Talk:Moral rationalism

Philosophy: Epistemology / Ethics Mid‑importance

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I've come to see a major problem with the opening presentation. It frames MR as an epistemological claim, when it seems to me to be more essentially a claim about the nature of ethics itself. Moral rationalism, then, is the view that true, or legitimate, ethical claims are derived from facts about logic. Now it presumably follows from this that they can be known a priori, but this is a secondary and not a primary feature of the view. Putting it this way also helps distinguish the claim from versions of intuitionism, which also claim that you can know moral truths a priori, but without necessarily using reason. Comments?--ScottForschler (talk) 17:54, 3 October 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Clean-up and expansion

Hi, all. I created this article because it didn't exist! It still can use some clean-up and expansion, though. Help if you can! -- Jaymay 21:10, 23 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Reasons and emotions

I added a section on this which distinguishes two types of moral rationalism. The two following sections seem to be primarily assuming that only the first exists, and need editing in light of this distinction.--ScottForschler (talk) 18:38, 27 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Seeing no objection to the contrary, I deleted the sections on moral externalism and internalism, which seem irrelevant and distracting. Mainstream rationalists derive ethics from practical reason, not theoretical reason, and hence do not necessarily have any problems with explaining how moral judgments can be motivating. I invite anyone who wants to describe moral rationalists who see moral facts as purely theoretical rather than practical to cite some such authors and describe their views, but this simply does not apply to Kant, Hare, Gewirth, Korsgaard, Nagel, etc.--ScottForschler (talk) 02:50, 2 May 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Another sense of moral rationalism

Note that "moral rationalism" is sometimes used to name the doctrine that moral obligations are reason giving. For instance see Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, p. 48.

Example(s) needed

It would be very helpful if this article gave one or more examples of a moral system that was derived a priori by reason. It's a little hard to think about in the abstract, especially for those unfamiliar with the subject. -- Beland (talk) 21:37, 13 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]