Talk:Propensity probability

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Popper

Added references to 4 of Karl Popper's works on propensity probability. These were all gleaned from "Self and It's Brain", and are not something I have read personally. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.85.193.162 (talk) 04:41, 14 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Main challenge

The claim that the main challenge of propenetiy is to define what it means is totally false and shows no familiarity with the problems facing propensity theory, such as Humphrey's paradox, the testability of propensity claims etc. Defining the word is considerably less important than these problems. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 141.92.67.45 (talk) 09:03, 15 October 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Copy

This article is in fact a copy of a part of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations. JaapB (talk) 17:25, 13 August 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Relevant?

Why is the section Principal Principle of David Lewis in this article? Is it really a propensitists position? RJFJR (talk) 19:13, 8 April 2012 (UTC)[reply]

From what I can tell it is currently irrelevent. But it could be made relevent by making explicit that Pronpensity theories, or at least most of their formulations, cannot meet one of david Lewis's desiderata, which is that probabilities should be able to constrain, or relate to, credences - this is the principal principle. This is begging the justificationist question; Propensity Theories, esp the one developed by Popper, were develoepd to dispense with probability and its link with justification (epistemic probability), because it lead to very many difficulties. To say that this is a desiderata, and that we should dispdence with Pronenity theory on this basis, is to jump over the fact that epistemic probability was criticised by Karl Popper, that is why he developed firstly a frequency-type theory and then the propensity theory.

Furthermore, the principal Principle arises out of Miller's criticism of the link between credences and probability, in his Paper a paradox of information. It would be interesting to see this controversy brought out more. It seems to be an overlooked, but important debate. 155.192.33.250 (talk) 08:26, 22 October 2017 (UTC)[reply]