Talk:Principal–agent problem/Archives/2020
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Does the principal-agent problem usefully model ad-driven middlemen like Facebook?
It has been recognized in the last years that social media companies have manipulated their users for the benefit of the social media company (e.g. Facebook feeding its users information that makes them angry, solely because it increases the amount of time the users spend on Facebook watching the ads that make money for Facebook). See, for example, Roger McNamee#Criticism_of_Facebook and The Social Dilemma.
Does the study of principal-agent problems illuminate this dynamic in a useful way? Users appoint Facebook as their agent for bringing them interesting information, in return for users' attention ("eyeballs"). Advertising agencies make Facebook their agent for attracting the attention of users, in return for cash. The agent has more information than both the users and the advertisers, an information asymmetry. Currently the article does not mention advertising-driven agents, nor Facebook in particular. Should it? Where has the attention economy or the social media economy been studied, applying principal-agent theory, that Wikipedia could cite? Gnuish (talk) 06:29, 10 December 2020 (UTC)