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Archive 1Archive 2Archive 3Archive 4Archive 5


Material discovered to be copied without attribution

There was material that I saw was identical to a passage in the beginning of chapter 3 in Ray Lubeski's Linebackers of the Sea (2010). I don't know if an editor took that material from Lubeski's book without attribution, or whether our text predates the Linebackers text and was originally taken from us. The Lubeski book is self-published by AuthorHouse, so we can't cite to it in any case.

I removed the text, but haven't examined the article to see if anything else was copied without attribution, so be on the lookout. --Neutralitytalk 01:42, 13 January 2012 (UTC)

(just noticed this): Lubeski's book is dated 2010, while this article has had that phrasing in it since at least October 2007, so make of that what you will... Xyl 54 (talk) 22:21, 19 January 2012 (UTC)

Changes to introduction

I notice the following was deleted from the introduction:
That the campaign "involved thousands of ships and stretched over thousands of square miles of ocean in more than 100 convoy battles and perhaps 1,000 single-ship encounters. The situation swung back and forth over the six years as new weapons, tactics and counter-measures were developed by both sides. The Allies gradually gained the upper hand, driving the German surface raiders from the ocean by the end of 1942 and decisively defeating the U-boats by mid-1943. New German submarine types arrived in 1945, too late to affect the course of the war."
as it was "copied verbatim" from a book by Ray Lubenski. Which is a shame, as it is a concise and fairly accurate overview of the campaign, which the introduction to the article should certainly contain. If we can’t use this account, (and I’d have thought with the proper attribution we could make some use of it) then we need something like it. Saying “the campaign began immediately after the European war began and lasted six years” doesn’t really cut it.

Also, a comment based on a reference to an essay by Allan Levin was added, saying that the campaign "only began in earnest in the second half of 1940, after the French bases became available". You might want to tell that to the survivors from the Athenia, or the crews of the nigh on 300 Allied ships (over 1 million GRT) that were sunk during the period up to then. I have a good deal of sympathy with Levin’s position ( what I can see of it on google books) and as far as the BotA is concerned he’s not alone; Blair says “at no time did the U-boat Arm ever come close to winning the battle of the Atlantic, or bringing about the collapse of Great Britain” and that Allied concerns to this effect were the result of “an over-pessimistic threat assessment”. But the place for all that would be in an Assessment section dealing with the campaign as a whole, or a Controversy section on the mythology of it, not as a bald sentence in the introduction.
Thoughts? Xyl 54 (talk) 22:13, 19 January 2012 (UTC)

♠On being earnest, I'd say that position is accurate. There really was a qualitative change after the fall of France. It increased the tempo, reduced the turnaround time, increased time on station, & drastically extended the threat range. (300 ships against 6000 sunk for the duration isn't really a lot...especially not when there were single months later with sinkings of 700K tons & up.) Perception isn't always borne out by the statistics.
♠I also think a mention of the myth in the lead is a good idea. I'm a member at an alternate history website, with some of the most knowledgeable people on milhist I've ever met, & even there, the misperception U-boats decimated convoys arises. It can only be worse among the lay readership. What about connecting to the misperception by Allied leadership? The Admiralty in June '43 were actually considering abandoning convoys, because they didn't understand: things were bad in March, but it was a death spasm. They'd won.
♠I haven't read Blair (sorry to say :( ), but what I have read confirms his view: under 1% of losses were in convoy.
♠Unfortunately, IDK where I saw the claim of victory... Milner's North Atlantic Run? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:28, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
We need to keep the Levin reference because, as as TREKphiler says, it's true, and extremely significant. When the battle was at its most intense is a key fact that needs to be in the introduction. More to the point, we already include in the intro: "It was at its height from mid-1940 through to the end of 1943." It makes no sense to take out a more specific, precise sentence that is referenced, but leave in a vaguer, unreferenced sentence that says nothing about why the battle began in earnest only then (i.e., French bases opened up). Neutralitytalk 15:44, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
I’m not saying there wasn’t a change of pace in June 1940, but I am saying it wasn’t the only one; and we need more than one sentence to describe the campaign adequately. As far as the deleted paragraph goes, it pre-dates the book referred to by several years (!), so I’m thinking we might as well put it back in.
And I am also saying the phrase “only began in earnest…” is dismissive of the period that went before; there was no Phoney War at sea! And yes, the losses when it was bad were much higher, but it wasn’t consistently bad; the early loss rate (an average of 30 ships/10,000 grt per month) was about the same as it was from June 1941 onwards (and in the North Atlantic, ie discounting the losses of the US east coast) up to the summer of 1942; and it was far worse than the losses in most months after May 1943.
And I agree/I’m all in favour of opening up the myth aspect of the campaign; but, again, it needs more than a sentence in the introduction, it needs a whole section further down. As you say, enough people know the myth; if it isn’t properly explained it’ll just lead to a flurry of “corrections”. It also needs backing up; before reading the Levin stuff I hadn’t seen anyone tackle the issue (so succinctly at least). Xyl 54 (talk) 16:01, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
"dismissive of the period that went before" I don't take it to be, but I do see your point. I read that to mean there was a significant intensification at that point, & that fits my undestanding. Before that, I've the sense things were ongoing, but a bit desultory. Not to say not serious or hazardous, but qualitatively different. What about "intensified sharply"? (In the lead, probably too much to say why.)
"average of 30 ships/10,000 grt per month"? When was it that low in '41-2? It was averaging 100K & up. And "after May 1943", the U-boat was effectively defeated: sinkings per boat drastically dropped (higher numbers at sea kept the total tonnages high), & losses in boats jumped.
"it needs more than a sentence in the introduction" I entirely agree. I wasn't suggesting it be limited to that, & if I left that impression, let me correct it. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:30, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
Sorry, I dropped a nought there; 30 ships should be 100,000 grt. But the comparison between the two periods holds up, I think. In the summer of 1941 the Allies were getting Ultra intelligence, and were able to re-route a lot of traffic away from danger. And while there were heavy losses off the US east coast in early 1942 the North Atlantic was quiet. The only point I was wanting to make is that the campaign had its ups and downs; it wasn’t just quiet up to June 1940, then everything went to pot for the next so many years.
There was an upsurge in June 40 (due to the access to French bases) which died back in summer 41; but there was also one in January 42 (the assault on the unprepared US Coastal traffic) which faltered as the USN got a grip on the situation; another in July 42 when the asault switched back to the N Atlantic (and the Germans had enough U-boats to guarantee interception) which collapsed in Black May; another in Autumn 43 (the advent of new weapons) which were fairly quickly mastered.
And the main body of the article already says (#Early skirmishes) that "the action quieted down" after the first months, and that the campaign "was transformed" in June 1940 (#British situation) leading to “spectacular success” (#Happy Time)
(And desultory… I think in some ways the whole campaign was desultory; it’s part of the myth that all convoys were fought through with heavy losses, etc. the thing that switched me on to the whole question was a comment by Nicholas Montserrat in the forward to one of his books (which I cannot now find (>|) that a colleague of his in western approaches went through the entire Battle of the Atlantic without once seeing a U-boat attack or a ship hit.)
I’m still inclining towards putting the original text back; it is ours after all, and it weren’t broke… do you feel it is inadequate as a broad overview?
Also I was trying to rough out a "Mythology" section, here. What do you think? (Comments there, if you like) Xyl 54 (talk) 15:01, 21 January 2012 (UTC)
♠"dropped a nought" Known to happen. :)
♠"comparison between the two periods holds up...upsurge" In that light, I'll withdraw the transformative & desultory both. "Uptick in the cyclical nature of the campaign" (if that didn't sound so damn much like an economist ;p ) might do.
♠"in some ways the whole campaign was desultory" It's that aspect I hoped to see highlighted: convoy was actually very, very safe indeed. It was the solitary ships, stragglers, & rompers that were really at hazard. As I think of it, I believe it was Middlebrook in Convoy who pointed out losses amounted to only 0.7% of all ships in convoy. 8o
♠"original text" Not inadequate, but the tone seems a trifle "rah rah" for my liking. Couldn't tell you why, tho. Given a bit of polishing, or a bit of "poshing", I'd leave it in. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 16:56, 21 January 2012 (UTC)
I've grasped the nettle and put it back; but any polishing you feel it needs is fine. I'll have a think about that, but I'm a bit tied up at the moment... Xyl 54 (talk) 23:06, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
Have a look now. It's got the same content, more/less, but IMO much more encyclopedic tone. I took out the "swung back & forth"; in retrospect, some description of the cyclical nature belongs, but I can't think of good phrasing... :( TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 01:32, 23 January 2012 (UTC)

Assessment

I've added the assessment section, as discussed above. I didn't go with "mythology" for the title, as it might come over as a bit POV. I tried to trim the draft down a bit, but I don't think I succeeded; is it too long? Thanks for all the comments, there; but I'm guessing this is where the ordure will hit the air-conditioning, now. Xyl 54 (talk) 01:25, 27 January 2012 (UTC)

♠A good effort, IMO. Relying on Mahan is a bad idea, tho. As the USN proved against Japan, he was wrong. It wasn't about "control of the sea" as much as it was about national survival. For an island nation, trade protection is essential, & attacks on commerce can be decisive. (That Japan hadn't surrendered was as much a product of delusional IJA leadership as anything.)
♠The '43 crisis might want mention of the major convoy battles, which, with reason, may've led Winston & the Amdiralty to wonder if they'd got it right. And I don't have the sources handy, so if you can cite for the losses being mainly in single ships, not convoys, I'd appreciate it.
♠Also, & this has come up already, change from "British shipbuilding" to "Allied"? Or clarify the issue. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 01:51 & 02:00, 27 January 2012 (UTC)
I’ve fixed the British/Allied thing; this is a general article, so it’s best simplified. But the difference does have a significance. The tonnage war target was based on Britain’s merchant fleet numbers, but about 10% of ships sunk were neutrals; so the tonnage sunk compared to the requirement to damage Britain was a fudge. If the UbW sank 300,000 tons, about 270,000 would be British, the rest would be someone else’s. Even if they were Allied ships, or neutrals carrying British goods (and a lot were neutrals minding their own business) the “achievement” was less than it should have been.
To bring in the March convoy battles I’ve put a link in to the Black May page; they are listed there, so it seemed more economical.
And fair enough, I wouldn’t want to “rely” on Mahan, but his is the clearest statement of the principle. And we could probably debate whether the Pacific experience proves him wrong on the subject; but as far as the BotA goes, Mahan was a significant influence on German naval thinking. It was Donitz who believed commerce raiding could win the war, and it needed his single-minded commitment to it in the face of those around him that kept the U-boat Arm from being distracted into more “strategic” initiatives (more than they were, anyway). And part of the premise of the section is that (as far as the Atlantic campaign is concerned) Mahan was right, and Donitz was wrong. Xyl 54 (talk) 23:38, 27 January 2012 (UTC)
♠"tonnage war" Agreed.
♠"Black May" I should've searched that... :( & linked it myself.
♠Mahan. I agree, his was the guiding principle, & not just for Germany; all major navies, including Japan's, bought it. Was he right? For BotA, maybe, except it can't be taken in isolation. As written, it looks like an endorsement, & the PTO calls his position in question. Actually, WW1 subwar does, too. My reading of Mahan is, he didn't believe a nation could be defeated by commerce war; "command of the sea", as I read it, is a separate issue. IMO, Mahan was demonstrably wrong, & implying otherwise gives a false impression. That may not be a debate we can settle. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:58, 28 January 2012 (UTC)
About the Mahan comment, it isn’t set in stone as far as I’m concerned; if you can think of another way to say the same thing then we can think about that instead. But the purpose of the comment is to point out that focusing on the BotA tends to overlook the fact that Germany did not have, or even contest for, a naval supremacy in any significant sense. For most of the conflict in the Atlantic theatre the Allies pretty much went where they wanted when they wanted, while Germany’s navy and merchant marine were either confined to port or reduced to the role of the inferior player, waging an asymmetric warfare. It was a different story to the Pacific, or even the Mediterranean, where each side was actively seeking command of the seas.
As for Mahan, if what happened in the Pacific proves he was wrong, the expansion of that point is best done on those pages, not here, as what happened in the Atlantic (if anything) does tend to back him up, IMO.
On the subject of WWI, that (again) is a story for a different article, but it’s worth considering that in the commerce war then, Germany only achieved its tonnage target (600,000GRT) in a single three-month period (April to June 1917). So sober analysis again shows a situation less favourable to Germany than we have been led to believe. Xyl 54 (talk) 22:26, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
♠I really can't think of a better way to put it, either. Unless we say the U-boat war was never a contest for supremacy, per Mahan, but an effort to defeat by guerre de course, which it was. Which comes back to whether it could succeed...which I suggest isn't a settled issue. (If it is, let's cite somebody saying so.) Was it different in the Pacific? Yes. Was the impact on trade different? Very much so. Was the commerce war decisive? I think it was, & think that can be demonstrated. I don't think the two theatres are as separable (or as clearly, cleanly separable).
♠Was WW1 evidence? If not, I stand corrected. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 06:51, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
True; but “whether it could succeed”? The cite for that would be Levin’s and Blair’s assertion that the U-boat Arm “never came close to winning” the BotA. Whether they could have succeeded in other circumstances takes us into the realms of alternative history, I think, but I’m wondering just how lucky the KM would have to have been; maybe if Britain had closed down all her ship yards, and scuttled half her merchant fleet, and the RN had sat on its hands for 6 years while the UbW sank the rest... I think “ never came close” sets the bar pretty high for the extra effort required from Germany to pull it off. Xyl 54 (talk) 22:55, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Also true. I keep coming back to the U.S. experience, & I'm having trouble separating how different things were, I guess. And the "could" is more about Mahan generally than Germany specifically: that is, did (could) commerce raiding alone produce victory? I've long been of the view the Sub Force contribution is heavily underestimated. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:28, 1 February 2012 (UTC)


Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the proposal was move per consensus below, as an overprecise title that, to the extent there is any amibiguity with the WWI battle, is the primary topic.--Fuhghettaboutit (talk) 03:31, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

Battle of the Atlantic (1939–1945) → Battle of the Atlantic — Since we have no other article with this title, why disambiguate here? I think it is also primary usage. Srnec (talk) 03:56, 28 February 2012 (UTC)

Survey

Comment- This too? Dru of Id (talk) 13:33, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
I went through 10 pages of results. That one didn't come up, no. Hey, maybe I missed something. But it looked to me like 10 pages of WW2. The term was extremely rare before 1936, so IMO it is quite misleading to use it to refer to anything that happened in WW1. Here is an ngram. Kauffner (talk) 14:34, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
Dru: Sheffield’s paper may use the term, but the books he cites certainly don’t. I don't know many reliable sources for the subject that do use it. Xyl 54 (talk) 02:10, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
  • Support. Primary usage. The contention that another event is occasionally, but not usually, referred to as the Battle of the Atlantic is irrelevant. The primary meaning of "Battle of the Atlantic" in English refers to this battle. In terms of convenience for readers, it seems pretty obvious - most readers who enter in Battle of the Atlantic are looking for this article. So moving it helps them. For the few readers who are looking for the other battle, we can have a hat note at the top of this article, meaning that they'd be no worse off than they are now - either way they have to click to get to the article they want. john k (talk) 17:42, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
  • Support: "Battle of the Atlantic" strictly applies only to the conflict in WWII. The term was devised in 1941 by Churchill to refer specifically to the defence of Britain’s supply route across the Atlantic (mainly from North America) and the assault on it by all means; U-boats surface raiders, aircraft (guys putting dynamite in lumps of coal...)
When the term is applied to WWI as some sort of retrospective short-hand for the U-boat campaign then it immediately hits trouble; the main theatre in WWI wasn’t the Atlantic at all, but the war zones around Britain (the North Sea, Channel, Irish Sea, South-West Approaches), and in the Mediterranean. Maybe moving the page will go some way to knocking this "First Battle..", "Second battle.." nonsense on the head. Xyl 54 (talk) 02:03, 29 February 2012 (UTC)

Discussion

It was my understanding that Churchill brought the term to prominence when he set up the Battle of the Atlantic committee in 1941 to co-ordinate the effort to defend the convoy routes, and I’d assumed he was following on from his previous references to the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain. It’s certainly possible (given his journalists ear for a good phrase) he lifted it from Lindley, or someone else; or that, (if he wasn’t an avid reader of the St Josephs News-Press) they both came up with it independently.
What does surprise me is your ngram dating it from 1936. Does that signify a use of the term then, or is it an artifact of the ngram, like when usage goes from nil to stratospheric in a short time? Xyl 54 (talk) 14:31, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
I looked through the Google Books hits, and I didn't see anything to support the ngram. I suspect that as soon as the phrases "Battle of France" and "Battle of Britain" were in circulation, "Battle of Foo" was a natural and not terribly original follow-up coinage. As far as when the phrase came to prominence, that would be when A.V. Alexander asked Parliament for "many more ships and great numbers of men" on March 5, 1941.[1] Kauffner (talk) 22:10, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
Thanks for finding that; it’s nice to have it pinned down to an exact date. Xyl 54 (talk) 20:11, 2 March 2012 (UTC)
The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Infobox: Leaders

So I added Ernest King to the infobox, on the grounds that he was the Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet, and that he had special responsibility for the Battle of the Atlantic (as his nominal subordinate Nimitz was largely directing the Pacific War). Trekphiler has twice reverted, first on the mistaken grounds that King was only CNO, a non-command position, and then on the grounds that including him would mean we need to include Pound and Raeder as well, but that they are not. Raeder, however, is, in fact, included (and Doenitz's successor as Submarines chief, Godt, is not), while Pound was not a commander, but First Sea Lord, which was a staff position. Given that the Battle of the Atlantic was an essentially grand strategic operation, I don't see why it makes sense to exclude the figures who actually designed that strategy, especially King, whose position is entirely analogous to the included Raeder's position. If there's a Brit whose position was analogous, he should be included to, and I'd not even be averse to including Pound and Cunningham, even though their position was somewhat different. I'm going to put King back in, especially since Raeder's been on there for years. john k (talk) 05:49, 1 March 2012 (UTC)

There was a long discussion about who to include in the infobox and who not to, the last time there was a row over this (it been archived, now; see here). It’s a question with no right answer, probably, but the feeling then was to keep the numbers down and just have the commanders who had operational control. (It also has a bearing on your other point, below) Xyl 54 (talk) 14:37, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
This is old news, & I opposed Raeder being in for the same reason I oppose King. The "commanders" list has to stop somewhere. If King & Raeder, why not Frog Low & (whoever was in charge of Room 39) (I'm ashamed to admit I can't recall :( )? Andrews, Horton, Murray, Dönitz, yes; others without direct operational control, no. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:31, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
Low doesn't have a wikipedia article and isn't mentioned in this article. And naval intelligence clearly isn't a command capacity. Including actual commanders like King and Raeder is totally reasonable. And adding King would provide symmetry with the Axis side, since Raeder is included and Godt is not. And we can easily make a distinction between Raeder and King, who were commanding officers, and Pound and whoever else, who were merely staff officers. john k (talk) 19:21, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
For my money, we could lose Raeder as well without hurting the article much; I don’t really know how he came to be there. If he and King are in, then there's a case for Pound and Nelles too (I'd dispute they were "merely staff officers"; Pound was an Admiral of the Fleet, just like King, and professional head of the Navy, like King: Nelles was head of the RCN, equivalent to both); then we'll have a French editor arguing for Muselier, then an Italian for Parona, and so on and so on. Best to cut it short, Xyl 54 (talk) 20:29, 2 March 2012 (UTC)
First Sea Lord is more like Chief of Naval Operations than it is like a Commander-in-Chief. And Admiral of the Fleet is a rank, not a position. And French and Italian editors can argue for French and Italian admirals as it is. They should not be included not because they were commanders-in-chief, but because French and Italian contributions to the Battle of the Atlantic were minimal. Beyond that, I rather think that for something as huge as the Battle of the Atlantic, it makes perfect sense to include very senior officers, and if someone things Pound and Cunningham (and Nelles, maybe) should also be included, I'd have no particular problem with that. john k (talk) 17:04, 3 March 2012 (UTC)
There’s obviously some subtle distinction here that’s escaping me; who was the USN’s Chief of Naval Operations during this period, then, and who was the RN’s Commander-in–Chief? AFAIK Pound and King were opposite numbers. Xyl 54 (talk) 18:07, 3 March 2012 (UTC)
King was CNO and Commander-in-Chief. The Royal Navy did not have a commander-in-chief, as far as I know. I would imagine that individual fleet commanders reported officially to George VI, or maybe to the Admiralty Board as a whole. john k (talk) 18:28, 3 March 2012 (UTC)
So what's the role of the First Sea Lord? Folks at 137 (talk) 11:39, 8 March 2012 (UTC)

(outdent). I’ve been thinking about this; I don’t agree with john’s reasoning, but am not sure how profitable it is to continue discussing it.
The RN didn’t have a commander in chief as such; the various commands (Home Fleet, Western Approaches, etc) all had their own commanders in chief, who reported to the First Sea Lord (not to the king!); Pound had ultimate professional authority over them, as evidenced (in an unfortunate example!) by the PQ 17 affair. He didn’t just advise Tovey and the others, he gave them direct orders. So it wasn’t just a staff/advisory position.
And King’s position as C-in-C US Fleet is anomalous; up to December 1941 it was a courtesy title, held by the senior of the three fleet commanders. Whilst King was CinC Atlantic, CINCUS was Kimmel, in the Pacific. They reported to Stark as CNO, and Kimmel did not (AFAIK) give orders or advice to King. When King became CNO in January 42 he was senior to Nimitz and Hart, and hung on the title as COMINCH. It’s got me wondering what that made his relationship with Ingersoll’s position as CINCLANT; maybe it’s because King wanted to stay involved with the Atlantic operations, as with Donitz remaining BdU after January 43, when he got his pierhead jump to Grand Admiral (Or perhaps like Grant and Meade with the Army of the Potomac). But I've no evidence for that. Xyl 54 (talk) 16:49, 8 March 2012 (UTC)

Xyl, while certainly the First Sea Lord was the effective head of the fleet, it was my understanding that he wouldn't have had a formal command position - are you sure that Pound was giving orders in his own name, rather than in the name of the Admiralty as a whole? I'd add that I wouldn't have a problem with adding Pound (and perhaps Cunningham) as well as King. john k (talk) 18:40, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

Poland?

Could somebody explain how Poland was involved in the Battle of the Atlantic? Its inclusion in the infobox seems highly dubious. john k (talk) 05:52, 1 March 2012 (UTC)

To answer this (and on the same subject as the point above) the Polish navy were involved (see here), but whether they (as minor players, compared to some) should be in the infobox or not is also an old question. (here) I’d incline to the view that less is better with infoboxes, but I suppose questions of national pride rear their heads. If you have a solution I (for one) would like to hear it. Xyl 54 (talk) 14:47, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
I'd say it would make most sense just to have Britain, the US, and Canada in the infobox, with perhaps a link to "Allied powers" in general to indicate that other powers contributed. john k (talk) 19:12, 1 March 2012 (UTC)
I disagree. The infobox's prominence can readily dispel errors and excite interest. One such error is that only Canada, UK and US were involved, at least to any great extent. Poland played a significant part in convoy escort (when British resources were at breaking point) and elsewhere, such as the sinking of the Bismarck, particularly when considering its available forces. Dutch MAC ships were also of great value. Czechoslovakia could also be added (air patrols) .... But I'm unsure of Newfoundland's separate contribution. A way out may be to set up a comparison (chart?) of the various national contributions. Folks at 137 (talk) 10:22, 7 March 2012 (UTC)
Including minor players in this campaign in the infobox is rather odd in my view. The UK, Canada and US did the great bulk of the fighting on the Allied side. On the Axis side, I'm unware of any Vichy French involvement in this campaign. Quite a lot of the smaller Allied countries participated in this campaign, but only as part of British forces. For instance, two Royal Australian Air Force maritime patrol squadrons were involved in most of the campaign, several Royal Australian Navy warships also took part during shorter periods and hundreds of Australians served in Royal Navy warships (including many sonar operators trained especially for this campaign in Sydney). But this was a tiny contribution compared to the hundreds of warships the UK, US and Canada each contributed. Logically, if Poland is here Australia should be as well. However, in my view neither country should be here. That said, improving the article is more important than worrying about the infobox! ;) Nick-D (talk) 22:16, 7 March 2012 (UTC)
Whether or not to include "minor players" (definition, please!) is a fair debate. However, Nick-D's point "Quite a lot of the smaller Allied countries participated in this campaign, but only as part of British forces." has implications elsewhere. Canadian troops were part of British forces during Normandy invasion; Polish troops likewise and at Arnhem; Australian ships were under Dutch command in ABDA; the British Pacific Fleet off Japan; Indian and other Commonwealth troops in many places. (However, it would take my point too far to point out that the British 21st Army Group was within Eisenhower's command.) My point is that where there is a discrete national unit (as opposed to, say, the Eagle Squadron which was I think, US volunteers serving in the RAF prior to US belligerency), we need to consider its inclusion. Folks at 137 (talk) 09:09, 8 March 2012 (UTC)
Many of the 'minor players' surrendered to Germany so their role in the battle, though no doubt valued, was however temporary. The ships of those countries that later participated on the Allied side, such as Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Norway, Denmark, etc., after the surrender did so against the wishes of their respective occupation governments, which were actually supporting the other side, i.e., Germany. So stating that these 'countries' fought in the battle on the Allied side seems a bit overly generous however technically true it may have been for a period.
In such circumstances one then gets into the question of legitimate governments, as a number of the countries mentioned set up 'governments in exile' in London, and brought with them as many of their naval forces and merchant shipping as they could, so it could be argued that these 'countries' fought on the Allied side. However, that didn't help much when Allied convoys were facing Luftwaffe air attacks from places such as Norway. It should also be pointed out that the difficulties the British and their Allies faced in the battle would not have been so severe if these countries had not surrendered in the first place. Unfortunately when a country surrenders it becomes 'de facto' allied to the occupying forces whether the populace like it or not, as the land and resources then become available to the occupier to be used against the occupied country's former allies.
The battle included participants from many countries, but only a few were actually at war with Germany at the time. It is to their great credit that so many people from those countries that were occupied, or not at war, voluntarily fought alongside Britain and her Allies at a time when they could have quite justifiably sat at home and done nothing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 11:28, 15 November 2012 (UTC)

Name section

If other editors don't like block quotes, I'm fine with that. But I think the political logic Churchill gives for promoting catch phrases like "battle of Britain" and "Battle of the Atlantic" is certainly pertinent. Kauffner (talk) 06:38, 4 March 2012 (UTC)

Given that there's no real dispute over the name of this campaign, I'm not sure if this is needed. Nick-D (talk) 07:57, 4 March 2012 (UTC)
I'm not uninterested in his reasoning, just not seeing the value of a quote. Summarize & cite it. Quotes, especially block quotes, should only be for things that can't be said better. Quoting the "fight on the beaches" speech, or "day of infamy" speech, yes; this fails that test. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 16:40, 4 March 2012 (UTC)

Vichy France

What exactly was Vichy France's role in the Battle of the Atlantic?

Providing bases for U-boats, & home to the local HQ, for a start. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 21:21, 4 July 2012 (UTC)
Which bases would those be? Brest, Lorient, St-Nazaire, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux, all of which where not inside Vichy France, they were all within the sections of France occupied directly by Germany. So what ports and bases did Vichy France provide to Germany? My understanding is that local U-Boat HQ were based in these same ports and not inside the rump Vichy state.
So what exactly was Vichy France's rold in the battle?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:55, 4 July 2012 (UTC)
You want to take it out, I'm not going to fight about it. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 03:12, 5 July 2012 (UTC)

What's with the lack of American flags?

Just curious as to why the info chart at the top of the page does not put American flags next to "United States" in belligerents and next to the American leaders. --69.126.210.25 (talk) 15:12, 16 October 2012 (UTC)

Vandal

Noticed that someone was screwing with the page. I simply removed the bolded section from 'The Happy Time' (June 1940 – February 1941)

....Shadowj2409 (talk) 22:50, 10 December 2012 (UTC)Canada was a major help, because they are an awesome country. Since a... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 120.144.151.20 (talk)

Assessment section

This section is decidedly one-sided, overly subscribes to Blair's viewpoints (who is by no means universally accepted - he was excoriated by J.E. Moore in a review in Mariner's Mirror, for instance), and needs to incorporate the other side of the argument (for instance, Milner in Battle of the Atlantic argues that Germany had a real chance to win after the fall of France). Parsecboy (talk) 23:39, 5 February 2013 (UTC)

I'll reserve comment on Blair & Moore, having read neither. As for Mahan, his view was the dominant one in strategy & doctrine of all the major players, & the Battle wasn't only about commerce, but about grand strategy. He may've conceived his theory based on 17th Century experience, but many agreed with him. He proved completely wrong... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:48, 6 February 2013 (UTC)
The German decision to go for guerre de course rather than Mahanian control of the sea is not a failure of any sort (apart from not having enough time to finish the Z fleet, of course). In fact, Mahan's theory of seapower only applies to a very small slice of naval history; for the vast majority of the time, fleets could not exercise control of the sea (which is in essence, what guerre de course is trying to prove - that Mahanian theory does not work). Saying that the Germans failed to win the commerce war because they did not build a battlefleet and duke it out with the Home Fleet would be akin to saying the Type VII was a terrible submarine because it never flew to the moon. Parsecboy (talk) 13:53, 6 February 2013 (UTC)
"Mahan's theory of seapower only applies to a very small slice of naval history" It was written about a very narrow slice, but it dominated the thinking of most major navies in the '30s.
It's the very success of the U-boat which demonstrates Mahan got it wrong, & that's what's at issue. The Battle wasn't only about commerce war. There are strategic, & grand strategic, factors at play.
I'll concede, it needs to be worded better than it was. The issue wasn't "command of the sea", it was victory. Mahan held command of the sea was essential to victory, & commerce war couldn't achieve victory because it couldn't achieve command; the U-boats were proving victory was possible without it. (I'd argue the U.S. Sub Force proved it.) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 05:27, 11 February 2013 (UTC)
No, Mahan really only applies to a very small slice. For instance, the vast majority of naval warfare in the Mediterranean, at least until well into the early modern period did not play by Mahan's rules on sea power (read, for instance, John Guilmartin's excellent book Gunpowder and Galleys - the first chapter addresses this point specifically). Nor does it apply in pre-modern northern Europe (for instance, see Rodger's Safeguard of the Sea).
If that's the intended point about Mahan (that guerre de course could achieve victory, proving Mahan wrong), that's fine. But the way it was worded (and stuck in between two paragraphs criticizing the German side for its failures), it didn't read that way at all. I'd wager you're right on the USN's boats in the Pacific. Parsecboy (talk) 13:36, 11 February 2013 (UTC)
Mahan only had a point if the other side sat still and did nothing or was ineffective. The Japanese in the Pacific had little or no effective anti-submarine (A/S) forces with-which to combat the US submarines in the area. Thus the Japanese lost. IIRC the USN lost a total of 46 submarines in the Pacific during the 1941-45 period, whereas the RN lost 42 of its own boats in the Mediterranean alone.
In contrast, the British and their allies had a state-of-the-art A/S force from around 1940-41 onwards, which slowly was worked up to a state where by late 1944-45 U-boats were being sunk almost before they had left their home waters. As long as Britain could hold out on the imports successfully brought in then Germany had little hope of beating the Allies at sea, and it is arguable that after 1943 she had none. By then the hunter had become the hunted. By 1943-44 a submariner's life facing modern competent A/S forces was not likely to be a happy or long one. Germany lost around 600 U-boats during the conflict, the vast majority sunk by British and Empire forces, over 200 by RAF Coastal Command.
By the time the Type XXI U-boat and the other advanced German submarines were ready to enter service it is likely that many would have been sunk by aircraft before they could do much harm, no submarine even today being able to outrun an aeroplane or helicopter, which is why the ageing Avro Shackleton was used for so long, it being just as effective against nuclear boats as it was against the previous diesel-electric ones.
To give you some idea of the numbers involved the British and Empire (the latter mostly Canadian) forces sank more submarines during the 1939-45 period than have been sunk by all the other nations of the world combined. That record still stands today.
... and it's probably only fair to Japan to also state that the British Empire went into WW II with the world's largest Merchant Fleet, around 12,000 ships, again, larger than all the world's other merchant fleets combined. IIRC, around 4,000 of these 12,000 were sunk or lost during the war.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.221.72 (talk) 11:20, 14 March 2015 (UTC)

Losses

The assessment discusses losses, and to my mind implies losses never exceeded 10%. Here and there in the article are loss figures, but I dont really know where these have come from. I have recently been reading O'Keefe's book on the Dieppe raid, which spends some time discussing the submarine war leading up this in August 1942, because his book is pretty much about the question of whether or not the raid was primarily motivated by the need to capture German codes. He says this was because of the massive losses of shipping, which had jumped once the Germans introduced the new 4 rotor enigma and corresponding new codes, coinciding with the start of the US coastal war at the start of '42. He quotes a loss rate in 1942 of up to 25% of all tankers at its height, which is well above what you mention, and says that the UK was only getting 75% of its oil requirement that year. He doesn't really discuss food, and sems to think the most critical problem was fuel supply, and that indeed this really was a very serious problem. He quotes both UK and US sources saying this might lead to loss of the war if the shipping losses were not halted.

O'Keefe is arguing that the critical issue in failure or success in fighting submarines was decoded intelligence, and that the submarine war turned once the four rotor enigma code had been reliably cracked, which was from the end of 1942 onwards. Much of his discussion on Dieppe turns on the fact that Enigma and all matters relating to it remained highly secret until well after WW2, some matters are still secret, and that the lack of any information about this had led historians to misinterpret the key issues. The allies never admitted breaking enigma, so never attributed any of their success to this, rather explaining it away by any other method they could. Sandpiper (talk) 17:40, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

The factors that beat the U-boats were improved radar and ASDIC, improved anti-submarine weapons such as Hedgehog and the Leigh-Light, the widespread use of long range maritime patrol aircraft such as the Liberator, Catalina, and Sunderland with the addition of the escort carriers equipped with Swordfish, and the independent Escort Groups. Once these had all come together any U-boats discovered were very likely to get sunk. The U-boats had to be in the vicinity of the convoy to attack it, so all the Escort Group needed to do was to wait for the U-boats to arrive. The Enigma decrypts were helpful as they helped locate U-boats before they were near a convoy. But the U-boat had to be near a convoy to attack it. The British weren't interested in sinking U-boats - they were interested in protecting the convoys - not the same thing. By 1943 once detected the U-boat's chances were not good. By late 1944-early 1945, some U-boats were being sunk on their first patrol before leaving their home waters. In short, by 1943 the average U-boat man's lot was not a happy one.
The UK had stockpiles (reserves) of oil, food etc, the requirements were those that needed to be imported to not have to break into the stockpiles.
Dieppe was staged to discover how difficult it would be to capture a channel port and to discover the difficulties inherent in landing tanks and other vehicles on a defended enemy beach. It was also staged to show to the Americans how unrealistic their demands for an invasion in 1942-43 were. The Canadians were used at their own government's request because they had been in Britain some time without seeing action and the Canadian government had been complaining that no use had been found for them. The results of Dieppe led to the decision to land on a sandy beach (Dieppe was shingle, and the tank's tracks could not get a grip on it), as at Normandy, and to build and deploy artificial harbours later known as 'Mulberry'.
ULTRA remained secret under the Thirty-year rule until 1973. So did Collossus. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.6 (talk) 17:38, 14 April 2016 (UTC)

Rotor craft

The back-&-forth is getting ridiculous. As written, the description of naval Enigma is accurate. It had 3 rotors, later 4. KM provided spares, which were replaced at intervals on patrol, to make decryption harder. At no time were these "additional", because they replaced existing rotors; they were not added to existing ones. Changing the text to say anything else is somewhere between misleading & flat wrong. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 22:53, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

I agree and disagree. The better text is a combination of both versions.
See Enigma machine#Rotors; Enigma machine#Military Enigma. After 15 Dec 1938 military Enigmas chose 3 rotors from a set of 5. (Other services had "spares".) Naval Enigma had 6 to 8 rotors in selection set plus 2 at fourth pos. The four/thin rotor Enigma was in place but not used for some time; it could operate as a 3 rotor.
The term "spare" is inaccurate; there were additional rotors in the selection set. "Spare" suggests a replacement for when something breaks; if nothing breaks, a "spare" would not be used. Only 3 large rotors could be in the machine at any one time.
Bombes were used to break keys rather than directly decrypt messages. Messages were decrypted with Enigma analogs.
Bombes were used in known plaintext attacks.
Combinations (# of brute-force bombe runs) for 5 rotors: 5 * 4 * 3 = 60
Combinations (# of brute-force bombe runs) for 8 rotors: 8 * 7 * 5 = 280 8 * 7 * 6 = 336 NOTE: TedColes showed me I cannot count backwards.Glrx (talk) 14:14, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
Brute force attacks relied on guessing the plaintext, so there was no guarantee of finding a key.
IIRC, the Luftwaffe procedure was horribly flawed: the message would always start XYZXYZ where XYZ was the session key; the repetition was to ensure the session key could be reconstructed if there were an error in transmission; a bombe would look for the day's key using that identity; when found, all traffic for the day could be read.
Naval cipher procedure was better, but I think there were some flaws.
Glrx (talk) 03:02, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
The decryption of Enigma-ciphered messages played an important part of the the Battle of the Atlantic in WWII.
Keys to Enigma ciphers consisted of:
  • the rotors used,
  • their positions in the machine,
  • the setting of the position of the rotors' alphabet rings,
  • the settings of the plugboard and, for each message,
  • the choice of starting position of the rotors.
The original German military Enigma had only rotors I, II and III which could be placed in the left hand, middle or right hand position giving 3 × 2 × 1 = 6 possible permutations.
The 1938 introduction of rotors IV and V gave 5 × 4 × 3 = 60 permutations, which stymied most of the Poles' Enigma decrypting.
The introduction of the Kreigsmarine rotors VI, VII and VIII gave a total of 8 × 7 × 6 = 336 permutations.
The M4 model Enigma, introduced for U-boat messages on 1 February 1942, multiplied the difficulty of decrypting messages by at least a factor of 26. This required 4-rotor Bombes working much faster to read operational messages in a timely way. British efforts to build such machines were not very successful, but the US Navy's OP-20-G commissioned the NCR Company in Dayton, Ohio to produce 4-rotor Bombes to the original Turing-Welchman specification. These were a great success and, by the end of the war were being used by Bletchley Park with settings and results telegraphed across the Atlantic with great convenience.
See any of the many good texts about Enigma, particularly:
  • Budiansky, Stephen (2000), Battle of wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II, Free Press, ISBN 978-0684859323 or
  • Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh (2004) [2000], Enigma: The Battle for the Code (Cassell Military Paperbacks ed.), London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ISBN 978-0297842514
--TedColes (talk) 07:05, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
♠"'Spare' suggests a replacement for when something breaks; if nothing breaks, a 'spare' would not be used. Only 3 large rotors could be in the machine at any one time." "Spare" doesn't suggest that to me at all, in this context (& I've seen "spare" used elsewhere to refer to the other rotors); for that, I'd say "replacement". It's the fact of 3 used at a time that's the key point IMO. When I'm saying "spare", I'm thinking there were uninstalled or unused rotors that could be fitted or connected as desired. (Am I misreading the design?)
♠My trouble with "additional" is the implication the other were in use at the same time, & that's clearly not the case. How we say "other rotors could be selected for use" is really the issue. "Auxiliary" has unfortunate connotations, but if it's "auxiliary rotors that could also be selected", I could live with it. (Use of "selection set" requires more explanation than warranted for this page, so that may need a link out.) Objection?
As for the importance of the change, I entirely agree--but that detail belongs on the decryption page, not here. Link out to it. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 14:54, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
I don't know of any evidence that those choosing keys would not select from the full set of 336 permutations of rotors, why should they not? Indeed, the first instinct of the American Navy cryptanalysts in OP-20-G was to place an order for 336 of the NCR 4-rotor Bombes. So rotors VI, VII and VIII might, on occasion, be used together, which seems eminently sensible from the Germans' point of view.
I would thus favour the use of the word "additional" as rotors VI, VII and VIII were added to the existing set of five. Perhaps we should say that these rotors increased the permutations of rotors in the machine from 60 to 336? Both the words "spare" and "replacement" imply to me that a new rotor would be identical to the one it was substituting for; but all eight rotors in the set were unique, so this was not the case.
The close collaboration between British and American code breakers, albeit after a shaky start, is surely worth mentioning here or in the sub-section about the 4-rotor Enigma.
--TedColes (talk) 16:37, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
♠"those choosing keys would not select from the full set of 336 permutations of rotors" That presumes all extra rotors could be used at any given time, & my understanding has always been only 3 (or 4) could ever be used at once; indeed, IIRC, the spares had to be physically changed in. Anything saying otherwise is dubious, & anything implying otherwise is a mistake IMO.
♠"Both the words 'spare' and 'replacement' imply to me that a new rotor would be identical" Insofar as they interchange, they are, & IMO that's all either means: a spare tire need not be identical to the original. Moreover, if the text makes clear their function is to change the settings (& it does), "spare" or "replacement" IMO is clear enough.
♠"The close collaboration" On that, I entirely agree. It's the amount of detail on this page I have reservations about. It should be covered mainly on the Enigma page or a breaking Enigma page. A mention of the fact there was close collaboration wouldn't bother me; more than that is too much. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:15 & 17:19, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
It is correct that only three standard rotors (as opposed to thin rotors for the left-hand position of the 4-rotor machine) could be inserted into the machine at any one time. But with eight rotors available, perming 3 from 8 gives 336, and that was the choice for the key setters and the puzzle for the code breakers. All eight rotors could be used in the sense that any of them could be chosen, but I don't think that "additional" (to the set of five) implies that more than three standard rotors were mounted on the spindle and inserted into the machine at once - there wasn't room for any more, it was always three standard rotors in military Enigma machines.
A spare tyre is normally functionally the same as the one it replaces. All of the the eight Enigma rotors were functionally different from each other in a fundamentally important way. "Spare" and "replacement" imply to me functionally identical rotors.
I wonder whether Glrx has a view on this?
--TedColes (talk) 18:56, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
Given the MW definition of spare, adj, I'm opposed to using "spare rotor". Maybe the definition across the pond is more in line with "additional", but in that case I would look for language that describes the number of rotors the navy could use in the machine compared to other services, and the implication for code breaking. Whether a spare tire is identical or not, I only use a spare tire when one of four mounted on car goes flat; I never use a spare tire in the ordinary course of driving around.
To me, using "spare" confuses the "replacement" point. The only sense of the rotors being "additional" is the sense that they were added to the 1938 set of 5 rotors that could be put into the machine's 3 positions. I can see were "additional" could confuse a reader into believing the spindle held more rotors. I think we all know the issues; we just have to be sure we don't mislead the reader.
My sense is that TedColes and I are taking a system view of the Enigma (so any rotors that could be inserted into the machine are significant to the system) and that Trekphiler is taking a current configuration of the Enigma (where only the rotors currently mounted on the spindle matter). I don't see a necessity to make either the system or current-config distinction in the article other than avoiding the confusion that Trekphiler worries about: the machine could never have more than 3 (or 4) rotors at any one time. Let's just make that point clear.
My impression is the eight rotors could occupy any of the first three rotor positions. I don't know, but I would expect the Germans to use all permutations. The fourth rotor position was thin and could only take one of two thin rotors (alpha and beta / NULL). There's a possibility that the alpha and beta rotors are rotor VII and rotor VIII. I'd have to check a source for that, but our WP article says VI, VII, and VIII have turnover positions, and I don't think the fourth rotor moved. Anyway, the thin fourth rotor could explain why someone would think not all permutations were available. The fourth rotor would double the number of rotor configurations and increase the run time by a factor of 26.
This article could go into more detail. I think Kahn/Seizing has the Allies breaking Enigma to learn U-boat positions, sending out SIGABA messages to redirect the convoy away from the U-boats, the Germans breaking SIGABA to get the new course, and then sending out more Enigma messages to adjust U-boat positions. In addition, there was a U-boat resupply attack that went awry when the resupply vessels that were deliberately not attacked (to protect the crypto source) were discovered and attacked during normal patrols.
Glrx (talk) 20:08, 24 May 2013 (UTC)
♠"My sense is that TedColes and I are taking a system view" I believe you've captured the difference in our viewpoints. I also think that's the difference between yours & what I expect the typical reader's to be. Yours requires a deeper knowledge IMO. (And tho I have some grasp of Enigma, it's evidently not as complete as yours, so I'd count myself closer to typical.)
♠"only three standard rotors...could be inserted into the machine at any one time" That (or having 4) IMO is the crucial point, & trying to avoid confusion on the subject is essential. "Additional" suggests to me they are also installed. I take "spare" to mean "able to be replaced", & the references I've seen to the extra rotors have used the same meaning.
♠That being so, I'd disagree on "fundamentally the same". They perform the same function in the machine, so "replacement" fits IMO. That they produce dramatically different outputs is in the nature of the rotor machine, so any replacement rotor would IMO do that.
♠"I never use a spare tire in the ordinary course of driving" Ah, but the spare can serve for that task, & does the same job when the original is in some way unsuitable, which a "spare" rotor would also: for when the original has "gone flat" from overuse (or "exceeded its mileage limit", so to speak).
♠So what about saying, "extra rotors (which would replace existing ones in the machine on a preset schedule)"?
♠I'm not opposed to more about the use of Enigma breaks, but we need to keep a balance for a couple of reasons. One, as said, this isn't a page on the breaking of it, so too much technical detail should be avoided. Two, Enigma gets a lot of attention in historiography, & it's undue weight IMO. It was perfectly possible to fight U-boats without reading Enigma traffic at all. Reading it helped, but wasn't essential. Let's keep a balance, there. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:50, 25 May 2013 (UTC)
I hope that my compromise clarification is acceptable. I have avoided using "spare", "replacement" and "additional", and have not expanded it too much. --TedColes (talk) 06:04, 25 May 2013 (UTC)
♠"I hope that my compromise clarification is acceptable" That's worse, I'm afraid.8o It's turned a 3-rotor machine into a 5-rotor, & added detail on the permutations not germane to understanding the issue for this page.
♠Also, I'd far rather we settle the language here, first.
♠Suggestion: delete mention of "spare" rotors entirely, & leave that for the Enigma machine page. That way, we say, "KM had different security procedures, including different rotor arrangements [or "provision of different sets of rotors"] and key systems". Suit you? If you want to add something on the lines of, "This made KM Enigma harder to break.", I'm okay with that. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 13:47, 25 May 2013 (UTC)
I agree that we should sort it out here before putting it into the article.
Let us be clear about how Enigma worked. It had three slots for standard rotors that could be removed or inserted with ease as part of the key-setting process. From 1938 onwards, the range of possible key settings was increased by the key setter choosing three from the set of five different rotors, giving 60 choices of rotors and their positions. For naval Enigma this was increased to a set of eight different rotors, each of which could be loaded into any of the three positions in Enigma giving 336 different settings of the rotors and their positions. This huge increase from 60 to 336 was one of the reasons that naval Enigma was so hard to break in a timely fashion, a point that is germane to the fact that the quantity and quality of intelligence was much worse for U-boat movements in the Battle of the Atlantic, than for other forces in other areas of the war.
My suggested text includes "in the three slots of Enigma machines". I don't understand how this could be construed as describing Enigma as a 5-rotor machine. Referring to "spare rotors (which could be replaced at intervals, a provision not made by the other services)" is incorrect and misleading. Each rotor in the set was different from the rest, and the other services were choosing three from five, so which rotors were spare? - it just does not make sense.
I suggest the following:
"The way that Dönitz conducted the U-boat campaign required relatively large volumes of radio traffic between U-boats and headquarters. This was thought to be safe as the messages were enciphered using the Enigma cipher machine, which the Germans considered unbreakable. The Kriegsmarine used much more secure operating procedures than the Heer (army) or Luftwaffe (air force). In 1939, it was generally believed at the British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park that naval Enigma could not be broken. Only the head of the German Naval Section, Frank Birch, and the mathematician Alan Turing believed otherwise (See Copeland, 2004 - p.257)
"The reason that Kriegsmarine keys were more secure than those of the other armed services, was that, in addition to conventional key sheets, there was a system of "bigram tables" issued to operators. Also, in addition to using the same five rotors as the others, there were three exclusively naval ones, which increased the possible arrangements in the three slots of Enigma machines, from 60 to 336 which made the codebreakes' task much greater."
I consider the last paragraph to be a worthwhile introduction to the bigram tables and rotors that were subsequently 'pinched' by the Royal Navy. If, however, you consider it to be too detailed, omit it, but please, please don't use your erroneous text.
--TedColes (talk) 15:33, 25 May 2013 (UTC)
  • "My suggested text" As previously written, it left me thinking the Enigma had 5 rotors (your "set of 5"). That same "set of 5" is problematic IMO, because only 3 (or 4) are actually installed at any given time. So what does that make the ones that aren't? I'd say "spare" or "extra". It appears you wouldn't. Would "optional" suit you?
  • "This huge increase from 60 to 336" I agree, that made a big difference. I don't agree mentioning it on this page is essential. On the Enigma page, yes. On a breaking the Enigma page, yes. Both places have room for more detail on the operation of the machine, & both deserve more, than this one. Here, we really only need to say the KM Enigma was substantially harder to break with passing mention of why (i.e., more available rotor setting options).
  • I agree with most of your wording above, except, again, the "same five rotors", for the reason I mentioned. Plus, you're saying there are 3 Navy ones on top of that, which suggests an 8-rotor machine. What needs to be very clear at the start IMO is, there are three in use, & the operator had more than that to chose from.
  • So, what about this? (Keeping yours up to this change.)
"...than the Heer (Army) or Luftwaffe (Air Force). The reason Kriegsmarine keys were more secure was that, in addition to conventional key sheets, there was a system of bigram tables [note, no needless quotes; it's a linked tech term] issued to operators. Furthermore, KM provided extra rotors that could be installed ["replaced" is probably better] at set intervals; the usual ["as issued to Heer & LW"?]) was a selection from a set of five, while KM issued eight. This substantially increased the number of possible rotor settings (each different rotor having new ones), and so made the cryptanalysts' task much harder.
"Because of this, when the war began, [GCCS believed it unbreakable].
Suggest changing to this: "selection from a set of five, while KM operators had eight to choose from". TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 18:19, 25 May 2013 (UTC)
I'm not sure of the goals here, and it's been too long since I've read any sources about the Enigma or BotA to have any notion of relative importance. Certainly late in the war, aircraft with radar was very effective.
Re Enigma, there are significant strategic and tactical issues to say for the BotA. Some of those issues depend on the complexity of breaking the code.
Although the Germans thought Enigma was secure, the Poles broke into Enigma in 1932. The machine had a small but fundamental weakness that was compounded by German procedures. Consequently, the Poles built 6 Bomba and could discover a daily key in 2 hours (and the plugboard was irrelevant to this attack). The Germans improved their crypto over time. When the German rotor set went from 3 to 5, then the Poles needed 10 times the number of machines. The Germans also fixed their weak indicator procedures, so other attacks were needed. Of all of the German services, the German Navy had the strongest crypto procedures. The bigram tables hid the indicator and using a larger set of rotors meant more complexity. The naval Enigma was close to the edge of what the Allies could read.
How much of that story or those details should be told in BotA depends on whether they had an impact. There may be periods when the Allies easily read naval Enigma and could use it to route convoys. Then a change in Enigma procedures, such as the new bigram method for transmitting the indicator, could then cause a blackout. If a blackout had a consequence for the BotA (e.g., more cargo sunk), then the story can be summarized here. Did increasing the set of rotors have an immediate impact? Introduction of the plugboard; increasing the number of plug wires? Appearance of the Navy Bombes. The changes should be tied to the narrative timeline if they had an impact on the BotA. I think the significant details should be described if they are important to a blackout (change that increased security) or a breakthrough (e.g., capturing some schedules).
Some of the technical details get the story slightly wrong or otherwise mislead. The added security is not from "three exclusively naval" rotors; it is that the navy chose from a larger set. The "large volumes of naval traffic" does have an impact ("females", overlapping alphabets, correlations), but I'm not sure how important that volume was to breaking a key. For the BotA, it's that some messages had actionable information (or that subs were transmitting status reports and could be located with direction finding without needing any decryption).
So, instead of worrying about text, are there specific Enigma events that we can say happened at time X and had impact Y? Is there some source that tells us about the amount of traffic being read and its impact on convoy traffic? I think Kahn's Seizing the Enigma would be good, but it's been at least 10 years since I've read it.
Glrx (talk) 00:50, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
♠"The naval Enigma was close to the edge of what the Allies could read." If you've got a source for that, I'd say that merits adding. It offers an understanding of the scale of the problem without too much technical detail.
♠I'd say mentioning blackouts & increased losses due to German changes definitely merits mention. Especially if we can correlate the two closely. And source the connection. There's no question German changes contributed to increased losses; my concern here is giving breaks into Enigma more weight than they deserve, since historiography since the secret came out has already put a heavy thumb on the scale.
♠I'd also agree describing the significant details (broadly) is a good idea.
♠"added security" Agreed, but it's the fact the KM alone used a bigger selection is what helped make it so hard.
♠Traffic volume contributed to the breaks the way it always does: more chance for mistakes, more exemplars. Beyond that, there's the plain DF, which made finding & tracking U-boats easier.
♠That's beyond the narrow technical issue raised above. :) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 01:52, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
I am standing back and reading: Kahn, David (1991), Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-boat Codes, 1939-1943, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., ISBN 978-0395427392; Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh (2004) [2000], Enigma: The Battle for the Code and Budiansky, Stephen (2000), Battle of wits. With reference to the patrols vs. patrol lines detail, Kahn (p. 191) says of the Admiralty's Submarine Tracking Room plots that "Sometimes the U-boats formed into woolfpacks; sometimes they stretched into long straggly patrol lines; sometimes they coalesced into loose gatherings heading towards one general area." --TedColes (talk) 14:19, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
How about this:
"... than the Heer (army) or Luftwaffe (air force). The reason Kriegsmarine keys were more secure was that, in addition to conventional key sheets, there was a system of bigram tables issued to operators. The cryptanalysts' task was made even harder by the fact that the set of three rotors installed in the machine on alternate days, was chosen from a set of eight different rotors giving 336 possible configurations, compared with the 60 options from the other services' set of five.
"When the war began, it was generally believed at the British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park that naval Enigma could not be broken. Only two people believed otherwise.[1], the head of the German Naval Section, Frank Birch, because "it had to be" and the mathematician Alan Turing because "no one else was doing anything about it and I could have it to myself".[2]"
--TedColes (talk) 17:26, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
I think that's close. I'd say, "the machine's three rotors were chosen from a set of eight (rather than the other services' five), & they were changed every other day"; I think the exact number of combinations belongs on the machine page, as more detail than this page needs. I don't think why Birch or Turing wanted to try answers why they thought it could be broken, tho. (Birch's is just too casual.) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 18:39, 29 May 2013 (UTC)

There seems to much misinformation on the rotors available and the method by which each message key was determined. At the beginning of world war II prior to the invasion of Poland, the Enigma system had three rotors (identified I, II and III). At the beginning of each day the machine was loaded with the three rotors in a differing order, it being possible to arrange them six diferent ways. Just prior to the invasion of Poland, the Germans added another two rotors (identified IV and V) increasing the different combinations to sixty. The Germans never exchanged these rotors for ones with different wiring for the duration of the war because they firmly believed that the machine was not only unbreakable but also unbroken.

It was Dönitz alone that began to believe that the system had been broken, but he could not convince his supperiors. Initially, a stop gap measure was the introduction of three more rotors (identified VI, VII and VIII) increasing the possible arrangements to 336. These three new rotors, in addition, were designed to advance the rotor to the left twice per revolution instead of the standard once (this was in addition to the middle rotor's 'double step' feature). Only the Kriegsmarine M3 Enigmas received these extra rotors, the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe continued with five for the duration of the war. He was responsible for the introducuction of the M4 Enigma machine with 4 rotors. In the 4 rotor system, the three right most rotors were still selected from rotors I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII the left most rotor being selected from two new rotors identified 'beta' and 'gamma'. The original rotors were not interchangeable with the new rotors because the design was slightly different. The original rotors were designed to be moved in a cyclometer fashion each time the machine encoded a letter. The new rotors were not intended to be moved during an encryption and lacked the means to do so. This use of the rotors increased the rotor arrangement possibilities to 672.

The three rotor machines were at some point provided with an extra reflector, the original being identified 'B' and the new one 'C'. The M4 enigma had with a much thinner reflector than normal (to allow space for the fourth rotor). This increased the arrangement possibilities to 1344. Although still identified as 'B' and 'C', the internal wiring was completely different. One purpose of the different wiring was that if the M4 enigma was set up with the 'B' reflector and the 'beta' fourth rotor set with its 'ringstellung' set to 'A' and actually set so that 'A' is visible in its window, the M4 then functioned as an M3 allowing messages to be exchanged between the two machines. It was this feature that allowed the Bletchley Park codebreakers to break this machine once it was discovered in a machine recovered from a U-boat.

Although spare rotors were available for requisition, the rotors themseves were never replaced with rotors with a different internal wiring, such was the German's misplaced belief that the system was unbreakable.

The Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe were very lax in the manner in which the machine operators selected the three 'random' letters used to encode a further three 'random' letters to be used as the message key. The operators were allowed to use any six letters of their choosing and inevitably patterns emerged where the first three letters (the outside indicator) gave away the actual message key (the inside indicator). 'BER' usually turned out to be 'LIN'. 'LON' usually turned out to be 'DON'. Even Adolf himself got in on the act because 'HIT' would turn out to be 'LER'! The Kriegsmarine adopted a much more disciplined approach where the operators were not allowed to select their own letters, but derive them from bigraph tables where the letters were apparently random.

The Abwehr (German intelligence) used the Enigma-G which was of a substantially different design. Although still a three rotor enigma, it was sufficiently different that in this machine the reflector was rotated in addition to the rotors themselves. The Abwehr were probably the worst offenders at selecting an outside indicator that gave away the inside indicator as the six letters were usually one German obscenity or another. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 11:23, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Timeline

Here's a rough timeline. EINSing needs to be added to this list.
In 1920s, the German military adopted the 3-rotor Enigma. The rotor wiring, the rotor order, the rotor setting were secrets. The Germans thought it was secure, but they still improved it.
-It would have been difficult for the German military to have adopted the machine at this time because...
-In 1923 Arthur Scherbus invents the Enigma machine. It is marketed by the (in English) Cypher Machine Corporation of Berlin. A machine costs the equivalent of $144.
-In 1929, the Poles intercept a commercial Enigma destined for a German company in Warsaw. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
German navy uses Enigma with rotatable reflector; might be commercial Enigman; Poles figure system out from commercial Enigma; Navy switches to "Heimsoeth and Rinke" Enigma (plugboard) used by other German forces in 1931. [2] Glrx (talk) 18:39, 12 June 2013 (UTC)
In 1930, the plugboard was added; it amounted to a limited substitution cipher. Each plug wire could swap two characters.
-In 1931, a 'walk in' German agent, Hans Thilo-Schmid, offers to sell German secrets to French intelligence. These included the Enigma operating manuals and some setting tables. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In 1932, the Poles hired mathematicians to attack the cipher. The Poles developed techniques to determine the rotor wiring and that ignored the plugboard. The Poles exploited weaknesses in how the machine was used.
-In 1933, the Poles experimented with connecting several (Polish made) Enigma machines together to speed up decryption. This ultimately led to the development of the bomba. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
By 1935, the Poles could crack the daily keys in about 15 minutes.
In May 1937, the German navy adopted a better system for indicators. The Poles could no longer read naval Enigma.
Kennbuch started 1 May 1937. Poles broke May 8, 1937, suspected bigram table, but limited insight into system.[3]Glrx (talk) 18:39, 12 June 2013 (UTC)
In Nov 1937, the reflector changed, so the Poles had to develop a new catalog.
In Sep 1938, army and air force indicator procedures changed; no common daily indicator.
Autumn 1938, the Poles developed the bomba which could crack the indicator in about 2 hours. It relied on characters 1-3 being identical to characters 4-6. That test didn't depend upon the plugboard. The bomba would thus determine rotor order and the rotor setting for the current message. The plugboard wiring could then be attacked as a limited simple substitution cipher (where many of the characters were already plaintext: only 10 to 16 characters were steckered). Once the plugboard was figured out, then the Poles knew all the key information for that time period and could decrypt other traffic with an Enigma analog.
-Since three rotors could be inserted six different ways, six bombas were built, one for each rotor arrangement. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In Dec 1938, the army Enigma increased the rotor set to 5. Poles don't have enough Bomby to timely crack messages.
-In fact the poles simply could not afford to build the sixty bomba that were required, both in terms of money or time. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In Jan 1939, plugboard wires went from 8 to 10. (Probably minimal impact on decryption.)
-The Germans considered that the plugboard made analysing the machine much harder. In reality it was hardly any impediment at all. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In Jul 1939, Polish reveal that they broke Enigma to the British, who had been dark to German Enigma.
In Dec 1939, British break into old naval Enigma traffic from Nov 1938. (I think the system was understood, but lacking a complete bigram table meant it could not be exploited.)
In early 1940, navy using 8 rotors.
-Also in early 1940, the British cryptanalysts noticed that the six character indicator string shows more repeated characters than it should have done. For example, a key string might be 'FJRYJV', the repeated 'J' being the same letter encrypted and decrypted. This occured in 1 message in 8 rather than 1 in 169 that probability would dictate. This was a quirk of the way the machine operated - a systematic flaw. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In Feb 1940, U33 gives rotors VI and VII
In Mar 1940, the 'Jeffries sheets' were developed. These simple cartridge paper sheets with holes in allowed the cryptanalysts to exploit the repeated character(s) in the indicator string, though some found them easier to use than others. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In Mar 1940, the British Bombe appears. It was designed for crib cracking (not Polish Bomby indicator matching).
-It relied on another quirk of the Enigma's operation. Messages revealed circular encryption. For example, in a message segment a 'G' might be encrypted as 'P'. Elsewhere in the same segment, a 'P' would be encrypted as 'G'. Some larger examples also appeared. A 'F' might be encrypted as a 'K'; the 'K' in turn encrypted as a 'W' and the 'W' encrypted to 'F' completing the circle. The bombes searched for key settings where these relationships were true. To be strictly accurate (in Turing's words), the bombes searched for all the rotor positions and key settings where the circular relationships were invalid, rejecting them, until a valid setting was found leaving the operators to merely try all the posibilities that were valid, as they were found, until German appeared. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In May 1940, double key discontinued. (Which I think means the Bomby were now useless.)
-Indeed, the bomba would have become useless as did the Jeffries sheets. No one today knows how the Jeffries sheets worked. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
In Mar 1941, commando raid gets naval Enigma keys for February 1941 (but no bigram tables), but the keys allow reconstruction of bigram table.
I think this means there was little chance of naval Enigma being useful for the BotA until April 1941.
In Feb 1942, the 4 rotor machine is introduced. Blackout.
Bowers, Secret History: The Story of Cryptology, page 282, comments on Kahn's assessment of reading Enigma traffic. During the second half of 1941 (when codes were being read) shipping losses were 600,000 tons; second half of 1942 losses were 2,600,000 tons.
http://books.google.com/books?id=EBkEGAOlCDsC&pg=PA282&lpg=PA282&hl=en&sa=X&f=false
Glrx (talk) 19:13, 24 July 2013 (UTC)
In Oct 1942, U-559
-It was this capture that revealed that the 4 rotor machine could function as a 3 rotor. It was quickly discovered that the machine could be cracked with a three rotor bombe, and it was only necessary to try the fourth rotor in each of its 26 positions until intelligible German came out. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
I read that the brits had detected messages earlier than this which must have been from 4 rotor machines used in a three rotor configuration, where it had been accidentally mis-set, so were aware they were being distributed before they came into use.Sandpiper (talk) 18:15, 18 May 2015 (UTC)
In Dec 1942, German naval messages are regularly deciphered. U boat positions; shipping losses decline (in BotA article already).
In May 1943, first US Navy bombe (4-rotor) runs.
By Jul 1943, there were enough US bombes that Banburismus was no longer needed.
-In 1944, the Luftwaffe introduce the 'Uhr' attachement. The device functioned as 13 plugboard leads with a rotary knob that changed the way the plugs were wired together. The Luftwaffe believed that it would considerably complicate analysis. In reality it made almost no difference. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
Glrx (talk) 16:43, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Apologies for breaking Wikipedia protocol and inserting my comments in your post, but I believed that it better preserved the timeline. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:30, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

theatre covering thousands of square miles of ocean

In the intro above contents box, it strikes me that 1000 sq miles is 33x33 miles which in fact does not seem that much in naval terms. A bit like the evil guy in Goldmember movie talking about millions of dollars (instead of billions). Maybe leave out "square"? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hvaltonen (talk • contribs) 02:33, 18 November 2013 (UTC)

Spelling and date format

This article was started in American English but arguably it is a British topic. Should we be in British or American English here? --John (talk) 05:35, 10 June 2014 (UTC)

It's also arguably an American topic, as well as a Canadian topic (and both predominantly after 1941) - I'd say there's no good reason to choose one variety over another, apart from retaining the original. Parsecboy (talk) 12:36, 10 June 2014 (UTC)
To me the noticeable issue was not really spelling, but the use of mdy dates instead of dmy. I have adjusted the title of this section to expand the topic and started a subsection below. It is possible that my lack of prominently noticing the American/British English issue is a result of it being in American English. At this time, I have not formed an opinion as to the spelling issue. — Makyen (talk) 14:10, 10 June 2014 (UTC)

Date format

I only recently read the entire article. After reading a few others on similar topics, it was strange to come to this article and change to reading mdy dates. It seams that dmy is appropriate here. Obviously, the US association is with both civilian and military, but the connection to the US military makes the leaning towards mdy much more tenuous. I would suggest changing to dmy throughout. In my opinion, dmy is more appropriate.

After checking, it does appear that the article started with mdy dates. — Makyen (talk) 14:10, 10 June 2014 (UTC)

Standard practice in modern American military-related articles (which certainly includes this article) is to use DMY, since that's what the US Navy used at the time. It also makes quite a bit of sense since this is of course an international topic and just about anyone with a bit of sense uses DMY (not to insert my opinion too much ;) Parsecboy (talk) 14:49, 10 June 2014 (UTC)
Agreed that dmy is appropriate. See Wikipedia:WikiProject NATO/Conventions#Dates. --TedColes (talk) 15:06, 10 June 2014 (UTC)
@Parsecboy: Can we please stay away from comments about which format is inherently "better", or that only people without any sense use X. Such comments are inherently divisive. Most people are going to prefer the format with which they are most familiar. For the vast majority of people that will be the format which they were taught as children and which they saw continuously while they were growing up and, likely, by which they remain surrounded in their environment. In my opinion, it is very inappropriate to denigrate someone for the environment in which they were raised. Further, which format is generally "better" has nothing to do with the current discussion.
WikiProjects establish their desired styles for many different things. While their desires should be considered, the controlling guidelines are at WP:STRONGNAT and WP:DATERET.
The arguments for mdy include:
  • The article was establish and has been developed with the mdy format (WP:DATERET).
  • There are non-military ties to the US (WP:STRONGNAT) (moderate and conflicted).
The arguments for dmy include:
— Makyen (talk) 16:20, 10 June 2014 (UTC)
Jeez, it was a joke, buddy. Relax. Parsecboy (talk) 16:22, 10 June 2014 (UTC)
As for your substantive points for MDY:
  1. RETAIN is trumped when there are strong national ties.
  2. The US civilian ties to the topic are negligible compared to the US military, and that of course ignores the fact that the US can lay claim to about a 25% share at best (along with Canadians, Brits, and Germans, all of whom use DMY - not to mention the French and Italians who also had significant roles). Parsecboy (talk) 17:08, 10 June 2014 (UTC)

South Atlantic

Link added with details of the official entrance of Brasi in the war, plus Morison's 1947 ("History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic") excerpt visualization on google books. 177.68.18.206 (talk) 01:18, 24 July 2015 (UTC)

The link to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force is OT to Brazil's declaration of war. The cite of Morrison doesn't explain the unclarity, & the linked page doesn't contain the information, so it's unhelpful, too. For both these reasons, I've rv'd (& will continue to, since the problems aren't addressed). TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 16:09, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
Well, here (in Talk page) you say that the explanation in Morison's reference FOR YOU was unclear (without specifying how such "unclarity" of Your personal point of view could be a general public perception), while in the historic review of the article, in the justification for revert, you said that you was unable to see the visualization of Book excerpt, and worse, to justify your reverting, you insinuated that the googeBooks viewing of a book in English (which is already available in the "bibliography section" of the article) could be in Portuguese. WTF? After all, with all this contradiction, which of your "explanations" we should consider to analyze? 177.68.18.206 (talk) 16:46, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
♠Getting pissed off isn't helping...
Perceptions... I don't know where you saw it in me, but I can say the same with respect to you ;)
♠When I used the link before, I got "page not included in preview"--in Portugese (or Spanish). It's working, now. It's no more helpful, however, since Morrison doesn't say if he means coastal convoy or something else, so your citing him & deleting the tag, rather than actually answering the issue, is a fail.
You are making several assumptions here, so let's do it by steps:
When Morison comes to "suitable for scorts", he uses it related to "aircraft" And "minelayers" (not only for minelayers as is now on the article), he didn't also wrote long or short scorts, he just wrote "scorts" (of which he speaks over the chapter mentioned in the reference).
Since for example the general public may not know the utility of minelayer ships in the anti-submarine warfare, I propose that text should be fixed, besides the right use of word "scort" (without assumptions) After "minelayers" And "aircraft", by also adding a link to "minelayer ship"
♠Furthermore, linking to the BEF is a non-starter, since it wasn't the BEF that declared war, it was the government of Brazil. I see no reason for a link to the BEF, nor how there's a logical connection to the declaration of war in linking to it.
Again, this specific link is to the Section "Overview" at BEF Article, not to BEF Article as whole, since right there, there are the antecedents in more detail, of which led to the declaration of war. Anyway, it is a link which I won't die for.
♠As for "my confusion", if you'd bothered to actually read what I wrote in the first instance, we wouldn't be here. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 18:16, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
If you had been clear from the beginning about your doubts (and even now I'm not sure if I got your doubts regarding the reference discussed), for sure! Anyway, as you see, the clarity goes for everyone! ;) 152.250.14.208 (talk) 20:35, 24 July 2015 (UTC)

I've protected the page for three days, you both need to stop edit-warring and solve this issue here, not in edit summaries. Consider that a gentle warning. Parsecboy (talk) 19:02, 24 July 2015 (UTC)

♠"If you had been clear from the beginning" I presumed a "clarify" tag with an explanation would at least get somebody to read it...
♠Linking to minelayers doesn't address the issue; it's still not clear if ocean or coastal convoy escort is meant, & from the source, it's not clear, either. (BTW, I do know what a minelayer is, which is why it's not clear; they make pretty awful deep-water escorts.)
Again, as in the original text there is no mention on scorts range, the confusion here is about the permanence of the term "long escort" after minelayer, Unlike the original text, which is after "aircraft". In the article there is "long", when at original there is simply "escort", when if a assumption, if any, was about to arise, it should be (even so freely) for BOTH (minelayer and aircraft), ie generic Or just for planes, but never for minelayers only.
♠Linking to the overview at BEF is still a link to the BEF page, which has damn all to do with the gov't of Brazil declaring war. It's misleading at best.
What part of my above explanation on this point, didn't you understand to cite it here again?
♠"Without assumptions"? That doesn't address the issue of unclarity at all...which is why I tagged it in the first place.
Read the explanation bellow
♠When Morrison refers to escort, he refers to both minelayers & a/c, talking about modern equipment & better training. He says not one word about what type of convoy he has in mind. It might be clarified in the rest of the text on the Brazilian Navy, or he might be presuming "minelayer" ="coastal convoy". That's the presumption I'd make, but Morison doesn't say, so my presumption can't go in. Since I haven't read the full text, IDK; since you cited it, I presumed you had read it. Was I wrong? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 20:46, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
Some things here again, first (see above) he cites "minelayer" then "aircraft", and lastly "escorts". After, along the chapter he details some intercontinental naval convoys, citing aircraft participations and not minelayer, now you guess why I'm against the passage after "minelayer" and not after "planes" (as in the book), especially if fixed with a comma after the word "minelayer", since it is clear that the author in this stretch, simply talk about "escorts". 152.250.14.208 (talk) 22:55, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
♠"when at original there is simply "escort", when if a assumption, if any, was about to arise, it should be (even so freely) for BOTH (minelayer and aircraft), ie generic" I have no idea what that means.
Well, why is this not surprise me? When a person doesn't want to "understand" something, it is virtually impossible to make such person understand. Which part you didn't understood about the author at no time wrote what is in the present article text, regarding the minelayer?
♠"now you guess why I'm against the passage after "minelayer" and not after "planes" (as in the book), especially if fixed with a comma after the word "minelayer", since it is clear that the author in this stretch, simply talk about "escorts"." I really have very little idea what this means, either. It's evident your first language isn't English, however.
Here we see a very common tactic for despaired people without argument and substance, when someone try to change the subject, at the same time betake form over substance, in an attempt to attract the sympathy of others, betting on their ignorance and prejudice.
♠"What part of my above explanation on this point, didn't you understand to cite it here again?" What part of my objection do you not understand? After I've stated it at least twice, now.
I'll repeat, perhaps this time, your English enable you to understand (with bold letters at the end): Again, this specific link is to the Section "Overview" at BEF Article, not to BEF Article as whole, since right there, there are the antecedents in more detail, of which led to the declaration of war. Anyway, it is a link which I won't die for.
♠"along the chapter he details some intercontinental naval convoys, citing aircraft participations and not minelayer" Which appears to support the proposition I offered before: namely, Morison's reference to minelayers is meaning coastal convoys & not blue water escort. Where, exactly, is he talking about "intercontinental naval convoys"? That page (or those pages) would clear up the issue.
From Caribe to Brazil, for example Page 387
♠Which does leave your insistence on attaching the BEF, & not the government of Brazil, to declaring war... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:10, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
Again, this specific link is to the Section "Overview" at BEF Article, not to BEF Article as whole, since right there, there are the antecedents in more detail, of which led to the declaration of war. Anyway, it is a link which I won't die for. 152.250.14.208 (talk) 06:10, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
♠Morison, p.386, talks about Bahia-Trinidad convoys, which are effectively coastal; when the protection expires, I intend to change & clarify on that basis. I also intend to rv the BEF, for my stated reason--unless you've changed your mind. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:29, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
Referring to the BEF link, I repeat that I don't bother with it, although I reaffirm the reasons (explained above) of why I used it.
But I suggest that the Morison's quote regarding Brazil's entry into the war, be put back as (for example, without the BEF link): "...even before Brazil's declaratioon of war on 22 August 1942, which was of great importance to the Battle given its stature and strategic position at South Atlantic.{ref} Morison, 1947. Page 376 {ref}"
Regarding Morison's mention of "escorts", again it seems that he meant it in general, both Coastal as Transoceanic ones. It is likely he has not been explicit in this volume, because it may was obvious to him and experts of that time, the adaptation of minelayers for anti-submarine warfare, both on the coast, as auxiliary vessels for transoceanic convoys;
since for example, he describes in another volume "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Operations in North Africa Waters ", the use of minelayers in such function, eg. in pág.176 on 2 convoys between the US and Morocco. So, when he spoke about escort, probably he meant the two types, especially considering that Brazilian Navy then as part of the 4th fleet, was not restricted to the Caribbean and the Brazilian coast. It mainly acted there, but not exclusively (the clarification on escorts types, that I think should be placed, if any). 152.250.14.208 (talk) 18:36, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
Can you link to that? I'd like to see if he actually says "transoceanic" or just mentions MLs on escort as part of a system of convoys (as he does in ref the Brazil convoys). Because if he expressly says MLs were blue water escorts, I'd be astonished. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 02:40, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
Looking at this, I see only two reference to minelayers doing anything, one in connection with a USN task force, the other on a convoy of LCIs. I see no mention whatever of them being on broad escort duty for merchant convoys, & certainly not routine deep water use, which is about what I expected. In which case, IMO, the cited edit stands. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 02:53, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
Specifically on the section referring Brazilian Navy convoys, you are infering yours thoughts over what author wrote, going beyond not only the scope of an encyclopedic article (ie summary with readings indications) but at expenses of what the quoted author himself wrote.
Since he wrote escorts, without mentioning a specific type, it must be respected, mainly when apart the justifications above (as ships' conversions and adaptations), he used minelayers and aircrafts, as examples of tools among others of a Navy which also had destroyers, destroyers escorts, trawelers, submarine chasers in greater number than its minelayers, among others war ships... - see for example Pettibone, 2014 ISBN 9781490733869 "The organization and order of battle of militaries in WWII, Volume IX" p.454-55. For one phrase about convoys done by Brazilian Navy in WWII, One may add or use other authors, like English, Adrian J. 1984 ISBN 0710603215 "Armed forces of Latin America: their histories, development, present strength, and military potential" p.10 and 92, for example - but the effect will be the same, since this one as others also talk about escorts (in the plural) at South Atlantic, generically. Thus, a resolution to the phrase can be eg., reminding Pettibone, instead of quoting "minelayer" name "Warships" and keep "escorts" without specification and in the plural. 189.79.120.182 (talk) 06:30, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
♠"you are infering yours thoughts over what author wrote" Did you not read what Morrison actually wrote? He specifically says the convoys out of Trinidad to anywhere but Brazil used other escort types. He does not say Brazilian minelayers were used on deep-water duty. And, unlike you, I know (frex) Canadian minelayers were not used for deep-water duty. Therefore, since Morrison does not contradict that inference, it's safe to presume, since he knows it better than I do, that is, indeed, what he meant. I can't help it you don't know any better.
♠"Since he wrote escorts, without mentioning a specific type" Did you not read what Morrison actually wrote? He specifically named minelayers on the very page for the link you relied on as your source in the first place. And you were the one trying to say minelayers were being used as deep-ocean escorts, which is not borne out by what Morrison actually says. And since you wanted to name minelayers, & the source you cited isn't supporting you, you want to change it to a term that's less accurate? Am I going to have to get them from interlibrary loan just to prove they don't say what you claim, either? Or will you accept that minelayers in Brazilian service were never used as deep-ocean escorts based on Morrison? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 09:30, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
In reality you Again is infering of an author, from a term, your own conclusions; again: he wrote escorts, without mentioning a specific type, so it should be respected,
mainly when apart the justifications above (as ships' conversions and adaptations), he used minelayers and aircrafts, as examples of tools among others of a Navy which also had destroyers, destroyers escorts, trawelers, submarine chasers in greater number than its minelayers, among others war ships... - see for example Pettibone, 2014 ISBN 9781490733869 "The organization and order of battle of militaries in WWII, Volume IX" p.454-55. For one phrase about convoys done by Brazilian Navy in WWII, One may add other authors, since them contrary to what you said also talk about escorts (in the plural) at South Atlantic, generically.
I mean, you made a good improvement in the section, when instead of your previous times, rather than simply delete the Morrison stretch that talked about the importance of the official entry of Brazil in the war, you summed up well the strategic importance of this, not clashing with what the author said.
But to other phrase, still it seems you see the tree not the forest, haven't realized that when the author speaks of the adaptation/conversion of minelayers and aircraft, he does it within a general context of escorts. Thus, a resolution to the phrase can be eg., reminding Pettibone, instead of quoting "minelayer" name "Warships" and keep "escorts" without specification and in the plural. 189.79.120.182 (talk) 15:45, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
♠"haven't realized that when the author speaks of the adaptation/conversion of minelayers and aircraft, he does it within a general context of escorts" Garbage. If Morrison had meant the Brazilian Navy had or was using any other type but minelayer, or on anything but coastal convoys, he would damn well have said so. He was a professional sailor first. He understood the difference, which you clearly don't. Not to mention, the Brazilian Navy was not notoriously a blue-water force even after WW2, let alone before; perhaps you'd like to provide a source for it even having destroyers before or during WW2.
♠Moreover, when the source specifically says something that doesn't accord with what you want it to say, you want to change it to fit your preconceptions. What I have said all along, & what the source supports, is, Brazilian minelayers were used on coastal convoys. If you want it to say anything else, you're going to need more than you've got, because Morison, I suggest, is more authoritative than the rest. (I'll bet none of them actually contradicts him, either.) It sounds to me as if you don't like admitting or accepting there were limits on Brazil's participation. Get over it.
♠As for the generic use of "escorts", read what Morison actually wrote. He's talking about minelayers generally as escort vessels. (I'm less sure he means to include a/c in that.) They did serve as escorts--for coastal convoys; that's what Morison expressly says. They didn't serve as deep ocean escorts for convoys generally, not in the Brazilian Navy & not in any navy I'm aware of, & there is nothing in Morison saying they did. (Two instances as part of a task force deployment are not "general use" by the wildest stretch of imagination. Nor, you'll notice, were those Brazilian minelayers anyhow.)
♠All this being true, your desire to change what the page says to support your preconceptions, or your desires, fails the test of what the source says. I imagine none of the other sources actually support you, either. I'd prefer not to have to interlibrary loan them to prove your ignorance, but if you insist... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:03, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
"perhaps you'd like to provide a source for it even having destroyers before or during WW2." In case you have not noticed selectively (again), they are listed above ;)
"Moreover, when the source specifically says something that doesn't accord with what you want it to say, you want to change it to fit your preconceptions." This is precisely the description of your own behavior in relation to the stretch under discussion (again)
"It sounds to me as if you don't like admitting or accepting there were limits on Brazil's participation. Get over it." Why not surprise me that this is the exact impression I have of you? Again, you not only is seeing, as trying to impute your behavior on other...
"He's talking about minelayers generally as escort vessels." Where, in this stretch? "(I'm less sure he means to include a/c in that.)" Inference...
"change what the page says to support "your" preconceptions, or your desires, fails the test of "what the source says" ", And Again here you seeing and trying to impute your behavior on other. 189.79.120.182 (talk) 18:42, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

So far, you've gone out of your way to impugn my motives, ignore clear & simple requests for information, try to change the standards being used, & ignore what the source (a source you provided) actually says. So why don't you go read Morison, pp376-86, actually read it, & see if you can find the vaguest mention of Brazilian Navy minelayers in deep ocean. You can't, because it isn't there. Unlike you, I've actually read it. Then, why don't you use the link to Morison, the link you provided, & find the references to minelayers in North African waters; find me exactly where it says any one of them was Brazilian. You can't, because there isn't one. Unlike you, I've actually read it. Your proposition somebody else's minelayers somehow became Brazilian didn't support you, so you decided you needed to change from minelayers. Sorry, but no. And what Morison says about aircraft isn't about "escort", it's about maritime patrol, which, if you were less ignorant, you'd know is not the same thing at all. As for my views, they haven't changed, & I've held a constant view of what Morison says & means all along, unlike you; you've tried moving the goalposts at every opportunity. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 19:37, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

It seems that you trapped yourself;
First; "what Morison says about aircraft isn't about "escort", it's about maritime patrol..." Well, it could even be about what he meant, but it was not what he left written... Anyway, in the case you've forgotten, the "clarification" about main aircrafts function in the stretch was not done by you ;)
"the references to minelayers in North African waters; find me exactly where it says any one of them was Brazilian." The mentioned example of conversions/adaptations is to say that if a Navy did it, nothing forbid it to others. He used minelayers and aircrafts, as examples of tools among others of a Navy which also had destroyers, destroyers escorts, trawelers, submarine chasers in greater number than its minelayers, among others war ships... (Again see for example, the mentioned above Pettibone, 2014, among the other ones). On this sentence, you continue seeing the tree not the forest, haven't realizing that when he speaks of the adaptation/conversion of minelayers and aircrafts, he does it within a general context of escorts.
And from where I concluded it? Simple: from the very phrase written by Morrison himself, refreshing your memory: ""(Brazil) had an excellent small Navy, including several modern minelayers and planes which only needed modern equipment and training to be suitable for escorts." Again: he wrote "INCLUDING", not "ONLY". And (again) he didn't also wrote long or short scorts, he just wrote "scorts". Deal with it!
"if you were less ignorant, you'd know is not the same thing at all." About this pathetic attempt to ad hominem (again), there is nothing to comment on, since whenever you are caught without counterargument you play such trumpet, without success. What is not surprising, since above you already had tried to disqualify contrary referenced arguments, based on the "authority argument", and to worse your case, on a self-proclaimed "authority". First, as linguist, now as the only and infallible interpreter of authors' thoughts.
Thus, I prefer keep myself civilly sticked to the issue. 189.79.120.182 (talk) 21:40, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
I'm done wasting my time trying to reason with you. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 21:53, 6 August 2015 (UTC)
The problem, as shown above (including the quote in full of author, in bold) is that on this phrase, you have done everything except reasoning.
Thus, due to all exposed above, and so far in the absence of undoubted counter-arguments, I suggest again a resolution to the phrase beyond the mentioned above, another one, which have more to do with the above full quote: "Although small, Brazilian Navy had warships* and aircrafts which only needed modern equipment and training to be suitable for patrols and escorts", with aditional adding of Pettibone at *. 189.79.120.182 (talk) 22:26, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

I just checked the sources here. Morrison clearly only refers to minelayers, not "warships", and Pettibone's book is self published and so not a reliable source. I've blocked the IP for edit warring. Nick-D (talk) 05:19, 7 August 2015 (UTC)

♠For clarity's sake, for anybody else reading this: Morison, as a professional sailor, would have identified the most important ship types in Brazil's navy. If she'd had battleships or cruisers, he'd have said so; if she'd had destroyers, the same. He didn't. He mentioned minelayers. (IIRC from what I've read of him {I haven't read all 14 vol}, he tells off the most important types involved at every point.) Moreover, that being about as good as it got for Brazil fits what (small amount) I've read. If there are good sources refuting (or amplifying) Morison, I'd welcome seeing them.
♠As to a/c "escorting", they don't, so that claim is based in ignorance. (Nor does Morison say they were used in that fashion; his phrasing is ambiguous, but he'd know this, & probably presume his readers did, too.) Any claim for it needs an unambiguous statement.
♠As to "nothing forbidding", that's pure WP:OR (or pure fantasy). Minelayers as part of a task force sortie is a far cry from minelayers on blue water escort of civilian ships. Brazil doing it needs an unambiguous statement by Morison (or somebody). TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:02, 7 August 2015 (UTC)
"Morrison clearly only refers to minelayers, not "warships" As reminded above, he wrote: "(Brazil) had an excellent small Navy, including several modern minelayers and planes which only needed modern equipment and training to be suitable for escorts." ie; he wrote "INCLUDING", not "ONLY". And (again) he didn't also wrote long or short scorts, he just wrote "scorts". As well as, by the way if everything must be taken at fire and sword, too literally with any inferences not allowed, "maritime patrol" should not include too, since that is not present in the original quote. Besides the other part has abused of personal attacks, as of "authority argument", a self-proclaimed "authority", first as linguist, after as an infallible interpreter; both in the talk page, as in the edit justifications windows. I must also remind all you of this.
"Pettibone's book is self published and so not a reliable source. " If Trafford Publishing is in the black list, no problem here since the information about Brazilian warships during WWII appear in other publications, both mentioned above, as those contained in the bibliography of article itself, just change the reference accordingly. 189.121.138.15 (talk) 15:22, 8 August 2015 (UTC)

Well, well, well, returning from a onesided block, I note that given the silence after the repetition of my considerations by the IP above, it seems that finally my point was understood. So, summing up the discussion on the South Atlantic section so far:

First, I justified the inclusion of one link to a section of Brazilian Expeditionary Force Article, due the linked section explains in details the Brazil's entry into the war, but I recognized that such link was not fundamental, so I consensually gave up of such link.
After, I clarified that there was no justification for simply delete the stretch where Morrison spoke about the strategic importance of Brazil's entry into the war. After some days of discussion (including personal attacks on me, here and in the justification windows of Article revision history), the other part agreed (without even mention such unjustified deletion along the discussion).
Now it seems that after some weeks of discussion (idem ibidem), we finally came to the consensus on the very point that, "Mostly" (about Escorts types) and "Including" (about minelayers) doesn't mean "Exclusively"; apart inferences have their limits and don't provide double standards. 189.79.153.212 (talk) 18:19, 9 August 2015 (UTC)

I've just blocked the IP editor for renewed edit warring, and pretending in the above post to be two different people. Nick-D (talk) 08:03, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

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