Talk:Chattanooga campaign/Archives/2013/November
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Chattanooga Campaign
This is a new article that is intended to replace the Third Battle of Chattanooga article, as discussed on the talk page for that article. This campaign article is not completely finished and requires more refinements, including a number of citations. I will get to that over the next few days. In addition, I will be re-creating the separate, more detailed articles Battle of Lookout Mountain and Battle of Missionary Ridge, which are currently redirects. The latter article will use the greatly expanded text about M.R. that is currently in the Third Battle article. Hal Jespersen (talk) 20:56, 13 January 2009 (UTC)
The article rearranging is essentially done. More updating and mapping will occur to improve the individual battle articles, particularly Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. I would suggest that, over time, articles having links to the Third Battle of Chattanooga be redirected to Chattanooga Campaign. Hal Jespersen (talk) 20:36, 18 January 2009 (UTC)
Orders to stop at the rifle pits-
Battle of Missionary Ridge - I have instructed Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the rifle pits and ridge directly in front of them or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require.[14]
Chattanooga campaign - He therefore ordered Thomas to move forward and seize the Confederate line of rifle pits—the first of two lines of Confederate entrenchments to his front—and stop there to await further orders.[51]. The 2 notes on the related pages contradict each other and this should be resolved if possible. All I have at hand is Foote's Civil War a Narrative which doesn't give exact orders, but implies Grant expected Sherman's attack to succeed and Thomas's to be a feint. Nitpyck (talk) 00:56, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
- I have modified the latter article (which is a summary of the former). See if that is satisfactory. Hal Jespersen (talk) 15:44, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
- Very much so, thanks. I find a problem and someone else does the hard work of fixing it. What could be better. Nitpyck (talk) 05:32, 2 June 2009 (UTC)
Military crest
I have reverted a change for the second time, so let us discuss it here. The original sentence was "Bragg had placed his artillery and trenches of the infantry along the actual crest of the ridge, rather than the military crest, and they were unable to provide effective fire." and the proposed replacement was "Bragg had placed his artillery and trenches of the infantry along the actual crest of the ridge (as had Sherman on Goat Hill), and they were unable to provide effective fire."
Although military crest is a comparatively modern term, its meaning applies to any application of direct fire weaponry. The linked term could be replaced by a summary definition "rather than the point on the hill from which the approaching troops were defiladed by the slope" but that is rather clumsy. Any 19th-century readers (those still alive) who do not know the term can simply click on the link to find the definition. I agree that it would be an anachronism to attribute this term to a 19th-century writer, such as "Grant wrote in his memoirs that Bragg did not use the military crest ..." but that is not the case here. We also did not say anything to the effect of "Bragg violated 19-century military doctrine by not using the military crest." Furthermore, retaining the term "actual crest" makes no sense in the context of removing the term military crest.
Linking a failure of Bragg to practices by other generals might be slightly interesting or ironic, but it is irrelevant. Sherman was not defending Goat Hill from a massive Confederate attack and did not lose the battle (or any battle) because of where he placed his fortifications. Bragg did, and we are explaining why. I know of no secondary sources that attempt to justify Bragg's position based on a comparison with Sherman, which is probably why you did not provide a citation for the new text. Hal Jespersen (talk) 15:08, 5 July 2011 (UTC)
- The American Civil War was the birthplace of trench warfare. True, trench warfare had been used to some extent during the Crimean War, but nowhere near as extensively. There were no established doctrines regarding trench warfare prior to that war; in fact, many of them came about because of the experiences on both sides. True, if Bragg had thought rather than reacted, he may have placed the trenches of the Army of Tennessee on Missionary Ridge at what is now called the military crest rather than the actual crest. However, since no standards had been written on where military rifle pits should be placed on a ridge or a mountain, pointing out that he placed the trenches on the actual crest rather than the military crest is misleading. It suggests there was such a military doctrine in existence at the time, which there was not. Had there been, Sherman never would have his rifle trenches on Billy Goat Hill on the actual crest as well.
- In truth, the placement of the trenches of the Army of Tennessee on the military crest of every engagement fought during the Atlanta Campaign in terrain where heights existed suggest that it was because of their experience at Missionary Ridge that the doctrine of military crest came about.
- Again, Catton is a 20th century writer commenting more than half a century after the fact, not a contemporary military expert. If you want to include a criticism of Bragg's placement of the trenches, you need to provide a source that proves such a doctrine existed at the time of the Battle of Missionary Ridge. Furthermore, to be fair and accurate, you would also need to criticize Sherman for the same deficit if that were the case. However, it is not. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 00:27, 10 July 2011 (UTC)
- Furthermore, Sherman's placement of rifle trenches on Billy Goat Hill is indeed relevant because it demonstrates that such was common practice. Avoiding that issue because it weakens your criticism of Bragg as being in default over the same placement of rifle trenches is dishonest. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 00:31, 10 July 2011 (UTC)
We are not really talking about a "doctrine" here, we are talking about common sense. If you place your defensive troops in a position where they cannot see the enemy approaching them, or they cannot aim their weapons at them effectively, your defense will be inadequate. Although the term came from the 20th century, the concept has been valid ever since men employed direct-fire weapons – starting with bows and arrows. A general does not need a 20th century military manual to see that that is a problem. He simply needs to look at the ground. (There was also no "doctrine" that said you should not put your men in a 10 foot deep railroad cut, but the Confederates did that at Gettysburg and have been criticized for it. About the only difference between these two situations is that the modern military uses a specific term to describe the first situation, but not the second.)
The quotation from James McDonough is careful to explain the situation and then mentions in passing that the modern military uses the term for this situation. (I am certain that I can find other examples of secondary sources making this same claim, but one is sufficient.) Since this is a quotation from a legitimate secondary source, there is no justification for removing it. If you have a secondary source that disagrees with this judgment, you are welcome to suggest it and we can ensure that we are representing a WP:NPOV. If you have a secondary source that describes Sherman's trenches and compares them to Bragg's as a justification for Bragg's action, you are welcome to suggest it. I have doubts whether you will find such a source.
Regardless of whether you are able to provide secondary sources to support your claim – a requirement in Wikipedia – once this discussion has died down I can see that an improvement is warranted. Although the article about the Chattanooga Campaign carefully uses a cited quotation about the military crest (which is in the body of the article and the corresponding mention of it in the lead section does not need a footnote because of that), the article about Missionary Ridge does not go to that level of detail and your concerns indicate it needs to be brought up to that same standard. Hal Jespersen (talk) 17:52, 10 July 2011 (UTC)
- Hal, "common sense" is not a valid source of criteria according to Wikipedia standards for sources. We have been over this several times before, and in three years you have not provided a single source to demonstrate that Bragg's placement of the trenches along Missionary Ridge according to military doctrine in November 1863 was incorrect. Therefore, making that assertion is invalid, and, by the way, the burden of proof is upon the person making the positive assetion, which in this case is you. As it stands, even mentioning the military crest as if there were such a doctrine at the time is as anachronistic as it would be to criticize him for not placing machine gun pits at intervals that allowed overlapping fields of fire. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 20:40, 12 July 2011 (UTC)
Sorry, you are not paying attention. The article already has a cited quotation from a military historian writing in a valid secondary source. (The quotation is in the body of the article and the gist of that is summarized in the lead section without a footnote, which is the way we do it in Wikipedia.) If you have an alternative viewpoint, you need to present at least one similar quotation or citation from another valid secondary source to balance out the quotation that is already there. Removing the current quotation is not an option. Please stop modifying the article until you have more than your own personal opinion to present. Hal Jespersen (talk) 21:21, 12 July 2011 (UTC)
- If you are relying on the seconadary source's information, then you need to cite that source, not another source which cites it. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 12:54, 13 July 2011 (UTC)
The direct quotation from McDonough is cited in footnote 37, his book page 183. This is also cited in footnote 54, although not so directly. Woodworth, p. 199, which is also in footnote 54, agrees with this assessment and I could quote him by name as well, but didn't do so because McDonough should be adequate. Hal Jespersen (talk) 18:17, 13 July 2011 (UTC)
- McDonough is a 20th century writer commenting from a standpoint over 100 years after the fact, and nothing in his statement indicates that there was a doctrine of "military crest" at the time of the Battle of Missionary Ridge. Unless such a source can be produced, criticism of Bragg due to his placement of the trenches in a way which suggests he was ignoring established protocol is invalid. However, pointing out the practical result of that placement is not invalid. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 11:16, 14 July 2011 (UTC)
- Interesting. While encamped at Corinth in July 1862, Chief-of-Staff and Engineers of the Dept. of the Mississippi Brig. Gen. George W. Collum was documenting Nicolas Édouard Delabarre-Duparcq's Elements of military art and history: comprising the history and tactics of the separate arms; the combination of the arms; and the minor operations of war. On pages 369-372, there is a complete discussion of the term military crest (in which its use is accepted as already contemporary) and two precedent battles in which it played part (Battle of Talavera (July 28, 1809) & Heights of Pampeluna (July 28,1813)). The concept does not appear to be an anachronism.
- I'm not sure that this is finger-pointing as much as it is explaining why something happened. I don't think that this is gratuitous criticism of Bragg...rather, it is an explanation of the turn of events.
- However, if you are looking for criticism, a contemporary critique of Bragg for this oversight of position may be read on pages 252-255 of Louis Philippe Albert d'Orleans, comte de Paris's History of the Civil War in America. In particular:
- "He did not even attempt to make up for the small number of his soldiers by seriously strengthening his line. The most important part of this line, the crest of Missionary Ridge, was too abrupt at the top to offer good positions for the artillery. The breastworks and batteries which he had erected on the summit were sufficient to crown it; but instead of simple wooden barricades covered with a little earth he should have established strong works on the lower slopes. However, it would have been necessary to concentrate the entire army on Missionary Ridge in order to render this position impregnable. This army was not so numerous as to occupy at once the entire crest from Rossville on the south as far as the tunnel of the railway on the north, together with the western foot-hills of Missionary Ridge, which the enemy must have been tempted to take either to cover the defence of the place or prepare for offensive movements."
- He didn't use the term military crest but he certainly described what happens when one fails to observe it.
⋙–Berean–Hunter—► 03:46, 19 July 2011 (UTC)
- He didn't use the term military crest but he certainly described what happens when one fails to observe it.
- Ok, I give. The criticism of Bragg is justified, but Sherman should likewise be criticized, both for relying on inadequate intelligence and for the placement of his rifle pits. Both he and Bragg should have known better: the rifle pits supporting the four forts Cleburne built in the Tyner area and the one in Harrison were on what's now called the military crest. And thanks for the sources. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 10:00, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- You're welcome. :) Do you happen to have a reliable source which criticizes Sherman for inadequate intelligence and for the placement of his rifle pits?
⋙–Berean–Hunter—► 18:16, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- You're welcome. :) Do you happen to have a reliable source which criticizes Sherman for inadequate intelligence and for the placement of his rifle pits?
- I can't remember which source I've read it in, several I think, but Sherman was supposed to take the north end of Missionary Ridge on the 24th, not a separate elevation. Bragg didn't have that actual north end covered until AFTER Sherman crossed the Tennessee. As for the rifle pits on top of Billy Goat Hill, I've seen those but I don't think anyone has ever commented on them. His artillery emplacements were, and still are, on the south side of Billy Goat Hill. Chuck Hamilton (talk) 09:38, 21 July 2011 (UTC)
Original map
This map published in 1875 is available on Commons if someone would like to choose where to incorporate it. --Fæ (talk) 01:33, 30 July 2011 (UTC)
- It's a pretty poor image. I do not see any advantage to including it. Hal Jespersen (talk) 20:55, 30 July 2011 (UTC)
Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign
According to Dyer, Frederick H. (1959). A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. New York and London. Thomas Yoseloff, Publisher. LCCN 59-12963, he has the Chattanooga Campaign as "Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign" in Volume 3, p. 1,153. Should this reflect "also known as... Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign" in the opening paragraph? Adamdaley (talk) 07:34, 25 June 2013 (UTC)
- After the Union Army broke the Confederate siege of Chattanooga, Tennessee at the Battle of Missionary Ridge on November 25, 1863, the culmination of the Battle of Chattanooga which began on November 23, 1863, the Union forces pursued the Confederates to the vicinity of Ringgold, Georgia where a sharp rearguard action was fought on November 26. The fighting continued at Ringgold Gap and Taylor's Ridge, Georgia the next day. Both armies then consolidated their positions but the fighting died down since part of the Union force was sent to Knoxville because of the continuing siege of Knoxville. As far as I know and have read, modern historians refer to the battles around Chattanooga, including the pursuit into northern Georgia simply as the Chattanooga Campaign, or even just the Battle or Battles of Chattanooga. You cite a 1959 publication but it is a reprint because Dyer's Compendium was published in 1908. The campaign may have been more generally referred to as Chattanooga-Ringgold at that time or perhaps Dyer just wanted to credit the units which engaged in the pursuit and subsequent fighting around Ringgold. The page you cite gives brief regimental histories of some Union regiments which were so engaged. I certainly would not object to some reference to the campaign at one time being referred to as the Chattanooga-Ringgold campaign but I would not give it any greater prominence because I think the term is not in much, if any, use in modern times. In the alternative, I also would not think it necessary to include the alternate title of the campaign as long as some mention is made of the pursuit to Ringgold.
- Cozzens, Peter. The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994. ISBN 0-252-01922-9.
- Faust, Patricia L., ed. Historical Times Illustrated History of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. ISBN 978-0-06-273116-6, does not even mention Ringgold, only the pursuit to the vicinity of Rossville, Dalton and Chickamauga Creek.
- Heidler, David S., and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X, calls it the Chattanooga Campaign, mentions the culmination at Ringgold but does not use alternate title.
- Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861–1865. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. OCLC 68283123, calls it the Chattanooga Campaign, does not use alternate title.
- McDonough, James Lee. Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984. ISBN 0-87049-425-2. Donner60 (talk) 10:17, 4 July 2013 (UTC)
- Let me add that I do not doubt that you know that Dyer's Compendium was originally published in 1908. I just was trying to make the point that it is over a century old and may not reflect the name of the campaign in modern sources, as I specifically note with respect to three of the five that I cite above.
- The pursuit is mentioned in a later section of the article. It only briefly mentions the action on November 26 but gives a good summary of the action of November 27 and the effect of the withdrawal of some Union units to go to Knoxville. So my alternative of not mentioning Ringgold in the name of the campaign subject to that condition is mostly fulfilled. I suppose I slightly favor the apparent modern usage of not adding Ringgold to the name of the campaign, but, as I stated, I also would not object to its mention as an alternative name which has fallen out of modern use. Donner60 (talk) 21:40, 4 July 2013 (UTC)
- Here is another consideration. Regardless of the title of the campaign in some modern sources, the order of battle articles in Wikipedia for this campaign use Chattanooga-Ringgold as the name of the campaign. Donner60 (talk) 06:11, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
- IMHO, this issue is already covered in footnote number 1 of the article. The article is really about two classified campaigns, combined into one topic, so the title is somewhat arbitrary. (A popular alternative that is widely used elsewhere would be the Battles for Chattanooga, but I didn't think that fit well into the Wikipedia naming convention.) Hal Jespersen (talk) 17:53, 9 July 2013 (UTC)