Talk:Blitzkrieg/Archive 2

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Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Blitzkrieg in Poland

Input appreciated at Talk:Invasion of Poland (1939)#Blitzkrieg myth. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 03:04, 4 May 2009 (UTC)

Didn't happen. Even the myth itself, large concentrations of armour supported by air power did not exist in Case White. The PDs were spread out - not really Blitzkrieg. Infact it was, and rightly so, the infantry that got credit for the victory. Dapi89 (talk) 15:57, 5 June 2009 (UTC)

First of all - Blitzkrieg itself is not a myth. Russian historians found the best definition of German Blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg (in its German version - because there was also a Soviet version of Blitzkrieg, the best example of which is the Vistula - Oder operation in September of 1945) is an elitaristic, bourgeois conception which relies on high combat value of well-equipped, elite units which constitute the minority of armed forces, not on massive mechanized armies as in the Soviet version (source: Christopher Duffy, "Red Storm on the Reich", page 64).

Secondly - Blitzkrieg in Poland happened and in some ways in Poland it happened more than anywhere else. The stupid myth that in Poland Panzer divisions operated separately and large concentrations of armour were not present can be found for example in "The Blitzkrieg Legend" written by Frieser, but this myth is completely false. On page 18 of "The Blitzkrieg Legend" we can find:

"[...] during the Polish campaign German armor was not yet employed independently on operational level either at the corps or army echelons. Instead the Panzer formations on the tactical level usually fought in a divisional framework." - both the claim that in Poland Germans didn't have armoured corps and the claim that Panzer division is a formation designed to work on tactical level (even single Panzer division is a formation clearly designed to complete operational tasks) are false. In fact Germans had got plenty of armoured-motorized Corps in Poland in 1939 - XIX., XVI., XV., XIV., XXII., some of them even cooperated with each other, for example XVI., XV. and XIV. or XIX. and XXII.

In Poland one of the biggest concentrations of armour per each kilometre of the frontline in WW2 took place (for example during the battles of Piotrkow Trybunalski - Tomaszow Mazowiecki, during the battle of Radom, during the initial German advance and battles near Czestochowa).

I explained it clearly in my (Domen121 / Domen123) posts on these forums, I also don't agree that infantry got credit for the victory (and I explained it there):

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=137912&p=1384598#p1384598

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=33&t=25632&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&start=105

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=45&t=9183&p=218717&hilit=the+german+campaign+in+poland#p218717

Peter558 (talk) 22:29, 11 October 2009 (UTC)

Peter, the dominant position in academic literature is it didn't exist. Infact the most ardent historians are Germans. To suggest Blitzkrieg existed it to proffer the now discredited theory that the Germans intended to achieve their total aims by a series of short campaigns. This was not the case. The websites you offer don't come close to being first class academic sources, and they are typical of the rubbish that exist on the internet.

And I have the book by Frieser - he does not argue that Blitzkrieg was actioned in Poland - infact his whole thesis is that Blitzkrieg was a myth! He calls it a world-wide delusion. Dapi89 (talk) 13:12, 12 October 2009 (UTC)

North Africa

The section is uncited and doesn't make it all clear whether it is arguing the so called Blitzkrieg did take place there. If cites are not found, it should be removed. There is absolutely no connection (in my mind alone) in the article to North Africa and the Blitzkrieg methodology. Dapi89 (talk) 16:00, 5 June 2009 (UTC)

Myths & Realities

Added section. Given the amount of crap on the internet an in books, not to mention the "myth buying" of people on the concept of the Blitzkrieg doctrine, the above needs to be addressed:

It ain't new
The Third Reich did not have a Blitzkrieg economy - It did not prepare its economy for a "Bltizkrieg" war, but an all out conflict much later than 1939
The make up of the German army forces as fully mechanized and highly trained - largely nonsense

All trashed by Friesers "Blitzkrieg Legend", Overy's work, and Harris, Naveh and most of the other heavy weights . Dapi89 (talk) 18:54, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

Earlier use of the term "lightning war"

I read an article from August 1939 which mentions a Hungarian author discussing the idea of Germany undertaking "a lightning war". The context of the newspaper article suggests that this term was already being used well before the article was written, which differs from this wikipedia article's claim that the term was later applied by western journalists.

http://orwelldiaries.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/daily-telegraph-8-8-39-page-10-2.jpg —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jonovision (talk • contribs) 23:21, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

I suggest you read this article carefully. It says no such thing. German uses of the word can be found earlier than 1939. But offering a word without attaching any kind of meaningful theory is useless. Neither the authors that used this word mention any detail about how a Blitzkrieg victory is supposed to be won. Dapi89 (talk) 13:19, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

I see what you mean, and I've edited the second paragraph to make it more clear. I've split the run-on sentence into two parts, and removed the reference to "eingreif", because it is not explained in the rest of the article. --Jonovision (talk) 07:58, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

NPOV

A year ago, this was an encyclopedia article discussing the history of the term "Blitzkrieg" and the development of maneuver warfare in the 20th century. At the moment, it appears primarily to be a sloppily-written polemic denouncing the term and its users and attempting to argue that either no such development occurred or that, if it did, Germans should get no credit for it.

I see sufficient references to support the idea that there is controversy over both the term and the historical development, and would be appropriate for the article to discuss this controversy. What is not appropriate for the article to be scattered with weasel words ("alleged"), accusations of bad faith ("by manipulation and contrivance, Liddell Hart distorted..."), and conclusions such as "Another misconception... is also misleading."

Furthermore, even if it were to become widely agreed that the "classical" interpretation of "Blitzkrieg" in relation to WW2 was a historical fallacy -- something far from the case; the best Wikipedia can do is present the arguments -- that interpretation would itself still be a historical fact and the term would still have a meaning in common usage.

Please let me be clear: I have no stake in the reputations of Guderian, Liddell-Hart or the German general staff. But this article as it stands has become unencyclopedic.

--Chronodm (talk) 17:59, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Rubbish. You obviously have no idea about the subject. I study military history, and it is well known and covered by some of the most prominent historians. Every single line in relation to this "controversy" is sourced - and is worded in the way of the said author. Stop trying to casue trouble where there isn't any. Dapi89 (talk) 09:38, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

Quotation marks have been added to the section relating to Hart to avoid erroneous accusations of 'POV' in future. This article represents the dominant academic view of Blitzkrieg, not some fanboy bullshit that is found in third rate books that only touch on the subject. The modern works have examined the German archives far more thoroughly than old authors, who simply did not have access to them. Dapi89 (talk) 13:59, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

The new phrasing is improved. However, headings such as "Alleged foreign influence" still make no sense to the lay reader. I don't doubt that they make sense to an expert on the subject such as yourself, but it doesn't say anything about who alleges this or why -- it's written under the assumption that the reader is already familiar with the former conventional wisdom on the subject, and argues with that conventional wisdom. Again, I am not disputing the correctness of your argument but I am disputing the style in which it is made. --Chronodm (talk) 14:09, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

Fair enough. I have dumped the problematic words. I still think they are npov, but I'm not unreasonable. I'm not an expert yet. Dapi89 (talk) 14:16, 23 September 2009 (UTC)

Honestly, it a good article, but needs clean up and more at the top for modern and common uses of the term. One recommendation. The only controversy seems to be when the term "Blitzkrieg" is used to describe Wehrmacht doctrine. In the NFL a shotgun formation passing heavy offense became know as a "west coast offense" yet none of the playbooks or documentation of that era ever used the term "west coast offense"

If I understand correctly - Historically - "Blitzkrieg" is a retroactive term to describe the Wehrmacht use of mechanized warfare with the doctrine of establishing a schwertpunkt to provide direction after initial break through was made, and how to use concepts like rattzenkrieg and cauldron battle to exploit maneuver advantage on the enemy. Does it really matter that Wermacht Doctrine combined with mechanized weapons of the day was so unprecedented and revolutionary in effectiveness that it inspired a new word and theoretical concept of battle for generations to come? At Cannae Hannibal didn't call it "double envelopment". Historians named it that well after the battle had ended.

But the only historical controversy appears to be the origin of the term. The modern popular usage and the fact that popular culture uses a watered down version of the concept is worth a sentence or two - the same can be said of almost any sophisticated concept named by a single term.

The point is Historians make a living arguing semantics. Great. This is an encyclopedia to summarize all uses and origins of the term, including but not exclusively historical and theoretical contexts.'Bold text' Historians will always argue semantics of historical relevance. Strategists like Liddel-Hart or Boyd use "Blitzkrieg" as a retroactive term that in general describes the sorts of maneuver driven successes that effectively conquered France in WWII; as an homage to Rommel & Guderian. They use Blitzkrieg to describe that style of warfare; they never made any historical claim to what the Wermacht formal terminology for their doctrine at the time. And I'd bet they would freely agree that the Wehrmacht didn't expect it to work so well, or inspire a new style of mechanized warfare for generations to come in multiple languages and militarizes far exceeding the humble roots of the phenomena. "Blitz Krieg" is a modern term used to describe mechanized fast maneuver warfare that ignores lines of supply or control. The Wehrmacht is attributed to apparently accidentally inventing it and it got named by the media retroactively. The strategists are arguing strategic theory, not history. And even then we have to admit that JFC Fuller and the Tank are what made blitzkrieg possible - and they made the blue print for it.

You got to admit - the whole article still reads mostly like a complaint that people use Blitzkrieg in a semantically retroactive sense that despite common usage is not historically accurate. I still say, the same argument cam be made with terms like "West Cost Offense," "OODA Loop," mathematics vs arithmetic, or E=mc^2. That doesn't mean that a well written and pedantic article on the current state of debate in academic journals is strictly appropriate to dominate an encyclopedic entry on the term. The history is fascinating; but is much more than necessary and does take away from the common, popular, and modern uses of the term outside of the historical community that are not well represented in the article.

Also - Read Clausewitz again. Schwerpunkt is a much broader and more useful concept than the current entry describes it; even when you limit it to the historical application of the formal written Wermacht doctrine of WWII. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.82.126.100 (talk) 15:39, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

I don't agree. You say The history is fascinating; but is much more than necessary and does take away from the common, popular, and modern uses of the term outside of the historical community...the purpose of wikipedia is not to expound myths, its to educate. Dapi89 (talk) 17:45, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

The problem with all the military doctrine articles is they don't employ any single consistent doctrine. Military operations aren't like chemistry or mathemathics -- there isn't a single defining and universally accepted notation or method. The Soviets, Germans, British, US etc. all had their own formal structure (doctrine) for characterising operations (both their own and the enemy's), and each shoe-horned enemy tactics into their own structure when discussing it.

Further problems arise when someone trained in one dogma studies another, and inevitably begins mixing elements of the two. On p. 5 he defines his terms, then on p. 155 he returns to the topic. Problem is, p. 155 gets quoted and its actually a mangled mash-up of incompatible terminology without those definitions from p.5.

This problem isn't exclusive to this article -- it pervades the military science articles from top to bottom. Obviously correcting this would be a monumental task, and even achieving any sort of consensus on a uniform approach to apply to all articles could take years. Hopefully someone will set up a doctrines project, though any reward may be a long way off.Dduff442 (talk) 17:27, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

I couldn't disagree more. Military doctrines do have consistent and coherent principles - thats what makes them doctrines. Soviet deep battle the prime example.

And this article is not a mish-mash at all. It identifies the problems and engages them using the thesis of academics that base their entire work on the myth of Blitzkrieg. BTW, there is a consenus relating to Blitzkrieg. Dapi89 (talk) 17:45, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

But it's only possible to usefully discuss a military event or theory in the context of a single doctrine, otherwise confusing, contradictory, ill-defined and incompatible terminology comes to be employed. Of course its possible to deal with all the doctrines in a cohesive manner -- by evolving a new meta-doctrine that encompasses all the elements of the others. This is precisely what I was referring to. Nobody has done this in practice, however, and if you quote a book its likely the author is freely mixing concepts from his own native doctrinal base with that of his focus of study.

The consistent and coherent principles are of the lowest common denominator variety only. Cannae and Stalingrad were fought according to the same principles (which are a function of humans physical, psychological and social makeup and are invariant with time) not according to the same doctrine.

I didn't claim it is. The very idea of Blitzkrieg -- the focus of study, not the article -- is, however; an attempt by US and British soldiers to digest in their own terms something that originated within an entirely different framework. E.g. the Schwerpunkt concept as a broad principle transcending the tactical and strategic spheres did not exist in their tactical doctrines of the time. Ultimately phrases like 'point of main effort' came to be used, but without the explicit reference to the strategic sphere and to Clausewitz.

The specifics of this case were not on my mind when I posted. I don't doubt I'd have my own opinions there as well, but I was addressing the fact that different doctrines cannot be reconciled in combined terms. Either one doctrine is the one in which the others are defined, or some new meta-doctrine is evolved. This follows from the nature of logic and formal systems of reasoning, not military science.Dduff442 (talk) 18:58, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

Please don’t split up people's comments as it is against wiki etiquette.

Perhpas we are having two different conversations. My point was that Blitzkrieg is the opposite of a doctrine. Unlike others there are no systematic events, procedure or combination of principles that goes beyond the vague "surprise, speed, encirclement". Accusing authors of "mixing it" is not an academic argument.

I also think you’re generalising. Trying to group doctrines together using the effects or results of their employment, or their "lowest denominator" (i.e that they are similar -Stalingrad and Cannae) is not the correct approach to their study (in my opinion).

I agree that 'Blitzkrieg' was an invention. It was created in an attempt to understand the German operational methodology. German operational cognition of course did not develop at all. In fact all they did, through the expansion of mechanized and motorised forces, was to create a basic tactical pin, flank encircle move. Terms like "schwerpunkt" and "focus" are thrown in by historians (and historical personalities as well) to add some sort of military doctrine-like framework to it. This just gives the veneer of core principles to something that never was.

I don't agree. That does not sound logical to me. What are you talking about when you say "combined terms"? It doesn't seem to mean anything. If Blitzkrieg didn't exist as a doctrine, then it can hardly help "define", as you put it, any others with cited, calculated and scientific (and logical) procedures. On the other had, this would be true of a particular predecessor....... Dapi89 (talk) 23:25, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

It seems to me that the current article immediately goes to great lengths to explain what Blitzkrieg isn't, almost to the point of saying that it doesn't exist. This must be confusing, and probably rather unhelpful to our audience - the average reader. How about writing about what it usually refers to, inexact as that might be, but (obviously) using reliable sources, with later sections explaining that it isn't a doctrine, etc. This is far more helpful to the uninitiated reader than criticism and denial before they even get to read about what it's usually understood to mean - technically incorrect as that might seem to grognards. Hohum (talk) 03:02, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

To keep focus, I'll focus on this article return to the point about mixed doctrines later.

The article as currently constituted would be better titled 'Blitzkrieg (Historiography)'. This is a topic of greater importance than 'Blitzkrieg' since, as is helpfully pointed out, the Germans themselves never really used the term.

So I start reading the article and find Blitzkrieg described as 'a headline word applied retrospectively to describe a military doctrine'. Excellent, I'm with you 100%.

Now I click on 'Military Doctrine', linking to a topic that kind of peters out half way through and contains no link whatsoever to german military doctrine of the second world war. I'd be delighted if you could point me towards this information because I've no idea where to look.

The attacks on the 'Blitzkrieg' idea are well founded, but there's a massive leap from the statement 'Blitzkrieg itself is not an official doctrine' to the statement 'the German army at the outbreak of war had no radically new theory of war' (called Blitzkrieg or called anything else). They had both new methods and theories but, in summation, naturally just called them 'war'.

Whether these were 'a radically new theory of war' or not is open to debate. What is not is that this is a topic of immense importance in its own right, as it amounts to the foundations of modern combined arms warfare. The new methods included but were not limited to:

Unique methods:

1) Mission-type orders (auftragstaktik); maximum independence at all levels of command from squad to field army

2) Near universal employment of armour as large formations

3) Operational mobility - Motorisation of logistical assets for motorised and armoured forces

4) 'Infiltration' or 'Stormtrooper' tactics; I've quoted the words because they were just known as infantry tactics

5) Easily reconfigurable command structure ('Kampfgruppen') at all levels

6) Easily reconfigurable communications nets to support this

7) Ability to direct artillery fire against mobile targets of opportunity

8) Ability to call in air strikes against mobile targets of opportunity and to guide the strike a/c from the front while on approach to target

9) Responsive air-ground liaison enabling joint focus on a single objective

10) Manoeuvre-based defense

With Soviet Union

11) Employment of paratroopers and glider-borne troops

12) Defense in depth

13) Theory of independent armoured operations

(12) and to a more limited extent (4), (2) and (3) had been employed by other nations but were never theoretically formalised and had, in essence, been forgotten by 1939.

The article states these were not employed in any 'coherent' way. German doctrine was certainly diffuse however in summation, the different elements were self-consistent, well defined and comprehensive. A unifying point was Die Truppenfuehrung, the universal army doctrinal manaual applicable at all levels from platoon and higher.

The sources support the assertion that the coherent whole a) was not called blitzkrieg and b) did not encompass the political or strategic spheres. They do *not* support the assertion that no coherent operational framework existed. The unifying framework was so general, in fact, that it encompassed *both* the ideas of the armour specialists like Guderian and their adversaries such as (initially) von Rundstedt without contradiction.

I have only time to address one such Cite in detail: Naveh. In a brief examination on Google books, it becomes apparent that Naveh identifies i) that Blitzkrieg was a label of the Germans' adversaries ii) that it was seized upon by the political hierarchy in Germany to strengthen its operational and ideological control of the armed forces and iii) that this lead to the operational doctrines of the Germans becoming obscure and incoherent with time.

It is clear from the context his statement about "the complete absence of a coherent theory which should have served as the general cognitive basis for the actual conduct of operations" (emphasis added) refers to the lack of any fundamental juncture linking the strategic and operational spheres, not the lack of any coherent principles underpinning individual operations. Whatever the merits of the individual operations, they lacked a 'general cognitive basis' because the German Army didn't do strategy and the Nazi regime which did had little comprehension of the operational methods.

Did the drive to the channel constitute an operation in the modern sense of the term or not? Is it claimed that this operation was not the result of a coherent set of doctrines? And is it furthermore claimed that these doctrines, and their unique elements outlined above, do not merit an article on its own and separated from the historiographic question of blitzkrieg as a strategic, military-economic or tactical framework?Dduff442 (talk) 06:51, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

With regard to Hohum's comment: I agree. With regard to Dduff442: I really hope you get the chance to read Naveh's book in full. The point of the issue is this:

The word Blitzkrieg was never used by the military in 1933 - 1940
The Germans did not develop a Blitzkrieg strategy to win any future war
With the absence of a Blitzkrieg strategy, there is no doctrine
The 'operational' (if thats what it was) and certainly tactical methods of the Germans were sort of similar to Bewergungskrieg methods, but less coherent, as it realied more exploiting success than sticking to preconceived objectives or operational staged manouevres as Moltke did in the Franco-Prussian war. 'Blitzkrieg' or German military methodology isn't a doctine at all but rather a sort of pusedo-reactionary operational system.

Most importantly:

Your intepration (It is clear from the context his statement about "the complete absence of a coherent theory which should have served as the general cognitive basis for the actual conduct of operations" (emphasis added) refers to the lack of any fundamental juncture linking the strategic and operational spheres, not the lack of any coherent principles underpinning individual operations) is not accurate.

For you will also note Naveh said: It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight - and with some help from Liddell Hart - this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design...this why you should read the full book rather than small parts. Dapi89 (talk) 12:55, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

He also states: "Formulating the tactical concept of combined arms undoubtedly requires some sort of operational cognition. The extensive space allocated to this subject in Truppenfuehrung 1936 confirms this premise. Furthermore it is obvious that constructing any coherent fighting organisation is not possible without a general theory of operations serving as its conceptual framework."

I notice you have failed each time I have posted to address the specific issues I have raised, preferring to respond in general terms. I asked three simple questions above, and you ignored each of them. Please make some effort to address the points raised.Dduff442 (talk) 13:18, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

I haven’t failed to anything. You are the professing nothing put personal and opinionated posturing. I have provided my sources. If this is going to get personal, I'm not going to bother responding. My position, as is the academic position, is in the article. And I have addressed your main points thus far in what I have already posted.

But to satisfy you (and I shouldn't have to be doing this):

1) The first point is about tactics. The important issues are operational and strategic. A tactical manual does not imply operational doctrine. Tactical manuals used did not provide operational direction, but methods of ad-hoc command. Simply expanding a tactical "platoon" doctrine to what may be considered an operational unit does not constitute an operational system.

2) They most certainly do support the absense of operational cognition. As I have already proven (without trying to personally interpret the author) with the direct wording and position of Naveh

Lastly, you have just reinforced the point I was making: that your interpretation is not correct. Scouring for any remote phrases that (only minutely) 'rescues' your incorrect claim that Naveh holds the position that the Wehrmacht did posses an operational system, is tendentious and highly inappropriate. The fact remains: no operational design. Perhaps adding the second following quotation even more aptly summs up Navehs position:

The core of operations (ie Blitzkrieg did not consist of any particular new use of the new means of warfare, but in a kind of operational opportunism that knew no pre-set or standardized methods

as does:

It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight - and with some help from Liddell Hart - this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design

I say again, I cannot have a debate with someone, who by his own admission has never read Naveh. Please do so, and we will pick this up where we have left off. Dapi89 (talk) 13:50, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

Last reply: The German Army, unlike the Americans or the Soviets, but like the British did not have an operational system. They may have referred to and carried out "operations" or operational art as we now call it, but neither had an operational structure specifically designed for mass warfare. My Professors would argue that the British did have an operational system "of sorts", but as I keep telling them: if ain't offical and structured it ain't a doctrine. The same is true of the Wehrmacht. Dapi89 (talk) 13:59, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

When you began making edits to this article in March, the introductory sentence already described the topic as "a headline word applied retrospectively to describe a military doctrine".

Now you would have done Wikipedia a service if at that time you had created a new article called 'Blitzkrieg (Historiography)' but you did not. You would even have been (technically more) correct to move the Blitzkrieg article to "German Military Doctrine of WWII" and start on the historiography with a clean slate. As was clearly stated before you began, the term was applied retroactively.

The first two sections now consist entirely of historiography -- 2,251 words of it -- attacking numerous 'myths', not one of which was espoused in the original article.

The main sources for this section are Overy, Frieser, Naveh and Citino.

OVERY's book is definitive, but irrelevant here. It relates to the Strategic-Political sphere, not to military doctrine or operations. The theories criticised never existed on the page until you introduced your criticism, and the page is simply not the appropriate place for exploration of strategic or economic concerns.

NAVEH espouses his own novel theory of operations called Systemic Operational Design (SOD). He describes this as descended from Soviet Operational Art. I could endorse this undertaking but Dr Milan Vego, Prof of Operations at the US Navy War College states that "SOD theory is also supposedly based on the Soviet theory of operational art of the 1920s and 1930s ... despite the claims of its advocates, SOD does not contain, except for some terms, any of these ideas. The leading theorist of SOD falsely reinterpreted the early Soviet writings on operational art in terms of GST (General Systems Theory -- dduff). Supposedly, operational art in contrast to strategy and tactics is systemic in nature. This is not the case, however."

He adds that "a more serious problem is that the Soviet theory of operational art as defined by SOD supporters bore almost no resemblance to what the Soviet theorists actually wrote or implied in their numerous published works." ([1])

Naveh's theory was in the process of being adopted by the IDF but he was supended for financial irregularities within his office and resigned. His star pupil, BG Gal Hirsch was relieved of command of the IDF 91 Infantry Division after the war against Hizbollah

He has remarked of the Israeli Naval commander that "someone like that should be executed, and I said the same about (former IDF CoS Dan) Halutz. In a well-ordered state they would be executed; the one is a criminal, the other a lout" ([2]), refers to his former colleagues as 'idiots', 'cattle', 'fools' (etc etc) and it is safe to say his influence on IDF doctrine is now nil.

Sections of the US military have since adopted systems related to his theories, but as decision support mechanisms not as doctrine, and certainly not as guiding principles for day-to-day operations as the continuous stream of incomprehensible new jargon it generates was widely blamed for communications failures in the IDF for the poor results against Hizbollah.

I note you employ his jargon (e.g. 'operational cognition') freely. You criticise German doctrines in Naveh's terms as lacking a 'system of operations'. A 'system of operations' cannot, by definition, belongs to the operational sphere and Naveh's focus is on the link between operations and strategy, not operations per se.

His theories are in no sense mainstream (he rejects Clausewitz) and have never been tested in a major war. Do you know of *any* instances elsewhere where his work has been cited in *this* field?

CITINO's work directly contradicts your conclusions. According to Citino 'no one man -- and certainly not Hitler -- "invented" Blitzkrieg. Rather, the birth of this new style of war was an evolutionary development, the result of 15 years of doctrinal experimentation" (p244 emphasis added, as with following quotes).

"In its training, wargames and manoeuvres, the Wehrmacht continued and refined the new military doctrine that had first arisen in the Reichswehr era" (p244)

"Case yellow was the proof of the brilliance of German military doctrine".

"The military history of the last 50 years, from Case Yellow to the almost bloodless coalition triumph in Operation Desert Storm, bears the deep mark of the German doctrinal revolution from 1920-1939". (p 251)

FRIESER doesn't like the term Blitzkrieg any more than you or I do.

He does support the claim the operational concept of rapid breakthroughs by massed armour was an expedient. Of course there is no way it could have become reality in the time needed without item 3 (Operational Mobility) mentioned in the list above, and operational mobility was unique to the German Tank/Motorised forces at the time. This very fact contributed to the poverty of the rest of the German military in terms of motor transport.

This expedient would have been impossible for France or Britain for this very reason. Also, the doctrines dictating the employment of the tank divisions were well developed.

The importance of the 'Blitz' in Blitzkrieg can be exaggerated. The principle focus of German doctrine was on combined arms.

These statements are a very long way from your claim that 'there is no doctrine'. Contemporary doctrine did not prescribe such operations, but it certainly permitted them. There were no major doctrinal novelties between the Polish campaign and Barbarossa: Luftkriegsführung and Truppenführung remained standard with continuous updates being published.

I identified a list of 14 straightforward doctrinal novelties above, each universally applied today. Also, contemporary German doctrine was comprehensive, self-consistent and well-defined.

If you dispute it was comprehensive, please state what was omitted. Likewise, if you dispute it was either self-consistent or well-defined please mention the inconsistencies or what was poorly defined.

Germany's lead in military theory brought the world to the brink of catastrophe in 1940. Historians' attitudes to other historians' attitudes to these theories are interesting but irrelevant to the theories themselves. They belong in a different article.

Dduff442 (talk) 21:19, 28 October 2009 (UTC) (more to follow)

No Way. Wikipedia articles cover every aspect of military doctrines. The article starts and concludes logically.

1) OVERY's book is definitive, but irrelevant here. It relates to the Strategic-Political sphere, not to military doctrine or operations What nonsense. Blitzkrieg is alleged to have been a strategy - not doctrine - this is basic. It is integral to 'Blitzkrieg' precisely for political-economic-strategic positions.

2) It is not for you to determine or interpret a historians motivations or findings. And you're quoting Naveh out of context -purely because you can't misinterpret his work. Having failed to do so last time around, you are trying to discredit it. Have you seen the historical journals reviews of Naveh's work?

3) I note you employ his jargon (e.g. 'operational cognition') freely. You criticise German doctrines in Naveh's terms as lacking a 'system of operations'. Since when does using one phrase (which you had not heard of until today) justify you generalising and alleging I'm some how a kind of blind follower?

4) The attempt to use Citino for "doctine" is a nonsense. I can't see that he refers to operational doctrine -this is what we were discussing. Citino is referring to tactical doctrine - which is appropriate considering TACTICAL methods were structured and innovative.

5)For Citino to call German methodology new is bizarre. Certainly a minority position. But then again, you provide no proof he was referring to operational structure.

6) I take issue with: These statements are a very long way from your claim that 'there is no doctrine. I never claimed "there was no doctrine" - but that there was no coherent operational system. That does not mean that the German Army did not have any doctrine! JC!

7) I identified a list of 14 straightforward doctrinal novelties above, each universally applied today - er, no you havn't.

Perhaps you should pay proper attention to what I actually say. You're barking up the wrong tree. As for your last line: The Germans had no military theory - which is the entire point of the Blitzkrieg myth. No Strategy. No operational doctrine. What they did have was a sound tactical doctrine which was expanded by the size of combat forces to Corps (operational) level. Dapi89 (talk) 00:27, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

| Freudian slip? - Dduff442 (talk) 08:41, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

This is getting too wordy, we don't need to proselytise about how big our brains are. Currently, this article reads more like it is called "The myth of Blitzkrieg (don't bother to read me)". I find it confusing that Dapi89 has said that he agrees with my comment, yet what I said seems to be more in line with Dduff442. Anyway...

Lets get back to basics; This article should not read like an academic dissertation, nor should it have otherwise unstated myths raised to mighty proportions so that they need to be slain in further needlessly wordy refutations. An explanation that Blitzkrieg isn't a "doctrine" takes a paragraph, at best. There don't need to be several sections devoted to saying all the things that it isn't.

The article should inform and engage novices. Currently, I expect it frustrates, confuses and intimidates them. At the very least, refutations should be nearer the end of the article, after the things it criticises. (Or after each section as a point/counterpoint) Hohum (talk) 00:48, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Because issues are becoming interwoven, confused and ignored in Dapi's responses, I'm going to break my response down according to the specific issues.Dduff442 (talk) 08:26, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

I have never I said I agreed with you. Don't make things up. No slip indeed. You'll note it corrected - and not unnoticed - it’s irrelevant anyway. I couldn't disagree more. The concept itself did not exist. At best, it was loosely based an experiences of the past. At the very best one might call it similar (at least at the operational level) to the posture of Bewegungskrieg. This in itself has no concrete meaning and isn't really a doctrine either. Originally it was at the end. But people shouldn't have to read through it and then at the end find out what the were reading is based on a myth and not necessarily accurate. In fact it was suggested to me that it should be in the first paragraph. This lets people know what is supposed to be, its difficulties and then what the Wehrmacht actually did. And I'm getting really bored with your attitude. Because issues are becoming interwoven, confused and ignored in Dapi's responses, I'm going to break my response down according to the specific issues

This really is a cheek and it’s to the contrary! I've been very specific. You are the one who didn't seem to understand the point of the debate we were having. Existence of a doctrine of any type (you) v operational doctrine (me). That was what I was trying to get through to you.

I shall be taking a break from this as I am busy and I do have better things to do. If I were you, I would try and find some substantial evidence that an operational doctrine existed. Trying to pass Citino's work off as cnfirmation of this fact (and I have read it) is not acceptable. Dapi89 (talk) 11:20, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

I do not accept your right either to define the problem in terms of your own choosing ('System of Operations') that are at best of marginal relevance, that historiography and military history should occupy the one page, the reasonability of applying an obscure doctrinal method originating 40 years after the event to the subject matter or the notability of Naveh's work (2 Citations re WWII on Google scholar, both unpublished, plus a mention by Citino).

You promoted your views to the first paragraphs. You're engaged in a pretty blatant Naveh POV push which will be documented presently. Dduff442 (talk) 11:52, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Puerile to say the least. FIND SOME EVIDENCE. You have failed to offer any evidence and you have attacked Naveh without just cause. In the process you have tried to use Citino to support you - only he does not. BS accusations, "NPOV" - is nonsense. NPOV is limited to personal interpretation. In case you had forgotten, Naveh is a well received academic. Under those circumstances it is not me violating "NPOV". Further continuation is pointless. Over and out. Dapi89 (talk) 13:01, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

The article lead concludes:

In recent years the majority of historians have come to the conclusion it was not a new form of warfare invented by the German military, but an old method of pursuing decisive battles using new technology.

This is backed with a reference to Citino, who actually states in the book cited:

"the birth of this new style of war was an evolutionary development, the result of 15 years of doctrinal experimentation ... In its training, wargames and manoeuvres, the Wehrmacht continued and refined the new military doctrine that had first arisen in the Reichswehr era...The military history of the last 50 years, from Case Yellow to the almost bloodless coalition triumph in Operation Desert Storm, bears the deep mark of the German doctrinal revolution from 1920-1939".

Citino makes no mention of 'the majority of historians', and otherwise appears to hold a position diametrically opposed to yours and to the sentence purportedly drawn from his work. Do you still stand by the sentence? Dduff442 (talk) 15:13, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Wrong. Citino, The German Way in War:

Clearly, the Germans did not invent something called Blitzkrieg in the 1920s or 1930s. The introduction of the tank and the aircraft, typically viewed as a revolutionary development, or indeed as part of 'revolution in military affairs' , simply provided the tools that the German Army needed to get back to what it had always done best. The German analysis of theses successful operations in the war's first two years - Poland, Weserbung, Case Yellow, the opening phase of Barbarossa - placed them squarely within that traditional context

he goes onto say:

The Wehrmacht killed the old command style because it no longer corresponded to modern realities (referring to the operational use of Auftragstaktik (fundamentally a tactical doctrine) at Army Group level)........

And you are still failing to FIND EVIDENCE of an operational doctrine. He is not refering to operational doctrine - merely (as does Corum) an evolution in tactics. Dapi89 (talk) 16:42, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

If a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, you are the most dangerous man in the world. This has gotten beyond a joke. You seem to think that by simply keeping talking you can get out of the insane hole you've dug for yourself. You lack any shred of scholarly integrity as an examination of the previous two posts will reveal.

Just to humour you, this is from p. 118 of Naveh: "An examination of Truppenfuehrung reveals that Beck (Credited as author -- dduff) and his associates comprehended the complete depth of modern war and were fully aware of the role technology and mechanization played in it. [It] is nothing other than the revelation of the operational approach at its best." Dduff442 (talk) 17:08, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Stop throwing a tantrum because you have been contradicted, again. As I have asked you before; stop quoting Naveh out of context and manipulating his position. He concludes in an undeniable sense on what he considered German methodology to be:

It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight - and with some help from Liddell Hart - this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design

This is within context. Case closed.

Finally, you sir, have shown yourself to be nothing other than a tendentious manipulator of sources. When it suits you try and quote Naveh, when your misinterpretation of him is pointed out, you try and discredit him altogether; then you have the audacity to claim that he opposes my position - which essential is his position. Go away and cause trouble elsewhere. Dapi89 (talk) 17:35, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

I quoted Naveh precisely because he is your favourite authority.

This is from review of a modern reprint of the book: "Truppenführung (Unit Command), the German army manual containing basic principles for 'command, field service, and joint operations in war' [is] the major source for Wehrmacht doctrine during the Second World War, and it has received unstinting praise from both military professionals and historians. Williamson Murray, a leading scholar of the German Army, believes Truppenführung to be "one of the most thoughtful examinations of the conduct of operations and leadership ever written," and other commentators have been no less laudatory. The United States Army early recognized its excellence and based large portions of the 1940, 1944, and 1949 editions of FM 100-5: Operations directly on Truppenführung; it has also had marked influence on the 1984, 1986, and 1993 editions of the same publication." Naveh describes it as "nothing other than the revelation of the operational approach at its best."

Evidence of an operational doctrine was your request.

The sources appear, to the untrained eye, to be contradicting themselves. It's called nuance. Thus when Citino writes "the Germans did not invent something called Blitzkrieg" he appears to contradict his statements that it constituted "a new style of war" or "a doctrinal revolution". You and I both know it wasn't called Blitzkrieg and that it was an evolution as Citino describes.

Similarly, Naveh describes the German fundamental doctrine of operations as "the revelation of the operational approach at its best" but criticises later operations as "an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success". Yet again, the contradiction is not an imperative conclusion. Germany possessed a doctrine reflecting "the operational approach at its best" but deteriorating relations between the technocratic militarists and the ideologues running the country eventually caused the strategic-operational relationship to break down.

Now the key point here is that the passages like "sorted out less by design" or "the Germans did not invent something called Blitzkrieg" are reflected in the article where as the passages like "new style of war" or "operational approach at its best" are not. This is the very essence of distortion. Dduff442 (talk) 18:11, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

It isn’t a nuance in the sense you are trying to prescribe. When Naveh states “the operational approach at its best” – he is not saying “the operational approach at its most brilliant”, he saying “it is the only thing that came close”, i.e “an operational method....at best”. Hence why he concludes German operational methods were not designed.

Its very odd you’ve missed:

Truppenführung, and not the opportunistic occurrences of Blitzkrieg, was the key to German tactical success

And:

It has been more commonly regarded as Holy Writ for the German theory of operational warfare; as one of the best expressions of both manoeuvre warfare and mission command; and as a model of the systems approach to the formulation of doctrine. Truppenführung may be all these things, and more, but what it certainly is, is a clear and elegant expression of a coherent, consistent, and workable offensive and defensive tactical doctrine—simply and clearly expressed.

Mr Greaves does not interpret it as an operational doctrine, and this is a damning indictment for someone who is a military historian specializing in operational and tactical warfare.

Did the Germans view Truppenführung as a blueprint for operational conduct? It does not seem so.

Halder describes it as: a prerequisite of independent action within the overall operational framework in which he discusses command initiative – or mission-command, an essentially tactical command principle.

The article has not convincingly identified Truppenführung as an operational doctrine. As Greaves leaves it impossible to identify Murray’s arguments, I don’t think this acts as confirmation. Although if Murray does say these things; there will be at least one historian that does believe there was a proper operational doctrine, and not one that was enmeshed so deeply with the tactical.

A better source for you would be something directly from Murray. Dapi89 (talk) 19:36, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

"With regard to Hohum's comment: I agree. With regard to Dduff442: I really hope you get the chance to read Naveh's book in full." -- Who said this?

I wish Dduff442 luck with his efforts, and support his approach as it stands. I don't necessarily think Dapi89 is wrong, but he is being inflexible, snarky, and dismissive, which doesn't help convince anyone (he's not the only one). Please consider the main audience of the article. "Dumbing down" isn't exactly what I would suggest - but it does need to be more accessible to novices, and I am adamant that refutations must come after the bulk of what they criticise. Hohum (talk) 20:11, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

I wasn't being inflexible or dismissive. Asking for concrete evidence before editing the article is commonplace. As I keep saying, until evidence is provided, I won't budge. Hardly inflexible. And I should also point out I did have the layout in which refutations must come after the bulk of what they criticise - but under review two editors suggest this was not appropriate. This is something I have told Dduff442 on more than one occasion.

Once again, I’m asking for sources which state the facts in no uncertain terms. Thus far I have not been given it.

In all this debate over whether operational doctrine did or did not exist, we have forgotten 'Blitzkrieg' itself. Beyond doubt there was no Blitz' strategy. Operations revolved around making a tactical breakthrough and seeing what develops while they explioted the operational depths, is what they did. Tactically of course, the German Army had tons of different doctrines. But if there was no Blitzkrieg strategy there cannot be 'Blitzkrieg operations' or tactics to fulfil that mandate. Again this did not mean a confused ad-hoc operational methods were not used. Dapi89 (talk) 20:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Please direct me to the archives or records of the review process which resulted in the sections in question being promoted to the top of the article. Also, indicate where you told me of this 'on more than one occasion', or on any occasion. Dduff442 (talk) 11:34, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

No. You look for it. You have wasted enough of my time as it is. Dapi89 (talk) 12:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Your contempt for the ethos of Wikipedia is evident. You never mentioned any review process previously. Now it is only reasonable to direct me to this review material in the interests of fair argument. Dduff442 (talk) 13:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Having tracked down the review, I am unsurprised to find it stating the opposite of what you say. The article structure you claim was instigated by the reviewers was in reality castigated by them. Dduff442 (talk) 18:02, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Liar. As you will see, the intial structure had myths and realities at the bottom of the article. This was inappropriate (to Mattisse). The restructuring was made to bring into line and group the problems with Blitzkrieg altogether. Besides which, many other alterations were made. So when I said: I did have the layout in which refutations must come after the bulk of what they criticise, it was the truth. Dapi89 (talk) 12:48, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Anyone can check the the review proceedings for themselves and work out who is a liar. Not only were the changes criticized for aggravating the structural problems with the article, they were the exact reason given by two of the three reviewers for voting to de-list the article. The third review did not explain his reasons. Dduff442 (talk) 13:48, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

One persons preference in a review which delisted the article is hardly consensus. Hohum (talk) 17:49, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

I'm afraid I don't fully understand what you mean. Anyway the committee members' remarks were as follows:

User:Yellowmonkey: Suggested FA criteria concern are citations, structure, original research

User:Cirt (Voting Member): Delist per FA criteria concerns

User:Eubulides (Voting Member): Delist The idea that blitzkrieg was a post hoc myth or legend is well-supported among reliable sources, but the current article gives the idea too much weight and veers off into advocacy of it. Agree with comments re organization

User:Mattisse (Voting Member): Delist Per the above concerns, including Eubulides's comments. Although the lede is relatively clear, there seems to me an intermingling in the article body of the history, origination etc. of the term "Blitzkrieg" and the history, origination etc. of the military tactic retrospectively labelled "Blitzkrieg"

3 - 0 to delist; Structure suggested as a concern; reading comments suggests concern with structure for all four committee members. Dduff442 (talk) 19:07, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

What I meant was, the historical comments of a member of a group who were deciding on whether to delist an article was not a consensus on how to improve it. Additionally, his brief comments are not cast in stone - we are talking about the state of the article now, and interested editors should now decide how to best improve it. Hohum (talk) 19:41, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Well, IMO, that would best be achieved by splitting off the historiographical sections thereby helping the structural issues, briefly describing the word as a term that emerged to unofficially describe the methods employed, and then restrict ourselves to discussion of things that really existed -- real tactics, real operational methods, real doctrines and real plans -- to avoid confusion.

I am unsure how long is reasonable to wait before closing the vote or what procedures apply. If you have any info on this please comment. I'm ready to go, but it only seems reasonable to wait for the views of other interested parties to trickle in. Dduff442 (talk) 20:24, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

German Operational Planning Process

Traditionally, Prussian operations planning had a simple genesis: The commander and his chief of staff would each analyse the task separately. When each had arrived at a plan, they would attempt to combine the best features of the two and arrive at a consensus solution. The working relationship between CO and CoS was regarded as of paramount importance as the CoS was regarded as the CO's only confidante in the unit -- fears or misgivings which he might never discuss in the presence of even his HQ officers were supposed to be freely discussed with the CoS.

At this point, the then-secret Part II of Truppenfuehrung came in -- tables of road spaces, units of supply and fuel etc -- enabling the operations staff to compare the time and space factors in the area of manoeuvre with the resources at hand -- were the bridges strong enough?; Could the heaviest vehicles handle the steepest gradients on the march routes?; Were the schemes of manoeuvre realistic given the supplies to hand?; Could the road net in the area support the supply of the units involved? A myriad of planning factors were employed in this essentially non-creative checking process. The results were calculated for each variant of the plan.

The military geographic service provided ancilliary services and materials for this process such as topographic maps, target appraisals and information about the quality of roads and bridges. Military geology units produced geotechnical maps offering information on issues like as water supply, availability of construction materials, and cross-country trafficability.

Logistical plans would be worked out in detail. In the case of the French campaign, logistics worked smoothly. The Group Kleist AAR stated ""Between May 10 and the capture of Calais, there was not a single supply crisis that could not be resolved with the resources of the Group von Kleist without in any way interfering with command functions." (quoted in Frieser) Within days of the fall of Dunkirk, the follow-on offensive across the Somme was underway. A tough 2-3 day battle to achieve a breakthrough was not hindered by supply shortages. Successive operations are possible only with detailed planning of road usage.

Naturally, intelligence and reconaissance resources would focus on the same operation and routing of supplies would be shaped to fit.

The data from these processes would be fed in to simultaneous work on detailed tactical planning by the operations staff (Ia). This tactical analysis would attempt to work out a detailed scheme of manoeuvre, further examine the enemy's possible responses etc. Even the simplest operations would be broken down into logical phases and attempts would be made to anticipate possible opportunities that might arise and to plan for these contingencies.

Not infrequently this process would result in objections of one sort or another arising or in suggested modifications, in which case the commander and his chief of staff would re-examine the original plan. Naturally, the CO would not invariably agree to this but it was regarded as bad form to refuse. The planning process was generally iterative.

If time was available or especially if elements of the plan were proving contentious, a map exercise might be organised.

Once a detailed plan had evolved, its component parts would be parcelled out to the units intended to carry it out. Normally, specific direction would not be given to units more than two levels down the chain of command and often they would not extend beyond giving a mission (in the context of the overall plan) to a subordinate.

At this lower level a similar process would begin, and so on down the chain.

Traditionally, solutions were arrived at by consensus. Whereas disciplinary measures were harsh for those perceived to fail in their duties, the duty to dissent from planning conclusions had also been traditionally emphasised. Regulations stipulated that each soldier had the right to dissent to any order and that any protests had to be officially noted in unit records. For example, during the crossing of the Dyle river in Belgium, one infantry division ordered infantry/engineer teams to haul boats over 200 metres of open ground and assault across the river. Numerous NCOs officially dissented against the orders, the dissents were entered into the division's war diary, the attack was carried out and the troops were slaughtered. With their statements in the official record, the commander's career was doomed.

Of course multiple alternatives could be considered simultaneously where sufficient time and resources were available. It was normal for the planning resources to work not only on proposed offensive actions but also on contingencies. Apart from its hypothetical nature, contingency planning was identical to that for offensive actions. Contingency plans would be circulated to subordinate units, again in the context of an overall plan, so that a single code word was all that had to be issued for the contingency to go into effect.

An example of successful contingency planning is the response to the Salerno landings. Italy defected to the allies on the day of the allied landings. Immediately prior the landings, a large bombing raid wrecked Kesselring's HQ at Frascati. With the allied invasion, the Germans were now massively outnumbered on the Italian peninsula. Badoglio had issued no orders to the Italian troops, however, made no effort to explain the volte-face to them and instead fled to Ortona with the King. As a result, Kesselring issued the order for contingency 'Axis' (Fall Achse), the response to the Salerno invasion was swift and exact, and the Italian army disintegrated under the weight of its own internal differences.

updated - Dduff442 (talk) 16:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Useless to say the least. Proper academic literature which clearly identifies a doctrine, its designers and its structure is needed. Your say so doesn't count. Dapi89 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

I'm not going to jump through hoops on your say so indefinitely. I have the authoritative information you requested and that will be my final effort to satisfy you.

The post was an effort to provide a basis for argument. If you wish to dispute anything of what I wrote, go ahead. Let's just wait for the torrent of expert rebuttal from all angles that would be expected if what I wrote is not correct....

The fact that the article is currently littered with your POV, OR, weasel words etc, much of it flatly contradicted by your own chosen sources, doesn't bother you in the least. Interesting that you should apply higher standards to the Talk page than to your own work in the article. Dduff442 (talk) 14:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Bull sh1t. Thus far you seem incapable of being honest. Dapi89 (talk) 01:11, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

This is pointless. People interested can draw their own conclusions by reading the debate. I'm dropping the tit-for-tat now, so over to you. Dduff442 (talk) 10:27, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

Sources Supporting Existence of Operational Methods and Doctrine

...to follow. Dduff442 (talk) 14:01, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

And plenty to oppose it as well. Dapi89 (talk) 13:23, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

I have no interest in propaganda, and have no objection to the inclusion of criticisms of German operational methods in the article from whatever source. What I object to is blatant distortion, selective quotation, dishonest attribution etc. Dduff442 (talk) 14:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Jesus Christ! Thats the most ironic thing I've ever heard! So you have learned your lesson then? Some of things you were doing were outrageous. Anyway, I hope you keep your word....but I'm not holding my breath. Dapi89 (talk) 01:09, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

I realised further debate was pointless when you wrote: When Naveh states “the operational approach at its best” – he is not saying “the operational approach at its most brilliant”, he saying “it is the only thing that came close”, i.e “an operational method....at best”. This came after your claim it was reasonable to cite Citino to support the statement the majority of historians have come to the conclusion it was not a new form of warfare invented by the German military, but an old method of pursuing decisive battles using new technology when he makes no mention of 'the majority of historians' and holds the opinion that "the German doctrinal revolution" brought about "a new style of warfare" that has had influence down to the present day.

Everybody is welcome to trawl through the NPOV section and draw their own conclusions. Dduff442 (talk) 09:48, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

Article Split

The first two sections currently deal exclusively with historiography (the history of history) whereas the opening sentence clarifies the scope of the article as 'a headline word relating to a military doctrine'. Debates between historians about correct labelling are not relevant to a discussion of Military Science. Equally, military science is not relevant to an article about debates between historians when the historians themselves are not debating the actual content or existence of the doctrines in question. As the opening sentence illustrates, Keegan -- an authoritative source -- has no problem with the Blitzkrieg label provided an appropriate caveat is applied to acknowledge the fact that the term was applied retroactively.

Currently, the historiography is tangled with the history leading to confusion and ambiguity. The sections such as 'The myth of the Blitzkrieg Economic', 'The myth of a Blitzkrieg Wehrmacht' and 'Problems with the interpretation' actually have nothing to do with the German military whatsoever -- they relate to semantic debates among historians or unrelated matters such as Hitler's foreign or economic policies or his war plans.

I refer interested parties to the criticisms levelled at the article during the review process of Jul/Aug 2009 which resulted in the de-listing of Blitzkrieg as a Featured Article.

Reviewer Eubulides remarked that "The idea that blitzkrieg was a post hoc myth or legend is well-supported among reliable sources, but the current article gives the idea too much weight and veers off into advocacy of it".

Reviewer mattisse added that "there seems to me an intermingling in the article body of the history, origination etc. of the term "Blitzkrieg" and the history, origination etc. of the military tactic retrospectively labelled "Blitzkrieg" in a particular war".

The result of the review was a 3-0 vote in favour of de-listing. (extra notes added Dduff442 (talk) 16:28, 30 October 2009 (UTC))

It is proposed to split the article along one of the lines suggested below:

A) The military doctrines move to a page titled German Military Doctrine of WWII. The current page is renamed Blitzkrieg (Historiography of) and a disambiguation page is created.

B) The historiographic sections are split off to a page titled Blitzkrieg (Historiography of) and linked to via a (see also...) note inserted in the lead.

Persons responding may indicate a general opinion for or against the suggestion, inticate a preference for a particular kind of split or add new alternatives to the proposals suggested above. Dduff442 (talk) 11:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Oh, we may, may we?

Largely oppose. (With the exception of creating a doctrine page)

The myth of a Blitzkrieg Wehrmacht' actually have nothing to do with the German military whatsoever - this is not on. Of course it is relevant. Are you saying this should be deleted for the Blitzkrieg article? If not, make it clearer. And the Blitzkrieg economic has everything to do with ‘Blitzkrieg’; it demolishes the theory of a deliberate, planned military strategy based on short campaigns. The myth dictates Blitzkrieg was adopted for those reasons.

‘‘Historiography is tangled with the history leading to confusion. How?

The current page is renamed Blitzkrieg (Historiography of). No, the title doesn't need to be renamed 'Historiography of' - There is only going to be one article on Blitzkrieg itself. And point B doesn't make any sense either. You can do the same in one article by splitting into sections.

Agree

...with having a separate doctrine article. This must include tactical doctrine obviously. But it should make clear, the German doctrine in the Second World War stems from the Prussian era and the Imperial German Army – and there are various stand alone articles that discuss stand alone tactics and methods of command.

Furthermore, there needs to be a supplied source for you claim of operational doctrine. So far there is nothing concrete. There needs to be source that spells this out in no uncertain terms. The last source provided appears to show Murray accepting it an operational doctrine exists, but the author of the piece (Greaves) does not. Dapi89 (talk) 12:35, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Please adhere to normal practice re: formatting and don't mix in the NPOV dispute above with this discussion. Move the remarks immediately above to the NPOV section and I'll gladly address them.

The state of the German army is of relevance to the article. Myths about the state of the army that arose years after the war's end are not.

Your arguments are self-defeating. You state the Blitzkrieg economic has everything to do with Blitzkrieg; it demolishes the theory of a deliberate, planned military strategy based on short campaigns. The myth dictates Blitzkrieg was adopted for those reasons. Theories about military strategy or myths about those strategies are simply not germane. None of these theories was mentioned in the page until you introduced them. The historiographical debate is with yourself in a vacuum. Dduff442 (talk) 13:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

If you continue to behave this way, you won't be supported by anyone. Don't tell me to remove my comments - you don't own this page or have the authority to decide what is said here, do you understand?

They did not arise afterwards, but during it.

No they are not. You fail to understand the basic premise of 'Blitzkrieg' and how it was (in this case - not) devised. Grand strategy is the first element, and always will be. Strategy leads to operational and tactical doctrine. If the strategic principle does not exist, neither can the doctrine. Whether they were here before I started editing or not is irrelevant. These arguments have been around since the 1970s.

No they are not. Only in your mind - which seems to invent what it pleases. I suspect your main objection in drawing attention to the lack of operational doctrine is because you have failed to provide evidence of any - which was the main thrust of your original complaint and why I suspect, you are keen on having a doctrinal article.

Anyway I haven’t got time for this. You brought this up, so you’re not in a position to refuse anything. Dapi89 (talk) 14:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

What I said was 'move the remarks immediately above to the NPOV section and I'll gladly address them', not 'Move the remarks immediately above to the NPOV section'. Your ideas on strategy, operations, doctrine and my state of mind are not relevant. Dduff442 (talk) 14:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Which requires removing them from this section does it not? And if we are to discuss a possibility of a doctrinal article, then its contents needs to be discussed here too. Dapi89 (talk) 15:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Refer to the contents by all means. IMO, this is not the place to debate doctrinal matters, however. That debate is already underway elsewhere. Dduff442 (talk) 15:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Sorry folks I have substantial difficulties understanding the issue. My takeaway from this discussion is that the term "Blitzkrieg" is ambiguous. To some historians it is a proclaimed military doctrine which was never achieved and to others it is term that was applied to the early successes of the Wehrmacht, which had the appearance of being lightening fast. If the split helps resolve this ambiguity I would be supportive. MisterBee1966 (talk) 17:25, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

The term is certainly ambiguous. It was never employed in any official publications until after the battle of France and never had any real official status. Subsequent to the war, it came to be employed as a catch-all term as is mentioned in the first sentence of the article. Reputable historians do employ the term all the time, however. Naturally, my belief is that splitting the article would go a long way towards clearing up the confusion.

I've made a couple of edits to the proposal in the interests of clarity.Dduff442 (talk) 17:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Oppose A, Support B. I believe that this has the best chance of clearing up the problems with this article. Hohum (talk) 20:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

The only issue with (A) is that some explanation about the confused emergence of the word is still necessary. The risk then is that, without consensus, this will once again expand to the point where it distorts the article. Possibly mention of the word should be more-or-less restricted to its definition -- the word has no historic validity, which contributes to the confusion between discussion of official methods and discussion of terminology. Trying to discuss something that never really existed will always be confusing. Dduff442 (talk) 10:52, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

I will make myself clearer: My position is as Hohum, oppose A, accept B. Dapi89 (talk) 12:50, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

I am not yet in a position to judge whether I support motion A or B. Irrespectively I feel that the reader needs guidance on what aspect of Blitzkrieg the article is referring to. I want to re-read everything once more and may have some questions later. Sorry for now. 20:13, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

I lean towards oppose A, accept B as well MisterBee1966 (talk) 05:26, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Accept B is fine by me. It seems we have unanimity. Anyone know the procedures to follow? Is it appropriate to wait, or to close the issue only after a declared interval of time? Dduff442 (talk) 09:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

An article about the blitzkrieg needs to discuss the origin and spread of this word. It can be explained how German military doctrine is seen through this idea and when the Germans started using this expression and for what purpose. Wandalstouring (talk) 12:01, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

The origin and spread of the word is reasonable to include in the article. Myths or common misconceptions about it, or historians' opinions of other historians' opinions are not except insofar as they relate directly to the subject matter.

Material on Nazi foreign policy or economics is even more irrelevant. A historian's invention of the phrase 'Blitzkrieg Economics' decades after the war ended has no bearing on military science. It is not disputed by anyone that no such idea ever existed in Nazi Germany. Dduff442 (talk) 12:44, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

Fate of Blitzkrieg prisoners.

Instead of edit warring about the inclusion of a single sentence about the fate of prisoners taken during "Blitzkrieg" operations, please try and gain consensus here before reverting it yet again. Hohum (talk) 18:16, 26 November 2009 (UTC)

There are two facts: 1) mumber of prisoners taken 2) their fate. I think either both facts should be in, or both out. Doesn't make sense to keep one but not the other. Steel2009 (talk) 17:52, 28 November 2009 (UTC)

I suggest putting information regarding the fate of the prisoners of war in a footnote. It doesn't pertain to Blitzkrieg directly but it is valid information nevertheless. MisterBee1966 (talk) 18:24, 28 November 2009 (UTC)

I like MisterBee's suggestion. I would put both bits of information together in the footnote if that is acceptable. Steel2009 (talk) 04:31, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

Both out. Info is covered already in other articles. They could not be more irrelevant. Dapi89 (talk) 23:41, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Oh, and it ain't sourced either. Dapi89 (talk) 23:43, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

It easy to source. I expect you could have within a few minutes.

Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, Total War - "The total number of prisoners taken by the German armies in the USSR was in the region of 5.5 million. Of these, the astounding number of 3.5 million or more had been lost by the middle of 1944 and the assumption must be that they were either deliberately killed or done to death by criminal negligence. Nearly two million of them died in camps and close on another million disappeared while in military custody either in the USSR or in rear areas; a further quarter of a million disappeared or died in transit between the front and destinations in the rear; another 473,000 died or were killed in military custody in Germany or Poland." They add, "This slaughter of prisoners cannot be accounted for by the peculiar chaos of the war in the east. ... The true cause was the inhuman policy of the Nazis towards the Russians as a people and the acquiescence of army commanders in attitudes and conditions which amounted to a sentence of death on their prisoners."

"Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century", Greenhill Books, London, 1997, G. F. Krivosheev

Christian Streit: Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-1945, Bonn: Dietz (3. Aufl., 1. Aufl. 1978), ISBN 3801250164 - "Between 22 June 1941 and the end of the war, roughly 5.7 million members of the Red Army fell into German hands. In January 1945, 930,000 were still in German camps. A million at most had been released, most of whom were so-called "volunteers" (Hilfswillige) for (often compulsory) auxiliary service in the Wehrmacht. Another 500,000, as estimated by the Army High Command, had either fled or been liberated. The remaining 3,300,000 (57.5 percent of the total) had perished."

Nazi persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War United States Holocaust Memorial Museum - "Existing sources suggest that some 5.7 million Soviet army personnel fell into German hands during World War II. As of January 1945, the German army reported that only about 930,000 Soviet POWs remained in German custody. The German army released about one million Soviet POWs as auxiliaries of the German army and the SS. About half a million Soviet POWs had escaped German custody or had been liberated by the Soviet army as it advanced westward through eastern Europe into Germany. The remaining 3.3 million, or about 57 percent of those taken prisoner, were dead by the end of the war."

Jonathan Nor, Soviet Prisoners of War: Forgotten Nazi Victims of World War II - "Statistics show that out of 5.7 million Soviet soldiers captured between 1941 and 1945, more than 3.5 million died in captivity."

So, 60% is closer. Now, instead of continued edit warring, ignoring consensus, abandoning discussion, and feeling you get the casting decision, perhaps we could try discussing this. Three editors currently seem to think it should be included in some way, one doesn't. A single properly sourced sentence doesn't seem to be giving undue weight to this fact. Hohum (talk) 00:13, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

I agree with Hohum. Removal of this information as "unsourced" is not proper, and sources can easily be provided. Steel2009 (talk) 19:07, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

I would appreciate it if Steel2009 would stop lying about other editor's positions. Hohum did not say it was unjust to remove it on those grounds, infact Wikipedia encourages unsourced deletions. I must also point out Hohum did not revert.

All this is beside the point. To my mind it irrelevant. Mr B only suggests including it as a footnote : he clearly seems to think it does not have anything to do with Blitzkrieg. Rather he prefers a compromise. The onus is on the editor PROVIDING THE INFORMATION IN THE FIRST PLACE, to source it. Not to fill articles with unsourced figures (which I note are wrong anyway). Steel2009, whether he gets consensus on its inclusion or not, has placed false information into the article. If I hadn't challanged it, it would still be there.

Steel2009: Thus far your edits have been illogical unsubstantiated and poor. It is your responsibility to provide the references. If you fail to do so, which you have, then I can justifiably remove them on those grounds. I don't need consensus for that. Dapi89 (talk) 19:46, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

If Hohum feels that I am "lying" about his position he is quite capable of speaking up. A bit of civility will do you no harm. I am quite aware of the source requirements of Wikipedia. There is something called a citation tag, you can use that instead of using "unsourced" as a plea for removing something there is disagreement about. Steel2009 (talk) 05:00, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

Enough of the drivel. The logic of my argument is undeniable. Dapi89 (talk) 12:41, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

{{citation needed}} is usually used in cases where an editor thinks something might be true, but is not sure, and is used to give other editors time to find a reliable source (as the editor who originally added the text may be long gone). BUT in cases like this Wikipedia policy is quite clear WP:PROVEIT states "All quotations and any material challenged or likely to be challenged must be attributed to a reliable, published source using an in-line citation." If you add new material to an article and someone removes it because it is unsourced, the onus is on you to cite a reliable sources before putting it back. -- PBS (talk) 08:45, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

PBS, what you say is of course factually true. It is also true that the veracity of the contested material here in not in doubt, it is the importance of the contested material. Steel2009 (talk) 01:40, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

I deny the logic of your argument. ... Hey, that was easy! Paradoctor (talk) 15:37, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

I believe I asked for, "Enough of the drivel". Do you have anything useful to contribute here? Dapi89 (talk) 18:10, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Ah, I see what happened. PBS skipped the comment queue and you read my comment thinking I was refering to his answer? Well I wasn't. As you can see from the dates I was replying to Steel2009. Dapi89 (talk) 18:14, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Yet again, I have to ask that people stop putting words in my mouth.

I have provided sources. The argument that a comment about the fate of prisoners being unsourced is now moot. Can we get back to whether the factual fate of prisoners should be included in some way. I believe that a single sentence, whether as a footnote or in the main article text, is relevant, and doesn't give it undue weight. I believe at least one editor says that it's irrelevant, while a couple of others think it should be included. Please try and limit yourself to relevant, logical reasoning. Hohum (talk) 23:33, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Once again, I believe that either both bits of information should be included, or both excluded. Can't argue one bit is important enough to be included and the other is not. Steel2009 (talk) 01:31, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

I don't want to get slapped in the face by expressing my opinion ... but I tend to think that it belongs in the article (properly cited) for the following reason and I may be totally wrong here. I think that the fate of the prisoners of war is implicit proof of what Dapi89 says about Blitzkrieg (Blitzkrieg is a myth). If indeed the Germans would have thought this through from the beginning, than they surely would have had a concept or idea of what to do with the POWs. Since they were totally surprised by the high number of POWs taken in the early part of the Eastern front campaign, they didn't have this on the equation, thus Blitzkrieg wasn't thought through and thus it's a myth as Dapi89 says. I hope this makes some sense???? MisterBee1966 (talk) 16:59, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

Hitler did say (and possibly believe) that the war would be over in 6 weeks. Something along the lines of the Soviet Union being a rotten door that would be kicked in by the Wehrmacht. Other facts seem to indicate that the Germans thought the war would be over quickly, such as the lack of warm clothing when the winter came. Can't blame them for thinking that, given the speed with which they had earlier overcome the French and the BEP. Steel2009 (talk) 07:20, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

BEP? I'm assuming you meant the ten division BEF, which was up against the 144 Division Wehrmacht in 1940?

Mr B has a point. But the question is: do war crimes have a place in German doctrine. I believe, having read widely on German doctrinal practices, that I have yet to come across literature that points to systematic murder in military manuals, much less any on the 'Blitzkrieg' which didn't exist. Dapi89 (talk) 11:27, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

MisterBee, not predicting all of the implications of a plan/theory/("Blitzkrieg") doesn't mean the plan/theory/("Blitzkrieg") doesn't exist. I think the article concentrates far too heavily on "debunking" the (mostly strawman) idea that Blitzkrieg was a formal military strategy, instead of describing what it actually is/was - a name coined to (innacurately) describe combined armed attacks using newer technology - as opposed to the mostly static combat of WWI.

That aside, it seems clear that a sentence mentioning the fate of prisoners should be included. Including dubious conclusions that it proves Blitkrieg didn't exist (at all - even as a loose concept or as a strategy) would need citations beyond the ones I have provided.

I can't see any merit (or much logic) in excluding the fate of prisoners on the basis that military manuals didn't mentioning systematic murder, because the article isn't about what is in military manuals, it's about Blitzkrieg - a far looser subject, and it's a fact that most Soviet prisoners died after capture. Hohum (talk) 15:56, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

Sorry Hohum, it doesn't make much sense to me. Why doesn't a link to the battle and inclusion in that article suffice? The fate of prisoners is irrelevant to the subject. It eats up space. I don't see any logic in its conclusion. It serves a subject matter wholly irrelevant to German doctrine or 'Blitzkrieg' itself. Its inclusion encourages the addition of more insignificant material. Where does it end? Dapi89 (talk) 16:36, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

I'm sorry that it doesn't make sense to you. It does to me, and other editors. A single sentence eats up so little space in an already bloated article that spends several paragraphs "tilting at windmills" arguing about an issue that could be resolved in a single sentence - "Blitkrieg was not the name of an official German military strategy or doctrine"(reference).

Also, the "slippery slope" argument (where does it end?) is an informal fallacy. Hohum (talk) 17:30, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

That really is a silly thing to say. Do you really believe it is appropriate to sum up a complex subject "in single sentence". I suggest you might want to understand the proverbs before you use them. There is an almighty debate about Blitzkrieg, so for you to say: "tilting at windmills", is a total nonsense and your statment:informal fallacy is even more ill-thought through, and may I say, quite ironic. You are lossing credibility. I thought you were better than that. Can I ask you to refer to my previous posts sensibly. Thus far you have failed to dislodge their logic. Dapi89 (talk) 18:18, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

...:::In addition, I forgot to mention: issuing simpleton statements like: "Blitzkrieg ain't a doctrine" is not good enough. We have to explain why it sin't to the casual reader. Dapi89 (talk) 18:26, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

Reducing the doctrinal argument to a single sentence was hyperbolic. Your informal fallacy of asking "where it ends" was emphatically not. Asking where something ends, in the hope that the question itself justifies not including something is clearly a fallacy. To answer the question, if it was simply a question, which seems unlikely, since you have been an editor for a considerable time, and should know wiki policies and guidelines - wiki editors decide what is included and what isn't on a case by case basis. Currently, opinion favours including a sentence on the fate of prisoners, despite your wish otherwise.

Instead of questioning the credibility of editors, perhaps you could focus on the argument in question, and accept that you are in the minority in this case. Hohum (talk) 19:08, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

There isn't any truth in your first paragraph Hohum - it still doesn't fit this situation. Where this ends is an important question. Do you suggest including the murder of British POWs at Arras in the Battle of France section? Treatment of Polish POWs in the Polish section (of which there are hundreds of cases). How about US POWs in the Ardennes in 1944/45? Nit picking war crimes and including them selectively, agenda or not, makes the article imbalanced with irrelevancies.

I judge your credibility on the quality of the argument presented. Thus far there isn't one.

I ask again: What is the relationship between Blitzkrieg and War Crimes? Are they inherently linked? No.

In case you hadn't noticed, is 2:1, as Mr B has not made his feeling absolutely clear (he proposes inclusion as a footnote not in the main text as you propose). So I would appreciate it if you would not pretend consensus is against me yet. Dapi89 (talk) 20:02, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

It would be quite okay not to include the murder of British POWs at Arras, etc. etc. if it were not mentioned in the first place that they were taken prisoners. As for the 10 divisions of the BEP against the 144 German divisions, whether the BEP and the French Army together constituted strength comparable to the German divisions, or whether the BEP were valiant warriors who pulled off a magnificent retreat in the face of overwhelming numbers, or whether the BEP were actually cowardly custards who took flight at the first sight of the Panzers, are questions that do not pertain to the current discussion and are best left alone.

I once again reiterate my position that the two pieces of information (number of POWs, and their fate) should either both be in, or both be out. Arguments such as "It eats up space", and "Its inclusion encourages the addition of more insignificant material" are weak. No imminent end of Wikipedia need be feared from including both bits of information, or neither.

As for allegations such as Hohum "lossing [sic] credibility", I will simply note that I do not agree any such thing is happening. Steel2009 (talk) 06:50, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

Drivel. What is the "BEP"? Do you even know what you are talking about? My argument is it has nothing to do with the subject here. That is a strong argument. What are you trying to pull? Who do you think you are kidding? You, Steel2009, have failed to refute anything I've said. I wonder if you bother reading my posts properly at all. Your latest post is so fundamentally flawed I can't be bothered listing everything that is wrong with it. Sufficed to say, your nonsense responses are compelling enough to argue the opposite. Dapi89 (talk) 18:45, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

Haven't failed to refute anything you have said? I really found nothing that needed refuting. Yes, I meant the BEF rather than BEP, for whatever that's worth. Steel2009 (talk) 21:27, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

I fail to understand why POWs are not part of the equation. Operation Barbarossa, at least in its initial phase, was the closest thing to what one may call Blitzkrieg (if Blitzkrieg existed). As stated in the article, I quote: >>Its stated goal was "to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the West and to prevent their escape into the wide-open spaces of Russia." This was generally achieved by four panzer armies which encircled surprised and disorganized Soviet forces, followed by marching infantry which completed the encirclement and defeated the trapped forces.<< By nature of the concept (if successfully executed) this could only lead to large numbers of POWs. So why if we accept that POWs were the consequence of a successfully conducted Blitzkrieg operation, it is so absurd to mention in a footnote what happened to these poor guys. Really Dapi89, I truly don't understand why you oppose this line of thought so strongly. Please help me understand why you think this way. MisterBee1966 (talk) 17:50, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

The operational plans of the Wehrmacht relate to combat destruction of the enemy, not murder of captured soldiers and or civilians. By combat destruction I mean their elimination in battle or removal from circulation by capture. This has been Germanic doctrine since Moltke TY. There was no preplanned system or literature relating to Blitzkrieg or any other form of said doctrine that states once these operations are carried out prisoners must be treated how you please. Mistreatment is regime, not doctrine specific. I would just as readily oppose any inclusion of Soviet violations against German POWs on the Deep battle page. Dapi89 (talk) 20:08, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

Whether it was an official policy isn't the point: It happened; as a consequence of capture, it is relevant, able to be reliably referenced, and is notable. It doesn't take significant space to mention it, and a single sentence isn't undue weight. Inclusion doesn't set a precedent to include irrelevant information, there is no slippery slope. What you would do in another article doesn't concern this one. A number of other editors are completely unconvinced by your arguments. I don't think that splitting hairs about inclusion in the main body or as a footnote is an issue - either is inclusion in the article in general, and you appear to oppose both. So the majority consensus 'is clearly against you. Furthermore, your attitude is becoming insulting and incendiary - "Drivel ... nonsense responses". Please take a step back and consider your position and conduct. Hohum (talk) 20:49, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

It happened? Meaningless and irrelevant. I'm asking you once more to demonstrate the relationship between War Crimes and doctrine. You havn't thus far and it is getting irritating. I'm not even asking for a convincing argument anymore, just one attempt. There is a slippery slope and you're on it. As has been said, its either all or nothing. You do not nitpick. And it is only now you have seeming consenus. Then again, consenus does not = logic or correct. And I have to remind you Hohum: those were deserved by a deliberately provocotive individual. If he starts acting sensibly, I'll treat him with respect. Dapi89 (talk) 21:13, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

I concur in your opinion that if this article were about the Blitzkrieg doctrine only than in this instance we could do without the POW discussion. However that to me implies that the article should only deal with the theoretical aspects of Blitzkrieg as a doctrine. As soon as we allude to real engagements such as Operation Barbarossa I would vote for inclusion of the POW fate. Is it correct to ask whether we should limit the article to theoretical aspects or include the historiography as well? (see discussion above). MisterBee1966 (talk) 22:07, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

That article clearly isn't just about doctrine. This is so apparent that I thought it too obvious to mention. I'll remind Dapi that wikipedia requires civility at all times as a matter of policy, not just when you feel like it. I note that Dapi didn't respond to the thrust of my points, but latched onto a single one, out of context, hoping to ignore the totality. MisterBee has made his position clear. Only Dapi claims not to understand this. Consensus is what decides what happens on wikipedia. Hohum (talk) 22:43, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

There weren’t any points with "thrust". I wasn't selective. I was responding to the only "point" with clarity. I don't claim to not understand - I don't. Consensus does not immediately = correct, as I have already said. You've come up with nothing new and have constantly failed to address the main issue: What does war criminality have to do with doctrine. Dapi89 (talk) 17:10, 13 December 2009 (UTC)

My view is that whereas the article may be about doctrine, and the Blitzkrieg doctrine (if there was any such thing) did not say that POWs should be ill-treated or starved, however as a result of the application of the doctrine, if there were a large number of prisoners, and the article mentions that there were a large number of prisoners... then the article should also mention what happened to these prisoners. Wiki articles are not supposed to be sterile descriptions of doctrines, the results of the doctrines have a place in any good encyclopedia. Thanks, Steel2009 (talk) 02:38, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

Mention of the fate of prisoners could be accomodated consisely with a link to the appropriate pages. I'm assuming there is a page relating to the fate of esp. Soviet prisoners. If there were more logical structure to the article(s), the Blitzkrieg article might be restricted to military science. As things stand, I see no reason not to include a mention of Soviet prisoners' death rates.Dduff442 (talk) 23:41, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

As I see it, here are the positions of the various editors on the fate of the Soviet prisoners:

Hohum: Include

Mister B: Include ("As soon as we allude to real engagements such as Operation Barbarossa I would vote for inclusion of the POW fate.")

Dapi89: Exclude

Steel2009: Include (rather include both or exclude both, and as the information about the prisoners being made prisoners is there, therefore include)

Dduff442: Include

If I have misrepresented anyone's position then please correct. From the above, it would appear proper to restore the information. Accordingly I have made the edit restoring the information along with references provided by Hohum. Thanks, Steel2009 (talk) 20:50, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

It's a fair characterisation of my position anyway. Ideally, I'd like doctrine, campaigns and historiography to be treated separately. I can understand how inclusion of this info with the campaigns is reasonable. The doctrine could be sensibly isolated from broader issues like this only so long as its article was restricted to technical matters without discussion of the history of the war or its campaigns.Dduff442 (talk) 21:50, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

I find Dduff's point quite compelling that as long as there is mention of the actual campaigns the "broader issues" should be included. This is also consistent with the MisterBee's position that "As soon as we allude to real engagements such as Operation Barbarossa I would vote for inclusion of the POW fate." I am accordingly revising my position that both bits of information (rather than neither) should be included. Thanks, Steel2009 (talk) 01:52, 11 December 2009 (UTC)