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I took nearly all this article and merged the information into the avian influenza article. It has since been reverted, so if you're thinking about integrating the two, foregt it. Her Pegship 17:39, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

>"resulting in fifty five deaths outside of China"

What about inside of China? Why does this sentence specifically exclude China? Kaldari 00:02, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

It may be that statistics were not immediately available from within China.

I suggest that the article's statistics be updated both in terms of a time line and country by country.

I've added some information, including a subsection, but the article's information, I suggests, needs to be streamlined and the various sections regrouped and some headings edited.

If no one else works at it I'll give it a try in the next little while.

CBorges 19:38, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

Update: I juggled text around and updated some figures. I would suggest once more information is added that a section showing country-by-country figures be placed between the history and transmission sections.

Every part of the article needs updating, expanding, and refining, but I would suggest in particular more information on farming practices and how they could be changed.

CBorges 21:19, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

Effects of a Pandemic

The information in this section is taken from a report by an finance company with strong links to the pharmaceutical industry and cannot be considered NPOV. It should be removed and a more credible summary from the WHO report be added instead.

Judging by the questions my patients are asking, and what is going through the media, it might be a good idea to make a clear differentiation between human and avian infection. It is the most lethal form of AVIAN flu. It is not capable of causing a pandemic (as yet) because it is not transmissible from human-to-human... all the cases have been bird-to-human.

Carl 17:52 30 October 2005


Cleanup of this and Avian Influenza article

The "Bird Flu Spread on October 26th, 2005" is neither up-to-date or accurate. It should be updated or removed.

It appears most of this text was originally taken from the Avian influenza article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avian_influenza#H5N1

Unfortunately the main article was largely left as is so still contained way too much text. As such, people have been modifying the main article and not this in some cases. Someone needs to go through the work of cleaning up the Avian influenza article to summarise & remove unnecessary stuff on H5N1 and move anything new here (sorry too busy).Nil Einne 13:40, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

In response to Kaldari's question about the sentence that excludes China from the death count:

The Chinese government (as it previously did with SARS, and before that AIDS) continues to deny that there have been any human deaths caused by cases of H5N1. Thus we can only go on "unofficial" numbers as far as China is concerned.

Throughout the article, different deathtolls are confirmed "as of July" 20 or 21, 2005. The death toll and date need to be confirmed and made consistent. While the first two iterations are appropriate, the other repetitions should be deleted.

Trying to clean this up (and failing, really) made me think it's probably better to start again from scratch. Selectively copy useful material across, and whatever's left can be dumped in a Timeline-type article. Rd232 23:45, 19 October 2005 (UTC)

  • Agreed. This page is a complete disaster. Half of it is redundant, there are copyvios all over the place, and it reads like a timeline instead of an article. Maybe I'll blank everything out and replace it with a cleanup notice - that'll draw attention to things, if it doesn't just get reverted immediately. --Quintin3265 15:57, 21 October 2005 (UTC)
I took a crack at this. See the avian influenza article for the result. Her Pegship 17:39, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
BanyanTree reverted my edits almost immediately, so if you want to merge the two articles, you should try a different approach, as s/he apparently feels this should still be a separate article.Her Pegship 18:01, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
This page is the result of BanyanTree cleaning up a very long and straggly avian influenza article. I also believe the pages should be kept separate, if only to keep the page size manageable on this very important topic. Duplication means that people do not know which article to edit. Wizzy…☎ 18:46, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

To those who are so zealous about protecting wikipedia from copyright lawsuits, please read the following:

This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.-unsigned

Fair use says "Fair use makes copyrighted work available to the public as raw material without the need for permission or clearance, so long as such free usage serves the purpose of copyright law, which the U.S. Constitution defines as the promotion of "the Progress of Science and useful Arts" (I.1.8), better than the legal enforcement of claims of infringement."

See [1] for further information.

"RULES OF THUMB FOR COURSEPACKS

The Classroom Guidelines that were negotiated in 1976 can provide helpful guidance and we recommend that you read them. 1. Limit coursepack materials to

  • single chapters
  • single articles from a journal issue
  • several charts, graphs or illustrations
  • other similarly small parts of a work. "

from [2] illustrates the principle of extracting part of a work being covered by fair use.

The New York Times itself quotes others.

"Copyright protects the particular way an author has expressed himself; it does not extend to any ideas, systems, or factual information conveyed in the work." [3] therefore a quote that essentially lists facts isn't even covered by copywrite in the first place.

Wikipedia primary servers are in the US.

While it would be nice to have no legal complications, the rich in this world are seeking to own everything including math equations (which is what software patents are).

Don't help memes that block the free flow of information. Help memes that promote freedom. Fair use is one such doctrine, law and meme. WAS 4.250 00:25, 22 October 2005 (UTC)

The entirety of the work

Well, I think the key issue here is that it wasn't just part of the work that was copied - it was all of it. Most judges would uphold that copying the entire work consitutes a violation. --Quintin3265 05:12, 22 October 2005 (UTC)

The important thing is to both stay legal and to not throw away data. Copying the whole for educational purposes is within what has been held as "fair" in America. We must strive to be legal EVERYWHERE - but not at the cost of throwing away data. Changes have been made that improve the situation.

  1. We MUST cite sources; whether we copy or paraphrase or glean numbers. This has been done.
  2. Copying the WHOLE, while POSSIBLY legal, is certainly not best practice. So I have deleted the part of the quoted section that simply reproduces data we already have (in the prior section), joined it to the prior section, and reformated to make more clear that it is a referenced quote, not just referenced data. WAS 4.250 07:47, 22 October 2005 (UTC)

Reason for inoculations

I wrote the following under 'prevention' a little while ago:

Tamiflu, an antiviral agent, may help prevent the development of a human strain. The reason for using this is not to suppress the bird flu but possible other infections, which, if present in an individual, might combine with the bird flu, creating a strain that would be more infectious to humans.

The explanation has since been removed. I myself had some doubts about writing this, because it might stop people from using it because it's just for the good of mankind, not for themselves particularly. Is that the reason for the removal? DirkvdM 09:08, 24 October 2005 (UTC)

I removed it because I don't believe it is true and you provided no source backing it up. If you have a reputable source, quote the source or at least provide the reference so the assertion can be verified. In contested cases, references stating something is so and references staing it is not so are provided, quoted or summarized and we let the reader draw his own conclusions. What wikipedia is not about tho is us throwing in our opinions. WAS 4.250 11:11, 24 October 2005 (UTC)

The mechanism by which drugs like Tamiflu works involves reducing the amount of infectious virus produced by cells and reducing the spread of viruses. I assume that "a human strain" means a strain that would more easily infect humans or more easily pass from human to human. Each time a new cell is infected, there is a chance for virus mutation. Anything that reduces virus infections will reduce the chances of evolutionary change. It is also true that one way avian flu could evolve would be through genetic recombination with another flu virus inside of an infected cell. Tamiflu can limit the spread of many flu strains and reduce the opportunity for avian flu to genetically recombine with other strains. However, I think it is important to put these effects of Tamiflu into perspective. Under what circumstances might Tamiflu use produce a significant change in the rate of evolution of avian flu? It would have to be the case that a significant fraction of the viral evolution would be blocked, which would require that a significant fraction of avian flu infections be blocked by Tamiflu. It is not clear to me that this is possible. Rather than the vague "may help prevent" that was in the article, it would be better to explain all of the steps that can be taken to limit the evolution of avian flu and which ones are most likely to be the most important. For example, teaching people to limit contact with infected animals and animal waste is more important than selling Tamiflu to people who are not in contact with the virus. --JWSchmidt 13:34, 24 October 2005 (UTC)

It certainly isn't an opinion (it doesn't even look like one, it's a statement of fact - whether the 'fact' is correct is a different matter). I heard this on Nieuwslicht, a Dutch tv show with scientific background to the news. It specifically mentioned that the inoculations of people in Romania, as shown on tv, were not meant to fight the bird flu infection in people (or was that 'not just'?), but (also?) to prevent infected people from getting another virus infection, which might then combine with the bird flu to produce a mix that is as dangerous as the bird flu but is as infectious to humans as the other virus. It was something to do with the new virus getting the inside of the one virus and the outside of the other virus. I agree that a better source is needed, but I'm not going to do this because I simply don't know enough about this sort of thing. I merely added it so someone more knowledgeable could pick it up.

Here's a phrase from the French wikipedia (search for 'tamiflu' - first hit):

... a possible bird flu pandemic after recombination of H5N1 with another human flu virus.

Which leaves the question whether we should give this info. I suppose we should because that's what an encyclopedia is supposed to do and only the more interested will read this. Hell, it was even on tv. Although that's no excuse, really - we shouldn't base our moral standards on tv shows. DirkvdM 07:36, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

Hold on, that phrase on the French wikiopedia was added after I edited this article, so it may very well have been copied form here. DirkvdM 07:42, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
In the online version of the Dutch newpaper NRC Handelsblad (paid-for login required) I just read something similar. Except that it says that vaccination is meant just to prevent people from getting infected with the bird flu and an existing human human flu virus (during the coming flu season) because that might lead to the creation of a mixed virus tha combines the qualities qualities of both the bird flu (potentially lethal) and the human flu (easy infection). So that's not about tamiflu, but I'm fairly sure I didn't misunderstand Nieuwslicht. And in the same newspaper it says that tamiflu doesn't offer any protection against bird flu. DirkvdM 10:36, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
"tamiflu doesn't offer any protection against bird flu" - Previously, bird flu isolates have been shown to be sensitive to tamiflu (oseltamivir), for example: (Comparison of Efficacies of RWJ-270201, Zanamivir, and Oseltamivir against H5N1, H9N2, and Other Avian Influenza Viruses). This is why countries are using it on people who are exposed to avian flu. It has been "big news" when tamiflu-resistant strains of avian flu have been isolated: Avian flu: isolation of drug-resistant H5N1 virus. (download file PDF). Monitoring is on-going to see if tamiflu-resistant strains become common. As of now, they are not. --JWSchmidt 18:29, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
I read that in the newspaper's archive, so maybe that was old info (shouldn't they remove it then, I wonder). But is the other reason (preventing a combination of bird and human flu) also valid and, if so, which is the most compelling reason for using tamiflu? That seems like one of the most important things the article could say. DirkvdM 09:14, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
The most important reason to use it is that it decreases your chance of DYING from flu (avian or otherwise). Since there is enough for the rich and powerful, but not enough for the rest of us, it would not surprise me in the slightest if "we are taking it for the benefit of all mankind" noises were made by the controlled media puppets. WAS 4.250 14:47, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

DirkvdM: As I tried to explain above, yes, anything that inhibits the ability of flu viruses to infect new cells can contribute to reducing the opportunities for genetic recombination between flu strains. The next question becomes, can use of drugs like Tamiflu make a significant contribution to reducing the opportunities for genetic recombination between flu strains? This is not yet known. We need to know more about how many people are being infected by avian flu and if it is possible to get drugs like Tamiflu to the people who are being infected. If there are other things that can be done that would have a much greater impact on reducing the opportunities for genetic recombination between flu strains (such as educating people to avoid contact with infected birds), then it may not not make much sense to make a big deal out of Tamiflu as a way to reduce the opportunities for genetic recombination between flu strains. If 99% of such genetic recombination is taking place in poor farmers with no access to Tamiflu, then why suggest that Tamiflu can prevent formation of a pandemic virus? --JWSchmidt 15:38, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Do I understand correctly that any such effect is uncertain and if it exists the effect is negligible compared to other methods, including the other effects of the administration of tamiflu? But you speak of genetic recombination, which is alteration of the gentic information. As I understand it, that is one threat. But 'Nieuwslicht' spoke of something different, namely the combination of the inside of the one (the genetic information) with the outside of the other. From what I read in virus#Steps associated with viral reproduction, I assume that what is meant is that the reproduced genetic info by chance combines with the capsid of the other (human) virus, if present. But now I wonder if a vaccine mix wouldn't make more sense here. Alas I've erased the recording, and I'm no longer sure if they were speaking of tamiflu here (alsthough they did mention it). DirkvdM 11:51, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

My understanding is that flu (and many other) viruses have multiple pieces of genetic material and if two different flu viruses infect the same cell a new flu virus can be created with a combination of the genetic material of the two flu viruses. Among the virus genetic material is the coding for the protein coat that determines the virus's abilty to enter host cells and in turn are on the surface thus available for use in the host organism for detection and killing of the virus by the host's defense mechanisms. The avian flu right now has a hard time infecting humans, but if it and a common human flu virus infect the same human cell, they can combine to form a mutation we have no immunity to that can be expected to infect half the world's population and kill one to ten percent of the infected human. After the pandemic, the living humans will as a population have immunity so for a generation that strain will not be a problem. That's my understanding of the situation. WAS 4.250 13:13, 27 October 2005 (UTC)

Graphic of the extent of H5N1 spread misleading

I find the graphic showing the spread of avian flu misleading. Apparently, a whole country is colored yellow if there's any reported incidents from that country. This causes the entire Russia to be colored. I don't know if H5N1 is that prevalent in Russia; I suspect that not all parts of that country is affected. The graphic seems to suggest that diseases somehow observe or respect national boundaries -- something that we know is not true. - 71.246.5.238

  • I agree. In addition to the above, I suggest using one colour (e.g. yellow) for regions in which avian cases of H5N1 have been identified, and a different colour (e.g. red) for those which have had human cases? - Gobeirne 18:28, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

Further, the graph is incorrect in leaving Japan white while the country has at least 3 outbreaks.

The map also shows Great Britain to have H5N1; it doesn't. A bird died in a quarantine facility but no wild birds and no poultry have been found to have the disease, and the bird is believed to have contracted the disease while in storage in Taiwan. Officially, the UK is still H5N1-free. And about Japan: there have not been any confirmed H5N1 outbreaks as far as I know; there have been outbreaks of other types of bird flu recently, but not H5N1. --Jamieli 17:34, 14 November 2005 (UTC)
A swan died yesterdaty in Fife from H5N1. It's still wrong, however, as the swan died in Scotland, which means that it was Scotland that should be hilighted in red and not the whole of the UK. --Veratien 09:27, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

How about simply changing the caption from "Bird flu spread" to "Countries affected by bird flu" or "Countries with cases of bird flu"? That would make the meaning of the image much clearer, at least while we search for an image that reflects the actual spread of the virus.--Daniel Medina 19:50, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

It's still very misleading, though. I look at that and think it's much, much worse than it really is. --Veratien 09:27, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Mortality rate

I'm just curious: why does a to-date 51% death rate indicate that the total death rate would only be 2-3%? -Litefantastic 18:02, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

  • No one knows the death rate if this avian flu mutates into a form that can be transmitted human to human. Typically these mutations cause the virus to be less deadly. 2-3% as an overall death rate is rough guess-timation from experts based on past mutations of avian flus. If it makes you feel better, know that high death rates TYPICALLY cause the pandemic to die out cause the infected persons die rather than live and spread the disease. This, unfortunately, doesn't apply if the death only occurs after the victim has been spreading the disease for several months. An aids like latency period combined with an aids like death rate combined with a flu like abilty to spread easily human to human would be an ideal species-killer. WAS 4.250 20:35, 31 October 2005 (UTC)
I believe there is some confusion over "Mortality rate" and "Fatality rate". Fatality rate is number of death per infected people, and it is said to be around one-third to 50%. The Mortality rate is death per population, which therefore takes into account other factors such as how effective the disease spreads, etc, which is hard to predict but should be considerably lower than the fatality rate. --Vsion 06:33, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

"it is said to be around one-third to 50%" <-- Isn't this based largely on data for people who have been treated in hospitals? Has a real effort has been made to estimate how many people are infected but not treated in a hospital? --JWSchmidt 18:48, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't know, it is from the news. I assumed any detected H5N1 cases would be documented, given the concerns. But for known cases, as shown in the table, the fatality rate is indeed around 50%. --Vsion 19:57, 17 December 2005 (UTC)
Isn't this based largely on data for people who have been treated in hospitals? YES The test for H5N1 is difficult. Nonhospital/lab tests are unreliable. WAS 4.250 20:40, 17 December 2005 (UTC)
Has a real effort has been made to estimate how many people are infected but not treated in a hospital? NO The real question is the infection and death rates for the still nonexistant pandemic version of the virus, and as it does not exist it can not be known. The current versions of H5N1 don't spread well person to person so having antibodies against it is not meaningful for any useful purpose given the cost of verifying the fact.WAS 4.250 20:40, 17 December 2005 (UTC)
any detected H5N1 cases would be documented YES The difficulty of detecting that it is H5N1 insures that the fact will be documented. But not necesarily reported (example China). WAS 4.250 20:40, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Prevention

Could there be a little info on prevention for human, as to what should we eat or what to do if we think our food is infected. Should we cook every aviary product, can we drink milk. 132.204.207.108 20:08, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Milk is from mammals, drink away, not a problem. If you are in an unaffected area like America is today, nothing you eat is an avain flu problem. In an affected area, bird breath and uncooked bird blood or meat can kill you. Read the external links for details. If you think I'm kidding, why do you think they KILL ALL the poultry in affected areas? WAS 4.250 20:23, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for the answer, i don't think you are kidding, but this info was missing on the page so I asked it because I wanted to know. And the idea that America isn't affected isn't true anymore (I live in Canada BTW) because they have found 28? ducks that have been infected with H5N1. Can the virus propagate to poultry's eggs also? 132.204.207.108 20:57, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

I read they found H5N1 in bird eggs. The canada avian flu has NOT yet been determined to be the H5N1 strain. WAS 4.250 09:05, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

What about a mention of Bush's (was it proposed or passed) 7 Billion for vaccine (to be purchased from Pfizer, btw). I also believe that this amount would enable the vaccination of 20 million Americans potentially viable for the virus/mutations etc. (That's 350/person...hello profit margins). I'm no conspiracy theorist, but this seems to me to be shady, and is largely ignored by the population. Also, there are other reasons to kill off ALL of the poultry in affected areas. For instance, since these areas have absolutely no birds, they're going to need to import food from somewhere...you know, unaffected. Maybe like the US. Not to mention the millions of people that will go starving because they've lost their livestock and food sources. Look, I know that most of what I'm mentioning here is speculation, but it seems to me that these days, any time there is a strong media representation using fear tactics, something underhanded is going on. Especially in cases where prevention is concerned, where preventative measures can't be quantitatively proven, the public is commonly assured that everything was taken care of by direct use of preventative measure, while significant amounts of money is passing hands. Kingerik 18:53, 11 November 2005 (UTC)

Something "underhanded" is ALWAYS going on. Viruses trick cells. Bacteria poison other cells. Parasites disguise themselves. Some flowers trick insects into mating with them to spread their pollen. Animals engage in stealth. Humans and ants use other species (farming and livestock). Humans and other social animals use force and fraud on each other to gain social advantage. Welcome to the real world. What ain't force is usually fraud. Math and science and altruism and happiness do exist and life is a free gift, so it isn't ALL messed up. WAS 4.250 15:30, 12 November 2005 (UTC)

Worst-case scenario in United States

It's natural that H5N1 has no humor section, but just in case: 

     http://www.swarthmore.edu/NatSci/cpurrin1/evolk12/h5n1/avianflu.htm

But my real reason to post here is to ask all of you if you have a nice phylogeny I could use for the above site. I'd be grateful for any leads on how to find one.

Cheers, Colin Purrington

bad URL, long quotes, commercial source

At the end of the H5N1#Mutations and strains section; bad link?

Thanks. I deleted the paragraph because the link has gone bad and the director was quoted the next day as saying it was all very very minor. almost sheepish. A big announcement about was supposed to happen but it never happened or was as if never happened. I'm guessing it was hype. WAS 4.250 22:57, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Is there anyone who can defend the long quotes in H5N1#Symptoms and the use of this commercial website as a source? --JWSchmidt 22:46, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

I linked to cytokine storm in lieu of the quote. WAS 4.250 23:12, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

References

Back around October 21 this was added as a note:

H5N1 Bird Flu Information Used under the fair use policy of the United States copyright law, and under Wikipedia fair use policy See also: What is "Fair Use" in Copyright Law?

along with some text in the body of the article that was later removed as a copy right violation. As far as I can tell, the source is no longer cited, so I am going to remove it from the reference list. --JWSchmidt 04:34, 13 December 2005 (UTC)

I think the intention of the section called Global spread 2004/2005 is to document the highly pathogenic strain that has been shown to have a limited capacity to infect humans. We we should remove most reports of H5 type avian flu that were not the highly pathogenic type from the lists of places/times where the highly pathogenic strain has actually been confirmed. For example, the article has, "On 31 October 2005, Canada has discovered a strain of H5 avian flu in wild birds and is now checking whether it is the same H5N1 killer strain which has spread to Europe." However, none of the reports of H5N1 virus in Canada have ot been confirmed as the highly pathogenic type (see). --JWSchmidt 03:27, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Absolutely. This article is not about any old H5 avian virus. Just H5N1. Whether it should confine itself to the H5N1 variations that are pathogenic (I believe this evolutionary branch of the virus is called subtype Z or variation Z) is unclear. WAS 4.250 20:46, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

"A complete genetic characterization of circulating H5N1 viruses is critical to identify the possible incorporation of human influenza virus genes by reassortment. To this end, we analyzed the phylogeny of the internal protein coding genes. The PB2, PB1, and PA polymerase genes from 2003–2005 H5N1 isolates from humans constitute a single clade (data not shown) and have coevolved with the respective HA genes (Figure 1). No evidence of reassortment with polymerase genes from circulating H1N1 or H3N2 human influenza virus was found. The phylogenies of the NP and NS genes also supported the avian origin of these genes, indicating that all the genes from the human H5N1 isolates analyzed are of avian origin, which confirms the absence of reassortment with human influenza genes. Taken together, the phylogenies of the 8 genomic segments show that the H5N1 viruses from human infections and the closely related avian viruses isolated in 2004 and 2005 belong to a single genotype, often referred to as genotype Z." CDC WAS 4.250 20:51, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Recombinomics

I read this and this, changed the article, but reverted myself after reading this and the below at [5]:

WHO says the samples at GenBank were contaminated and dismiss the President of Recombinomics, Niman, as a man who
has not published in the scientific literature since 1996 and is not a flu expert. WHO will not issue an official statement about the case, Klaus Stöhr, WHO's global influenza coordinator says: "We're not going to bother 6.5 billion people with something that's of no public health importance." Webster, too, says any publicity is too much: "It's so easy these days for somebody with a Web site to create a lot of panic." WAS 4.250 21:46, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

more guff: Henry Niman - Prophet of Doom for the Internet Could have a bit of fun with this Wikipedia entry; inc count the days n months since start of the H5N1 pandemic (by 6 april) on Planet Niman, which is surely a parallel world, where science looks similar on surface, but actually radically different if look in any detail. MW

The beginning of the structure subsection

Reference

Influenza viruses have a relatively high mutation rate that is characteristic of RNA viruses. Influenza genes are carried on a set of eight separate RNA molecules (called: PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M, and NS). This segmentation of the influenza genome facilitates genetic recombination by segment reassortment in hosts who are infected with two different influenza viruses at the same time[1].

(The following paragraph moved from "treatment" is both unsourced and partially incorrect:) Influenza viruses have ten genes, three of which specify the structure of proteins that are medically relevant as targets for antiviral drugs and antibodies. The hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and M2 are essential viral proteins with functions that can be inhibited antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir and rimantadine or bound by virus-inactivating antibodies produced by the immune system. The HA glycoprotein forms spikes at the surface of flu viruses that function to attach viruses to cells. This attachment is required for efficient transfer of flu virus genes into cells, a process that can be blocked by antibodies that bind to the hemagglutinin proteins. The viral neuraminidase protein is important for the release of new viruses from infected cells. The M2 transmembrane protein is an ion channel required for efficient infection.

(This is what the source ACTUALLY says:) "Orthomyxovirus replication takes about 6 hours and kills the host cell. The viruses attach to permissive cells via the hemagglutinin subunit, which binds to cell membrane glycolipids or glycoproteins containing N-acetylneuraminic acid, the receptor for virus adsorption. The virus is then engulfed by pinocytosis into endosomes. The acid environment of the endosome causes the virus envelope to fuse with the plasma membrane of the endosome, uncoating the nucleocapsid and releasing it into the cytoplasm. A transmembrane protein derived from the matrix gene (M2) forms an ion channel for protons to enter the virion and destabilize protein binding allowing the nucleocapsid to be transported to the nucleus, where the genome is transcribed by viral enzymes to yield viral mRNA. Unlike replication of other RNA viruses, orthomyxovirus replication depends on the presence of active host cell DNA. The virus scavenges cap sequences from the nascent mRNA generated in the nucleus by transcription of the host DNA and attaches them to its own mRNA. These cap sequences allow the viral mRNA to be transported to the cytoplasm, where it is translated by host ribosomes. The nucleocapsid is assembled in the nucleus.Virions acquire an envelope and undergo maturation as they bud through the host cell membrane. During budding, the viral envelope hemagglutinin is subjected to proteolytic cleavage by host enzymes. This process is necessary for the released particles to be infectious. Newly synthesized virions have surface glycoproteins that contain N acetylneuraminic acid as a part of their carbohydrate structure, and thus are vulnerable to self-agglutination by the hemagglutinin. A major function of the viral neuraminidase is to remove these residues."[6].

(this paragraph is both true and sourced and discusses three of the RNAs) "The 3 viral envelope proteins of influenza A virus are most medically relevant. The hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and M2 are essential viral proteins targeted by host antibodies or antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir and rimantadine. The HA glycoprotein forms spikes at the surface of virions, mediating attachment to host cell sialoside receptors and subsequent entry by membrane fusion. The NA forms knoblike structures on the surface of virus particles and catalyzes their release from infected cells, allowing virus spread. The M2 is a transmembrane protein that forms an ion channel required for the uncoating process that precedes viral gene expression." [7]

(this paragraph shows those 3 may not be the ones responsible for virulance, and thus NOT the only ones medically important) "[A] lysine at residue 627 in the PB2 protein was crucial for the high level of virulence in mice infected with the H5N1/97 virus. In a pig model of influenza, the pathogenicity of influenza virus was related to the nonstructural (NS) gene of the H5N1/97 virus, which was believed to have conferred more resistance to the antiviral effects of interferon and tumor necrosis factor alpha (30). Recent studies also showed that pathogenesis in humans may be related to aberrant immune responses, which may be related to NS or other internal genes." [8]

Comments

What do YOU propose given the above? If you make no response, I'll ignore your revert and carry on the best I can. WAS 4.250 17:36, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

What is incorrect about the paragraph from the "treatment" section? If you want to add additional references that describe the viral proteins, feel free. Wikipedia articles are not collections of quotes. If you change the order of sections in the article you will probably have to change the order in which topics are mentioned. In this case, rather than paste in another quote that duplicates what is already in the article, the solution would seem to be to just move the description of the proteins up in the article. --JWSchmidt 18:15, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Don't panic the public

"So what's the worst that could happen?

  • A pandemic of human-adapted avian influenza such as the 1997 H5N1 virus.
  • Such a reassortant could easily have a mortality rate of 30-40%.
  • Within a few months 10-25% of the world's population could have been infected.
  • 6.3 billion * 0.4 * 0.25 = over half a billion deaths.
  • or worse .."

Quoted verbatim from [9] WAS 4.250 05:11, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

New Z genotype clades evolve in 2005

Two clades infecting humans It would appear that there are now two clades of H5N1 that infect humans. Can someone with knowledge on this subject update the article? http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060320/ts_nm/birdflu_genetics_dc

Thanks. I deleted out of date data to adjust the article to reflect the new data. But I hesitate to add scientific data based on popular reporting as they get things wrong so often. Anyone have a link to the scientific study itself? We could add a few sentences about this part: "Now there are two clades of the Z genotype [that infect humans, there was only one a couple years ago]. There were also small numbers of viruses [(ie one or more other clades)] in birds that were genotype V or W or recently identified genotype G [or Z? what happened to the other Z clade that didn't infect humans?]."WAS 4.250 01:19, 21 March 2006 (UTC)


NOTE: Please note that this is NOT the worst pandemic threat in the world!! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.50.165.150 (talk) 12:27, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

H5N1

H5N1 was reported to probably be in Turkey, then reported probably not in Turkey, and now as of Jan.4 back to probably in Turkey. But reports say "probably" [10], "The WHO said it has yet to confirm the Turkey cases, but it is checking into them." [11], " The Associated Press reports that more tests are being carried out." [12].

Confirmation one way or another will be available in a day or so. But looks like H5N1 to me. WAS 4.250 00:39, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

Wikinews

This article is linked to from Wikinews, we have an infobox that links directly to the section currently titled "Global spread". This is referenced to obtain the current confirmed death toll. Could this please stay with the same sub-section title so I don't repeatedly have to re-read the article and find the new section heading for the bit that contains the table? --213.193.176.101 21:22, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

I have no idea what you just asked to have happen. WAS 4.250 21:44, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

wikinews relied on the table that used to be present in the Global Spread section, see this infobox. Where now can I find the current figure for the official death toll? --Brianmc 12:55, 9 April 2006 (UTC)
Nevermind, I found out some had mangled the template. --Brianmc 12:58, 9 April 2006 (UTC)

Updates to Global Spread grid

Hi people!

Just wondering, how many times a week is the global spread grid of figures updated? Reasom am asking is because we at the World Wide Help Group are going to be putting up a snapshot of the h5n1 outbreak on the Avian Flu Help blog and we're thinking of getting a wiki of help resources and the like going soon just like this one that we did during the tsunami. Any ideas?

thanks, Angelo EmbuldeniyaWorldWideHelpGroup 16:13, 11 January 2006 (UTC)

answer

Feel free to link to our major H5N1 pages: H5N1, Template:H5N1 cases, Template:H5N1, Transmission and infection of H5N1, Global spread of H5N1, and Influenza pandemic.

THE CONTENTS OF THE TABLE ARE SOURCED FROM

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) IS TASKED WITH MAINTAINING AN ACCURATE UP TO DATE ACCOUNT OF CONFIRMED HUMAN CASES AND DEATHS. THEY ARE OUR SOURCE. THEY SHOULD BE YOUR SOURCE.

The World Health Organization announces the current phase of the pandemic alert here.

See "Assessing the pandemic threat" at [13]. WHO published a first edition of the Global Influenza Preparedness Plan in 1999, and updated it in April 2005. See [14] and [15] which define the responsibilities of WHO and national authorities in case of an influenza pandemic. This is the first time a pandemic has been anticipated and is being prepared for. WAS 4.250 17:14, 11 January 2006 (UTC)


thanks!

your suggestions have been taken, thanks a lot & keep up the great work! WorldWideHelpGroup 08:32, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

H7

mentioned once... Unfamiliar. Is it a misreading for H1? Or does one see it in birds Midgley 01:00, 13 January 2006 (UTC)

Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I tried to make it as accurate as possible. Now I'm trying to communicate as well as possible. H7 is best explained by reading Avian influenza. The short version is that avian flu is a disease and avian flu virus is a species and that virus's subtypes are labeled according to an H number and an N number. (And flu=influenza.) WAS 4.250 03:43, 13 January 2006 (UTC)


WHO H5N1 Ref Labs Info

We have information on WHO's H5N1 reference Labs also known as National Influenza Centers for each country which includes the doctors'/experts' names & contact details -- this info would be vital for sampling tests and the like, cross checking if you will.

We are planning on either getting another wiki page going for the ref labs and linking it here to this article or do you prefer including it straght in this article, there are over 20 labs along with their details. Your suggestions are most appreciated.

thanks! WorldWideHelpGroup 14:47, 13 January 2006 (UTC)

Referring to the size recommendations for articles, I would think a separate page might be preferred (this is mostly meant to help the large number of people with slow internet access). Just my 2 cents. Awolf002 14:51, 13 January 2006 (UTC)
Yes, we are already as large as Wikipedia articles are recommended to get. Additional information gets hived off into seperate articles like you see in the H5N1 box at the top right of this article. WAS 4.250 16:34, 13 January 2006 (UTC)
Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, not a database, so any article is supposed to be an encyclopedia article and not a list, unless its a list of related encyclopedia articles (actual or potential). National Influenza Centers doesn't yet exist, you might want to place your data there. I just googled the term and it definitly qualifies to be an article. And if informamation on any one of the centers becomes too big, it can be hived off into its own article. Don't worry about getting everything perfect, but always "save page" with the contents in a readable state. Connecting it to the existing H5N1 series of articles can be done in many ways. I'll be happy to do that. WAS 4.250 16:34, 13 January 2006 (UTC)

Link to page containing below added to article

WHO Collaborating Centres and Reference Laboratories involved in annual influenza vaccine composition recommendations

Reference Laboratories

WHO Collaborating Centres

Dr I.D. Gust WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza 45 Poplar Rd Parkville Victoria 3052 Australia Telephone: +61 3 8344 3963 Fax: +61 3 9347 1540 Influenza news on: http://www.influenzacentre.org/index.htm

Dr M. Tashiro WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza Department of Viral Diseases and Vaccine Control National Institute of Infectious Diseases Gakuen 4-7-2 Musashi-Murayama Tokyo 208-0011 Japan Telephone: +81 42 565 2498 Fax: +81 42 565 2498 http://idsc.nih.go.jp/index.html

Dr A. Hay WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza National Institute for Medical Research The Ridgeway, Mill Hill London NW7 1AA United Kingdom Telephone: +44 208 959 3666 Fax: +44 208 906 44 77

Dr N. Cox WHO Collaborating Centre for Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control of Influenza Influenza Branch Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases National Centers for Infectious Diseases Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1600 Clifton Road, Mailstop G16 Atlanta, Georgia 30333 United States of America Telephone: +1 404 639 3591 Fax: +1 404 639 2334 Influenza news on:http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm

Reference Laboratories

Dr G. Grohmann Immunology and Vaccines Therapeutic Goods Administration Laboratories P.O. Box 100, Woden ACT, 2606 Australia Telephone: +61 2 6232 8490 Fax: +61 2 6232 8564 http://www.tga.gov.au

Dr J. Wood Division of Virology National Institute for Biological Standards and Control Blanche Lane, South Mimms, Potters Bar, Hertfordshire EN6 3QG United Kingdom Telephone: +44 1 707 641 000 Fax: +44 1 707 646 730 e-mail: enquiries@nibsc.ac.uk

Dr R. Levandowski Division of Viral Products Centre for Biologics Evaluation and Research Food and Drug Administration 1401 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 United States of America Telephone: +1 301 827 1908 Fax: +1 301 402 5128 http://www.fda.gov/cber

WAS 4.250 17:54, 13 January 2006 (UTC)


H5N1 Ref Labs -- listings info

Thanks for the suggestions, last night i started on a wiki page and named it H5N1RefLabs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H5N1RefLabs

and I just saw the suggestion for national influenza centers, so I've copied the contents there as well: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Influenza_Centers

So we've ended up with 2 duplicate pages, more prone to go with national influenza centers as mentioned above -- could someone please sorta' absorb the centers' info into the h5n1 article? If there's going to be a url change, please mention it here as we're currently linking to the national influenza centers wiki page from the blog.

thanks! Angelo Embuldeniya

WorldWideHelpGroup 16:35, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

I moved the contents and placed a redirect at the old article. Please help with adding information. If it remains a list and not more of an article, it will rightfully be deleted. To not be deleted, enough encyclopedic content needs to be added to SOME of the centers so that it's obvious that in time, all the centers could similarly be expanded. I'll start. But if no one helps adds a few relevant sentences to the more prominant centers, it WILL wind up being deleted. I'll also add a link in a couple of the H5N1 articles. WAS 4.250 17:30, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

Please see Talk:National Influenza Centers. WAS 4.250 18:42, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

A concerns about Italy and Olympic...

I have a concern that I'd like to be addressed... Because Olympic is currently being hosted in Turin, Italy while same time we discovers that Italy just got its first bird flu case (not sure if it's first or not, since I noticed that the article mentioned the bird flu as orginating in 1959 but I think it said ti's really similar, not same one). Because bird flu apparently has been spreading without even stopping at all despite all the efforts to contain it, isn't it possible that this bird flu may reach Turin, Italy sometimes later? This would be castrosphere, because, while professional atheles, VIPs, and officials may be better off and well-insulated from this such outbreak, the tourists are at far greater risks because they aren't much controlled and that they're foreigners in most respects.

In effect, if bird flu made it there, it may be possible that spread will get even bigger or so, since those tourists will be returning home after Olympic completed, which means many, many countries, including, but not limited to, United States, Canada, Australia, and many other countries, even those that are still unaffected by the spread at this time. Olympic being held in same country as where bird flu is reported in Sicily is really a bad timing. It was really coincidence since this could not have been anticipated, especially considering the fact that the decision to accept the bid from Turin was actually made way before this bird flu even made bigger concern. Bird flu, while a major media piece, did not reached the highest level of concern until about late 2005 or early 2006. Too late for such change or at least even being prepared at all.

I have yet to see any information about any preparation in anticipation of this bird flu if a human case is reported in Turin during Olympic events. Obviously, the person infected would be guarantined, I think, but it will take time before it's discovered and thus spread may widen, making it difficult to aggressively combats it.

I mean, I want this concern to be addressed with respect to this coincidence or, even worse, a bad luck. Thanks and I will appreciate if anyone can address this concern. I'm feeling uneasy about this situation I'm imagining in my mind. -_-

Respectfully Yours, Legion 16:43, 13 February 2006 (UTC)

A LOT of people are having the same MISUNDERSTANDING. BIRDS NOT PEOPLE are catching and transmitting and causing the global spread of H5N1. People only catch it if they act in inappropriate ways (eat sick birds, play with sick birds, etc.) or in a couple of cases lovingly cared for a sick relative (who caught it from a bird) in a very hands on way (no professional health givers have caught the disease). Currently, it is VERY hard for humans to catch. It is very EASY for birds to catch it one from another. some species of birds don't usually die from it. Poulty usually DOES die from it. The biggest worry is that it MIGHT someday mutate into a form that IS easy to pass from human to human. If it does, governments around the world will be quaranteining, stopping large gatherings, cancelling international travel, and other very dratic things. You won't need wikipedia to tell you about it if it becomes a person to person transmissible illness - you'll hear about it from everyone. WAS 4.250 17:02, 13 February 2006 (UTC)

RNA molecule

I removed this part as I don't think it's very useful:

For example its NS RNA molecule looks like this:
gtgacaaaga cataatggat tccaacacga taacctcgtt tcaggtagat tgttatctat
ggcacataag aaagctactc agtatgagag acatgtgtga tgcccccttt gatgacaggc
tccgaagaga ccaaaaggca ttaaagggaa gaggcagcac acttggactc gatttaagag
tggctacaat ggaggggaaa aagatcgttg aggacatcct gaagagtgag acaaatgaaa
acctcaaaat agccattgct tccagtcctg ctcctcggta tatcaccgat atgagcatag
aggagatgag ccgagaatgg tacatgctga tgcctaggca gaaaataact ggaggcctta
tggtgaaaat ggaccaagcc ataatggata aaagaattat ccttaaagca aatttctcag
ttctatttga tcaactagag acattagtct ctctgagggc attcacagaa agtggtgcta
ttgtggctga aatatttccc attccctccg taccaggaca ttttacagag gatgtcaaaa
atgcaattgg aatcctcatc ggtggacttg aatggaatga taactcaatt cgagcgtctg
aaaatataca gagattcgct tggggaatcc atgatgagaa tgggggacct tcactccctc
caaaacagaa acgctacatg gcgaaacgag ttgagtcaga agtttgaaga gatcagatgg
ctcattgctg aatgtagaaa tatactgaca aagactgaaa atagctttga acagataaca
tttttgcaag cattgcaact cttacttgaa gttgagagtg agataaggac cttctctttt
cagcttattt aatactaaaa aacac

Plus, it might be a copyvio (assuming Intelligent design <evil grin>) bogdan 10:59, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

Even assuming that, the copyright would have long expired. 82.103.206.128 16:36, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
Nah, it's open source- that's why the gnu was created (or intelligently designed). - unsigned
It's the derivative versions, not the exact copies, that are the problem. If it would just stop evolving, it wouldn't be a problem. WAS 4.250 20:27, 21 February 2007 (UTC)

Domestic or wild birds responsible

I found this article worth mentioning here. The author seems to think wild birds are unreasonable victimized. The argument is also good, infection is not following the wild birds migrating trajectory. Now, if we are placing the blame on the wrong victim for personal reason, wouldn't that allow the disease to grow? Does anyone think its worth mentioning it on the article? This paragraph would then be modified:

A highly pathogenic variation of H5N1 is currently spreading across the world from areas where it is endemic. Migrating waterfowl (wild ducks, geese, and swans) carry H5N1, often without themselves becoming sick. - unsigned

Infection IS following the wild birds migrating trajectory. It just took a while for the relevent governments to admit it. WAS 4.250 03:34, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

Is the bird flu deadly to all mammals?

Bird flu is deadly to humans. My question is: Is it deadly to all mammals? --84.146.195.25 14:47, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

No. It is not. WAS 4.250 15:54, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

The problem is animals that don't die from it can walk round looking healthy and spreading it to animals and people who do die from it, in particular cats are a real problem.--Hontogaichiban 11:57, 21 May 2006 (UTC)
While that is largely true, the bigger problem is the lack of good data on H5N1's spread in both wild bird and wild mammal species and the lack of even a clue as to its future spread because H5N1 is uniquely deadly and contagious to so many species. It acts differently in each species it infects and adapts differently in each species; creating ever more new varieties. We don't have a clue to exactly how many bird species can harbor this virus. H5N1 is the first HPAI Avian influenza virus to just keep spreading and not automaticlly die out when its domestic bird hosts were killed. WAS 4.250 13:49, 21 May 2006 (UTC)

Fatality rate amongst birds

Is there any way of knowing what proportion of infected birds are killed by the virus? I imagine it's a difficult question to answer (especially since there are thousands of different species of birds), but I'm curious. Has there been research done on chickens, for example? Just wondering. Harry R 07:53, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

The "highly pathogenic" part of the description {of this strain of this subtype (H5N1) of the species called avian flu virus} refers specifically to chickens. It kills close to 100% of chickens that are not vaccinated. It varies in other species of birds from near 100% also in turkeys to no known dead birds by it in other species. Pigeons can catch it, but they aren't dying mostly, so if you find a single dead pigeon and it checks positive for H5N1 how do you know if it was the H5N1 that killed it or something else? Roughly, the pathogenicity in bird species runs from near 100% to near 0 %. WAS 4.250 15:37, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

Somewhere in the 0-100% range? I could have come up with that for myself. :) Seriously, though, thanks for the info. Harry R 13:05, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

New report

This new report Fowl play: The poultry industry's central role in the bird flu crisis from GRAIN should be noted and added. I'll not do it myself as H5N1 isn't a subject I know a lot about - MPF 15:56, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

It should not be noted. It should not be added. It is ignorant lying bullshit without an ounce of scientific credibility. There are significant issues relating to the H5N1 evolution and China's poultry practices, but they are entirely conjectural so far, and this article doesn't address even one of the real issues. Further a proper addressing of the real issues would not go here but in articles on Poultry farming and Livestock vaccination. WAS 4.250 16:51, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
That's your POV, and you shouldn't impose it on the article. It is well referenced, and very detailed. By all means mention conflicting POVs, but wikipedia should reflect NPOV and cite all sides of the debate. - MPF 17:01, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
You say "H5N1 isn't a subject I know a lot about". On the other hand, H5N1 is a subject I do know a lot about. My assertion to you is that the references supplied by the article do not back up its major conclusion (because for several months now, I have literally read everything I could on the subject from the most reliable sources - the scientists doing the research). This is readily dealt with by not using this article as a source; but instead, using good sources (which you claim it uses; and at this point, I am not disputing; as what is a good source depends on the use to which it is put). Further, any real addressing of the issues would not go here but at Poultry farming and Livestock vaccination. It is neither censorship nor inappropriate to put data in the right Wikipedia article and to require a source to be trustworthy. This article may quote good sources, but it is not itself a good source. Blogs and the Recombinomics site (see the section with that name above) are also untrustworthy though they may themselves reference good sources. For more good sources than you can shake a stick at check out the on line links in the "Sources" and "Further reading" sections of H5N1. I've read them. I highly recommend them. WAS 4.250 17:58, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
The article advocates against commercial poultry. Some points may be valid, but are certainly cherrypicked and it doesnt consider any alternate explanation - just one argument after another (and not very well referenced, actually). It may be compelling reading but its not science. Unfortunately, advocacy groups are using the public interest in H5N1 as a "vector" for airing their own cause. If we see human to human transmission then expect this to increase 1000-fold. Dont fall for it. 66.236.150.178 20:30, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

Dead cat with H5N1 in Germany

Today they found H5N1 in a dead cat in Germany on the island Rügen.(heute-news 16:00)Stone 15:02, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

Maybe the cat that ate the canary. (gives the phrase a whole new meaning...) Istvan 15:07, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
See Global spread of H5N1#Tigers, leopards, domestic cats. Among other things it says "The spread to more and more types and populations of birds and the ability of cats to catch H5N1 from eating this natural prey means the creation of a reservoir for H5N1 in cats where the virus can adapt to mammals is one of the many possible pathways to a pandemic." People who say it really isn't a pandemic threat just don't know the facts. There are so many pathways to a pandemic and this is such a unique case in terms of its speed of mutation, cross species pathogenicity, and ability to be spread by wild birds that all the experts believe its a matter of time. And the bit about maybe the pandemic when it comes may not be H5N1 simply acknowledges the fact that a genetic shift can cause a virus of the H5N1 subtype to mutate into another even more deadly (to humans) other H5 or H7 subtype (the other H subtypes are not, so far, highly pathogenic). WAS 4.250 16:02, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

Bird cases confirmed in sweden

FYI several birds have been confirmed to carry the H5M1 virus. http://www.thelocal.se/article.php?ID=3187&date=20060303&PHPSESSID=3f96814948fdcb9df12916b8e570eff9 It would be good if someone familiar with this topic can check official sources and maybe utpdate the article. Sorry, I'm not too familiar with this virus but the article didn't say it wasn't confirmed to be the aggressive variant. I haven't myself read through the H5N1 article so the suffix N1 maybe tells that it's aggressive? Anyway H5 was confirmed. Maybe stick low with this for some days to see what it's really like. Aqualize 17:45, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Hi, Aqualize. Global spread of H5N1 is the article you are looking for. That's the encyclopedia article that is dealing with the latest spread data. All "aggressive" varients are H5 or H7 (the N# is not involved with this, basically). But not all H5 or H7 are aggressive (i.e. "high pathological" or "deadly"). Currently, ALMOST the ONLY "aggressive" avian flu is H5N1. So being H5 and being "aggressive" is close to 100% saying it is H5N1. WAS 4.250 20:19, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Link to H5N1 article on right side.

Is this supposed to redirect to the "Transmission and Infection of H5N1" article, or not? Shouldn't it just redirect to the main H5N1 article? 63.192.190.119 19:17, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

"H5N1" refers to a virus. "H5N1 flu" refers to a disease. The Wikipedia article entitled H5N1 is about the virus mostly; but it also introduces and links to articles related to the virus. The Wikipedia article H5N1 flu is a redirect to to the wikipedia article Transmission and infection of H5N1 because that is the Wikipedia article that is most about the illness that H5N1 causes. When the illness and the illness agent (e.g. virus) have too little content to warrent two seperate articles, both are often conflated into one article (e.g. H3N2 and Hong Kong Flu). WAS 4.250 19:51, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

spam spam spam spam spam

I just started a forum on H5N1. looks like this is going to be a huge problem soon... http://www.allaboutflu.com Trimmer56 04:43, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

Read WP:WWIN. WAS 4.250 11:07, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

Good Article Collaboration of the week

Three people agreed to make this article the Good Article Collaboration of the week [16]. WAS 4.250 02:41, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Help all you want but don't spam the article space. WAS 4.250 02:41, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Doesn't the tag go on the article page instead of the talk page? Homestarmy 14:42, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Comments for users go in article space. Comments for editors go in talk space. So this tag goes in talk space. WAS 4.250 20:53, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Ok, here's the way im seeing this, reading the FA nomination page for this, it looks like every single objection people raised has been fixed awhile ago, I don't see any external links and inline citations are everywhere, the 1997 thing has a source and is down there now, the intro doesn't appear to me to have any "usually" situations, it also seems to note why H5N1 is a concern, what are we supposed to be fixing? :/ Homestarmy 14:59, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Maybe help the whole series of H5N1 and flu articles go together better? Or pick the one that needs the most help? Or change the referencing style in H5N1 to [1]
  1. ^ this?

    2. WAS 4.250 20:53, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

    I think we're just supposed to be improving one article over the course of one week, the thing is our collaboration isn't very good yet, I don't even think anybody showed up for the first article :/. And for the refs, are you saying all the blue looking superscripts should turn purple via the ref thing? Homestarmy 21:53, 20 March 2006 (UTC)
    People who show up can help any way they want. As for the refs, it has nothing to do with the color of anything. I am talking about changing the referencing codes used from ones that have the referencing data seperated from what ir references to referencing codes (style) that allows the data to be next to what it references in the source yet shows up at the bottom during normal reading. This second style makes moving thing around easier. WAS 4.250 01:27, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

    No Human to Human infection

    I think the sentence "Most humans known to have become infected had a lot of physical contact with infected birds, or, rarely, an infected relative" should be reworded so it is clear that H5N1 is not (yet) human-to-human transmittable. Or in other words, a infected human cannot infect another human by e.g. sneezing at him. (Should H5N1 mutate to a strain that is Human-to-Human transmittable, things will become very ugly very fast - see Spanish Flu) CharonX 21:47, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

    We keep trying. What you see is our best effort to achieve the objective you indicated. Perhaps you'd like to try your hand at it? WAS 4.250 01:29, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

    -This is not verifiable, but apparently there have been 7 cases of human to human transmission in China, and a cover-up, resulting in +- 5 medical officials being jailed. I would not expect news like this to be easily verifiable.

    H5N1 virus structure

    Avian influenza viruses have 10 genes on eight separate RNA molecules (called: PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M, and NS)?? Is this technically correct?? Avian influenza viruses have only 8 genes on 8 segments encoding for 10 proteins. Some genes encode for 2 proteins using different reading frames. May be we can use the genetics part from Influenzavirus_A#Genetics. It is well written there. Also, isn't better to arrange genes(& their proteins) according to their actual arrangement on the segments i.e. first, Pb2 which is encoded by segment 1 then Pb1 encoded by segment 2 and so on? Please refer to Figure 2 and table 1 on [17] or [18]. If there is no objection i'll rewrite it. --Wedian 23:35, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

    It is accurate as it stands, and the organization is functional. Please don't rewrite it. Please feel free to add sourced data. Maybe how "gene" can mean different things so some sources call it "10 genes" and others call it "8 genes"? WAS 4.250 01:40, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

    About risk of pandemic

    "In 2004, scientists pointed out that the avian influenza virus might undergo an antigenic shift with the human flu virus and cause a global influenza pandemic like the one in 1918." (from Antigenic shift).The condition for that is there to be an epidemic as the one of influenza type A concomitant with infection of the birds (H5N1 virus). Berton 18:24, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

    No. There are many possible pathways to a flu pandemic. WAS 4.250 19:01, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

    Then which are they? Berton 19:40, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
    To have a flu pandemic several distinct phases must happen. H5N1's next phase is easy person to person transmition, which is what both our comments are about. After that occurs, it is theoretically possible to stop it before it becomes an epidemic, or if that opportunity is missed, to stop the epidemic before it becomes a pandemic. It is widely believed by the experts that it will not be possible to prevent any of these phases from occuring with H5N1, but if we are lucky enough to delay it for a few years, we might come up with a solution (eg flu vaccine).
    Now to the issue of what are the possible pathways for easy person to person transmission of a deadly flu virus like H5N1. First H5N1 is just one of the many subtypes of the species influenza A virus. Any one of them can combine with each other or with different varient genotypes within its own subtype creating new varients, any one of which could become a pandemic strain. We know enough about the genetics to know what stains to fear most (H5 and H7 subtypes) and we know what genetic factors make a flu virus a human virus (ie easily passed human to human); so we know H5N1 is the biggest pandemic threat of all the stains in circulation and we know it is only one antigenic shift mutation or a couple of antigenic drift mutations from changing from being an avian flu virus to a human flu virus (when it does this it may or may not still be in the H5N1 subtype). Both the drift and the shift can happen in any infected animal and then be passed to a human and spread like wildfire. The most likely shift scenerio is for the shift to occur in humans or pigs (but it could occur in cats). To aquire the needed mutation through drift, it simply has to continue being an epidemic in birds long enough for the mutations to occur and then be passed to a human. It appears H5N1 isn't going away. It probably already did mutate to a human flu virus in some bird somewhere, but without being passed to a human, it is outcompeted inside the bird populations and dies out. WAS 4.250 20:53, 22 March 2006 (UTC)~
    Thank you very much for the explanations. Berton 21:07, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

    Why h5n1 does not spread easily human to human

    As to why - in headline news on ctv.ca - two studies, one published today in Nature and one to be published online tomorrow in Science have revealed the following:
    Scientists have provided a clue as to why a virus so deadly to birds doesn't pass easily from person to person. The H5N1 strain of bird flu lodges itself too deeply in the respiratory tract of humans to be easily expelled by coughing and sneezing. University of Wisconsin-Madison virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka and a team from Japan reported the finding in Thursday's issue of the journal Nature. A similar study from the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, will be published online Thursday by the journal Science. "What (scientists) have been able to do is find out that the H5N1 virus, when it attacks humans, goes deep into the lungs . . . like a pneumonia," explained CTV's medical correspondent Avis Favaro, "whereas the normal flu attaches to cells up closer towards the throat and the mouth, where it's more easily coughed up."
    I don't know enough about the virus to feel comfortable adding this info, but I thought you folks might want to know about the recent information.....DonaNobisPacem 05:43, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
    I read a while back that easy transmission human to human would require nasal infection rather than lung infection, so this is not news.
    To be easily transmissible human to human it is believed that the PB2 polymerase position 627 must have a lysine and H5N1 does while no other avian flu virus does (but all human flu viruses do).
    To be easily transmissible human to human it is believed that the hemagglutinin must bind alpha 2-6 sialic acid receptors, which it doesn't - yet. When it does, it is expected to be easily transmissible person to person. WAS 4.250 06:57, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
    This story reports that there is already one H5N1 strain that can attach to both 2-3 and 2-6 receptors. -- Avenue 10:48, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
    The genotype of that isolate (Hong Kong/213/03 or HK/213/03) is called Z+. It died out so far as anyone is saying. [19] [20] [21] A vaccine was made from it using reverse genetics. [22] China told some tall tales about possible human deaths from this geneotype, so maybe it didn't die out in China. WHO WHO WHO WHO WAS 4.250 14:19, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

    None the less, I disbelieve "Only one H5N1 strain--A/Hong Kong/213/03--showed the ability to latch onto either type of receptor and thus gain such access." from here because this says "Amino acid residues at positions 226 and 228 of the receptor binding pocket of HA1 appear to determine binding affinity to cell surface receptors and to influence the selective binding of the virus to avian (sialic acid -2,3-NeuAcGal) or human (sialic acid -2,6-NeuAcGal) cell surface receptors. The human A/HK/212/03 and A/HK/213/03 isolates retain the signature associated with avian receptor binding, but they have a unique amino acid substitution (Ser227Ile) within the receptor binding pocket that was not present even in the closely related A/Gs/HK/739.2/02 (genotype Z+) virus. Although the biological significance of this change is unclear, a Ser-to-Ile substitution at this position has been shown (16) to alter the virulence of human H5N1/97 viruses in mice. Interestingly, the A/HK/213/03 and A/Gs/HK/739.2/02 showed markedly different pathogenicity in mice." WAS 4.250 14:40, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

    cous someone change the locations of where bird flu is, as the UK had just confirmed it has found a swan with HN51.

    Images

    Apparently User:WAS 4.250 has asserted ownership of this page, and I am not allowed to edit it, unless I make a full explanation here first. So, here goes:

    This article's layout has several problems:

    1. Wikipedia:Infobox templates states that infoboxes should be inserted at the top of the article, however in this article the infobox has been pushed down by an image, which creates confusion and pushes important information that we want readily available out of view.
    2. In order to put the infobox at the top, I moved the map to a different section.
    3. Image #1841 (the colorized transmission electron micrograph of H5N1) is displayed twice, once in the infobox, and once below. We only need to display this image once.
    4. Wikinews templates are typically placed at the end or beginning of an article, not in the middle. I moved this so it was directly under the infobox, a fairly standard position. - - - unsigned by User:Hetar
    1. I don't "own" the page.
    2. I object to your gratuitous insult.
    3. I have as much a right to delete as you do to add.
    4. The issue is what is best for the article, not ownership.
    5. Insults are a poor way to begin a conversation.
    6. I believe the map belongs at the top regardless of what Wikipedia:Infobox templates says.
    7. We don't need to display an image twice but the image with the box doesn't have a description, so it's not the same thing twice. Do you have a better image for the box?
    8. The wikinews box was put where it seemed most applicable, although this is debateable. Why do you feel it is better placed somewhere else? Where it is "typically" placed is not relevant. What counts is what works best for this article, and maybe you can provide a fresh eye for that. WAS 4.250 04:33, 6 April 2006 (UTC)


    1. I don't "own" the page.
    Reverting my change without explanation, and then when I asked for a reason replying, "You changed MY work before I changed yours. Explain yourself on the talk page please." when I made changes to the whole article, implies that you own the article. Stipulating that I explain edits on the talk page before I make them implies ownership, you made that implication, not me. --Hetar 05:24, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    1. I object to your gratuitous insult.
    2. I have as much a right to delete as you do to add.
    Of course, but WP:CIVIL would seem to indicate that you should at least attempt to explain a wholesale revert of another editor's changes. --Hetar 05:24, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    1. The issue is what is best for the article, not ownership.
    2. Insults are a poor way to begin a conversation.
    3. I believe the map belongs at the top regardless of what Wikipedia:Infobox templates says.
    Is there a reason behind this? Does the map provide more comprehensive info than the infobox? --Hetar 05:24, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    1. We don't need to display an image twice but the image with the box doesn't have a description, so it's not the same thing twice. Do you have a better image for the box?
    The image is obviously of H5N1 - if readers need a more detailed explanation, they can simply click on the image. --Hetar 05:24, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    1. The wikinews box was put where it seemed most applicable, although this is debateable. Why do you feel it is better placed somewhere else? Where it is "typically" placed is not relevant. What counts is what works best for this article, and maybe you can provide a fresh eye for that. WAS 4.250 04:33, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    On the contrary, where it is typically placed is very relevant, because users who are looking for specific types of information (in this case news) will look there, and should be able to quickly and easily find it without having to read the whole article. --Hetar 05:24, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    • This map is there to inform, while this box is there to provide links to related articles - informing the reader to go there if they are looking for that.
    Everything in the infobox relates directly to the article's subject. It gives access to a broad range of information about H5N1 while the map provides a pretty image. --Hetar 07:07, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    • How can they know what will happen if they click? Maybe no data. Why should they have to click? They shouldn't have to. The same logic can be used to hide any and all data. And click what if you delete the image they are supposed to click? You aren't making sense.
    The image in the infobox is clickable - and again, there isn't any crucial information in its little caption. It's a natural reaction that if you want more info on an image, you click on it. One additional link for non-essential content is not a big deal, however a confusing/nonstandard layout is much worse.--Hetar 07:07, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
    From Wikipedia:Sister projects, "Links to sister projects are best placed in the actual section of the article that they relate to. (Such as, for examples: next to any discussion of quotations for a link to Wikiquote, or next to the event that they source for a link to Wikinews.) Otherwise, they are usually placed in the External links section (not the "See also" section)." --Hetar 07:07, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

    Third opinion: Frankly, I have to say that I agree with most of Hetar's points. The infoboxes and images, quite frankly, look a mess just now; that's why we have standards, so that they are where you expect them to be, and don't jar. The map's probably better off in the global spread section, and we certainly don't need the image in the infobox twice. Perhaps reducing the size of a couple of the other images would help, too. --Scott Wilson 09:36, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

    OK, let's vote on it. Vote open. It's two to one. I lose. Vote closed. You two implement your victory. Go for it. :) WAS 4.250 16:04, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

    Woah, I just moved the images around in my edit on April 3, 2006 because I remembered reading somewhere (I tried to find that page just know but I couldn't) that images should alternate left and right on the page to make it more interesting and easier to read, and also that way the images don't get all stacked up on the right the way they were. I didn't know this would cause such a problem :). In general, I think if there is no official guideline for whatever the problem is, then it's up to the individuals themselves to format the page the way they want. And we're all individuals, so remember, diff'rent strokes for different folks. If you like something one way, make it so. If somebody wants it more, then turn to him the other cheek, that's what I say :) J. Finkelstein 21:04, 6 April 2006 (UTC)


    Factory Farm v Migratory Birds as Vectors

    A reference was removed to this study suggesting that industrial poultry operations - not migrating birds - are the main vector for transmission of avian flu: http://grain.org/briefings/?id=194

    The Lancet (Vol 6, April 2006, in Leading Edge) has picked up the story and backs the GRAIN study. Here is some relevant, and important, text:

    Since mid-2005, the Food and Agriculture Organisation(FAO) and WHO have given wide prominence to the theory that migratory birds are carrying the H5N1 virus and infecting poultry fl ocks in areas that lie along their migratory route. Indeed, this is probably how the virus reached Europe. Unusually cold weather in the wetlands near the Black Sea, where the disease is now entrenched, drove migrating birds, notably swans, much further west than usual. But despite extensive testing of wild birds for the disease, scientists have only rarely identifi ed live birds carrying bird flu in a highly pathogenic form, suggesting these birds are not efficient vectors of the virus. Furthermore, the geographic spread of the disease does not correlate with migratory routes and seasons. The pattern of outbreaks follows major road and rail routes, not fl yways.
    Far more likely to be perpetuating the spread of the virus is the movement of poultry, poultry products, or infected material from poultry farms—eg, animal feed and manure. But this mode of transmission has been down-played by international agencies, who admit that migratory birds are an easy target since nobody is to blame. However, GRAIN, an international, non-governmental organisation that promotes the sustainable management and use of agricultural biodiversity, recently launched a critical report titled Fowl play: the poultry industry’s central role in the bird fl u crisis. GRAIN points a finger at the transnational poultry industry as fuelling the epidemic. Over the years, large concentrations of (presumably stressed) birds have facilitated an increased affinity of the virus to chickens and other domestic poultry, with an increase in pathogenicity. Since the 1980s, the intensification of chicken production in eastern Asia has gained momentum, changing the whole dynamic of avian influenza viruses in the southern China epicentre, which has had far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world.

    The Lancet story can be found here (subscription only): http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/section?volume=6&issue=4&section=Leading+Edge Mackinaw 11:56, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

    I moved it to the H5N1 impact article in its Political sub-section. Feel free to add to it. Don't worry about proportions, as when and if it gets too big it can be split off into a seperate article. Just don't delete anything that is sourced. Feel free to spin it differently than I have, just try to be NPOV and always supply a neutral source or else clearly identify the source's biases. WAS 4.250 16:59, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
    Hmm. The issue is a scientific one, not political (though it does have political implications). GRAIN comes from a political perspective, of course, but their evidence for their claims are scientific - ie studying infection routes, which correlate with transport networks (rail & road) and not migratory paths. If GRAIN is a political group, so they are POV; but when Lancet, a (perhaps the) leading global medical journal agree that the focus on migratory birds as a vector is probably spurious, then it would indicate an issue here more than just spin, but rather science. that is: what are the causes of the outbreak; and what are the vectors of transmission? I guess the wikipedia article does focus on both, so fair enough, but the issue of virus spreading routes (human transport networks and not migratory paths) seem to me of relvance in this article, not on the politics page. Mackinaw 18:54, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
    The best scientific evidence is that migratory birds play a part but no one has data on whether it is a small or large part. Any statements saying to ignore the migratory bird transmission path is political not scientific, as there is no scientific data to back up such a claim. The spurious claim that "most" transmission is not migratory is beside the point since most transmission is within countries not between countries and the issue of world-wide spread is an issue of between borders and between continents. A migratory bird just needs to cross a border once and nonmigratory bird transmission can spread it from there. The migratory bird issue was about can we contain it to south east asia or not and with knowledge that wild ducks wee transmitting it , it was clear to scientists that it could not be contained, only delayed. They were right. WAS 4.250 20:13, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

    October 2004: Researchers discover H5N1 is far more dangerous than previously believed. "In the past, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry began following the primary introduction of a virus, of low pathogenicity, probably carried by a wild bird. The virus then required several months of circulation in domestic poultry in order to mutate from a form causing very mild disease to a form causing highly pathogenic disease, with a mortality approaching 100%. Only viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes are capable of mutating to cause highly pathogenic disease. In the present outbreaks, however, asymptomatic domestic ducks can directly introduce the virus, in its highly pathogenic form, to poultry flocks."WHO Limiting this conclusion to domestic waterfowl proved to be wishful thinking, as in later months it became clear that nondomestic waterfowl were also directly spreading the highly pathogenic strain of H5N1 to chickens, crows, pigeons, and other birds and that it was increasing its ability to infect mammals as well. From this point on, avian flu experts increasingly refer to containment as a strategy that can delay but not prevent a future avian flu pandemic. November 2004: The U.S.'s National Institutes of Health's (NIH) National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases's (NIAID) Influenza Genome Sequencing Project to provide complete sequence data for selected human and avian influenza isolates begins.Nature article: "Race against time" from Global spread of H5N1 WAS 4.250 20:18, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

    OK makes sense. One point though - cross-border transmission *has* been linked to transport of domestic chickens, eg Nigerian imports of day-old chicks from China & Turkey (ref: same Lancet article).Mackinaw 16:38, 9 April 2006 (UTC)
    Yes. And not just live poultry. Check out Environmental survival at Transmission and infection of H5N1 and you'll see why everything from frozen chicken to chickenshit (or even things just contaminated with chickenshit) are potential sources of spread. Chickenfeathers from chickens that died weeks ago can carry live H5N1! Trucks must get their tires decomtaminated when moving from an H5N1 contaminated area. Also I read that some chicken farms' chickenshit is used as food for fish farms where migrating ducks frequent picking up the H5N1 from the shit (this example was from China, but other countries probably do this too). It's all interwoven and pointing a finger at one piece of the puzzle and saying ignore that piece is not helpful but is merely propaganda. WAS 4.250 17:46, 9 April 2006 (UTC)
    agreed. though the worry is if there's not enough finger-pointing at major source of problems, which is propaganda of a different kind. but the wikipedia article seems to cover all bases, so that's not a worry here - though it does seem to be a problem in most media coverage. Mackinaw 19:03, 9 April 2006 (UTC)

    Structural problems

    Hi, this article has a lot of potential but IMO the structure is problematic (I may have temporarily worsened this w/my edits from 4/10/06, sorry). The article is not about flu viruses in general, orthomyxoviruses, other influenza pandemics, the Spanish flu, etc. It is about a particular subtype of a virus, which is known to cause "bird flu" and which is considered a major pandemic threat. The article should open with (1) what h5n1 is (a subtype of the species influenza A virus), (2) what the structure is (basic info about capsid, proteins, etc). (3) what it does (infect lots of birds everywhere and some people, (4) why it matters (global risk), and (5) what can be done (treatment & preparation). That's my view, anyway. I will make an effort to pare down the extraneous information, as long as consensus agrees with this. Kaisershatner 18:50, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

    Go for it! WAS 4.250 19:04, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
    Thanks. I think that's a pretty good first pass. Expect some continued copyedits but I think the major structure is in better order now. Kaisershatner 20:17, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

    OK. It is now much better than it was. Anybody have ideas for making this or related articles even better? Or do we continue improving as the muse moves us? WAS 4.250 16:38, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

    I still feel that there are some structural problems with the article. I actually came across this article while looking at the featured article list, and is one of the points that I was going to raise before deciding to work a little on the article first (BTW, I don't feel that it is comprehensive enough to be a FA just yet, but it is almost there). I would suggest Reorganising the article structure so that the epidmiology of natural H5N1 infection comes just after the introduction. Within this subsection the prevalence of H5N1 infection in the wild, routes of transmission, cross-species transmission (including frequency, restriction factors and clinical outcome) can be discussed. Then we move on to virology of H5N1. Briefly, orthomyxoviruses, the genomic organsiation, phylogenetic clusters, reassortment and mutation, co-receptor usage and dynamics of viral replication may be discussed. Then we can go onto the immunological features which would include pathology and symptoms in both humans and birds. Cats and ferrets should also have a mention here as they are the prime animal model for invectigation of the virus. Then go onto the macroeconomic impact of the possible pandemic and the current situation. At the moment, there is substantial repitition within the article, which, I feel, is a result of the current structure. What do people think? --Bob 20:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

    We just had a major reorganization by someone else in which H5N1 genetic structure and Flu research were spun off by me. I'm sure the article will be better after you complete your proposed rereorganization, but I would like to be reassured that you've read the sister H5N1 and Flu articles (the ones in those templates) and would recommend implementing your proposed rereorganization in steps others can follow rather than too much all at once. Seem sensible? WAS 4.250 21:29, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

    Of course. I won't be implementing too much at one point, and I doubt I'll have time to do that much soon, but rest assured, I will read around the subject on Wikipedia like I did for the HIV and AIDS articles. --Bob 21:35, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
    That's exactly the reassurance I was looking for. WAS 4.250 00:41, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

    Praise

    Congrats! —Encephalon 21:13, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

    Up to date?

    I haven't heard anything on the Bird Flu in quite some time on the news, and while it's obviously still out there, I was wondering if it simmered down a little or if people just lost interest in it? But being as the article says people are (the general public) 'stockpiling food stores' etc., makes me think this article is a little out of date; if it isn't, than it should at least reflect that many people have kind of put it out of their minds or something to that extent. This should be particularly important if it is being considered for Featured Status. - A.J. 23:09, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

    Supply an unbiased source. WAS 4.250 00:36, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

    "Human pandemic" and other changes

    I've made a number of smallish changes which should be self-explanatory; for example, adding Relenza, which appears to be similar in effectiveness to Tamiflu. A specific point which was questioned was my changing "pandemic" to "human pandemic". While the added adjective is clearly redundant, it is not incorrect. My reason for adding it: H5N1 is very much in the news, and this article is likely to be seen by many people. At As of mid-April 2006, there H5N1 has become worrying widespread in avian populations (i.e., birds). The non-expert can easily think of this as a pandemic. Even if the difference is explained elsewhere in the article, I think that it makes sense to spell out that "the human pandemic remains only a potential".

    I changed "at present" to "As of April 2006". The phrase can be updated, or a specific day added, as required. This is an encyclopaedia, a work of reference, to be read at any time. While this article is probably, in practice, updated frequently, there are a lot of articles using "currently" or "at oresent" to refer to out-of-date information.

    All the changes I made are sensible, neither vandalistic nor outrageous, even if there may be disagreement (which I didn't expect in this straightforward case). Please comment or Talk before reverting. Remember that "we are doing here. We are building a free encyclopedia for every single person on the planet. We are trying to do it in an atmosphere of fun, love, and respect for others" etc.

    Pol098 09:22, 19 April 2006 (UTC)

    My opinion of your edits:

    • As of April 2006, is best deleted. This could be added to every sentence. There is no point for it to be here in particular.
    • but no obvious contact with birds is not true
    • human pandemic implies there is another kind of pandemic, thus misinforms by implication
    • and zanamivir (commercially marketed by GlaxoSmithKline as Relenza is not especially relevant and is better dealy with elsewhere ; H5N1 flu for example
    • In Britain it was reported in October 2005 that the government was to order 120 million doses of Tamiflu[23]. The government forecasts about 50,000 deaths, but warns that 700,000 are possible is an inadequate and misrepresentative overview of UK pandemic preperations. WAS 4.250 16:54, 19 April 2006 (UTC)
    Some of the above has become moot, as other changes have been made to the article, improving it. By the way, As of April 2006 may not have belonged there, but it was less bad than the today which it replaced, which should be avoided in a work of reference as distinct from news. The present text avoids both. I don't see why Tamiflu is relevant and Relenza isn't; they seem to be about equally effective. Re preparations in Britain, I think you have better information than I do; perhaps you could add brief information? As other people are contributing and will presumably see this, I'll leave it to them to reinstate Relenza or not. Pol098 23:26, 19 April 2006 (UTC)
    They are very definitely not equally effective.
    The pandemic preparations section is merely an intro/overview of a sister article and should not single out the UK anymore than California, Texas or France. The EU does deserve a paragraph, tho. The rest of the world simply is not making noteable preparations other than through international organizations (which are already mentioned in the subsection). Sometimes I think China wants a flu pandemic, the way it behaves; but the section is about preparing against a pandemic, not preparations for creating one, so its efforts in that regard don't go here. WAS 4.250 18:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)


    He said, she said

    At the moment there are a little too many direct quotations for my liking. These should be summarised and linked to. Ideas? --Bob 20:37, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

    I far prefer quotes, but everyone else has your point of view on this issue, so you should feel free to summarize and link. I'll hate it, but everyone else will love it. WAS 4.250 21:22, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

    Conspiracy theories

    I have read many sites claiming that the bird flu is just a mass panic started by Roche to sell lots of medicine for high profits, there should be a section about these rumours too. Lapinmies 23:01, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

    See the last section of this article and that section's main article H5N1 impact. Please provide encyclopedic sources for "mass panic started by Roche" so it can be added to H5N1 impact. WAS 4.250 02:02, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
    Negative. Lapinmies 22:09, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
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