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Eye witness account of the battle

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this is totally manipulated indian version of the war. needs lot of improvement as it is giving impression that indians omen in the sky. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 202.63.222.175 (talk) 13:57, 26 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Please note that Lt Gen Irshad A Khan was the Commander of I Corps. Lt Gen Tikka Khan was Commander of II Corps in Multan. Even Col Brian Cloughley's recent History of the Pakistan Army contains this error. Lt Gen Irshad Khan was charged with this loss of territiory by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry. He had previously served as GOC Quetta and as Director Military Intelligence (DMI) at GHQ during the 1965 war.

Thanks. Corrected the same with sources. Idleguy 17:55, 17 October 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I dispute this article as it is providing false information to honor the Indian Army. The strenght of the Indian army was more than stated and therefore they were not "outnumber".

This was in I Corps (Pakistan) Operational area pre-war. However on December 1st, I Corps ( 4 divisions) lost its armoured division (6 Armour Div) to the group commanded by 23 Infantry Div, (the group at Chamb). In addition 17 Infantry Div was sent to Kashmir. As a result the Pakistan side had 2 divs, viz the 8 and 15 Infantry divs. They had two indepndent armoured brigades attached as well as an ad hoc formation, the Changez Force, which cosnsited 20 Lancers, 33 Cav and 29 Punjab if memory serves.

The action at Basantar (called Barapind-Jarpal by Pakistan) was part of a series of actions in the Shakargarh salient. It was not the entire battle. Whats more it took place on the last day of the war December 17th and was fought between 8 Indpt Armd Brig (Pakistan) and the 54 th Mountain Div (India). The Pakistani foces managed to dislodge the Indians, but suffered horrendous casualties, 13 lancers was reduced to 6 tanks (out of 45). It has often been called pakistan's version of the charge of the light brigade.

The Indian plan was to close the Shakargarh salient. In that they failed (like at Chawinda in 1965). They did capture territory in the area, but the maximum advance was 13 kms. Part of the reason was that the Pakistani breakthrough at Chamb prevented the Indian forces at Akhnur (10 Div I beleive) from moving from the norther portion of the salient.

This article needs a lot of attention.

WikiProject class rating

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This article was automatically assessed because at least one WikiProject had rated the article as start, and the rating on other projects was brought up to start class. BetacommandBot 17:26, 9 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Edit request from 221.120.249.18, 8 September 2010

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{{editsemiprotected}} Battle of Basanter or Battle of Shakargarh (3rd December—16th December 1971) Pakistan Side True Story Narrated by Eyewitness.

Military History must be based on facts; it is the duty of military historians to narrate factual accounts of battle fields and wars for the future generations who want to be military history students. All such accounts must give honest and unbiased details. Battle of Basanter or better known by Pakistan Army “Battle of Shakargarh” was planned by Commander 1 Corps Pakistan Army as “Mobile Defense” whereby Shakargarh and Zafarwal were organized in to strong points, area between these two small but strategic towns was heavily mined In three strips (1) along the main international border line (2) along line of defense held by covering troops (3) along main defenses, whereas main defensive line was established along Zafarwal--Shakargarh--Narowal Road. The Corps was poised to lure-in Indian troops steadily in the killing zone and then launch a strong counter attack with a view to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. To lure-in, rear guards equal to an Armored Brigade was formed with a name and style of Changez Force which consisted of mainly reconnaissance elements (20 Lancers) and covering troops (33 Cavalry), 33 Cavalry (Commanded by Lt. Col Abdul Rehman) was deployed along the home side of mine field-2, ‘A’ Squadron (Commanded by Major Alamdar Hussain who later commanded 33 Cavalry) was positioned on the right bank of Basanter river (West), ‘B’ Squadron (Commanded by Major Shah Zaman Haider Gorgani) on the left bank of Basanter river, in the centre, and ‘C’ Squadron (Commanded by Major Zarif Malik who later commanded 33 Cavalry) towards East, covering right flank of B Squadron. On the outbreak of war 0n 3rd December’ 1971, reconnaissance troops did some good shooting and were ordered to withdraw to an intermediary position on 4th December’ 1971 after sunset. When Indians saw a withdrawl they cautiously followed however met mine field which they tried to breach using mine sweeper tank but this tank was hit by precise shooting by C Squadron 33 Cavalry thus this attempt was frustrated. On 5th December , during early hours one Indian tank came giving broad side along the minefield at a range of about 1200 yards and one young amour officer of the rank of Lieutenant came out probably to examine the mined area ( This officer was later identified as Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal of Puna Horse),defense of this area was the responsibility of B Squadron 33 Cavalry which was being commanded by a decorated soldier Major Shah Zaman Haider Gorgani, who was in position at village Chakrra, the Indian officer was well in range to be destroyed along with his tank but Squadron Commander ordered to fire warning shots only, on watching Heavy Machine Gun fire, he better opted to save his life by fleeing away in his tank. Similar probing activities were performed all along this area defended by 33 Cavalry, where every time when Indian troops tried to pose aggressive gesture they were pushed back. At 1500 hours (3PM) same day Indians launched a tank regimental size attack on Chakrra village position through a forest corridor with a view to capture Chakrra village, there was a fierce tank battle for about 30 minutes, heavy casualties were inflicted on Indians who after fighting and losing four leading tanks withdrew hurriedly. In this battle a tank commander of B Squadron Daffadar Rafique lost his life while fighting tank battle very bravely. As a matter of fact this was the biggest tank battle fought in that area during which Indians suffered humiliating defeat and never again attempted to attack again from that direction. The Chakrra village battle accounts were later heard on Indian radio by Indian officers narrating that “it was an anti tank obstacle defended strongly by B squadron 33 Cavalry”. Indians kept trying to breach Pakistani defenses but failed suffering casualties, covering troops had orders to hold the Indians until 10th December’ 1971, everything went as per plan, on night 9-10th December’ 71, Indians launched a massive Brigade attack at night led by an infantry Battalion supported by a tank regiment firing from Basanter River right bank (West) and whole Indian Corps Artillery bombarding Chakrra village positions. B Squadron Commander along with his squadron fought a gallant battle thus containing the attack. At mid night, orders from 1 Corps Headquarters were received to withdraw and fall back to a designated intermediary position. All the covering troops carried out well organized fall back and took up positions on intermediary line of defense. Indian forces were following and actually being sucked in as planned by the Corps. On 10th December’ 33Cavalry was holding intermediary line of defense having A Squadron deployed across Basanter River, B Squadron holding central and pivotal positions and C Squadron towards North East (Covering Right Flank of B Squadron). Indians were in position but did not try to undertake any adventure because they knew such posture could have been very fatal for them. At dusk covering troops received orders to fall back to main line of defense behind Zafarwal—Shakargarh Road, 33 Cavalry conducted very organized withdrawl and fell back to the main defense line. Reconnaissance elements (20 Lancers) had already fallen back to the main defense line on orders. Indian troops carefully and slowly advanced and came in contact with main line of defense for the first time. After reaching here, Indians took up positions, consolidating defenses and tried to make a wedge near BaraPind (It was part of planned killing zone) when 8 Armored Brigade was ordered to launch a counter attack. A tank regiment size bold attack was launched that inflicted heavy casualties on to Indians and also made an end to any future aggressive design in this area. During the attack Pakistan side also suffered losses. During these actions starting from 3rd December, any military history student would know that Indians did not capture an inch of Pakistan’s territory with their own aggressive actions; all was done as per 1 Corps plan. On sensing stalemate position, Commander Indian 1 Corps decided to divert efforts towards Shakargarh. As mentioned earlier Shakargarh had been turned into strong point and was being defended by 14 Para Brigade Group. Defense posture was along Bein River ( A tributary of River Ravi) in the North and North-East of Shakargarh, Indians had their armour also deployed there, whereas 14 Para Brigade didn’t have armour support until 12th December’ 1971; when Commander 1 Corps (Pakistan) ordered B Squadron 33Cavalry to be in support of 14 Para Brigade. On evening of same day B Squadron was in position in Shakargarh, at night Indians tried to breach the Bein river mine field, using a mine sweeper tank supported by infantry and sappers, with a view to penetrate in to defenses from Eastern direction by crossing Bein River, mine sweeper was knocked out by B Squadron and very high casualties were suffered by Indians, Indians withdrew leaving dozens of men dead in the mine field. On night 13th December Indians again attempted to penetrate just East of Shakargarh town but B Squadron along with 27FF Infantry Battalion (Commanded by a competent soldier Lt. Col Iqbal) defeated the attack. B Squadron Commander started armoured patrolling along the defenses and wherever Indian tanks tried to show aggressive gesture they were pushed back. On 14th December, Indians launched a fresh Infantry Brigade size attack led by 3/9 Gorkha Battalion this time crossing Bein River from North and North-East of Shakargarh, by mid night they had gained some foot hold in Chitrana forest, Commander 14 Para Brigade summoned B Squadron commander and ordered him to restore positions in support of 19 FF infantry Battalion, responsible to defend that area. 19 FF was being commanded by a decorated very brave soldier Lt. Col Shafique Ahmed (Later retired as General Officer). B Squadron commander gave the responsibility of this famous and very courageous charge to Capt Kazim Hussain, troop leader (Commanded 33 cavalry later), who demonstrated extreme bravery during counter attack. B Squadron Commander led the troop to 19 FF locations and after carrying out consultation with 19FF Battalion Commander, decided to launch tank and infantry assault on to Indians penetrators at night 14/15 December. First time in Pakistan Armoured Corps history night counter attack by tanks supported by small size infantry force, was launched in a forest. Indians were completely caught by surprise because they did not expect any tank night assault that too in a forest, their 60 men with wounded company commander Major Survay (He lost his arm in battle) and other officers were captured and made POWs, a sizeable number of Indian men were killed. The defense line was restored and area up to Bein River was secured. After suffering humiliating and historical defeat in Shakargarh sector, on 16th December’ before cease fire was announced Indians tried another desperate effort to breach the main Zafarwal—Shakargrh defense in an effort to have last hour some gain. Commanding Officer 33 Cavalry ordered B Squadron commander to strengthen the main defense line near Dussri village, B Squadron Commander detailed a troop commanded by Lieutenant Wajahat and led it to the positions, some ferocious tank gun fire was exchanged that frustrated any Indians designs to make last hour gains in the main defense when cease fire was declared and all hostilities came to a halt. It is a historical fact that can be confirmed/ varified from record that large numbers of Indians were captured; made POWs and dozens of them lost their lives only in battles around Shakargarh town and Chitrana forest. An Indian tall claim about the number of captured and destroyed tanks is false, baseless and unverifiable. Indian soldiers captured in the battle and made POWs were around 100 in numbers and killed in the battle field in dozens.

Controversy on operational plan of 1 Corps Pakistan:

A lot has been said and discussed about 1 Corps operational plan of 1971 war in Shakargarh sector. Military analysts are of the view that Indo-Pak wars are always of limited durations thus mobile defense does not suit particularly in Punjab with heavy built up areas and thick population. Mobile defense operations require vast grounds where long maneuvers are possible for counter attacks. In indo-Pak war scenarios, forces that make initial advances/ gains keep the territories, very difficult to dislodge them in limited war durations. 1 Corps had heavy amour force available, an Armoured Division and 8 Armoured Brigade which had almost division plus strength and was a formidable force, if it had the opportunity to be launched properly, it could have been devastating for the Indian forces. Unfortunately both these formations, as force, were not utilized properly. If, instead of luring-in enemy, aggressive posture was adopted by entering in to Indian territories and fighting battles there thus cutting LOC to Jammu & Kashmir also threatening Indian base at Pathankot; could have changed military history of 1971 war in Western Sector. In the present plan, all the territories were given to Indians in plate without fighting in the name of “Luring-In” and when opportunity came for counter attack at BaraPind, a poorly planned weak and limited counter attack was launched which was fatal. Instead; a full fledged strong counter attack with a view to destroy all the enemy that had been lured-in was needed which was not done thus failing in the very purpose of planned “Mobile Defense”.


Gorgani (talk) 15:04, 21 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Thanks, Stickee (talk) 15:17, 21 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

incorrect figures

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the figures of destroyed and captured tanks r incorrect. only 80 pakistani tanks took part in this battle in the form of 31 cavalry and 13 lancers. pakistani losses were just 38 tanks destroyed;28 of 13 lancers and 10 of 31 cavalry. indians claimed to hav detroyed 47 tanks and accepted the loss of 23 tanks. correct the figures admin. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 119.156.17.20 (talk) 12:03, 16 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]

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