Talk:BAC TSR-2/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Canberra swordfish

Wasn't the TSR.1 was supposed to be the Canberra. The original TSR.II was the prototype of the Fairey Swordfish! --Daedelus 19:31, 11 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Cancellation

Rather than the political reasons I have heard from one source that the airframe suffered fatigue problems. Someone who is ex-RAF, and slightly connected to the project, commented that the avionics people where unhappy at cancellation but the airframe happy. One additional comment was that the USSR had got hold of the plans and it was important that they wasted effort finding the fatigue.--Paddy's Ego 19:35, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Very doubtful that this is true. By the time TSR-2 flew fatigue was pretty well understood and the number of hours that the aircraft clocked up would not have produced any fatigue unless the design was utterly hopeless, which it most definitely wasn't! I think some of the politics surrounding this is yet to come out, but I notice that all of the relevant secret govt docs on TSR-2 were released to the public records office in April this year as part of the Freedom of Information Act. Perhaps someone would like to pop down there and read them? I bet there's a book in it!!! Graham 01:08, 9 September 2005 (UTC)

My father was involved in the UK nuclear submarine reactor programme.

They were told at the time, that TSR2's cancellation and transfer of TSR2 technology to the USA was a condition for the purchase of Polaris missile system, & reactor technology.

That certainly sounds plausible. The Yanks have a history of making similar demands to maintain their military supremacy (e.g. Miles M.52). However, unless an official source can be found, it remains speculative. Graham 00:31, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

As a matter of interest, some years ago when I was interested in that sort of thing I looked into the TSR-2 and the more I found out about it the more I came to the conclusion that the person responsible for drawing-up GOR 339 really knew what they were doing - even if the politicians didn't.

As such, the raison d'etre of the TSR-2 was that it was designed to fly very low (within the radar ground-clutter, in fact) and very fast, which would make it almost undetectable until it was too late to stop (the Tomahawk cruise missile does this sort of thing today, but at only about a quarter the TSR-2's speed) It could therefore almost guarantee to deliver it's (nuclear) weapon thus making it a very credible deterrent.

To digress: At these low-levels it's not (or wasn't then) possible to swing any (manualy sighted) anti-aircraft gun rapidly enough to track a fast moving aircraft in order to fire on it. A heavy gun is useless at low levels because it can’t be swung rapidly enough and a small, say 20mm, gun, doesn't have the range to fire out to the ranges it can track the aircraft at. If the aircraft goes overhead, then by the time the gun has been swung around to point in the aircraft’s direction (assuming that it wasn't already pointing in the correct direction by chance in the first place) the target is likely to be obscured by the surrounding terrain, eg. trees, buildings etc. A radar-aimed gun (or missile system) needs to acquire the target and again the system needs to be ready in the first place. Yet again, the time the aircraft is within the system's acquisition-horizon is so short as to make this difficult if not impossible and then there's the problem of ground clutter. Incidently, the only type of weapon that might be able to provide some defence against this sort of attack would be the Phalanx CIWS type of system of today, but that would probably be much less effective over land littered with radar-shadow causing obstructions and other clutter.

In addition, because the TSR-2 was designed to operate from 'advanced' areas (i.e., in time's of crisis it was to be deployed to forward areas and operate from dispersed rough-fields or roadways in Germany or wherever - that's why the TSR-2 was STOL and didn't need a nice, tarmac, runway) it would not be possible to wipe-out the aircraft on their airfields in a pre-emptive strike.

As an aside, the reason for the aircraft having been designed to fly most of it's sortie on autopilot has less to do with making things easy for the pilot than it being due to the extremely low-level and high-speed the TSR-2 was designed to fly these missions at, day or night and in all weathers - at these altitudes and speeds (~ 200ft and ~ 900 Kts) a pilot's (who might well be tired) reaction-times are not good enough for safe flying over anything other than perhaps a flat, featureless, desert in daylight and good weather, hence the autopilot linked-in to the navigation computer - and the RAF knew quite a bit about low/night/poor-weather flying.

That's probably about right ref low-level/manual flying. I've spoken to former RAF F-4 pilots about high-mach low-level night missions over water, with low-light television. They said that it was so difficult as to be almost nightmarish. Many years later, they still became stressed even when recalling it. So the TSR-2 autopilot system was essential for this type of attack.

Until recently, it was, perhaps only the Oerlikon 35mm AA system which could handle such an attack. The (twin pack) system would acquire the target at more than 2 kilometres with its ranging and azimuth radars. At 2KM or under, it would engage at 360 rounds per minute per gun, with each round's muzzle velocity measured (3,000 metres/sec) and gunlaying compensated to give a dispersion of 1 pro mille (all shot falling in a 1 metre-sized frame, or pro-rata depending on range) at 1 kilometre on a target moving at mach 1.0. Unless the target could manoeuvre faster than the system computers, the probability of fatal hits was very high. The Phalanx system which you mention is a 30mm Gatling concept. It is very good but its accuracy is not up to the 35mm system and the range and muzzle velocity are less. However, these systems only came into service 10 to 15 years after TSR-2 so, in its time, it was a superb aircraft.Miletus (talk) 18:35, 12 September 2008 (UTC

BTW, there's an article by Roland Beamont called Testing The TSR-2 in a 1982 issue of Aeroplane Monthly (don't know the month) which includes his Flight Test Reports. TSR-2 flight testing was also done by Jimmy Dell. Ian Dunster 16:05, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

Designation Sequence???

In the 'designation sequence' section of the page, someone has tried to do something but has only come out as sets of Square Brackets. First of all, were they trying to do anything important (as far I know TSR.2 was the only designation so I'm not sure there is any 'sequence' to detail). If someone knows what they were trying to do, could they repair it - or shall I just delete it?

I removed it - it's from a standard template used in many other aircraft articles, but doesn't apply here, since this aircraft was not part of a designation sequence. Graham 23:59, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

1980s resurrection?

Could someone cite a source for the section claiming that the Thatcher government considered resurrecting the project? This would have been remarkable in many ways, especially as the Tornado was nearing service entry at the time. If it cannot be sourced it should be removed- it does sound like wishful thinking on someone's part. Colin Johnston 19:48, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

No, it definitely was the case, I remember it well. One of the magazines (possibly Aircraft illustrated, but I'm not very sure) at the time did an extensive article on it, even featuring a number of TSR-2 "Mk II" artists' impressions. (These speculations included Tornado-like air intakes in place of the half shock-cones). It should be easy enough to did up a reference to that at the very least, and probably to government papers on the subject too. Graham 06:01, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

B-1 Comparison?

Surely it would be more appropriate to compare the TSR-2 with the the Tornado IDS, Mirage IV, F-111, SU-24 or Vigilante than the inter-continental ranged B-1 ? Colin Johnston 19:46, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

Valid point, why are we comparing a 1960s tactical bomber with a 70s (and later) strategic bomber in the opening paragraph? GraemeLeggett 09:34, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

Total Cost

Can anyone hazard a total cost for the project, from design to cancellation, please? Vernon White 13:01, 22 May 2006 (UTC)

very, very difficult to estimate. The method of accounting will vary the costs tremendously e.g. do you attribute all costs to TSR-2 or share them across a number of programs? Some systems were procured under a separate contract and had other uses, do you include these? I think the way the project was run (and destroyed) noone will ever know the true cost. The real cost was the damage to the UK aviation industry from the cancellation Cirrus75 16:38, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

MiG-25 Foxbat

In section headed comparable aircraft I feel there is an important aircraft missing, the MIG-25 Foxbat. This aircraft's roles would have overlapped signifcantly with the TSR-2's intented roles. Not to mention they are of the same disign and time period. Nick Hayward 17:34, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

The MiG-25 doesn't have air-to-ground attack capabilities (not even a gun, IIRC). It is about 8 meters shorter, too, and is almost 50% faster in terms of max speed at altitude (Mach ~3 vs. Mach ~2 for the TSR-2). --Henrickson 19:02, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

If the TSR-2 were developed into a long, range, high-speed intercepter then you could have a case for saying that, there is very little data on that though. An interesting note is that with the power available, TSR-2 would potentially have been Mach-3 capable (material issues preventing any excursions much about Mach2.35 aside). Cirrus75 21:14, 11 June 2007 (UTC)

Edit 121484352

I'm confused - Edit 121484352 has just changed the article to say the exact opposite of what it previously did. Can anyone reference this and clarify if the TSR-2 did or didn't outrun a Lightning chase plane. I don't have a reliable source to turn to. Emoscopes ^Talk 19:10, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

Yes, it did indeed outrun the Lightning, it's in one of Bee Beamonts books (think it was 'testing military Jets') which includes a few flight reports of the TSR-2. I think it has been referenced in quite a few other books such as 'Phoenix or Folly' Cirrus75 16:33, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

I dispute this. I have read all of the books on the TSR-2, though unfortunately don't have any to hand to quote chapter and verse. This is an oft-repeated story but it has become something of a myth. On that flight, the TSR-2 reached Mach 1.2, which is obviously well below the Lightning's capability. Now it's possible that the TSR-2 might have momentarily out-accelerated the Lightning (especially a T5, which is less clean than a single seater) but the Lightning would have caught up easily. Given the realities of testing, surely what's more likely is that simply the two aircraft were not in a race - the TSR-2 may have shot ahead and the chase pilot was either not ready for it or decided not to keep up. If the "both afterburners lit" in the T5 are true, this is probably shortly afterwards when he cut them in to make up the opening distance. Even test pilots recollections' are not inherently reliable - it makes a good story and there's no doubt a certain amount of boys-own exaggeration takes place at the officers' mess after such occasions. Over time this story has been repeated so often it's become "fact", but there's no consensus in the properly researched literature as to what really happened. One has to remember that the Lightning had phenomenal performance, not just in its day, but to this day. The TSR-2 is a much larger, heavier aircraft - physically, how could it seriously outrun a Lightning? (And I'm old enough to remember seeing Lightning's demonstrating their "vertical" takeoff capabilities at shows in the 70s - lift the wheels off the runway, immediately haul up into a vertical position, and shoot up like a rocket! Great as the TSR-2 was it could never have done that!) 203.87.74.230 04:56, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

New image

Is it just me or are the last two photographs essentially the same? Shouldn't one be removed? IMHO Bzuk 02:44, 5 June 2007 (UTC).

Public Records

Someone should really go and have a dig through this lot - it might shed a lot of new light on the politics, now that the 30 year secret period is up: National Archives 203.87.74.230 01:11, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

Fairey Swordfish

I have removed the following text because, as Daedelus said, it isn't really accurate:

(the TSR-1 being the pre-war Fairey Swordfish biplane, an aircraft that fulfilled a similar role in its day).

The Swordfish was actually the TSR II and in it's case the TSR stood for Torpedo-Spotter/Reconnaisance. If I remember correctly the Swordfish's TSR I predecessor was a previous Fairey design that wasn't proceeded-with. (Just placed this here from below) 79.75.17.137 (talk) 12:16, 25 December 2008 (UTC) Tony S

Anime aircraft

Is it not pointless including material, including an illustration, on a fictional aircraft which looks like TSR-2 (but is different in role and performance) from anime in this interesting article? Colin Johnston 19:50, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

Personally, I'd say it doesn't really belong here, but I left it in since I'm fed up with defending articles against this sort of amateurishness. A separate article about it that links back here would seem more appropriate, and that can them be categorised with other anime articles making it easier to find. Graham 05:56, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Seconded, and done. Letdorf 15:41, 8 September 2006 (UTC).

Hi all, didn't realized that this topic has already been discussed. I've just added a link to the article from a sub-section in this one, so the relation between both can be established easily. IMHO, the fictional aircraft further highlights the cultural impact of the real one. I hope no one will feel offended by this. Kind Regards, DPdH (talk) 10:14, 19 December 2008 (UTC)

Barnes Wallis' involvement

On this page it states that Barnes Wallis was the primary designer yet on the Barnes Wallis page it states he did not work on the TSR2 but one of his sons did. Which page is correct? -- Mariocki ^TALK 16:27, 18 May 2005 (UTC)

Mmmm, who knows? I must admit that I had never, until I saw it here, heard that Wallis had worked on TSR-2, let alone been its "leading designer". However, I can't find any definitive info on the web, so at present it's hard to settle it. My father has a number of books about TSR-2, such as "Project Cancelled", etc, so perhaps I can get a peek at them and find out a bit more. In the meantime if anyone knows for sure, the article should be fixed if it needs to be. Graham 23:47, 18 May 2005 (UTC)

Wallis definitely didn't work on TSR-2, according to a number of books. The article as it stands todays appears to be correct. Graham 01:08, 9 September 2005 (UTC)

The article repeats the myth that Barnes Wallis designed the Wellington bomber. Although this has been repeated so many times is has almost become accepted as fact, the Wellington Bomber was actually designed by Reginald "Rex" Pierson. Barnes Wallis was a structural engineer who is responsible for the geodetic construction technique used in the manufacture of the Wellesley, Wellington and Warwick, but he didn't actually design the aircraft. SAHBfan (talk) 08:27, 17 November 2009 (UTC)

"Further reading" added

Hi all, I've just added to the article the referred section, to include in it a very good book (IMHO) by Paul Lucas, that I got today. It explores how the TSR.2 might have been deployed in the 60's and 70's has it been developed and accepted for service; roles, armament and equipment, and camouflage. AFAIK, it is based on official documentation + some "educated guessing".
Maybe some of the information it provides could be included in some of the existing sections?
Kind regards, DPdH (talk) 02:04, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

The material based on official documents would be welcome, but to be honest, I'm not sure that "what if?" speculation is entirely appropriate on Wikipedia, interesting though it may be. Letdorf (talk) 12:51, 30 October 2009 (UTC).

Cancellation 2

I think you should expand a bit on why a project, which had reached this advanced stage was cancelled.

The public accounts committee reviewed the project after cancellation and from that we know in December 1959 the estimated cost of development was £80-90m with an in service date of in 1966. By January 1964 this figure had increased to £240-£260m with an in service date of 1968 or later. Faced with ever increasing costs and that cancelling the TSR 2 and substituting the TFX would save about £250m the decision was inevitable...

Source Chapter 28 - RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces - Humphrey Wynn

According to another source I've read, the vast majority of the dev costs of TSR-2 had already been paid by the time of cancellation, with something like 70m outstanding. So to go and spend the same amount again on TFX as a cost saving measure is, well, silly. Th eproject got the chop for political reasons, the cost was just an excuse. Graham 06:08, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

The actual reasons for the cancellation are many and varied. Basically the aircraft was in the wrong place at the wrong time. As I tried to explain at various other places on these pages, the thing that actually made it possible for the cancellation was the cancellation of the OR.1177 nuclear weapon. This was in effect, the excuse that the people who disliked the TSR-2 needed. Many in the-then Labour Government were committed disarmers and didn't like the thought of Britain having any weapons at all, not to mention the 'fellow travellers' that made up a small but significant proportion of the Labour Party who didn't want anything that might threaten the Soviet Union, the place where their spiritual hearts lay. Many also thought that the TSR-2 hearkened back to the days of Empire, and didn't like the idea of Britain having the sort of Strike ability that the aeroplane conferred. Many felt uncomfortable with the thought of Britain having the aircraft, believing that any sort of military aviation was being militaristic, something that their heroes in the Soviet Union didn't seem to have a problem-with. So, many in positions of power had emotional reasons for getting rid of the aircraft, and would have tried to do-so no matter what the other, more rational reasons, were. Simple put, they didn't like the TSR-2, or what it stood-for. This is the driving force behind the cancellation.

In addition, high ranking people in the other services were trying to get access to limited defence budgets (which had been much reduced after the Second World War), so the Royal Navy were trying to play-off the RAF against obtaining more ships for themselves, and the Army wanted more tanks for Germany. This resulted in inter-service rivalry that muddied the waters considerably. This made the monetary cost of the TSR-2 programme relevant, so these other two services had something tangible to gain from the cancellation of TSR-2, and it was in their interests to lobby for it. Both Earl Mountbatten (a naval officer) and the then-Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, Solly Zuckerman were in favour of increasing the Navy's presence east of Suez, and were prepared to sacrifice (this meant the TSR-2) or at least considerably water-down the RAF's commitments to NATO or its ability to carry them out in order to get what they wanted. Then there was the possibility of Polaris missile system being on the horizon for the Navy, and the Navy wanted it, so any money saved from the RAF might well go to them for Polaris, thus transferring the nuclear deterrent away from the RAF to the Royal Navy. This was the Conservative Party's main reason for wanting the cancellation prior to their defeat in the General Election, and the cancellation had already been decided-upon should they have remained in power.

The RAF had NATO commitments (on things such as allocated targets in the Soviet Union in case of war) which they were required to be able to attack, come-what-may. The TSR-2 had been designed with this purpose in mind, and the whole programme had been commenced on the assumption that it would be provided with a suitable weapon for attacking these NATO targets, i.e., OR.1177 (the 'Improved Kiloton Bomb') This new weapon was to be of sufficient yield to be able to destroy these targets, thus fulfilling the intended purpose of the whole TSR-2 programme, which was to deliver this weapon to these targets with reasonable certainty. This is the 'raison d'etre' upon-which the aircraft had been designed, the considerable expense of the aircraft being due to the requirement to be able to deliver the weapon in all weathers and at day or night, with as little possibility of interception as possible. This made the TSR-2 and its weapon a considerable threat to the Soviet Union and something that they would have faced great difficulty in countering if it ever came to war. This is what many in the Labour Party didn't like, many of the older members having grown up in the 1920s/30s when the Soviet Union was looked upon by some as an ideal, and the excesses of the Soviet Regime had been either glossed-over or ignored - in the 1950s/60s many of these people still had trouble believing that they had been mistaken in their beliefs and clung on to the view that the Soviet Union was a peace-loving, unaggressive state, despite the evidence available by then to the contrary. The fact that the Soviet's were building up one of the largest military forces the world had ever known was excused by them as being for 'defence' against the 'Western Imperialists', the evidence of the Soviets having attempted to establish their own puppet empire in the East and in other parts of the European landmass being conveniently forgotten or ignored. This mistaken belief in the benevolent nature of the Soviet Union is also the reason for people like Kim Philby, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess doing what they did. If one were being less than complimentary one could say it also goes to show; 'there's one born every minute'.

All the other purposes/missions for the TSR-2 were secondary (the TSR-2 would have effectively been an 'unofficial' RAF nuclear deterrent) and other (cheaper) aircraft could do these other tasks reasonably well. Once the high-yield OR.1177 had been cancelled and the limitation on 10kt yields issued that made the TSR-2 an expensive aircraft for what, with the smaller weapons then available, it could then do. The aircraft was expensive in the first place, but with the smaller weapons the RAF would need more TSR-2s to reasonably guarantee to do the same job as with the larger weapon, and buying more aircraft than had been originally planned was not going to happen, considering the limited budgets on-offer. The original OR.1177 was considerably more powerful than 10kt, and even using the four smaller weapons that the TSR-2 could carry, the likelihood of destroying the targets allocated to the RAF's Strike force was much reduced. This limiting of the weapons available to the aircraft effectively emasculated the TSR-2 as a potent strike weapon. Once this happened, the TSR-2 became just like any other aeroplane, and the reasoning behind its original development was largely forgotten by the people then-in power - if the ones by-then making the decisions had ever known them in the first place. At this point, the RAF effectively gave up. This made 'cheaper' alternatives possible, and the alternatives were chosen, with the less than ideal (and expensive) results that we now know. This is the technical reason for the cancellation.

Thus the reason for the cancellation of the TSR-2 is a misnomer - there were actually many reasons, some technical, some emotional, others financial and due to money-grabbing by various third parties. There was also a fair amount of incompetence and downright lying on the part of politicians on both sides, and a seeming inability (or unwillingness) to take their responsibilities to the country's defence seriously, for the sake of scoring political points over the opposition or grabbing media attention. There was also the poor management of the TSR-2 programme, which was mainly the Government's fault, which amalgamated several British aircraft companies and then gave the resulting new British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) a technically challenging project to handle and then constantly interfered in the running of that project. Not a recipe for financial stringency and budget control or of bringing in a project on time. There was less interfering in the Concorde project, I suspect due to the French involvement, and BAC/Sud Aviation managed that equally technically difficult project just fine. News about the problems concerning the TSR-2 was being reported in the media, often on the front pages of newspapers, and the papers used the many problems arising from the project as a stick with-which to beat the people concerned, so that for many of the politicians involved on both sides, the political embarrassment was something that they regarded as jeopardizing their future political careers, despite the fact that much of its problems were of their own making, thus the aircraft became a constant and public reminder of their own failings, and many were relieved just to get rid of it. This is all why the TSR-2 was 'in the wrong place at the wrong time'. The aeroplane itself, by all accounts, was a triumph, with just a few minor teething troubles that would almost certainly have been solved with the second or third flight prototypes, however there were just too many other problems unconnected with the aircraft itself, and these are what finally killed it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.250.47 (talk) 14:23, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

Incidently, the then-Labour Government having cancelled the TSR-2, then also tried to cancel Concorde, which thanks to the previous Tory government's insistence on a 'no-getout clause' from the French, was not possible without great financial penalties, so they then had to continue with the supersonic airliner much to their (the Labour government's) chagrin. If Concorde HAD also been cancelled then the still relatively new British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) would have been effectively put out of business. The TSR-2 and Concorde were their only major aircraft projects at the time. So the previous government forces a merger of a number of well respected British aviation companies (English Electric, Vickers, etc.) and then the next incoming government deprives the same new company of most of its work and income. Those were the sort of people that were running the country back in the 1960s, and that helped make Britain what it is today - crap. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.253.207 (talk) 19:09, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

As an aside, many people have been puzzled by the way in which the cancellation was carried out, the hasty way that the prototypes and production jigs were destroyed. The reason for this was a particular sneaky and underhand piece of political manoeuvring on the Labour Government's part, and had nothing at all to do with 'security' or keeping the aircraft's design secret. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.254.36 (talk) 11:52, 3 January 2010 (UTC)

Specs

"The envisioned "standard mission" for the TSR-2 was to carry a 2,000 lb (900 kg) weapon internally" - Is this an error (900 kg seems a small payload, especially compared with the table on the right: 6 X 450 kg)?--Laur2ro 15:58, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

The planned standard mission was for a nuclear strike on a single target with a single weapon weighing 900 kg carried internally. In the original specification that the TSR.2 was built to, there was a requirement to be able to carry 6 x 1000 lb conventional internally with 4 more under the wings. Bill Gunston has written quite well about the TSR.2, it's mission, development, and the politics notably in "Attack Aircraft of the West", Scribners 1974, ISBN 0-684-14049-7. Hatcat 04:20, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

The only tactical nuclear weapon available when the TSR-2 was first envisaged was Red Beard and a new weapon, the 300kt OR.1177, was to be designed for the TSR-2 in parallel with it, the intended load being two OR.1177s. Red Beard was an early design and due to the implosion sphere, bulky, so that the TSR-2 bomb bay could only accommodate one weapon. The new OR.1177 was of later, more advanced, design, so would have been less bulky (more elongated and thinner) so that two could have been carried internally. This was the intended weapon load, but Red Beard was in-effect an 'interim' load until OR.1177 became available, which of course, it never did. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.249.9 (talk) 14:32, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

OR.1177 and TSR-2 cancellation

I'm not entirely convinced that the governmental edict on high-yield tactical nuclear weapons was a primary motivation for the TSR-2's cancellation in favour of the F-111K. Many different missions were envisaged for the aircraft (conventional tactical attack, tactical reconnaisance, close air support etc.) so it could hardly be considered worthless if it was denied devices of more than 10kT yield. In addition, this reasoning would equally apply to the F-111K. IMHO, the 10kT limit would have been a minor factor in comparison with the cost issues and the combined prejudices of Lord Mountbatten and Solly Zuckerman. Letdorf (talk) 10:34, 12 September 2008 (UTC).

Likewise: i'm not convinced that the available tactical nuclear weapons were not suitable for the aircraft mission capabilities versus operational requirements. My understanding is that (within reasonable yield limits) the physical dimensions of aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons do not vary greatly. The yield depends on the amount of tritium gas which is loaded into the warhead. Frequently, this is done close to mission departure by a senior NCO (ground crew) in a U.S.A.F. operation. There's a red-herring here somewhere. It may be more productive to look into the background of General Dynamics' relations with the UK government during this period.Miletus (talk) 16:26, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm not convinced that your knowledge of nuclear physics is that reliable. The amount of tritium gas cannot vary the yield of a thermonuclear weapon such as WE.177B or the C variant, since tritium gas is only used to boost yield in fission devices, such as the 10 kt Type A variant. Yield in both the B and C variants was fixed at the manufacturing stage. As for speculation that the results from four 10 kt weapons (assuming that stick bombing works without predetonation) was comparable to that of a single high yield tactical weapon such as the RAF specified for TSR2 is disingenuous to say the least. The weapons cancelled by Supermacs directive were 5 times, and 11 times more powerful than the combined yields of four 10 kt weapons dropped in a salvo.

I'm sorry, but that is the reverse of this aspect of the weapon. In a thermo-nuclear weapon, it is the tritium gas which is fused to form helium. The fissile component is the trigger device and the yield is directly proportional to the amount of tritium which is loaded. When I referred to an NCO loading the device according to mission requirements, this was for a weapon carried as an external store. Where the store was carried internally, there was a provision to load it during the mission. There is a reference to this facility below, where it is mentioned in a BBC documentary. A fission device (now rather old-fashioned) has a fixed yield according to the fissile material incorporatedMiletus (talk) 13:52, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

You are mistaken. In the fusion secondary of a thermonuclear weapon there is no stored tritium. It's only use is in the fission trigger used to ignite the secondary. It's use is often described as 'boosting' when the reality is that it permits a much smaller, safer fission device to be used than would be the case if an unboosted fission trigger were used. As for your quaint reference to a fission device being 'old-fashioned', well old-fashioned or otherwise there is no other device known to man or beast that can be used for this purpose. For the yields of 10 kt and under referred to here, a thermonuclear device would be (a) grossly wasteful in fissile material, (b) excessively expensive in money, and (c) any scrutiny of the globe's arsenals would be unlikely to find a single example. For the reasons stated. Furthermore, you are mistaken in your belief that a fission weapon has a 'fixed yield according to the [amount] of fissile material incorporated'. That is why tritium gas-boosting is used. A fission weapon such as WE.177A can have a yield of ½ kt without boosting, or 10 kt with boosting. When aircrew select the required yield all they are doing is selecting 'boosting on' or 'boosting off'. There is no other purpose for those selector switches, whatever they are named, or whatever minor differences there were between the RAF models and the US models.

BTW, I was the BBC's technical consultant for the documentary you referred to. 81.132.243.244 (talk) 18:53, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

very interesting and a very interesting clarification. (and thank you) There are several pages of descriptions of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons available on wikipedia. Would you give us your views on them? The BBC documentary (as far as it went) was a good (layman's) starting point but not really that informative. By the way (as I'm sure you will agree) schematics of this type of equipment are not really useful to anybody/country which does not have the extremely high-tech industrial capability required to undertake the precision manufacturing.80.9.198.24 (talk) 21:37, 13 September 2008 (UTC)sorry: forgot to login (you also,as above, I think)Miletus (talk) 21:40, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Speculation is one factor that has always bedevilled accounts of TSR2 history and speculation about Lockheed helps no one. What is needed are hard facts based on evidence. The documents released at the National Archives run to nine files of over 1500 pages and I've seen them all. There is no doubt from them that although TSR2 was equipped with non-nuclear weapons for a short period of non-nuclear warfare, the primary mission was expected to be nuclear, for which the weapons specified in OR.1177 were to be the only ones carried. Indeed, it was RAF operational policy to withhold aircraft from what was expected to be a short period of conventional warfare, in the expectation that there would be heavy attrition of those aircraft, and sufficient were to be withheld in reserve to ensure that there were enough to deliver the stock of nuclear weapons to pre-assigned targets. That is known from declassified archives to be true of the Buccaneer force of RAF Germany from 1971. No doubt that a similar policy would apply to TSR2 had it been deployed.

The documents BTW are available for Miletus to read himself, when he would discover that the use of salvo bombing techniques from TSR2 were themselves beset with difficulties i.e. the first weapon to detonate was likely to predetonate the second ... and so on, with aircraft escape impossible. You are right about one thing though, the prejudice of Mountbatten and Solly Zuckerman. Except that your interpretation of that is wrong. Their prejudice was not against TSR2 as such, it was against the doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons, and TSR2 was a casualty of their politicing. Zuckerman in particular, was keen to use the funds spent on tactical nuclear weapons to boost conventional forces East of Suez, for which an aircraft like TSR2 or F-111 was required. In some ways that helps to explain why TSR2 and F-111 survived for a while after its primary weapon was cancelled. The fact remains is that it was a very expensive and out-of-cost-control aircraft project without a suitable weapon. It had no raison-d'-etre.

We know that governments lie and cheat and steal the lollipops of babies, so we expect them to lie about projects such as TSR2. And in the absence of evidence myths grow up about projects such as TSR2 and the Avro Arrow. Mostly myths based on hearsay and alleged conspiracies and well-meaning speculation. There is lots about regarding TSR2. And eventually, when the politicians involved are dead, and the archives opened, the supporters of those myths and speculation are reluctant to see the truth. IMHO. Have a nice day chaps.86.146.193.188 (talk) 09:43, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm puzzled by Letdorf's comment that in his opinion, with his benefit of hindsight, the low yield devices available to the RAF did not materially affect TSR2. That was not the opinion of the RAF at the time, and that is the only view that matters.

Likewise the view expressed about TSR2's other functions, of conventional bombing and recon. Both these roles are important, but both were peripheral to TSR2's principal mission. To strike with suitable tactical nuclear weapons beyond the forward edge of the battlefield. If that mission is made impossible for lack of a suitable weapon (in the RAF's opinion at the time), then these other peripheral missions are of no consequence. Conventional bombing in a short conventional war in continental Europe was in essence a short holding operation whilst politicians and generals pondered whether to go nuclear. It was never expected to be decisive, and TSR2 was never going to be available in sufficient numbers to decide the battle.

As for recon, ... well I'm sure it was important, but recon doesn't win wars. Just as repeatedly weighing a pig doesn't fatten it.

TSR2 was undoubtedly a victim of the prejudice of Macmillan/Mountbatten/Zuckerman against the doctrine of use tactical nuclear weapons. TSR2 simply got in the way, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. That it was expensive etc was just convenient for the wreckers in government. IMHO 86.146.193.188 (talk) 10:19, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm puzzled by the note from Miletus about a red herring. It is known from a BBC video here [[1]] that settings were made on the weapon's Ground Control Panel by the aircraft navigator, the ONLY person to hold a key to the panel. And that is anyhow irrelevant, since the yield settings on the weapon could be changed in flight by the navigator from this panel shown here [[2]]. I was not aware that navigators were NCOs, however senior. I believe that navigators on strike aircraft were commissioned officers.

I was not referring specifically to the R.A.F. but rather to a U.S.A.F. situation where the device may, in some cases, be carried as an external store and the yield settings tweaked by a senior NCO (ground crew).Miletus (talk) 13:52, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm also puzzled by the reference to Lockheed. While Lockheed were without doubt angling for business with TSR2 cancellation, they were not the manufacturers of the F-111. General Dynamics was the guilty party. Nor were Lockheed the manufacturer of the final choice, the Phantom. That distinction belongs to McDonnell-Douglas. 81.132.243.244 (talk) 11:53, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

sorry everybody! if you look up in the sky, you will see an intense red glow. This is caused by my blushing red face and my error (a subliminal one). When I wrote Lockheed, it should have been General Dynamics. Abject apologies to everybody! The Lockheed saga came about 10 years later and has no bearing on TSR-2.Miletus (talk) 13:52, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Of course, if the records at the PRO are explicit about higher-yield tactical weapons being considered a sine qua non for the TSR-2, then that is inarguable. But without seeing these records, it's not obvious to me how much of your contributions to this article could be considered interpretation and extrapolation. This is Wikpedia after all, and one tends to become wary of bold new assertions appearing in historical articles! And the question remains, if the whole concept of tactical nuclear bombing was in doubt, and the conventional role was considered much less important, what was the point of the F-111K order? Was it a cynical ploy in the full knowledge that it would never come to fruition? Letdorf (talk) 14:41, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Given the renewed discussion of this thesis (below), I've been perusing the available online documents from the National Archives website and the following points seem clear from the relevant Cabinet minutes (CAB/128/39: CC(65)6, CC(65)8, CC(65)20 and CC(65)21) and Denis Healey's memos (CAB/129/121: C(65)57 and C(65)58):

• The final cancellation of the TSR-2 was the decision of the Cabinet, and was primarily motivated by Healey.
• The rationale given for the cancellation was the expected £280 million saving expected by ordering 110 TFXs (F-111s) instead, in pursuit of the objective of reducing the defence budget to £2 bn by 1970-71. The proposed "TFX Mark II" (presumably what became the F-111D) was expected to have roughly comparable capabilities to the TSR-2.
• No mention seem to have been made at this time of the OR.1177 cancellation or tactical nuclear weapon availability in general.
• There is little mention of the TSR-2 in the context of NATO or Central Europe, instead there is an emphasis on "oversea commitments" and "flexibility and economy of deployment" with regard to "limited wars in the 1970s in the Middle East and the Far East" (CC(65)20).

Letdorf (talk) 23:25, 18 May 2009 (UTC).

No mention seem to have been made at this time of the OR.1177 cancellation or tactical nuclear weapon availability in general - there wouldn't have been - OR.1177 was 'Secret Atomic' and wouldn't have appeared in any papers released until quite recently. Most of Healey's Cabinet wouldn't have known about it, so it wouldn't have appeared in any cabinet papers. The RAF didn't want either the F-111 or the Buccaneer but it was the cancellation of OR.1177 that made the F-111 acceptable to them because it then became apparent that it was either the F-111 (without OR.1177) or the subsonic Buccaneer.

To cancel a bespoke aircraft that is designed to do 'just what the customer ordered' in order to replace it with one designed for someone else, and which is itself having technical problems an order of magnitude greater than TSR-2's ones, and to then expect that aircraft to come in at estimated cost, is the act of an imbecile. It is for this reason that the cancellation of the TSR-2 has been questioned for so many years. The stupidity of it. To cancel something that has had most of the allocated money spent on it and which, minor teething troubles excepted, is performing at least as well as predicted, in favour of a 'cheaper' alternative that is mired in its own problems, not the least of it being that it was substantially down on performance estimates and which, in addition to its other problems, would necessitate much additional expenditure putting right, resulting in a considerably increased final unit price, is something only the British would manage to do. The government looked like a load of mugs taken for a ride by a bunch of shuysters - no offence to General Dynamics - they were in business to make money and if the-then British Government were that stupid it was no concern of theirs. They (and the Soviets) must have been laughing their heads off.

The fact is that the TSR-2 was an important part of the nation's defences and the sheer cavalier way that the politician's treated the whole programme was a national disgrace, and probably stood as a warning to other countries to have as little to do with the British aviation industry as possible - a policy that many have maintained to this day. And who can blame them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.250.47 (talk) 17:22, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

While it's true that OR.1177 was classified Secret Atomic a security grade higher than Secret and lower than Top Secret, the cancellation of the higher yield variants and the limitation in yield to 10 kt was done in 1962 at the fag-end of the MacMillan Government while Healey was in Opposition, and would not be known to Healey. When he took over at the MoD in 1964 and reviewed TSR2 and numerous other inherited projects, briefing papers by officials and proceedings of the previous government about OR.1177 were also not seen by him or any other Minister. That was, and still is the normal Civil Service convention. An earlier government's papers are sealed on leaving office. No one saw them again for 30 years, and in this instance much longer. They were not released until 2008 because in the basement of the MoD Main Building they were contaminated with asbestos when building work was done. Fourteen years after the due release date decontaminated reproductions were declassified at the National Archives. Speaks volumes about the MoD's efficiency. Perhaps the MoD should be cancelled too! Hope this casts some light on a murky business. 86.163.210.111 (talk) 00:03, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for sharing your views on the subject, but I feel I must remind you that the WP:TALK guidelines state: Talk pages are for discussing the article, not for general conversation about the article's subject (much less other subjects). Keep discussions on the topic of how to improve the associated article. Irrelevant discussions are subject to removal. Letdorf (talk) 14:05, 3 December 2009 (UTC).

I agree with the statement that the F-111k was also affected by weapons policy, so why waste £50 million on an order that had no reason to be made? Here is some information about the F-111[3]which show it's cost escalating 500% which was probably thye continuing reason for this cancellation in turn.Simonoriordan (talk) 20:17, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Interesting that the NA.39 (Buccaneer) was instrumental in the US Navy's desire for a low-altitude strike fighter that ultimately evolved into the TFX (F-111). I suspect that the people involved in the UK decision to acquire the F-111 rather cynically never really thought that it would be bought anyway, and that the order was basically just a sop to the RAF Chiefs of Staff that could then be back-pedalled on when the furore of the cancellation of the TSR-2 had been forgotten. The whole political aspect of the TSR-2 project was one of underhand dealings and Machiavellian attempts to poison the whole project. It's surprising that it got so far as a flying prototype really. Many of the political decisions made approached the logic of Alice in Wonderland, so much so that reading the relevant political documents makes you wonder what the people involved were trying to achieve. The destruction of the UK military aircraft industry presumably, as that was the effective result of the cancellation of the TSR-2. Because of the seemingly illogical chain-of-thought of many of the decisions made, people have been puzzled ever since as to why the project was cancelled, it just seemed so stupid, and that's what gave ammunition to the conspiracy theorists. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.249.227 (talk) 23:14, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Misleading information

in the section 'Recent information', it is written

.......... In addition to the RAF's NATO role, it also had commitments to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), specifically as part of the joint UK/US guarantee to India's security should the People's Republic of China carry out a nuclear strike on India followed by an attempt at invasion through the northern Himalayan passes, which the RAF would be required to seal. ..........

this is completely wrong and misleading (mis)information. India was never a part of SEATO or CENTO and never had a joint agreement with US/UK with regards to an aggression from the PRC (or any other country for that matter). While India did recieve some military assistance from US during the 1962 border conflict with PRC, it never had any such agreement with the UK. Moreover, by the time this project was going through its paces, in the mid-60's, the Lyndon Johnson led US administration had already undergone a foreign policy shift against India and towards Pakistan (and in a few years time in Nixon era, towards china). I'm deleting the unreferenced erroneous part. Madmonk11 (talk) 17:06, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

'joint UK/US guarantee to India's security should the People's Republic of China carry out a nuclear strike on India followed by an attempt at invasion through the northern Himalayan passes, which the RAF would be required to seal.'

this is completely wrong and misleading (mis)information. India was never a part of SEATO or CENTO and never had a joint agreement with US/UK with regards to an aggression from the PRC (or any other country for that matter).

That's OK - you probably haven't heard of it elsewhere yet. The UK/US governments didn't exactly publicise it. It was a bit 'sensitive' as they say and might have caused India some diplomatic problems with its neighbours if it had been widely known. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.253.207 (talk) 18:48, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

BTW, that is specifically the reason that the OR.1177 specification required an operational altitude for burst height from 0ft, to 10,000ft above sea level. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.252.141 (talk) 16:45, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

I'm afraid Wikipedia isn't the appropriate place to make claims about things "you probably haven't heard of elsewhere yet" without supporting sources - this is in obvious contravention of the verifiability policy. Letdorf (talk) 13:26, 20 January 2010 (UTC).

Better than a B-1?

I think that the TSR.2 was an incredible airplane and, based simply on the merits of its' performance, it was a serious error not to put it into service.

However, saying that it's superior to a B-1B seems a bit of hyperbole. If you're talking about raw speed - okay, that's valid, at least at altitude. However, at low level, it's aluminum construction would likely have limited it to high subsonic speed except perhaps for final "run-in" dashes. The B-1B can penetrate at low level at .95 Mach; no mean feat.

But unrefueled combat range with normal loadouts (TSR.2: 1150 miles vrs B-1B: 2,993 miles), and total armament load (6,000 lbs against 75,000 lbs) are both in rather different leagues.

Also, every reference I can find on the Olympus shows max ratings in the area of 33,000 to 34,000 lbs thrust so the power listed for the TSR.2 is total installed thrust, not thrust per engine. In contrast, the B-1B has 4 engines each of 30,000 lbs each. At expected attack weights the TSR.2 would have had a much higher thrust-to-weight ratio than the B-1B but this is not a big issue in their respective modes - the TSR.2 was a strike aircraft, the B-1B is a long-range bomber.

Found some numbers on the Rolls-Royce website (http://www.rolls-royce.com/media/showPR.jsp?PR_ID=1721) that say that the Bristol Olympus R28 mk. 360 had a thrust output of 42,733 lb(force) and was a heavily modified 320 (the type tha tpowered the prototype TSR.2) that was designed specifically for the aircraft. Only one of these engines was built and it underwent some testing at Rolls-Royce Barnoldswick, but was cancelled with the TSR.2. 194.80.32.8 17:48, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

As for the super-cruise reference - did the TSR.2 actually demonstrate super cruise (sustained supersonic flight without the use of afterburners)? I've been looking and haven't found a reference for that assertion.

In the end, comparing the TSR.2 to the F-111, Panavia Tornado, and Su-24 "Fencer" would make a lot more sense.

Hatcat 04:28, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree that there is a tendency to wishful thinking where the TSR-2 is concerned - and since it never fulfilled its potential, it's quite easy to project all sorts of performance accolades on it since it never was called upon to prove them in practice. I recently cleaned up one or two such wishful "facts". However, the low-level performance you're talking about is actually way better than the B-1 (if indeed the B1 is limited to Mach 0.95 low level; I don't know very much about the B1). TSR-2 was designed for supersonic low level attack, with a rated speed at sea level of Mach 1.2, according to the various books I've read on the subject. Of course, such performance was never actually demonstrated. I'm not even sure what the max speed actually obtained in testing reached - the first supersonic flight reached Mach 1.2 with one afterburner non functional. It's hard to come by data on further test flights. It's possible that supersonic testing didn't progress much beyond this. I would agree that comparison with the B1 is probably not all that sensible, I think someone just wants to say the TSR-2 was "ahead of its time". Fair enough, though TSR-2 is big for a strike aircraft (compare with the Tornado for example), yet on the small side for a pure bomber. No doubt it would have ended up in a half-and-half role, so it might stand some comparison with the B1. Graham 06:07, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

The aircraft only made the one supersonic flight. Why was the "pull away from the lightning" removed? I believe the chase pilot himself described this occuring. As far as low-level performance was concerned, the prototype was flown at 500kts IAS on 84% power (with the lower rated engines). DB. 13:32, 04 May 2006

The reason it was removed is that it doesn't make any sense. A Lightning was ALWAYS faster than TSR-2, by design. So even a fully-developed TSR-2 could not have outrun a Lightning in any conditions. On that particular flight, one afterburner could not be engaged due to a fault and the top speed attained was Mach 1.2, which for a Lightning was a stroll in the park. The only reason that the TSR-2 might have "pulled away" was because the chase pilot was simply cruising and didn't follow. However, in a drag race, Lightning would win every time. Graham 06:05, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

ACTUALLY, the invitation to tender for the TSR.2 stated that she should be able to out-run any interceptor in service, including the Lightning, and the ITT was surpassed in every test. The TSR.2 was designed to be capable of many roles, including the Soviet-style supersonic dash accross air-defences. It is CLEARLY stated in the Department of Testing & Observational Records at RAF... err, well, the base name escapes me for the moment, that the TSR. 2 did, infact, match the same top-speed as the Lightning did. It was only the verbal descriptions of the chase by the pilots who stated that the TSR.2 was faster. According to the RAF Logistical and Tactical Analysis reports, if the TSR.2 had been upgraded to "TSR.2 B.mk.1" specs., she was estimated at a top-speed between 1,650 mph (the maximum recorded speed attained by a Lightning (F.mk.6 Lightning) and 1,875 mph.

As for the "Better" than the B-1B argument, I'd have to say it depends on what you define as better. The B-1B has superior range, weapon-load, PRICE-TAG and, of course, it's gorgeous. The TSR.2 was superior in speed, maneuverability, potential targetting and Electronic Warfare systems and upgradability (the fighter variant, which was only developed for a matter of months, was over 85% compatible with the earlier bomber prototype). Unfortunately, as it was never finished (damned politics) we'll never know for certain194.80.32.9 17:01, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

I was under the impression that it was mainly compared to the F-111 Aardvark more than any other aircraft, which it was (supposedly) superior to. 194.80.32.8 14:47, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

IIRC, at the time the F-111 was undergoing numerous technical problems necessitating considerable redesign and was at that time in no-way comparable to the TSR-2, despite what certain politicians said. For one thing, the F-111 (I seem to remember it was then called the TFX or something) only had terrain avoidance as a capability, TSR-2 had terrain following, which was fundamental to its design philosophy. Terrain avoidance merely tells the pilot that an obstruction is ahead, relying on him/her to take the necessary avoiding action; terrain following flies the aircraft over or around the obstruction automatically, which is a necessity in European-type foul weather or at night. The F-111 may have had similar capabilities at some time in its years of service, but it didn't have the abilities of the TSR-2 when they were contemporaries. It only got these much later. Compared to the TSR-2 the F-111 was second-best, and the RAF knew it, but with the mergers that had taken place in the UK aircraft industry there was literally no-other alternative that far down the line - they certainly didn't want the subsonic Buccaneer.

Having forced the mergers of the various British companies that subsequently made up the British Aircraft Corporation, the Government then effectively killed (or at least mortally wounded) the new company by cancelling its only significant new military aircraft, one which would almost certainly brought forth considerable orders from overseas, the RAAF for example. One is forced to remark that when looking at the political decisions made at around that time that it's difficult to know what the people involved thought they were doing, that's if they actually bothered to do any sort of thinking at all. The kindest thing that can be said about them is that they seem to have been unbelievably stupid. Governments since have carried-on with that tradition, and a reasonable person could be forgiven for thinking that it might be considerably cheaper to replace the current 600-or-so MPs and just get a load of chimps to run the country. They couldn't do much worse and might be equally as eager to entertain the public both on TV and radio as the current ones. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.249.151 (talk) 22:12, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

As regards the flight performance if you look at the TSR-2 you can see that although it's a fairly long aircraft, in the other dimensions it's quite small and aerodynamically clean, particularly from the frontal aspect, in a similar way to the Lightning. The large installed power relative to this would have given the aircraft the specified Mach 2 capability quite easily, as the excess power was actually there to get the specified STOL performance, (to give the required runway acceleration and to provide the necessary bleed-air for the blown flaps) so the aircraft would probably have gone faster on the available power than the 2.2M that was required even on the initial Olympus 320 engines. This early supersonic Olympus was not in any-way developed or efficient at the time, and this can be seen in original footage of the TSR-2 in ground tests and in flight, by the large amounts of black smoke that they produce, so Bristol Siddeley would probably have greatly improved thrust by the time the aircraft was actually to enter service. The 40,000lb mentioned above sounds about right, which is slightly more than Concorde's Olympus 593s. IIRC, BAC were willing to guarantee the Mach 2.2 performance with confidence. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.250.47 (talk) 22:56, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

BTW, if you look at the aircraft's empty weight and the installed thrust you will see that the thrust exceeds the empty weight by a comfortable margin. This would have given the aircraft excellent performance even when fully loaded. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.253.207 (talk) 20:04, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

And as for the RAF's seeming dislike of the Buccaneer, this was nothing against the qualities of the aircraft itself, just that it was too slow. The Buccaneer was designed for long flights over water, where enemy ground (or rather sea-based defensive) fire is absent most of the time. Flying over mostly empty sea is possible at subsonic speeds and at low level as the time in which an aircraft is exposed to potential anti-aircraft fire is relatively small, only a small percentage of the flight when arriving at a target, attacking the target, and then leaving. Also, ships potentially carrying AA guns or missiles are visible on radar, thus allowing the attacking aircraft enough warning to re-route the flight around them. For an RAF aircraft making long flights over occupied (i.e., hostile) ground, the time in which the aircraft is vulnerable to ground fire is much greater (AA and SAM sites may be positioned almost anywhere on land and the pilot may have no warning of their existence until he is being fired-at), therefore the highest possible speed is needed to minimise this 'window of opportunity' for the defending forces. In effect, the RAF wanted a Mach 2 aircraft to minimise the time the attacking aircraft was over enemy territory. The Buccaneer was half the speed of the TSR-2, so flights over land would have been twice as long as with the TSR-2, greatly increasing the likelihood of interception. As for fighter interception, even a fifteen/twenty-year old Mig 15 could have caught a Buccaneer. This is why the RAF rejected the Buccaneer, and why speed did matter. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.254.37 (talk) 18:17, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

BTW, maximum speed for the TSR-2 was Mach 2.0 at sea level and Mach 3.2 at 36,000ft. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.82.94 (talk) 13:20, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Recent information

This section is oddly placed and should be more in line with the political decision. Comments? FWiW Bzuk (talk) 12:24, 10 May 2009 (UTC).

Hi Bill. Actually when I added it it seemed simpler to add the whole lot in a separate section than to try and work the information into the rest of the article. The whole subject is, apparently, so controversial that I'd rather not get involved in that can-of-worms - with the original OR.117 it had a substantial deterrence value and was well worth the money being spent - without it, it was just another, albeit high performance, bomber.

If you can work the info into the article then feel free. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.248.15 (talk) 15:46, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

I have a problem with the first paragraph of the main page sub-section headed Recent Information, because it seems at me that it strays from the purpose of the main page of offering an encyclopaedic view of the project's history, properly sourced and referenced, into a polemic about the subsequent arguments and disagreements about the reasons for cancellation. That there are these differing views is not in doubt, but the article main page is not the place for these disagreements to be aired.

Moving on, the writer then quotes a single source from the National Archives at Kew, LAB 43/432 Cancellation of TSR2 airplane (originating department the UK Ministry of Labour), conferring on this single source an authority that it simply does not deserve. As an experienced researcher in the National Archives at Kew, having possessed a readers ticket there for longer than I can remember, I seriously doubt that the relatively junior civil servants who compiled that file in the Ministry of Labour had any knowledge whatsoever of the complexities of TSR2, the RAF view, the Naval viewpoint, the MoD view, the view from Whitehall or the view from the various research establishments and industry. They most certainly had no sight of the complex operational strategies the RAF intended for this complex aircraft. Neither would they have any knowledge whatsoever of the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring of Mountbatten, Zuckerman and others, as described above by other editors. The sum total of the knowledge and interests of these junior civil servants in the Labour Ministry was confined to finding jobs for the people made unemployed by cancellation. To quote the Ministry of Labour as a reliable source for reasons for TSR2 cancellation is, with respect to the editor, perverse, and demonstrates how apparently cast-iron sources are as likely to be misread as dodgy sources. I suggest that this entire paragraph be re-written or preferably removed in its entirety. 81.157.126.23 (talk) 23:19, 17 May 2009 (UTC)

I agree WP articles shouldn't criticise themselves, but the reason the first paragraph of this section reads as it does currently is as a result of a deletion of this whole section by 82.25.138.131 (talk · contribs) being mis-identified as vandalism by ClueBot (talk · contribs) and reverted. Of course, adding a maintenance template would have been a better way of flagging an accuracy dispute - I'll do that now. Letdorf (talk) 12:43, 18 May 2009 (UTC).

The section has been reinstated by the original editor, although he/she has not explained the reasoning here. Since I'll be at the National Archives at Kew next week, I'll have a look at the document quoted, LAB 43/432. Another opinion as to precisely what it says, and the context, would be useful here. I can photograph it and place it online where others can read it. In normal circumstances I'd simply revert the reinstated section, but it's probably wiser to make an effort to avoid triggering an edit war. 81.157.126.23 (talk) 16:18, 23 May 2009 (UTC)

Always suspicious of terms like possible contributory factor normally means some element of OR. The section is rather large and would be better suited in an article about nuclear weapon policy and development. I would think under WP:WEIGHT it probably only needs a few lines in this article if it can be supported by more references. MilborneOne (talk) 16:32, 23 May 2009 (UTC)

Agreed. Regardless of the veracity or otherwise of the thesis that the 10kT limit was a crucial factor in the cancellation, IMHO, the PRO files cited (AIR 2/17322 to AIR 2/17330) count as a primary source and hence contrary to the WP guidelines on original research. To quote WP:OR, "All interpretive claims, analyses, or synthetic claims about primary sources must be referenced to a secondary source, rather than original analysis of the primary-source material by Wikipedia editors." I would be in favour of replacing this section with an expanded discussion of intended ordnance options, noting the changing OR.1177/WE.177 specification. Incidentally, Brian Burnell's nuclear weapons history site contains a comprehensive history of WE.177, including some scans from those PRO files. Letdorf (talk) 18:21, 23 May 2009 (UTC).

An expanded section on intended ordnance is a good idea. Although I'm not an authority on Wikipedia guidelines relating to OR, I note that other admins have ruled elsewhere that published documents freely available to everyone in the PRO are published material as any other published material and acceptable here. No doubt their judgement was also influenced by the dearth of other published sources in this area. Consequently, there are numerous uses of PRO references spread around Wikipedia. Are we to remove all of these? To do so would severely limit many articles, especially those where secrecy and security issues have prevented other secondary source material from being available. A cursory glance through websites such as PPRUNE suggests that former members of the Armed Forces, the weapons research establishments and the aviation industry are constrained from publishing by their lifelong commitment to the Official Secrets Act. And rightly so. Without the use of published PRO declassified files very little in the military aviation field could ever be verifiable. In such ways do the myths and rumours flourish. And here, the issue seems to be whether the opinion of a clerk an a Ministry of Labour Jobcentre is a reliable source to quote for cancellation of the most complex aircraft designed in the UK up to that date. Jobcentre clerks are of course entitled to an opinion, but experience suggests that those opinions are not of more worth that those of my windowcleaner IMHO 86.146.192.250 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 09:55, 25 May 2009 (UTC).

To quote WP:OR again, "Any interpretation of primary source material requires a reliable secondary source for that interpretation. Without a secondary source, a primary source may be used only to make descriptive claims, the accuracy of which is verifiable by a reasonable, educated person without specialist knowledge." I believe at least some degree of interpretation is present in the "Recent information" section in this article, and hence a secondary source is required, per WP:OR. And we don't need to resort to the opinion of "Jobcentre clerks" to challenge this interpretation: the Secret-classified Healey memoranda and Cabinet minutes regarding the final cancellation decision (PRO files C(65)57/58 in CAB/129/121 and CC(65)21 in CAB/128/39) make no mention of issues around tactical nuclear ordnance as a factor in the decision. In fact, on 31 March 1965, in C(65)57, Healey writes: The military merits of the two aircraft [TSR-2 and F-111] are finely balanced. Either aircraft would satisfy our military need, but there is a slight military preference for the F-111A Mark 2, before going on to justify the cancellation on purely financial grounds. Letdorf (talk) 13:11, 25 May 2009 (UTC).

Then the perfectly acceptable Healey source or some similar one (and there are plenty) should have been used, rather than a dodgy Min of Labour one. 86.145.69.94 (talk) 15:30, 26 May 2009 (UTC)

I wouldn't place too much faith in the quoted source; LAB 43/432 Cancellation of TSR2 airplane Unless thing have changed, the UK has never referred to aeroplanes as airplanes. That ought to give some idea of the likely accuracy of the source's writer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.254.31 (talk) 11:14, 19 July 2009 (UTC)

The Ministry of Labour source quoted is not a reliable source. It quotes an unnamed official voicing an opinion about the reason for cancellation being that "the TSR2 was too expensive". No person in the Ministry of Labour at that time could possibly be privy to the many issues involved when the cancellation decision was taken in full-Cabinet.

BECAUSE, the Minister of Labour himself, Ray Gunter, was NOT a Cabinet member. He did not attend Cabinet meetings. See here Labour_Government_1964-1970. He had no knowledge of the discussions that took place in secret, in Cabinet. Cabinet proceedings are not verbatim records of who said what to whom. They merely record 'Conclusions' the jargon for the decision reached. Neither the Minister of Labour nor his staff were security vetted to have access to the many-faceted issues discussed by that Cabinet, nor would they have any appreciation at that time, of the military issues related to TSR2 procurement. We have some knowledge now; but only 45 years after these events, with the opening of archives.

To stick relentlessly to the notion promoted by government spin-doctors that excessive cost was the only reason for cancellation flies in the face of reason when other evidence casts doubt on that explanation being truthful, or the ONLY reason. Few things in life are really that simple. There is almost always, with complex defence projects, a balance to be struck between several competing and complementary factors. There are of course people with such faith in governments of all colours who choose to take everything they say at face value. Realists usually are a wee bit more sceptical of what issues from government PR machines. Especially when the actual records are classified for thirty or forty years. Nothing to hide, nothing to fear in opening the records at the time. Of course ... there are those innocents abroad who still believe George W. Bush and Tony Blair when they said the Invasion of Iraq was not about regime change, but only to locate and destroy the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. Yeah! Right! 81.156.89.116 (talk) 16:50, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

An afterthought. A Freudian Slip? The article page contained the text " ... none of the government files (Cabinet, Labour Party or premier's office) in the National Archives contained ...". A Freudian Slip perhaps? Labour Party files . I don't think so chum! No Labour Party files are stored in the National Archives. That's for government files only. Not the territory of political parties or their followers. Unless the words Labour Party are now synonymous with the Government of the United Kingdom . Could have been an innocent mistake though! 81.156.89.116 (talk) 18:30, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

With the recent release in mid-2008 of declassified files concerning WE.177, the nuclear free fall bomb, at the National Archives, London, a possible contributory factor for the cancellation decision has been suggested, although the credibility of this suggestion is weakened by the fact that none of the government files (Cabinet, Labour party or Premier's office) in the National Archives mention factors other than the cost of the aircraft

I think I just said that earlier; "with the original OR.117 it had a substantial deterrence value and was well worth the money being spent - without it, it was just another, albeit high performance, bomber." - see, with the original OR.117 Improved Kiloton Bomb the TSR-2 was worth the money - once it (the bomb) had been cancelled the TSR-2 wasn't, it became 'too costly' because it couldn't do as much - get it? - the whole point of the TSR-2 was to drop these larger bombs, which could do SERIOUS damage, whereas the smaller ones couldn't. So the aircraft became less useful in the cost-benefit analysis - TOO DEAR FOR WHAT IT COULD NOW DO. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.40.251.216 (talk) 22:55, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

• The section has been placed at the bottom of the page for legibility and consistency. In the string above, it is not clear that there is a consensus of opinion as to the cancellation being based solely on program cost. However, the use of a reference source has been questioned although no definitive judgement can be made. My suggestion is that a rewrite of the section is in order. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 02:00, 23 November 2009 (UTC).

The source in question is unusable in another respect. It's Original Research and against Wiki rules. The source quoted is a single copy, in an archive in London, and unpublished. The rules are clear: no unpublished primary sources because they constitute original research. It's not clear to me how, without extraordinary effort, an editor in central Canada even could access the source to check it against claims made from it. [4]

Reference is also made above to unidentified files from the Cabinet and premier's office that are claimed to be of a similar ilk. Yet none of these are identified so that the editor's claim can be verified. Attention is drawn to the text below "Encyclopaedic content must be verifiable."

The main article's text is POV, promotes an editor's OPINION inappropriate to a main article, (although acceptable on a Talk page), is unverifiable, and is original research. 86.163.210.111 (talk) 09:56, 23 November 2009 (UTC)

To quote WP:OR, "All interpretive claims, analyses, or synthetic claims about primary sources must be referenced to a secondary source, rather than original analysis of the primary-source material by Wikipedia editors." 86.163.210.111 (talk) 10:07, 23 November 2009 (UTC)

There was certainly a questionable aspect to the introduction of the "latest information" section when sources were not clear-cut and were not easily accessible. The determination of the reasons or motives behind a controversial decision such as the cancellation of a leading edge weapons system, was the only reason that the section was allowed to remain in the main body of the article. The arguments forwarded are sufficient to provide a justification for change, however, having others chime in would be preferable before a major alteration in the direction is taken, although WP:Bold is implied in the original edit that was made to redact the statement/source. (Now, don't take this the wrong way, but have you, anon 86..., or 213... or whatever, have you considered establishing a userid, rather than contributing anonymously? I would encourage you also to join a working group such as the WP:Aviation in order to find like-minded Wiki editors. You will discover a wealth of human resources there. Contributing with a userid, also removes the all-too-frequent discrimination against the anon, which I have to admit was the reasoning behind my challenging your initial claim of original research. My apologies here.) FWiW Bzuk (talk) 13:34, 23 November 2009 (UTC).

I'm neither anon 86 ... or anon 213 ... although I'm certain they will be thankfull for your well-meant comment Bzuk. Perhaps they think as I do that they don't want the aggravation and personal attacks that sadly happen on occasion to registered users who seek to challenge established nostrums. That's been my experience in the past, so steps to avoid it are understandable. And some have other research colleagues and opportunities elsewhere.

Its been my experience on numerous aviation and military related pages that ideas and theories established many years ago are so entrenched, even though based on suspect sources of that time, that when new INFORMATION emerges as a result of research in sources that were not available many years ago, that a closed-mind syndrome takes over; denying that any other explanation can ever be more plausible than the ones originally promoted. Promoted usually by governments with something to hide; as was the case with both TSR2 and the Avro Arrow. It both saddens me and angers me; because those people, unconsciously or not, are seeking to close down the free discussion of alternative explanations that are vitally necessary if society and learning is to make progress. I expect there were anti-learning, anti-progress lemmings living in caves who argued that because they had always lived in a cave, no other possibilities were worthy of being considered. Fortunately, with a few exceptions the cave-dwellers petered out and are almost extinct. In this TSR2 case, there appears to be those who are determined to maintain the 'official' view of that time in 1964, as expressed by a Ministry of Labour official with no special expertise. However well referenced the 'official' MinLab view is it is still suspect and is still used to close down discussion of alternatives that are up-to-date, well-researched, referenced, and plausible. Where else in the world would a 45-year-old self-interested government handout be given such regard in the face of the latest information from archives kept secret from us 45 years ago. It defies common sense. Sadly, that anti-learning attitude is all too common elsewhere on Wikipedia. It is a barrier to progress here as elsewhere in life.

Apologies in advance for my earlier shouting, and I'd like to finish by saying that these comments are not directed against any one individual editor, or are ill-intentioned; rather the opposite is true. 86.163.210.111 (talk) 15:44, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

Within the context of Wikipedia, we need verifiability, not truth. When it comes to describing the reasons for the cancellation of the TSR-2 in this article, I'm afraid the "truth" is of no interest, and we must defer to what we find in reliable sources as defined by Wikipedia. I think certain contributors may be trying to use this article as a soapbox and I suggest that, instead, we try to work towards a description of the motivation for the cancellation that can be supported by sources meeting the Wikipedia criteria. I also suggest that the cabinet minutes and memos I have previously cited in this discussion from CAB/128/39 and CAB/129/121 (note, I'm not talking about the Ministry of Labour records referred to by another editor), as official records of the deliberations of the people actually responsible for the cancellation can be presumed to be reliable and authoritative for the purposes of Wikipedia, even if it could be argued that these do not represent the "truth". Letdorf (talk) 14:31, 3 December 2009 (UTC).

Are you saying that you are not interested in truthfulness? Only verifiability. Or verifiability even of an untruth? What a strange position to adopt, and illustrates perfectly why this discussion board has gone so badly astray. Imagine a juror who so closed his mind, not prepared to listen, and consider a fair verdict based upon the evidence heard, but only on those bits of evidence that he considers verifiable. Sends shivers down my spine. Men have been sent to the gallows for less. Letdorf appears to be saying that material published in the distant past is the very last word on the subject, and that nothing new now published, or ever published in the future can ever offer a worthwhile alternative explanation. The the CAB and LAB series documents quoted have no published secondary sources. Those editors who used them were violating Wikipedia standards on Original Research and using the main article to criticise other editors contribution. That is most certainly out of order and disrespectful. In the case of the LAB series they were also misquoted and misinterpreted. I've seen photographs of those documents, can produce them, and show how they were selectively quoted out of context. Everyone can play those games. Doesn't help advance the course of knowledge though. 81.156.94.22 (talk) 22:47, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

I don't make the rules around here, but "verifiability, not truth" is one of the central tenets of Wikipedia, like it or not. Writing for WP is not about "advancing the course of knowledge", it's about presenting existing material sourced from reliable sources as defined by WP. At no point have I said that we should ignore potential sources just because they are recent, but they (and their interpretation) have to meet the criteria demanded by WP. In my view, any hypothesis that contradicts the official minutes of the Cabinet meetings where the fate of the TSR-2 was decided could easily be considered a fringe theory and hence needs to be very carefully scrutinised. Letdorf (talk) 01:01, 4 December 2009 (UTC).

Carefully scrutinised of course; and with an open mind, and remembering that Cabinet records are not the ONLY records of what governments say and do. However, as as been patiently explained here by other editors, Cabinet files ONLY record CONCLUSIONS i.e. the decisions reached. They are not a verbatim record of what took place in Cabinet, or a verbatim record of who said what to whom. You are attaching an authority to those files that they do not possess. One example unconnected to TSR2 should illustrate that adequately. On 25 Jan 1965, at the height of the TRS2 debate in government, at a Cabinet Defence Committee in Downing St attended by several experts, one expert, Dr Nyman Lewin, Director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment collapsed and died in the Cabinet Room. He was declared dead at the scene by ambulance crews. No record of that most unusual event appears in the meeting minutes or anywhere else in CAB files. The ONLY record is of the meeting CONCLUSIONS. I see no point in continuing this discussion further. You clearly don't want to read anything that dosn't support the long established propaganda of the Wilson Labour government that cost was the only reason for cancellation. A version of events that was intended only for public consumption while giving other reasons to different interest groups. That contentious MinLab file contained a briefing for the TUC and trade unions that gave no less than THREE different reasons for cancellation. Only ONE of them referred to the expense. You ain't the only one who knows how to research in the archives! 81.156.94.22 (talk) 14:44, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

Actually, if you read the relevant minutes (CAB/128/39: CC(65)6, CC(65)20 and CC(65)21 - these are available electronically via the National Archives), they go into some detail about the discussions that led up to the decision to cancel. And these minutes, of course, were classified Secret and subject to the 30 year rule, so they can hardly be described as "long-established propaganda for public consumption"! Incidentally, some of your comments here could be taken as personal attacks, which is unacceptable behaviour on WP. Letdorf (talk) 19:14, 4 December 2009 (UTC).

While on the topic of rules quoting. The original uploader of the section citing the contentious MinLab file reference was guilty of WP:OR (since that material has never been published as a secondary source) in addition to using the main article to critique contributions from other editors. A fragrant and disrespectful breach of various WP rules that you didn't draw up, but were apparently content to ignore when it suited. 81.156.94.22 (talk) 14:55, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

I'd just like to point out (again) that you will find it wasn't myself who cited the Ministry of Labour files, nor have I used them to support my opinion on this talk page. Letdorf (talk) 19:14, 4 December 2009 (UTC).

Back in May I suggested that the recent information was to large and would be better suited in an article about nuclear weapon policy and development. I also suggested that under WP:WEIGHT it probably only needs a few lines in this article if it can be supported by reliable reference. No progress appears to have been made in the discussion. The recent information section has to go (no such think in an encyclopedia), can I have suggestion for a paragraph to summarise this information in the history or cancellation section. Thanks MilborneOne (talk) 17:11, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

I concur. Apart from any other objections, the article is certainly suffering from undue weight at the moment. Letdorf (talk) 19:14, 4 December 2009 (UTC).

Emboldened by Fnlayson's recent edit, I've now finally got round to having a go at removing more of the contentious OR content, excessive verbosity and digressions from this section, while trying to keep the facts documented in the cited documents and integrating the section into the rest of the article. Hopefully this will be seen as a improvement by most, if not all, concerned... Letdorf (talk) 23:59, 29 March 2010 (UTC).

• I figured I'd start trimming the uncited parts. But it needed a hatchet job like that. Thanks. -Fnlayson (talk) 00:03, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

The new article's fine. I always intended someone else to edit it to read better, and mainly concentrated on getting the new information into the page. Much of it may have been superfluous but I was trying to get the reasoning behind the various decisions made (much of which were classified until very recently) so as to allow other editors to incorporate it themselves as they saw fit. You people who were criticising the 'Recent Information' section may have had a point in your views, but nevertheless the information I added was accurate and may encourage yourselves to research more deeply than that which is available in published sources. From the information I and my colleague supplied you now KNOW why the project was cancelled, which you didn't before. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.65.134 (talk) 12:25, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

Prototypes - there weren't any

I am not sure why "Bzuk" has reverted my edits removing the mention of "prototypes", and also removed my clarification of the "successful" undercarriage retraction remark.

No TSR2 prototypes were built. The first contract was for 9 *development batch* aircraft, built on production jigs. The word "prototype" does not appear in any project documentation.

Furthermore, I am not sure why original reference sources are unwelcome while published books containing errors are relied upon - is there a justification for this? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.22.167.79 (talk) 17:24, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Development aircraft are prototypes and are described as such by authoritative sources. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 22:33, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

While it's true that the "development batch" were described as being built on production jigs [5], as Bzuk says, these aircraft are commonly referred to as "prototypes" in sources. To recap, Wikipedia has certain rules: one is no original research (WP:OR), another is that verifiability is more important than "truth" (WP:V). It is advisable to familiarise oneself with these policies before contributing to WP. Letdorf (talk) 00:00, 23 March 2010 (UTC).

What utter patronising rubbish! Hiding behind the almighty WP:V and the usual pitiful references from inaccurate coffee-table books (and we're talking about military aircraft, so almost all published texts are dreadful) is no substitute for "truth", however much you quote it. To claim this, whilst at the same time citing a fairly decent ref from Flight that supports the very opposite of what you're writing is shameful. Andy Dingley (talk) 00:42, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

These are the sources that describe the prototype development programme of the BAC TSR-2: Thornborough, Anthony. TSR2 (2005) pp. 13, 16, 21. On p. 13, the production is described as being as a "torturous and periphrastic system" and that the "first prototype" was actually assembled at the Armament Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down, not in a production line as was originally envisioned to be set up at Weybridge. Wood, Derek. Project Cancelled: British Aircraft That Never Flew (1975) devotes two chapters to the TSR-2 and describes the process of "building prototypes in production jigs" (p. 162) and later "nine development aircraft were contracted for in October 1960", along with a preliminary order for 11 "pre-production machines" (p. 172), from there on the initial aircraft in construction were solely described as two "prototype aircraft" (pp. 174, 175, 179). Winchester, Jim, ed. Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-Planes and Experimental Aircraft (2005) describes the TSR-2 as both "airframes" and "prototypes" (pp. 24–25). Buttler, Tony in "Strike Rivals" Air Enthusiast 59 1995 also uses the term "prototypes" (pp. 21, 23). Ex-BAC Chief Test Pilot Roland Beamont in "Testing TSR-2" Aeroplane Monthly (1982), consistently uses "prototype" while the BAC flight reports refer to "experimental flight" (p. 184). Contemporary articles in the January 1964 (William Green) Flying Review International describe "two prototypes" (p. 6), October 1964 (Gordon Swanborough) (p. 21), March 1965 "prototype flying", June 1965 described as "flight test aircraft" (p. 15). FWiW Bzuk (talk) 04:58, 23 March 2010 (UTC).

In terms of flight-testing and systems integration, the aircraft were prototypes. In terms of construction, they weren't (i.e. there had been a large pre-emptive investment in tooling, on the assumption that production numbers would definitely be built). That's significant. It is wrong to remove this distinction where it's in reference to their production, or the program's overall economics. It's wrong to stretch the scope of a correct use of "prototype" in one context so that it's made to apply to a scope it was never originally applied to.

This is a minor, or at least a narrow, point. What really concerns me is the assertion that, 'verifiability is more important than "truth"'. It's certainly more convenient to work in that way, but it's highly damaging to the quality of WP articles, particularly on some topics, military aircraft being one of them. Admittedly this article doesn't seem to have suffered too badly, but others certainly do show "the plague of the coffee table book". Andy Dingley (talk) 09:35, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

The aspect of development in regards to the BAC TSR-2 is a contentious one as was evidenced by observers both at the time and since, attempting to describe the period of testing that was being undertaken by the first two airframes. The company documents and promotional literature constantly emphasized the "TSR-2 in production" while it was clear that the first aircraft produced were "development series" prototypes of the entire run. The statement in the article: "Under the development batch procedure chosen, the prototypes would be built using the production line jigs. This meant that several prototypes could be assembled rather than building from scratch but slowed their construction." succinctly differentiates the exact construction but would be best served by a reference source to allay concerns in future that the development series was not properly identified. FWiW, the contention that "truth" is not being served by referring to this example, is far-reaching as the original contributor was merely bold, other editors resorted to the WP:BRD principle and the issue was sorted out. I do agree that the "coffee table" syndrome of reference sources is evident in some of the military aircraft articles on Wikipedia, but it may be attributed to some editors' lack of access to authoritative resource materials. Bzuk (talk) 12:39, 23 March 2010 (UTC).

Once again, Wikipedia is not intended as a forum for disseminating new theories, hypotheses or research (see WP:NOT for all the things WP is not), It is intended to be a repository of knowledge that can be found elsewhere, ie. knowledge that can be verified against reliable sources, in the WP sense of "reliable source". Verifiability is one of WP's core policies; if you have a problem with that, take it up with Jimbo Wales! To quote WP:BRIEF, Wikipedia aims to be a neutral compilation of verifiable, established facts. Verifiability is a lot easier to achieve than "truth", which can often be an elusive and subjective thing. Of course, "established facts" aren't always "true" to all of the people all of the time. While it is important to strive to get as close to some kind of "truth" as one can, as far as WP is concerned, the onus is on its source material to do that; the job of the WP editor to choose carefully where sources are inconsistent. Letdorf (talk) 14:03, 23 March 2010 (UTC).

Let, to whom is this comment directed? I agree fully with the establishment of WP:V as a principal element of Wiki policy. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 14:38, 23 March 2010 (UTC).

So an error is acceptable, provided that your favoured reference material supports it (however incorrectly), even to the point of reverting other editors (because this is what your edits have done here). That's just plain laziness in editing and a lack of fact-checking. Andy Dingley (talk) 14:47, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

No, that wasn't directed at you, Bzuk. Letdorf (talk) 15:35, 23 March 2010 (UTC).

No one is advocating propogating errors by using verifiable and authoritative sources such as Wood, Thornborough, Green and Swanborough. The original posting was the reversion of a long-standing understanding of the prototype status of the TSR-2. Stating that they never were "prototypes" is both misleading and unsupportable. FWiW, see latest edits. Bzuk (talk) 15:46, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

This is becoming rather like arguing over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin!

Thanks Andy Dingley for your recent contributions on the TSR2 page about truth versus verifiabilty. Brave of you, and someone needed to say it. Although Letdorf has a point, it is WP policy. However, that policy needs to be understood and applied sensibly. The operative phase being "the established view" quoted by Letdorf. So what does the "established view" actually mean? For Letdorf it appears to mean that any author who publishes a view becomes an authoritative source and "the established view".

Prioritizing published secondary sources for "verifiability" purposes is fraught with danger, esp when the topic is military weapon systems, and then these are overlaid with an almost impenetrable layer of party politics and government obfuscation as was the case with TSR2. Then add on the Wikipedia editors who slavishly follow Wikipedia dogma, rather than using their own brains. And then there are the editors who use WP:V as bludgeon to subdue other editors who are perceived to be offering a different or updated view, or who have the temerity to actually look at official declassified sources. And for every editor on this page who uses WP:OR or WP:V to get his way, there are other pages on similar contentious topics where editors take a more balanced view that some sources in official archives are indeed the only, repeat only, source of reliable data. Some editors who cite [WP:OR]] are only too ready to resort to that themselves when it suits them to get their way. The example above and in the main article that cites a Ministry of Labour archived source is sufficient. No names of course, no finger-pointing.

I research in archives frequently for a leading academic specialising in weapons systems at a world-class university department of international politics. Only a couple of weeks ago I got a mild bollocking from him for quoting weapon performance data from a published secondary source. His view (and mine) is that in the re-telling, reputable published authors frequently get it wrong, have mis-typings, just misunderstand the original data, or most commonly, in the absence of real hard evidence, resort to speculation. That speculation soon takes on an aura of truthfullness impossible to disprove without official data from official sources. Which in most instances is just not available.

That's why Wikipedia's verifiability policy is so damaging if misused. Some pages seem to attract more of these editors than others. Pages on nuclear weapons history are especially vulnerable to those who have a particular political axe to grind. That's why I just gave up some years ago. No longer bother to bash my head against an immovable object. Life's too short. Some immovable objects are just too entrenched in their prejudices. Thanks again Andy Dingley. Very brave of you to put down a marker. No doubt the hounds will be let loose after me now! But I won't be responding. Have no time for those whose belief in freedom of expression extends only to themselves. 81.147.66.89 (talk) 14:28, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Resonating eyeballs

The recent curious edit to the paragraph mentioning Wg Cdr Beamont's resonating eyeballs [6] has got me checking sources for this anecdote. The most reliable one I can find off-hand is in British Aircraft Corporation by Charles Gardner (Batsford, 1981) which actually states that the vibration was caused by a reheat fuel pump oscillation which occurred shortly after takeoff on XR219's second flight, not, as this article claims, caused by the undercarriage on landing. Does anyone have other good sources for this? Could there have been two sources of vibration that would have this effect on the anatomy? Letdorf (talk) 22:25, 30 April 2010 (UTC).

Also found that Project Cancelled (1986 edition, p.161) mentions "fuel pump oscillation" as the cause, not undercarriage vibration. Letdorf (talk) 23:04, 30 April 2010 (UTC).

GA Review

This review is transcluded from Talk:BAC TSR-2/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Ian Rose (talk) 01:03, 22 November 2010 (UTC)

Another great British aircraft saga, like Comet -- how can I resist? Will get on to this in earnest in over the next week -- initial comment though is that for an article of this size, the lead needs to be a bit longer, at least two paragraphs. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 01:03, 22 November 2010 (UTC)

Good suggestion, done! FWiW Bzuk (talk) 16:37, 22 November 2010 (UTC).

Okay, now that we've got De Havilland Comet out of the way, I think we can all concentrate on this! Will get on to a detailed review shortly... Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 22:43, 6 December 2010 (UTC)

By the way, like the re-vamped lead -- nice and punchy, manages to get some complex points across in a straightforward manner without over-simplifying things. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk)

Technical review

• Pls fix following dab links:
  • Hawker
  • IFF
  • Test Pilot
• Pls check the External Links tool at above right for a few warning messages.

• I adjusted and updated the ext. links. But am still getting a warning for the naa.gov.au link (last one). -fnlayson (talk) 16:46, 7 December 2010 (UTC) Removed

GOR.339

• Last sentence of first para needs citation.

Submissions

• Last sentence of last para needs citation.

Mission

• Last sentence of last para needs citation.

Design

• Pls deal with the 'page needed' tag. Replaced
• Last sentence of last para needs citation.

Testing

• "16 million" what -- I assume pounds but pls specify.

Project cancellation

• Last sentence of last para needs citation.

General

• Performed a light copyedit but overall it looks good, well-written/structured/illustrated. I'll place on hold and let you get on with the above items before I check image licensing, refs, and external links.Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 04:22, 7 December 2010 (UTC)

• Looks like Bzuk and others have taken care of all the issues identified. Anything that was missed or needs addressing? Thanks. -fnlayson (talk) 18:58, 13 December 2010 (UTC)

• Tks, was away from internet for a few days but will return to this review shortly. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 23:48, 14 December 2010 (UTC)

• Okay, checked image licensing and refs, as well as changes since my last read-through and, apart from the need for a very minor copyedit, it all looked good so happy to pass as GA -- well done all. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 05:57, 18 December 2010 (UTC)

Christopher de Vere

I'm pretty sure the Christopher de Vere mentioned in Burke (2010), is not this one. Burke mentions he owned/ran a company called Interflight Ltd. at the time, but there's very little to be found about this company on the Web. There is an Interflight (Air Charter) Ltd, but this was called Berrard Ltd. at the time, and it's unclear to me whether it's related. Letdorf (talk) 18:04, 26 December 2010 (UTC).

I cant see anything on this speculative idea in the usual places, no mention in the Times, Hansard or Flight. Is it really notable enough to mention? MilborneOne (talk) 19:25, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Again according to Burke, it was reported (inaccurately) in the September 1981 issue of Air Pictorial, which gave rise to a myth that it was the Thatcher government that had instigated the feasibility study shortly after it took power. Burke also mentions it on his website.[7] I'm not aware of any other sources at present. Regards, Letdorf (talk) 19:53, 26 December 2010 (UTC).