Talk:Oreshnik (missile)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 November 2024

Insert Allegedly prior to (making it impossible for western missile defence systems to intercept.) A Suspicious Whitby class Frigate (talk) 22:36, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

 Not done - The "claimed to have" is sufficient here, as per the wording of the source, for if it does indeed travel at Mach 10, then it is definitely useless against missile defence systems; the only unconfirmed part is the speed. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 22:42, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Revisit this request. I came here to make the same point. This claim, as per the reference, is solely attributed to Putin's own words. And of course he would say that. The only other thing supporting this statement is you @Flemmish Nietzsche, based on your WP:OR expertise on missile defence. Change it to 'difficult to intercept'. Apart from your and Putins' personal opinions, it's an inarguable fact that a missile defence system might intercept this 'new' missile by happy accident. Try to be more encyclopaedic and try to be less smug.

You admit (and you're an expert after all) that the speed is unconfirmed. So your refusal to change absolute language to something more accurate is based on your own "if".

Also, when you say "it is definitely useless against missile defence systems", I presume you meant the polar opposite? Yes?

Oh hang on, I just viewed the article again and I see someone more sensible has corrected you. Thank goodness! Blocked & Muted. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 22:54, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for correcting me, although a less harsh tone would be appreciated. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 22:58, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Apology accepted. And you owe @A Suspicious Whitby class Frigate an apology too. Only six minutes after their correctly reasoned contribution, you totally shut-them-down, when you ought to have been reading the reference to see that you were parroting Mr Putin. For my part I will do my utmost to try to be more tolerant and understanding of the needs of people like you in the future. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 23:17, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 November 2024 (2)

Change sentence "The strike occurred after a long-range missile attack by Ukraine in Russia which in turn occurred after the United States, United Kingdom and France — each a NATO member state — granted Ukrainian forces permission to strike targets in Russia using Western-supplied long-range missiles — ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG." to "The strike occurred after a long-range missile attack by Ukraine in Russia which in turn occurred after the United States, United Kingdom and France — each a NATO member state — granted Ukrainian forces permission to strike targets in Russia using Western-supplied long-range missiles — ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG. This decision by NATO leaders came after Russia repeatedly conducted large-scale drone and cruise missile attacks targeting Ukraine's civilian energy infrastructure.". Raimodns (talk) 23:35, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

I don't see why we need to explain the whole chain of escalation/response, when the subject of the page is only the missile and how it has been used; ideally we should also have a source which puts emphasis on the cause for the shift in US/UK/France policy which is also talking about the IRBM strike; this would determine that adding that fact as background would be due. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 23:44, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

For once I agree with @Flemmish Nietzsche. This is a missile page, and he's the missile-guy. Prior events are not important to this article. Whilst the timing of this attack is almost certainly important (in the context of events of recent days), it might just be that Putin only just got his new bomb delivered today. I know that if I'd ordered an Oreshnik online, I'd be desperate to try it out the minute it arrived. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 23:54, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

ATACMS and Storm Shadow aren't 'long range missiles'. ATACMS is a 'long range tactical missile' but also 'short range ballistic missile' as its a longer ranged tactical missile than existing capabilities but tactical missiles are a class of short range missile, hence why it is in the classification of short range ballistic missile (because ballistic is a flight profile type rather than tactical which is a target classification type). Storm Shadow are not long range cruise missiles either, many cruise missiles have ranges well over double or triple the Storm Shadow. The Stowm Shadow are within the short to medium range category for cruise missiles. The media used the language 'long range missile' as an abbreviation of 'long range tactical missile' but tactical systems are short range compared to strategic systems and indeed ATACMS and Storm Shadow are designed for hitting stationary and mobile targets at the rear of engaged forces rather than penetration of large distances to hit strategic higher value targets like protected capital cities or distant ports and facilities. The use of 'long range missile' is inaccurate and misleading. Axialturban (talk) 23:55, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

To further clarify (as a missile guy myself) -- ATACMS is an SRBM as noted; outside of the specific classification bands for ballistic missiles, qualifications like "long range" or "short range" are relative only to the context in which they're considered. For instance, the Tomahawk missile is generally considered a long-range weapon. However, in the context of the Army Multi-domain Task Force fires plan, it represents the mid-range capability in between HIMARS and LRHW/Dark Eagle. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, generally speaking any system that allows for engagements beyond the range of traditional tube and rocket artillery would be considered long-range. So it's neither inaccurate nor misleading, it simply requires context to explain that in this instance it means "capable of striking targets located in Russia from standoff distances in Ukraine". In which case, we should probably just say that, instead of trying to get readers to follow along. I agree that it is unnecessary to explain the chain of justifications for escalation in this article; this article is about the missile, and the relevant text should be about the operational history of the missile strike, not the decisions that led up to it. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 00:53, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

If there was a 'thumbs up' emoji I'd certainly deploy one now. Context is everything and it's good to have someone around who knows his bombs. I don't suppose the people of Dnipro are too concerned about how far the missile flew - it's all about the effect on their lives and the future threat. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 01:10, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

I made a compromise by modifying the sentence to say The strike occurred after a long-range missile attack by Ukraine in Russia which in turn occurred after the United States, United Kingdom and France — each a NATO member state — granted Ukrainian forces permission to strike targets in Russia using Western-supplied ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles. This addresses the confusion over the "long-range" part. If folks agree we can remove the entire chain of escalation for readability, we can do that as well.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 01:13, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

I only mentioned it because this page is about an intermediate range ballistic missile, which is longer ranged than even a medium range ballistic missile, yet the Ukranian attack was a short range ballistic missile. The wording 'long range attack' seems less misleading as an alternative, because as it stands it reads like Russia's use of the system was a de-escalation rather than an escalation. Just thinking of the reader and how they'll consider the term long range compared to the conflict rather than the state of the conflict at any one time. So my reading was if its just using broad language then the broad terms are for the ATACMS a short range ballistic missile and the Storm Shadow is a short range cruise missile - but yes the attack was a long range attack by Ukranian standards. 58.96.14.201 (talk) 02:38, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

[Proposal] Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 November 2024 (3)

Given the conversation that already occurred here in other requests, could we either omit the last line "US officials note that the missile is still experimental and Russia only has a few in its possession, and that it is unlikely to be regularly deployed against Ukraine." or change it to "US officials [speculate]..." I perused quite a bit of Russian media today as well as trying to find any contemporaneous reporting from the last four years on telegram and they didn't seem to have much insight even from their own experts. I think it's fair to doubt the claims from even less informed sources cited here. This might be a separate request but in its current form it might justify including even more context that such claims are being characterized in Russian media as further provocation. (I am not here to debate whether that allegation is valid or if provocation is justified, just that is being characterized that way.) Dmitry Plotnikov, a journalist with Pravda, wrote that, "...CNN immediately released the news that Russia probably has only a few experimental Oreshnik missiles, one of which was used in Dnepropetrovsk. This means that in order for the enemies to finally understand that the jokes are over, it is necessary to repeat as soon as possible..." (I am also not privileging his obviously biased perspective or even trying to advocate for Russian perspectives whatsoever, simply noting the commentary over this very claim which seems no less pompous than what Russian military officials have said.) Dan Lowe (talk) 03:29, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

We could change it to "claimed" or "stated" but we don't technically know if it's speculation. It could be an intelligence-based statement, it could be (reasonable) speculation based on the time, cost, complexity, and manpower of serial production of an IRBM and general economies of force.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 05:23, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Honestly your qualification seems more accurate, to say that "US officials [estimate]..." and I should probably plead with you for that change alone. But I would think this uncertainty justifies removing the line entirely (and foregoing any of the other context I've suggested). It's nothing but an emotional assurance without further corroboration and being an objectively falsifiable claim should carry that context until evidence is presented. Even an argument based on the approximate calculation you suggested, which would at least give us an idea of whether they know or are just guessing. That's my whole hangup. As it is, the line suggests that they do know and therefore we can be confident that we know too. We have to maximize objectivity to assess our own exposure as members of the public who will be independently affected by the apparently novel tactical capabilities of official adversaries. Dan Lowe (talk) 06:53, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

I don't disagree with you with regard to whether the claim is falsifiable, but it's no less without corroboration than Putin's claims of travelling at Mach 10 and being impossible to intercept (a statement problematic for other reasons such as being undue weight as that's nothing specific to the Oreshnik, it's just a general fact for all ballistic missiles of this size class with regard to Ukraine). But we include that as well because when we have generally accepted reliable sources using those claims with proper attribution (e.g. not in our own voice, but attributed to "US officials claim..." or "Putin says...") then readers can judge the veracity of those claims on their own. Incidentally, that's another reason why we can't say they're speculating -- because the AP (the source in this case) isn't saying they're speculating either. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:21, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

References

Typo "Oleshnik"

The missile system in question is called "Oleshnik" instead of "Oreshnik" twice in the article. Please correct? Kttmrfobg (talk) 05:56, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Done⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:23, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

ATACMS are short range missiles

Please change the related passage. accordingly. 2003:CA:370C:D500:1EE5:8A0:B183:F5D3 (talk) 06:20, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:24, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 22 November 2024

The Oleshnik reportedly uses an MIRV payload, which was shown in unverified footage of the attack.

The Oleshnik reportedly uses an MIRV payload, which was claimed to be shown in unverified footage of the attack. The footage actually displays much less sophisticated MRV strikes, not MIRV strikes. No MARV technology was demonstrated whatsoever. Wabobo3 (talk) 08:16, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Multiple independent reliable sources use language that reports the payload as appearing to be MIRVs. Whether they're right or not about the independent targeting capability, we simply point out what reliable sources are reporting.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:30, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

"9M729"

Where did 9M729 GRAU index originate from? The source cited doesn't mention it, moreover there's already a missile on wikipedia with that index Novator 9M729. Are these the same missile? Please delete the GRAU index, to comply with source. — Preceding unsigned comment added by L0ll3r (talk • contribs) 08:31, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 22 November 2024 (2)

https://www.youtube.com/live/n0e6rHG47IU?si=n2IHufYF8bmmqESF&t=1259

Oreshnik should be referred as a variant or derivative from the RS-26. It is not an autonomous system.

On November 21, 2024, during the Pentagon Press Secretary's briefing (United States Department of Defense), Sabrina Singh explicitly and literally confirmed that an RS-26 "Rubezh" Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-based weapon system was used. PMateus (talk) 08:38, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Number of warheads carried

After "...reportedly uses an MIRV payload" please add "consisting of six separate warheads". Reported by ria.ru in: "Сбить невозможно". Что известно о ракете, которую представил Путин, РИА Новости, 21.11.2024 (not a neutral source, but in sentence marked "reportedly"). Kttmrfobg (talk) 12:34, 22 November 2024 (UTC)