with Kant and neo-Kantians, incl. Habermas and Rawls (this is the "justify" part of justification & explanation)
• The view of reason as self-determination, transformation and the capacity to "being anew," associated with Hegel, German idealism, a minority of Kant scholars, Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault, among others.

These are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct. And I think it would be difficult to get a clearer or more inclusive picture on the major views than this. That is why I have restored the sentence about self-determination and transformation, and included additional citations to support it.

Walkinxyz (talk) 16:39, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

1. If this trichotomy is to be used to structure the opening section(s) do you have a source for it we can use? (To me the third one looks Kantian, and I am wondering if Rawls and Habermas are usually called Kantian. It is not so clear to me where you would source a definition of reason matching the second.)

2. Concerning the choice of last sentence for the lead, as there have been a few options up in rapid mode, can you quote the options for consideration? I find the current one is not good because for a lead because a lead should lead people in and should therefore have obvious relevance even to non experts. It "comes out of the blue". There was a previous version which was saying something about freedom which seemed something like the Kantian third option you mention above.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:37, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

The trichotomy is something that I owe to the work of Nikolas Kompridis, a Heidegger scholar and critical theorist who was also a teacher of mine (and a student of Habermas). He has done the most original philosophy on reason in the last several years. He makes these and other distinctions in the sources I've cited, and also in Critique and Disclosure. For example, he distinguishes between "deflationary" and non-deflationary conceptions of reason, between different "voices" of reason, between aesthetics and disclosure as an "other" of reason, or as integral to reason, between reason as a "unity" versus a "disunity", and his own formulation of reason as a "possibility-disclosing" faculty. But the trichotomy is a summary (not to say synthesis) of the most salient differences in his sources and arguments, which are truly the most erudite and perceptive that I've come across (in part because of Habermas' contribution).

1. The term "cognitive-instrumental" is Habermas'. I don't think it's something we should use in the lead. Instead, "inquiry", "evidence testing", "problem solving" etc. make more sense.

2. The view of Kant's picture of reason as autonomy and justification is best articulated by Kompridis in "The Idea of a New Beginning", and by Michael Sandel in Justice.

3. The view of reason as a self-determined new beginning, or as a primarily transformative set of practices, is articulated in the sources I've cited in the lead. Specifically, Foucault's essay "What is Enlightenment?" explicates Kant's ideas of "public" and "private" uses of reason, which inform the concept of "critique" that is at the heart of his project.

Finally, these are all relatively modern conceptions of reason. But that's partly because since "the Enlightenment" and "The Age of Reason", the concept has been articulated more and more. Habermas also makes a distinction between "pre-modern", substantive reason, which is able to provide answers to the question of "How should I live?" and modern, formal reason, which has divided into three categories: cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic. However, for various reasons these are not convincingly inclusive.

Walkinxyz (talk) 18:02, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for the explanation. I take it you think it is not only a good explanation but also not in conflict with the mainstream of various authors, which I think is a difficult thing to define for this subject? I am thinking the way you've phrased it so fr does not make the differences between the different approaches clear. How much are these different approaches really in confglict with each other, or are they just different ways of explaining?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:47, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I would say that it would be hard for most authors to disagree with my series of distinctions (the triad, I mean), as almost everyone, even implicitly, acknowledges some features of each one. Science is inherently geared to transforming one's beliefs, and justifying one's results, and not being governed by tradition, while anyone who would deny the role of cognitive-instrumental reason in our lives is just living on another planet. The majority of "critiques" of reason since Hegel have attempted to correct what the authors see as a one-sided identification of reason with instrumental reason (Nietzche's "will to power"), but I don't think anyone would explicitly admit that that is all it is, or should be. I wouldn't say any of these dimensions are "in conflict" with each other, they are all interdependent as regulative ideals. And they are all present together in many authors, e.g. in Kant, as you correctly recognized. Habermas is a big fan of the sciences, and models his view of moral-practical reason on their proceduralism, which is essentially cognitive-instrumental. And he doesn't know shit about art, and doesn't really think it's rational, but he tries to fit it into his picture of reason anyway… because he sees certain transformative possibilities in it. He has also written extensively about the relationship of modern individuals to time, the need to renew traditions, to transform institutions, etc. That's why I don't want to number these distinctions in the lead, since they really are entwined with one another.

Walkinxyz (talk) 19:22, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

OK, so we won't use that trichotomy, but I guess it is important if it is guiding your editing. I'm probably going to have to spend more time on this before I make sense. I really have not had much time while you've been working. But as a first attempt at raising some concerns and ideas and stuff: if philosophers basically agree on what reason is then do we need to emphasize the distinctness of different perspectives quite so much? I was a little concerned for example with the way that Hobbes has a distinct and powerful way of describing things but probably not really a totally different concept of what reason is compared to most other philosophers. That might be debatable of course, but the differences between definitions of reason is in any case probably not for the lead or intro, but more for the sub-sections. That was an attempt to describe Scylla. Charybdis in what we are doing is that we might end up with what is effectively a collection of quotes without structure? Or is that so bad?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:13, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I think the lead should be as inclusive as possible, suggesting what is common to almost all reasoning: asking questions, testing evidence/making comparisons, and problem solving. These things are uncontroversial, and common to most instances of reason. Then there is the sense in which a reason is an explanation or justification of something. This is also basic, and tied to what we do with each other every day. Finally, there is the connection of reason to reasonableness or flexibility, receptivity to reason, etc. which since the enlightenment has been tied to criticism and the transformation of the social order. The last is something which we cannot do without in the modern world.

As for Hobbes, his idea of reason as "self-preservation" has some interesting implications, especially if you look at it from the standpoint of receptivity and change . Essentially, this is the kind of reason that has been criticized by people like Heidegger, Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, et al. If reason is essentially what is required for self-preservation, then there is no room for genuine debate or reasoning with other people, and no way to be transfigured by reason, which would involve not preserving oneself, but changing oneself, something that Adorno and others think is absolutely essential to reason.

There is an article here that treats the question of reason as self-preservation vs. transfiguration in an interesting way: in relation to music (the most "rational" of all art forms, but the one whose effects tend to defy description in language.) The scene in Homer's Odyssey in which the hero sails past the sirens, tied to the mast, is treated as an allegory for reason as self-preservation (and therefore also self-repression).

It's all a bit heady. But hey, nobody said it would be simple!

Walkinxyz (talk) 23:40, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

Concerning Hobbes, he does not define reason as self preservation as far as I know. Of course he talks about self preservation as a natural aim of mankind but that is different. I am sure there are thousands of publications by good authors which twist Hobbes up and treat him almost as a traditional debating subject, as if actually reading him was not all that important. The same can be said of many other big names. I think more generally that we should be careful in philosophy articles, about using the almost artistic style of commentaries (or commentaries about commentaries) we sometimes find. I think philosophy is an area where primary sources are sometimes the best. This is because secondary and even tertiary sources are often quite difficult to define as a non controversial mainstream consensus as per WP:DUE.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:05, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

first sentence

• Old version: Reason is a mental faculty or ability found in humans, that is able to generate non-intuitive conclusions from assumptions or premises.
• New version. Reason is a mental faculty or ability found in human beings, that is used to question, evaluate, and problem-solve. It is sometimes contrasted with habit and intuition, which are also found in non-human animals, and with human knowledge.

Questions:-

• Why the preference for "problem solving" instead of "coming to non-intuitive conclusions"?

• Every time a human solves a problem, do they use reason? I would say no. People solve problems intuitively also.
• Does the list "question, evaluate, and problem solving" cover all types of reasoning? I would say it is any case not a clear way of covering them all. All reasoning does have some types of conclusions, based on putting together some types of premises, but is always done in a non-intuitive, conscious, way.

• Proposal: Reason is a mental faculty found in humans. When using their reason, humans consciously compare different ideas to each other in order to develop new ideas. Reason is therefore not the same as intuitive decisions, which are made without consciously thinking through the logic, or the premises or assumptions which reason builds its conclusions from. (Therefore reason is not the same as knowledge, but it builds from knowledge and produces new knowledge.)

This is maybe now a bit Lockean. I guess that is because my aim is to make the first sentence very "first principles" based, and not an advanced commentary. I have deliberately not tried to compress this. It is in a sense my attempt to expand out the old version. I also consciously tried to avoid mentioning non humans!--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:55, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

If the problem is, "I'm hungry" and I go to the fridge, then no. Reason is not involved. But neither is "problem-solving" in that case. If I need to think through the problem, then reason is quite obviously involved.

Regarding non-intuitive conclusions, if you ask me why I think my paragraph is better than yours, and I suggest that it is better because it is somewhat more inclusive, have I come to a conclusion? No. Have I reasoned? Yes. You have questioned, I have evaluated, and we have hopefully gone one step further in solving a problem together. No "non-intuitive conclusion" necessary.

The funny thing about reason is, sometimes it is also intuitive. But it is still contrasted, sometimes, with intuition.

"Compare different ideas"… I don't know about that… they think things through by symbolically mediating the contents of the mind. Is that the same thing? I don't know. Is an observation the same as an idea? Is evidence? That is the kind of evaluation that I'm talking about.

Reason is not to be thought of as knowledge-oriented, or as oriented to producing knowledge. It is able to test the value of knowledge, to apply knowledge, to propose ideas. But Kant distinguished reason (die Vernunft) from understanding (die Verstand) or knowledge. They are not to be confused.

You are getting into very theoretical kind of territory here, as to what is or isn't "reason". Reason is in the doing. If I park in the garage, because I park in the garage every night without thinking, and my wife asks me, "Where did you park?" and I say "The Garage, just as I do every night" she may very well say "That's reasonable."

Sometimes habit and reason, intuition and reason overlap. That doesn't mean it doesn't help to contrast them, because they are different, after all… but sometimes, they blur into one another in a funny way. That is partly because as we change our beliefs and habits according to reason, we ideally become more reasonable people.

Walkinxyz (talk) 12:18, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

Also, the lead paragraph doesn't read like commentary to me right now, it reads like a summary of the most important information. The helpful thing about the discussion of proposing a "reason", is that is exactly what is involved in reason. Plain and simple. Reason generates, not "conclusions" – but reasons (fallible ones). – Walkinxyz (talk) 12:24, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

I would also argue that we could say "Reason is a mental faculty or ability identified with human beings…" that is closer to what reason is and does for us. At no time do we go looking around in "human beings" to find "reason". Walkinxyz (talk) 12:30, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

• The importance of intuition. Is solving a maze, like when a rat does it, a case of "problem solving"? Or what about those tests they do with squirrels and birds? Do you think humans never solve problems like that without reason? Anyway, I have the sources on my side on this, e.g. that Hume reference. :)
• Compare different ideas. I am not married to this proposal, but I do not really like question, evaluate, and problem-solve,m for the reasons explained above. Can you come up with something better?
• Reason is not to be thought of as knowledge-oriented, or as oriented to producing knowledge. I think knowledge can be dropped from the lead?
• You are getting into very theoretical kind of territory here, as to what is or isn't "reason". Leads give definitions, and definitions say what things are and are not. Obviously this is always tricky for a philosophical subject, but the aim is to do our best.
• Fuzziness between reason and habit. I guess one way to look at this is that if reason is a meaningful word, then habit and reason are distinct. So it is a pre-supposition of the article that there is a difference. If we think the difference is controversial, the normal approach on WP would be to write something like Reason is said to be the xyz, whereby it is said to be abc, etc.
• identified with human beings. No problem with that.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:28, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

"Is solving a maze, like when a rat does it, a case of "problem solving"? Or what about those tests they do with squirrels and birds?"

No, because the rat has no conception of the problem. It has a drive, and it has a memory, and it is governed by its own impulses, and by its "instinct" (this is actually the correct word, not intuition) not by the goal of "problem solving". Problems, as such, are human, a uniquely human concept and experience.

Read the problem solving article:

Considered the most complex of all intellectual functions, problem solving has been defined as higher-order cognitive process that requires the modulation and control of more routine or fundamental skills.

We can modulate or control things – computers, our bodies – in order to solve problems, but human beings are the only creature that has problem-solving in-built as as a strong, original purpose.

What sources do you have? I can find sources to back up what I say too, you know. Here's a favourite of mine, a profoundly moving and complex description of reason in action:

The kaleidoscopic flash of suggestion, and intrusion of the inapt, the unceasing flow of odds and ends of possible objects that will not fit, together with the continuous collision with the hard, unshakable objective conditions of the problem, the transitive feelings of effort and anticipation when we feel that we are on the right track and substantive points of rest, as the idea becomes definite, the welcoming and rejecting, especially the identification of the meaning of the whole idea with the different steps in its coming to consciousness—there are none of these that are not almost oppressively present on the surface of consciousness during just the periods which Dewey describes as those of disintegration and reconstitution of the stimulus—the object… If there is ever a psychical feeling of relation, it is when the related object has not yet risen from the underworld. It is under these circumstances that identities and differences come with thrills and shocks… And it is in this phase of the subjectivity, with its activities of attention in the solution to the problem, i.e., in the construction of the hypothesis of the new world, that the individual qua individual has his functional expression or rather is that expression… It is equally evident that it is not the individual as "me" that can perform this function. Such an empirical self belongs to the world which it is the function of this phase of consciousness to reconstruct. The selves of our scientific theory are part of the data which reflection brings to us… Furthermore, one of the results of the reconstruction will be a new individual as well as a new social environment… It is evident that in this state of reflection it is impossible to present the elements out of which the new world is to be built up in advance, for disintegration and analysis of the old is as dependent upon the problem that arises as is the reconstruction. It is equally impossible to state the form which the world will take in advance. – George Herbert Mead, "Definition of the Psychical"

Walkinxyz (talk) 14:02, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

OK, but you are not defining problem solving in a way that will be obvious. Remember this is a question of word choice for a non technical publication. I think we need something better.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:30, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

usually identified with human beings

I inserted the word "usually" because while tradition defines man as the animal that reasons, some serious scholars claim that the differences between the thought processes of humans and the thought processes of animals are not so clear cut. Consider the famous story of the monkey, the banana, and the stick. Rick Norwood (talk) 14:44, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

Actually I noticed while working on this that Hume seems to have done this also, which effectively means he used a broader definition of reason than most philosophers ever have.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:32, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

I think you could look at the work of Daniel Povinelli, who has pretty successfully demonstrated that apes do not possess higher level cognitive functions, or the ability to reason about cause and effect.

If reason is discursive, as this article suggests, then that would obviously discount animals ability to reason in the same way that humans do. Moreover, what we are trying to get clear on here is what is significant about human reason and, while other animals could do things in a similar way (although there is little evidence they do so far – look at Daniel Povinelli's work), that is not what this article is about.

Also, it is not "usually" identified with human beings. It is identified as one of, if not the central ability or feature of human beings. Especially given that this article is about human reason, I don't think we should put a "usually" in there. Walkinxyz (talk) 04:30, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

I don't know the "story of the monkey, the banana, and the stick." Enlighten me. Walkinxyz (talk) 04:43, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

Also look at the stuff on personhood by Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt. They talk about the importance of agency to what a person is, and I would argue that is also central to reason. As Taylor writes:

What is crucial about agents is that things matter to them. We thus cannot simply identify agents by a performance criterion, nor assimilate animals to machines… [likewise] there are matters of significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, and have no analogue with animals.

Walkinxyz (talk) 04:46, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

I think this is more a Wikipedia thing than a real disagreement. You say this article is about human reason, but Rick is right that others will come along and start editing otherwise, and we can not stop that, because for example even David Hume used the word reason "wrongly" in this sense. So we need to always edit in a way that will fit with the different visions of different people. No one is proposing not strongly connecting reason and humanity, so hopefully this compromise will not hurt the article too much. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:22, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

BTW I have no problem with you change to "primarily" either.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:23, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

The overview section

My understanding of recent edit intentions is that the Overview section has become a sort of holding area for materials from old versions of the lead. I propose:

• Some of it is now looking redundant, and can perhaps be deleted (while checking to see if anything there can be used in other sections)
• Some of it it perhaps belongs back in the lead now, which has been (I think) successfully stripped down to a quite good short lead that we can now afford to make a little longer with less crucial stuff if we want to.

Does this make sense?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:12, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

Propose splitting up the content of this paragraph

Hume remarked famously that "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." [18] Hume also took the subject-centred definition of reason to unorthodox extremes by arguing that "reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations." It followed from this that animals have reason, only much less complex than human reason.[19]

The two notions are already dealt with under the sections on emotions and in other places. I propose taking them out of this section and, if necessary, moving the quotations to the relevant areas. (Do we need a section on animal reasoning?)

There are three other helpful distinctions that have been made about reason in moral-political thinking, as "the slave of the passions" (Hume), as "public justification" (Kant, Rawls) and as "reflective disclosure" (Taylor, Kompridis). That is the context in which I would most like to see Hume's "slave of the passions" discussed.

Walkinxyz (talk) 11:12, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

A section on animal reasoning has long been requested, but no one seems to ever feel the need to be the one to do it. :) Concerning that Hume quote I personally find it so important to the history section, for example how it sets up the Kant bit, that I'd rather we reduce discussion in other sections? But I'm open to different ideas as long as they all fit together in the end. There are pros and cons to every article structure.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:23, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

redirects and disambiguations affecting the term "intellect" and related terms

A discussion has started elsewhere which editors of this article are invited to comment about. But please respond here.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:00, 7 March 2011 (UTC)

Obscure phrase

In the "Reason as an intrinsic part of nature" section, an unclear phrase is used. This phrase is depth structure. Since Wikipedia is not an academic publication, there is no professional need to include incomprehensible words in order to impress anyone with their difficulty. Can anyone provide an explanation of depth structure?Lestrade 12:57, 27 April 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Not wanting this article to become more abstruse than it already is I can at least provide directions to the original text for perusal by fellow Wikipedia editors: go to [1] and simply search for 129 to get to the text on page 129 which makes this reference. I suppose a keener knowledge of Hegel than mine is required in order to expound on the use of this particular phrase in this context. Your additional comment to my edit was, btw, a good elucidation on the mere use of the terms ontological and epistemological. __meco 13:40, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

The comment shines light on the senseless thought that Reason can be an observed object for an observing subject if there is no observing subject.Lestrade 19:54, 27 April 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

I think a clue can be found also on Robert S. Corrington's project of developing a cosmology based on his consept of "ecstatic naturalism", and also when considering a possible interpretation of the term "raison d'être" implying equality between causality and teleology, i.e. beneath the superficial veneer of explicate reality lies an all-encompassing mesh wherein all aspects of reality, whether so-called physical or noumenal, are interconnected in myriad ways. Although certainly not manifestly stated by Reich or Hegel, but nor by Corrington, I sense an allusion to the quantum field here, and it all becomes very metaphysical also. __meco 14:48, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

---

After reading the article and this discussion, I still have no clear definition of the word "reason". Can somneone supply one?

Norm

---

To define reason to a person who does not already know what it means is like trying to define "red" to a blind man. You can state some wavelengths of light, but cannot give the impression of "red" to someone who cannot see. Similarly, people who reason know what reason is, people who do not never will.

Given that, some of the "wavelengths" of reason can be given. Reason is dispassionate, painstaking, thought. The goal of reason is to discover truth, even if the truth discovered is not what the person thinking wished it to be. Reason can be modeled by syllogism, or by mathematical logic. But that still doesn't tell you what reason is. Rick Norwood (talk) 12:52, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

"Like habit or intuition"

The sentence "reason, like habit or intuition, is the means by which thinking comes from one idea to a related idea."

This sentence seems needlessly opaque to me: I am not sure at all what it is trying to say. It doesn't seem to accord with the concept of "discursive reason" that is mentioned in the previous sentence, in that habit and intuition are things that individuals are said to possess and the notion of discursive reason implies discourse between a speaker and a respondent (even if the two are the same individual – one refers to being in dialogue with oneself). In that sense, at least, reason is unlike habit or intuition in an important way.

In addition, I think the notion of reason as "the means by which thinking comes from one idea to a related idea" is far too restrictive. It may be that reading is the way thinking comes from one idea to a related idea, or a changed situation, or indigestion. Why invoke reason here?

Furthermore, and additionally, I don't think habit and intuition are at all the way "thinking comes from one idea to a related idea." Habit and intuition may have something to do with thinking, but it isn't this.

I propose the sentence be changed to something like the previous version, perhaps with the qualifier that reason is often identified with intellect, thinking, etc. Then, the phrase "but more specifically" that follows will distinguish what it is that is peculiar to reason itself.

Walkinxyz (talk) 17:50, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Concerning the sentence you replaced:

• I do not see how it is opaque as the wording is pretty "everyday English".
• I do see how it is wrong because too restrictive on the one hand, and not pointing to what is distinctive in reason on the other, but I think it could be fixed by changing from "the means" to "a means"?
• I think you are wrong about habit and intuition not involving ideas. I think you need to do more than just assert that you do not see it.
• The sentence can of course be easily sourced. You only need to look through the detailed and sourced discussions in the article already to see this.

Concerning the sentence you have put in: "Reason is sometimes identified with thinking, cognition, and intellect."

• I think it is wrong. Reason, if it means anything, does not mean thinking, cognition or intellect, and I do not think you can source this.

So I propose the old sentence is returned, with a change from "the" to "a". Comments welcome.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:55, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

I guess I don't see the point in this sentence "…reason is the means…" (or a means), and I would like to see a source for it and hear from you precisely what in our article it is summarizing, or what the importance of such a definition is. As far as I can tell, it only makes sense in the context of a conception of reason's role in our practices and forms of life.

Philosophically speaking, the salient distinctions I am aware of in this regard are between reason as (1) Hume's "slave of the passions" – i.e. instrumental reason, which inquires into cause and effect, predicts events and intervenes in the world to produce a known outcome; (2) as a form of public justification – this is the Kantian conception of "public" reason that Rawls and Habermas subscribe to; and (3) as a form of possibility disclosure, the Heideggerian conception that Taylor, Dewey and Kompridis articulate.

I would also like to know what a reliable source that takes the same perspective thinks ideas are, ontologically, to get a better idea of what it would mean for "thinking" itself (as opposed to human beings) to come from one idea to the next, and why that would matter.

Re: habit vs. reason vs. intuition. I think this is a false trichotomy, ontologically speaking. And to show you the complexity that can be teased out in the relationship between reason and intuition, see this passage from Emerson's Self-Reliance:

"The magnetism which all original action exerts is explained when we inquire the reason of self-trust. Who is the Trustee? What is the aboriginal Self, on which a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the nature and power of that science-baffling star, without parallax, without calculable elements, which shoots a ray of beauty even into trivial and impure actions, if the least mark of independence appear? The inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, of virtue, and of life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions. In that deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all things find their common origin."

So for Emerson, intution, being the reason of (justification for) self-trust, is deeply connected to, even the prerequisite for, all later "teachings" (or reasoning, analysis).

Likewise, this whole distinction between "discursive reason" and "intuitive reason" is not coherent to me, nor can I find it in the article. If there is such a thing as "intuitive reason" then how can intuition be sensibly contrasted with reason? (I don't find anything in the article when I search for "intuit" other than a quote from the Bhagavad Gita.)

Perhaps a more salient distinction is that of Kant's between reason and understanding (roughly analogous to that between possibility and experience). Ideas, for Kant, are literally "possibilities" and they are generated by reason's spontaneous self-activity. On this view, there is no "there" for thinking to get to before reason does its work.

Finally, I didn't say Reason meant thinking, cognition or intellect. But Oxford English Dictionary essentially does:

the power of the mind to think, understand, and form judgments by a process of logic

…

• ( one's reason) one's sanity : she is in danger of losing her reason.

I do not, myself, believe in a cognitivist conception of reason, I think it is embedded in our practices in a dialogical way. Nonetheless, common sense tells me that most people do associate (or identify) reason with thinking, cognition, and intellect, and so does OED. These related terms are important and should be included in the introduction, in my opinion.

Walkinxyz (talk) 21:11, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

You are adding a lot of subjects, and making your post a personal reflection which makes a little difficult to be sure I cover everything, but here is an attempt:-

• If the OED is your source, can you add it?
• The distinction between discursive and intuitive reason is not something I would claim to know a lot about but I am aware people make it. I would not delete something like that, but if you have doubts maybe do a bit of a google books search first?
• The sentence you originally did not like, the one we were originally discussing, is pretty close to the formulation of Hume. When he called reason a slave to the passions he was also pointing to the fact that reason is, in his account, nothing more than a type of associative thinking, not something which (to use your verbs) inquires, predicts, intervene etc. because reason is not a passion and has no desires itself. According to that reason/passion dichotomy, it is our passions which drive us to inquire, predict, intervene, learn etc.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:13, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

*The distinction between discursive and intuitive reason is not something I would claim to know a lot about but I am aware people make it. I would not delete something like that, but if you have doubts maybe do a bit of a google books search first?

It's not just about the distinction between discursive and intuitive but the implication that intuitive reason is not, in fact, reason. This seems self-evidently preposterous. In any case, they are both technical terms that are not defined anywhere in the article or elsewhere that I can find on Wikipedia. But in addition, I think it's an invidious distinction.

When he called reason a slave to the passions he was also pointing to the fact that reason is, in his account, nothing more than a type of associative thinking, not something which (to use your verbs) inquires, predicts, intervene etc. because reason is not a passion and has no desires itself.

Yes, that is what makes it instrumental (i.e. subject to our will; a means to an end). What drives something and what does something can be two different things. If you say, however, that reason is a means by which we go from one idea to another, I think you're mystifying more than explaining. Walkinxyz (talk) 21:56, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

Reason, like habit or intuition, is one of the ways by which thinking comes from one idea to a related idea.

I think I can appreciate why you want the second part of this sentence ("from one idea to a related idea") in the introduction, but I'm not sure that it isn't misleading when you put it together with the first part. Can you try to expand a little bit on what it means to you?

Thanks, Walkinxyz (talk) 23:54, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

OK, some quick Googling has indicated that "intuitive reason" (as opposed to "discursive reason") is equivalent to "pure reason," "theoretical" or "speculative" reason. This term is archaic, referring to the old dualism regarding a priori knowledge vs. "discursive" reasoning based on empirical observation.

To which Kant famously (and confusingly, given that he reverses the meaning of "intuition" and opposes it to the term "concepts") replied: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their unison can knowledge arise." Walkinxyz (talk) 06:15, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

I think dismissing something as archaic in philosophical subjects is always a bit dicey. People reading philosophy are generally reading old books. For example if Kant used a term, then it is not out of date, because Kant is still being read?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:23, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

I reverted some changes to the lead coming from this discussion. The main concern I have is that the writing did not look like a lead anymore. I think we should write as much as possible in a way that a person who has no specialist knowledge can be lead through the subject. So maybe this type of material fits somewhere in the article, but I think you need to be careful when fitting new material into the article that it still read ok to a random reader. Hope that makes sense.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:05, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

new lead

I would like to call for discussion about the big changes now made to the lead. I have concerns that it appears to be an attempt to fight for the perspective of one discipline above others. I think a lot of subject matter which people seeking this article will need is now simply deleted? In other words I do not think this bold change meets WP:NEUTRAL. Perhaps adding more about modern psychology would be good, but not deleting everything about philosophy etc. But arguably I think the new material is not even a broad representation of psychology. It looks like a single viewpoint.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:55, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

Recent version

Current version

Reason is a term that refers to the capacity human beings have to make sense of things, to establish and verify facts, and to change or justify practices, institutions, and beliefs. It is closely associated with such characteristically human activities as philosophy, science, language, mathematics, and art, and is normally considered to be a definitive characteristic of human nature. The concept of reason is sometimes referred to as rationality and sometimes as discursive reason, in opposition to "intuitive reason". Reason or "reasoning" is associated with thinking, cognition, and intellect. Reason, like habit or intuition, is one of the ways by which thinking comes from one idea to a related idea. For example, it is the means by which rational beings understand themselves to think about cause and effect, truth and falsehood, and what is good or bad. In contrast to reason as an abstract noun, a reason is a consideration which explains or justifies some event, phenomenon or behaviour. The ways in which human beings reason through argument are the subject of inquiries in the field of logic. Reason is closely identified with the ability to self-consciously change beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and institutions, and therefore with the capacity for freedom and self-determination. Psychologists and cognitive scientists have attempted to study and explain how people reason, e.g. which cognitive and neural processes are engaged, and how cultural factors affect the inferences that people draw. The field of automated reasoning studies how reasoning may or may not be modeled computationally. Animal psychology considers the controversial question of whether animals can reason.

Reason is a term that involves the ability to use concepts and logic to form a conclusion. Example: If an individual is given a meaningless set of letters and asked to reorganize them into a word, reasoning is the process by which he or she determines the conclusion. "reason" may also be loosely referred to as thinking, cognition, or problem-solving. -Jackson Hardy Research involving Neuroscience and Cognitive Psychology has provided the current understanding of "reason" and its origins. In the field of Psychology "Reasoning" is viewed as one aspect of human cognition and brain function that is subject to testing, assessment, and overall scientific explication. According to recent textbooks, "[reasoning] Involves mental processes that are used to form concepts, solve problems, and engage in creative activities."(Plotnik,305) Modern understanding is centered around "Reason" and the brain, noting the physiological nature of our ability to reason in order to further explain the brain and behavior. Reasoning is largely associated with the frontal lobe(part of the cortex). Because human beings have a larger and more highly-developed cortex than any other species, the ability to "reason"--in the way we are capable--is likely specific to humans. Although, some other mammals possess a cortex--suggesting the possibility for simple reasoning capabilities--this cortex is primitive and incapable of providing an experience comparable to the human capacity for "reason," suggesting that the ability to "reason" is quite possibly a specifically human quality, an "integral part of human-nature." -Jackson Hardy In contrast to reason as an abstract noun, a reason is a consideration which explains or justifies some event, phenomenon or behaviour. The ways in which human beings reason through argument are the subject of inquiries in the field of logic.

I shall revert, as there has been no defense of this rather drastic change, and so my concerns are un-answered for the time being.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:42, 7 December 2011 (UTC)

I agree with the reversion. Rick Norwood (talk) 11:56, 15 March 2012 (UTC)

Potential for expansion

There's a good amount of scholarly work now on cultural differences in reasoning-- Richard Nesbitt has been at the forefront of this research. Furthermore, the intro section hints at cultural factors, but the body does not discuss them. Should this be an additional section that we develop? 15:35, 5 July 2012 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dan Cottrell (talk • contribs)

Sources for a definition of reason

Let's start collecting in this section, for a better discussion in other sections. (Of course I am ignoring definitions of reason which equate it to being cause.) Please feel free to add more.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:42, 16 December 2013 (UTC)

Tertiary sources

• The Encyclopedia Britannica:

reason, in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences. The term “reason” is also used in several other, narrower senses. Reason is in opposition to sensation, perception, feeling, desire, as the faculty (the existence of which is denied by empiricists) by which fundamental truths are intuitively apprehended. These fundamental truths are the causes or “reasons” of all derivative facts. According to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, reason is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts that are provided by the intellect. That reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls “pure reason,”

• Merriam Webster has:

Short version: the power of the mind to think and understand in a logical way

More detailed version: the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways

a (1) : intelligence

a (2) : proper exercise of the mind

a (3) : sanity

b : the sum of the intellectual powers

Classic works (very notable primary sources, plus secondary sources helping us understand them)

Early modern English

• John Locke, The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, (London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.). Vol. 2. Chapter: CHAP. XVII.: Of Reason.

Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/762/80842 on 2013-12-16

§ 1. [...]a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts

§ 2. [...]the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is that which we call reason. For as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge: so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent due. This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason.

§ 3. So that we may in reason consider these four degrees; the first and highest is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived: the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. [...]

§ 17. Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.

Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.