Talk:Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus/Archive 5

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"Political, not religious"

Arif Jamal writes:

Interestingly, Jamat-i-Islami considers September 1989, the day the Hizbul Mujahideen was founded, as the beginning of the insurgency.

By this time, there was a recognizable Hizbul Mujahideen (which was formed by the merger of existing Islamist groups).

Jamal also says:

By early 1990, the ISI had cut off all funds to the JKLF.

Amanullah Khan said:

Khan, who lives in the Pakistani capital, said the agreement ran succesfully until the ISI floated its own organisatons and interfered in our affairs." "In early 1990 we realised that ISI was no longer supporing our ideology of an idependent Kashmir and were pursuing it own agenda, so it came to an end.

Ashfaq Majid Wani, the leader of JKLF, was killed on 30 March 1990. (Before this, he had apparently gave orders to Bitta Karate to kill some 20 odd Pandits.) Yasin Malik and Hamid Sheikh were arrested soon afterwards. This was basically the end of JKLF.

So it is not at all clear that this was a "political, not religious" movement at the time of the Pandit exodus.

The paradox of political Islam can be found in Kashmir as well: nationalist leadership employed Islamic slogans instrumentally to mobilize the population and inspire them to victory, but empowered radical players with more serious Islamic aspirations at the same time. ... the internal impetus for Islamization came from Islamist groups like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Ansarul Islam before the insurgency), Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT), and the Islamic Students League (ISL). At a press conference in March 1980, the leader of the IJT, Shaikh Tajamul Islam, vowed to establish an Islamic state in Jammu and Kashmir, and in August 1980, announced he would work toward an Iranian-style Islamic revolution. The group's overall aim was to keep the freedom struggle rooted in Islam. IJT remained at the center stage of Islamist politics until 1989 and then converted itself to the Mahaz-e-Azadi to accommodate more of the Muslim population. The group believed in Jammu and Kashmir's integration with Pakistan for the short term, but really wanted to establish a pan-Islamic state.[28: Jamal 2009, p.119]

The Islamic Student League, by the way, what became the JKLF in the valley. They had put on a veneer of secular nationalism but they were Islamist at the core. Praveen Swami writes:

Even the JKLF's notion of independence was theocratic in nature: one popular slogan from early 1990s, Behera records, was “Azadi ka matlab kya? La Illahi il-Allah!” [What is the meaning of freedom? It means there is no god but God]. Similarly, as I have noted in the previous chapter, the notion of azadi, or independence, was often twinned with that of the Nizam-e-Mustafa or Islamic state.

Knowledgeable people would recognize the slogan as an adapation of that of Muslim League in the 1940s: Pakistan ka matlab kya? La Illahi il-Allah!. The slogan was also heard by the India Today in January 1990.

Snedden also records these slogans:

However, by 19–20 January 1990, according to one Pandit, the communal situation had worsened. Loudspeakers in Srinagar blared 'threatening' pro-Islamic, anti-India and anti-Pandit slogans before many of his intimidated community fled the Kashmir Valley.[134] These slogans included: 'Eliminate every Indian'; 'Pray to God for the elimination of Kafirs [non-believers]!'; Kashmir mein rahna hai to Allah, Allah Kahna hai (one desirous of living in Kashmir will have to espouse Islam); 'Either mix or leave, otherwise we shall annihilate you'; … Yahan kya Chalega – Nizam-e-Mustafa (It will be only Nizam-e-Mustafa here).[135] The next day, 'Slogans denouncing the police, India and calling for “Azadi” were raised'.[136] 'Facing homelessness, the Hindu community regarded aazadi as an exclusory slogan.'[137]

There is no way that Nizam-e-Mustafa is a political, not religious slogan. In fact, it appears to be a Jamaati slogan:

Some of the rural elite supported the Jamaat-i-Islami as a link with the wider international Muslim community and supported Jamaat's mission to create a Nizam-i-Mustafa or Islamic state in Kashmir.

For the Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, this platform was not new: the organization had long argued that faith made imperative the Nizam-e-Mustafa, the state as the Prophet Mohammad had envisaged it.

This is a clear indication that JKLF was not in control already in January 1990 (or even if it was in control, it was following the Jamaaati ideology). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:27, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

Sumit Ganguly, the author of 'The Crisis in Kashmir' CUP [1], has refered it as 'ethno-religious insurgency' -[2]

In the early hours of March 24, A group of armed men dressed in Indian Army fatigues entered the mountain village of Nadimarg, in Indian-controlled Kashmir. They ordered the village’s Hindu inhabitants out of their houses, and then shot those who complied, 24 of 52 villagers, including several women and children. The attack was only the latest in a series of massacres of innocent civilians, especially Hindus, since the eruption of an ethno-religious insurgency in Kashmir in 1989.

More -[3]

Apart from the Siachen Glacier conflict, Indo-Pakistani relations were also deeply strained as a consequence of the ourbreak of an indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir in December 1989.

Akshaypatill (talk) 05:20, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

Some more from 'Deadly Impasse, CUP.' [4]

In December I989, an indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency erupted in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The internal dimensions of this crisis, like that in the Punjab, also stemmed primarily from various shortcomings in India's federal order. The incipient peace process that Bhutto, along with her Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, had initiated was now placed in jeopardy. The abrupt onset of the rebellion in Indian-controlled Kashmir effectively ended these nascent discussions. Shortly thereafter the insurgency threatened to spin out of control as Indian authorities proved wholly incapable of coping with it. Within the year of the outbreak of the insurgency, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) worked assiduously to transform it from a grassroots uprising into a well-orchestrated, religiously inspired and externally supported extortion racket.

Akshaypatill (talk) 06:09, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

Tangential

It is true that the JKLF was not secular in quite the way as say a Nehru, a Subhas Bose, a Bhagat Singh, a Christopher Hitchens or Stephen Hawking was, but then neither is Narendra Modi, neither were most people who helped draft the Constitution of India Most Hindus in India, if you asked them whether they believed in Darwin would laugh in your face. They wouldn't have propped up the caste system for 2,500 years if they truly believed in "We bear in our bodily frame the indelible stamp of our lowly origin" (Darwin's ending words in The Descent of Man). Endogamy (marrying within caste) is gloriously alive and well in modern India. I will add something more in a minute, once I wake up. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:13, 24 March 2022 (UTC) Kautilya3: Well, from long before the Hindu nationalist high noon in India, secularly-minded Indians which have included their secularly-minded leaders, have sung, Vande Mataram Bankim Chandra's ode to a maternal country with distinctly religious overtones (Thou art Goddess Durga, Lady and Queen, With her hands that strike and her swords of sheen, Thou art Goddess Kamala (Lakshmi), lotus-throned, And Goddess Vani (Saraswati),..." much more than they have Tarana-i-Hindi, Iqbal's secular Song of India, much less grandiose ("Religion does not teach us to bear animosity among ourselves We are of Hind, our homeland is Hindustan. ... We have no confidant in this world What does anyone know of our hidden pain" which shorn of its pathos, they have relegated to a marching song. For that matter, they have sung Tagore's Bharoto Bhagya Bidhata (with faintly religious but also faintly vacuous overtones, "Wake up listening to Your auspicious name, ask for Your auspicious blessings, And sing to Your glorious victory. Oh! You who impart well being to the people, victory be to You, dispenser of the destiny of India!) more than they have recited his secular and much more nationally-meaningful "Where the mind is without fear." whether in Bengali, Hindi, or English (Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls; ... Into that heaven of freedom, my Father let my country awake"). In north India, Hindus have said, "Namaskar," or "Namaste" which have religious meaning (since they are also used in prayer) more than they have said Adaab, Salaam, the secular greetings of Hindustani language or more than they hugged or shook hands. They have lit many-tiered temple lamps in the opening ceremonies of secular institutions more often than they have cut ribbons. They have greeted Bill Clinton with a tilak applied to the forehead, which is what they also apply to the foreheads of their deity of choice in the home temple. They have launched ships by breaking a coconut, which is also a daily ritual in the temple. When their written language is at a loss for words, they have borrowed from Sanskrit a liturgical language, rather than Persian (a secular language that has been used in the expansion of Urdu). Ostensibly secular Indians display Hindu forms of worship (offering flowers and garlands, bowing low in a prayerful gesture of folding hands, doing "parikrama" (walking around the deity; "Typically, in Indic-religions the parikrama is done after completion of traditional worship (puja) and after paying homage to the deity.) at memorials of India's secular heroes such as Mahatma Gandhi, Bhagat Singh or Subhas Chandra Bose? Why should a visiting foreign dignitary be made to circle Gandhi's cremation spot? If a visitor from Mars had appeared on India, they'd judge it as a spectacularly "Hinduist" nation, nowhere near being secular. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:46, 24 March 2022 (UTC) Thanks for the grand display of whataboutery. Unfortunately this article isn't about the credibility of India's secularism, Vande Mataram, Saare Jahaan Se Acha, Jana Gana Mana, the caste system or India's treatmemt of foreign dignitaries. It is about the Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. UnpetitproleX (talk) 09:33, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

That is why it is important to use scholarly assessments. I am happy to add cites to that sentence. There is already one from Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf's A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge University Press, which states: " The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives." This is a book read around the world, an impeccable WP:TERTIARY source ("Many introductory undergraduate-level textbooks are regarded as tertiary sources because they sum up multiple secondary sources. Policy: Reliable tertiary sources can help provide broad summaries of topics that involve many primary and secondary sources and may help evaluate due weight" with 850 Google Scholar citations. I know I shouldn't be repeating these banalities to you, but they nonetheless bear remembering. I will now add some cites that address the issue of "secular" in the context of early 1990. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:53, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: OK, I get that JKLF's public persona (which is what the Pandits apprehended) was not determinedly secular. They obviously engaged in targeted violence. But then we can't make the description only about what was apprehended. They were nowhere near being Islamicist, as the sources I have now added assert. They did not shun violence (but then either did Lenin or Mao or Che). How about

"The Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, who are also called "Kashmiri Pandits," is their en masse migration, or large-scale flight, from the predominantly Muslim Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir in early 1990 in the wake of incidents of targeted violence in a separatist uprising which had generally secular-nationalist antecedents and generally political goals?"

There is plenty support in the sources for that formulation. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:27, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: You have incompletely quoted Sneddon. He is not talking about those incidents in his voice, but giving them as examples of Pandit and Indian perceptions. This he also says:

Yahan kya Chalega – Nizam-e-Mustafa’ (It will be only Nizam-e-Mustafa here).135 The next day, ‘Slogans denouncing the police, India and calling for “Azadi” were raised’.136 ‘Facing homelessness, the Hindu community regarded aazadi as an exclusory slogan.’ Such anti-Pandit sentiments and slogans while despicable, may have been overstated. According to one commentator, the ‘available evidence’ suggested that such ‘allegations’ were ‘largely though not entirely, a potpourri of fabrication and exaggeration’. This was not then, and is not now, the perception of many Kashmiri Pandits

Before that he prefaces his accounts by pointing out that the Indian press is not reliable:

In my research, I have rarely seen the Indian press explain or discuss in any great detail the term azadi, and the Kashmiris’ widespread usage of this highly popular term. This subject, it seems, is taboo. ... Surprisingly, neither the terms azadi nor independence appear in this list (although the more amorphous term ‘freedom’ does). Similarly, apart from regularly reading about the deaths of militants killed in ‘incidents’ or ‘encounters’ in J&K, we rarely get to read what dissident Kashmiris want for their region or about their (invariably anti-India) aspirations. Rather, most, but not all, reporters working in the Indian press generally have toed India’s strongly, often paternalistic, line on Kashmir and Kashmiris.

That hardly bodes well for using Indian press as sources for the Kashmir issue. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:55, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: I have to thank you for your posts and for your immaculate attention to detail. I believe I have made the formulation more precise in light of your criticism and of the sources. I have now changed the phrasing to make it much more precise. I have changed it to "in the wake of incidents of targeted violence in an uprising with generally secular antecedents and the predominant goal of political independence," added new citations, and removed the POV tag. Thanks again. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:33, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Fowler&fowler, I can live with that wording for the time being. Thanks.

On the issue of the Indian press coverage, I agree that they don't use termrs like "Azadi", but note that we don't regard as an NPOV term either. It might get called "separatism" in Indian press, a concept that has been well-known since the 1950s (and not only in the context of Kashmir). I think most Indians equate "Azadi" with "Poorna Swaraj", but the idea that it could have other meanings is being discussed now, perhaps not by news reporters but certainly in the op-eds and books. We can thank JNU students for bringing it to the fore. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:01, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: I just understood the sentence about JNU. That is a funny one Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:53, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Not funny at all. It was genuine. And JNU was defended in the Rajya Sabha by a Kashmiri politician called "Azad". That might be the funny part. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:12, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

That is funny. In my earlier reply, I should have said, "That was ironic." I meant the the idea that India's Second War of Independence (from its own worst instincts) might be inspired by Kashmir's First War of Independence. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:27, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Azad defending Azadi. I lived upto my surname. :) Akshaypatill (talk) 17:30, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

After the Kathmandu meeting (14 January 1990), Arif Jamal adds a poignant sentence:

The Jamat-i-Islami leadership now moved on to decisive action, activating a decade of planning.

The "decade of planning" comes from the fact that it was in 1980 that Zia ul-Haq first sent feelers to the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir to raise an armed insurgecy. In 1983, the Jamaat chief Maulana Saaduddin Tarabali agreed with Zia to send youth for arms training. So, plans were made from that time, but Jamaat was afraid to act. Now, in January 1990, it was put into action. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:06, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Secular

• Removed the word "secular" in the lead because focus of this page's lead has to be in the Context of it's Topic, Exodus, and we all know that this particular Exodus happenned due to an uprising, which was primarily Islamic as supported by multiple reliable sources. Please Read this one too:

"K. N. Pandita (2011) rails at the 'agenda for communal and parochial administrative policy and culture' that Sheikh Abdullah put in place upon his return to power in 1975. He believes: "Secularism in Kashmir is a myth. Pro-Islamism is the interpretation of NC's [National Conference] secularism. If you are a pro-Islamist you are secular otherwise you are a Jan Sanghi meaning rabid Hindu communalist...""

Source: Ajay Gudavarthy. Secular Sectarianism: Limits of Subaltern Politics. SAGE. p. 160.</ref>

Bose too said that "Islamization of the movement resulted in selective killing of Pandits and resulted in their mass exodus in 1990."

Sources: Cristina Jayme Montiel, Noraini M. Noor. Peace Psychology in Asia. Springer. p. 69. and Sumantra Bose (2003). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Vistaar Publications.

Jhy.rjwk (talk)

@Jhy.rjwk: Can you please teach yourself to indent properly and not post below the reflist? Sumantra Bose does not say anything like what your outermost of fringe sources has described him saying. He is talking about a later period when says on page 3 and 4 of Kashmir: Roots of Conflict and Paths to Peace, Harvard University Press, 2003:

In early 1990 a group of young men in the Kashmir Valley launched a guerrilla revolt against Indian rule under the banner of a movement calling itself the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front ( JKLF). The JKLF’s stated objective was to liberate IJK and reunite it with Pakistani Kashmir as a single independent state. The independentist, Muslim but secularist JKLF’s dominance of the uprising yielded by 1992–1993 to the rise of a pro-Pakistan, moderate Islamist guerrilla group called Hizb-ul Mujahideen, strongly promoted by Pakistani military authorities.

This page is about the period of the exodus, which took place in early 1990 and which had substantially ended by 1992–1993. There are numerous sources, a full half-dozen of the most scholarly, that attest and are still there and which you forgot to delete. I'm happy to change the wording to "led by an organization that had generally secular antededants. etc." Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:36, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

(edit conflict) I would be happy to put Sheikh Abdullah as well as Amanullah Khan, along with Jinnah, in the camp of "Muslim nationalism", which is not the same as "Islamism". Neither is it the same as "secularism". Secularism means not recognizing "Hindu" or "Muslim" as identities and relating to people on the basis of nationality and ethnicity alone. That requires a level of modernity that most people in India or Kashmir don't have. (Nehru was secular and the Indian intellectual class that he founded, which pervades Indian press, academia and to some extent, its bureaucracy, is secular. So most Indians can easily see and recognize secularism even if they are not secular themselves. Kashmiris less so.)

Muslim nationalism simply means that they believe in Muslims having power. It doesn't mean that religious minorities are supposed to have fewer rights in any way. Much less does it mean that they want to drive out the minorities from their homes.

The Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen, on the other hand, are hard-core Islamist, even jihadist. To them, all Pandits are Indian agents and they need to be driven out. Note this threat note signed by "Ameer H. M.".

The exodus happened during the period of transition in the movement passing from the JKLF hands to the Hizbul Mujahideen hands. The time periods coincide in a striking way. 14 January 1990 is when the Jamaat-e-Islami agreed to take over Hizbul Mujahideen. On 19 January 1990, we had midnight mosque-marathon, blaring Islamist propaganda. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:58, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Kautilya3: Not sure if you're replying to Jh* or to me. In any case, that is the reason why I have added "generally." There is only so much nuance we can add in the lead. A large number of reliable scholarly texts published by the best academic publishers (Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, Routledge) and authored by people such as Sumantra Bose and Mridu Rai to whose writings we have been beholden on the Kashmir page for upward of 15 years, state that. It may or may not be that a transition took place on the night of January 19, but the best sources by WP's standards still say that in early 1990 during the time of the substantial exodus the uprising was led by an organization with generally secular-nationalist antecedents and the goal of political independence. As for "secular" in India, whether meant in the original intent of religious pluralism or its various later interpretations, I agree that in Kashmir it is further fraught (explained in Sokefeld's article in the cited references and quoted briefly). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:30, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Kautilya3: I have tweaked the text slightly to accommodate your point to "an uprising that was initiated by an organization with generally secular antecedents ..." Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:43, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

User:Kautilya3 That's the exact thing Sumit Ganguly has pointed in above cited books and several others, especially 'Deadly Impasse'. Fowler&fowler, I am proposing to add a note on this view too. We can add it as an explanation to the 'Secular' or 'antecedents'. Akshaypatill (talk) 14:32, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

They are adequately accommodated. Kautilya3 has stated that he is agreeable to the phrasing for now, even the less accommodating phrasing. (See above.) As for a note, it is there in Sokefeld's nuanced article quoted from in the stacked citations. I can add more to his quote. Such notes are Pandora's boxes. How many will you add? To the FA India, to Constitution of India, and dozens of other major India-related articles? The Indian notion of secular is hardly secular in the usual definition of the word. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:01, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

I agree with @Akshaypatill:, if we are to go the lengths of explaining the ideology and goals of one faction of the insurgency within the lead paragraph, we cannot blatantly ignore the other, Islamist faction of the insurgency. Should include a mention about them as well. UnpetitproleX (talk) 15:15, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Akshaypatill, "Ethno-religious" doesn't mean "religious". Read that page. It is similar to what I called "Muslim nationalism".

I think people are objecting to the use of "secular" to describe JKLF. "Secular" can have two meanings: "non-religious" and "non-communal". It is in the former sense that it is meant here. Whether they are non-communal is harder to say, but there is nothing in their published literature that suggests otherwise. If they came to power through the ballot box, there is no reason to believe that they would operate any differently from the National Conference. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:50, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: But the insurgency wasn’t limited to JKLF, there were other factions, like HM who were decidedly Islamist and during that time had sufficient influence within the insurgency. UnpetitproleX (talk) 10:11, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Secular 2

Agree with @Akshaypatill:, and UnpetitproleX (talk) that putting Secular in the lead paragraph is not appropriate, as it would ignore the other, non-secular and blatantly religious antecedents and goals of the insurgency related Uprising.

Different scholars have noted multiple antecedents for the initation of the "Uprising", which was Complex; and "Secular" is one of many debatabatle antecedents ; and therefore adding Secular in the lead's first papragraph appears to be POV. Earlier text mentioned it as ill-defined Uprising, which was more Neutral view. Also, none of the KP Scholats have accepted this view on Secular Uprising. Secular can be mentioned later in the Section that goes into details of antecedents and initiation of the Uprising.

Jhy.rjwk (talk) 22:44, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

But there is something more basic and rudimentary here, and they are Wikipedia rules and policies. Please note due weight and WP:TERTIARY say "Many introductory undergraduate-level textbooks are regarded as tertiary sources because they sum up multiple secondary sources. Policy: Reliable tertiary sources can help provide broad summaries of topics that involve many primary and secondary sources and may help evaluate due weight, especially when primary or secondary sources contradict each other.

When Barbara D. Metcalf (a pre-eminent historian of Islam in South Asia, former president of the American Historical Association) and her husband Thomas R. Metcalf (a preeminent historian of colonial South Asia and of the period during which the British fobbed off Kashmir and its Muslim population to a shrewdly conspiring Hindu ruler of an adjoining little kingdom) have summarized something in a history textbook, published by Cambridge University Press, read around the world, and cited 848 times on Google Scholar, and now cited in the lead sentence.

When Sugata Bose (Professor of Oceanic History at Harvard) and Ayesha Jalal (Professor of History at Tufts)'s Modern South Asia, another major textbook read around the world, and 1038 times on Google Scholar, have stated something, also cited in the first sentence.

When I have also added the relevant quotes about JKLF from Stanley Wolpert's A New History of India, New York, Oxford University Press 2004, cited 1241 times on Google Scholar, which in the context mentions not only India's repression but also its less that irrefutable case on Kashmir.

When in addition there is a stacked set of half a dozen sources authored by the leading scholars of the day and published by the best academic sources. See WP:SOURCETYPES which states

Many Wikipedia articles rely on scholarly material. When available, academic and peer-reviewed publications, scholarly monographs, and textbooks are usually the most reliable

We are talking of nothing nuanced, no fancy footwork, just bread and butter policy and guidelines of this encyclopedia @Akshaypatill:, @Jhy.rjwk: and @UnpetitproleX: Please note that Ms/r Guduvarthy's book has been cited 1 times on Google Scholar. The citation indices are not everything, for sure; they don't necessarily mean that the text-books have been cited for accuracy on Kashmir, but they count for something, they are an index of the general reliability and notability of their summarized views. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:57, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

We should avoid misusing WP:TERTIARY to insert Secular into the lead, while vast majority of sources also mention religious nature of the uprising. Secular antecedent was only one of the many antecedents that led to the Uprising.

Holocaust against Jews was also considered non-religious by some Scholars and NYT, arguing that Holocast was against "Polish citizens", implying it to be Secular, which was misplaced. This is widely reported, but you can see the source below. We should not fall into the same trap. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:22, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

How the NYT Missed the Story of the Holocaust While It Was Happening https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/10903

User:Kautilya3 The JKLF was secular and remained secular but my point is though the JKLF remained secular, the insurgency itself didn't. It was taken over by ISI after a year and it wasn't a secular one thereafter. That's why Sumeet Ganguly may have called the insurgency a 'ethnoreligious insurgency. From 'Deadly Impasse, CUP.' [5]

Within the year of the outbreak of the insurgency, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) worked assiduously to transform it from a grassroots uprising into a well-orchestrated, religiously inspired and externally supported extortion racket.

Akshaypatill (talk) 02:57, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

A year from December 1989 is December 1990. The major exodus had taken place in early 1990 as numerous sources attest which are all cited in the article. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:09, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

In fact, in Ganguly 2022 which I have already added to the citations, he says within months, but even that does not mean that the KPs left because of Islamicist fears. They were simply more attached to India than they were to an independent Kashmir. They had given no evidence earlier for supporting the independence of Kashmir, during the Partition (well, one or two such as Prem Nath Bazaz did but the majority did not), nor during the Sheikh's own bid for independence. They had left Kashmir earlier in many earlier exoduses. In fact they have their own legendary history of seven exoduses. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:16, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

I've now created a 2-stack of Ganguly; please read it carefully. Please also note the number of citations for "early 1990": Sumantra Bose (2021) ("Feb to March 1990") whose substantially similar earler book has 651 Google Scholar citations; Shahla Hussain (2021) ("In March 1990"), Mridu Rai (356 Google Scholar citations)("beginning in January 1990 and in a few months"); Shala Hussain (2018) ("In the winter of 1990," which means ending on March 15); S. Paul Kapur (241 Google Scholar citations ("in early 1990"); John Braithwaite and Bina D'Costa (2018) (already 61 Google Scholar citation ("in early 1990"); Haley Duschinsky (2018) ("in the first few months of 1990"). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:30, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

I forgot to post a quote from Sumantra Bose [6]

Ethnolinguistic community with a religious base, rather than an overarching pan-Muslim identity, was clearly the decisive factor in the 1990–1995 phase of the azaadi movement.

I ain't saying that the KPs left because of Islamicist fears. My point is if your are going to call the insurgency a secular and political movement then add the whole thing because it leaves an impression that it remained secular throught its life, which wasn't the case. Akshaypatill (talk) 03:53, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

He's talking about the Doda district in Jammu whose Muslim population was ethnolinguistically similar to the Valley's. The population there supported the insurgency unlike some ethnolinguistically dissimilar Muslim communities such as the Gujjars and Bakkarwals (which did not participate) Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:05, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Here's a more extended quote:

Doda district's Muslimsethnolinguistically similar to the Valley's

But demographic and political factors, rather than merely topography and geography, made Doda district into one of the toughest zones of the guerrilla war by 1992. The district’s population is at least 57 percent Muslim (1981 census) and most of these are Kashmiri speakers, ethnolinguistically identical to the dominant Valley population, making Doda’s Muslim society substantially a sociocultural and political extension of the Valley. Significantly, Indian-controlled Jammu’s two other Muslim majority districts, Rajouri and Poonch, whose Muslims belong predominantly to non-Kashmiri ethnolinguistic communities such as Gujjars and Rajputs, remained quiet in the intifada phase of the war, even though both districts adjoin the volatile LOC—their turn would come several years later, in the fidayeen phase. Ethnolinguistic community with a religious base, rather than an overarching pan-Muslim identity, was clearly the decisive factor in the 1990–1995 phase of the azaadi movement. Doda’s Kashmiri speaking Muslim enclaves embraced the Valley’s cry of self-determination with enthusiasm. In July 1992 the bustling market of Doda town (which is 80 percent Kashmiri Muslim) was razed by the CRPF in retaliation for a militant raid

He is saying the ethnolinguistic (religion and language) similarity was the reason for Doda's Muslims to support the insurgency. Not anything about the Pandits leaving because of this identity, especially not as they went to Jammu in the northern part of which is this district. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:11, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Most Pandits went to Jammu city, some to Delhi and Punjab. Few (or maybe none?) went to Doda. UnpetitproleX (talk) 10:02, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Apologies, I was sloppy with language. I meant to say that en route to Jammu city they would have been in the vicinity of Doda disctrict, not exactly the direction to head in if were they in the business of avoiding certain ethnolinguistic groups. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:52, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

The main thing is that major scholars of South Asian history state that the insurgency was generally secular at the approximate time at which the major exodus took place. You are welcome to go to RS/N and test the strength of my sourcing. I don't start out with any preconceived notions; the sources are the drivers. Our hands are tied. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:17, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Then expect me to add analogous notes like 'though JKLF preached secularism they were against enacting anything that goes against basic law of Islam.'[7] Akshaypatill (talk) 04:52, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill: No apologies to me or thanks for pointing out that you completely misinterpreted Sumantra Bose? What is the point of a talk page conversation if all you are doing is attempting to wedge in your point of view? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:33, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

@Fowler&fowler I am rereading the chapter. Akshaypatill (talk) 06:44, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

@Fowler&fowler I haven't reread these yet. This is not an excuse to stop you. You can proceed. I will be back once I complete the reading. Akshaypatill (talk) 16:14, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Again, you have misinterpreted a text for a second time. What she says is this:

In the late 1970s and 1980s, support in Britain for the JKLF’s goal of an independent Kashmir grew steadily ... To win the support of the many cultural and linguistic communities that inhabited Jammu and Kashmir, JKLF promised “final freedom” to every person, “according to his or her choice to practice their religious, political, and economic principles.” Ironically, however, this vision of a united, independent Jammu and Kashmir, like any nationalism, argued for a rigid, monolithic concept of sovereignty. The JKLF proposed a democratic form of government free from religious discrimination and based on economic equity and social equality. However, they added, no law would be enacted that contradicted Islam’s basic principles. To appease its diverse sub-regions, the JKLF promised that independent Kashmir would have a federal parliamentary style of government to negotiate the political, linguistic, and religious demands of Kashmir’s communities and sub-regions. But the potential conflicts between majority preferences at the national level and at the local level illustrate the difficulty of creating a stable federal state in which one group’s conception of “freedom” is not shared by all. And although the philosophy of the JKLF claimed to ensure religious freedom and federal governmental organization, it ignored the reality that many sub-regions and minorities within the state would prefer to be a part of India even if such guarantees were enforced.

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:48, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Indian secularism also does not enact laws that contradict the basic tenets of Hinduism, such as the taboo on the consumption of beef, which is banned in many parts of India. I think you are not making an effort to read sources comprehensively, as a result you are misinterpreting them again and again, making talk page discussions futile. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:57, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill: And just as JKLF's federalism, per Shahla Hussain, did not acknowledge that possibly some parts of the Kashmir region, such as southern parts of Jammu, Ladakh, and at that time, the Pandits in the Valley did not want to be part of an independent Kashmir (despite JKLF's notions of freedom), the Republic of India's federalism did not acknowledge that possibly some parts of Kashmir (such as the northern parts of Jammu, most of the Valley, and possible some Shia areas of northern Ladakh) might not have wanted to be a part of India, despite all of the Republic of India's freedoms.

Otherwise, as Mahatma Gandhi had perceptively stated long ago, India would have had a plebiscite in Indian-administered Kashmir long ago. In other words, to insist that Pakistan withdraw its army from Gilgit Baltistan before the plebiscite as India had insisted at the time, was just a technicality as GB has always been overwhelmingly Muslim and sparsely populated. There is a reason that Gandhi is one of the great men of the age; he was able to abnegate human and national vanity to a rare degree. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:14, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

Secular 3

Dear Fowler&fowler, your insertion of Secular in the lead, is in effect misrepresenting the UPRISING as SECULAR, which is POV; and misusing a group's history citation to hide multiple antecedents of Uprising, which clearly also had religious elements as mentioned in multiple sources in this section. We all should try to follow first paragraph's NPOV guidelines, MOS:BEGIN, and therefore remove Secular from the lead's first para, as there is no Talk page consensus over it. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 03:02, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Please do not keep repeating inaccuracies about consensus. Kautilya3 was the one who added the tag; he is agreeable to the wording for now as he has stated on the talk page. Please read the citations with "secular." You have violated WP:1RR several times in the last couple of days. So please do not edit war. There are half a dozen of them. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:07, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

There are a total of six citations with quotes (for "secular") and a total of eight for "political independence" but which are also state that the JKLF was secular. So there are 14 citations, from two major history text books read around the world with a total Google Scholar citation index of 2,000, and for example the US Army Special Operations Command's Casebook on Insurgency. Please find any other article on Wikipedia that has 14 high quality sources to explain one word. If you can find it and have it attested at WP:RS/N, I will leave WP for ever. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:20, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Number of citations is no justification to insert POV. This page has over 20 citations from Reliable Sources that mention that UPRISING was NOT SECULAR.

That is what (Sorry Akshay Patil, not) User:Kautilya3 has also mentioned in his last comment,"The JKLF was secular and remained secular but my point is though the JKLF remained secular, the insurgency itself didn't. It was taken over by ISI after a year and it wasn't a secular one thereafter. That's why Sumeet Ganguly may have called the insurgency a 'ethnoreligious insurgency. From 'Deadly Impasse, CUP.' [10]

Within the year of the outbreak of the insurgency, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) worked assiduously to transform it from a grassroots uprising into a well-orchestrated, religiously inspired and externally supported extortion racket.

Jhy.rjwk (talk) 20:47, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

@Jhy.rjwk: And what date was that? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:51, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Because a large number of citations also say that the migration/flight/exodus was substantially over by the end of March 1990. So, when did Pakistan turn it into a well-orchestrated religiously inspired and externally supported extortion racket? Month and year please. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:53, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

::::::: Okay, this particular comment was by Akshaypatill on 02:57, 26 March 2022 directed to K3, but that does not change the status of Consensus, and there is not Consesnsus to include JKLF's secular nature in the lead. A mentioned by Akshaypatill

User:Kautilya3 The JKLF was secular and remained secular but my point is though the JKLF remained secular, the insurgency itself didn't. It was taken over by ISI after a year and it wasn't a secular one thereafter. That's why Sumeet Ganguly may have called the insurgency a 'ethnoreligious insurgency. From 'Deadly Impasse, CUP.' [8]

Within the year of the outbreak of the insurgency, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) worked assiduously to transform it from a grassroots uprising into a well-orchestrated, religiously inspired and externally supported extortion racket.

Akshaypatill (talk) 02:57, 26 March 2022 (UTC)

We need to have consensus before including Secular nature of JKLF in lead, because then religious elements of Uprising will also need to mentioned in the same sentence to be NPOV. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 22:02, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Consensus on WP is a consensus of reliable views in reliable sources not that of editors of the moment who happen to appear on a talk page and argue their POV without any sources. Again, so when does Sumit Ganguly think that the insurgency in Kashmir turned into Pakistan's well oiled machine? Did it happen by end of March 1990? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:10, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

@Jhy.rjwk: Here is: Desmond, Edward (1995), "The insurgency in Kashmir (1989–1991)", Contemporary South Asia, 4 (1): 4–16, 7, doi:10.1080/0958493950879748

From the start of the trouble, many Indian journalists and politicians have insisted that the Kashmir uprising was the work of Pakistan's intelligence services. The dean of India's defence specialists, K. Subramanyam, in a lengthy monograph on the Kashmir dispute, cites the existence of a secret Pakistani plan to start a Kashmiri uprising, code-named Op Topac, that the late General Zia ul-Haq reportedly set in motion. This plan, however, was later shown to be a fraud, concocted by Indian analysts as a hypothetical exercise, a fact Subramanyam later acknowledged. Even so, this non-existent game-plan for subversion is still cited by Indian writers, and there remains a deep suspicion in the Indian establishment that the Pakistani hand lies behind the trouble. Given that in 1965 there was such a plan, known as Operation Gibraltar, that led to the infiltration of several thousand Pakistani guerrillas into the valley, Indian suspicions are understandable. And three years into the conflict, the Indian perspective has proven to have some truth. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has become a controlling influence on the Kashmiri insurgents, both in terms of their political agenda and their military operations. But it would be wrong to argue that in early 1990 Pakistan was in any direct way behind the militants. Islamabad was as surprised as New Delhi by the sudden, dramatic outburst of sentiment for 'Azaadi'.

We say based on dozens of sources that the exodus took place in early 1990; Desmond seems to think that in early 1990 Pakistan was not in any direct way behind the militants.

For sure the militants might have been reading Iqbal, the patron saint of the germ of Pakistan, who was ethnic Kashmiri, but the Indian army also marches to the tune of his children's song. So where does that get you? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:32, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

And you too @Akshypatill: do you have a date that indicates the metamorphoses took place before the migration of KPs had substantially ended? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:37, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Sumit Ganguly mentions on Page 10 "In December 1989, an indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency erupted in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir" Jhy.rjwk (talk) 22:42, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Please read ethnoreligious. JKLF is ethnoreligious group that is secular. We've had this discussion over and over again. I'm asking for a date on which Pakistan supported groups became ascendant and Pakistan became their puppet master. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:56, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

That was for you @Jhy.rjwk: Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:03, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Not taking a position on this yet. But here is some data. Deadly Impasse is not a book on the insurgency, but rather about the India-Pakistan conflict surrounding it. The insurgency is only summarised here. Ganguly's theory is that there was a grass-roots insurgency that started in December 1989, and "ISI-D" took it over after about a year. He cites Arif Jamal and Pravin Swami for this (no page numbers), but I don't think either of them said it in this form. I will go and check.

But the more detailed book on the insurgency is The Crisis in Kashmir. In this book pp.107-108, he says that there were two reasons for the Pandit exodus, (1) Jagmohan dropped hints that they could not be protected. (2) "the fanatical religious zeal of some of the insurgent groups instilled fear among the Hindus of the valley". As a result, by early March, according to one estimate, more than forty thousand had fled to the comparative safety of Jammu. His source for this is a story by AFP Hongkong, dated 8 March 1990. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:36, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Aftab and Al-Safa

The book by Siddhartha Gigoo and Varad Sharma is an edited collection, containing testimonials by a number of exiled Pandits. But at the end of the book, there is a Timeline, which is the editors' own. It says the following regarding Aftab and Al-Safa as well as the night of 19 January 1990:

4 January 1990: Aftab, a local Urdu newspaper, publishes a press release issued by Hizb-ul Mujahideen, set up by the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1989, to wage jihad for Jammu and Kashmir's secession from India and accession to Pakistan.

19 January 1990: Jagmohan arrives to take charge as governor of Jammu and Kashmir. JKLF and Hizb-ul Mujahideen use public address systems at mosques to exhort people to defy curfew and take out protest marches. Anti-India and anti-Pandit slogans are heard across Kashmir. Mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits starts.

14 April 1990: Al Safa, a local Urdu daily, publishes a press release issued by Hizb-ul Mujahideen warning all non-Muslims to leave Kashmir within 36 hours or face death. (About half a million Kashmiri Pandits leave Kashmir by the year-end and take refuge in Jammu, Delhi and other parts of the country.)

Note that the Aftab press release (in January) did not have any threats against Pandits, but the Al-Safa press release (in April) did. This is consistent with Alexander Evans's information. The current content regarding Aftab sourced to dubious newspaper reminiscences needs to go.

The 19 January description is also cryptic about "anti-India and anti-Pandit slogans". These were not "threats", according to scholars, even if the Pandits interpreted them as such. There were merely anti-India slogans. "Kafirs" meant the Indian state.

But by April, the scene had changed. By now, more than half the Pandits had already left. And the JKLF was on death-row and Hizbul Mujahideen was taking over. It is very well possible that Hizb wanted the remaining Pandits out as well, so that they can wage their purely Islamist struggle. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:45, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

As I wrote a few months ago,

[I]t was an obscure military commander giving bytes; not a Press Release. No sooner than the piece was published, HM had him branded as a "false militant" and the newspaper carried a clarification. HM also did some kind of "public conference" at Tashgao where it was reiterated about how this was a Jehad against the state than any community.

HM's claims shall not be considered to have much basis in facts and it is quite plausible that they were disowning cadres who had gone a bit too rogue but these denials probably merit inclusion due to the absence of rigorous secondary scholarship on these aspects. TrangaBellam (talk) 20:33, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Yeah, I remember you saying it. You can add it if you can source it. It doesn't particularly matter though, because the killings continued. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:51, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

The article seems to have plagiarized a two-year-old article orig. published over a Hindu Nationalist publication except in that it attributes the list to one "Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies" whose only existence seems to be on paper.

This list is decent and interesting. TrangaBellam (talk) 21:03, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

That source obviously can't be used in this article for anything factual. It axed its chances with the doozy: About half a million Kashmiri Pandits leave Kashmir by the year-end and take refuge in Jammu, Delhi, and other parts of the country. (as there were only between 120K and 140K, as our article says in its infobox.) I will take it out if it is used to make any dubious point that the exodus was only 50% complete by April but the Hizb was 150% lethal by April. @Kautilya3: you shouldn't be casually trading these ideas, "It is possible that ..." Even if you are being ironic or satirical, there are people here who will run with them and cause disruption. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:04, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 28 March 2022 (4)

Just after this sentence in the lead,

The description of the violence as "genocide" or "ethnic cleansing" in some Hindu nationalist publications or among suspicions voiced by some displaced Pandits is thought to be misplaced.

, Please add this,

However, a US-based non-profit organization International Commission for Human Rights and Religious Freedom (ICHRRF) has officially recognized the Kashmiri Hindu genocide in Jammu & Kashmir and declared its recognition of the genocide of Kashmiri Hindus after a hearing on the issue.

References

-Y2edit? (talk) 17:57, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit extended-protected}} template. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 20:32, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Akshaypatill, Fowler&fowler, UnpetitproleX, Kautilya3, Kpddg, Jhy.rjwk, Uanfala, Johnbod, Mathsci, Kautilya3, @RegentsPark, DaxServer, Dwaipayanc, Venkat TL, and Sitush: I was asked to generate consensus, so please answer all the 4 edit requests I have made above. Thanks!-Y2edit? (talk) 18:37, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

TrangaBellam, please reply.-Y2edit? (talk) 18:42, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I am hearing of the organization for the first time — can you point to a single reliable source, from outside India, who has profiled this organization? I am only reminded of India's vast disinformation networks. Their BoD has Lavanya Vemsani, an avid supporter of Hindu Nationalism and fringe historical ideas, which do not inspire any confidence either. TrangaBellam (talk) 20:09, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

This organisation is probably not very credible, I am also hearing about it for the first time. But I would add that some Indian centre-left 1 2 and even left leaning 1 2 3 publications have used ‘ethnic cleansing’, though not ‘genocide’. However, some of these are written by Pandits themselves. Even prominent Kashmiri Muslim politicians have used ‘ethnic cleansing’ (MH Baig, F Abdullah) though politicians can be often found contradicting themselves. There’s probably more instances, both in non-Hindutva publications and by Muslims. Ofcourse, the “genocide” charge is largely by right-wingers and the far-right. Perhaps “some Hindu Nationalist publications” could be changed to “some publications.” UnpetitproleX (talk) 23:10, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 28 March 2022 (2)

I believe that this can be used to show that the Central Government is keen on resettlement of the Kashmiri Hindus in their homeland.-Y2edit? (talk) 06:00, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:41, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Please add that the Central Government is keen on resettlement of the Kashmiri Hindus in their homeland and 520 of them have returned. - I am citing the reference as per Wikipedia's rules now.-Y2edit? (talk) 18:00, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

References

To say govt is "keen on resettlement" based on that article would be WP:SYNTH. And if you read that article closely, the minister carefully says "Kashmiri migrants" when referring to those resettled and uses "Kashmiri Hindus" only when referring to those who'd left. Hemantha (talk) 02:20, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 28 March 2022 (3)

The leading sentence,

The Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus,[note 2] also Pandits, is their early 1990[1][2] migration,[18] or flight,[19] from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an ethno-religious[20] insurgency launched by a declaredly secular[21] pro-independence group

should be changed to,

The Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus,[note 2] also Pandits, is their early 1990[1][2] migration,[18] or flight,[19] from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an ethno-religious[20] insurgency launched by a pro-independence group, claiming to be secular

for neutrality.-Y2edit? (talk) 17:45, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit extended-protected}} template. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 20:33, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done. There is a debate about how the issue of "secular" should be treated. Why don't you read it and participate? I don't think it is appropriate to make edit request about the same issue, with zero justification provided. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:33, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Kautilya3, I am not asking to remove the word, "secular", I am only asking to change the last part of the sentence from, "declaredly secular pro-independence group" to, "pro-independence group, claiming to be secular" for neutrality.-Y2edit? (talk) 02:46, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

WP:CLAIM is rarely neutral. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:54, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Claims of Genocide

meta discussion
Please do not ping a hundred editors to generate consensus - it is acutely disruptive. TrangaBellam (talk) 20:09, 28 March 2022 (UTC) Fowler&fowler had pinged some people and I have pinged just about the same number of editors. Please respond to all my edit protected requests.-Y2edit? (talk) 20:24, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

TrangaBellam, this, this, this and this mention the hearing-Y2edit? (talk) 20:42, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

To reiterate, [C]an you point to a single reliable source, from outside India, who has profiled this organization? All of your above sources, except one, are reprints of IANS feed. Thanks, TrangaBellam (talk) 21:40, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I agree. This is an unknown organisation. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:36, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

While I also agree with K3 that this ICHRRF is a quite unknown organization, and hence it may not be mentioned in the lead, but the news itself has been reported in WP:RS sources such as "Greater Kashmir", and "Business Standard" (sources below), and therefore I think we need to create a New Section "Claims of Genocide" so that we do not fall into the trap of complete "Genocide Denial" of such news, as we are getting more scholarship from KP authors, and new KP eye-witness accounts in media, whoose voice was unheard for 32 years.

Chrungoo deposes before US based International HR Commission https://www.greaterkashmir.com/jammu/chrungoo-deposes-before-us-based-international-hr-commission

ICHRRF officially recognises the Kashmiri Hindu Genocide, 1989-1991 https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/ichrrf-officially-recognises-the-kashmiri-hindu-genocide-1989-1991-122032800405_1.html

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Jhy.rjwk (talk • contribs) 02:12:16, 29 March, 2022 (UTC)

Apart from the points raised already above, to repeat from the first edit request - Ved Nanda, who is a director of this org, was a head of Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh and the chairman was associated with VIF. This organization has clear ties with Hindu nationalist organizations and hence is by no means an independent when it comes to claims about Kashmir. The only WP:RS above is Business Standard, which actually is an IANS re-post and not enough to even begin arguing about WP:DUEness of inclusion. Hemantha (talk) 02:36, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Okay, agreed we may not have enough WP:RS yet, but we should be open to having such section as and when more reliable sources emerge. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:43, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

We have seen earlier, that many top history Scholars fell into the trap of "Armenian Genocide Denial", by following only “Turkish position” not giving any space to the "Armenian position" :

Mamigonian, M. A. (2015). Academic Denial of the Armenian Genocide in American Scholarship: Denialism as Manufactured Controversy. Genocide Studies International, 9(1), 61-82. "From its origins in the World War I era, denial of the Armenian Genocide emerged in American universities during the Cold War... apologists for the “Turkish position” now labor to construct denialism as a legitimate intellectual position within a historical debate"

Smith, R. W., Markusen, E., & Lifton, R. J. (1995). Professional ethics and the denial of Armenian genocide. Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 9(1), 1-22.

Despite the vast amount of evidence that points to the historical reality of the Armenian genocide — eyewitness accounts, official archives, photographic evidence, die reports of diplomats, and the testimony of survivors The basic argument of denial has remained the same— it never happened, Turkey is not responsible, the term "genocide" does not apply. The tactics of denial, however, have shifted over the years.

We can learn some things from Armenian Genocide Denial, and give some space to "KP position", which has been largely denied so far, even in recording the history of their own exodus. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:48, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Not due. The organisation doesn't seems to be notable. Akshaypatill (talk) 02:55, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

We should have a section on denial then.-Y2edit? (talk) 02:57, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

We don't have enough Reliable sources yet on Genocide/ Denial for a new section, but hopefully in few weeks or months, we will find coverage of new KP Scholarship & KP eye-witness accounts in Reliable sources, and we can have a section then after meeting WP:RS and WP:DUE-ness criterion. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 04:46, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

So, can we discuss these aspects in few weeks or months? TrangaBellam (talk) 08:05, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Next year would be better, perhaps at the time of the one-year anniversary of the KF Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:58, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

34 outsiders purchased assets in J-K

The following section shall be added in [this section.

In March 2022, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Nityanand Rai, informed the lower house of the Parliament that 34 persons from outside Jammu and Kashmir have bought properties in the Union Territory after the abrogation of Article 370 in the state.

 Not done. Unclear relation to the topic. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:59, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 28 March 2022

Please add this to the, "Aftermath" section, just before para 3,

The "Jammu and Kashmir State Land (Vesting of Ownership to Occupants) Act, 2001" commonly known as Roshni Act was promulgated during Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's government in 2001 which granted ownership of Jammu and Kashmir state land to illegal encroachers with the aim of raising money for power projects upon payment of a sum to be determined by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

I have copied it from the, "Roshni Act" article.-Y2edit? (talk) 04:30, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

References

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit extended-protected}} template. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:42, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit extended-protected}} template. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 09:19, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Kautilya3, I request you to please reply to this (and the next) edit request also.-Y2edit? (talk) 12:18, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done. No relation to the topic. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:21, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Administrative intervention please

@Vanamonde93, Bishonen, Abecedare, RegentsPark, El C, and Doug Weller: I am frankly at my wits end with the disruption being caused by two editors here: primarily Jhy.rjwk (talk · contribs), but also less so: Akshaypatill (talk · contribs). The first has violated 1RR several times. Please look at his last three of four edits on the page. He first removed "secular" along with its many sources. Upon being reverted, he made a talk page post here. Upon being informed that "ethnoreligious" is not an opposing semantic category to "secular" (in the manner in which the word is used in South Asia), he has now inserted ethnoreligious for it to read: "migration,[18] or flight,[19] from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an ethno-religious[20][21] insurgency launched by a declaredly secular[22] pro-independence group." The citation [21] makes no mention of ethnoreligious. I have dozens of citations for each special word used. I frankly don't know what to do. There is a limit to disruption on WP. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:37, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

I've told everyone here that we are beholden to WP:TERTIARY, which states:

"Many introductory undergraduate-level textbooks are regarded as tertiary sources because they sum up multiple secondary sources. Policy: Reliable tertiary sources can help provide broad summaries of topics that involve many primary and secondary sources and may help evaluate due weight, especially when primary or secondary sources contradict each other."

I've produced over a dozen citations for secular and pro-independent (or nationalist), including two of the most widely read textbooks on modern Indian history, one is cited for secular, the other for independence. They are Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf's A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge 2012 (cited some 900 times on Google Scholar) and the other is Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal's Modern South Asia, Routledge, (cited some 1200 times on GS). But all this makes no difference. These editors come in here without either the ability or the desire to fully interpret the text; and when they are disabused of their misinterpretation they attempt to throw the new interpretation in some perverted fashion in my face. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:02, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I have to admit that is clever and not a bad compromise. We have Islamist slogans plastered all over this talk page. So scrubbing religion entirely off the lead isn't right. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:50, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

How many sources describe JKLF as having launched an ethnoreligious insurgency? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:04, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

And how many times have these plastered slogans been cited on Google Scholar? I can give you a total count of for my sources for the lead sentence. It is greater that 4,000 already for the couple of dozen. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:05, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

How many plastered slogans have been published by major academic presses? Please read WP:SOURCETYPES, which says, "When available, academic and peer-reviewed publications, scholarly monographs, and textbooks are usually the most reliable sources." Please name the university press that produces posters for plastering. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:08, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I'm happy to add Kashmiri-speaking Muslim group for ethno-religious. Why would you object to that? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:15, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Do you have such a clear statement about the insurgency's "ethnoreligiousity" as Paul Staniland's is about its secular nature in

• Staniland, Paul (2014), Networks of Rebellion: Explaing Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 73–74, ISBN 978-0-8014-5266-6

  The early years of JKLF activity, especially in 1988, involved coordinated, publicly symbolic strikes carried out by a relatively small number of fighters. Central control processes at this point were handled by the four original organizers. Crackdowns by the Indian government spurred mobilization, and “within two years, the previously marginal JKLF emerged as the vanguard and spearhead of a popular uprising in the Kashmir Valley against Indian rule. It dominated the first three years of the insurgency (1990-92).”! Even to the present day, “most commentators agree that among Muslims in the Valley, the JKLF enjoys considerable popular support.” This was especially the case in the early 1990s, when contemporary observers argued that “the predominant battle cry in Kashmir is azadi (freedom) and not a merger with Pakistan’”and that “the JKLF, a secular militant group, is by far the most popular. The support for the JKLF was clearly substantial and greater than that of its militant contemporaries.

  Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:26, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Vanamonde93, Bishonen, Abecedare, RegentsPark, El C, and Doug Weller:Dear Editors, The charges by Fowler&fowler are half-truths that misrepresent the facts, which can be noted by a closer look at my edits and Talk page comments. I have been trying to make consensus on Talk Page, while F&F is pushing his views, without consensus on Talk page. I have not violated 1RR, and instead F&F has repeatedly violated WP:TALK guidelines, by threating me and Akshaypatill (talk · contribs) and posting bullying messages on my Talk page. To be fair, action should be against F&F for bullying and not following WP:TALK guidelines.

More specifically, I have provided WP:RS ciatations with quote and page number for ethno-religious insurgency launched by a declaredly secular

This was noted and acknowledged by K3 in his comment on 23:36, 27 March 2022 (UTC) "Not taking a position on this yet. But here is some data. Deadly Impasse is not a book on the insurgency, but rather about the India-Pakistan conflict surrounding it. The insurgency is only summarised here. Ganguly's theory is that there was a grass-roots insurgency that started in December 1989, and "ISI-D" took it over after about a year. He cites Arif Jamal and Pravin Swami for this (no page numbers), but I don't think either of them said it in this form. I will go and check.

But the more detailed book on the insurgency is The Crisis in Kashmir. In this book pp.107-108, he says that there were two reasons for the Pandit exodus, (1) Jagmohan dropped hints that they could not be protected. (2) "the fanatical religious zeal of some of the insurgent groups instilled fear among the Hindus of the valley". As a result, by early March, according to one estimate, more than forty thousand had fled to the comparative safety of Jammu. His source for this is a story by AFP Hongkong, dated 8 March 1990. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:36, 27 March 2022 (UTC)"— Preceding unsigned comment added by Jhy.rjwk (talk • contribs) 00:05, March 28, 2022 (UTC)

(edit conflict) I think we need to sleep over this and think about it a bit. The guys were first opposed to "secular" being added to the insurgents. We rejected that. So they came up with the idea of adding "ethnoreligious" which balances it. "Kashmiri-speaking Muslim group" doesn't.

Note that your WP:SOURCETYPES objection doesn't apply. You might say that these are not TERTIARY source books, but you have already cited plenty of non-TERTIARY sources. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:35, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: But I have cited two major tertiary sources. Thus far they have cited none for "ethnoreligious" or "Islamicist". Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:39, 28 March 2022 (UTC) UPdating Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:24, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: The Wikipedia page Ethnoreligious groups cites the definition of the term to a textbook:

• Taras, Ray; Ganguly, Rajat (2016), Understanding Ethnic Conflicts (4 ed.), London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 9780205742301 which states:

  Finally, an ethno-religious group can be defined as one where ethnic and religious identities are inseparable in the making of community. Because this seems to encompass so many groups, ranging from Irish Catholics to Serb Orthodox, to Arab Muslims, and to Indian Hindus, and because there are important exceptions to each case, the ethno-religious category seems analytically unhelpful, except, arguably, to explain ethno-religious conflict—a clash of cultures rooted in both objective and psychological factors that fuse lineage with a religious belief system.

So should I change the lead sentence to: "Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, is the early 1990 migration, or flight, of an ethno-religious Hindu group from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an ethno-religious insurgency launched by a declaredly secular pro-independence group?" Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:06, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

More seriously (now for your attention) @Kautilya3:, I'm not sure that Asutosh Varshney's old categories of Indian secularism, Pakistani Muslim nationalism, and Kashmiri ethno-somethingorother-ism are really valid anymore. Martin Sokefeld, as I've already indicated has spoken to it obliquely. He says in his article "Secularism and the Kashmir dispute," which I have cited several times, also says in reference to a later issue, but involving similar dynamics:

Given that those who protested were all Muslims and that the target of the protests was a Hindu pilgrimage, one could argue that the secular commitment of the protestors as well as the distribution of food by Muslims to Hindus was only staged strategically in order to pose as secularists and to mask a basically communalist, Islamic commitment. Probably, this is true for a certain number of the protestors who, for instance, did not hesitate to shout ͞Allahu akbar!͟ at a secular demonstration. Yet such a perspective would essentialize secularism as essentially non- or even anti-religious and contradict Talal Asad’s (2003) argument that religion and secularism are intimately interconnected. The interesting point is that none of the India media saw it necessary to "unmask" the "secular pose" of the Muslim demonstrators but took for granted that, to paraphrase the general secretary, Muslims are religious by mind. Thus, secularism turns out to be highly specific to particular contexts and religions. While from the Indian point of view, it is not a contradiction in itself to be Hindu and secularist at the same time, the Indian perspective as it becomes apparent in the discourse about Kashmir rather precludes the idea that Muslims who are protesting against the government in Kashmir can be secular at all.

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:58, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Just to clarify, because Kautilya3 said these guys opposed to add secular in lead, I never opposed calling JKLF a secular organisation. I have already said that in a reply above. I am proposing to add more details about the insurgency itself which didn't remain secular as it went under influence of ISI within months/year as Sumeet Ganguly points out. The current wording leaves an impression that the insurgency remained secular throughout its life which isn't the case. Also, why aren't we adding/naming 'JKLF' directly in the lead rather than calling it 'an orgnisation' or 'a group'? Akshaypatill (talk) 03:10, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill: I don' t have any issues with mentioning the JKLF. The two major tertiary sources cited in the lead sentence, Metcalf and Mecalf and Bose & Jalal, both do mention it. Say M&N:

The denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favourable position, first under the maharajas, and then under the successive Congress regimes, and proponents of a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Of a population of some 140,000, perhaps 100,000 Pandits fled the state after 1990. their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate ‘suspects’ and weed out Pakistani ‘infiltrators’, the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.

whereas the Bose and Jalal say:

In 1989 and the early 1990s a popularly backed armed insurgency was orchestrated by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which called for a secular and sovereign Kashmir. Kashmiri cultural and linguistic identity appeared to be more potent than Islamic aspirations or pro-Pakistan sentiment in the Vale of Kashmir. In time, however, the balance of firepower among the rebels shifted to the Hizbul Mujahideen, which received more support from Pakistan. The Indian state deployed more than 550,000 armed personnel in the early 1990s to severely repress the Kashmir movement.

The second source does not mention the Pandits. I don' t have any issues. I'm happy to stick to just the two of them for the lead sentence. How would you paraphrase them in one readable sentence? Please tell me. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:16, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: I did find Martin Sokefeld's mention of Varshney's categories.

In writings about the Kashmir dispute, secular political mobilisation of Muslim Kashmiris is frequently disregarded. Even when it is mentioned it is often not taken seriously. In a paper that discusses different forms of nationalism in Kashmir, Ashutosh Varshney distinguishes religious, secular and ethnic nationalism. He flatly identifies religious nationalism with Pakistan, secular nationalism with India and ethnic nationalism with insurgent Muslims in the Kashmir valley. In a footnote he concedes that Kashmiri nationalism in the valley is secular, too. Still, he labels the movement as "ethnic nationalist" because it aims at separation from "secular" India and because he regards it as being limited to Muslim valley Kashmiris and as excluding both other religious communities and Muslims from other parts of Kashmir like Jammu or Azad Kashmir. This is a too limited view, as we have seen. There are "secular" movements in other parts of Kashmir, too, and at least some of them project a Kashmiri nation that cuts across and transcends ethnic and religious boundaries with erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir State. The Kashmir issue is much more complex than the orthodox view on the problem concedes. It is neither simply a conflict between India and Pakistan nor an issue between religion/Islam on the one hand and secularism on the other.

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:19, 28 March 2022 (UTC) Updated. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:20, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Anyway, thanks for your inputs @Kautilya3: and @Akshaypatill: Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:24, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I see quite a few scholars have referred to the insurgency as 'ethno-religious' other than Sumit Ganguly including Christophe Jaffrelot in Pakistan Nationalism Without a Nation, Jugdep Chima, G. Kurt Piehler in Encyclopedia of Military Science.

There are many more. (Sumit Ganguly has co-authored several books for reputed publications and almost all of them call it a ethno-religious insurgency.) -

Amrita Narlikar, Sandra Destradi, J. Plagemann, Oxford University Press India [9]

The Kashmir and Punjab insurgencies were both ethno-religious in their origins.

Karen Rasler, William R. Thompson, Sumit Ganguly - University of Pennsylvania Press

In December 1989, an ethno-religious insurgency erupted in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The origins....

Jacques Bertrand, André Laliberté, Cambridge University Press (Written by Ganguly)[10]

Since I989, Pakistan has been deeply involved in directing, support- ing, and steering an ethno-religious insurgency in the Indian-controlled portion of the state.o The origins of the insurgency were mostly indig.....

Sramana Majumdar [11]

...Yet scholars like Chowdhary (2010) argue that the conflict did not possess a religious character initially and was purely a contestation over political identity. It was much later and around the time of the militancy and forced displacement of Pandits (the group of upper caste Kashmiri Hindus) in the late 1980s that the political conflict took on an ethno-religious claim.

@Kautilya3: Here are some sources for consideration -

Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency, Sumit Ganguly with 221 citations [12] -

The more prominent of the insurgent groups include the nominally secular, pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKL and the radical Islamic and pro-Pakistani groups Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Hizbollah, Harkat-ul-Ansa, and Ikhwanul Muslimeen.

Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending, Columbia University Press [13]

Protests, demonstrations, bombings, and other violent incidents swept across the Valley throughout much of 1988 and 1989. These incidents ultimately culminated in the kidnapping of Rubiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Union home minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, on December 8 in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The perpetrators of the act were members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a nominally secular secessionist organization, formed in 1976. To secure the release of Rubiya Sayeed the government of Vishwanath Pratap Singh acceded to the demands of the JKLF releasing five political activists who had been incarcerated on various charges. The government's willingness to concede emboldened the insurgents, and very soon the Valley was aflame.

Damien Kingsbury, [14]

Factionalism among Islamic militants has also increasingly come to the fore. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)a nominally secular group that is nevertheless controlled by Muslim leaders argues for a sovereign state of Kashmir, including part of the Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, and remains the most popular group. The Hizbul Mujahideen are modeled after the Mujahids in Afghanistan and argue for accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.

Kaushik Roy, Scott Gates, Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present [15]

Protests, demonstrations, bombings, and other violent incidents swept across the Valley throughout much of 1988 and 1989. These incidents ultimately culminated in the kidnapping of Rubiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Union home minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, on December 8 in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The perpetrators of the act were members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a nominally secular secessionist organization, formed in 1976. To secure the release of Rubiya Sayeed the government of Vishwanath Pratap Singh acceded to the demands of the JKLF releasing five political activists who had been incarcerated on various charges.0 The government's willingness to concede emboldened the insurgents, and very soon the Valley was aflame.

Ugo M. Amoretti, Nancy Gina Bermeo [16]

Factionalism among Islamic militants has also increasingly come to the fore. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (OKLE), a nominally secular group that is never theless controlled by Muslim leaders, argues for a sovereign state of Kashmir, including part of the Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, and remains a popular group.

There are lot many (more than a half dozen). They call JKLF a nominally secular group. Akshaypatill (talk) 07:19, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill: Kautilya3 has already agreed to "secular;" the question according to him is whether to add "ethno-religious." You have stated above, "I never opposed calling JKLF a secular organisation. I have already said that in a reply above." I will repeat this until I am blue in the face, that per Wikipedia policy WP:TERTIARY sources, such as widely read undergraduate textbooks on history are to be used in determining due weight. You asked me above, "Also, why aren't we adding/naming 'JKLF' directly in the lead rather than calling it 'an orgnisation' or 'a group'?" I replied to that and said I would be happy to mention them. I have already given you two widely used undergraduate textbooks in history authored by (1) Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf and (2) Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal. They both mention the JKLF. Together their Google Scholar citation index, moreover, is more that 2,000. I have quoted two paragraphs from them. I have asked you how you would use them to paraphrase a lead sentence? You have not answered my question. Instead you are now searching for publications that use "nominally secular." Will you be talking to me? Otherwise, what is this talk page conversation about? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 09:05, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill: I had forgotten, a third widely read undergraduate text book on Indian history is

• Wolpert, Stanley (2004), A New History of India (7 ed.), New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 433–434, ISBN 0-19-516677-9 This book by the late UCLA historian Stanley Wolpert is cited 1,242 times on Google Scholar. So, together the three tertiary sources have been cited over 3,000 times.

Wolpert says:

the young daughter of Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, himself a Kashmiri Muslim, was kidnapped by a Kashmiri separatist gang in Srinagar. The kidnappers demanded the release of all their recently arrested Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front leaders for her life. ... Miss Sayeed was released unharmed, in exchange for freeing all the incarcerated Liberation Front leaders. ... Yet some Indians feared that releasing prisoners for any hostage, no matter how important she was, had set a dangerous precedent that might provoke more kidnapping or escalating violence in Kashmir. Srinagar now ceased to be one of India’s favorite and most lucrative tourist attractions, transformed instead into a front-line state, in constant conflict. Kashmir’s best hotels were all used as barracks for Indian troops, more than 500,000 of whom were deployed around the thinly populated state, ... By mid-1995 the death toll from fighting in Kashmir was much higher than in Punjab. India blamed 'foreign' (that is, Pakistani) 'infiltrators' for such rapidly escalating violence and refused to discuss holding a UN-run plebiscite or any other possible peaceful solution to Kashmir’s conflict, either with Pakistan or any other nation. India insisted that Kashmir 1s purely an “internal” issue for New Delhi. Concerned human rights groups, including Amnesty International, Asia Watch, and International Alert, were repeatedly denied permission to visit Kashmir in order to investigate and report on a growing number of charges of brutal military as well as police violations of human rights. Indian officials either denied such accusations entirely, or insisted that they were 'under investigation' by the 'appropriate' Indian agencies.

Please paraphrase and summarize them to write the lead sentence, or the first two sentences. I am asking you this so we may improve the article. Please do not go around making Google Searches. It is Wikipedia Policy, per WP:TERTIARY. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 09:33, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill: : Another widely used textbook is Paul Brass's

Brass, Paul (1994), The Politics of India Since Independence, The New Cambridge History of India (2 ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 222–223, ISBN 978-0-521-45362-2 It is cited 1263 times on Google Scholar It mentions both the JKLF and the Pandits.

Brass says,

In the 1987 elections, the two alliance partners, the National Conference and the Congress won sixty-six of the seventy-six seats to the Legislative Assembly, but the routine political process soon became irrelevant as disaffected Kashmir youth in the Valley turned increasingly to armed militant revolt against the Indian state. As in Punjab, there has been a proliferation of fighting groups divided roughly into two camps: those whose focus, "fundamentalist" or otherwise, is on their identity and/or religiosity as Muslims favoring merger with Pakistan and those whose primary identity is with the distinctive culture, region, and language of Kashmir, favoring independence from both India and Pakistan. It is generally believed that the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front, which advocates Independence for a secular Kashmir state, containing both Muslim and Hindu populations, is the most popular fighting force in the Valley. ... Governor's Rule was declared the day after Jagmohan's arrival (January 18, 1990). The latter, despite considerable bluster, exuding of self-confidence, and application of massive force, failed also to make any headway in containing the rising strength of the militant groups and was himself dismissed in May, 1990 after the police fired upon a group of mourners in a funeral procession for the slain religious-political leader, Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq. He was replaced by Girish Chander Saxena, previous head of India's intelligence bureau known as RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), under whose governorship a full-scale internal war was launched against the militant groups operating in the state. This internal warfare has become more intense, more brutal, and more violent than the situation in Punjab. For a time, despite the increasing brutality and intensity of the struggle, it remained largely one between militants and state security forces. However, the small population of mostly Brahman Hindus in the Valley, numbering approximately 125,000, ultimately felt or were made to feel insecure and all but a few thousand have left for Jammu or other parts of India.

So, again, lease use these four (per Wikipedia policy) to draft a reasonable lead paragraph. (without the genocide bit, of course). They have together been cited more than 4,000 times on Google Scholar. Cc also to @Kautilya3: Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:03, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

PS. A note to @UnpetitproleX:, please note the expression: "felt or were made to feel insecure." I am happy to write "felt insecure or were made to feel insecure and left" or a suitable paraphrase. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:03, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

If you mean you are happy to add “felt and were made to feel insecure and left” replacing “felt compelled to leave”, I have no issue with it. Though “the valley” should be added after “left” for a more complete sentence, ie “ felt or were made to feel insecure and left the valley.” But it would perhaps require a complete reword of the current sentence. Something along the lines of, “The Pandits with a total population ranging between 120,000-140,000 felt or were made to feel insecure, and about 90,000-100,000 of them left the valley, …” I leave it upto you to use whichever wording you wish. UnpetitproleX (talk) 12:39, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@UnpetitproleX: That is fine. Let us hear from other about your proposal and if they give their assent, please go ahead and change it, citing it to Brass, with the appropriate snippet of the text added if you'd like. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:20, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill, Kautilya3, and UnpetitproleX: Per WP:TERTIARY, There is another very widely read textbook worldwide. It is Ira M. Lapidus's

• Lapidus, Ira M. (2014), A History of Islamic Societies (3 ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 720, ISBN 978-0-521-51430-9 It has been cited 2636 times on Google Scholar. Says Lapidus:

  By the mid-1980s, however, trust between Delhi and local leaders had again broken down, and Kashmiris began a fully fledged armed insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front calling for an independent and secular Kashmir. As the military struggle went on, Muslim—Hindu antagonism rose; Kashmiris began to define themselves in Muslim terms. Pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan sentiment became more important than secularism, and the leadership of the insurgency shifted to the Harakat and the Hizb ul-Mujahidin. To achieve its strategic objectives the Pakistani military and its intelligence services supported militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who attacked Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and more recently attacked civilians in India. Saudi influences, more militant forms of Islam, and the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services gave the struggle in Kashmir the aura of a jihad. The fighting escalated with the deployment of more than 500,000 Indian soldiers to suppress the resistance.

  So, now there are five, with 6,500 Google Scholar citations. Whatever you might say about them, they are all written by major scholars, published by major university presses, and used as textbooks around the world. By WP:TERTIARY we have in four of these five, a description of the JKLF as an organization advocating secular views, but without ethnoreligious. That is why I had added "declaredly secular." We can change it to "statedly secular." They do say of course that in time the insurgency was taken over by the Hizb and controlled by Pakistan. I think we should agree that "secular" belongs and "ethnoreligious" does not. That would be the first step. We can then move on to when the Hizb became dominant and so forth. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:15, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Arbitrary break

This discussion has become rather haywire. It is worth keeping in mind the following points:

• This page is not on the insurgency, but rather on the Pandit exodus. So the lead has to cover those aspects of the insurgency that had an impact on the exodus. Saying that it was a "secular" insurgency, which in no way threatened the Pandits, leaves open the question why they left at all. This is not doing justice to their predicament.
• TERTIARY sources can be relied upon exclusively when we are dealing with established subjects, but when covering relatively recent events, which are themsmelves shrouded in layers of mystery, armed underground organisations and intelligence agencies, information becomes available quite slowly and the academic world would be even slower to catch up.
• The transition from JKLF to Hizbul Mujahideen is another problematic aspect. Most academics seem to believe that JKLF was in control till about 1992, and it was only after that that Hizbul Mujahideen took the leadership. But that is turning out to be quite wrong on a factual basis. The transition was occurring precisely when the Pandit exodus was taking place. Moreover, even earlier, JKLF had only very weak control, if at all, over the plethora of insurgent groups operating in the Kashmir Valley.
• By the time the Pandit exodus began, already all the liquor shops were closed down, as were cinema halls and video parlour and beauty saloons. People were even forced to close down their bank accounts for fear of being branded "un-Islamic". Terms like "fundamentalists" and "Islamic fundamentalists" were regularly used to describe the insurgents in those days, even by the New York Times. JKLF is never known to have condemned any of these Islamist trends. So its "secularism" was only skin-deep, if it was even real.

So, on the whole, I don't support painting the insurgency as "secular". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:24, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Akshaypatill, Kautilya3, and UnpetitproleX: These are books written by major scholars, most revised within the last ten years. Here is another: It is Ira M. Lapidus's

• Lapidus, Ira A. (2014), A History of Islamic Societies (3 ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 720, ISBN 978-0-521-51430-9 It has been cited 2636 times on Google Scholar. Says Lapidus:

  By the mid-1980s, however, trust between Delhi and local leaders had again broken down, and Kashmiris began a fully fledged armed insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front calling for an independent and secular Kashmir. As the military struggle went on, Muslim—Hindu antagonism rose; Kashmiris began to define themselves in Muslim terms. Pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan sentiment became more important than secularism, and the leadership of the insurgency shifted to the Harakat and the Hizb ul-Mujahidin. To achieve its strategic objectives the Pakistani military and its intelligence services supported militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who attacked Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and more recently attacked civilians in India. Saudi influences, more militant forms of Islam, and the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services gave the struggle in Kashmir the aura of a jihad. The fighting escalated with the deployment of more than 500,000 Indian soldiers to suppress the resistance.

  So, now there are five, with 6,500 Google Scholar citations. Whatever you might say about them, they are all written by major scholars, published by major university presses, and used as textbooks around the world. By WP:TERTIARY we have in four of these five, a description of the JKLF as an organization advocating secular views, but without ethnoreligious. That is why I had added "declaredly secular." We can change it to "statedly secular." They do say of course that in time the insurgency was taken over by the Hizb and controlled by Pakistan. I think we should agree that "secular" belongs and "ethnoreligious" does not. That would be the first step. We can then move on to when the Hizb became dominant and so forth. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:55, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

At present the lead sentence focuses more on the insurgency than it does on the exodus. My issues are less with the details and more with the placing. The lead sentence does not need this extensive detail about the insurgency. “Separatist uprising”, “secessionist militancy” or even a plain “armed insurgency” should be in the lead sentence. These are fairly non-controversial descriptors and are often used in international media. That being said, the details of the militancy do belong in the lead paragraph, but in my opinion they should be the third sentence, after the sentence about the figures (which we have been discussing above). UnpetitproleX (talk) 14:44, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@UnpetitproleX: That would be fine. Propose something: not the phrasing just yet, only the content of the first four sentences. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:50, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Why are you selectively quoting Staniland? He points to the organizational weaknesses of the JKLF. In fact he spends a lot of time explaining that how the JKLF slow unraveling over ten years fits his model. But he also says very clearly in addition to what I have quoted about "secular" that:

In the early years of the war in Kashmir, the JKLF was the center of insurgency, but I will show later in this chapter how the social-institutional weakness of the organization made it vulnerable to targeting by the Indian leadership and dissention from local units. The Hizbul Mujahideen became the most robust organization in the fight in Kashmir. While its rise to dominance occurred after 1990, its mobilization during 1989–1991 through networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami laid the basis for an integrated organization that persisted until it shifted to a vanguard structure in the early to mid-2000s.

He is talking about how it was mobilizing to build networks, not how it was taking part in violence necessarily. I'm very perplexed by what you are doing. Upstairs in another section you seem to be doing blatant OR on flimsy sources. Really putting together Aftab and whatnot and divining the exact moment the balance shifted to the Hizb. I know you to be better than that. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:54, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Well, if the details are delegated to a later sentence, then length becomes less of a constraint. ‘Ethno-religious’ can go, but with an accompanying remark about factions other than JKLF (like Hizb). I propose “By the time the exodus was largely complete, the insurgency was being led by a declaredly secular group with the predominant goal of political independence, but also consisted of Islamist factions envisioning an Islamic state.” Or something similar. UnpetitproleX (talk) 16:03, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

That's fine. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:35, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@UnpetitproleX: So the first sentence would be shortened to:

The Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, also Pandits, is their early 1990 migration, or flight, from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an insurgency.

The second would read: By the time the exodus was largely complete, the insurgency was being led by a declaredly secular group with the predominant goal of political independence, but also consisted of Islamist factions envisioning an Islamic state.

Third: Some 90,000–100,000 Pandits of a total population of 120,000–140,000 left because they felt insecure or were made to feel insecure, and 30–80 were killed.

The remaining would be the same. Please see that @Kautilya3 and Akshaypatill: are on board. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:54, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Mostly agree with this. Minor modifications: the second and third should be switched, imo. In the pattern of: this is what happened; this is how pandits were impacted; this is what the insurgency was.

And also, I do think my wording for the ‘felt insecure’ line was better because the source says Pandits were insecure, and most left (as opposed to those Pandits who left, felt insecure). UnpetitproleX (talk) 17:11, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@UnpetitproleX: Per Kautilya3's latest post below, please go ahead and change the lead paragraph. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:52, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Fowler&fowler and Kautilya3: I’ve changed the paragraph, and added Brass as a ref and moved citations but the citations probably still need organising and more moving. I leave that to you and Kautilya3. You may add, remove or move the current citations to wherever is more appropriate. UnpetitproleX (talk) 22:28, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@UnpetitproleX: Thank you! Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:11, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@UnpetitproleX: I had forgotten that we talk about fear and panic in the third sentence. So, maybe, there isn't much point talking about insecurity in the second. You could change it to: "Some 90,000-100,000 Pandits of a total population of 120,000–140,000 left the Valley and 30–80 were killed." if you'd like Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:21, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I am fine with this. Might I add that this is exactly what I had been advocating for since the beginning, that we do not need to use “felt [feeling]” and can simply use “left/fled the valley” for the figures. UnpetitproleX (talk) 23:29, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

I mean the fourth sentence. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:25, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Basically this:

The Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, also Pandits, is their early 1990 migration, or flight, from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an insurgency. The Pandits with a total population ranging between 120,000-140,000 felt or were made to feel insecure, about 90,000-100,000 of them left the valley, and 30–80 were killed. By the time the exodus was largely complete, the insurgency was being led by a declaredly secular group with the predominant goal of political independence, but also consisted of Islamist factions envisioning an Islamic state.

Open to further modifications by any of you. UnpetitproleX (talk) 17:15, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

The source says "ultimately." It might be better with: The Pandits with a total population ranging between 120,000 and 140,000 eventually felt vulnerable or were made to feel so, and about ..." (to avoid close paraphrasing: insecure to vulnerable; ultimately to eventually) Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:26, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Well, I don't know what changed. But I am ok with the proposed reordering. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:59, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

User:UnpetitproleX, we are back to square one as Fowler has removed your 'felt or were made to feel insecure'. The wording is back to pre-discussion, rendering all the discussions futile. The word 'left' alone doesn't imply the involuntary nature of the migration. We had discussion at lengths for the wording. You should check the archives. 'Felt compelled' was much better to this effect. Also Fowler had opposed calling the exodus involuntary in past discussions, so I don't see the 'were made to feel insecure' remaining in the lead for long. Akshaypatill (talk) 03:18, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

I’m ok with “left,” though I do think “fled” would be better (this is what is used in the infobox for the same sentence). As for “felt or were made to feel insecure”, this part can still be included in the fourth sentence that talks about fear and panic, and cited to Brass. UnpetitproleX (talk) 10:07, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

I don't have any issues with restoring "felt compelled to leave." I just did not want "insecure" to be in the second sentence, as similar states fear and panic are in the fourth sentence. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:00, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

@TrangaBellam: Had the previous sentence been about the Pandits, starting with the appositive, "Generally allied to India," would have made good sense. But as it stands, it makes the reader think initially that we are talking about the insurgents and causes them to pause for a moment to mentally clarify. I will change this. If you don't like it, please revert Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:02, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Also, "declaredly secular group with the predominant goal of political independence," is a mouthful. Even readers familiar with such jargon will pause. I am changing it to the language of the first cited reference Bose and Jalal, "led by a group calling for a secular an independent Kashmir." Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:00, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

References

Tertiary sources

@Kautilya3: Another thing I am perplexed by is the dismissive remark about the authors of the TERTIARY sources. Barbara D. Metcalf for example is a pre-eminent scholar of Islam in South Asia. See her books on the WP page. Do you seriously think she doesn't have the network after 40 years of research on Islam in South Asia to not know what was going on in Kashmir? She was the President of the American Historical Association, besides. The review of her last book, Islamic Contestations, OUP, in the Journal of the American Association of Religion reads The book bears witness to the years Barbara Daly Metcalf has spent working with and reflecting upon materials and issue pertaining to modern and contemporary South Asian Islam. In her introduction, she share the profound insights that can only emerge after one as worked so trenchantly in a specialized field as hers: Indian subcontinental Muslims. Yet you are dismissing and her husband Thomas R. Metcalf's widely read 2012 book, A Concise History of Modern India on the grounds that it might not be up-to-date, but holding up Sumit Ganguly's 1999 Crisis in Kashmir as the shining source on the insurgency. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:41, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

And, yet there is only one small paragraph on Kashmir (p.224) in Islamic Contestations.

The coverage in Concise History of Modern India is also quite wishy-washy. They almost imply that the Maharaja "decided" to accede to India before anything happened (p.224), but Nehru accepted it only after Kashmir was invaded (p.225) and saw "no reason to undo it" (So, if we were all under the impression that Nehru promised to hold a plebiscite, we were imagining things). Finally, it was "Pakistan [that] took the Kashmir issue to the fledgling United Nations". (p.225)

For me, the policy that matters most is WP:CONTEXTMATTERS. I see out source that display a detailed knowledge of the subject and perhaps done considerable thinking about it to sort out troublesome issues. In that respect, the Ganguly books are far more suitable than Metcalf and Metcalf. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:56, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Islamic Contestations is not a Tertiary Source, just an indication of her familiarity with South Asian Islam. In CHMI, M&M say

The year 1989 marked the beginning of a continuing insurgency, fuelled by covert support from Pakistan. The uprising had its origins in Kashmiri frustration at the state's treatment by Delhi. The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Of a population of 140,000, upwards of 100,000 perhaps left the state during early 1990; their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate ‘suspects’ and weed out Pakistani ‘infiltrators’, the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.

Ganguly is nowhere in their league. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:42, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: There are four other Tertiary sources from which I have quoted above, making five in all. Four of the five speak to Secular. Please read them. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:49, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

"Compelled to leave"

I thought we had discussed this phrase in the past discussions, but apparently we hadn't. The original choice was between two phrasings: "left" and "forced to leave". "Left" suggests leaving voluntarily, which we don't believe was the case. "Forced to leave" implies that they were directly asked to leave or threatened to leave. Despite the Pandits' claims, scholars don't find evidence for Pandits being asked to leave. Even if the slogan "Kafiron, Kashmir hamara, Chod do" was in fact used, it could be taken to have been directed against the state rather than the Pandits. Polls revealed that only 2% of the Pandits had received direct threats. The rest didn't.

So, "felt compelled to leave" was an intermediate phrasing that suggests some degree of exertion but not as strong "forced to leave". Fowler&fowler switched to this wording on his own, and I was glad when he did so. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:59, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Agree. It touches almost all the views. Thanks to Fowler. Akshaypatill (talk) 17:43, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

US based ICHRRF officially recognise this as a Genocide

This shall be added

US-based non-profit organization International Commission for Human Rights and Religious Freedom (ICHRRF) has officially recognized the Kashmiri Hindu genocide in Jammu & Kashmir. The ICHRRF declared its recognition of the genocide of Kashmiri Hindus after a hearing on the issue.

References

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Kichupila (talk • contribs) 10:55, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Provide repair secondary sources discussing this to show that it is due. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:40, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Ved Nanda, listed as a director of that non-profit org, is/was the sanghchalak of Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh. The chairman, Adityanjee, might've had direct links with Vivekananda International Foundation. That "International Commission" is way far from being an independent organization when it comes to Kashmir-related things. Hemantha (talk) 11:51, 28 March 2022 (UTC)

Provided secondary RS Kichupila (talk) 03:57, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Another reprint of the same IANS post addressed in another edit request below. Take this as a warning and stop disruptive opening of edit requests. Hemantha (talk) 07:12, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

what is the problem with IANS? sensible reply expected Kichupila (talk) 11:42, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

• Strike off sock comments — DaxServer (t · m · c) 06:33, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

The Genocide Drive-Bys

@Kautilya3, UnpetitproleX, Akshaypatill, TrangaBellam, Cannolis, Hemantha, and ScottishFinnishRadish: As you know, there is a veritable cavalcade of IP drive-bys on this talk page requesting the name of the page to be changed to "Genocide of Kashmiri Hindus." I just reverted a post that claimed 400,000 were killed, that number being more than three times that of those who migrated out.

Do you think the sentence about the exodus not being a genocide (which is currently the last sentence in the first paragraph of the lead) might be better placed to deter the drive-bys were it to follow the violence statistics as in this version? I had changed it, then thought it didn't fit the narration so smoothly, but am wondering again if it might not be a reasonable short-term expedient. Apologies if I have forgotten someone. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:11, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

The movie, "The Kashmir Files", running successfully all over India, uses the word, "genocide" and that is why this is happening. Do you want to do what they are asking - add that this was a genocide? Find a reliable source for it then!-Y2edit? (talk) 13:08, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

They won't read anything and will continue to make the requests and comments until the publicity from the movie dies down. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 13:37, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

Hi Folwer, I don't think those drive-by IPs either read the page, or believe what it says. They are a lost cause. I think we should simply ignore them. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:40, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

It appears that at least Android users (both IP and logged-in) are now shown WP:EDITNOTICEs, so perhaps one can be requested from admins? Editnotices would be shown on every edit, see this for example. Or a bright warning at talk page top like the one at Talk:Shamsheer Vayali might also work, which doesn't need admin input. ({{FAQ}}, {{Warning}} etc templates aren't shown in mobile skin, so would be useless) Hemantha (talk) 02:54, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

I don't oppose moving that sentence but I also don't feel it will affect the number of requests. Pretty sure the only thing that would reduce requests would be moving the article to Genocide. Cannolis (talk) 17:11, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

I don’t think moving the sentence does any better a job at deterring the drive-bys than the current placing does, both are within the lead paragraph. We could even put it as the first sentence and it still wouldn’t change anything. Even the current placing in the lead paragraph (as opposed to later in the lead) is mostly because of the Kashmir Files fiasco, as far as I understand. The current placing is fine imo. They firmly believe it was a “genocide,” they don’t care about what happened or whether it fits the definition. The drive-bys will die down as soon as there’s a new thing for the Hindutva brigade to obsess over. UnpetitproleX (talk) 17:34, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

El C, please change the protection level of this article from Extended confirmed protected to semi-protected, so that more people can edit it (asking for 500 edits to become eligible to edit this article is too much). Thanks!-Y2edit? (talk) 06:45, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

The notice right at the top is enough to deter disruptive editing.-Y2edit? (talk) 06:54, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

Sorry, Y2edit? , but simply saying it's too much does not make it so. Your request does not address the substance of the action, so I am declining it. El_C 19:41, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

How is that notice enough? You assume disruptive users visit the talk page, but many do not even know it exists (or are limited to devices that don't even display a link to it). El_C 19:46, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

How about an FAQ banner instead of the current flashy red banner?. That would be better like we use it on several other talk pages instead of the current one. See Category:Wikipedia article FAQs — DaxServer (t · m · c) 20:47, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

Very good idea @DaxServer:. Would you like to take a stab? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:55, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

@Fowler&fowler I ventured into it :) The current version is crude and certainly need tweaks. I wouldn't be surprised if someone posted a section asking why the FAQ points out Hindu nationalists and that it's wrong. Either way I would leave those improvements to you or other endeavourists, if that's even a word!! Looking at those other FAQs and their wording could be worthwhile — DaxServer (t · m · c) 21:16, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

@DaxServer: what you are proposing will not be visible to mobile users, so please let the present notice remain.-Y2edit? (talk) 22:09, 3 April 2022 (UTC)

Yes, all the templated messages are hidden behind an bland "About this page" link on mobile, even for logged-in users. Check how it looks for mobile editors. As seen by pageviews, roughly as many views are from mobiles as from desktops for this talk page. And I suspect all of the Exodus/Genocide requests are from mobiles. If it's the provenance that's suspect, @DaxServer, it's copied from this page where an administrator had added it.

But as others have already said, none of these talk notes will address Fowler's original concern about article edits; which I think, can only be addressed by WP:EDITNOTICEs. Hemantha (talk) 04:37, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

Hemantha, what do you mean? I added the edit notice (Template:Editnotices/Page/Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus) back in 2019. El_C 09:12, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

@El C, Fowler's concern was how to mitigate 'Exodus to Genocide' changes by editors who don't bother reading the lead, let alone the article. While the current edit notice on 1RR and DS is very strong, it doesn't have language specific to the frequently requested/changed 'Exodus/Genocide' aspect. My suggestion was that adding some text to the editnotice, informing about scholarly opinion on the term genocide, might help in catching the attention of such users. Hemantha (talk) 09:23, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

Okay, feel free to propose the custom text and I'll consider adding it to the edit notice. El_C 09:49, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

@El C: I edit Wikipedia with my mobile and after you removed the notice DaxServer complained about, I can't see any notice/warning at all now!-Y2edit? (talk) 10:04, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

Yes, Wikipedia on mobile is quite lagging. That's a known issue that Wikimedia Foundation, I believe, is working to improve upon. — DaxServer (t · m · c) 10:06, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

Y2edit?, I didn't remove anything. El_C 10:25, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

Oh, I am sorry, DaxServer was the one who removed it with this edit but I request you to put it back there, so that mobile editors (like me) can see it.-Y2edit? (talk) 10:34, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

I think a normal FAQ would be better than that unconventional talk page notice. El_C 10:46, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

El C, only that notice (which you say is unconventional) is visible to mobile users/editors. I am only giving suggestions here. I have already been accused of "bludgeoning" wrongly according to WP:BLUDGEON (see my talk page), so please don't sanction me any further for posting suggestions here. Thanks!-Y2edit? (talk) 10:51, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

Y2edit?, I've no intention to sanction you right now for making proposals. Anyway, that problem could be resolved easily enough (I'll give it a shot in a sec), but that other talk page notice just seems too jarring. El_C 10:57, 4 April 2022 (UTC)

FAQ notice for mobile users RE: "genocide"

The FAQ above may not display for some mobile users. It is available at: Talk:Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus/FAQ. El_C 10:59, 4 April 2022 (UTC)