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Reform bill

  • "Even the Third Reform Bill of 1884 fails to meet Rummell's stated criteria for democracy" Again simply false, here is his critera "By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least 2/3rds of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights" Ultramarine 13:50, 27 January 2006 (UTC)
    • The figures are: in 1884, about 5 and a half million out of about 9.2 adult males (8.897 million in 1881 census; 9.794 in 1891) For 1911, seven and a half out of 12.846. International historical statistics. Europe, 1750-2000 Pp. 3,8, 26, 44-5. 60% is less than two-thirds.Septentrionalis 03:22, 28 January 2006 (UTC)



Never at War

Weart has never stated that Syracuse was as democratic as Athens. He states that the only scholar who ever possessed the documents needed study the constitution of Syracuse, Aristotle, carefully avoided calling Syracuse a democracy. One of the main reason for the Sicilian Expedition was that Syracuse was reported to have violent factional strife. Help from an inside group was essential since the Greeks lacked effective siege machinery. In every other known case when cities were betrayed to an Athenian army, it was by a democratic faction.Ultramarine 23:46, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

In so saying, he persuades me, as he persuaded Eric Robinson, the classicist, that he is out of his field and out of his depth.
  • It is unlikely that the Constitution of Syracuse was written from "documents", rather than oral traditions and monuments. Certainly there is no trace of them in the Constitution of Athens, which survives.
  • Whatever sources were available to Aristotle, or his student, were also available to Timaeus of Tauromenium, whose work is reflected in Diodorus.
  • The meaning of politeia in Aristotle is one of the most vexed philological questions. It is entirely possible that the passage in question means a transition from elected officials to direct democracy.
  • The remarks on siege warfare show profound ignorance of the subject, as I have remarked in the text. I see that Weart cites a modern count of 27 betrayals during the war; one a year is a remarkably small number, considering the number of operations against cities that took place.

These comments are for the benefit of anyone who will read them, not a justification of text. Demands for sources will be ignored, as harassment. Septentrionalis 05:11, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

Furthermore, Weart does not make claims regarding "city-states" or "republics" only. He talks about democracies in general. And this is another of Pmanderson personal musings: "oligarchs view democracy as government by the bad men, as Theognis put it."Ultramarine 18:42, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

Would Ultramarine explain what difference he imagines between democracies as governed by inferior men and democracy as government by the bad men, except in vividness and the use of an actual quotation from an oligarch? Septentrionalis 18:53, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
That is your opinion and original research. However, Weart has never used Theognis.Ultramarine 19:34, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
Weart is very incomplete and non-consensus in his treatment of classical antiquity in general, as his reviews make clear. This might be a valid objection to mentioning the canonical sources on the subject in Never at War; but not here. Septentrionalis 20:08, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

Weart defines "democracy" as a type of republic; see page 12. Not all non-democracies are republics; the oligarchies are, autocracies are not. Weart's argument gives no reason for autocrats to treat each other as in-group, and he denies they can form lasting alliances. (p255ff.) Nor is there any reason for oligarchies to bond with autocrats; and in fact Sparta defied Philip of Macedon, when every other city in Greece capitulated to him. Septentrionalis 16:10, 8 February 2006 (UTC)

Gowa again

Joanne Gowa has presented to most well-known criticism of the theory. Septentrionalis has however presented it incorrectly and in violation of NPOV excluded the counter-arguments.

Pmanderson's text: "Jeanne Gowa analyzed the claims of one of these theorists. She finds that there were so few democracies, by his definition, before 1939 that the claims of the theory are not significant. She also finds that there were only independent, non-allied, Great Powers for a relatively short time before the Entente Cordiale of 1904; and that there were several crises and minor conflicts, between them, in several of which war was popular on both sides. While war was averted in these cases, there was only one war between Powers in that period, and the Spanish-American War was between a democracy and a borderline democracy.) [35] The democratic peace since 1945 she finds significant, but largely explained by the external cause of the Cold War (see below)."

In another section: "Joanne Gowa observes that much of the data used to infer an absolute democratic peace consists of Western democracies not going to war with each other while allied against the Soviet Union, and argues that this offers limited hope that non-allied democracies will remain at peace"

An "absolute democratic peace" theory is something invented by Pmanderson. Some research have found no wars between democracies, with wars having more than 1000 battle deaths. Other research have found fewer MIDs between democracies, with MID being a broader concept including for example a military display of strength with no deaths. Note that this is the findings of many different researchers and studies.

Gowa briefly notes that the Spanish-American war may be an exception to no wars, based on the Polity II classification of Spain in 1898. However, this score has changed in Polity III and IV. Almost all of her criticism is instead against fewer MIDs between democracies. She finds that democracies have fewer MIDs but argues that this is a recent pattern due to the external threat during the Cold War. She argues that before 1914 inter-democratic MIDs were as likely as MIDs involving at least one nondemocracy.

Pmanderson has completely excluded the counter-arguments. "While not statistical evidence, one intuitive counter-argument is that external threat did not prevent wars between the Communist states and did not prevent wars beteen democracies and nondemocracies in the Western bloc."[4]. "More importantly, more recent studies find fewer MIDs between democracies also before the Cold War.[5][6]. Gowa's theory does not explain the low domestic violence in democracies or why relative military strength does not influence the outcome of crises between democracies.[7] Gowa did not control for alliances, arguing that there are methodological problems. Many studies that have controlled for alliances like NATO show support for the DPT.[8]"

Also, permission to split my comments is not given. Your have previously made the flow of discussion the flow of the discussion unintelligible by doing this. Put your comments after my signature only.Ultramarine 15:03, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

Then split them yourself! This gallimaufry of separate (and mostly false) claims cannot be answered together. Septentrionalis 14:42, 4 February 2006 (UTC)
I will present a new structure under which Ultramarine's separate claims can be answered separately; but at a better computer. Septentrionalis 15:44, 4 February 2006 (UTC)
No answers yet, despite Pmanderson initial statement that there would be one in 24 hours. I will give him a little more time before making the necessary changes.Ultramarine 12:12, 6 February 2006 (UTC)
  • This is a misquotation. I said I would probably be able to edit at a suitable computer in 24 hours. It was in fact somewhat more; and when I did ge to one, I had only time to answer a couple of points above.
  • If Ultramarine is impatient, he can divide this section into separate heads himself, as requested. Septentrionalis 15:50, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

Let me make this short. Ultramarine's account of Gowa is so sketchy and inaccurate that I do not recognize the book. Ray's counterargument ignores the whole structure of her argument. The observation that she did not answer Gelpi's paper, which was published two years after her book was published, is valueless. As for the proposed structure, this is another of Ultramarine's efforts to bias this article by sandwiching any argument he dislikes between counterarguments. Septentrionalis 23:09, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

This is the response that took several days to produce and required moving to a different computer??? This is your response to the scholarly articles??? Thanks for showing your true interest in discussing the factual issues.Ultramarine 07:02, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
No, this is the short version, which doesn't take several days to produce. Divide the complaints into separate points, or permit your complaint to be divided; and I will, in time, address those that do not arise from a simple failure to read the sources or the text of the article. Septentrionalis 17:12, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
As I have stated repeatedly, you can of course quote my statements and split the quotes however you like.Ultramarine 06:07, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

second iteration

Joanne Gowa has presented to most well-known criticism of the theory. Septentrionalis has however presented it incorrectly and in violation of NPOV excluded the counter-arguments.

Pmanderson's text: "Jeanne Gowa analyzed the claims of one of these theorists. She finds that there were so few democracies, by his definition, before 1939 that the claims of the theory are not significant. She also finds that there were only independent, non-allied, Great Powers for a relatively short time before the Entente Cordiale of 1904; and that there were several crises and minor conflicts, between them, in several of which war was popular on both sides. While war was averted in these cases, there was only one war between Powers in that period, and the Spanish-American War was between a democracy and a borderline democracy.) [35] The democratic peace since 1945 she finds significant, but largely explained by the external cause of the Cold War (see below)."

In another section: "Joanne Gowa observes that much of the data used to infer an absolute democratic peace consists of Western democracies not going to war with each other while allied against the Soviet Union, and argues that this offers limited hope that non-allied democracies will remain at peace"

An "absolute democratic peace" theory is something invented by Pmanderson. Some research have found no wars between democracies, with wars having more than 1000 battle deaths. Other research have found fewer MIDs between democracies, with MID being a broader concept including for example a military display of strength with no deaths. Note that this is the findings of many different researchers and studies.

  • The present text should not speak of absolute DPTs; but of an "absolute democratic peace"; which phrase is my invention. "Absolute" is the best way I can think of to make the distinction between those descriptions of the democratic peace which acknowledge no exceptional wars and those which admit rare or marginal ones. All alternatives I can think of are either clumsy or barbarous. Suggestions are welcome; none have been made. Septentrionalis 18:09, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Gowa briefly notes that the Spanish-American war may be an exception to no wars, based on the Polity II classification of Spain in 1898. However, this score has changed in Polity III and IV. Almost all of her criticism is instead against fewer MIDs between democracies. She finds that democracies have fewer MIDs but argues that this is a recent pattern due to the external threat during the Cold War. She argues that before 1914 inter-democratic MIDs were as likely as MIDs involving at least one nondemocracy.

  • The change in the classification of Spain is mentioned in the present text, in the footnote to the extract Ultramarine makes. Since the difference is between one side of the borderline to the other, and there are other methods of making a democracy/non-democracy brightline out of Gurr's data (for example, Gleditsch subtracts autocracy from democracy), this seems as much emphasis as is warranted.
  • Gowa argues many things; the book is a compilation of six long papers. The text is a summary of page 61, which discusses wars (as also p. 108 and elsewhere). She also regards MID's as a far more significant indicator, and tends to use them herself, but that is a separate criticism of studies based on wars, which Ultramarine should feel free to add. Septentrionalis 18:09, 14 February 2006 (UTC)


Pmanderson has completely excluded the counter-arguments. "While not statistical evidence, one intuitive counter-argument is that external threat did not prevent wars between the Communist states and did not prevent wars beteen democracies and nondemocracies in the Western bloc."[9]. "More importantly, more recent studies find fewer MIDs between democracies also before the Cold War.[10][11]. Gowa's theory does not explain the low domestic violence in democracies or why relative military strength does not influence the outcome of crises between democracies.[12] Gowa did not control for alliances, arguing that there are methodological problems. Many studies that have controlled for alliances like NATO show support for the DPT.[13]"

  • These are cut-and-pastes from Ray's paper, which is a polemic. Undesirable on both counts.
  • Gowa's analysis of alliances is confined to parts two chapters; one to assert that alliances do (as they are intended to) have a real effect in keeping the peace between their members; and one to show that this is a plausible explanation for the Cold War peace between the democracies. Ray is an advocate, and is (by those rules) playing fair in objecting that she does not answer a paper not yet published when her book was printed. It would be PoV for Wikipedia to do so. Septentrionalis 18:09, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Also, permission to split my comments is not given. Your have previously made the flow of discussion the flow of the discussion unintelligible by doing this. Put your comments after my signature only.Ultramarine 15:03, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

Then split them yourself! This gallimaufry of separate (and mostly false) claims cannot be answered together. Septentrionalis 14:42, 4 February 2006 (UTC)
I will present a new structure under which Ultramarine's separate claims can be answered separately; but at a better computer. Septentrionalis 15:44, 4 February 2006 (UTC)
No answers yet, despite Pmanderson initial statement that there would be one in 24 hours. I will give him a little more time before making the necessary changes.Ultramarine 12:12, 6 February 2006 (UTC)
  • This is a misquotation. I said I would probably be able to edit at a suitable computer in 24 hours. It was in fact somewhat more; and when I did ge to one, I had only time to answer a couple of points above.
  • If Ultramarine is impatient, he can divide this section into separate heads himself, as requested. Septentrionalis 15:50, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

Let me make this short. Ultramarine's account of Gowa is so sketchy and inaccurate that I do not recognize the book. Ray's counterargument ignores the whole structure of her argument. The observation that she did not answer Gelpi's paper, which was published two years after her book was published, is valueless. As for the proposed structure, this is another of Ultramarine's efforts to bias this article by sandwiching any argument he dislikes between counterarguments. Septentrionalis 23:09, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

This is the response that took several days to produce and required moving to a different computer??? This is your response to the scholarly articles??? Thanks for showing your true interest in discussing the factual issues.Ultramarine 07:02, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
No, this is the short version, which doesn't take several days to produce. Divide the complaints into separate points, or permit your complaint to be divided; and I will, in time, address those that do not arise from a simple failure to read the sources or the text of the article. Septentrionalis 17:12, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
As I have stated repeatedly, you can of course quote my statements and split the quotes however you like.Ultramarine 06:07, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Before Ultramarine objects, I acknowledge that I have not included Gowa's finding that there were fewer MID's between democracies entre les deux guerres. Brevity should count for something, even in footnotes. She herself observes that the influence of joint democracy is less than the effect of contiguity and the belligerence of great powers. Septentrionalis 18:46, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

third iteration

Septentrionalis acknowledges that an "absolute democratic peace" is his own invention and not used in the literature. Again, some research have found no wars between democracies, with wars having more than 1000 battle deaths. Other research have found fewer MIDs between democracies, with MID being a broader concept including for example a military display of strength with no deaths. Note that this is the findings of many different researchers and studies. Again, Gowa mainly attacks the claims regarding MIDs. The presentation of her research is misleading.

Septentrionalis seems to misunderstand Gowa completely "She also finds that there were only independent, non-allied, Great Powers for a relatively short time before the Entente Cordiale of 1904; and that there were several crises and minor conflicts, between them, in several of which war was popular on both sides. While war was averted in these cases, there was only one war between Powers in that period, and the Spanish-American War was between a democracy and a borderline democracy." Gowa in chapter 5 is only trying to intuitively show that alliances are a good indicator of whether state interests concede. In later chapters she analyzes data for regarding alliances and all states, not just Great Powers. The DPT is certainly not limited to only Great Powers which Septentrionalis seems to argue here.

  • Gowa finds that major powers are involved in more war. By this same finding, the peacefulness of small powers is another cause of the democratic peace, if a minor one. "The effects of major powers and contiguity are positive and statistically significant" (p. 61)
  • Major powers "dominate the creation and maintenance of international systems." (p.74).Septentrionalis 21:18, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
    • Strange arguments. Again, Gowa is not trying to disprove the DPT here, she is only trying to show that alliances are good indicators of whether state interests concede.Ultramarine 08:56, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
      • I presume Ultramarine means coincide. She is, however, doing this to show what the normal behavior of allied and unallied states is, in order to show that this accounts for the phenomena called the "democratic peace". Septentrionalis 16:26, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

Septentrionalis states "She finds that there were so few democracies, by his definition, before 1939 that the claims of the theory are not significant." This is incorrect, she finds that there is no significant difference in war rates for democrarcies and non-democracies before WWI. (p. 104)

  • "Nor does dyadic regime type affect the probability of war between 1919 and 1939" P.62, as cited. p.104 is using a different set of statistical tests, which are ineffective in discriminating between factors producing war on data that include no wars. [User:Pmanderson|Septentrionalis]] 21:18, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Septentrionalis reasons for excluding the peer-reviewed papers critical of Gowa is "These are cut-and-pastes from Ray's paper, which is a polemic. Undesirable on both counts." and "Gowa's analysis of alliances is confined to parts two chapters; one to assert that alliances do (as they are intended to) have a real effect in keeping the peace between their members; and one to show that this is a plausible explanation for the Cold War peace between the democracies. Ray is an advocate, and is (by those rules) playing fair in objecting that she does not answer a paper not yet published when her book was printed. It would be PoV for Wikipedia to do so." Most are not from Ray's peer-reviewed paper. Even if they were, that is no excuse for excluding them. His argument that one cannot include papers published after Gowa's book is strange and invalid.Ultramarine 20:35, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Caption and NPOV Tag

The problem is that this is prominently stated at the top: "Inflation of the position of R. J. Rummel, and advocacy of his particular findings, which is giving undue weight to a single researcher". No evidence of this has been presented. Indeed, I have previously presented many studies mentioning that most researchers and studies accept the DPT as an empirical regularity. As Rummel is specifically attacked, some of his credentials should be specifically mentioned. Therefore, I can accept changing to Robert A West's text if also removing the strange statement regarding Rummel. However, far more important than this is continuing the discussion regarding Gowa's criticism. Ultramarine 17:45, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

So, did you add the caption to balance the template? If so, I don't follow your reasoning. The template makes no disparaging claim about Rummel whatsoever. The claim is about the text of the article, and responding to it by adding (or preserving) more text of the type the template objects to strikes me as counterproductive at best. Robert A West 18:07, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
Well, not disparaging, simply false. There are many other researchers who have a similar position, not only Rummel. So how about changing it to "Inflation of the position of the supporters of the DPT"? Ultramarine 18:12, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
Interesting. I see no claim about Rummel at all in the template. If I criticized an article about modern developments in Cosmology for giving undue weight to Albert Einstein (say by omitting Kip Thorne or Edward Witten) that is not a claim about Einstein -- it is, I suppose, a claim about Kip and Ed. Robert A West 18:31, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
So you agree to removing or changing this statement? As can be seen here, Rummel's position is shared by many others.[14]Ultramarine 18:57, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
Then those others should also be given due weight, especially in a field like this where "agree" tends to mean "agree 90%". Scaife took out a lot of what looked like fluff to me. To what degree this allays Septentrionalis's concerns is something he should speak to. Meanwhile, horse-trading of the sort you propose does not strike me as appropriate in this case. Robert A West 20:28, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
That is my point, many of these reserachers that support the DPT are now excluded. Which brings us back to the earlier discussions regarding Gowa and her counter-critics. Unless someone shortly gives some evidence that Rummel's views are unsupported by other reserachers, contradicting the material I have presented, and therefore given undue weight, I will ~shortly remove the statement. Ultramarine 20:41, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
That would be needlessly provacative, and I advise against it. IMHO you are misunderstanding the criticism and therefore responding inappropriately. Robert A West 21:46, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
Then explain it. "Inflation of the position of R. J. Rummel, and advocacy of his particular findings, which is giving undue weight to a single researcher" Again, there are many other reserachers that have the same findings.[15]Ultramarine 21:48, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
Assuming I am understanding correctly ("I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken") there are three points:
  1. Findings are never (well, hardly ever) 'identical'. Few academic papers say, "Smith got it right, and didn't miss anything. I have nothing to add." Thus, giving too much weight to Smith will tend to ignore the additional findings of Jones, who extended and refined his theories. Emphasizing Rummel gives short-shrift to Russet and Oneal, who believe in a Kantian mechanism that is distinguishable from Rummel's view.
  2. Superfluous references to Rummel's bibliography and website give the impression of Rummelolatry. Scaife eliminated a lot of this.
  3. Repeatedly inserting Peacock terms and marginally-useful opinions Rummel holds give the same impression.
This is *not* the same as saying that Rummel is unsupported. Robert A West 22:41, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
There are many other reserachers, like Ray and Weart, that agree completely with Rummel. Nor do Russet or Oneal disagree very much with Rummel. Rummel certainly also argues for the importance of other factors. Please state exactly what findings are given undue weight from a single researcher.Ultramarine 22:46, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
I did not place the tag, so I am not the correct person to answer your question. I am merely explaining what I think it means. Robert A West 22:56, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
What findings do you think Pmanderson are refering to? Ultramarine 23:02, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
The same question to you, Pmanderson. Exactly what findings by Rummel is given undue weight and is from a single researcher? Ultramarine 23:13, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

Most importantly:There are two main differences among those theorists who support a democratic peace, both of which divide the field:

    • The question of a Kantian versus a non-Kantian peace
    • The question of whether there exist a few marginal or exceptional wars between democracies, or whether there are none.

Rummel takes the second position on both questions; my impression is in each case this is the minority view. Both splits, however, are fairly even; and some authors take a neutral or compromise view of one or the other.

However, Rummel, Ray, and Weart are almost alone, among the hundred-some authors on DPT, in holding both the non-Kantian and the no-exceptions position.

(Note that an acknowledgement of exceptions doesn't show that there is no democratic peace, any more than the statement "My Uncle Joe lived to be a hundred, and he smoked a cigar every day of his life" shows that smoking doesn't cause cancer.)

Secondly. the opposition to any democratic peace is throughly understated. For example, Ultramarine has just added a word which implies, falsely, that Gowa objected only to particular DPT's.

Third:There is a wide difference of definitions on what consistitutes a democracy, and what constitutes a full war. Spiro remarks on this at some length, in a paper I have cited but not yet summarized. Ultramarine's parenthesized additions to the section on Specific historic examples are tendentious appeals to Rummel's particular definitions.

This applies also to Rummel's charts, which include such non-consensus claims as the democracy of Ukraine in 2004, before the Orange Revolution. (click on the PDF links, the uploaded images are illegible.) Septentrionalis 23:43, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

While defering to Mr. West and Septentrionalis, I would have to echo some of their observations. From an academic POV this article does lean a bit more towards Rummel, as well as the ideology of libertarianism. Including those viewpoints are fine with me, however my concerns are that by doing a simple literature review of recent DPT articles, Rummel is hardly mentioned. That is not to say that his viewpoints are insignificant, but that there are more widely accepted ideas that are not being given their proper voice.
I believe that Mr. West made a good point when he stated that,:
"Assuming I am understanding correctly ("I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken") there are three points:
  1. Findings are never (well, hardly ever) 'identical'. Few academic papers say, "Smith got it right, and didn't miss anything. I have nothing to add." Thus, giving too much weight to Smith will tend to ignore the additional findings of Jones, who extended and refined his theories. Emphasizing Rummel gives short-shrift to Russet and Oneal, who believe in a Kantian mechanism that is distinguishable from Rummel's view.
  2. Superfluous references to Rummel's bibliography and website give the impression of Rummelolatry.
  3. Repeatedly inserting Peacock terms and marginally-useful opinions Rummel holds give the same impression.
This is in now way an attack on Rummel, nor is it upon you Ultramarine, I am sure that we can all work together to make sure that all (important, since we shouldn't editorialize) sides of the issue. BTW kudos on the recent edits to everyone, as well as playing nice over the past 24 hours. :) --Scaife 23:56, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
Pmanderson, Please cite your sources for that Rummel objects to the three Kantian variables. Please also cite your sources for the research that have found exceptions to no wars. Most disagreement concern the frequency of MIDs, not the rule of no wars. Here are four different researchers who have found no wars between democracies, including Russet.[16]-- —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Ultramarine (talk • contribs) .
I didn't say Rummel objected to the Kantian variables; I said he produced a theory without two of them. Please present a source that says otherwise. For sources which assert the existence of exceptional cases, see the footnotes on the section on Specific historic examples. I have quoted Chan above; Maoz explicitly excepts the Spanish-American war; Cederman argues that exceptions are, according to what Kant actually held, only to be expected: they encourage the democracies to actually adopt and strengthen the articles of perpetual peace. Spiro cites the Continuation War. Doyle cites two exceptions, but eventually disregards them.
I would not be surprised if there is relatively little writing on rare exceptions; their existence or non-existence has little bearing on the real scholarly question of whether democracy is associated with peace. Zero can be true, and still not significant; on the other hand, the tendency could be established beyond all doubt, and there may still be a war when all other factors are against peace. Septentrionalis 17:28, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
  • The question of zero or very few matters almost entirely in terms of the soundbite presented by Bush and Clinton, which readers will come here to check. I have seen no democratic peace theorist hold that exceptions are common; I have seen none hold they are impossible. The middle ground is that they happen once in a blue moon; and the question of zero is whether there has been a blue moon yet — not the sort of the question that helps with understanding the democratic peace, and so not an important subject of research. Septentrionalis 23:10, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

I should also point out that if it is established that Rummel included international organizations and trade in his theory, the article would have to be recast, started with including them in the header. The non-Kantian writers would become such small parts of the field that they should be noted in a paragraph on exceptional writers. Septentrionalis 17:32, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Then Rummel's view in no way contradict the Kantian Triad. Regarding exceptions to no war: The Cederman link is dead. There is no explanation what wars Chan may have objected to. This leaves only Maoz and Sprio who give two possible exceptions. This hardly seems convincing, I have given four books that find the opposite, including one by Russet who also argues for the Kantian trial. See this User:Ultramarine/sandbox3 for a discussion with references of many possible exceptions.Ultramarine 18:13, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Cederman's paper is fully cited; go and look it up. I recommend InterLibrary Loan, not for the first time. As for the sandbox article, this is the sort of one-sided presentation and narrow adherence to Rummel's definitions to which I object. I could not imagine a better example than this recreation of a deleted article.Septentrionalis 18:19, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
  • For a relatively neutral discussion of these examples, and many more, see Matthew White, here.
You call that neutral? A personal webpage that gives no sources and consistently removes and distorts the arguments against these conflicts being wars between liberal democracies.Ultramarine 18:27, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Yes; although I did not realise that he had ignored Ultramarine's new arguements. Septentrionalis 18:47, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Eh, he chooses to selectivly not mention for example Weart's arguments, despite claiming to have read the book.Ultramarine 18:49, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

History

Very good edit, reads much better. --Scaife 00:52, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Thank you. Robert A West 01:15, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Now this is interesting, Pmanderson is starting to remove supporting statements from the history, apparently you were not critical enough.Ultramarine 18:15, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Yes, I did remove certain redundant statements, most of them introduced after Mr. West's edit; Ultramarine insists on expressing his point of view repeatedly, in every possible place. Septentrionalis 18:41, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Never at War

I feel that this section needs some work, however I haven't read this book yet so I am rather ill prepared to start editing it. What I have noticed about this section is that it takes up almost a full third of the DPT article and voices similar information in the main article, or so it seems to me. I am also concerned about the apparent editorializing at the end of the section.

How can we convey the information here in a more succinct and NPOV way? --Scaife 17:01, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Most of this is Pmanderson's work. I find the presentation confusing and different from what the book states. Any improvement would be welcome.Ultramarine 17:21, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
For the questions at issue, see Talk:Democratic_peace_theory/Archive_3#Reading English.
Weart appears to have a rather loose acquaintance at least with Greek history, which came up frequently in the reviews. His views of the Sicilian Expedition rest heavily upon conjecture; and whatever he has read has not led him to several of the Greek oligarchic wars (or to the League of Corinth, which was a reasonably stable alliance between oligarchies and an autocrat, and would seem to be material to his questions). His claims are exaggerations of well-known facts: the Athenian and Spartan tendency to favor similar regimes was noted by Grote, if not Thucydides; the Roman support of oligarchies goes back to Mommsen, at least.
The section could certainly be trimmed. Septentrionalis 18:36, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Another example of Septentrionalis use of original research. I suggest that he publishes a book by University Press, like Weart, or at least an article published outside Wikipedia.Ultramarine 18:38, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Again Ultramarine attacks any statement he finds inconvenient as "original reseach", even on talk pages.<sigh> Septentrionalis 18:44, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Guys, come on. It is obvious that you guys both hold different ideologies with regard to DPT. I have my own ideas which are different from yours' as well. Can we focus our attention on editing this article to a cogent and concise article with a neutral POV. Please let the reader decide what to think, this isn't CNN or FOX. :) --Scaife 20:25, 11 February 2006 (UTC)
Really my only ideology on this is contrarian, which leads to great unexpected benefits. ;-> I am genuinely agnostic on which dpt (if any) is correct, and have a strong suspicion that the data is insufficient to decide. Septentrionalis 22:46, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Rummel and CoW

The article at present cites papers by Ray, Gleditsch, and Spiro in support of the claim that Rummel established the criteria of the Correlates of War Project.

What Ray says is

In addition Doyle, like Rummel, performed a systematic analysis of data regarding the validity of the democratic peace proposition. That is, both authors analyzed authoritative data on interstate wars (from the Correlates of War project at the University of Michigan; see Singer & Small 1972, Small & Singer 1982) and systematically attempted to classify by regime type all the states involved in those wars.

(Part of this seems to have crept into the text, which would be undesirable.) This seems to say that Rummel used the data; he didn't manage it.

The other two papers both survey the history of the field, and as far as I can see, mention both Rummel and CoW; but, again as far as I can see, neither mentions both in the same paragraph. Rummel is not mentioned in the history on the CoW website. Pending an exact quote or page reference, the claim seems {{dubious}}. Septentrionalis 04:35, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

I see what you mean, since I wrote it I went back and looked at my sources. I incorrectly misled the reader. From what I read he did not work on the CoW project w/ Singer, but worked with the CoW research in developing his ideas of what constitutes war and liberal democracy. Sorry for the confusion. --Scaife 04:57, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

Archiving of ongoing discussions

Do not archive material that is still discussed. Ultramarine 05:57, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

You are the only one currently discussing it. --Scaife 07:22, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
That you refuse to discuss certain things certainly do not mean that they are not relevant.Ultramarine 07:37, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Why have you now selectively deleted most of the material that formed the basis for the disputed tags? Ultramarine 07:38, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Again link to the discussions that you want. This is really getting rediculous. Why is this even a problem? Why are you looking for a "conspiracy", like I am out to get you or something... Seriously...Don't be dense.
Please note that arbitration committee considers editing or deletion other persons comments on the talk page a serious offense. I consider this to be similar to a deletion of my comments and arguments, especially strange since they formed the basis for the disputed templates. I find it extremely serious that continue with this despite opposition. On the talk page everyone should be allowed to express opionions and not have them removed.Ultramarine 07:48, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Are you even paying attention? THEY HAVE BEEN ARCHIVED. THEY STILL EXIST. Can I do it in another language so you will understand? --Scaife 07:50, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
By placing them in the archive you are indicating that they are resolved. It makes it extremely difficult to continue the discussions. People wondering about the templates will no be able to find the reasons.Ultramarine 07:51, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Archiving an argument does not mean that it is resolved. Refactoring and summarizing existing arguments is specifically encouraged. Go ahead and summarize the issues that have been archived. And, please, I mean summarize. When I first was able to log on and tried to catch up on this talk page, my eyes glazed over, and I am already familiar with the structure of most of the disagreements. Robert A West 08:52, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
This should be done point for point and with agreement. At once archieving all the discussions regarding NPOV, factual accuracy, and original research is not acceptable.Ultramarine 08:56, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

In that case maybe we should restore all of the archives to this page, I am sure they are relevent to those points, too. --Scaife 08:58, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

No need, only the three sections that explain the templates.Ultramarine 09:02, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Please, if we have to discuss all of this, then we will need a meta-discussion page to discuss changes to this discussion page (and soon a meta-meta-discussion page for that and ...). In the space that we have spent discussing whether stuff should have been archived, Ultramarine could have written a quick sentence on each of his, say, ten top points, put a link to the archive for each, and we could have gotten back so substance. Pretty please? Robert A West 09:07, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

(I corrected the spelling of this section. No offense meant.) Robert A West 09:07, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

I have been arguing that ad nauseam now for over four hours. Good luck. I am done with this. --Scaife 09:10, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

Some briefs overviews available online

[17] [18] [19] Ultramarine 06:20, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

Gowa

Pmanderson has still not responded to my points regarding Gowa, despite stating that he would do so in probably 24 hours, 10 days ago. Please continue this discussions now. You can of course quote and split my statements however you like. See "Gowa again" above. Ultramarine 06:03, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

Hmmm! That sounds like a good offer :-) Kim Bruning 07:47, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Accepted, now I have my hands on a copy of Gowa. Ultramarine's text also remains undivided at Talk:Democratic_peace_theory/Archive_3#Gowa__againSeptentrionalis 18:10, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Democracy reduces terrorism!

Popular article here: [20]. Scholarly here: [21][22] Ultramarine 21:59, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

Actually reading the papers (setting aside the advocacy piece for the Iraqi war) shows:
  • They are incompatible on which sort of regime does have terrorists. One predicts the most tyrannical regimes, the other moderate and democratizing ones.
  • Goldstein (quite sensibly) remarks that terrorism is impossible to truly predict. Terror is a tactic, which depends on surprise for its execution and shock for its effect (such as it is). It is therefore in the terrorists' interest to be unpredictable.
  • Neither paper, as far as I can see, claims that the acquisition, much less the imposition, of democracy reduces terror.
  • Goldstein also finds unemployment a significant predictor. The devil finds work for idle hands to do. Septentrionalis 18:19, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
    From the abstracts: "The findings of this paper reinforce the conclusions of existing literature that political freedom is a key determinant of terrorism, with the greatest risk coming from countries that are middling between liberal democracy and authoritarian control." "Political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, but it does so in a non-monotonic way: countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes." Ultramarine 19:44, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
Nothing is the papers contradict the statements in the abstracts.Ultramarine 08:56, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
When Ultramarine is quite through fighting this straw man, I trust he will read the papers. Abstracts are incomplete by nature; that's why they're called "abstracts". Septentrionalis 16:34, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
Agreed. --Scaife 04:55, 16 February 2006 (UTC)


Go tell it to the PIRA, the RAF and the ALF. --Philip Baird Shearer 11:55, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

No claim have been made of no terrorism, only less. Most terrorism occurs in third world nations far away from Western media. Ultramarine 12:23, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

Note to readers and peer-reviewers

Material on this talk page has been archieved without consensus. For now, in order to understand the templates, read the archieves. Ultramarine 09:48, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

This section was removed by an administrator because it was disruptive. I demand to know why it has returned, especially given that consensus was reached last night. You cannot place a disclaimer on everything that goes against your POV. --Scaife 19:06, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
That thread contained among other things a very uncivil image. Again, archieving of ongoing discussions without prior agreement is not acceptable. Especially as the disputed templates referred to these discussions.Ultramarine 21:59, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
In your prior arbitration it should, and has been demonstrated to you that 3-1 is consensus. Robert A. West, Pmanderson and myself all agree that it was time to archive. Your bull-baiting is accomplishing nothing except making you look dense. In future dealings with me please keep these points in mind:
  • You are neither the discussion leader on this page nor the Editor in Chief on the article. Please conduct yourself in a more collegial manner.
  • You have no right to demand anything from anyone of us here. If you have a complaint please voice it here collegially without automatically reverting.
  • You have exhibited this behavior before in prior instances where the talk page has been archived, I was acting in good faith, I explained this to you many times.
Please review [23] and [24] again, so that we may avoid confusion again. --Scaife 22:33, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Amazing, you are again uncivil, calling me dense. This is in addition to your prior accusations of me being a stalker and your very uncivil image. And your false statements on the 3RR page that I have been admonished for Wikipedia:POINT. In contrast to this, no evidence of me being uncivil has been presented. Also, see Wikipedia is not a democracy.Ultramarine 22:43, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
You haven't been uncivil? Please review [25] and [26] --Scaife 22:46, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
All the accusations of incivility by me were rejected by the arbitration committee.Ultramarine 22:52, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Where do you get that from? We were all told to work well and play nicely with others, which is hardly an acquital, much less a finding of innocence. Robert A.West (Talk) 13:31, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

USA vs. Iran

If USA attacks Iran, will that qualify as an attack by a democracy against a democracy? --Kvaks 07:10, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

(Wikipedia is not a crystal ball, but the what-if can be analyzed in terms of the usual standards in published research.
    • Suffrage: universal.[27] This seems to qualify.
    • Emerging status: It has had this system of government for at least three years, and has had contested elections. Flawed elections to be sure, but the same can be said of undoubted democracies.
    • Authority for war and peace: The commanders of the Armed Forces are appointed by a Supreme Leader who is appointed by the Assembly of Experts, which is elected. [28]. I have not seen much in the literature about subtle distinctions such as direct vs indirect election, but the indirect nature of U.S. Presidential elections and (prior to 1913) Senators doesn't seem to bother anyone. The fact that there is no provision for removing the Supreme Leader is a flaw.
    • Some authors insist on separation of powers, and/or a market economy. Iran has, I believe, neither.
So, if the U.S. attacks Iran (or vice-versa), I predict there will be papers showing how Iran is not a democracy, so that DPT continues to hold. My opinion only.Robert A.West (Talk) 08:44, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
It is certainly not a democracy but theocracy. The Supreme Leader has the final word regarding everything and is elected for life by an assembly of priests. True, there is some public election of these priests but the state decides which priests are allowed to participate. Other state elements like parliament and the president are unimportant trappings that can be overruled on all decisions by priests.[29] Freedom House gives Iran scores of 6 and 6, making it one of the least democratic states in the world. Ultramarine 09:09, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
Ah, the flexibility of theorists in action. "Democracy" can expand to include the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2004, which both had to be overthrown. It will presumably expand to include the forthcoming Iraqi government, if it lasts for three years - unless of course Iraq goes to war. It contracts like a sensitive plant at the touch of a counterexample.</sarcasm> Is Rummellism falsifiable? Septentrionalis 16:07, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
While Iran is not what any of us think of when we say, "democracy," nevertheless it satisfies a mechanical application of Rummel's original criteria -- the ones he afterwards remarked would have been less controversial had he called them "X-ocracy". This is a useful caution concerning the difficulties inherent in any theory that requires a rigorous definition of any political form. It is not inconceivable that Iran's Supreme Leader could someday evolve into a figurehead, theoretically vested with the full sovereign power, and personifying the sovereignty of the people, but bound by tradition never to exercise it. (cf Constitutional monarchy) In that case, future researchers will probably classify it as a democracy when the history of 2006 is written. If not, they won't. A country may be a democracy (or have a Bill of Rights) on paper, but "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women. When it dies there, no law, no court, no Constitution can save it." Or, I should add, if it has never been born there, no Constitution can create it. Robert A.West (Talk) 21:23, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
This is in essence the liberal/illiberal democracy argument, right? Just because it looks democratic and the name says that it is (People's Democratic Republic of...) doesn't mean that it is democratic. --Scaife 04:53, 16 February 2006 (UTC)
Can there be such a thing as a long-term illiberal secular democracy? I can't think of one, and would expect that either the illiberalism will destroy the democracy (Third Reich) or vice-versa (end of the USSR). On the other hand, theology gives a set of shared assumptions about the world that pervade family and private life, so an illiberal theocratic democracy might be able to endure, changing only as fast as the religion changes. We may yet see my idea tested in the Middle East. Robert A.West (Talk) 00:45, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

I will let Mr. West answer Mr. Scaife's question; but I would go slightly further than "illiberal democracy". Iran is probably no less democratic thant the Constitution of 1791 or the actual conduct of the First French Republic, which some dp theorists would call democracy, without qualifier. It may also be that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his ministers are in fact conducting foreign policy on their own; we will not know until the papers of the Islamic Republic are published. If so, a forthcoming war would be an exception, probably a marginal one. This should not disprove, although it should qualify, any intellectually responsible theory of democratic peace. Septentrionalis 16:34, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

Now, can any of this be put into the article, so that other inquirers won;t have to look here?Septentrionalis 21:03, 17 February 2006 (UTC)
Hard to say. All the above comments are attempting in good faith to use the various definitions of published authors cited in the text, so it might qualify as explanatory. Then again, some people might view it as straying close to OR, which is not a problem on a talk page, but would be in the article. Robert A.West (Talk) 01:44, 19 February 2006 (UTC)
I've had a stab at it. This will probably be what most readers will want to know from the article, so we should provide it if possible. Septentrionalis 00:40, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

Archiving

In part due to the repetitions under #Gowa again, this page is 57K. That is still manageable for my computer, but the time has come to consider the issue - again. Septentrionalis 21:04, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Agree --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 21:48, 17 February 2006 (UTC)
I would support some archiving. Obviously the part relevant to the templates should be kept and those that were removed without agreement should be restored.Ultramarine 21:57, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Sugestion, seems like a lot of discussion is needed on this page, archiving is problematic, as editors don't get to see past discussion easily. How about creating one talk page per section in the main article so we have Talk:Democratic peace theory/Never at War etc. --Salix alba (talk) 15:47, 18 February 2006 (UTC)

Seems like a good idea. The main problem is however the archiving of ongoing disuscussions without agreement. Especially troublesome is the removal by one side of the arguments by the other side disputing NPOV, factual accuracy, and original research.Ultramarine 16:23, 18 February 2006 (UTC)
Those arguments mostly refer to text that has now been changed, often by Ultramarine himself. Sorting by section (which Salix's proposal would enforce) would certainly permit the complaints to be addressed in the order of the text, which might make things easier to follow. What do we do when verbosity requires archiving of the subpages, however? This page is chiefly about one or two sections as it is. Septentrionalis 17:08, 18 February 2006 (UTC)

Possible exceptions to no wars between liberal democracies

I have made a list of possible wars between liberal democracies and included arguments from the literature. I would like serious feedback and more referenced arguments regarding this before going further.

Definitions

War and liberal democracy can be defined in different ways. Research often define war as any military action with more than 1000 killed in battle. This is the definition used in the Correlates of War Project which has also supplied the data regarding the wars for many of the studies.

Repetitious. Also ignores the obvious point that 1000 deaths was chosen, not for any inherent advantage, but because it was the limit of a pre-existing database. Septentrionalis 19:46, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

This is the definition used in most conflict studies. Also the studies using MIDs use it since they exclude wars.Ultramarine 06:09, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

The early researcher R.J. Rummel states that "By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least 2/3rds of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights."[30] Furthermore, it should be well-established. Well established means that a regime had been democratic long enough for it to be stable and democratic practices to become established. In practice, this means that the democracy should be older than three to five years.

Rummellite POV. Septentrionalis 19:46, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

The book Never at War by Spencer R. Weart uses somewhat similar definitions. This book also proposes a related peace between oligarchies.

The book Grasping the Democratic Peace by Bruce Russet also uses somewhat similar definitions for modern wars but has different definitions for Ancient Greece.

The researcher James Lee Ray requires that at least 50% of the adult population is allowed to vote and that there has been at least one peaceful, constitutional transfer of executive power from one independent political party to another by means of an election.

Spurrious --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 04:18, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Please explain. Ultramarine 12:17, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Note that the following discusses specific conflicts that may be exceptions to the claim of no wars between liberal democracies. It does not discuss other claims like that there are few Militarized Interstate Disputes between liberal democracies.

Whole section unnecessary. Rummel and Ray and Weart is undue representqation of a single faction. Septentrionalis 19:46, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Ancient

  • Wars involving the Athenian democracy. Most notable is the Sicilian Expedition.
    • Russet finds no wars between liberal democracies in modern times but uses different definitions for democracy and war for Ancient Greece and finds several wars between Athens and other democracies. Still, he argues that some of these may have been caused by misperception caused by the poor communications. He also finds much textual evidence that democracies and oligarchies were reluctant to attack and frequently allied with states that had the same political arrangement.
    • The city states in Ancient Greece had large numbers of non-voting slaves and Metics. At most half of the adult males in Athens could vote. Many of the government leaders in Athens were selected by allotment and thus did not have to worry about being elected or re-elected. Ray therefore argue that these states had little resemblance to modern liberal democracies and did not fulfill the criteria above.

Metic should not be capitalized; not a proper name. Any source which does so is worthless. The claim that direct democracy is not answerable to the people is novel. Applied to Athens, it also ignores the fact that foreign policy was entrusted to the ten generals, who were elected. Septentrionalis 19:54, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

My mistake regarding metics. Athens certainly did not fulfill the criteria for liberal democracy when looking at the percentage who had the vote. Note that many sources give lower percentage for voting males, often around 30-40%.Ultramarine 05:40, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
In fact, Athens should probably be treated as a special case. All Athenians could vote, whatever their status or wealth, and all Athenians were free. Like some modern democracies, Athens imported large numbers of foreigners, of all social conditions. While at Athens, the sweatshops used legal slaves, rather than illegal ones, I fail to see why this should affect Athens' foreign policy. Septentrionalis 18:12, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
    • Weart in his book Never at War instead argues that Athens was a borderline democracy but that the opponents were oligarchies or were young democracies less than 3 years old. [1]

Weart's superficial knowledge and conjecture-ridden accounts of ancient history are all ready more porminent than such stuff needs to be. Its value is not just my judgment, but that of his reviewers; see notes to present text.Septentrionalis 19:46, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Even if his critics are right, then this only shows more wars between oligarchies in antiquity, not between democracies in modern times. Also the critics do not know or choose to not mention that Weart regarding the Sicilian Expedition only restates the position of the prominent scholar G.E.M. de Ste. Croix. Ultramarine 05:34, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
Ste. Croix'x position is non-consensus; also doctrinaire.Septentrionalis 06:33, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
In addition, they do not mention that Thucydides neutrality is very much disputed. Scholars have argued that personal distaste for democracy influenced his descriptions, including that of the Sicilian Expedition.Ultramarine 12:24, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
    • Thucydides thought the democrats at Athens had mismanaged the war, and he may have been right. What this has to do with his evidence on Syracuse, I fail to see. (If he were confirming his prejudices, in Weart's manner, surely he would have shown the victorious Syracusans are oligarchs?)
    • If you throw out Thucydides, you must also throw out the Timaeus tradition, which agrees with him on this. At that point, you will have no history of Greek Sicily at all, and are free to believe Weart's unevidenced conjectures, or engage in any other solipist fantasy. This is perfectly suitable for a blog, but it will not do for Wikipedia. Septentrionalis 18:12, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Punic Wars Both states did not fulfill the criteria for liberal democracies. Had large numbers of non-voting slaves and free non-citizens. Roman citizens were legally divided into plebs and patricians. See the discussion in Never at War regarding whether there is enough information about Carthage to determine the exact form of government there at the start of each of these wars.

Weart's dismissal of all the wars of Rome is so hasty that he did not index it. Reference please. Septentrionalis 19:54, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Reference for Weart please. Are these his claims about the plebeians or Ultramarine's original research? They are in any case vastly exaggerated; almost all of the legal distinctions between patricians and plebeians were abolished in the 4th century BC, and the only important remaining one was in favor of the plebs, who alone could stand for the tribunate. Septentrionalis 06:33, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
Here are some references for Rome: [31][32]. Or look in Britannica at "Slavery".Ultramarine 05:27, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
Another, voting power was based on wealth.[33] Here is another.[34] See the section INTERNAL HISTORY.--THE GRACCHI. " In practice, however, the constitution became an oligarchy." Not to mention that the large slave population, the Roman allies in Italy, foreigners, and former slaves were excluded from the franchise.Ultramarine 10:45, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Slavery is not incompatible with democracy. Consider 18th century New Jersey, which had female (and black) suffrage; and slavery.
  • Nevertheless, Weart is adopting a long-standing consensus in claiming Rome as an oligarchy, supporting other oligarchies.
    • Will Cuppy puts it, only slightly exaggerating his textbooks, "Carthage was ruled by its rich men, and was therefore a plutocracy; Rome was also ruled by its rich men, and was therefore a republic." ;->
  • In fact, that is the relevance of the Punic Wars to DPT: Weart is drastically wrong, and ignoring most of the ancient evidence, when he claims that the War of Chioggia was the only one fought between oligarchies. Ultramarine's paragraph is another instance of necrohippoflagellation.Septentrionalis 20:57, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

Modern

  • The frequent raids on and eventual destruction of most of the Hurons by the Iroquois. Both had some democratic elements. Were not liberal democratic states but rather tribes formed by the extended kinship group. Importantly, there were no effective control of personal raids against non-kinship groups which eventually escalated by involving relatives and friends to vendettas and wars.[2]

They were not states. However, they were subject both to the cultural and institutional causes suggested for the democratic peace. They conducted their affairs by discussion, like Weart's republics. The chiefs could be deposed or deserted in case of failure. Septentrionalis 20:16, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Weart explicitly states that allowing personal raids againt non-kin groupts is the key difference between states and anocracies.Ultramarine
This reply has no connection to the objection above.Septentrionalis 06:37, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

It would be far more useful to carve out a category for wars of secession within a liberal state, including the American Revolution, the American Civil War, the Anglo-Irish War of 1921, the present troubles in Sri-Lanka, and the next intifadeh. I have not yet seen this in the literature, but I'm sure it exists. Septentrionalis 20:16, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Better to follow chronological order. Uprisings without any hint of democratic procedure can be ignored even without the time limit.Ultramarine 06:17, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
None of the above are without any hint of democratic proceedure.````
  • Quasi-War. Far less than 1000 battle deaths. The franchise in the French Directory was restricted to a minority of wealthy Frenchmen. In 1797 there was a coup d'etat which used troops against the opposition, closed down opposing newspapers, cancelled election results, and condemned hundreds of opponents to exile or death. [4]

And yet Rummel counts late eighteenth-century France as a democracy.

In one publication he states that Republican France was a liberal demoracy at some point before 1800. Probably refers to the National Convention before the terror. Irrelevant to this conflict.Ultramarine 05:22, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
*Presumably using Doyle's list, as he uses Doyle's list for 1800-1850 in the same connexion. Doyle's list includes "The French Republic 1790-5", which includes the Terror. Septentrionalis 18:21, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
  • War of 1812. Only a few percent had the right to vote in the United Kingdom, many new urban areas had no representation, the ballot was not secret, many seats in Parliament were appointed or openly bought from the owners of rotten boroughs, and the House of Lords could veto all laws. The monarchy retained important powers. [5]
    • politicians entrenched by corruption, as the present text says.
    • Nevertheless, this is a jaundiced description even of the unreformed House of Commons.
    • The War of 1812 may be a marginal case for DPTs in general, but it is a decisive test of Weart's hypothesis. He might have written the plan with which the Americans decided on war.
      • The Canadian democrats are oppressed from London, and by their local oligarchs. We will rescue them.
      • We can defeat the British regulats in Canada.
      • Since the Great Lakes are landlocked, we can defeat the British there; the Royal Navy can't reinforce them.
      • The British can raid, but cannot conquer, the American coastline.
    • This in fact turned out to be largely true, although much harder than expected, and with exceptions.
      • Maine was conquered and held.
      • Isaac Brock was not driven from Niagara.
    • However, at that point, the American expectation )and Weart's theory) fail: The Canadians did not rise up to join the invading democrats; they didn;t even feed them. Without that, the logistics were impossible; Harrison's army, victorious in Canada, could not march as planned to take Niagara from the rear. Septentrionalis 21:26, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Trail of Tears. The Cherokees had created a republican constitution in 1827 that in theory had many democratic rights. However, the nation allowed slaveholding and become increasingly authoritarian, in the end beating, censoring and even murdering those advocating a voluntary removal. The state of Georgia decreed that the government was dissolved in 1828 which was before three years had passed since the creation of the constitution. No battle deaths. [6]

Not a "war". --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 04:25, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Sometimes mentioned as an exception. Thus it should be discussed.Ultramarine 05:43, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Mexican-American War. Mexican President Mariano Paredes was a general that took power in a coup d'etat. [7]
    • Ambitious military, I suppose, although there is no sign that Mexico wanted war.
    • My source here remains The course of Mexican history by Michael C. Meyer, and William L. Sherman. The entire course of negiotiation, including the American ultimatum, took place in the fall of 1845, under the elected president Valentin Gomez Fariás. During the actual fighting Snata Anna was (again) President, and he was appointed and deposed by the Mexican Congress. Septentrionalis 04:11, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
  • Sonderbund War. Far less than 1000 battle deaths. The Catholic Cantons restricted the suffrage to Catholic men and in many also to a group that descended from the original inhabitants. [8]
    • I am shocked by Weart's dishonesty here. There were no Protestants in most Catholic cantons; any more than there were Catholics in Geneva. At least Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden (all of which were in the Sonderbund) had effective universal male direct democracy. Septentrionalis 04:24, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
  • The war between the French Second Republic and the Roman Republic (19th century). Both young democracies less than 3 years old. The Pope had promised to excommunicate those that took part in the elections, leaving only inexperienced radicals in the Roman government during the few months it existed. The French President and later Emperor Louis Napoleon needed support from the conservative Catholics and the military. The young French assembly was led to believe that the French expedition was a simple police action in order to restore order in a chaotic regime and to protect Rome from foreign monarchies that planned an intervention. The news that Rome had instead been attacked caused violent uprisings in France. The critics called the military repression of these the "the Roman expedition into the interior". [9]
    • Ultramarine, please read an actual history of nineteenth century Italy, or even the Wikipedia article linked to. The Roman Republic of 1849 was both better and worse than this.
    • But its inexperienced radicals don't matter. For one thing, in Italy in 1849, only a handful of (mostly incompetent) kings and ministers had any experience. Nor does the rest of this. The only points that matter are:
      • France was a new democracy in 1849, and the war was conducted to please a strong domestic constituency, which is one of the noted exceptions.
      • By battlefield casualties (and the storming of Rome was really no battle) it was not a full-scale war. Septentrionalis 04:24, 1 March 2006 (UTC)


**This entire line of argument is PoV insofar as it appeals to the factional two-thirds standard. Insofar as it does not, it reveals a vast ignorance of antebellum American politics: ***Abolitionists were censored and persecuted in Alton, Illinois and in Boston in (one-party) Massachusetts, just as in the Carolinas. .

      • Most state politics, North and South, consisted of quarrels between factions who might very well carry the same banner in national politics, but exercised all the forms of governmental rivalry between themselves. In 1820, everybody waved the same national banner; there was no other. In New York, there were the Hunkers and Barnburners and Locofocos; all Democrats nationally, but competing parties in NYC and Albany. So in the South; Stephens also tells how the Georgia Convention, in which he opposed secession, was chosen to include Douglas men, Bell men, and Breckenridge men - so that it would represent the State as a whole. Septentrionalis 01:07, 23 February 2006 (UTC)
    • I see this last piece of nonsense is Ultramarine's own original research; Weart is not so foolish. I have strong views about the constitutionality, propriety, and sanity of the Montgomery Convention, but its members were appointed by elected legislatures or conventions, and were often the former state delegations to Congress. It is true that the final ballot for Davis was unanimous, 6 states to 0; but his election was not uncontested: there were strong campaigns for Robert Toombs and Howell Cobb, which were only abandoned at the final vote for the sake of the appearance of unity. A constitutional view of the late war between the states : its causes, character, conduct and results ; presented in a series of colloquies at Liberty Hall Alexander H. Stephens, (1870 ed.) II, 320-31.Septentrionalis 19:07, 22 February 2006 (UTC)
      • There are two sources in the references. Ray states this objections clearly. Davis was not elected in fair, competitive elections. He also notes that this was a temporary arrangement and in the elections in the fall of 1861 the Confederacy only provided one ticket for the presidency and in many areas also for the Congress.Ultramarine 19:32, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

If you have a refernce for the last we could add it. Here is a new proposal.Ultramarine 17:22, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

  • American Civil War. Weart argues that the Confederate States of America was less than 3 years old. Less than 2/3 of the adult male population could vote in the Confederacy. The state was created in order to continue the suppression of the black slave population. Wealthy planters played on racial fears in order to avoid criticism from poor whites. Abolitionists were censored and imprisoned even before Lincoln was elected and he was not on the ballot in most parts of the South. In the first elections in the confederacy, voters in many areas again had no choice of candidates.
Rummellite standards again. The argument about abolitionists would prove Illinois and Massachusetts no democracies either; and you going to exclude every country in which unsavory politics are successful from the list of democracies? If so, the democratic peace becomes a small handful of claims indeed.Septentrionalis 17:57, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
Ray argues that there was never a competitive presidential election in the confederacy. There was only one ticket in 1861 presidential election. Only in some districts were there two candidates for the Confederate Congress. On the other hand, the Montgomery Convention there were discussions regarding other presidential candidates by . All final votes, from approving documents to electing officers, were to be unanimous in order to impress the Union and the border states. [11]
Ray argues that there was never a competitive presidential election in the confederacy. There was no choice of candidates in the 1861 presidential election. Only in some districts were there two candidates for the Confederate Congress. On the other hand, the delegates from the six states at the Montgomery Conventiondiscussed other presidential candidates. All final votes, from approving documents to electing officers, were to be unanimous in order to impress the Union and the border states. [12] Ultramarine 18:06, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
This is a dishonest representation of Ray, who begins by admitting "the primâ facie case" for the democracy of the CSA. I see no point to continuing discussion of tendentious extracts from a handful of PoV books, if it is to be conducted in this manner. Septentrionalis 21:33, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
  • First Boer War. Britain did not fulfill the criteria for liberal democracy before the Representation of the People Act 1884. The new Boer state was less than 3 years old and its democracy doubtful even for the White male population. Blacks were excluded from the franchise. Less than 1000 battle deaths. [14]

Spurrious evidence, does not qualify as a war. --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 04:23, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Again, sometimes mentioned as an exception. Thus it should be discussed.Ultramarine 05:47, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Spanish-American War. In Spain all males could vote and the constitution in theory protected many civil liberties. However, there was the Turno system, dissidents were jailed, 1/4 of the members of the Cortes were appointed by the King or had hereditary positions, the monarchy retained important powers, and a military coup d'etat was feared if Spain would compromise in the negotiations. [15]
    • Such arrangements have occurred in other undoubted democracies: Austria in the late 1950's; Uruguay in the 1960's. Like other arrangements for oligopoly, they depend on the partners each being able to maintain its position, and collapse when this is not done. To exclude such states is more special pleading, emptying the vacuous theory further.
    • The proposed restriction that democracy only exists when the military has no power over politics would restrict the applicability of a democratic peace theory to Costa Rica and Heaven. It is true that these two powers have never gone to war.
    • The Spanish Government did in fact fall as a result of its defeat; outside of the Turno. Ray omits this from his book, the only serious dishonesty which I have seen from him. Septentrionalis 22:30, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
      • Sources please for claims regarding Austria and Uruguay. Note that during the Turno corrupt officials manipulated the elections to return to office as many of their own party as they wished. Anyhow, possible problems in other nations are not relevant for this conflict. That the Spanish Government did fall due to the war is irrelevant for whether it was a democracy before. The military junta in Argentina did fall after the Falklands war but this is not evidence that this junta was democratic.Ultramarine 06:48, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
        • See the contemporary descriptions of Austria and Uruguay in the relevant chapters of John Gunther's Inside Europe Today(1961) , Inside South America(1967). The problem with this paragraph is precisely that it uses a "private definition" of democracy, in Orwell's sense of term, which contravenes common usage. It is the business of politicians to secure their seats. Any theory of democratic peace which applies only to utopias is claiming nothing about the real world. I also observe the convenient illogic:
          • The Spanish Government could not fall, so it was no democracy.
          • But it did fall.
          • So what? Septentrionalis 16:48, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
            • The Proporz system divided the power proportionally according to election results. This is not the same as determining the results of elections before they are made. Even if Austria had an exact copy of the Turno systems and all the other problems with the political system that Spain had, then this would only means that Autria was not an democracy, not that Spain was a democracy. Again, the military junta in Argentina did fall after the Falklands war but this is not evidence that this junta was democratic before the war. Spain was not a liberal democracy: corrupt officials manipulated the elections to return to office as many of their own party as they wished, dissidents were jailed, 1/4 of the members of the Cortes were appointed by the King or had hereditary positions, the monarchy retained important powers, and a military coup d'etat was feared if Spain would compromise in the negotiations.Ultramarine 17:46, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
                • The Proporz was a different' system; Uruguay's system was different again. However, one of its provisions was that the representatives of the Volkspartei and the SD should always, regardless of the election results, be Minister and Deputy Minister in each department, and this alternation continued down the scale, and that they would operate by agreement. This gives continual job security and policy control to everyone concerned. If it is democracy (and it has always been considered so); so was Spain. Septentrionalis 23:43, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Philippine-American War. No democratic elections in the Philippines. The Philippine regime was less than 3 years old. One group of Filipinos had proclaimed a constitution which explicitly gave the power to a small group of landowners and professionals. Emilio Aguinaldo was declared president without elections. He was suspected of killing two of his main political rivals and nearly all foreign observers saw no chance for genuine self-government, but only different regional groups and bandits. US president William McKinley stated that it would be immoral to withdraw and leave the Filipinos to fight one another or be occupied by an European power. [16]
  • World War I. The German Reichstag was elected by all adult males and it did vote overwhelmingly to fund the war. However, the German Kaiser had the executive power. He appointed and dismissed the Chancellor, the Imperial officials, and the officers. He could and did declare war together with the not democratically elected Bundesrat, 30% of which was appointed by the Emperor, and most of the rest by the German princes. The Reichstag had little control over the executive power and its legislative power was greatly limited by the Bundesrat. The Emperor's appointees in the Bundesrat could themselves veto amendments to the German constitution. There were often threats of a military coup d'etat if the Reichstag should ignore the Emperor on important issues. In effect, therefore, especially in foreign and military affairs, there was little democratic control. The Emperor was also the King of Prussia which had 3/5 of the German population and the Prussian constitution gave him even greater power there. The landed aristocracy of the Junkers formed the officer corps of the army, dominated Prussia, and had strong influence on national politics as well.
One argument against the above is that Germany was every bit as democratic as the United Kingdom. Only approximately 60% of British males could vote and the House of Lords was (and is) not democratically elected. However, this ignores the Parliament Act 1911 which destroyed the House of Lords' power to reject bills. The German Chancellor in 1913 ignored an overwhelming vote of no confidence and stated: "that in France and Great Britain conditions were different, but that parliamentary government did not exist in Germany; that it was the constitutional privilege of the Emperor to appoint the Chancellor without any assistance or advice from the Reichstag" Also, if the United Kingdom was not a liberal democracy at this time, then this is another reason for WWI not being a war between democracies. [18]
  • Anglo-Irish War. The Irish state was less than 3 years old. The initial violence involved rebels acting on their own outside democratic control. Later democratic control of the Irish Republican Army was doubtful and immediately after the war one part of the IRA tried to overthrow the government in the Irish Civil War. [19]

It is arguable that the Occupation of the Ruhr valley was a major catalyst for WWI. As a seperate event it doesn't qualify as a war. Why is this even mentioned? --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 04:23, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Sometimes mentioned by critics. Thus it should be discussed.Ultramarine 05:46, 21 February 2006 (UTC)]
Ultramarine misunderstands the function of the Ruhr in the discussion of the democratic peace; see Layne's paper. Septentrionalis 19:07, 22 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Continuation War. Five months after the start of the War, the United Kingdom reluctantly issued a formal declaration of war on Finland due to pressure from Soviet Union. However, the United Kingdom's only significant act of war happened prior to the declaration, a Royal Air Force raid on German-run mining operations in Petsamo. Therefore too few battle deaths for a war. Finland spent the Second World War fighting a totalitarian opponent, the Soviet Union, who had previously attacked the nation. There have been very few formal declarations of war since WWII and using this as the definition of war would mean that for example the US has fought no wars since WWII. [20]
  • Turkish Invasion of Cyprus. Initial hostilities after a coup d'etat in Cyprus. Both the later formally democratic regime in Cyprus and that in Turkey was less than 3 years old. The military retained significant influence in both. Less than 1000 battle deaths. [23]
  • Paquisha Incident. Far less than 1000 battle deaths. Both young democracies less than 3 years old. Lacking democratic control over the military on both nations. [24]
  • Kargil War. Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan at the time of the Kargil War, suppressed opposition-led demonstrations, arrested opposition activists, curtailed civil liberties, and persecuted independent NGOs and journalists. The judiciary at first tried to check the Sharif, but later gave up. His supporters stormed the Supreme Court of Pakistan and he forced the Chief Justice out of office. He also passed laws removing the legal possibilities to dismiss him from office and stating that party leaders could dismiss any of their legislators if they failed to vote as they were told. [25]
  • Yugoslav Wars. Yugoslavia did not fulfill the criteria for a liberal democracy. Frequent and arbitrary changes of election laws and districts, even retroactively after elections. Press freedom greatly restricted. Slobodan Milosevic's regime controlled the state television and radio broadcasts. Electoral manipulation including: massive double voting, "voting" of persons being permanently absent or deceased, the pressure on employees by the management of "socially owned companies", organised planting of already prepared voting ballots into the polling boxes, forging of electoral records and election board records, alteration of the election results made by electoral commissions, the large-scale annulment of the election results by courts rulings, and changing the number of participating voters in order to fulfil the legal requirements for the validity of the elections. [26]
In addition, the Ten-Day War and the War in Croatia would be excluded as both sides were less than 3 years old. Also, Croatia was not a liberal democracy for similar reasons as those mentioned for Yugoslavia. [27]

In summary, this is copying out Weart's doctrinaire special pleading, which amounts in fact to an admission that Rummellism excludes so many states and so many wars as to be vacuous. This is how many citations of the same book?Septentrionalis 20:16, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Several of these points would be valuable in refining the fallacious theories of a perfect democratic peace into a form which actually matches the world; most of the papers on the subject are real examples of the process. This, however, is doctinaire trash, drawn from Weart's book, which is, like one of DR Johnson's: "both good and original, but the good parts are not original, and the original ones not good"; proving neatly that Sturgeon's Law does apply to political science, as elsewhere. Septentrionalis 22:30, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

Notes

  1. ^ Russet, Bruce (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691033463. p. 41-62
    Ray, James Lee (1995). Democracy and International Conflict. University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 1570030413. p. 103-105.
    Weart, Spencer R. (1998). Never at War. Yale University Press. ISBN 0300070179. p. 24-37, 298-300.
  2. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 253-254.
  3. ^ "The Struggle for Democracy". The National Archives. Retrieved February 14, 2006.
    "The U.K. Parliament". The United Kingdom Parliament. Retrieved February 14, 2006.
    Ray, 1995, p. 106-107.
    Weart, 1998, p. 304-305.
  4. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 305-306.
  5. ^ "The Struggle for Democracy". The National Archives. Retrieved February 14, 2006.
    "The U.K. Parliament". The United Kingdom Parliament. Retrieved February 14, 2006.
    Ray, 1995, p. 106-107.
    Weart, 1998, p. 135-138, 184-186, 306.
  6. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 225-226, 306-7.
  7. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 201-204, 207, 214
  8. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 26-27, 309-310.
  9. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 156-160, 310-311.
  10. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 110-111.
    Weart, 1998, p. 114-119, 311.
  11. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 110-111.
    Weart, 1998, p. 114-119, 311. [1]
  12. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 110-111.
    Weart, 1998, p. 114-119, 311. [2]
  13. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 67.
  14. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 307-308.
  15. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 111-115.
    Weart, 1998, p. 141-2, 204-205, 311.
  16. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 207-210, 308-309.
  17. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 124-128, 308.
    "Orange Free State and Transvaal". (11 ed.). 1911. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |ency= ignored (help)
  18. ^ "Imperial Germany". Country Studies, Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Retrieved October 3 1995. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
    "Prussia". (6 ed.). 2001. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |ency= ignored (help) [3]
    "The Second Empire until 1914". Lecture Notes, Germany and Europe, 1871-1945. Retrieved October 3, 2005.
    Quick, John (1896). "A Digest of Federal Constitutions". The University of Sidney. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
    Gerard, James W. "Chapter 1 My first year in Germany". My Four Years in Germany. Retrieved October 3, 2005.
  19. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 312.
  20. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 313.
  21. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 120.
  22. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 120.
    Russet, 1993, p. 18.
  23. ^ Ray, 1995, p. 120-121.
    Weart, 1998, p. 314-315.
  24. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 70, 316.
  25. ^ "World Report 1999 : Pakistan". Human Rights Watch. Retrieved February 14, 2006.
    Wayman, Frank (2002). "Incidence of Militarized Disputes Between Liberal States, 1816-1992". Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, La., Mar. 23-27, 2002. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
    "Pakistan: Feudalism: root cause of Pakistan's malaise". News Weekly. Retrieved February 14, 2006.
  26. ^ Nedovic, Slobodanka; et al. (2000). "Guide Through Electoral Controverseries in Serbia" (PDF). Centar Za Slobodne Izobre I Demoratiju. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Explicit use of et al. in: |author= (help)
  27. ^ Weart, 1998, p. 316-318.

Ultramarine 17:58, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

Cod War

While luckily few if any died in the Cod War, it might be worth a mention as an exception --Philip Baird Shearer 11:59, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

Mentioned above.Ultramarine 12:15, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

The perfect democratic peace

The real flaw with the Rummelite claim is not that it is false (although several of the denials above are very tenuous), but that it is vacuous. Consider the requirements involved to be a democracy:

  • 2/3 male suffrage
  • Contested elections
  • regimes at least three years old.
  • No effective power in the hands of hereditary officers.
    • And Ultramaine invokes several others above, ad hoc

Great Britain did not meet these before 1884; nor indeed after 1884. (Setting aside Ultramarine's equivocations about whether 60% is somehow more than 2/3, the Parliament Act was not passed until August 20, 1911 - so Great Britain was not a democracy when she delcared war on Germany by this artificial definition.) But let her in 1884-1914 as a marginal case.

In fact, the only nations to pass through this sieve before 1884 are the United States, Switzerland, and San Marino (and the degree of enfranchisement in Helvetic Confederation of 1813-1847 is dubious; and did San Marino abstain from feud?).


Between 1884 and 1904, there were a handful of democracies. (Doyle actually printed his list; and includes 13, some of which (like Belgium and Chile) would not pass the requirements above; the honest Rummel count must be smaller. (licet contradictio in adjectis) Some of these are isolated from each other; some are small powers. The same studiesthat Ray quotes, which find mutual democracy a force for peace, find non-contiguity and small-power status stronger forces.

There were several crises between the Great Powers. The only one that led to war was between a democracy and a border-line democracy. Several of these crises were between democracies, and there is no sign of either institutional or cultural constraints to war. Layne is quite right, and is supported by the literature outside this little conclave of DPT, insofar as I know it.

From 1904 to 1940, Great Britain and France formed the Entente Cordiale. Most of the other democracies before 1945 were either allied with them or benevolently neutral. The same studies again show that alliance is, as it is intended to be, a force for peace.

From 1940 to 1989, most of the democracies of the world were allied against first Germany and then the Soviet Union.

Since 1945, the other articles of the Kantian triad, trade and international organization for peace, have been in existence. They have been especially widespread and effective since 1989. At that rime, furthermore, the major discords of the post-war world, which visibly spun off minor wars, the Cold War and decolonization, both ended.

Nevertheless, I believe that those studies which find democracy to be one of several independent forces for peace are probably, in some sense, correct. We have, however, a small amount of data, massively affected by external sources. Finding out what sense is almost impossible. Ultramarine's disingenuous and partisan quotations from a handful of already tendentious non-notable books are a disservice to the reader and to Wikipedia. Septentrionalis 22:15, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

Lots of claims here without sources but you are of course correct that liberal democracies were rare before the 20th century. But in the last 30 years there have been many liberal democracies. There were 43 liberal democracies in 1972 and 87 in 2004. Using other data and a broader definition of conflict than 1000 battle deaths there has still not been a single conflict between liberal democracies.[35] I find the arguments regarding the Cold War strange, Gowa's theory predicts an increase in wars between liberal democracies when the threat from the Communist states disappeared. The claim regarding decolonization is also strange, this greatly increased the number of states and democracies so again more wars should have been expected.Ultramarine 13:58, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
  • if this were article text, it would be sourced; that would be tedious, but not difficult. Sources for much of it have been cited already.
  • Liberal democracies are rare throughout the twentieth century. 43 states (which is Doyle's count, using far more inclusive standards than Rummel's) is less than a quarter of all states, mostly in Europe and North America.
  • Rummel gives no source, much less a list, for the claim of 87 l.d. 2003 [sic]; so it is impossible to discuss. Septentrionalis 16:31, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
  • Increase in the number of states would increase the possibility of conflict, other things being equal. Several things are not equal: among these are the absence of wars of decolonization (except possibly in Sinkiang) and the absence of proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union.Septentrionalis 16:26, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
    • "for democracy, I will use Freedom's House's "All Country Ratings from 1972-2003". Freedom House is not a proponent of the democratic peace (I don't recall them ever mentioning it), so we can treat their data as independent of this proposition." 87 states is close to half of all states in 2003. No decolonization war may be one possible explanation for less warfare in general, but is no explanation for why no wars between the many new democratic nations. Again, Gowa's theory predicts more wars between liberal democracies after the end of the Cold War, not less.Ultramarine 17:04, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
      • Freedom House is merely an extreme advocate of the rapid spread of democracy. Partisan cherry-picking is not serious discussion.
      • Their actual list, however, is not as unreasonable as Rummel's usual claims, which are repeated on his placards. Their increase in democracies consists principally of two classes of nations: Eastern Europe, which is deeply involved in the international organization, trade, and freedom of travel associated with the EU, and the Caribbean states. Barbados and Grenada have never taken part in a war with over 1000 battlefield deaths under any government; I think, however, that the size of their armed forces may be a simpler explanation. My preference for the Kantian and imperfect peace remains unshaken. Septentrionalis 00:15, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
      • And if I were advocating Gowa's full position, I would have said so; she is, however, both stating the obvious, and widely supported, in suggesting the Cold War as an external cause tending towards peace among the resulting alliances. Septentrionalis 23:49, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
        • It would be better to discuss their data than just reject them with ad hominem. Again, Gowa's theory predicts more wars between liberal democracies after the end of the Cold War, not less. Also, here is Rummel's review of the book.[36]
          • You chose an advocacy group's data; I merely observe that you did. That their data does not support your analysis is a separate problem. I agree with Gowa only in part; I have said repeatedly that I suspect that there is, in some sense, a democratic peace; she does not. I doubt it is Rummel's sense - and most democratic peace theorists agree. Rummel's glaringly incomplete review shows some of the reasons why. Septentrionalis 00:25, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
            • You have shown no errors in Rummel results. Your description of the increase in democracy is incorrect, it has occured all over the world. See this [37]. Very few of the changes they mention have occured in the Caribbean.Ultramarine 00:44, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
                • Not surpising, since I did not set out to democstrate error. To quote the top of this section: The real flaw with the Rummelite claim is not that it is false, but that it is vacuous.Septentrionalis 00:57, 26 February 2006 (UTC)


Not sure if relevant

I have not enogh knowledge about this, but since I stumbled onto this article : http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HA31Ak01.html Among the examples of wars launched by democracies are: Serbia (1991): civil war Iraq (2005): Kurdish and Shi'ite militias, threat of civil war Bosnia (1995): war with Serbia Ethiopia (1998): Eritrean war India and Pakistan (1999): Kargil war Burundi (1993): Hutu genocide against Tutsi Iran (2005): election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad Indonesia (1975): East Timor independence movement Make of it what you will. I want the theory to be correct. I thought I would mention the article, since it appeared to be relevant here. DanielDemaret 14:47, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

From the article, in reference to the cited book: I do not recommend the book; what is true in it is trivial, and what is not trivial is silly. I have to agree, none of these examples demonstrates an established democracy going to war, or initiating a war. Civil wars and revolutions are usually excluded, as by definition a nation in a civil war is divided and therefore not a "democracy" in the truest sense. And if a "democratic" state goes to war due to an election, it's probably not a liberal democracy. That being said this article is a good look at how the mainstream media looks at DPT and some of the false assumptions attached to it either pro or con. --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 15:21, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
Good points. Still, I will look into some of them for User:Ultramarine/sandbox3. Some of the examples seem very strange, how is "Iran (2005): election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad" a war? Ultramarine 15:26, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
In the same sense that the election of Hamas is a war; as a casus belli.Septentrionalis 22:13, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

I note also that the book in question appears to be Mansfield/Snyder, a (somewhat cautious) theory of democratic peace, and it is being condemned for those claims it holds in common with other DPTs.

Ultramarine's continued reversions

Ultramarine has been reverting this page for two points;

  • To get rid of a reference to Matthew White's webpage, in a footnote. Since Rummel considers him a foe worthy of his steel, shouldn't discuss him?
  • To claim that this page, as modified, disagrees with Ultramarine's account of why there are no real democracies at war. Since what I have done is to summarize his excuses above, which he repeated on Never at War, this seems perverse. Septentrionalis 22:13, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
I have added Rummel's response to White's unreferenced personal webpage. Obviously the arguments by DPT researchers should be presented correctly and in full, they are what essential to understanding the dispute. Ultramarine 22:26, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
To be perfectly accurate, Ultramarine has added blatantly prejudical language about a source which Professor Rummel treats with full respect even while disagreeing with it. See diff. He has also repeatedly placed a tag, unsupported anywhere. On which wars does he claim that the present text represents Weart's view differently than in Never at War? Septentrionalis 22:37, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
See Never_at_War#Definitions or R.J._Rummell#Democratic peace for the correct definitions used. Compare to your strange text Democratic peace theory#Exceptions that is completely different. And of course the actual claimed exceptions should be discussed.Ultramarine 22:48, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
This is remarkably unspecific. I did not change a single argument, I simply condensed. Feel free to add to the footnotes. Actual tags require actual documentation, not these vague and airy charges. Septentrionalis 22:54, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

I am concerned about this section, in particular the links for site supporting the DPT. Almost every link is related to Rummel in some form or fashion, and I find this to be dishonest. Rummel's research merits perhaps one link, however 4 or 5 is a bit POV, don't you think? --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 18:24, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

Hm, I count at most 3, including one that is simply a listing of the literature. The others are certainly better than unreferenced personal webesites by nonresearchers provided by the opposite side. However, we can certainly remove the link to his website and the interview. I suggest replacing them with these online overviews: [38][39][40] Ultramarine 18:55, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

HMMMM, Supportive

  • Rummell's website <----1
  • Democide, Democracy and the Man from Hawaii <----2
  • A summing-up in favor of Rummellism as of 1998 <----3
  • Spread of Democracy Will Make World Safer, Historian Says a moderated webchat with Victor Davis Hanson hosted by the Department of State, International Information Program.
  • Rummel's charts, outlining his particular democratic peace theory, are to the right. <----4

The correct answer is 4. --Scaife (Talk) Don't forget Hanlon's Razor 19:27, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

The strangely titled "A summing-up in favor of Rummellism" is a review of the literaure not written by Rummel. Nor is his charts links and also contain research by other reserachers.Ultramarine 19:30, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
The summing-up is Ray's 1998 paper, often mentioned in the notes, especially Ultramarine's notes. It strongly advocates Rummel's particular positions, which he and Ray and Weart appear to hold alone against the field. In the process, it does give an overview of the field, somewhat longer, but considerably more PoV, than Chan's or Gleditsch's. Septentrionalis 20:46, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
Incorrect again, please read the paper, there are many other supporting reserachers. Here it is and also some other online reviews: [41][42][43]Ultramarine 20:49, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

These are

  • Ray 1998 as discussed. I've read it, often enough to recognize cut-and-paste work from it.
  • Gieseler reviewing Moore
    • Thank you, I knew I'd seen some mention of a recent monadic theorist; Rummel is not, as Gelditsch (see 1992 paper) described him, quite alone in being monadic. Even Ray does not appear to support him in this.
  • Risse 2003, a Kantian, claiming support for the Kantian theory. Mention of Rummel is historical. Septentrionalis 21:12, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
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