Talk:Battle for Narva Bridgehead/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Battlefield terrain

The town of Narva is situated along the river of the same name. In 1944, the river stretched from Lake Peipus northward to the Gulf of Finland. The corridor of land from Lake Peipus to the coast is about 45 kilometers wide, creating a natural choke-point for military operations. The terrain is predominately low-lying with the highest areas being around 100 meters in elevation. Much of the land is swamp and cut by numerous waterways, with other areas heavily forested. This combination of aspects meant the land was by and large well-suited for defense as the waterways, swamps, and forests tend to channelize an attacker’s movements.

For both sides, from the first day, the struggle focused on securing bridgeheads across the Narva River. The German defense line included the bridgehead on the east side of the river across from the town of Narva, while the Soviet 2nd Shock Army held bridgeheads both north and south of the town of Narva. One of their southern bridgeheads would grow large enough to hold six rifle corps.

Formation of the bridgeheads

On January 14, 1944, the Soviet Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts launched operations aimed at forcing the German Field Marshal Georg von Küchler's Army Group North back from its positions near Oranienbaum. On the third day of the offensive, the Soviets broke through German lines and pushed westward. By February 1, the 2nd Shock Army's 109th Rifle Corps had captured Kingisepp. SS General Felix Steiner's III SS Corps brought up the rear, fighting many bloody rearguard actions until it finally reached the positions on the eastern bank of the Narva. Likewise, the Soviet 43rd Rifle Corps reached Narva river, establishing a shallow bridgehead across it 5 km north of Narva town at Kudruküla on February 2, 1944. Soon, the infantry of 166th Rifle Regiment joined them. The SS Brigadeführer Christian Poul Kryssing, who was responsible for the defense of Kudruküla section, personally took three tanks and some infantry to counterattack, repelling the Soviet attack. On the same day, the 48th Soviet Marine Brigade quickly penetrated the German line and re-established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Narva River 10 km south of Narva town in Krivasoo swamp. The first 'liberator' to set foot on the Estonian ground was the Kazakh commander J. Shur. The parallel fighting on the eastern side of Narva river left a great number of German troops on the wrong side of the front, trying to make it back to their side. This was a dangerous enterprize, as reaching the no-man's land on the ice-covered Narva river, some of the men were killed by the bullets shot from their own side. Commander Arne Hansen of a platoon of the "Nordland" Division disguised his besieged unit in Soviet uniforms and managed them safely across Narva river, while himself perishing to a German machine gun. On 3 February, the 48th Marine Brigade quickly penetrated the German line and established a bridgehead in the mouth of the Narva River in Narva-Jõesuu, 15 km north of Narva town. The Soviet losses of the operation were 240 men. The attackers were repelled to the opposite bank in a few days by the tank battallion Hermann von Salza. During the following weeks, the Soviet attacks kept bringing them similar casualties. Simultaneously in 3rd February, another rifle corps of the 2nd Shock Army, the 122nd, crossed the Narva south of the town in Vääska settlement, establishing a bridgehead in Kriivasoo swamp 10 km south of Narva town.

Ivangorod bridgehead

The main brunt of the Soviet attack was, where the Germans least expected it - Steiner's III. SS Panzer-Korps, positioned east of the strategically important town of Narva and holding the German bridgehead on the opposite bank. Steiner's corps was mostly made up of SS volunteer formations. The Dutchmen of the 4th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Brigade Nederland and the various nationalities of the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland began frantically digging in along what had become known as the Narva Line. The defensive line ran for eleven kilometres, from the settlement of Lilienbach 2 km north-east from the highway bridge over Narva river, to the settlement of Dolgaya Niva 3 km in the south, bulging eastwards from the river. The 4th SS Brigade defended the northern half of the bridgehead while the 11th SS Division held the southern half. Facing them were four rifle divisions of the Soviet 2nd Shock Army. The "Nordland", the "Nederland" divisions, the I battallion of the "Danmark" regiment, and the German artillery brought heavy casualties to the Red Army, who failed to reach their operational goal of destroying the bridgehead. The German defense was supported by the command of the SS III Armoured Corps manoeuvering the artillery back and forth between the river banks. In order to implement such tactics, the bridge over Narva river was hidden in smoke screen from numerous Soviet air attacks.

Kriivasoo bridgehead in first half of February

Despite the resistance of the Estonians of the 29th Police Battallion in Kriivasoo swamp 10 km south of Narva, the 314. Rifle Division pushed until Auvere Railway Station 10 km west of Narva, threatening to cut the railway behind Steiner's SS Corps and two division-sized units. The Soviet sources depict the battles for Auvere station as ferocious, leading to serious casualties to the 314th Riflemen Division. Two regiments of the 125th Rifle Division were sent to assist them. On February 6, the renewed Soviet units gained the railway crossing near Auvere station, losing it on the same day under the fire of German coastal artillery. From then on, the Soviets remaine passive in the direction of Auvere, giving the German side valuable time to regain their strength.

Omuti, Permisküla and Gorodenka bridgeheads

On 2nd February, units of 2nd Shock Army attempted to cross the river to the settlements of Omuti, Permisküla and Gorodenka 40 km south of Narva, defended by the Estonians of the 30th Police Battallion. The defense was built as an array of small bridgeheads on the east bank, appearing to the Soviets as a carefully prepared defense system in front of the main defense line. The 2nd Shock Army took time to prepare the attacks against the phantom defense line. The Estonians pulled back to their bank during the Soviet attacks, stopping the advance of the Red Army and causing them heavy losses.

Soviet difficulties

The Soviet operations were accompanied by major problems in supplies, as the major connections had been been largely destroyed by the Germans and the remaining poor roads were threatening to fall apart in the thaw closing in. Another failure were the data of the Soviet Intelligence, as all partisan troops sent to Estonia were destroyed.

Siivertsi bridgehead

On February 12nd, the 98. and the 131. Soviet Armoured Divisions established a bridgehead on the west bank near the settlement of Siivertsi further North. The bridgehead composed a peril to the German Forces, so all units were thrown against it. On February 13, the Soviet Artillery opened fire on the Siivertsi cemetery, attacking the positions of the 16. Company of the "Norge" simultaneously from across the ice and along the rver. Under the command of SS Hauptsturmführer Wanhoefer, the attack was repelled. This allowed the 336. Regiment with the tanks of lieutenant Carius at their command to squeeze the bridgehead into a smaller unit, but that was all the German side had strength for. The trenches, gained by major Wengler's 336th Regiment at daytimes, were at nighttimes filled by men from the fresh divisions, brought in by the command of 2nd Shock Army.

First attack of Soviet main forces

Until the second week of February, the Leningrad Front applied only vanguards. General Govorov of the Leningrad Front ordered the 2nd Shock Army to use four corps to break through the German defense line north and south of Narva town, move the front 50 km westward and continue towards Rakvere. On 11th February, the artillery of the 2nd Shock army opened fire on all German positions. The 30th Guards Rifle Corps, an elite unite usually applied at breaking through defense lines, joined the Soviet units trying to seize Auvere station. The Soviet corps widened the bridgehead to 10 km along the front. The remains of the German 227th and 170th Divisions retreated. On February 13th, General Major Romancov of the 64th Guard Rifle Division ordered a shock at Auvere village from the Air Forces and the artillery, seizing it in a surprise attack. Half a kilometre westward from Auvere station, the 191st Guard Rifle Regiment cut through the railway 2 km from the Tallinn highway, the last way out for the Germans.

Stalin's orders

The retreat of Army Group North from the surroundings of Leningrad had brought the commanders of Finland to an understanding, that soon it may be late to start negotiations with the Soviet Union. On January 31, 1944, General Field Marshall Keitel sent a letter to the Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim, claiming that the retreat of Army Group North to the Panther Line constituted no danger whatsoever to Finland. Marshall Mannerheim did not share the optimism, expressing his concern, that the road in Narva would be open not only to Estonia, but also to Finland. On February 9th, President Paasikivi travelled to the Soviet embassy in Stockholm to listen to Stalin's peace terms. However, Finland made no decision to exit the war. To put pressure on Finland, Stalin needed to conquer Estonia, separating Finland from Germany and making it hopeless to defend it by military means. Stalin hoped, that a breakthrough in Narva would make Finland sign a peace treaty quickly. On February 14th, Stalin personally gave short and clear orders to the Leningrad Front:

“ It is mandatory that our forces seize Narva no later than 17 February 1944. This is required both for military as well as political reasons. It is the most important thing right now. I demand that you undertake all necessary measures to liberate Narva no later than the period indicated. (signed) J. Stalin" ”

The German condition

By February 14th, the situation on Narva front was turning into a catastrophe for the German Armed Forces. The Red Army had formed two bridgeheads north and south of Tallinn highway, the closest of them a few hundred metres away from the highway. German forces were in direct danger of getting besieged. The defense of the highway was held only by small infantry units formed of the field divisions of the Lufwaffe, supported by Panther tanks after every few hundred metres along the highway. The German side distracted the direct observation of the highway by placing branches of spruce trees along it, which did not distract the Soviet artillery from keeping the highway under constant gunfire. The faith of the German side, that the defense could go on like this, started to diminish.

Meerapalu landing operation

Seeing the condition of the front, Hitler ordered the Estonian SS Division to be replaced in the Nevel front and transported to the Narva front. The transportation of the Estonian Division coincided with the prepared landing operation by the left flank of the Leningrad Front to the west coast of Lake Peipus, 120 km south of Narva. On February 12th, the Soviet 90th Rifle Division seized Piirissaar island in the middle of the lake, with the capital South Estonian town of Tartu as the goal. The Estonian Division was placed at the Yeršovo bridgehead on the east coast of Lake Peipus. On February 13th, they destroyed an unidentified Soviet unit of 700 men committing a deception operation. The actual landing operation took place on February 14th, as the 374th Rifle Regiment crossed Lake Peipus, seized the coastal village of Meerapalu in a surprise, and formed a bridgehead. Additional Soviet units, keeping attacking across the lake, were destroyed by German fighter planes. On the next day, the Soviet units were expelled from the west coast by the Estonian battalion lead by Harald Riipalu and the 11th Division. The Soviet casualties were in thousands of men. On February 17th, a battalion of the 44th Grenader Regiment regained Piirissaar island.

Meriküla amphibious assault

While annihilating the Soviet landing operation in South-Estonia was of great importance to the German defense, it made the Estonian Division late for the simultaneous battles in Narva, where they were desperately missed. Other reinforcements, sent to Narva, were of limited fighting capacity or had poor Eastern Front experience.

To break the last resistance, General Govorov of the Leningrad Front ordered the 260th Naval Rifle battalion to be prepared for an amphibious attack to the German rear. This was an elite unit, especially trained for an amphibious assault. They were transported to the Narva front by a navy unit of 26 vessels. Troops were to assault from the Gulf of Finland, landing several miles behind the Axis lines near the coastal settlement of Meriküla. The first company were to destroy the railway and Auvere station, the second company to occupy the railway east from Auvere, and the third company to cover the left flank and to blow up the railway bridge east of Auvere. As the instructions for later action, Major Maslov ordered to kill all civilians. Another amphibious unit was supposed to land after them. Beyond their knowledge was the fact, that already in 1939, Estonian Counterintelligence had acquired data on an amphibious operation being prepared to land in Meriküla. In 1944, the Germans placed their 10 cm artillery on the coastal battery built by the Military of Estonia specifically against such landing. On February 14th, the Soviet unit of 430 men landed directly in front of the German artillery. The 23rd Regiment and the "Küste" platoon, supported by three Tiger tanks quickly responded. In seven and a half hours of fierce fighting, the Soviet beachhead was annihilated before it could cause any real threat.

Kriivasoo bridgehead in second half of February

On February 15th, to accomplish the task, given by Stalin's personal orders, General Fedyuninskij of the 2nd Shock Army took the 13th Rifle Division from the reserve to the attack on Auvere station. Supported by heavy gunfire, the 45th Rifle Guard Division broke through to the railway again 500 m to the west of Auvere station, but a powerful attack by German fighter planes stopped them. The Tallinn railway, supplying the surroundings of Narva, was cut from two places, threatening to encircle Steiner's corps in the north. In the course of the action, the Soviet 30th Rifle Guard Corps suffered the loss of 7773 men and their fighting capacity. On the following day, Commander Griesbach of the 170th Infantry Division was heavily wounded at his post in Sinimäed Hills 14 km to the west from Narva, and was replaced by Colonel Hass. The Germans, supported by tanks, went on counterattack, stopping the Soviet advance.

On February 20th, as another reserve, the command of the 2nd Shock Army brought in the 124th Rifle Corps, reinforced by the artillery of the destroyed divisions. Despite the heavy resistance from the German 61st Infantry Division, they gave a powerful shock behind the railway. Army Group Narwa rushed forces south to halt the Soviet advance. The 61st Infantry Division and the Armoured Infantry Division Feldherrnhalle, supported by the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion, counterattacked and in heavy fighting managed to drive the Soviets back to the river. A battalion from the 26th Panzergrenadier Regiment Norge was brought south to help shore up the line. The weakened Soviet 30th Guard Rifle Corps was replaced by the 10th Rifle Corps. On the February the 28th, the 214th Division and an Estonian battalion cut a Soviet rifle division from the rest of their troops. The two divisions of the 43rd Rifle Corps restored the situation. The German units suffered serious losses during the battles.

Destruction of Soviet bridgeheads north of Narva

The Estonian Division arrived on the week following February, 13th at the height of the fighting around Narva. To strengthen the German defense in the north, the Estonian Division, reinforced by newly conscripted Estonians, was attached to Steiner's corps. They were placed in the line 7 km to the north of Narva town. Steiner threw the division into battle on the February 20 against the 378th Rifle Division, the 340th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 803th Zenith Artillery Regiment, reinforced by automatic guns and defending the Riigiküla bridgehead. The units with ample experience from the Siege of Leningrad had a significant number of women within their lines. Retreat was forbidden from the units in the threat of death sentence. As this was the main Soviet direction of attack for the moment, Steiner's corps frantically fortified the line with mine fields, barbed wire, and a great amount of artillery across the river north of the bridgehead. The terrain was well known to some of the Estonians, as an army rifle practice field was located on the exact spot before the war.

On February 21st, as the first task for the Estonian Division in Narva, the 45th and 46th Regiments separated the Riigiküla bridgehead from the Siivertsi bridgehead. The failure of the attacks on 22nd and 23rd made it clear, that direct attacks were impossible because of the numerous batteries across the river. Instead, the "rolling" tactics learnt by the Estonian officers in the Estonian National Defense College were applied. This meant small shock units piercing into Soviet trenches, who were impossible to spot by the artillery. It was considered a matter of national honour to annihilate the Soviet base by February 24th, the Estonian Independence Day. For the decisive day, the Soviet bridgehead was reinforced with the 1078. Rifle Regiment, increasing the number of defenders to 776, accompanied by 14 guns. The Estonian Division and the German artillery appeared as if committing a direct assault, while a shock detachment of the 6th Company threw themselves in to fight the Soviets in their own trenches. At first, the Soviets resisted well, but after running out of hand grenades, the defenders went to an escape over the frozen river.

The next task for the Estonian Division was the destruction of Siivertsi bridgehead 4 km north of Narva, which was defended by 1100 soldiers of the 378th Rifle Division with 20 guns. On February 29th, The Estonian 45th Regiment attacked the bridgehead in front of it, while the 46th Regiment, in their try to assault from the left flank, ran into the Soviet fortifications and crossed the mine field. As the I battalion of the 46th regiment lost almost all of their officers, Harald Nugiseks stepped in as the commander of the attack. He immediately changed tactics, loading all of the hand grenade supply on sledges, so the attackers would not have to crawl back for the supplies over the mine field. With hand grenades being passed on along the trenches, the bridgehead was squeezed in from the north by the rolling tactics. On March 2nd, the Nordland battalion took the Siivertsi cemetery from the northern suburbs of Narva, while they could not accomplish beating the Soviet machine gunners inside the massive granite monument erected for the perished soldiers of the Northwestern Army in the battle of Narva in 1919. The machine gunners were destroyed by a flamethrower. Another nest for the Soviet machine gunners was the wreck of a Tiger tank, which was destroyed by commander Loopärg of the Estonian 14th Company, firing a neglected Soviet 45 mm gun.

By March 5th, the Soviet bridgehead was squeezed into a few hundred metres of river bank around the ruins of Vepsküla settlement. By an unexpected attack of the Estonian I Battalion of the 45th Regiment, the bridgehead was split into three parts and rolled down by hand grenades. A small Soviet bridgehead, still left on the west bank, was cleared by the Estonian II battalion of the 46th Regiment on March 6th.

Reinforcements

The setbacks on Narva front came as an unpleasent surprise for the leadership of the Leningrad Front. They blamed the arrival of the Estonians for it, carrying the main responsibility for the destruction of the bridgeheads to the north of Narva. Both sides rushed for reinforcements. The three Corps of the 59th Army were brought to attack Narva and the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps given under the command of the Leningrad Front. The headquarters of the German XXVI Army Corps settled themselves in Iisaku village 80 km south-west of Narva, facing the complicated situation.

Kriivasoo bridgehead in first week of March

On March 1st in the Kriivasoo bridgehead 20 km south-west of Narva, supported by the fire of 2500 cannons and more than 100 tanks, the newly arrived 59th Army attacked the 214th Infantry Division. The Soviets were aiming at the nearest road to the west of them in Kuremäe village. After three days of fierce battle, the Soviets broke through the defense and advanced westwards, getting close to the siege and destruction of Army Detachment Narwa. Referring to the lack of support by the artillery and scarcity of manpower, the leadership of the Soviet 59th Army delayed the advance. Throwing in all available forces, the XXIV Army Corps managed to bring the 59th Army to a halt. The German losses in the battles were in thousands.

On March 4th, a Soviet regiment of the 2nd Rifle Division tried a surprize assault over Lake Peipus to seize the road on the north shore of the lake. Up to 500 of them were killed by the 225th Infantry Division, with a large number of weapons, including seven cannons gained as trophies. Another impetuous Soviet attack took place in the northwestern part of the Kriivasoo bridgehead, held back by the Estonian Regiment "Tallinn". A platoon of "Norge" Regiment was rushed to help, and managed an unexpected counterattack. The main defense line was restored. In the trenches, the bodies of an Estonian scout platoon were discovered, who had been savagely tortured to death.

Soviet air assaults at civilians

As the Estonian nation had joined the German side as an important force in Narva line, it was considered necessary by the Soviet Armed Forces to intimidate the local civilians, to press down the national will of resistance. Later in 1945, the Allied air terror on German cities was carried out for the same cause. Another purpose for the air raids was pressing Finland out of the war, as the military supply of Finnish Armed Forces was carried out through the port of Tallinn. The Soviet Long Range Aviation, ordinated directly to the Headquarters of Soviet Armed Forces, was committed to the task of attacking the civilians in five Estonian towns and villages: Narva, Jõhvi, Tapa, the Southeast Estonian capital Tartu, and the national capital Tallinn.

On March 6th, a massive Soviet air assault began at Narva and the 9 km segment of Tallinn highway connected to the town. The explosives, attached to the main target, the bridge over Narva river, was hit and blown up. The baroque style Old Town was levelled, with only two buildings standing intact: the Town Hall and the Hermann castle. On the next night, another air raid followed at Ivangorod bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river. As the local inhabitants had been transported from the two towns, virtually no civilian casualties occurred. Instead, the German units remained in the towns were heavily hit and a great deal of military equipment lost.

On March 8th, the Soviet aviation bombed Jõhvi and Tapa. The heaviest of the air assaults was at Tallinn, on March 9th. On March 3rd, the Mayor of Tallinn had given an order to the city dwellers to leave the town, but the evacuation was not carried out. The extent of the attack was beyond the expectations of the German High Command. Without pre-warning, 300 IL-24 planes throwing 3068 bombs, 1725 of them explosive and 1300 ignicious, set the town on fire. Most of the damage was done to the dwellings and public buildings, including St. Nicholas Church and the medieval documents of Tallinn City Archives. More than 20,000 people were left without a shelter, while military objects were almost untouched. On March 25th, 10% of the dwellings and public buildings in the centre of Tartu were bombed down, along with Vanemuine Theatre. Among the casualties was Theodor Lippmaa, professor of botany by the University of Tartu.

The hopes of the Soviet Armed Forces to break the Estonian will of resistance remained unfulfilled. Rather the opposite was achieved, as the people felt disgusted by the Soviet air atrocities. On February 27th, a Soviet air raid had bombed the children playing in the schoolyard of Luunja Parish. The burial of the four children turned into a national memorial day, accompanied by the poem "Uus Heroodes" ("Modern Herod") published by Henrik Visnapuu. More Estonians felt an urge to stand up against the Soviets. A banner was hung at the ruins of the Estonia Theatre, saying:

“ Varemetest tõuseb kättemaks! (Vengeance Will Rise from the Ruins!) ”

The slogan became the title of the newspaper of the Estonian Division.

Soviet offensive at Narva in March

Following the day of levelling the town, the Soviet air force and the artillery of the 2nd Shock Army launched another avalanche, firing 100,000 missiles and mines against the three weakened German regiments defending the town. The assault of the 30th Guard Rifle Division and numerous tanks followed, with the main shock of three Soviet Divisions given at the "Nederland" Brigade. Soviet General Leonid A. Govorov, the commander of the Leningrad Front, realized that the Narva line could not be breached until the German bridgehead on the eastern side of the river was annihilated. On March 11th, a heavy assault was ordered at the ruins of the Lilienbach estate 2 km northeast from Narva, defended by the 4th SS Brigade’s 49th Regiment (German: 49. SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Regiment de Ruyter). After an artillery duel between the 4th SS Brigade and the Soviets, the attack disintegrated into fierce hand-to-hand fighting between the attacking Soviet infantry and the outnumbered Dutchmen of the 49th SS Regiment. After several hours of fierce combat, the 30th Guard Rifle Corps had suffered enough losses to fall back. Govorov decided to shift his focus of the attack elsewhere.

At the same time, three Divisions of the 14th Rifle Corps attacked the positions of the Estonian Division in Siivertsi, 5 km north of Narva. The artillery of the Estonian Rifle Corps was given at their command. For the first time, Estonians were facing Estonians in combat over Narva river. Powerful loud speakers were set up on the Soviet side, calling the Estonians on the German side to swap side. Often, the Estonian Division managed to calculate the position of the propaganda centre, and open gunfire at it. On March 17th, after a massive canonade at the positions of the Estonian Division, and heavy losses from the 1256th Rifle Regiment, the Soviets managed a bridgehead on the west bank of the river 8 km north of Narva. The attackers were 'encouraged' by political commissars following them with sub-machine guns. Assisted by the artillery of the III Germanic Armoured Corps, the Estonian machine gunners, placed along the bank, cleared the bridgehead by the following night. The three Divisions of the 14th Rifle Corps were destroyed and the remains reformed in the rear.

Over March, the 4th SS Brigade was subjected to almost constant artillery and air attacks. Next, Govorov launched an attack using both overwhelming numbers and concealment. After a heavy artillery barrage on the 24th SS Regiment Danmark of the 11th SS Division, the Soviets made an all-out assault on the 4th SS Brigade’s 48th Regiment General Seyffardt, positioned to the south of the 24th SS Regiment. Taken by surprise, the Dutchmen were forced from their positions, but quickly rallied and mounted a ferocious counterattack. In intense hand-to-hand fighting, the men of the 48th SS regained their positions and annihilated the Soviet attack force. Govorov now switched his point of attack back to Lilienbach. After a heavy barrage, Soviet infantry with tank support launched an attack. Despite fierce resistance, the 49th SS Regiment was pushed back. The Soviets made a breakthrough, and throwing his reserve armour into the fray, Govorov ordered his men to make for the bridges over the Narva river. The Hermann von Salza Panzer Abteilung was committed to hold the line, forcing back the Soviet armour, but heavy Soviet anti-tank fire halted the German counterattack in turn. By March 12th, the defense line was virtually non-existent. The Dutchmen retreated step by step, building a new defense line. On March 14th, the Soviets, getting wind of the withdrawal, threw artillery and infantry at the new positions of "de Ruyter". The regiment suffered heavily, with its II Battalion only narrowly escaping destruction with the assistance of a counter-attack by an SS rifle company. On 22 March, another Soviet barrage fell on the 49th SS Regiment. Red Army troops attacked, annihilating the 49th Regiment's 5th Company and breaking through into the regiment's rear. SS regimental headquarters troops assaulted the 150-man Soviet force, destroying them in heavy fighting, and retaking the regiment's trenches.

Kriivasoo bridgehead in second half of March

On February 17th, the the six Divisions, the armoured vehicles and the artillery of the 109th Rifle Corps and the newly brought 6th Rifle Corps attacked the weakened 61st Infantry Division at the defense of Auvere railway station. The Soviet goal were the headquarters of the Corps on Lastekodumägi of the Sinimäed Hills next to Tallinn highway 14 km west of Narva. The defense of the headquarters by the 162nd Grenader Regiment, having built up as an array of posts between the hills and the railway, was shaken by the gigantic gunfire and air bombing. The Soviet 930th Regiment managed to break through the rarefied defense line of the 61st Infantry Division to the railway, keeping moving towards the German headquarters. The six Soviet T-34 tanks were destroyed by two Tiger tanks of lieutenant Carius, forcing the Soviet infantry into withdrawal. The Soviets kept rolling their attacks, as on March 17th – 22nd, the 502nd Tank Battalion destroyed 38 tanks, 4 motorized cannons, and 17 cannons, losing none of their own. The last of the massive Soviet attacks was committed on March 22nd, when the 61th Infantry Division repelled ten assaults.

German offensives in March and April

In the last week of March, the tables were turning. In seven weeks of offensives, the 2nd Shock Army had lost around 150,000 men and its capacity to commit any more massive operations. On March 24th, Army General Govorov of the Leningrad front turned to the Soviet Headquarters for switching the mode on Narva line from offence to defence. Army Detachment North had suffered the loss of around 30,000 men, diminishing the massive predominance of the Soviets.

Utilizing from the situation, the commanders of the German army detachment re-grouped their forces, setting the annihilation of the Kriivasoo bridgehead as the goal. On March 26th, the 170th, the 11th, and the 227th Infantry Divisions targeted the flanks of the Soviet 109th Rifle Corps south of the railway. The assault was supported by an air shock. Tank Commander Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Gross-Zauche und Camminetz in command of the operation considered the Tigers useless for operating in the swamp, exploiting the Panther tanks instead. The closely following East-Prussian Grenaders pierced into the positions of the 109th Rifle Corps, fortified by palings of a man's heigth. The Panzergraf was out cheering the attackers up personally, driving his offroad vehicle to decorate the bravest with Iron Crosses, chocolate and cognac in the middle of the heaviest combat. By the end of the day, the Soviet 72nd and parts of the 109th Rifle Corps in the western 'tip' of the bridgehead were besieged. As Commander von Strachwitz had forecasted, on the following day, the 109th went on counterattack, which was repelled by the East-Prussian 23rd Grenader Regiment, bringing the Soviets great casualties. Following von Strachwitz's tactics, in several places, small tank units in two groups broke through the lines of the 109th Rifle Corps, splitting the bridgeheads in two halves. Fierce air combat followed, with 41 German planes were shot down. On March 29th, Commander von Strachwitz gave an order to break out as small platoons. By March 31st, the west half of the bridgehead was destroyed, with 6,000 Soviet Riflemen dead.

The east half of the Kriivasoo bridgehead, defended by the Soviet 6th and the 117th Rifle Corps, were first confused by a deception attack on April 6th, trying to leave an impression of trying to cut them out from the west flank. The actual assault came from Auvere station in the north, starting with heavy gunfire. The forest in the positions of the Soviet Corps was ignited and bombed by planes, while the 61th Infantry Division and von Strachwitz's tanks pierced deep into the Soviet defense, separating the two Soviet Corps from each other, forcing them into their own palings. Army General Govorov was outraged by the news, sending in three more Rifle Corps. Their attempt to cut out the Tigers in their rear was repelled by von Strachwitz's right hand man lieutenant Günther Famula keeping the road to the supplies open. On April 7th, Army General Govorov ordered to switch to defense, as the 59th Army, having lost another 5,700 men as dead and captured, was replaced by the 8th Army. On April 15, von Strachwitz received the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds as the eleventh man in the history of the award.

With the Soviet side pushed back into the swamps, brought the Germans hope to bring the Kriivasoo bridgehead to a destruction. The spring thaw meant that tanks were impossible to use. Von Strachwitz hoped to use the artillery to keep the Soviet defense from blowing the roads up. The four newly brought Rifle Corps of the 8th Army with numerous extra units repelled the German attack, lasting from April 19 – 24. The Germans lost 2,235 men in the operation, as the total of casualties in April was 13,274. The Soviet casualties in April were at least 30,000 – 40,000 men. Thus, both sides were out of their strenghts, and on April 18th, Finland terminated the negotiations with the Soviet Union. For May, the front stagnated with the exception of artillery, air, sniper activity and clashes between scout platoons.

Soviet offensive at Narva in first weeks of June

The beginning of June signalled the end of the thaw, and the ground began to dry. Govorov had spent the time reinforcing his southern flank and preparing for an all-out attack against the settlement of Dolgaya Niva, held by the Danes of 24th SS Regiment. On June 7, hundreds of Soviet guns opened up all across the seven-mile Narva front. The entire 13th Air Army of the Red Air Force took to the skies with minimal Luftwaffe opposition. Special attention was paid by the Soviets to positions of the 24th SS Regiment. As the smoke from the bombardment cleared, the Danes found themselves under attack from masses of Soviet infantry, attacking in human waves.

The 11th SS Divison’s artillery opened up, tearing holes in the advancing Red Army soldiers. Pushing through the fire, the Soviet troops made it to 24th SS Regiment’s positions and began heavy fighting. Over the next four days, the Danes held their positions against the Red Army, but on 12 June a hole appeared in their lines and the Soviets took the strongpoint known as Post Sunshine. Only scattered forces blocked a Red Army advance to the bridges over the Narva River. The 7th Company of the 24th SS Regiment counterattacked and recaptured “Post Sunshine”, inflicting many casualties and restoring the German line. Fighting went on for two more weeks with no substantial advance by either side.

While continuing attacks on the Narva front, STAVKA had begun to look elsewhere for their breakthrough. A new offensive, codenamed Bagration after the Napoleonic-era Russian field marshal, was launched on June 22 against Army Group Centre as an operational victory. Alongside the invasion of Normandy, it signaled the defeat of Nazi Germany being only a matter of time.

German withdrawal to Tannenberg Line and Soviet capture of Narva

German preparations for withdrawal

The Soviet success in Belorussia and the Ukraine brought the High Command of the German Armed Forces to propose to withdraw the German forces from Estonia to the line between Riga and Daugavpils 400 km to the south of Narva. The aim of the General Headquarters was to keep the battlefront as short as possible and to use the troops in the Ukraine instead. On July 12th, the commander of the army detachment Infantry General Johannes Frießner proposed it to Hitler, who's reaction was to "stand or die" at Narva Line. The Leningrad Front was preparing for all-out attack to be committed on July 24th. While Army Group North had held firm, they were out of reserves. Ignorant of Hitler's orders, Frießner ordered a new defensive line built, the Tannenberg Line (Tannenbergstellung), with the main defenses located on the three Sinimäed Hills 14 km to the west of Narva. On July 21st, Frießner asked permission to withdraw to the Tannenberg Line. As Hitler was afraid the Finnish will to resist would suffer from it, he informed the Finnish High Command about his plans. Finding out, that the withdrawal to a new line was not considered a problem by the Finnish side, Hitler gave orders to retreat.

Soviet preparations for the assault on July 24th

For their all-out attack on July 24th, most of the Soviet units and artillery were concentrated in the Kriivasoo bridgehead in the south to assault the Estonian Division at the defense of Auvere railway station and the 11th East Prussian Division at the defense of Sirgala settlement in the west. The first attack by the 8th Army was to be given by the 117th and the 122nd Rifle Corps, both consisting in three Rifle Divisions. The rest of the 8th Army included 124th and the 112th Rifle Corps. Their intention was to break through the German defense of the station, while the 2nd Shock Army was to break through the defense of the III Armoured Corps at the defense of the river north of Narva. The 2nd Shock Army included the 131st and the 191st Rifle Divisions, the 109th Rifle Corps, the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps, two Artillery Brigades, the 328th Separate Heavy Artillery Division, four Mine Thrower Regiments, the 760th Anti-Tank Regiment, and 62 armoured vehicles. The two armies were to besiege the III Armoured Corps and destroy it. In the prepared assault, the Soviet artillery outnumbered the German artillery by eigth times. The Soviet air force consisted in 546 planes against 49 German planes. The overall standings of manpower were 46,385 Soviets against 17,100 German troopers. For the German benefit was the utter ignorance of the Soviet intelligence about the prepared Tannenberg Line.

Auvere battle

In the morning of July 24th, the Soviet assault started with gunfire of 2,000 tons of missiles and mines fired at the 45th Regiment of Estonian Division in Auvere and the 11th East Prussian Division, with the Estonians losing a significant part of their troops. Two hours later, the Divisions were attacked from the air, as 3 German and 8 Soviet planes were shot down. Under the cover of the gunfire, the 117th Rifle Corps went on attack at the Estonian regiment regiment while the 122nd Rifle Corps atttacked the East Prussians at Sirgala.<krivo/> The 122nd Rifle Corps pierced to the East-Prussian positions, as the 117th Rifle Corps forced besieged the Estonian regiment, who gathered up to defend in a circle. Rescued by a Company of Panther tanks and three reactive mine throwers, the Estonians went on counterattack. The East-Prussians were saved by the swift movement of artillery behind them clearing their positions from the Soviets. The 117th Rifle Corps attacking in human waves reached the headquarters of the I Estonian Battalion, who resisted by heavy machine gun fire. The support by the anti-tank weaponry of the 14th Company and the "Nordland" Division helped to seize the main frontline back to the control of Estonian regiment. While the 8th Army lost 3,000 men and Army Detachment "Narwa" 800 troopers, in similar way, all other attempts by the 117th and the 122nd Rifle Corps to break through were repelled.

German withdrawal from Ivangorod bridgehead

The Soviet attack at Auvere and Sirgala forced the III Armoured Corps to a hasty withdrawal from their position in Ivangorod bridgehead on the opposite bank of Narva and the surroundings of Narva. The 8th Army threatened to reach the Tannenberg Line before the Germans. In the evening of July 24th, unnoticed by the Soviets, the "Nederland" and the "Danmark" detachments, calmly left their positions in the surroundings of Ivangorod. Leaflets in Russian were left behind warning the Soviets from following, as the German troopers were watching them everywhere. The Soviet scouts found out about the withdrawal, while the Germans were blowing up the bridge. By a mistake made by Battalion Commander Günther Wanhoefer in placing the explosives, the bridge stayed intact. The Soviet attempt to cross the river was repelled by an improvized defense unit taking control of the Ivangorod side of the bridge again. Behind their back, Wanhoefer attached the explosives and after his defenders had withdrawn, blew the bridge up.

2nd Shock Army crossing Narva River

In the morning of July 25th, 1360 Soviet cannons fired 280,000 missiles against the units of the Estonian Division across Narva river, covering the right flank of the III Armoured Corps. The density of the cannons was 160 per kilometre of frontline. The shock made the trenches to collapse on both sides of the frontline. After the strike of the ballistic cannons, bomber planes and direct-shooting cannons started to destroy remaining firepoints. Regiments of the 131st and the 191st Rifle Corps were ordered to cross the river, accompanied by "Svyaschennaya Voyna" and the Anthem of the Soviet Union playing from the loudspeakers. The cannons and the machine guns of the Estonian Division along with the Stuka planes destroyed the first attempts of the 2nd Shock Army to cross the river on boats and rafts, until the Estonians ran out of ammunition. The main strike drifted at the Estonian 46th Regiment. In close combat they cleared their positions of the Soviets and retreated slowly, holding the Soviet attack. The remains of the 6th Company remained on their positions on the bank of Riigiküla, after the main front had passed them, and went on counterattack several times. After killing almost all officers of the 546th Rifle Regiment, an air and artillery attack was ordered to annihilate them.

Defense of German withdrawal along Tallinn highway

The Tallinn-Narva highway, the III Armoured Corps's only line of retreat, was threatened. The Soviet advance along the river to Narva was stopped by the II Battalion of the Estonian 47th Regiment. Major Alfons Rebane had saved the battalion from the Soviet bombardment by ordering to dig into new trenches the night before. Aiming at the Rebane's positions according to their data, the gunfire of the 2nd Shock Army hit empty trenches. As the 131st Rifle Division threatened to cut between the 47th Regiment by the river and the 46th Regiment 5 km to the west of the river, Rebane shifted his front line to the left. The assaults by the 556th and 546the Rifle Regiments were repelled by the Estonians defending the highway in a half-circle around Olgina estate and causing the Soviets great casualties.

Another defense line was located against the 131st Rifle Division at the Peeterristi crossroad 9 km from Narva, the 180 Estonians of the II Battalion of the 46th Regiment held the Rifle Divsion back. Luftflotte 1 was sent into the air to provide cover for the withdrawing men of the III Armoured Corps, but despite the Luftflotte’s efforts, its 137 aircraft were overwhelmed by the 800-plus aircraft of the Thirteenth Air Army. In a joint defense line with the II Estonian Battalion of Alfons Rebane in the segment of Olgina, the Estonians managed to hold the Soviet regiments while the detachments of the III Armoured Corps withdrew across the bridge to the Tannenberg Line. The Corps destroyed the highway with road destruction machinery.

The German units, which failed to retreat exactly on the agreed timetable, immediately faced Soviet assaults. The greatest German casualty of the retreat to the Tannenberg Line were the 700 troopers of the 48th Regiment "General Seyffardt", which was in still in Narva, when the Soviets had already gained control of the highway behind them and the Soviet armoured vehicles were crossing the Narva bridge. In a clash with them, the Dutch volunteer Derk-Elsko Bruins let a Soviet tank detachment approach his cannon and destroyed eight of them. The Dutch II Battalion of the 49th Regiment "De Ruyter", who were covering for the retreat of "General Seyffardt", were rescued from the siege by their compatriots of the I Battalion of Regiment. Besieged in the swamps between the highway and the railway, the withdrawing Dutchmen of the "General Seyffardt" were discovered by fighter-bombers of the Red Air Force and pinned down. Two Rifle Regiments of the 191st Rifle Division were brought in to attack the regiment, and soon they were under assault from both air and ground. After a few hours, the 48th SS Regiment ceased to exist, with about 20% of them reaching the Tannenberg Line a week later.

With the exception of the annihilation of the 48th Regiment, the withdrawal had been a success, and Steiner's men began to dig in on the Tannenberg Line, in preparation of the next Soviet attacks. On July 26, the Red Army captured Narva, ending the six-month struggle for the town. While the Soviets celebrated victory, they had once again failed to reach their main goal – the siege of the III Armoured Corps and the destruction of Army Group North.

Aftermath

The baroque style town of Narva was shattered by a Soviet air raid and lay in ruins. Less than five per cent of the prewar population returned to their former homes.

Attempt to re-establish Estonian independence

The five-month campaign for Narva Bridgehead gave the German Armed Forces the chance to secure positions in Tannenberg Line, which were kept for three more months. The battles of Narva were perceived by Estonian people as the for their country, a consolation for the humiliation of 1939. The lengthy German defense prevented a swift Soviet breakthrough into Estonia, which gave the underground Estonian National Committee enough time for an attempt to re-establish Estonian independence. On 1 August 1944, the Estonian National Committee pronounced itself Estonia’s highest authority, and on 18 September 1944, acting Head of the State Jüri Uluots appointed a new government led by Otto Tief. Over the radio, in English, the Estonian government declared its neutrality in the war. The government issued two editions of State Gazette. On September 21, the national forces seized the government buildings in Tallinn and ordered the German forces to leave. The Estonian flag was raised in the flag tower of the government buildings only to be removed by the Soviets four days later. Estonian Government in Exile served to carry the continuity of the Estonian state forward until 1992, when Heinrich Mark, the last prime minister in the duties of the Head of State, handed his credentials over to the incoming President Lennart Meri.

Fleeing to the West

The delay of Soviet re-occupation allowed over 25,000 Estonians and 3,700 Swedes to flee to neutral Sweden and 6,000 Estonians to Finland. Thousands of refugee boats and ships sunk in the Baltic Sea. In September, 90,000 soldiers and 85,000 Estonian, Finnish, German refugees, and Soviet Prisoners of War were safely evacuated to Germany. The sole German cost of this undertaking was the loss of a steamer. More German naval evacuations followed from Estonian ports, where up to 1,200 people were drowned by Soviet attacks.

Outcomes for Finland

The battles of Narva denied a Soviet-occupied Estonia as a favourable base for amphibious invasions and air attacks against Helsinki and other Finnish towns. Hopes of Soviet Armed Forces to strangle Finland from the Baltic Sea and force it into capitulation, were diminished. Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim repeatedly reminded the German side that in case their troops in Estonia retreated, Finland would be forced to make peace even on extremely unfavourable terms. Thus, the battles of Narva helped Finland to avoid the Soviet occupation, to sustain its capacity of resistance and to enter the negotiations for Moscow armistice with terms of its own.

War trials over Estonians in German military units

The Estonian citizens, who fought on the German side, were later convicted as traitors of Soviet Union. If captured, they were sent to prison camps or shot immediately. The Western countries were insisted on rendering up the Estonians in German forces. The Soviet demand was generally disobeyed by most of the Western countries, excluding Sweden and Finland. The Nuremberg Trials, in declaring the Waffen SS a criminal organisation, explicitly excluded conscripts in the following terms:.

“ Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter the group composed of those persons who had been officially accepted as members of the SS as enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became or remained members of the organisation with knowledge that it was being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter or who were personally implicated as members of the organisation in the commission of such crimes, excluding, however, those who were drafted into membership by the State in such a way as to give them no choice in the matter, and who had committed no such crimes. ”

In April 13, 1950, a message from the U.S. High Commission in Germany (HICOG), signed by John McCloy to the Secretary of State, clarified the US position on the "Baltic Legions:" they were not to be seen as "movements," "volunteer," or "SS." In short, they had not been given the training, indoctrination, and induction normally given to SS members. Subsequently the US Displaced Persons Commission in September 1950 declared:

“ The Baltic Waffen SS Units (Baltic Legions) are to be considered as separate and distinct in purpose, ideology, activities, and qualifications for membership from the German SS, and therefore the Commission holds them not to be a movement hostile to the Government of the United States. ”

Modern controversy

After the re-establishment of the Estonian Republic in 1991, the Government of Estonia took the position, that the Estonians in the German Armed Forces were fighting for the independence of Estonia. Based on the actions of the Government of Otto Tief, it was demonstrated, that Estonians fought both the communists and nazis, thus differing in no way from the fight of the Finns for their country. Estonian soldiers in German forces earned the right to march as veterans in the Independence Day parade. Freedom fighters with outstanding services were rewarded with decorations of honour. In 1994, the first memorial stone was unveiled in Sinimäed Hills in the presence of Aleksander Einseln, Commander-in-Chief of Estonian Armed Forces. Books about the battles of Narva started to be published in Estonia and a full-length documentary film was made.

In 2002, near Pärnu, the Estonian Government forced the removal of a monument, depicting a soldier of the Estonian SS Division. The In 2004 the monument was re-opened in Lihula but shortly after removed again because of the Estonian government opposition to the opening. On October 15, 2005 the monument was opened in the grounds of the Museum of Fight for Estonia's Freedom.

On May 22, 2004, the Jerusalem Post ran a story about the plans of Estonian individuals to build a monument to the Estonian SS Division. International outrage followed, due to the criminal status of the non-conscript Waffen-SS, after the Nuremberg Trials. One of Russia's chief Rabbis, Berl Lazar, condemned the action, stating it would breed anti-Semitism .

On July 28, 2007, the gathering of some 300 veterans of the Estonian Division and of other Nazi German military units, including Waffen SS veterans from Austria and Norway, took place in the historical location of Tannenberg Line.

Literature

The battles of Narva are almost unknown to the world. It is hard for the defeated of World War II to write books about their victories, while the victors prefer to avoid discussion about their defeats. Books on World War II barely mention the battles of Narva. The fact, that the battles were just one out of ten directions of attack on the Eastern Front in 1944, hardly explains the overall disregard of the death of more than a hundred thousand men. Albert Seaton and David Glanz in their monographies on the battles of Leningrad devote merely a few pages to the battles of Narva. The elsewhere detailed Paul Carrell, has almost entirely left the campaign of Narva out of his discussion. John Erickson in his classic overview on Germany in World War II writes just slightly more on the battles. The capital six-volume German compilation allows minimal space for the battles of Narva.

The international composition of the SS troops has fascinated several authors who have written very focused (but one-sided) works about the battle. The unusual spectacle of German troops resisting a Soviet advance for months on as late as 1944 has proven a compelling topic for those fascinated by the Wehrmacht, and particularly, the SS. Generally, the Soviet and Russian authors try to diminish the importance of the battles of Narva. It is a tradition for the Soviet historians to present the actual outcomes of the battles as the desired goals of the Soviet leadership. At the beginning of 1944, the Soviet aim was not merely liberating Leningrad from the blockade and seizing Narva, but the destruction of the entire Army Group North, the capture of the Baltic States and the invasion of East-Prussia. As the outcomes were not achieved, the Soviet authors claim, that the intentions were limited from the very start of the campaign. To deny this, the Soviet historians do not count the losses in the battles of Narva separately, but as part of the the losses in Leningrad-Novgorod Offensive, and have left the losses from March 2nd to July 23rd 1944 entirely out of the official count of human losses by the Soviet Armed Forces.

Formations and Units involved

Soviet

As of March 1, 1944

Leningrad Front - General Leonid Govorov

• 2nd Shock Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Fedyuninski
  • 43rd Rifle Corps - Major General Anatoli Andreyev
  • 109th Rifle Corps - Major General Ivan Alferov
  • 124th Rifle Corps - Major General Voldemar Damberg

• 8th Army - Lieutenant General Filipp Starkov
  • 6th Rifle Corps - Major General Semyon Mikulski
  • 112th Rifle Corps - Major General Filipp Solovev
  • 115th Rifle Corps - (HQ with no troops assigned by 1 Apr 1944)

• 59th Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Korvnikov
  • 117th Rifle Corps - Major General Vasili Trubachev
  • 122nd Rifle Corps - Major General Panteleimon Zaitsev

Separate Corps and Divisions:

• 8th Estonian Rifle Corps - Lieutenant General Lembit Pärn
• 14th Rifle Corps - Major General Pavel Artyushenko
• 30th Guards Rifle Corps - Lieutenant General Nikolai Simonyak
  • 45th Guards Rifle Division
  • 63rd Guards Rifle Division
  • 64th Guards Rifle Division

Attached to the Corps 31th, 46th, 260th and 261st Separate Guards Heavy Tank and 1902nd Separate Self-propelled Artillery regiments

• 124th Rifle Division - Colonel Papchenko Danilovich
• 3rd Breakthrough Artillery Corps - Major General N. N. Zhdanov
• 3rd Guards Tank Corps - Major General I. A. Vovchenko

German

Military formations subordinated to the Army detachment "Narwa" (as of March 1, 1944)

• XXVI Army Corps - Infantry General Anton Grasser
  • 11th Infantry Division
  • 58th Infantry Division
  • 214th Infantry Division
  • 225th Infantry Division
  • 3rd Estonian Border Guard Regiment (as of April 15)
• XXXXIII Army Corps - Infantry General Karl von Oven
  • 61st Infantry Division
  • 170th Infantry Division
  • 227th Infantry Division
  • "Feldherrnhalle" Armoured Infantry Division
  • "Gnesen" Grenadier Regiment
• III SS (Germanic) Armoured Corps - SS-Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner
  • 11th SS Armoured Grenadier Division "Nordland"
  • 4th SS Armoured Grenadier Brigade "Nederland"
  • 20th Armed Grenadier (Infantry) Division of the SS (1st Estonian)

Separate Corps:

• Eastern Sector, Coastal Defense (Staff of 2nd Anti-Aircraft Division as HQ) - Lieutenant General Alfons Luczny
  • Estonian Regiment "Reval"
  • 29th Estonian Police Battalion
  • 31st Estonian Police Battalion
  • 32nd Estonian Police Battalion
  • 658th Eastern Battalion (Estonian)
  • 659th Eastern Battalion (Estonian)

Other military units

• Artillery Command No. 113
• High Pioneer Command No. 32
• 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion
• 752nd Anti-Tank Battalion
• 540th Special Infantry (Training) Battalion

See also

• Battle of Narva - Battle of the Tannenberg Line (1944)

References

• Beshanov, V., Ten of Stalin's shocks., Minsk, Harvest, 2004 (Russian: Бешанов В. Десять сталинских ударов. — Мн.: Харвест, 2004.)
• Frieser, Karl-Heinz, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (German official history), Volume 8, München, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.
• David Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002. ISBN 978-0-7006-1208-6.
• Golubev, V.F., In the name of Leningrad, Moscow, FAIR-Press, 2000 (Russian: Голубев Василий Федорович, Во имя Ленинграда, M., ФАИР-ПРЕСС, 2000)

Recommended reading

• Estes, Kenneth, A European Anabasis — Western European Volunteers in the German Army and SS, 1940-1945, Columbia University Press. Online with the Gutenberg Project here
• Andrei Grechko, Geschichte des Zweiten Welt Krieges (Soviet official history of World War II), Volume 8, 1977.
• Michaelis, Rolf. Die 11. SS-Freiwilligen-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Nordland".
• Steiner, Felix. Waffen-SS im Einsatz.
• Tieke, Wilhelm. Tragedy of the Faithful: A History of III. (Germanisches) SS-Panzer-Korps.
• Armeeabteilung Narwa Order of Battle from Axis History Factbook

External links

• Netherlanders in the Waffen SS
• Topographic map of Narva area