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Talk:Proving too much

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This article is not much shorter than the articles for other important fallacies such as appeal to loyalty. While it is short, it is also complete - it could be expanded upon, certainly, but as it stands it forms a useful stub of an entry. This borders on misuse of the criteria used for its speedy deletion since its context and function are evident from the article. Zelse81 (talk) 21:06, 28 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I think it actually crossed over that border. That happens a lot these days. Thanks for the rescue. Tisane talk/stalk 01:53, 29 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Does anyone other than Block use this concept or argument? If not, it should probably be merged into his article. Robofish (talk) 17:15, 8 July 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Murray Rothbard and a lot of others have used it. Tisane talk/stalk 17:32, 8 July 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Ironically, the example using the Serwer reference appears to prove too much. By Serwer's logic, anyone who has driven a car should not be able to serve on a traffic related homicide jury, since they have either been in the defendant's place by causing a fatality or, like the different-sexed partner judges, failed to do so :).

Logical fallacy?

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Is this actually a logical fallacy? I feel like this is more a consequence that results in fallacious reasoning. That is, when examining an argument, if the argument "proves too much" you haven't actually identified the problem in the argument, but rather there exists a problem at some point in the logical chain. Ikiwi (talk) 14:10, 28 December 2018 (UTC)[reply]

In response to the above. Many arguments are, as a whole, formed from chains of logical premises, each premise following from the last. If there exists a problem with in one premise, the entire argument may become invalid as subsequent premises no longer have sound basis. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.210.179.242 (talk) 09:34, 22 April 2019 (UTC)[reply]